

# BRAHMA-SŪTRA SHĀNKARA-BHĀSHYA

*Bādarāyaṇā's Brahma-Sūtrās  
with Shankarāchāryā's Commentary*

*Translated into English  
By*

VASUDEO MAHADEO APTE

POPULAR

Rs. 45/-










# BRAHMA-SŪTRA SHĀNKARA-BHĀSHYA

*Bādarāyaṇā's Brahma-Sūtrās  
with Shankarāchāryā's Commentary*

*Translated into English*

BY

V. M. APTE, B.A., LL.B., Advocate,  
Dhulia (West Khandesh)



POPULAR BOOK DEPOT, BOMBAY

© 1960, V. M. Apte and K. V. Apte

First Published :

28th March 1960  
Chaitra Shuddha 1, 1882

Printed by  
V. P. Bhagwat  
Mouj Printing Bureau  
Khatau Wadi, Bombay 4

Published by  
G. R. Bhatkal  
Popular Book Depot  
Lamington Road, Bombay 7



DEDICATED

TO

MY PARENTS

“Drishyante hi sakritshrutāt vākyāt mandapratītam  
vakyārtham āvartayantah tattadābhāsavyudāśena  
samyak pratipadyamānāh.”

— *Brahma-Sūtra-Shāṅkara-Bhāṣya* IV. i. 2





## PREFACE

IT is with mixed feelings of personal satisfaction and some diffidence that I am venturing to commend to the notice of the public my English translation of the famous *Brahma-Sūtra-Shāṅkara-Bhāṣya*, also known as the *Shārīraka-Bhāṣya*. I am not sure if a book of this nature needs any preface at all, still, it is usual for a book of this type to have some such introduction, just as it has been the recognized traditional practice of old Sanskrit writers to begin their work with an auspicious verse (*Mangala*). This tradition of an auspicious verse is so deeply rooted in the minds of old Sanskrit writers, that when in some few cases such an auspicious verse is conspicuous by its absence, it is found necessary to supply the deficiency anyhow. For instance the *Brahma-Sūtrās* of *Bādarāyaṇa* have no such auspicious verse, and commenting on their very first *Sūtra*, 'Athāto *Brahmajijnāsā*', *Shankarāchārya*, while observing that the word 'Atha' could not be construed in the sense of an auspicious verse, is yet anxious to supply the deficiency by saying that the mere hearing of the word 'Atha' has the effect of an auspicious verse. It is merely with a view to comply with such usual practice, therefore, that a short preface is here attempted.

The *Brahma-Sūtrās* of *Bādarāyaṇa* are a compilation of Aphorisms (*Sūtrās*) dealing with the subject of ancient Indian Philosophy, and *Shankarāchārya*, like some others before and after him, has written his famous commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtrās*. From the earliest times, nobody could be considered an 'Āchārya', unless he wrote his own commentaries on the 'Prasthānatrayī' i.e. the three basic books of Indian Philosophy, viz. the *Upanishads*, the *Brahma-Sūtrās*, and the *Bhagavadgītā*.

Now the question that naturally arises is as to what is understood by the term 'Philosophy' in general and by the term 'Indian Philosophy' in particular. In its general sense it means the love of wisdom or knowledge, especially that which deals with the 'Ultimate Reality' or with the most general causes and principles of things. It is the synthesis of all thought which has agitated the human mind.

from the most ancient times known to History, right down to the most modern times, with regard to the 'Ultimate Reality' behind this most wonderful and mysterious Universe, including of course this world in which we live and have our being, and about which we undoubtedly notice a definite pattern and design, and its origin and cause etc.. Indian Vedānta Philosophy lays stress on Brahma as the only one 'Ultimate Reality', and endeavours to determine the relation of the individual embodied Self (Jīvātmā) to this 'Ultimate Reality' i.e. Brahma.

When, impelled by curiosity natural to every human mind, we look at this world, we cannot fail to observe a variety of animate and inanimate objects. We observe that this world which we inhabit is full of other human beings like ourselves, and that there are various other kinds of creatures such as birds and beasts, and a variety of marine life such as fishes of various kinds. We also observe a variety of vegetable kind both on land and in the sea. All these come under the category respectively of the animate world possessing life and movement, and the vegetable world having life and growth without movement. Besides this animate life of both sorts, the Earth consists of diverse physical aspects such as land, mountains, forests, rivers and seas etc.. We also notice a peculiarity about the animate life on the Earth, viz. that these various species of animate beings are from time to time born into this world, usually subsist for their normal span of life and ultimately gradually but inevitably decay and die and are no more. Still it is a wonder that in the midst of death there is a continuous vigorous struggle for existence, and life persists with amazing tenacity. We also observe that from time to time cataclysmic and elemental changes take place on this Earth. There are periodical epidemics and floods which afflict mankind and act as preventive checks on population. Occasionally the Earth is rocked by seismic disturbances, storms and lightnings, while on other occasions volcanoes spout forth their devastating flood of lava, tornadoes and fires sweep across the face of the Earth, leaving a trail of death, destruction, and a sorely scorched Earth behind. Civilizations come into existence, flourish for the nonce and are then wiped out of existence and memory. "The old order changeth yielding place to new."



While all these diverse changes are occurring on this Earth, in the space beyond, we observe the Sun, the Moon, the stars and the planets as they appear to rise and set, so far as observers on this planet are concerned, with clock-work regularity. Though all these phenomena are quite obvious and unexciting to most observers because of familiarity, yet a discerning mind somehow becomes conscious of a strange fact underlying all these surface phenomena, viz. that nothing on the Earth or elsewhere is actually stable and permanent. There is a constant and everlasting flux and motion everywhere. This has been very picturesquely expressed by Will Durant in his 'Story of Philosophy' thus:—"Everywhere change goes on imperceptibly but effectively and all the face of the Earth is changed and rechanged. Egypt is the work of the Nile, and the product of its deposits through the centuries. Here the sea encroaches upon the land and the land reaches out timidly into the sea. New continents and oceans rise and old continents and old oceans disappear, and all the face of the Earth is changed and re-changed in a great systole and diastole of growth and dissolution."

Even from prehistoric times, however, the great Indian sages had by acute observation noted and appreciated this curious phenomenon, this continuous flux and motion persisting with the inevitability of gradualness, and had recognized it as the necessary condition of transitory existence (Samsāra). They called the world 'Jagat'—a word derived from an original Sanskrit root implying motion. The ancients who observed these phenomena very minutely were naturally very greatly puzzled and various doubts arose in their minds to which they could find no solution, and various questions arose in their minds to which they could not find ready answers. What indeed is the nature, they asked, of this wonderful and somehow mysterious world? How did it come into being? Had it a beginning in time? What is time? What is space? If this world was created, who was its creator? Out of what did he create it? What is He like? What is life? What is birth and what is death? Is there a soul and is it subject to death and destruction, or is it deathless and immortal? Can there be life after death and is there transmigration of soul? These and various other doubts assailed the minds

of the ancient sages of India, and have been agitating the minds of men all along. Herein lay the beginning of Philosophy, and it was thus that Philosophy began. The more a man thought the more his puzzlement grew, making him restless. The struggle of man trying to find out the truth underlying these phenomena, and trying to find a solution to this jigsaw puzzle and yet not succeeding in his quest, has been described by many in the past. Milton, for instance, describing the woeful plight of Satan and his fallen angels in 'Paradise Lost' has described their state of mind thus :—

"Others apart sat on a hill retired  
In thoughts more elevate, and reasoned high  
Of Providence, Fore-knowledge absolute  
And found no end in wandering mazes lost.  
Of good and evil much they argued there  
Of happiness and final misery,  
Passion and apathy, and glory and shame  
Vain wisdom all and false Philosophy."

Again, says Omar Khayyām :—

"Myself when young did eagerly frequent  
Doctor and saint and heard great argument  
About it and about ; but ever more  
Came out by the same door as in I went.

Then to the rolling heaven itself I cried  
Asking what lamp had Destiny to guide  
Her little children stumbling in the dark ?  
And a blind understanding Heav'n replied.

For in and out, above, about, below  
'Tis nothing but a magic shadow-show  
Play'd in a box whose candle is the Sun  
Round which we phantom figures come and go."

Even during comparatively modern times the well-known writer C. E. M. Joad, summarizing his conclusions at the end of his book 'God and Evil' has stated thus—"If the religious view of the Universe is true : if that is to say, the Universe has a meaning and purpose, this life is not all, and something probably survives the break of our

bodies. Indeed, unless there is a more abundant life before mankind, this world of material things in space and time is a bad joke beyond our understanding, a vulgar laugh braying across the mysteries."

Indeed, the road in Philosophy is hardly easy, and unlike Geometry, a straight line in Philosophy is not the shortest but the longest distance between two points. Many separate Sciences such as Logic, Esthetics, Ethics, Politics, Metaphysics, Ontology, Psychology, Epistemology, Eschatology, etc., constitute the windows through which Philosophy sees the world, and the findings of Sciences form the basis of the study and progress of Philosophy.

Turning now from the question of Philosophy in general to Indian Philosophy in particular, we notice that the earliest glimmerings of philosophic thought can be traced to the most sacred books of India, viz. the Vedas. Strictly speaking the Vedas are not books in the modern sense of the term. They are neither man-made nor God-made (Apaurusheya), are supposed to be eternal and are supposed to have been revealed to great sages called the 'Seers'. They always had an oral tradition and were taught by teacher to pupil, and were memorized and continued to be preserved word-perfect and accent-perfect and were transmitted from generation to generation of teachers and pupils, right down to the modern times, with amazing exactitude. In the Rig-Veda occurs the famous 'Nāśadiya Sūkta' (Rig-Veda, M. 10, Sū. 129) wherein we find an ancient sage of India soaring to giddy heights of speculation about the origin of the Universe. The following is Max Müller's English translation of the Sūkta :—

1. "There was not non-existent nor existent : there was no realm of air, no sky beyond it.  
What covered in, and where ? And what gave shelter ? Was water there, unfathomed depth of water ?
2. Death was not then, nor was there aught immortal :  
No sign was there, the day's and the night's divider.  
That One Thing, breathless, breathed by its own nature : Apart from it was nothing whatsoever.
3. Darkness there was : at first concealed in darkness,  
this all was indiscriminated chaos.

All that existed then was void and formless: by the great power of Warmth was born that Unit.

4. Thereafter rose Desire in the beginning, Desire, the primal seed and germ of spirit.

Sages who searched with their heart's thought discovered the existent's kinship in the non-existent.

5. Transversely was their severing line extended: what was above it then, and what was below it? There were begetters, there were mighty forces, free action here and energy up yonder.

6. Who verily knows and who can here declare it, whence it was born and whence came the creation?

The Gods were later than the world's production, who knows then whence it first came into being?

7. He, the first origin of this creation, whether he formed it all or did not form it,

Whose eye controls this world in highest heaven, he verily knows it or perhaps he knows not."

The Vedās consist of Samhitās, the Brāhmaṇās, the Āraṇyakās and the Upanishads. The Samhitās consist of Sūktās and hymns and are mainly invocations to and the praise of the Vedic Deities. The Brāhmaṇās deal with the ritual of sacrifices etc.. The Āraṇyakās and the Upanishads which form the concluding portion of the Vedās contain the philosophical speculations of the ancient sages, and form the basis of later philosophical development.

Later on as philosophical thought gradually progressed, we notice the development of what are known as the six systems of Philosophy (Shaddarshanās), which come under the group of the orthodox (Āstika) systems, and the systems of the Buddhists, the Jains and the Lokāyatikās etc. which come under the group of the heterodox (Nāstika) systems. The orthodox systems are the 'Sāṃkhya' of Kapila, the 'Vaisheshika' of Kaṇāda, the 'Yoga' of Patanjali, the 'Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā' of Jaimini, and the 'Uttara-Mīmāṃsā' or Vedānta of Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the famous Brahma-Sūtrās. Differences gradually arose amongst the followers of the Vedānta system, which came to be further divided into distinct sub-systems of Vedānta. All these however uniformly accepted the Upanishads, the Brahma-Sūtrās and

the Bhagavadgītā as their source of authority.

The extremely compressed and terse form of the Sūtrās made it possible for the protagonists of these several sub-systems of Vedānta Philosophy to interpret the Sūtrās in different ways conducive and helpful to their own sub-systems.

These several sub-systems are the 'Advaita' (Absolute Monism) of Shankara, the 'Vishishtādvaita' (Qualified Monism) of Rāmānuja, the 'Dvaitādvaita' (Dualism with Monism) of Nimbārka, the 'Shuddhādvaita' (Pure Monism) of Vallabha, the 'Dvaita' (Dualism) of Madhva. All these sub-systems were of course Vedāntic in nature and though they were systematized by their several exponents in different periods of history, their different tenets must have been held in some form or other by different people even before the compilation of the Brahma-Sūtrās by Bādarāyaṇa. The term 'Vedānta' (lit., End of the Vedas) is popularly understood to mean the philosophic ideas contained in the Āraṇyakās and the Upanishads, and although these several systems are Vedāntic in nature, still later on the term Vedānta has come to signify only the Advaita system as represented and interpreted by Shankarāchārya, who is recognized as the most brilliant exponent of Advaita Philosophy.

I will now state as briefly as possible the cardinal tenets of these several sub-systems of Vedānta Philosophy, and briefly indicate their differences.

The adherents of the Advaita system hold as follows :—

There is only one Ultimate Reality viz. Parabrahma (Nirguṇa Brahma) which is the only one without a second. It is also described as the Sat or the Paramātmā, which is pure Being, pure Consciousness, and pure Bliss (Sachchidānanda). Sat, Chit, and Ānanda, however, are not the attributes of Parabrahma but its very constitutive essence. It is eternal and Aja i.e. it has not originated as an effect from a cause. It is an incorporeal Being and is indivisible, spaceless, sexless, passionless, changeless and perfect. It is all-pervading (Vibhu) and is the substratum of everything, and while it is immanent in everything, yet it transcends all things. The attributes of goodness, justness, all-powerfulness, being the internal regulator (Antaryāmi), and being one whose desires are just and are already fulfilled etc.



are applicable to what on a lower plane of thought is understood to be the Lower Brahma (Saguṇa-Brahma) for the purpose of contemplation, devotion, prayer and propitiation. It is through its own power of Māyā that Brahma in its aspect as the Īshvara has projected all the phenomenal world in which human beings and others exist, move and have their beings. Rigorous Monists hold that the embodied individual Self (Soul or Jīva) is a portion as it were of Brahma. The phenomenal world according to rigorous Advaitins is not real in the extreme real sense, yet they concede that prior to the actual realization of Brahma, one has to understand the phenomenal world practically as real as one finds it during one's condition of being under the binding and blinding influence of Nescience i.e. Avidyā or Māyā. It should be noted that Shankarāchārya has used that argument against the Buddhists who go by the name of Vijñānavādins (Idealists) and who deny the existence of external objects (Bāhyārtha). The Advaitins understand Brahma to be absolutely devoid of internal or external differences (Nirviśeṣha), devoid of all attributes (Nirguṇa), devoid of any kind of change (Nirvikāra), and devoid of any kind of activities (Nishkriya). In short Parabrahma is in itself an absolute, unchangeable, pure, perfect Being, and from this pure absolute standpoint, Brahma alone is, and it is the only reality, and there is in fact no creation at all. The world as we see it is merely an illusion (Vivarta), a super-imposition by Brahma on itself as the substratum of such illusion. Rigorous Monists also speak of a Lower Brahma (Aparabrahma) and that is when Brahma is considered to be the creator of the Universe as we see and experience it. It, in that aspect, is said to be the Lord (Īshvara), and whenever Advaitins refer to its attributes, as for instance when they speak about its being all-merciful, omniscient, omnipotent etc., they all are the attributes of the Lower Brahma. With the conception of Lower Brahma as Lord or Īshvara, it naturally becomes an object of devotion, propitiation and prayer. The Īshvara is supposed to deal out justice according to a person's meritorious and unmeritorious action (Karma) and it then becomes an Anthropomorphic, Theistic conception. When it is said that Brahma is both the material as well as the efficient cause, it is its aspect as the Lord or Īshvara that is meant. The

Rigorous Monists maintain that there is neither any creation nor any creator. According to Advaita Philosophy this world of our daily experience has only a relative reality and it is very much like the creations of a dream, and is not real in the real (Pāramārthika) sense. Creations of the mind of a man in the dream-condition appear to be real enough as long as the dream lasts, but they are sublated or contradicted when the dreamer wakes up, and even so, this phenomenal world appears to be real, only as long as a man continues to be affected by Nescience i.e. Avidyā, i.e. as long as he continues to be affected by limiting adjuncts (Upādhīs). The Advaitins hold that the moment a man realizes Brahma i.e. realizes his own identity with it, he knows that the phenomenal world, which he so far fondly, but all the same erroneously, believed to be real, is not so in fact and is but merely an illusion (Vivarta). The Advaita view classifies existence (Sattā) into three levels of existence: the transcendental existence (Pāramārthika Sattā), the empirical i.e. phenomenal existence as exemplified in the world appearance (Vyāvahārika Sattā), and the apparent existence as in a dream or as in the reflection in a mirror (Prātibhāsika Sattā). According to the Advaitins, the Jīva (the embodied individual Self or Soul) is a portion (Amsha) as it were, of Brahma. As long as the Jīva-Self is under the influence of Nescience i.e. the limiting adjuncts (Upādhīs), it identifies itself completely with the body, mind, intelligence and all the other organs of sense, considers all these to be his, and is affected by the pleasures and pains of the phenomenal world, but the moment the Jīva-Self realizes its identity with Brahma, it appreciates the unreal and phenomenal nature of the world, becomes one with Brahma, and at that very moment it attains its highest aim (Purushārtha) and is released from the binding influence of Nescience or Avidyā i.e. it attains Final Release (Moksha). In that condition of complete identity and unity with Brahma, not only the phenomenal world but even the Lord (Ishvara) is necessarily negated.

It should however be clearly understood that when it is said that the phenomenal world is merely an illusion and is really not existent, it is so in the sense in which a non-existent snake is wrongly imagined in a rope, or non-existent water of a mirage is wrongly imagined on a hot desert

land, and not in the sense of total non-existence (Tuchchhatva) in the sense of a hare's horn (Shashavishāṇa) or a non-existent flower in the sky (Khapushpa) or the non-existent son of a barren woman (Vandhyā-putra) or the non-existent phantom city (Gandharva-nagara), because in the former cases there is always a substratum on which the illusion is perceived, while in the latter cases there is no such substratum at all. In the case of the phenomenal world appearance, Brahma always is such a substratum. Shankarāchārya in his commentaries has in various places stated that behind world appearance, Sat (Brahma) is always present and not even a mirage and the like can ever be seen to exist without any such basis. ("Nahi nirāspadāḥ rajjusarpa-mrigatrishṇikādayaḥ kvachit upalabhyante kenachit", and, "Vandhyā-putro na tattvena māyayā vāpi jāyate".) It is from this standpoint that Brahma is said to be the material and efficient cause, because reasoning tells us that there can be no effect without a cause. But when once for all it is realized that the world appearance is a superimposition (Adhyāsa) by Brahma on itself, and that Brahma is the only reality, questions such as the existence of the phenomenal world and its cause lose their significance and become irrelevant.

The adherents of the Vishisṭādvaita (Qualified Monism) system of which Rāmānuja is the chief exponent, hold that there are three ultimate realities and not one as the Monists hold, viz. the intelligent embodied individual Self (Jīva), the non-intelligent matter, and God, which is equivalent to the Supreme Spirit i.e. Brahma. God is the cause of the creation, which according to them is not the production of something quite new but is only a change of the attribute or condition of the Supreme Spirit, and the Jīva-Self and the non-intelligent matter constitute its body or modes (Prakāra), while according to the Advaitins, there is no creation in the real sense and the so-called creation is merely an illusory superimposition of the apparent phenomenal creation by Brahma on itself as the substratum. According to the Vishisṭādvaitavādin, God enters into matter and the Jīva-Self as the internal regulator (Antaryāmī) and guides them from within. Unlike the Advaitins who hold Brahma to be devoid of attributes, the Vishisṭādvaitins hold that Brahma, the Supreme Spirit, is

not devoid of attributes, but that it has only auspicious attributes such as Omniscience, Omnipresence, Bliss etc.. Again, unlike the Advaitins, Final Release with them does not mean the merging of the Jīva-Self into Brahma, but they hold, on the other hand, that while the Jīva-Self attains perfection by the acquisition of divine qualities through purity of life and devotion (Bhakti), it still continues to retain its individuality as the Jīva-Self. While the Advaitins believe in the doctrine of illusory Māyā or Vivarta, the Vishishtādvaitins subscribe to the doctrine of evolution (Parīṇāma).

According to Dvaitādvaitins (adherents of Dualism with Monism), the followers of Nimbārka, there are only three principles or entities viz. the sentient world (Chit), the non-sentient world (Achit) and Lord Krishna, the Supreme Spirit. They are also called the thing enjoyed i.e. matter (Bhogyā), the enjoyer or the Jīva-Self (Bhoktri) and the Regulator i.e. the Lord (Niyāntri) respectively. While 'Chit' is of the nature of knowledge (Jñānasvarūpa) and is able to know without the help of the sense-organs, it also is the knower and is both knowledge and the possessor of knowledge at one and the same time. It is also Ego (Ahamkāra) and this Ego also belongs to the Paramātmā. The Jīva-Self is also essentially active, though its activity is not absolutely independent, and both its activity and knowledge depend upon Hari by whom the Jīva-Self is controlled. Unlike the Advaitins who hold the Jīva-Self to be a portion of Brahma as it were, the Dvaitādvaitins hold that the Jīva-Self is atomic (Aṇu) and has the attribute of ever present knowledge. Its true form is distorted and obscured as a result of its contact with action (Karma) resulting from ignorance (Avidyā), which is beginningless (Anādi) but not endless (Ananta), because it can come to an end by the Grace of God. The Ishwara i.e. Brahma or Hari or Krishna is naturally free from all faults or blemishes and is the store of all beneficial attributes, is adorable by all, and has four forms (Vyūhās), viz. Vāsudeva, Samkarshaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. It should be noted that Shankarāchārya in his Bhāṣhya has accepted the form 'Vāsudeva' but rejected the rest as not being reasonably sustainable. Like the Monists the followers of Nimbārka hold Brahma to be the material and efficient cause of crea-

tion, but it should be noted that while the Advaitins ultimately negate all creation and hold the world appearance as being merely an illusion (Vivarta) caused by Brahma on itself by its power of Māyā, as the Īshvara, the followers of Dvaitādvaita consider the notion of illusion as being absolutely unreasonable. According to the followers of Nimbārka the mutual relation between 'Chit', 'Aчит' and 'Brahma' is both of real difference (Bheda) and non-difference (Abheda). They hold that for Final Release (Moksha) the Jīva-Self has to begin with complete submission to the Paramātmā and depend upon God's Grace which at the proper time is vouchsafed to him. It generates special love for Him (Bhakti) which ultimately culminates in the realization (Sākshātkāra) of the Paramātmā.

The followers of the doctrine of Shuddhādvaita (Pure Monism) of which Vallabha is the exponent, hold, unlike the Advaitins, that pure Brahma can create the Universe without having any association with Māyā, and that it is a real creation and not a creation 'as it were' or only an illusion (Vivarta) as the Advaitins hold. They hold that the Jīva-Self is not different from Brahma, is atomic in size, and is a part of Brahma. It is produced from Brahma even as scintillae are produced from fire. It is pure (Shuddha) when its greatness is not obscured by ignorance (Avidyā) and it becomes finally released (Mukta), when it attains freedom from bondage by means of knowledge. They similarly hold that the inanimate world (Prapancha) also is essentially Brahma with its qualities of Intelligence and Bliss obscured, and that the creation or destruction of objects is the manifestation (Āvirbhāva) or occlusion (Tirobhāva) of Bhagavān in these forms. With them the world is as real and eternal as Brahma itself and not illusory as held by the Advaitins. They propound that everything being in fact Brahma, we ought to find the form of all things in everything, so that, in a jar, for instance, the nature of cloth may manifest itself, but actually all other possible manifestations are obscured by the will of God and only the nature of a jar is manifest (Āvirbhūta). It follows therefore that the relation between cause and effect is of absolute unity. The world is real but the infatuating ignorance of man endows the real world with unreal and illusory forms. Thus the inanimate world (Prapancha) which in fact is

real but appears to be in different forms, is realized as Brahma by those who themselves have attained knowledge and realized Brahma, and it appears to them both subjectively and objectively, along with a clear discrimination as between the two forms. Like the Advaitins, the followers of Vallabha hold that Brahma is eternal, omniscient and omnipotent, but like the followers of Rāmānuja and unlike the Advaitins, they also hold that Brahma is possessed of a number of attributes essentially of the nature of Sat (Existence), Chit (Sentieny) and Ānanda (Bliss), that it is pure and never contaminated by association with Māyā, and that it has lordly power (Aishvarya), and that as described by the Upanishads it is truly both qualified (Saguna) and unqualified (Nirguna). They describe Brahma as extraordinary (Jagadvilakshana) and hold that it manifests itself as the embodied individual Self (Jiva) and the inanimate world (Jaḍa), merely through sport (Līlā). As to the relation between the Jiva-Self and Brahma, they hold that non-difference between them is alone substantial (Vāstāvika). According to them Final Release (Moksha) which consists of the absolute cessation of all misery, and the experience of Bliss, can be obtained by devotion (Bhakti) and knowledge, the former being superior to the latter. Devotion also according to them is of two kinds, viz. Devotion by practice of means (Māyādābhakti) and Devotion by depending mainly on the pure and simple love of Brahma or Purushottama or Hari, which is the special privilege of those to whom His grace is vouchsafed.

The doctrine of Dvaita of which Madhva is the exponent, is purely dualistic and emphasizes the absolute and eternal difference between Brahma, the Jiva-Self, and the inanimate world (Jaḍa). Unlike the Advaitins, the followers of Dvaita deny Brahma to be the material cause of the Universe. Unlike the followers of both Advaita and Vishishtādvaita, the followers of Madhva propound eternal difference between the Jiva-Self and the inanimate world on the one hand, and God on the other, as between the Jiva-Selfs *inter se*, as between the Jiva-Selfs and the inanimate world, and as between the inanimate objects *inter se*, and claim that the clear understanding of such distinction alone leads to Final Release (Moksha). God according to Madhva, possesses infinite number of qualities and has

the eightfold functions of creation, protection, dissolution, control of all entities, the affording of knowledge, self-manifestation, involving the Jiva-Selfs in the knowledge of the world, and deliverance. The Jiva-Selfs according to him are distinct from God and also from each other, and as having successive existences are characterized by ignorance etc.. Like the Sāmkhyās, Madhva holds that the world is created by Prakriti as distinguished from the Supreme Self (Purusha) who is only the efficient cause. Final Release (Moksha) is attained by the direct knowledge of Hari, and the means of attaining it are aversion (Vairāgya), equanimity (Shama), self-control (Dama), the acquisition of knowledge from the teacher, self-surrender (Sharanāgati), devotion to God, and the resigning of every act to Hari. Madhva holds that even in Final Release the Jiva-Self cannot be one with Brahma. According to him the distinctions between the experiencing Selfs, the objects of experience, and the controlling Supreme Spirit, are eternal and real.

Having so far stated as briefly as possible the cardinal tenets of the followers of the different sub-systems of Vedānta Philosophy, and the similarities and differences between them, it would now be convenient, to refer to some comments made by some eminent authorities, on the Advaita Vedānta Philosophy of Shankarāchārya, and some charges made against him by these learned scholars. For instance some of them have said that Shankarāchārya has in his commentary on the Brahma-Sūtrās, for the first time introduced his special brand of rigorous Monistic Philosophy with a special accent on the doctrine of Māyā. Dr. Thibaut in his introduction to his English translation of the Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāshya of Shankarāchārya has raised an interesting question as to whether Bādarāyaṇa the author of the Brahma-Sūtrās can be said to have held views akin to Shankarāchāryā's view of the Advaita Philosophy of Māyā, or whether his philosophical leanings are more consistent with the Vishishtādvaita system of Rāmānuja or the doctrines of the Bhāgavatās.

Knowing but too well the differences in the Vedānta tenets of the several sub-systems and the mutual doctrinal disagreements referred to above, he claims to look upon the question from the standpoint of an impartial critic owing



no allegiance to any one particular system in preference to the other, and after considering the inner evidence of the *Brahma-Sūtrās* themselves, he appears to have come to the conclusion, that *Bādarāyaṇa* the author of the *Brahma-Sūtrās*, must have held views similar to the *Vishishtādvaita* system of *Rāmānuja*, and has expressed his opinion that *Shankarāchārya* in his commentary on the *Sūtrās* has deliberately given a Monistic bias to the *Brahma-Sūtrās*. He says that the twofold division of Para and Apra *Brahma* does not seem to have been recognized by the *Brahma-Sūtrās*, nor are the other doctrines of *Shankarāchārya*, viz. the distinction between *Brahma* and *Īshvara*, the unreality of the world, and the absolute identity of the *Jīva-Self* and the *Paramātmā*, recognized by the *Brahma-Sūtrās*, and are therefore a graft on them. He says in his introduction :—

“The author of the *Sūtrās* may have held views about the nature of *Brahma*, the world and the soul, different from those held by *Shankara*, and yet not agreeing on all points with those of *Rāmānuja*. If however the negative conclusions stated above (i.e. earlier in his introduction) should be well founded, it would follow even from them that the system of *Bādarāyaṇa* had greater affinities with that of *Rāmānuja* and the *Bhāgavatās* than with the rigorous Monism of which *Shankarāchārya* is the classical exponent.” Yet, it must be stated that Dr. Thibaut has very fairly stated that “It is not altogether impossible that *Shankarāchārya*’s interpretation should represent the *real* meaning of the *Sūtrās*.” He says further in his introduction : “It has been said before that the task of reducing the teaching of the whole of the *Upanishads* to a system consistent and free from contradictions is an intrinsically impossible one. But the task once being given, we are quite ready to admit that *Shankarā*’s system is most probably the best which can be desired and *Shankarā*’s method thus enables him in a certain way to do justice to different stages of historical development, to recognize clearly the existing differences, which the other systematizers are intent on obliterating”. He further says about *Shankarāchārya*’s system :—“That it is not only more pliable, more capable of amalgamating heterogeneous material than the other systems, but its fundamental doctrines are manifestly in greater harmony with the essential teaching of the *Upanishads* than the *Sūtrās* of *Bādarāyaṇa*.”

Having stated his views as stated above and being quite aware, as he was, of the fact that the several Achāryās of the other systems of Vedānta and their followers, by taking advantage of the fact that Bādarāyaṇa's Sūtrās necessarily happen to be extremely concise and terse, have tried to distort and interpret the Sūtrās in such a way as would be suitable to their own particular system of Vedānta, and also being aware of the fact that the peculiar nature of the Sūtrās has easily lent itself to such rival interpretations, it must be said with great respect, that it is somewhat strange that Dr. Thibaut should have come to the conclusion that the views of Bādarāyaṇa had probably greater affinity to the system of Rāmānuja. It is not disputed that Bādarāyaṇa's Brahma-Sūtrās are meant to systematize and condense the Philosophy of the Upanishads as it was understood in those days, in a brief and terse form. Modern scholars have expressed it as their opinion that the doctrine of Māyā is not Shankarāchāryā's own invention, but that he has merely developed and elaborated the doctrine of Māyā, which unmistakably had its roots in the Philosophy of the Upanishads. The late Prof. Ranade for instance has very ably discussed and indicated this, in his 'Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy' (pp. 225-228), and there is enough direct evidence in the Upanishads themselves about the conception of the Para and the Apra Brahma, Ishvara and the Paramātmā, and of the fact, that distinctions between the Para and Apra Brahma and the Paramātmā and the Ishvara, have been advisedly made in the Upanishads with a view to suit the varying mental capacities of people so that they may not be confounded, but should have some sort of a symbol (Pratīka) for the purpose of prayer and propitiation. It is not therefore impossible that Bādarāyaṇa also in his own time, held views similar to those expressed later on by Shankarāchārya in his commentary, and if the peculiar arrangement of the Sūtrās shows, as Dr. Thibaut has suggested, that Bādarāyaṇa probably held views more akin to Rāmānuja, the arrangement was perhaps deliberately so made by him as a concession to those who preferred the Anthropomorphic conception of a Deity to the rigorous conception of an attributeless Brahma and the doctrine of illusion (Māyā or Vivarta) which interpreted the world appearance as pure

illusion and which in the ultimate analysis negated the notion of any creation and even the conception of a personal anthropomorphic Ishvara endowed with all good attributes, to whom prayer and worship could be usefully offered. Besides it should be borne in mind that the *Brahma-Sūtrās* were obviously compiled to systematize and reconcile the various different views expressed in various different places in the Upanishads, and it cannot be maintained that their author has either consciously or unconsciously displayed his own bias in favour of any particular school of philosophical thought out of the various different schools of thought which must have undoubtedly prevailed in some form in his own time, and it would not be justifiable to draw any such inference about the author's bias in favour of any particular school of thought akin to that of Rāmānuja or the Bhāgavatās, merely on the ground of the arrangement of the *Sūtrās*.

It is suggested that the author of the *Brahma-Sūtrās* may well have been quite as rigorous a Monist as Gauḍapāda or Shankarāchārya, but the task he had set before himself was to take a review of all the various subsystems of Vedānta Philosophy as contained in the Upanishads and prevalent in his own time, and to systematize them in the *Sūtra* form, and even though a rigorous Monist himself he may well have hesitated to destroy the faith of the people in general for fear of consequences to public morals, and it may well explain the peculiar nature of the arrangement of the *Brahma-Sūtrās*, if there at all was any such deliberate arrangement, on which Dr. Thibaut has laid such great stress, and it is submitted therefore, that no legitimate inference about Bādarāyaṇā's own philosophical leanings can be drawn from the arrangement of the *Sūtrās*.

Here, I would like to refer briefly to some remarks made by Dr. Paul Deussen (Professor of Philosophy, Keil University, Germany), during the course of an address delivered before the Bombay branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, as far back as the 27th February 1893 (Vide 'Aspects of Vedānta', pp. 142-155, published by G. A. Natesan & Co., Madras). After stating that this world is *Māyā*, an illusion, is not the very reality, was the deepest thought of esoteric Vedānta, attained not by calculating 'Tarka' but by 'Anubhava', by returning from this varie-

gated world to the deepest recesses of our own Self (Ātman), and that if you did so, you would get aware of a timeless, spaceless, changeless reality, very different from empirical reality, and also that Plato came to the same truth viz. that this world was a world of shadows and the reality was behind them, Dr. Deussen said :—"The accord here of Platonism and Vedāntism is wonderful, but both have grasped the metaphysical truth by intuition; their tenet is true but they are not able to prove it, and in so far they are defective. Here a great light and assistance to the Indian and Grecian thinker comes from the philosophy of Kant, who went by the way of abstract reasoning and scientific proof. Kant found to the surprise of the world and of himself, that the three essential elements of the outside world viz. space, time and causality are not eternal fundaments of an objective reality but merely subjective, innate, intuitive forms of our own intellect. This has been proved by Kant and Schopenhauer with mathematical evidence." He has said later on in his address :—"You see the concordance of Indian, Grecian and German metaphysics; the world is Māyā, is illusion, says Shankara; it is a world of shadows, not of realities, says Plato; it is an appearance only, not the thing-in-itself, says Kant."

Now the point here is not whether the claim made by Dr. Deussen on behalf of his great compatriot, is just or not, but whether his comparison of Kant with Plato or Shankarāchārya in that respect is justified. So far as Kant is concerned, we may grant at once that with regard to the 'Phenomenon' the claim is correct. It should however be borne in mind that Shankarāchārya in his commentaries on the Upanishads and the Brahma-Sūtrās, has endeavoured merely to elucidate their true meaning and to show that according to them, Brahma is the only one reality and everything else is an illusion (Māyā), and also that it can be realized intuitively, and that Scriptures (Shrutis) are the highest means of proof and what they say must be accepted. On the other hand it should be borne in mind that even Kant has to say that the thing-in-itself (Noumenon) can never be known. In his 'Critique of Practical Reason' he has endeavoured to prove the existence of God and religion by intuition i.e. by an *a priori*, innate, absolute categorical imperative. It may be noticed that this also, as remarked

by Will Durrant, is no proof by reason, and our reason leaves us free to believe, that behind the thing-in-itself is a just God, and our moral sense commands us to believe it. The heart has reasons of its own which the head can never understand.

We will thus see that Kant also like Plato and Shankarāchārya has to depend upon intuitive knowledge for the realization of the objects of faith viz. a free and immortal soul and a benevolent Creator. They can never be proved by abstract reasoning and scientific proof. In the same connection I would also like to draw the reader's attention to an extremely interesting contribution 'Yājñavalkya and the Philosophy of Fictions' made by Prof. Ranade to the 'Jhā Commemoration Volume' (published by the Poona Oriental Agency). He says therein that—"Yājñavalkya regards Ātman as both the ontological substratum of all existence as well as the epistemological nucleus of all knowledge. He is the 'Fons et Origo' of all existence and is also the source to which all perceptions have to be referred. Another way of stating his ontological doctrine is his very characteristic theory of 'Emanations'. This involves that the only reality in the world belongs to the Ātman, everything else is merely derivative and a fatuity (Ārta). From the heights of his Advaitic Philosophy Yājñavalkya is led even to regard transmigration as unreal. He regards consciousness itself as a fleeting phenomenon. The passage in which Yājñavalkyā's 'Philosophy of Fictions' comes out particularly is the celebrated one "Yatra hi dvaitamiva bhavati taditar itaram jighrati" etc. (Brih. 2.4.14). Yājñavalkya is telling his wife Maitreyī, that it is only where there is an as-it-were duality that one is able to see another, etc.. Yājñavalkya tells us that because all perception, audition, thought, imagination and so forth, take place only when there is as-it-were an 'other', in the absence of such 'other' such acts of perception and the rest would be impossible altogether. Hence Yājñavalkya's Philosophy requires an as-it-were, a semblant duality before any psychological act like that of perception or thinking becomes possible. But experience shows that this 'other' is of an unenduring character and is not a real duality at all, etc.. This is what we might call the nucleus of Yājñavalkyā's 'Philosophy of Fictions'." Prof. Ranade later on compares

and contrasts this Philosophy of Yājñavalkya with Vaihinger's Philosophy of 'Als Ob', but that is not necessary for our present purpose.

It should thus be seen therefore that it was more than two thousand years before Kant, that this great sage of Brihadāranyaka has spoken with great authority about the phenomenal and unreal nature of the objective world, and that Shankarāchārya did not have to prove it by abstract reasoning and scientific proof, as Dr. Deussen claims Kant to have done.

I will now turn to another topic viz. the opinion expressed by some other eminent scholars about the nature of the philosophic tenets of Gauḍapāda, the teacher of Shankarāchārya's teacher Govindapādācharya, as expressed in his famous Kārikās on Māṇḍukyopanishad. It is believed that Gauḍapāda and Shankarāchārya were contemporaries for some time at least, and Shankarāchārya has acknowledged his debt to him, and that he had opportunity to know Gauḍapāda's views at first hand. Shankarāchārya has also written his commentary on his Kārikās. The opinion of these eminent scholars is that his Kārikās show that Gauḍapāda was probably a Buddhist by persuasion. It is also stated that in his own time Shankarāchārya was criticized as being a crypto-Buddhist (Prachchhanna-Buddha). One of the arguments used by them is that in his Kārikās Gauḍapāda has used expressions peculiar to Buddhist Philosophy. With great respect it has to be said, however, that the probative value of this argument is not enough to establish that Gauḍapāda was probably a Buddhist, because technical terms used in one system of philosophy may very well be used in their ordinary sense in another system. The term 'Guṇa' of the Sāmkhya is an instance in point. It is also difficult to understand why the words 'Dvipadām Varam' should indicate Buddha alone and none else. Shankarāchārya has in his commentary interpreted the Kārikās in the Advaita sense, and he had, as stated above, opportunity to know Gauḍapāda's views at first hand. Besides, it is well-known that a pupil as a rule carries on the tradition of his teacher, and it may be safely presumed that he must have followed the teaching of his teacher's teacher. Again, the term 'Buddha' is used by Gauḍapāda in several places, and the context shows that

by that term he could not have meant Buddha (Sugata). In one place however (viz. in the penultimate Kārikā of the 'Alātashānti Prakaraṇa') he has used the words—'Naitad Buddhena bhāshitam'. Here without doubt Gauḍapāda must have meant Buddha (Sugata), because it will be seen that it is not possible for the Kārikā to make sense unless the word is understood to mean Buddha (Sugata). Here Gauḍapāda has taken care to mention that the view expressed therein is not expressed by Buddha (Sugata). Again Advaita holds 'Brahma' to be the only really existing entity, and that there is no creation as such (Ajātavāda), while Buddha advocated the doctrine of Nihilism (Shūnyavāda). All this would show that Gauḍapāda was a rigorous Monist, and could not be a Buddhist.

Now, to suggest that Shankarāchārya was a crypto-Buddhist, could only be a malicious aspersion made against him by his contemporary opponents. Nobody who has read Shankarāchārya's trenchant criticism of the Philosophy of Buddha, and his almost merciless attack on Buddha in criticizing his three-fold doctrines of 'externalism' (Bāhyārthavāda), 'Idealism' (Vijnāna-vāda) and 'Nihilism' (Shūnyavāda), as being mutually contradictory and unworthy of respect by those who desire Final Release (Shreyaskāmaih), would ever think that he was a crypto-Buddhist masquerading as a rigorous Monist. (Bra.-Sū.-Bhā. II. ii. 32).

It would be convenient at this stage to refer also to the views of some Western Philosophers about the Indian conception of Brahma in the 'Advaita Vedānta'. The late R. B. V. J. Kirtikar in his 'Studies in Vedānta' has stated that some Western Philosophers who do not appear to have taken the trouble to understand or who even if they have so tried have not been able to understand the Advaita conception of Brahma, have indulged in uncharitable criticism of the Eastern conception of Brahma. He says:—Hegel, for instance, ignoring the question as to what really is the ultimate necessary Truth i.e. a Truth for all possible intelligences and not for human intelligence alone, has given quite a grotesque description of the Indian conception of Brahma, as "A characterless nothingness, an empty abstraction, a purposeless empty power without wisdom and without activity, a unit into which all existences pass as into a dark eternal night", and describes the votaries of such a

Deity as "revelling in a region of unbridled madness". Another describes Brahma as—"An abyss of negative infinitude, a unity which was no principle of order in the manifold differences of things, but merely a gulf in which all difference was lost". Still another professional philosopher describes Brahma as—"An indeterminate abstract being, which is hardly distinguished from nothing, an abyss which swallows all infinite being, not as a positive ground which produces and maintains the finite. It is like the cave of a lion in which all foot-steps lead but none lead out again". Some other objections taken by various other European thinkers can be stated as follows:—"That it is revolting to common-sense and blasphemous for humanity to claim complete identity and equal rank with the eternal absolute. That such conception presupposed the fictitious character of the individual soul or the annihilation of that individual soul. That it involves the destruction of nature and is thus one-sided. That the conception is inconceivable and absurd. That it is pan-theism with a decidedly anti-theistic and immoral tendency. That it does violence to the Christian ethical ideal which is acceptable to all mankind. That it is mystic in character and furnishes no guide either in Philosophy or Theology for general acceptance. That as leading to a life of quietism it is practically useless in the development of man or the progress of society." I have taken the liberty of quoting these various objections at some length, more by reason of their picturesque recklessness than the possibility of their being in any way justified. They have been very adequately answered by the author of the 'Studies in Vedānta', and I would be content to leave the reader to read the refutation of these charges and objections in the original. I cannot however resist the temptation of once again quoting some remarks which the author has addressed to those who have dared to prefer such grotesque charges. Referring to the leading ideas of the Vedānta and especially the conception of 'Tat tvam asi' (That thou art), the author has stated that it belongs to a different plane of thought. He then gives these objectors a most dignified warning, thus:—"If we cannot reach that plane or would not endeavour to reach it, our attitude should be to leave it alone. But it is unphilosophical to comment upon it from the plane we occupy



and pronounce it absurd and nonsensical. Those who can conceive the possibility of its truth, and those who have realized it to themselves, say that it is impossible to discern the highest spiritual truth with 'the eyes of the flesh'."

It would now be interesting to refer to an attempt made by a Moslem Professor a few years ago, to suggest that the Advaita Philosophy of Shankarāchārya must have been the direct outcome of the impact of Moslem and Hindu modes of thought during the time of Shankarāchārya. He has built up his theory on certain historical facts. He refers to the advent of Islam in South India and the development of commercial relations between Travancore in South India and the Arab traders, just about this time, and he has stated that without doubt there was considerable influence of Moslem thought on contemporary Indian life on Travancore side, which culminated in the conversion of King Cheraman of Perumal dynasty to the Moslem faith, and his consequent pilgrimage to Mecca. He has, however, obviously confused the Monotheism of the Prophet with the rigorous Monism of Shankarāchārya. A very convincing reply to this singularly far-fetched attempt is given by one who can be described as a modern Brahmovādinī in her article 'Shankara and Islam' which appeared in the Modern Review only a few years ago (see Modern Review, February 1946, p. 129).

It would be convenient at this stage to offer a few remarks with regard to the doctrine of Māyā in the Advaita Vedānta system. It has already been noticed while discussing the interesting question raised by Dr. Thibaut about Bādarāyaṇa's personal leanings in Philosophy, that as indicated by the late Prof. Ranade, the conceptions underlying the doctrine of Māyā, are to be traced to the Upanishads. Prof. Ranade has said :—"When we consider that we have the conception of a veil (Īsha. 15), of blindfoldness (Kāṭha. 1.2.4.5), of a knot (Muṇḍ. II.1.10), of ignorance (Chhān. 1.1.10), of not being, of darkness, of death (Brih. 1.3.28), of unreality and uncertainty (Kāṭha. II.4.2), of untruth (Chhān. VIII.3.1-3), of crookedness, and falsehood, and illusion (Prashna. 1.16), of power of God, of his power as identical with nature (Brih. II.5.19, and Rig-Veda VI.47.10, and Shvetā. IV.9), of meshes (Shvetā. III. 1 and V. 3), of semblance, an as-it-were and an appearance (Brih. II.4.14), and

finally of a word, a mode and the name (Chhān. VI.1.14), let no man stand up and say that we do not find the traces of the doctrine of Māyā in the Upanishadic Philosophy." (Vide Ranade's 'Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy', p. 228 and Source 31 a to o).

The Brahma-Sūtrās are undoubtedly an aphoristic compendium of Upanishadic Philosophy as Bādarāyaṇa must have known it, and howsoever the exponents of the other systems of Vedānta may have construed and interpreted the meaning of the Brahma-Sūtrās, it would not only not be justifiable to advance against Shankarāchārya the charge of having given a deliberate Advaitic bias with a special accent on Māyā, to the Vedānta of the Brahma-Sūtrās, but all that has been said so far would rather show that while the other rival interpreters have deliberately misinterpreted the Brahma-Sūtrās to their own special brand of Vedānta, Shankarāchārya alone must be understood to have given the only proper interpretation of the Brahma-Sūtrās, and it is his commentary that should be understood to give us a faithful reflection of the doctrine of Māyā in the Advaita Philosophy as originally adumbrated in the Upanishads.

Shankarāchārya has several times made a reference to Māyā in his commentaries, and it clearly appears that he used the words Māyā, Avidyā, and Ajnāna in one and the same sense. The English renderings of these words, viz. Illusory Power, Nescience and Ignorance, are also synonymous. He has explained what he means by Māyā thus :— "This potential power of the seed is of the nature of Nescience (Avidyā) and it is indicated by the word 'undeveloped' (Avyakta) and has the Highest Lord as the basis, and is of the nature of an illusion (Māyā) and is the great sleep in which transmigratory Jīva-Selfs, unaware of their own true nature (Rūpa) continue to slumber on." (Bra.-Sū.-Bhā. I.iv.3). In another place he explains Māyā as follows :—"It is declared by both the Scriptures and the Smritis, that the names and forms which are imagined through Nescience, and which are as it were the Self of the omniscient Lord, and about which it is impossible to say either that they are one with, or that they are different from Brahma, and which are the seeds of this entire expanse of transmigratory existences, are the illusory power of the

Lord." (Bra.-Sū.-Bhā. II.i.14). Māyā can neither be said to be Sat (Existent) nor Asat (Non-existent) and so is something inexplicable (Tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvachanīyā). Like 'Time' it is beginningless (Anādi), but unlike it, it is not endless (Ananta), as it apparently exists only as long as it lasts, but comes to an end the moment the Truth (viz. that Brahma is the only one reality) is realized. Its creative activity is similar to the creative activity in a dream-state, and just as creations in a dream are contradicted in the waking state, the creations of Māyā are contradicted the moment the Truth behind is realized. It is only co-extensive with the existence of ignorance or empirical knowledge in a man, and it is Brahma in association with its power of Māyā, that creates as it were the illusory world-appearance (Prapancha). An objection is sometimes taken that as it is associated with Brahma, that would lead to the destruction of the doctrine of Advaita, but the Monists retort that the question is not legitimate, because there cannot be any real association between Brahma as such and empty illusory Māyā. Besides it is conceived to be the power of Brahma as Īshvara i.e. Brahma in its Qualified (Saguṇa) aspect.

To illustrate the difference between the reality and Māyā, let us take the modern illustration of the Cinematograph by means of which it is now possible to project three-dimensional pictures. Let us assume two persons as spectators of a film-show, one of whom is an educated and knowledgeable person and is well conversant with the technique of the Cinematograph, and another who is absolutely uneducated and ignorant (like an Ajāvipāla). Now, can we not imagine what the reactions of these two persons would possibly be? The educated expert would know that what he is seeing is nothing but a mere shadow-show, a mere phenomenon, having no reality about it, while the ignorant uneducated person would no doubt feel that real flesh-and-blood persons are living, talking and moving about him. It would thus be easy to see that the difference between the two spectators would exactly be the difference between the person who has realized the truth behind the phenomenal appearance viz. Brahma, and one who under the influence of Māyā fondly thinks the phenomenal creation to be real.

It would be convenient at this stage to discuss briefly the attitude of those who claim to be Rationalists and Materialists. The Hedonist Chārvāka of the Lokāyatika school may well come under the same category. They are not prepared to accept the truth of any thing on faith and rely solely on their sense perceptions and reasoning for arriving at the truth of any thing, and reject every thing that cannot stand that test. The point however is whether the evidence of the senses or the deductions of Logic are invariably quite so reliable as they seem to suppose. It appears from experience that sense perceptions cannot always be relied upon to determine the truth even in the case of the ordinary concerns and questions of worldly experience. It is easy to see how optical illusions are apt to deceive. The classic instances of mistaking a rope for a snake or a mother-of-pearl for silver, often used in Indian Philosophical literature, should be sufficient to convince any person of the undependability of visual perceptions. And what is true of visual perceptions is equally true of the auditory, tactual, olfactory and gustatory perceptions, and this will show how sense perception is not a sure guide. Has not Heraclitus told us that our senses are 'liars' and has not Plato spoken of the 'rabble of the senses'? If sense perceptions, then, are not a sure guide for determining the truth even of the ordinary things of life, it is hardly necessary to say that they are absolutely of no value in determining the truth or otherwise of things which are said to be, by their very nature, supersensuous.

Logic and Reasoning appear to be equally unreliable guides in our search after Truth. It is often not realized that a syllogism in Logic is a kind of *petitio principii* wherein the major premiss invariably takes for granted precisely the point to be proved. The major premiss (All men are mortal) cannot be true, unless the conclusion (Socrates is mortal) is true in advance. Shankarāchārya has clearly recognized the limitations of Reasoning as an instrument of arriving at the truth of any thing. He has stated that it is seen that the conclusions arrived at by one logician (Tārkika) are disproved by another who is his superior in the art and science of reasoning, and the apple-cart of the conclusions of this superior logician is in its turn upset by yet another still greater logician, and

hence there never can be any stability about logical conclusions on which one could safely depend (Bra.-Sū.-Bhā. II.i.11). Shankarāchārya accepts the dictum of the Mīmāṃsakās that the Scriptures (Shruti) are the highest means of proof (Pramāṇa) and the truth of what is declared by the Scriptures has therefore to be accepted and no one has a right to question the truth of what is declared by the Scriptures. All the same Shankarāchārya does not rule out the employment of reasoning in consonance with the Scriptures as an auxiliary to an endeavour to arrive at the truth as stated by the Scriptures, and only rules out mere dry logic (Shushka-Tarka).

Now the Upanishads and the ancient sages say that Brahma is a supersensuous entity, and speech and mind are unable to reach it and are rolled back. The Kāthopanishad says :—"This Ātmā is not to be obtained by instruction nor by intellect nor by much learning. It is graspable by one to whom the Ātmā itself vouchsafes its grace, and it is to him so chosen that it reveals its own person" (Kātha. I.ii.23). The same Upanishad also says :—"The realization of the Ātmā is not attained by mere reasoning. It is only when it is expounded by another (a teacher), oh dear pupil, that it makes for better understanding" (Kātha. I.ii.9).

Let us now take stock of the progress which modern Science has achieved so far. During the last century a very remarkable advance has been made in Chemistry and Physics. Will Durant in his 'Mansions of Philosophy' says :—"Many old conceptions in Chemistry have now become obsolete and Physics has made a tremendous advance in unravelling the mystery of matter and natural forces. Matter was formerly supposed to be inanimate and indestructible. Physicists have now succeeded in splitting the Atom and revealing its mystery. They have shown that an atom of matter is nothing else but a Proton round which several Electrons keep whirling at great speed. Every Atom has thus become a planetary system of electric charges, moving about nothing more substantial than another electric charge, and matter has thus lost its name, weight, length, depth, breadth and impenetrability, and all those sturdy properties that once won it the reverence of every tough and matter-of-fact mind. It has become merely a form of Energy. Newtonian world is all awry now. Gravitation

is no longer a matter of 'Attraction' and the 'Laws of Motion' have been wrenched in every direction by the theory of 'Relativity'. Physicists have now succeeded in demonstrating, that by bombarding the electrons of an atom of lead and knocking out some of them, lead can be transmuted into gold. Physicists before splitting an atom believed that matter and energy were two different things, neither of which could be created or destroyed, but Einstein has said that the physicists were wrong. All matter was actually energy in a different form. According to him matter could be transformed into energy and *vice versa* under the formula  $E = MC^2$  which means that energy equals mass times the velocity of light, squared. Stated in a different way it means that Energy in a particular condition *appears* as matter, and that Energy is the only reality." Now, how is this in any way different from what the Advaitins maintain, viz. that all this world appearance of material things is but an illusion caused by Brahma on itself as its substratum through its power of Māyā in its aspect as Īshvara, and that Brahma is the only reality? It should not be difficult under the circumstances, to be able to appreciate that all animate and inanimate things in the world as we see it, are indeed nothing else but Energy in another form. It is interesting to notice how as scientific knowledge has progressed, Chemistry has tended to merge into Physics, and Physics into Metaphysics, and it is gratifying to find that all modern scientific thought is converging and coming to a focus into what the great ancient sages of India claim to have realized merely by intuition, viz. Brahma.

Brahma according to Vedānta Philosophy is the only real existent entity, while the whole world appearance is merely an illusion caused by Brahma as Īshvara, even as a snake imagined on a rope is. Brahma has further been said to be an absolutely attributeless entity, having 'Sat', 'Chit' and 'Ānanda' as its constitutive essence. Being so attributeless it is not possible to describe it in worldly language, and ordinarily the human mind also is unable to comprehend it. That is why the Upanishads have described it only negatively as 'Not that', 'Not that'. There is a very significant story in the Upanishads which illustrates the point admirably. Bāshkali once asked Bādhva

to explain to him what Brahma was, but Bādhva only kept silent and did not reply. When however Bāshkali persisted in repeating his question, Bādhva replied that he was as a matter of fact just explaining that by observing silence. If however Bāshkali could not understand it, it was his own fault. This illustrates the point that Brahma is an entity which cannot be described in words nor can it be indicated in any other way. Everyone has to realize it for oneself. The Upanishads have equated Ātmā and Brahma and they assert that nobody ever doubts the existence of his own Ātmā.

Shankarāchārya has explained in his commentary, that in order that a man should be competent to desire to know Brahma, he has to put himself under a severe course of training and acquire the necessary qualifications for it, which are enumerated to be as follows :—

- (1) The ability to discriminate between what is eternal and what is transitory (Nityānityavastuviveka).
- (2) A feeling of resignation and apathy disinclining a man from the enjoyment of the pleasurable fruits of actions in this world and the world beyond (Ihāmūtraphalabhogavirāga).
- (3) Equipping oneself with the necessary self-restraint, renunciation etc. (Shamadamādisādhanaśampat).
- (4) A strong urge to be freed from transmigratory existence and to attain Final Release (Mumukshutva).

It will be noticed that it is extremely difficult for a person even to equip himself with these fourfold qualifications, which necessarily require assiduous study and the leading of an ethically pure life. Having accomplished that and learnt from the Scriptures, that Brahma and one's own embodied Self are but one and the same, an aspirant has constantly and repeatedly to try to visualize, to hear about, to cogitate upon and unrelentingly meditate upon the Ātmā. While so occupied it is necessary for him to come across a competent spiritual teacher who is willing to initiate him into the esoteric secret of the knowledge of the Ātmā. The Scriptures say that he must forthwith go in humble spirit, fuel in hand (Samitpāṇih) to a spiritual teacher who has

realized the Self, and the teacher has to accept him as a pupil for his proper initiation into the esoteric doctrine. The parable in Chhândogya (6.14.1, 2) illustrates the point very clearly. It says:—That a man was once led away from his country viz. the Gāndhārās (by some robbers) who took him blind-fold to a lonely and uninhabited place, and left him to roam about as best he might in any direction he pleased. When he was piteously crying for help and instructions to be able to reach his original home, he was told by a person who suddenly happened to come there, ‘Go in that direction, in that direction are the Gāndhārās’, and thereupon, exercising his intelligence as best as he could, he asked his way from village to village on his return journey, and finally came back after much travail to his original home. Even so, it is only a man who has acquired a teacher for himself (Āchāryavān) that realizes the Ātmā (Chhān. 6.14.1, 2). Yet even this securing of a teacher also, is not enough for an aspirant to attain the acme of mystic realization. For as the Muṇḍakopaniṣad says:—The Ātmā cannot be realized except by one whom the Ātmā himself chooses. The doctrine of Grace in Christianity is also very similar to this. The Upanishadic ideal of Self-realization is not at all an easy one to reach. For has not the Kaṭhōpaniṣad said:—“Awake and learn from those who are better than ye. For the path of realization is as hard to tread as the edge of a razor. Very wisely have the sages called it an inaccessible path” (Kaṭha. 1.3.14).

It is high time now to descend from the ‘Ivory Tower’ of Philosophy (the ‘Dear Delight’ of Plato) to mundane affairs. I have now to refer to some features of the translation. It will be noticed that I have used the terms ‘Brahma’ and ‘Ātmā’ without the final ‘n’, because we in India at any rate pronounce the words that way in our usual conversation. Explanation is also needed in the case of my translation of the compound word ‘Mithyājñāna’ as false-ignorance and not ‘False Knowledge’, because I have it on the authority of a very learned Mahāmahopādhyāya, that ‘Knowledge’ can never be ‘False’ and the word should be understood as compounded of the two words ‘Mithyā’ and ‘Ajñāna’, and not ‘Mithyā’ and ‘Jñāna’. Those who would prefer it the other way may please themselves. I have deliberately retained certain words such as Ākāsha, Prāṇa,



Vāyu, Teja, Nāḍī, Hridaya etc. as they are in the original, because the conventional English rendering of these words fails to convey the proper meaning, and also because the words themselves are often used in the original in different senses in different places. In addition to a few foot-notes, I have given short explanations in brackets to help the reader in the proper understanding of the text. It should be noted that the so-called 'Opponent of Vedānta' referred to in the commentary is an imaginary and fictitious person. It was usual in the dialectic method of philosophic disputations, to assume such an opponent, furnish him with ingenious arguments against the Vedānta view (as the Pūrva-paksha), and then to refute the arguments and thus establish the Vedānta conclusion (as the Uttara-paksha or the Siddhānta).

My sincere thanks are due to Mr. V. P. Bhagwat and Mr. S. B. Damle of the Mouj Printing Bureau for the very careful work they have done in the printing of the book and for the co-operation and help they have all along extended to me.

I hope that this English translation would be of some help to a student of the Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāshya in the original, and if it does so, I shall consider it as quite adequate compensation for my labours. Lastly, I cannot do better than end this short preface with the well-known Shānti-Pāṭha of the Kaṭhopanishad :—

“Om sahanāvavatu saha nau bhunaktu saha vīryam  
karavāvahai tejasvi nāvadhītamastu mā vidvishāvahai.  
Om Shāntih Shāntih Shāntih.”

Dhulia, 1st Jan. 1960.

V. M. APTE



## ABBREVIATIONS

Ait.	for	Aitareyopanishad
Ait. Brā.	„	Aitareya Brāhmaṇa
Ait. Ār.	„	Aitareya Āraṇyaka
Bh. G.	„	Bhagavadgītā
Bra. Sū.	„	Brahma-Sūtrās
Bra. Sū. Bhā.	„	Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāshya
Brih.	„	Brihadāraṇyakopanishad
Chhān.	„	Chhāndogyopanishad
Dha. Sū.	„	Dharma-Sūtra
Gauḍapāda Kā.	„	Gauḍapāda Kārikā
Ishā.	„	Ishavāsyopanishad
Jābāla.	„	Jābālopanishad
Jai. Sū.	„	Jaimini Sūtra
Kaṭha.	„	Kaṭhopanishad
Kena.	„	Kenopanishad
Kaivalya.	„	Kaivalyopanishad
Kaush.	„	Kaushītakiyopanishad
Kaush. Brā.	„	Kaushītaki Brāhmaṇa
M. Bh.	„	Mahābhārata
Manu.	„	Manusmṛiti
Manu. Sam.	„	Manu-Samhitā
Muktik.	„	Muktikopanishad
Muṇḍ.	„	Muṇḍakopanishad
Nārā.	„	Nārāyaṇīyopanishad
Nyāya-Sū.	„	Nyāya-Sūtra
Prashna.	„	Prashnopanishad
Pū.-Mī.	„	Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā
Rig.-Ved. Sam.	„	Rig-Veda-Samhitā
Sarvānu.	„	Sarvānukramaṇī
Shata. Brā.	„	Shatapatha-Brāhmaṇa
Shvet.	„	Shvetāshvataropanishad
Tait.	„	Taittirīyopanishad
Tait. Ār.	„	Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka
Tait. Brā.	„	Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa
Tait. Sam.	„	Taittirīya-Samhitā
Tāṇ. Brā.	„	Tāṇḍya-Brāhmaṇa
Vai. Sū.	„	Vaisheshika-Sūtra

## ERRATA

PAGE	LINE	FOR	READ
65	10	the tail, pedestal	the tail, the pedestal
149	11	(Prāṇabhrit).	(Prāṇabhrit),
176	9	prevericator	prevaricator
196	21	eternality	eternal nature
244	18	<i>[The word 'pools' should be dropped.]</i>	
279	3 (f. n.)	whose	whole
279	6 (f. n.)	and	the
326	40	such blood	such as blood
338	3	endeavour, (if	endeavour. (If
361	25	engineer	enginer
516	27	of	or
539	19	gift	gist
624	40	Shāstra	Shastra
801	1	under	asunder
811	6	first	fruit

## DIACRITICAL MARKS USED

ā = आ; ī = ई; ū = ऊ; ri = ऋ;  
 ṭ = ट्; ḍ = ड्; ṇ = ण्.

# BRAHMA-SŪTRA-SHĀNKARA-BHĀSHYA

“*Sarvam Khalvidam Brahma*” (Chhān. 3.14.1)

## I—SAMANVAYĀDHYĀYA

That the sense-object (Vishaya) and the subject of sense-objects (Vishayin) which are within the range of the denotative power of the words ‘Yushmat’ and ‘Asmat’ respectively, and have natures as opposed to each other as darkness and light, cannot transform themselves into each other, being (a matter) firmly established, the attributes of these two also, with a greater reason therefore, cannot transform themselves into the nature of each other. And therefore, the superimposition of the sense-objects which are within the range of the denotative power of the word ‘Yushmat’ and its attributes, on the subject of sense-objects which is within the range of the denotative power of the word ‘Asmat’ and has pure intelligence as its self, and its attributes, is necessarily unreal (Mithyā). All the same, it is a natural course of worldly conduct resulting from false-ignorance (Mithyājnāna) (in a person), to superimpose the sense-objects and the subject of sense-objects which are absolutely different from each other, and their respective attributes, mutually on each other, through failure to discriminate or distinguish either of them from each other, and by coupling truth and untruth together and to imagine thus—‘I am this’, ‘This is mine’.

(The opponent asks—) What indeed then, is this superimposition any way? We reply—It is the unreal manifestation of some thing previously perceived and which is of the nature of remembrance, on some thing else. Some describe it as the superimposition of the attributes of one thing, on some other thing. (Some describe it) as the confusion based on the inability to discriminate between that which is superimposed on some thing else, and that some thing else on which it is superimposed. Others again describe it as the fictitious assumption in a thing, of attributes contrary to the attributes of that thing on which some thing

else is superimposed. All the same, none of these definitions differ in any way as to the generally unreal assumption about the attributes of one thing as being the attributes of some other thing. Even so is our experience in the ordinary world. A mother-of-pearl appears as if it is silver. The moon, one as she is, appears as if she is two moons.

(Says the opponent—) How can there be a superimposition of a sense-object and its attributes on the Universal Self (Pratyagātmā) which is not an object? Everybody superimposes one sense-object on another which is right before one's eyes, while you have mentioned (earlier), that the Universal Self to which the word 'Yushmat' is not applicable, is not a sense-object.

We reply—The Universal Self is not a non-object in the extreme sense, because it is an object denoted by the word 'Asmat', and it is also well-known that the Universal Self can be directly and intuitively perceived. There is no such hard and fast rule, that it is only on an object right before one's eyes that another object should be superimposed. Ignorant people superimpose the attributes of concavity (Tala) and dustiness etc. on the Ākāsha (Space) which is not directly visible. Therefore to superimpose the non-self on the Universal Self is not inconsistent. Learned men consider superimposition of this nature as Nescience (Avidyā) and they (further) say that knowledge (Vidyā) is the determination of the real nature of a thing by discrimination. This being so, that on which some other thing is superimposed is not in the least affected by the faults and merits of the thing superimposed, and it is by entertaining i.e. adopting this reciprocal superimposition of the Self and the non-self, that all worldly conduct and Vedic actions depending on the means-of-proof (Pramāṇa) and the objects of knowledge, and all scriptural injunctions and prohibitions, known as Nescience, are promoted.

How again (says the opponent) are the means of right knowledge such as direct perception etc. and the Scriptures, concerned with that which is the object of Nescience?

We reply—Because in the case of a person who has no such false sense of 'I' or 'Mine' with regard to the body and the sense-organs, there is no possibility of his being desirous of knowledge, as there is no possibility of the

operation of the means of right knowledge. Without the employment of the sense-organs, perception is not possible, and without a basis (such as a body) the operation of sense-organs is not possible, and nobody ever acts or is concerned with a mere body which is not superimposed by the notion of the Self. Neither in the absence of all this (i.e. mutual superimposition), is it possible either for the Self which is free from all contact, to be a knowing agent, nor in the absence of the condition of a knowing agent is any operation of the means of right knowledge possible. Therefore, means of right knowledge such as direct perception etc., and the Shāstrās have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience. This a person has in common with the animals etc. Just as animals etc., when sounds are in contact with the ear etc., and the knowledge of the same is not favourable, go away from them, and when it is favourable, are attracted towards them, as for instance, finding in front of themselves a man holding up a stick, they begin to run away from him, thinking that he wishes to strike them, but when they find him in front of themselves with his hands full of green grass, approach him ; similarly men even when they are able to discriminate properly, (finding before them) strong men who have swords in their upraised hands and who have a fierce aspect, and who are shouting wildly, go away from them, and approach those who are of an opposite nature, and thus, the employment of the means of right knowledge and the objects of knowledge is common both to animals and men. Now, the employment of the means of right knowledge such as direct perception etc. by animals is well-known as being due to their failure to discriminate properly. Similarly, it is thus determined, that even in the case of properly discriminating persons their employment of the means of right knowledge such as direct perception, which is seen to be common to them with animals, is at similar times, also similar.

In the case of activities based on the Scriptures (such as sacrifices etc.) though a man motivated by intelligence is not competent to act without the knowledge of the relation of the Self with the world beyond (Paraloka), yet the knowledge of the Self which can only be acquired from Vedānta, and is beyond the physical necessities of eating etc., and is beyond the distinctions of Brāhmaṇa and Ksha-

triya and which is not of the nature of transmigratory existence, is not necessary for a man for attaining that competency, because it is useless and even opposed to such competency (for performing religious acts). The Shāstra which comes into operation before the realization of such nature of the Self does not exceed its jurisdiction of being concerned only with that which is affected by Nescience. Thus Scriptural injunctions such as "a Brāhmaṇa should sacrifice" operate by depending on this superimposition on the Self, of caste, stage of life (Āshrama), age and special conditions. We have already said that superimposition is the notion of *that* in something which is *not that*. Just as it is, for instance, when a person superimposes on his Self attributes external to his own Self, i.e. when his son or wife etc., are in sound health or otherwise, he considers himself to be similarly sound in health or otherwise, or when he superimposes the attributes of his body on his Self, thus—"I am stout or lean or fair, or I am standing or going or crossing over", or when he superimposes the attributes of his sense-organs on his Self, thus—"I am dumb or squint-eyed or impotent or deaf or blind", or when he superimposes on his own Self the attributes of his internal sense-organ (Antahkaraṇa) i.e. the mind, viz., desire, intention, doubt, determination etc. In this manner he superimposes that which experiences the 'I' or 'Ego' viz., the mind, on the Universal Self which is a witness of all the processes of the mind, and conversely superimposes the Universal Self on the internal sense-organ i.e. the mind.

It is in this manner, that there is this beginningless and endless natural process of superimposition, which is of the nature of erroneous conception and which promotes the notion of the Self as being an agent and experiencer, which is perceived by all. It is with a view to destroy this cause of all evil, and for acquiring the knowledge of the unity of the Self, that all Vedānta is begun. How this is the meaning of all Vedānta (texts) we will endeavour to show in this present Shāriraka-Mimāṃsā.



## ADHYĀYA I—PĀDA 1

## 1. JIJNĀSĀDHĪKARAṆAM. Sū. 1.

This is the first Sūtra of the Shāstra of the consideration of Vedānta which is desired to be explained.

*Now, therefore, the inquiry into Brahma  
(should be taken up).—1.*

The word 'Now' is to be understood as meaning something which follows (after the attainment of the requisite spiritual qualities) and not as something which introduces a subject, because the desire to know Brahma is not something which is possible to be introduced as a subject, nor can the word mean an auspicious recitation (Mangala), as it cannot be properly construed in the meaning of the sentence. The word 'Now' which is used in a different meaning, has still the effect of an auspicious recitation by its being merely heard. The expectation of its referring to something relevant to something else which has gone before is virtually not different from a thing's following after. The word being understood then, as indicating something which comes after something else, that something else which is expected to have been accomplished, before the desire for the knowledge of Brahma (can be entertained) needs to be mentioned, just as in the case of a desire for the knowledge of duty (Dharma) the study of the Veda is expected to have been accomplished already, before such desire for the knowledge of duty (is entertained). The coming after the study of the Veda, is common (to both). But, (says the opponent) the peculiar difference here (i.e. in the case of the desire for the knowledge of Brahma) is its coming after the (previous) knowledge of the acts of duty.

No (we reply). In the case of a person who has studied the Vedānta, it is reasonably sustainable, that the desire for the knowledge of Brahma may arise (in him) even before the arising of the desire for the knowledge of duty. Here (i.e. in the case of the desire to know Brahma) no particular serial order is intended to be prescribed (by the Scriptures), just as in the case of the desire for the knowledge

of duty, a serial order is intended to be prescribed, in as much as there is a rule about (a particular thing) coming after (another particular thing) such as in the cutting off of the heart, (of the animal sacrificed) etc., or as there is no proof to hold, that as between the desire for the knowledge of duty and the desire for the knowledge of Brahma, there is a relation of one thing being the principal thing and another a subsidiary thing, or as there is no proof of any similar relation as between competency (Adhikāra) and a person who has such competency (Adhikṛita), and, as there is a difference between the desire to know 'duty' and the desire to know 'Brahma', and also a difference in their results and the things to be known. Knowledge of duty has for its result secular prosperity (Abhyudaya) and it expects the performance of certain actions (such as sacrifices etc.). The knowledge of Brahma, on the other hand, has for its result eternal bliss (Nihshreyasa) and it does not expect the performance of any act. Religious duty is something which is to be done at some future time and it does not exist at the time of the acquirement of its knowledge and it depends upon the activity of a man. Here on the other hand it is Brahma which is actually eternally in existence, that is desired to be known, and being thus eternal does not depend upon any action on the part of a man. Also as between the two there is a difference in the operation of the scriptural injunction. Injunction which is a characteristic of religious duty instructs a person and at the same time enjoins him to the performance of the same. The science of Brahma however merely instructs a person about Brahma, but it does not enjoin a man to any act of acquiring knowledge. The case is similar to the perception of a sense-object merely by the connection of a sense-organ with its object. Therefore it is necessary to mention something, after (the accomplishment of) which the inquiry into Brahma is advised.

We reply—Discrimination between the eternal thing and a transitory thing, distaste for the enjoyment of things here in this world as well as in the world beyond, equipment of oneself with tranquillity, self-restraint, and such other similar means, and the desire for Final Release. When these are present, it is possible to desire the knowledge of Brahma and to realize it actually, even before the desire

for the knowledge of duty or after it, just as you please. The word 'Now' indicates—following after the acquisition of the means as mentioned (above). The word 'Therefore' (Atah, in the Sūtra) is indicative of the reason, in as much as the Scriptures themselves disclose the transitory nature of the fruit of such means of acquiring secular prosperity as the Agnihotra etc., thus—"As here on earth whatever has been acquired by religious actions perishes, even so, in the next world also whatever is acquired by merit, perishes" (Chhān. 8.1.6) etc. Similarly the Scriptures also show that by realizing Brahma the highest aim of man is attained, thus—"One who realizes Brahma attains Final Release." (Tait. 2.1). Therefore the desire for the knowledge of Brahma should be entertained after the acquisition of the four means referred to above. 'Brahma-jijnāsa' is the desire to know Brahma. Brahma is that whose definition will be stated presently in the subsequent Sūtra, viz., "From which the origination of creation etc. (comes about)." One should not therefore think that the word 'Brahma' may mean the Brāhmaṇa caste. The form 'Brahmaṇah' is in grammar the 'Karmanī' genitive of Brahma and not the 'Sheshe' genitive, because the desire for the knowledge of Brahma presupposes an object such as Brahma, of which knowledge is to be desired, and because no other such object is here indicated. But (says the opponent) even if we understand 'Brahmaṇah' as a 'Sheshe' genitive, the fact that Brahma is the object of the desire to know is not contradicted, for the general relation (indicated by the genitive case) may base itself on the particular relation (indicated by the 'Karmanī' genitive).

We reply—In giving up Brahma as the object directly indicated (by understanding 'Brahmaṇah' as the 'Karmanī' genitive) and then by accepting it as the object indicated, in an indirect way (as indicated by the 'Sheshe' genitive) you will be taking needless trouble. If the opponent were to say that it would not be undertaking needless trouble (in understanding 'Brahmaṇah' as the 'Sheshe' genitive) as it would mean the desire to know all that which is dependent on the word Brahma, we reply—no, because when we accept the principal thing (as indicated by the 'Karmanī' genitive) it also necessarily implies that all those secondary things meant by the word Brahma, are included in the

principal thing. Brahma being the most desirable thing to be realized by knowledge, is of course the principal thing. When that principal thing is once accepted as the object of the desire to know, all those other (secondary) things, without desiring to know which Brahma cannot be properly desired to be known, are necessarily implied, and need not be separately mentioned in the Sūtra. For when we say 'The king is passing by', it implies that the passing by of the king along with his retinue is meant. It (i.e. that Brahma is the object as indicated by the 'Karmanī' genitive) is in consonance with the Scriptures. The Scriptural passages "That from which all these things are born" (Tait. 3.1) etc. and "Desire to know that, that is Brahma" (Tait. 3.1) actually indicate that Brahma is the object indicated by the 'Karmanī' genitive and that alone will be in consonance with the Sūtra. Therefore the form 'Brahmaṇah' is the 'Karmanī' genitive. 'Jijnāsā' means the desire to know. Complete comprehension is the object of the suffix 'San' which means desire, because desire has for its object the result of action. Knowledge is the only means of comprehending Brahma, and the complete knowledge of Brahma is the highest aim (of man) through the destruction of the evil of Nescience which is the root-cause (lit., the seed) of all transmigratory existence. Therefore the knowledge of Brahma should be desired. But again (says the opponent), that Brahma must either be well-known or not known at all. If it is well-known, it need not be desired to be known. If it is not known at all, it would not be possible to desire to know it. We reply—Brahma which is omniscient, all-powerful, and of the nature of eternal purity, intelligence and freedom, exists of course. Etymologically, from the root 'Briha' we understand such things as eternal purity, etc. The existence of Brahma is moreover well-known, because of its being the Self of every one. Every one experiences the existence of the Self, and does not experience that he is not. If the well-known existence of the Self were not to be so in fact, every one would experience that he does not exist. The Self of course is Brahma. But (says the opponent), if Brahma is known to everybody as the Self, then being already so known, it comes to this, that in that case there could not be any desire to know it. No (we reply), because there is a conflict of

opinion as to its special nature. Unsophisticated persons and the Lokāyatikās understand that the mere body as such endowed with intelligence is the Self. Others that the sense-organs which are intelligent are the Self. Some say that the mind is Ātmā, some say that it is merely momentary knowledge. Some others say that the Self is merely a vacuum (Shūnya). Others again say that an entity different from the body which is an agent, an experiencer, and a transmigratory being is in fact in existence. Some others say that the Self is an experiencer only but not an agent. Some others think that there is a Lord who is omniscient and all-powerful, and is different from the Self. Others that the Ātmā is the Self of the experiencing Jīva. In this manner there are many who have resorted to fallacious reasoning or the Scriptures as an authority and have differed amongst themselves in their view (as to what the Self i.e. Brahma is). Under these circumstances if one were to conclude recklessly and to understand something else (as the Self), one may miss Final Beatitude and may be ruined. Hence now begins, under the designation of 'an inquiry into Brahma', an analysis of the Vedānta texts with the help of Logic (Tarka) conformable to the Scriptures, having the highest Beatitude as its reward.—1.

## 2. JANMĀDYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 2.

We have said so far that one should desire to know Brahma. The question arises—What are the characteristics of that Brahma? Therefore Bhagavān Sūtrakāra has said :

*(Brahma is that) from which the origin etc.  
of this (world, proceed).—2.*

The compound word 'Janmādi' is a Bahuvrīhi compound of the 'Tatguṇasamvijnāna' type, and it is dissolved as follows :—'That of which origin is the first'. The meaning of the compound word is—origin, preservation and dissolution. Origin comes first in order, because it is so indicated in the Scriptures and also because it is so in fact. The indication of the Scriptures is "From whence these beings are born etc." (Tait. 3.1) in which origin, preservation and dissolu-

tion are mentioned in their order. The fact as it is, is that it is only when a thing possessing attributes has attained the condition of existence, that preservation and dissolution of the same are possible. The word 'Asya' (in the Sūtra) indicates the thing possessing attributes, which is established by direct means of knowledge etc. as—*this is it*. The genitive case (of Asya) is for showing the relation with the origin etc. The word 'Yatah' indicates by the ablative case the cause (of the origin). The omniscient and all-powerful cause from which, the origin, preservation and dissolution of this transient world, which is distinguished by names and forms, and which is connected with diverse agents and enjoyers, springs, and which is the basis of the fruit of actions depending upon a particular environment, time, and cause, and in even the mere thinking about which, imagination boggles and is unable to comprehend the arrangement, *That* is Brahma which is to be understood as the complementary portion of the Sūtra. These three only viz. the origin, preservation and dissolution, are to be understood here, as the other modifications of existence are covered by these three. If we include the other modifications of existence enumerated by Yāska, we may be tempted to doubt the origin, preservation and dissolution as originating from the root-cause, as they (i.e. other modifications) are possible only when the transient world is in existence. In order that we should not doubt that the preservation and dissolution is of that only which is created, we should understand only these three (by the word Janmādi). It is not possible to conceive the origin etc. of this transient world of the type described (above) to be from any cause other than the Lord described as above, viz. from the non-sentient Pradhāna (of the Sāṃkhyās) or from the atoms (of the Vaiśeṣhikās), or from mere non-existence (as held by the followers of Buddha), or from a transmigratory being (such as Hiranyagarbha). Nor can it ever evolve from its own nature (without any cause), for in such a matter, particular environment, time and cause have to be considered to be necessary. Those who maintain the Lord as the cause of this transient world (such as the Logicians) think that the same inference (as is stated just above) also supplies the means for holding the existence of the Lord as distinguished from the transmigratory Self etc., as being the cause (of this trans-

migratory world). But (says the opponent) the same argument (by inference) is also adopted in this 'Janmādi' Sūtra. No (we reply), for the Sūtrās are meant only for the purpose of stringing together the flower-like Vedānta passages. The Sūtrās refer to the Vedānta passages which are considered therein. For the knowledge of Brahma is effected by the determination (brought about) by the consideration of the meaning of the Vedānta passages, and not by the other means of right knowledge such as inference etc. Such Vedānta passages dealing with the cause of the creation etc. of the transitory world being there (for that purpose), inference also, which is not antagonistic (to such passages) and furnishes a means of right knowledge, for the strengthening of the understanding of the meaning of these passages, is not rejected, because the Scriptures themselves accept the aid of Logic as an auxiliary. For Scriptural passages such as "The Self is to be heard and cogitated upon" (Brih. 2.4.5), and "A learned and intelligent person does of course reach Gāndhāra, and similarly, a man who has a teacher acquires knowledge (of Brahma)" (Chhān. 6.14.2), show that a man's intelligence is helpful to the Scriptures. It is not that the Scriptures alone are the means of the right knowledge of Brahma, as is the case about the right knowledge of religious duty, but the Scriptures, as also intuitional experience, so far as is possible, constitute the authoritative or valid means of right knowledge, because the knowledge of Brahma culminates in the realization of Brahma, and has an already existing entity as its object. In the case of religious action there is no expectation of intuitional experience and the Scriptures alone are the authoritative means of its right knowledge, and action is dependent upon man for its origination. In the case of action in ordinary life, or action according to the Vedās, it is possible that it may either be done or not done or done in a different way. For instance a man may use a horse for going (from one place to another) or he may go on foot or in some other way or he may not go at all. Similarly, in an Atirātra sacrifice he may optionally use (take up) or may not use (take up) the 'Shodashī' (a particular sacrificial cup) or he may sacrifice either before or after sun-rise, and in this manner injunctions and prohibitions, options, and rules and their exceptions, have a proper *raison d'être*. But

there is no such scope for exercising an option in the case of an existing entity, such as that it is like this or not like this or that it does not exist. Options again depend upon the notions of a person, while the knowledge of an entity as it actually is, depends upon the thing itself, and not upon the notions of a man. In the case of a pillar, for instance, that it is either a pillar or a man or something else cannot (each) be correct knowledge, because the knowledge that it is a pillar depends upon the pillar itself. In this manner, the authoritativeness or validity of the knowledge of an entity actually in existence depends upon the entity itself. That being so, the knowledge of Brahma also, is knowledge depending upon the entity itself, in as much as it concerns the actually existing entity itself. But (says the opponent) Brahma being an existing entity, it is the province of other means of right knowledge also, and thus it comes to this that the consideration of the Scriptural passages is therefore purposeless. No (we say), Brahma not being an object of sense, it has no relation with the sense-organs. Sense-organs by their very nature have sense-objects for their province while Brahma is not their province. Were Brahma to be an object of sense-organs, we would be able to know that this world (the effect of Brahma) is connected with Brahma, but we are unable to determine whether the world, which alone we are able to perceive, is connected with Brahma or something else. Therefore, the Sūtra 'Janmādi etc.' is not meant for the statement of an inference. What is it for, then? It is for commending the Vedānta passage to the notice (of the student). Now what precisely is the Vedānta passage to which the Sūtra is meant to draw attention? The scriptures beginning thus—"Bhrigu the son of Varuṇa approached his father Varuṇa (and said)—'Oh Bhagavan, teach me what Brahma is'", go on further and say—"That from which all these beings are born, that by which, after being born, they live, and that to which they go and in which they are absorbed, that (you should) try to know, that is Brahma" (Tait. 3.1). And of that the conclusive passage is—"From Bliss (Ānanda) these things are born, by Bliss, after they are born they live, and into Bliss, at death they enter" (Tait. 3.6). Other similar passages also, having reference to the cause (Brahma) which has eternal purity, intelligence, freedom and omni-



science as its nature, should be adduced in illustration.—2.

### 3. SHĀSTRAYONITVĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 3.

We have stated, by indicating that Brahma is the cause of the transitory world, that it is omniscient. Now wishing to make that statement firmer (the Sūtrakāra) says:—

*(The omniscience of Brahma) follows from its being the source of the Shāstra i.e. the Scriptures.—3.*

Brahma is the source of i.e. the cause of the Shāstra comprising of the great Rig and other Vedās, the Shāstra which is supplemented by many Vidyās and which like a flambeau illuminates all objects and which is almost all-knowing. It is not possible, that such Shāstra of the nature of the Rig and the other Vedās, which is endowed with the quality of omniscience can have its origination from any thing other than what is omniscient. It is well-known in the world that any author from whom any special body of Shāstra emanates—as, for instance, Grammar from Paṇini—, and refers to only a branch of knowledge, possesses more knowledge than that Shāstra. How can anything (more) be said about that great Being who is the source (Yoni), i.e. from whom, as if without any special effort and as if in sport and as naturally as its own breathings, is born the Rig-Veda, which is the ocean of all knowledge, the cause of the distinction as between all the different classes and conditions of the Devās, animals and men, and which is divided into many different branches, according to the Scriptural passage —“That which is the Rig-Veda is but merely the breathing (the Divine Afflatus) of that great divine Being” (Brih. 2.4.10), and also that the great Being possesses unsurpassed omniscience and is all-powerful? Or (we may construe the Sūtra in this way)—the Shāstra, Rig-Veda etc. described above, is the source, the cause, and the authoritative means of the understanding of the right knowledge of Brahma as it is. What is meant to be conveyed is that Brahma which is the cause and origin etc. of this transitory world, is understood from the Shāstra (such as the Scriptures) which is the only means of right knowledge. The

Scriptural passage in point is quoted in the former Sūtra—"From which all beings are born" etc. (The opponent asks)—in that case what is the occasion for this Sūtra, when by quoting the Scriptures you have indicated that Brahma has this Shāstra as its source? We reply—The words of the previous Sūtra did not clearly indicate the Shāstra, and hence one may feel a doubt that by the word 'Janmādi' only an inference is stated. And now, this Sūtra endeavours to remove this doubt, (by stating) 'From its being the source' etc.—3.

#### 4. SAMANVAYĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 4.

But (it is again objected) how can it be said that Brahma has the Shāstra (the Scriptures) as its authority, since it has been shown (by me) on the authority—"The Vedās having action (Kriyā) as their purpose, those portions of it which do not indicate any action, are purposeless" (Jaimini Sūtra 1.2.1), that the Scriptures indicate action. Those portions of the Scriptures which are known by the name of Vedānta, are therefore purposeless, because they do not indicate that any action is meant (by them). Or else (it may be said) that by way of indicating an agent or a deity etc., or by way of indicating an injunction to action such as devout meditation, they are but supplementary to an injunction to action. But it is not at all possible that they are for the purpose of propounding an entity firmly established as an entity, because an established entity is an object of direct perception etc., and also because there is absence of any aim of man being served by propounding anything which is not connected with something which has to be given up (Heya) or accepted (Upādeya). It is precisely because of this, viz. that sentences like "He wept" should not be rendered purposeless, that they are said to be useful by way of glorification (of the passage with which they are connected) on the authority of Pūrva Mimāṃsā (1.2.7), thus—"These sentences being in syntactical relation with an injunctional passage, they are for the glorification of that injunction." In the same way Mantrās like "For strength I cut thee (Oh blade of grass)" (recited when darbhās are being cut for the Darshapūrṇamāsa sacrifice) are said to be in a relation of invariable concomitance to

action, by indicating action and the means to accomplish the same. It is nowhere observed nor is it reasonably understandable from the Scriptural passages, that they are purposeful as apart from their being connected with an injunction in some way. In the case of an entity established as such, an injunction is not possible, because an injunction has action for its province. Therefore (the opponent concludes) the Vedāntās are merely supplementary to injunctions for action, by way of making the nature of the agent and the deities necessary for such action, manifest. If it be said that they cannot be so understood because it is feared that that would necessarily imply a different chapter (Prakaraṇa), then they may be understood as indicating actions such as devout meditation etc. referred to in their passages. The conclusion of the opponent, then, being that Brahma has not the Scriptures as its origin, the reply given is :—

*But it is so (i.e. Brahma is so known from the Scriptures), because they (i.e. all Vedānta texts) have that connected sequence.—4.*

The word 'Tu' (but) in the Sūtra means the rebuttal of the objections (of the opponent). That the all-powerful cause of the origin, preservation and dissolution of the transient world is the omniscient Brahma, is understood from the Vedānta Shāstra itself. How so? Because that is the connected sequence. In all the Vedānta texts the sentences construe properly by intimating *that* to be the meaning. For instance (the following texts)—“In the beginning, Oh Soumya, this world was just Being (Sat), the one only without a second” (Chhān. 6.2.1), and “This Self alone was in existence in the beginning” (Ait. 2.1.1.1), and “That precisely is this Brahma, without itself being the cause, without itself being an effect, having nothing inside or outside of it. This is the Self, the Brahma which perceives everything” (Brih. 2.5.19), and “It is that immortal Brahma right in front” (Muṇḍ. 2.2.11) etc. It is not proper to attribute any other meaning to these passages when their connected sequence is determined to be with regard to the nature of Brahma, because, otherwise there would

be the predicament of the abandonment of what is stated in the Scriptures and the acceptance of something which is not so stated. It cannot be understood that they propound the nature of the agent, because of the Scriptural statement "Then by what should one see and whom?" (Brih. 2.4.13) which in effect rejects all actions, agents and fruits. Nor can Brahma, though it is determined to be of the nature of an already established entity, be an object of direct perception, because it is not possible to comprehend, except by means of the Shāstra, that the Self is Brahma, as conveyed by the Scriptural passage—"That thou art" (Chhān. 6.8.7). As regards the objection (of the opponent) that any instruction which does not require the giving up or the accepting of anything, is purposeless, (we say) this is no fault, because the highest aim of man is accomplished by knowing, that Brahma, from which nothing can be discarded and to which nothing can be added, is the Self, and that it destroys all misery. There is no contradiction even if it be understood that it has the purpose of propounding the deities etc. connected with the devout meditation referred to in its own passages (in Vedānta). Understanding it even in that manner would not render Brahma as being supplementary to an injunction for devout meditation, for it can be reasonably sustainable that when the unity of Brahma and the Self is understood, there is destruction of all notions of duality, of actions, agents etc., there being then nothing to give up or to accept. There is no possibility of the revival of the notion of duality which has once been uprooted by the knowledge of absolute unity, because of which we would again arrive at the conclusion about Brahma being supplementary to an injunction for devout meditation. Though elsewhere (i.e. in the Karmakāṇḍa) we do not accept the validity or authoritativeness of Vedic passages except when they are connected with injunctions, still as the knowledge of the Self results in its own fruit, it would not be possible to impugn the validity or authoritativeness of the Shāstra dealing with the subject of the Self. It is not that the validity or authoritativeness of this Shāstra is inferable, so that it may expect instances observed elsewhere (to be cited). Therefore it is proved that Brahma has the Scriptures as its valid authority. Here some others come forward with the objection thus—Even though

Brahma has the Shāstra as the only means to its right knowledge, still the Shāstra culminates in making Brahma an object of an injunction for Upāsana i.e. meditation, just as the Shāstra culminates in making the sacrificial post (Yūpa) and the Āhavanīya Agni etc., though they are not familiar in ordinary life, as being supplementary to an injunction. Whence do you get that? Because the Shāstra has the purport of either promoting or discouraging (action). For, those who know the Shāstra have said so, thus—"The obvious meaning of it (i.e. the Veda) is seen to be an instruction to do something" (Jai. 1.1.1), "Injunction is a statement which stimulates action, and instruction is the knowledge of that" (Jai. 1.1.5), "Words in a sentence should be construed as having relation to a word signifying action" (Jai. 1.1.25), "As action is the purport of the Veda, whatever does not refer to action is without a purpose" (Jai. 1.2.1). Hence it is in stimulating a person to activity with regard to some particular object, or by making him averse to act with regard to some other object, that the Scriptures have a purpose, and that (part of it) which does not do so is utilized as being supplementary to action. In common with it, Vedānta passages likewise, will have a purpose only in the same way. The Scriptures being of the nature of injunctions, it stands to reason that just as Agnihotra and other means are enjoined on one who is desirous of heaven etc., similarly acquisition of the knowledge of Brahma is enjoined on one who is desirous of immortality. But (says the Bhāshyakāra) a difference in the nature of what is desired to be known is mentioned here. In the Karma-kāṇḍa what is indicated as desired to be known is Duty (Dharma), which is performed some time in the future, but here on the contrary the already existing and eternally established Brahma is indicated as that which is desired to be known. Therefore the fruit in the form of the knowledge of Brahma is different from the fruit in the form of the knowledge of Duty which expects the doing of some particular act. (The Vṛttikāra says—) It does not deserve to be so, because what is intended to be propounded is Brahma, which is connected with an injunction for something to be done, as for instance—"Verily the Self is to be seen" (Bṛih. 2.4.5). When the following injunctive statements are there, viz. "That Ātmā (Self), which is sinless—

he is to be looked for, he is to be understood" (Chhān. 8.7.1), "Let (a man) meditate devoutly on the Self only, as his true state" (Brih. 1.4.15), "He who knows Brahma, himself becomes Brahma" (Muṇḍ. 3.2.9), etc., and when there is a desire to know what that Brahma is and what that Self is, all the Vedānta passages are employed in intimating the nature of Brahma, thus :—(Brahma) is eternal, omniscient, all-pervading, absolutely eternally satisfied, and is of the nature of being eternally pure, intelligent, and free, and is knowledge and Bliss etc. It is through devout meditation that the fruit viz. Final Release which is not capable of being seen, but is envisaged by the Shāstra, will accrue. If the Vedānta passages were not to lead towards an injunction to some action, and were to be statements of mere things only, then by reason of the impossibility (in such a case) of knowing what is to be given up or what is to be accepted, the Vedānta passages would be as purposeless as the sentences 'The Earth consists of seven islands', 'Here goes the king' etc. But (says the Bhāshyakāra) just as even the mere mention of a fact viz. that this is a rope and not a snake, has meaning by way of removing the fear caused by the erroneous opinion (that it is a snake), so also here, the mere mention of the entity i.e. the Self which is not of a transmigratory nature, would have a meaning by way of removing the erroneous opinion about its being of a transmigratory nature. The Vṛttikāra replies—This would be so, provided the erroneous opinion about the Self being of a transmigratory nature were to be removed by merely hearing about the nature of Brahma, even as the erroneous opinion about a rope being a snake is removed by hearing about the nature of the rope as being a rope only. But it is not so removed, because even in the case of a person who has heard what Brahma is, he is still seen to be affected by pleasure, pain and such other attributes of a transmigratory being, and because we see that there are such injunctions (in the Scriptures) about hearing and cogitating upon the Self, thus—"The Self should be heard and cogitated upon and constantly meditated upon" (Brih. 2.4.5). Therefore Brahma should be understood as having the Shāstra as the right means of its knowledge, by way of its being an object of an injunction for meditation (i.e. Upāsana). To all this (The Bhāshyakāra replies)—No, because of the dis-

similarity between the fruits of actions and the fruits of the knowledge of Brahma. Action, known by the name of 'duty' from the Scriptures and Smritis, is the activity of the body, speech and the mind, the desire to know which is expressed in the Sūtra—"Now therefore the inquiry into Duty", and that which is non-Duty, such as killing etc., which is of the nature of a prohibition has to be inquired into with a view to avoid the doing of it. The fruits of these good and evil things such as duties and non-duties which are of the nature of an injunction, which actually are pleasure and pain respectively and which arise out of the union of the sense-organs and sense-objects and are experienced only by the body, speech and the mind, are generally known by all, right from the Brahmā (Hiraṇyagarbha) down to the inanimate things. The Scriptures declare that there are different degrees of pleasure as experienced by all embodied beings, from men right up to the Brahmā (Hiraṇyagarbha). Hence from them we understand that there are comparative degrees of Duty which is their cause and from these comparative degrees of Duty, the comparative degrees of the competency of persons who perform such Duties (is understood). The comparative degrees of the competency of persons performing such Duties is well-known as being caused by their ability for actions and their desire for certain results. Thus we learn that only those who perform Sacrifices and have special ability for meditation (Upāsana) and concentration on Deities etc., proceed by the Northern Path (Devayāna) and those who perform only minor Sacrifices and works of charity and public utility, proceed by the Southern Path (Pitriyāna), and we also know from the Shāstra, such as the Scriptural passage "Having dwelt there till their action is worked out or consumed" (Chhān. 5.10.5), that even there such comparative degrees of pleasure and the means of pleasure are understood (as existing). We also know that beginning from man down to those who reside in hell, and all the inanimate things, there exists a comparative modicum of pleasure attainable by 'Duty' (Dharma) which is of the nature of an injunction. So also in the case of those who possess a body and who have either gone down (the abyss) or gone up (to heaven), in as much as comparative degrees of pain are to be seen, it is understood, that its cause viz. religious demerit (Adharma),

which is known from prohibitory injunctions, as well as those who perpetrate such non-meritorious actions, also have such comparative degrees. In this manner, in the case of those who are affected by the fault of the nature of Nescience etc., that there are differences in the comparative degrees of pleasure and pain which are of the transitory nature of a transmigratory existence and which are caused by their merit or demerit and which are preceded by a prior assumption of a body, is well-known from the Scriptures, Smritis and Nyāya (Logic). The Scriptural passage "As long as he continues to possess a body, there is no freedom for him from pleasure and pain" refers to the transmigratory nature as described above. So also we learn from the Scriptural passage "When he is once rid of this body neither pleasure nor pain affect him" (Chhān. 8.12.1), which denies any touch of either pleasure or pain, that the disembodied condition called Final Release is not the result of religious Duty (Dharma) which is of the nature of an injunction. Were it to be the result of religious duty, such denial of being touched either by pleasure or pain would not be reasonably sustainable. If it be said (by the opponent) that the disembodied condition is itself the result of Duty, (we reply that) it is not so, because the condition of being unembodied is natural to the Ātmā as illustrated by the following Scriptural passages—"The wise one, knowing the Self to be bodiless amongst the embodied, unchanging amongst the changeable, great and omni-present, does not grieve" (Kaṭha. 1.2.21), "He is without vital breath (Prāṇa), without mind and is pure" (Muṇḍ. 2.1.2), "That Purusha is without any attachment" (Brih. 4.3.15). It is proved therefore that the eternal unembodied condition called 'Final Release' is dissimilar to the fruit of action which has to be performed. Amongst these eternal things there are some which are eternal but subject to modification, and though they undergo such modification, the notion of their being the same eternal things is not destroyed, as for instance, the Earth, as understood by those who hold the view that this transitory world is eternal, or the Attributes (Guṇās) according to the Sāmkhyās. This (Self or Brahma) however is eternal in the highest sense, eternally unchanging, all-pervading like the sky (Ākāśha), free from all modifications, eternally contented, without



any parts, and is of the nature of a self-luminant entity, in whose case meritorious or unmeritorious religious duty or actions along with their effects, in the past, present or future, do not apply. And this precisely is that unembodied condition called Final Release, according to such Scriptural passages as "Different from duty (Dharma) and non-duty (Adharma), different from every effect and cause, and different from past and the future also" (Kāṭha. 2.14) etc. Hence if this Brahma, an inquiry about which is proposed here, were to be propounded (by the Scriptures) as being supplementary to action (Karma) and were Final Release (Moksha) to be understood as obtainable through action, it would necessarily be of a transitory nature, and it would then come to this, that Final Release is but only a superior type of a transitory fruit of actions as amongst those described above, and which stand to each other in the comparative degrees (of greatness or smallness). All those who regard Final Release as a creed, understand it as being eternal, and therefore it would not be proper to propound Brahma as being supplementary to action. Besides the following passages from the Scriptures "He who knows Brahma, becomes Brahma" (Muṇḍ 3.2.9), "All the sum total of his actions perishes when he who is both the higher and the lower is beheld" (Muṇḍ. 2.2.8), "He who knows the joy of Brahma is never afraid" (Tait. 2.9), "O Janaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness" (Brih. 4.2.4), "That Brahma knew itself, only as itself being Brahma, therefore it became all that" (Brih. 1.4.10), "To him who realizes the unity of all, whence can there be any infatuation or bewailing" (Isha. 7) etc.,—which show that Final Release comes about simultaneously with the knowledge of Brahma, preclude the possibility of any action in between the two. We can similarly quote as an illustration the Scriptural passage "Seeing this the sage Vāmadeva understood, I was Manu, I am the sun" (Brih. 1.4.10), to show, that in between the realization of Brahma and becoming one with the Universal Self there is no other action in between, just as in the sentence "He sings standing" we understand that there is no other action intervening between his singing and standing. Passages from the Scriptures such as "You indeed are our father, you who carry us from ignorance to the other shore beyond" (Pra. 6.8), "I have heard from men like

you, that one who knows the Self overcomes grief, I myself am in similar grief, the Bhagawān should help me to tide over the grief" (Chhān. 7.1.3), "To him whose faults had been washed off, Bhagawān Sanatkumāra showed the other side beyond the darkness" (Chhān. 7.26.2), show that the fruit of the knowledge of Brahma consists in merely the removal of the obstacle to Final Release. Similar is the Sūtra of the great teacher (Gautama) supplemented by reasoning, thus—Final Release (results) from the successive removal of erroneous ignorance, faults, activity, birth and pain, the removal of each succeeding member of the series serving to cause the removal of the one coming earlier (Nyāya Sū. 1.1.2). This removal of the erroneous ignorance moreover results from the knowledge of the unity of one's own Self with Brahma.

This knowledge of the unity of the Self with Brahma is not of the nature of attributing greatness to a comparatively small thing (Sampadrūpa), as for instance in the passage "The mind is infinite, the Vishvedevās are infinite : he thereby conquers the infinite world" (Brih. 3.1.9). Nor is it of the nature of a superimposition, as for instance in the passages "Contemplate devoutly on the mind as Brahma" (Chhān. 3.18.1), "The advice is that the sun is Brahma" (Chhān. 3.19.1) etc., where there is a superimposition by way of looking upon the mind and the sun respectively as Brahma. Nor is it something caused by any special action, as for instance "Vāyu indeed is the absorber" (Chhān. 4.3.1), "The Vital Breath (Prāṇa) indeed is the absorber" (Chhān. 4.3.3). Nor is it of the nature of any special process of the refinement (Samskāra) of any thing supplementary to action, such as the act of looking upon the sacrificial ghee etc. (Ājyāvekṣhaṇa). If we were to understand the knowledge of the unity of the Self with Brahma, to be of the nature of attributing greatness to a comparatively small thing, then the co-ordinated meaning of the sentences such as "That thou art" (Chhān. 6.8.7) and "I am Brahma" (Brih. 1.4.10) and "This Self is Brahma" (Brih. 2.5.19) which have the purport of propounding the unity of the Self and Brahma, would be done violence to, and would contradict Scriptural passages about the fruit in the form of the removal of Nescience such as "The knots of the Hridaya are cut asunder and all doubts are resolved" (Muṇḍ. 2.2.8), and passages

like "knowing Brahma, he became Brahma" (Muṇḍ. 3.2.9) which speak about the Self attaining the condition of Brahma, cannot be properly understood. Therefore the knowledge of the unity of the Self and Brahma is not of the nature of attributing greatness to a small thing etc.; hence also, the science of the knowledge of Brahma does not depend upon some sort of operation by man. What is it then? It is that it depends upon the thing itself, even as is the knowledge of a thing which is the object of the right means of knowledge such as direct perception. It is not possible to imagine by any method of reasoning, that Brahma or the knowledge of Brahma which happens to be of such a nature, is supplementary to action. Nor can Brahma be said to be supplementary to action, as being an object of the act of knowing, because, the Scriptural passage—"It is different from the known as well as the unknown" (Kena. 1.3)—denies that it is the object of the act of knowing, as also the Scriptural passage—"How should one know him, by whose help one knows all this?" (Brih. 2.4.13). Similarly there is a denial of Brahma being the object of the act of devout meditation, because, after having declared Brahma as not being an object (of sense), by the Scriptural passage—"That which is not proclaimed by speech, but by which speech is made manifest"—it is said—"you should know that alone as Brahma, and not this on which you are devoutly meditating" (Kena. 1.4). If there is an objection (by the opponent) that in case Brahma is not an object (of sense), the Shāstra could not possibly be its source (as is said in Sūtra 2), we reply—No, because the Shāstra has concern merely for the removal of difference imagined through Nescience and it does not purport to propound Brahma as being an object objectively, thus—*This is Brahma*. What then does it propound? It propounds Brahma as not being an object (of sense), but as being the Universal Self and thereby removes the distinction between objects to be known, the knower, and the act of knowing etc., as imagined through Nescience. Similarly the Scriptures say—"It is conceived by him by whom it is not conceived. He by whom it is conceived, knows it not, it is not understood by those who say they understand it, and it is understood by those who say that they understand it not" (Kena. 2.3), "You cannot see the seer of sight, you cannot

hear the hearer of hearing, you cannot perceive the perceiver of perception, you cannot know the knower of knowledge" (Brih. 3.4.2) etc. Hence, Final Release is not open to the fault of being transitory, because the removal of the notion of the transitory condition, imagined through Nescience, culminates in indicating Final Release to be of the nature of the eternally free Self. For him however, who holds Final Release as something to be effected (by action), it would be logical to say that it depends upon the mental, vocal or bodily action. Final Release would certainly be transitory also in the case of those who consider it as being something which undergoes modification. In the ordinary worldly life, things like curds which result by modification (of milk) and things like an earthen pot which are the result of manufacture (from earth), are not observed to be everlasting. Nor can there be any expectation of some sort of action, by considering Final Release as something to be obtained, for, as Brahma is of the nature of one's own Self, it is not capable of being obtained (from outside). Even if Brahma is considered to be something different from one's own self, it is not capable of being obtained, because of its being all-pervading like the Ākāsha, and as all persons always happen to possess it in themselves as their own nature. Nor is Final Release something which admits of being subjected to a process of refinement, so that it should expect some sort of operation. Refinement can be effected either by the addition of some attribute (to a thing), or by the removal of some blemish (in it). It is not possible to refine Final Release by the addition to it of some attribute, because Final Release is of the nature of Brahma to which nothing can possibly be added. Nor is it possible to refine it by the removal of some blemish, because Final Release is of the nature of Brahma which is eternally pure. If it be argued by the opponent, that just as a mirror which is subjected to a process of polishing becomes bright and shining, similarly Final Release being an attribute of the Self which for the time being happens to be obscured, becomes manifest when it is subjected to a process of refinement by some sort of action, we reply—No, because it cannot be reasonably understood that the Self can ever be an object of any sort of action on it, because action can never come into being without causing

any modification into that in which it abides. If the Self were to be liable to modification by action on itself, it would mean that it is not eternal, and in that case Scriptural passages such as "It is said to be unmodifiable" would be contradicted, which is not desirable. Therefore there is no possibility of the Self ever acting on itself, and as the Self is not the object of any action which has another object as the sphere of its activity, the Self is in no way modified by any such action. But says the opponent, the Jīva-self (i.e. the individual embodied Self) is observed to acquire refinement by such actions as bathing, performing Āchamana (sipping water) and wearing the sacred thread, which depend upon there being a body. No, we reply, the one that acquires this refinement is the Jīva-Self, which under the influence of Nescience, has for the time being connection with a body. For it is a matter of direct perception that such bathing and Āchamana is in direct relation with the body, and therefore it is proper to hold, that by that action of which the body is the sphere, it is only that particular Jīva-Self which under the influence of Nescience, is (for the time being) the Self of that body, that acquires the refinement. Just as by the re-establishment of the humoral balance (of a body) by means of medical treatment, it is that embodied Jīva-Self which is in connection with such a body which it considers to be its, that gets the fruit in the form of perfect health, and it is that embodied Jīva-Self in which this consciousness of the absence of any such malaise arises. In a similar way it is that embodied Jīva-Self in which there arises the consciousness of such refinement by such bathing and Āchamana and the wearing of the sacred thread thus—I have been purified and refined—that happens to acquire such refinement. He is of course in contact with that body, and all actions performed by him, who—as being the object of the terms 'I' and 'agent'—is the experiencer, and it is he alone that enjoys the fruit, according to the following Scriptural Mantrās viz. "One of the two enjoys the delectable pippala (fruit), and the other one (the Universal Self) refrains from enjoying and merely keeps looking on" (Mund. 3.1.1), "When he is in union with the body, the senses and the mind, the wise people say that he is the experiencer" (Kāṭha. 1.3.4). Also "He is the one God hidden in all beings, who is all-

pervading, the Universal Self of all beings, the director of all actions, dwelling in all beings, the witness, the vitalizer, the one and the only one, and the one free from all attributes" (Shvet. 6.11). And "He pervades all and is bright, incorporeal, scatheless, without muscles, (and is) pure and untouched by sin" (Isha. 8). These two Mantrās show the eternal purity of Brahma, and that it is not possible to improve upon it in any way. Final Release is nothing but becoming Brahma, therefore Final Release is also not something which admits of any refinement. Therefore, it is not possible for anybody to show any other way by which Final Release could be connected with action. Therefore barring knowledge and knowledge alone, action cannot have any the slightest relation to it. But (says the opponent) knowledge of course is a mental act. No (we reply), because there is dissimilarity (between the two). Action is of course that which is enjoined, independently of the nature of anything, and is dependent on the operation of the mind of a man, for instance as in the following passages viz., "For whatever Divinity an oblation is taken up (by the Adhvaryu priest) one (the Hotri) should meditate on that Divinity while reciting 'Vashat'. "Let him meditate on Sandhyā" (Ait. Brā. 3.8.1) etc. Though meditation or reflection is mental, it is yet possible for a man to do it or not to do it or to do it in some other way, because it solely depends upon a man. Knowledge however is generated by the right means of knowledge. The right means of knowledge has concern with things as they actually exist, and it is impossible to generate knowledge or not to generate it or to generate it in some other way (optionally), because knowledge depends upon the existing thing itself, and not upon any injunction or upon a man. Therefore, knowledge though mental is greatly dissimilar (to meditation). Just as in the Scriptural passage "A man, verily Oh Gautama, is Agni, the woman, verily O Gautama, is Agni" (Chhān. 5.7, 8.1) the conception that a man or a woman is Agni is mental, and as resulting from an injunction, is action pure and simple and it depends on a man. But the conception of the ordinary fire as Agni is neither any thing which depends upon an injunction or on a man, but something which depends on the thing (the fire) itself, and it is knowledge pure and simple and not action. In the case of all things which are objects

of the right means of knowledge, one should understand similarly. This being so, the knowledge that the eternally existing Brahma is the Self, is not something which depends upon an injunction. So Brahma not being the object of an injunction, or not being an entity from which any thing can be discarded or to which any thing can be added, any imperative forms (of verbs) we see used in the Scriptures, become as ineffective as when the sharp edge of a razor is employed on a stone. What then is the purport (the opponent asks) of passages like "The Self (Oh Maitreyī) is to be seen, heard etc." which have an appearance of an injunction? We reply—They are for the purpose of making (a man) averse to the objects of his natural tendency. In the case of a man who is an extrovert and acts with a view to attain the objects of his desire and to avoid things distasteful to him, he, having failed to attain the highest aim of man, is yet desirous of attaining such aim, passages like "The Self, Oh Maitreyī, should be seen" etc. help him to set his face against the aggregate of the objects of the natural tendency of his body and sense-organs, and to direct the stream of his mind towards the Universal Self. To him who has started on the quest of the Self, the Scriptures propound the true nature of the Self from which nothing can be discarded and to which nothing can be added, by means of the following passages, viz. "All this is that which is the Self" (Brih. 2.4.6), "When the Self only is all this, how should he see another, how should he know another, how should he know the Knower?" (Brih. 4.5.15), "This Self is Brahma" (Brih. 2.5.19) etc. Now we understand, that the knowledge of the Self with respect to which contra-indication of any action as such is the principal thing, and, that it does not admit of the giving up or the taking up of anything, is but too true. The fact that when there is the realization of Brahma, all duties come to an end and there is satisfaction that the aim is achieved, is something which indeed is a feather in our cap (lit., it is our Alankāra i.e. an ornament). The Scriptures also say similarly thus—"If a man understands the Self as his own Self, then wishing for what should he suffer along with his suffering body?" (Brih. 4.4.12), and the Smṛiti also says thus—"Having understood this, O Bhārata, a man becomes enlightened and one who has achieved his aim." (Bh. G. 15.20). Therefore the

Vedānta Shāstra does not culminate in propounding Brahma as being something which could be an object of an injunction to realize it. The objection which some raise, that there is no such portion of the Scriptures which has the purport of merely making a statement about an existing entity (Vastu), as distinguished from an injunction for the doing or for abstaining from doing something, or being supplementary to any such injunction for doing or abstaining from doing something, is not a felicitous statement, because the Purusha of the Upanishads is not subsidiary to anything else. It cannot be said about that Purusha which can be comprehended only from the Upanishads, and which is not of a transmigratory nature, and which in fact is Brahma, and is different from the fourfold materials of things which are liable to be created etc., and which is a topic in itself, and is not subsidiary to any thing else, that it is not, or that it cannot be comprehended, because, in the following Scriptural passage it is described as the Ātmā (the Self) thus—(The Self can only be described negatively as) “Ātmā is, not that, not that” and it is not possible to deny the Self, because whosoever endeavours to deny it, is himself the Self (Ātmā). To the objection that it is not reasonably sustainable that the Self is to be understood from the Upanishads only, because it is the object of the notion of ‘I’ or ‘Ego’, (we reply)—No, it is not so, because the Self is the immediate consciousness (Sākshī) of that Jīva-Self which is the object of the notion of ‘I’ or ‘Ego’. Now, because this Purusha who is the mere immediate consciousness, as distinguished from the agent who is the object of the notion of ‘I’ or ‘Ego’, which resides in all beings, is uniform, the only one (without a second), is eternally unchanging, is the Self of all, and is not understood by anybody either from the Vedic chapter on injunctions or from the science of reasoning (Nyāya), and it is not therefore possible for anybody to deny it, or reduce it to the status of being supplementary to an injunction. It is precisely because of its being the Self of all that it cannot either be discarded or taken up. All things which are the modifications of the root-cause and are perishable, perish only upto the Purusha. The Purusha is imperishable because of the absence of any cause for such destruction, is eternally unchanging because of the absence of any cause for its modi-



fication, and is (therefore) of the nature of being eternally pure, enlightened, and free. Therefore the particularization of the Purusha as the one belonging to the Upanishads, in the passages "There is nothing beyond the Purusha, he is the final goal and the transcendental condition" (Kāṭha. 1.3.11), and "I ask you about the Purusha mentioned in the Upanishads" (Bṛih. 3.9.26) can be proper, only if the Purusha is principally the subject illustrated in the Upanishads. Therefore it is but a bold and reckless statement that no portion of the Scriptural texts treats of an existing entity. The statement of those who know the purport of the Shāstrās, viz. "We have seen that the meaning of that is the knowledge of action" etc., being with regard to the subject relating to the desire to know 'Duty' (Dharma), should be understood as purporting to relate to the Shāstra of injunctions and prohibitions (i.e. the Karmakāṇḍa of the Pūrva Mimāṃsā). Besides if we were to understand that "action is the purport of the Scriptures, and whatever does not refer to it is purposeless" in the extreme sense, there would occur the predicament of the mention of existing entities (in the Shāstra) being rendered purposeless. If the Shāstra does in fact propound an existing entity, as apart from an injunction about an action or aversion to it or something supplementary to these, with regard to something (occurring) in the future, then where is the reason for maintaining that it does not propound the eternally existing and unchanging entity (such as Brahma)? Merely because an existing entity is propounded (in the Scriptures) it does not thereby become 'action'. If it were to be objected that although an existing entity may not be 'action' as such, still the propounding of an existing entity (by the Shāstra) is for the purpose of 'action', because of its being the means of 'action', we reply—this is no fault, because even if we understand the mention of an existing entity for the purpose of 'action', the existing entity possessing such potentiality for bringing about such 'action', would thus happen to have been propounded all the same. Their aim may very well be to subserve 'action', but even if it were to be so, it would not mean that an existing entity is not propounded at all. That it is meant to subserve 'action' is its fruit. But (says the opponent) supposing it is so propounded, how does it help you? We reply—The propound-

ing of an existing entity such as the Self is also of such a nature, and by understanding such existing entity (as the Self or Brahma) which has the result of removing erroneous ignorance, the cause of transmigratory existence, the purpose that an entity has such a meaning, is common between it and the propounding of an entity which is a means for 'action'. Moreover the Shāstra is seen to teach 'abstention' such as—"A Brāhmaṇa should not be killed", which is neither 'action' nor a means for 'action'. Now if instruction about entities not meant for the purpose of 'action' were to be purposeless, then the inevitable conclusion is, that instruction about such 'abstention' as that 'a Brāhmaṇa should not be killed' would be without a purpose, which would not be desirable. From the mere connection of the suffix Naña ( नञ् ) with the verb 'to kill' ( हन् )—which means the act of killing which follows naturally from the verb 'to kill'—it is not possible to imagine that it expresses some new meaning, and that too 'an action' which is different from mere passivity or indifference as to the act of killing. The nature of Naña is such that it makes known the non-existence of that in connection with which it is used, and the consciousness of such non-existence is the cause of the (resulting) passive indifference. That consciousness wears off of itself, like fire after the complete combustion of fuel. Therefore, we consider that everywhere—except in the case of the Prajāpati-vrata—in the case of passages like "A Brāhmaṇa should not be killed" the passive indifference resulting from the aversion to the suggested act, is itself to be understood in the sense of a prohibition (of an act). Therefore the reference to the purposelessness of passages (which do not imply action according to Pūrva-Mimāṃsā) should be understood to have reference to Artha-vāda passages, like legends, which are useless so far as the highest aim of man is concerned. Then with regard also to what has been said, viz. that the mention of actually existing entities which do not lead up to some sort of injunction to action, is purposeless like such sentences as 'the world is comprised of seven islands', it has been refuted, because it has been seen that a fruit does accrue by the mere mention of such an entity, thus—"This is a rope and not a snake'. But (retorts the opponent) I have said already that as it is seen that even in the case of

a person who has received instruction about Brahma, he is still seen to continue to be in the same transmigratory condition, the Scriptural passages have no such meaning as there is in mentioning that this is a rope and not a snake. To this, we reply—it is not possible to show that he who has once understood the condition of the Self's unity with Brahma, still continues to be affected by the transmigratory condition, because it is contradictory to the condition of the unity of the Self with Brahma achieved on Scriptural authority. It is not possible to maintain, that because we see that a man who vainly supposes the Self to be the body is affected by pain or fear, he would continue to be affected by the same condition of pain or fear, which in fact is caused by erroneous-ignorance, when his vanity in supposing the Self to be the body is removed by the knowledge of the unity of the Self with Brahma, generated by such right means of knowledge as the Scriptures. It cannot be, that because we see that a rich man who is vain about his wealth, is affected by pain caused by his wealth being taken away from him, is subject to similar pain by his wealth being taken away from him, when he has renounced the world and has become a sanyāsin and when thereby his vanity about his wealth is removed. Nor can it be, that because it is seen that a man who wears a Kuṇḍala (an ear ornament) feels pleasure caused by his vanity about the Kuṇḍala, continues to have similar pleasure caused by the vanity of being adorned with a Kuṇḍala, when he has divested himself of the Kuṇḍala and is free from the vanity of the adornment by it. This has been expressed by the Scriptures as follows—"Neither pain nor pleasure affect one who is in a disembodied condition" (Chhān. 8.12.1). If it be objected, that disembodiedness supervenes after the body falls (i.e. when a person dies), and not while a person continues to live, we reply—no, because the embodied condition itself is caused by erroneous-ignorance. In the case of the Self it is not possible to conceive of any corporeality for the Self, otherwise than by the erroneous-ignorance of the nature of the vanity of the Self being possessed of a body. We have already said that the Self is eternally sans-body, because of its not having action as its cause. If it is urged that corporeality is caused by meritorious and unmeritorious actions, we reply

—no, because in as much as the relation of the Self with a body is not yet properly established, any assumption about the Self having performed meritorious or unmeritorious actions is even still less established. And also because the assumption of corporeality to the Self as depending upon meritorious and unmeritorious actions and of meritorious and unmeritorious actions as depending upon the corporeality of the Self, would lead (us) towards (the fallacy of) mutual interdependence as cause and effect. And this notion about the beginninglessness (of these two) would be like a series of the blind leading the blind (*andha-paramparā*). And it is not reasonably sustainable to predicate activity as referring to the Self in as much as it has no relation to action. If it be said that we observe activity on the part of kings etc. (without their being actually physically active) merely by their immediate presence, we reply—no, their apparent activity is understood to be reasonably sustainable because of their relation (as masters) with their servants obtained on wages etc. It is not possible to imagine in the case of the Self, any cause such as wages etc. effecting a relation between it and the body, like the relation between a master and a servant, when erroneous-ignorance is there as a direct cause of its relation to a body. In this way the host-ship (*Yajamānatva*) of the Self is explained. If one were to object here (as does, for instance a follower of *Prabhākara*'s view) that the identification by the Self with the body, when in fact it is different from the body, is not erroneous, but is in a secondary sense, we reply—no, it is well-known that it is only when there is an evident difference between two entities, that the use of a term in a primary and secondary sense is reasonably sustainable. Just when the difference between two entities is patent to a man, as for instance when it is well-known to him that an animal with a mane etc. and a peculiar proud form, which by the method of positive and negative instances, deserves to have a designation, viz., a lion, applied to it, is a distinct and separate entity, and when there also is another person who is endowed with the usual qualities of a lion such as fierceness and boldness, and who is a different entity altogether and is quite distinct from the former (i.e. the lion), then the consciousness in such a man, of the other man's leoninity, and the use by such a man of the

term 'lion' for that other man, is in a secondary or figurative sense, and not when the difference between the two is not known to him. Hence a man's consciousness and the use by him of one term for another (when he is not conscious of the difference between two entities) are caused by his confusion alone and are not in a secondary or figurative sense. Just as in the twilight, when a pillar is not cognized as such, a man's consciousness of it and his use of the term 'man' for it, or when in the case of a mother-of-pearl his consciousness of it and his use of the term 'silver' for it, is *prima facie* not in a secondary or figurative sense. Similarly, how can the consciousness of and the use by a man of the term 'I' with respect to the aggregate of body etc., be said to be in a secondary or figurative sense, when his consciousness and his use of the term 'I' for the body are caused by his not being able to discriminate between the Self and that which is not the Self ? Even in the case of those learned people who are able to discriminate between the Self and the non-Self, their consciousness and use of the term 'I' for the body, is, like that of the shepherd's (Ajāvipāla), due to their inability to discriminate between the Self and the non-Self. Therefore (the notion of) corporeality is caused by erroneous ignorance (as caused by Nescience) and it is established that a person who has attained knowledge (of the Self) becomes disembodied even during life. The same is illustrated by the Scriptural passages relating to a person who has realized Brahma, thus—"Just as the slough of a snake lies inert and spread out at length on an ant-hill, even so does this body also. And this disembodied and immortal vital breath (Prāṇa) is in reality the Brahma, the Teja" (Brih. 4.4.7). Similarly—"While endowed with eyes he is sans-eyes, while endowed with the organ of hearing he is without the organ of hearing, and so on in the case of speech, the mind and the vital breath (Prāṇa)". Smṛiti also, in the passage beginning thus—"What is the nature of the language used by one whose intellect is well-poised" ?—and enumerating the characteristics of a man whose intellect is well-poised, describes the total absence of any the least relation with activity. Therefore, a man who has realized the unity of the Self and Brahma has no further transmigratory life as before. Ergo, it is clear that he who continues to have such transmigratory existence has not realized the unity of

the Self and Brahma and the Shāstra therefore is absolutely flawless. Again with regard to what is said, viz., that because it is observed that further cogitation and meditation should follow the hearing of Brahma, Brahma is merely complementary to an injunction and its knowledge does not culminate in the realization of its own nature, we reply—no, because cogitation and meditation are for the purpose of their ultimate culmination in the realization (of Brahma). If Brahma after being fully realized were to be employed elsewhere (for some other purpose) then it would very well happen to be complementary to an injunction, but it is not so, because (as said above) cogitation and meditation also, like hearing, are meant ultimately to culminate in the complete realization (of Brahma). Therefore it is not possible (to say) that Brahma is something, to know which the Shāstra is the right means of knowledge, only in so far as it is the object of an injunction to meditate upon, and it is conclusively established by the proper co-ordination of the Scriptural passages that Brahma is independent in itself, having the Shāstra as the right means of its knowledge. This being so, an altogether separate beginning of the Shāstra, thus—“Now, therefore, the inquiry into Brahma”—is perfectly justified. Were it to be of the nature of an injunction to realize, the Shāstrakāra would begin it thus—“Now, therefore, the inquiry into Dharma”—and he would not begin a new Shāstra at all. And even if he were to follow the former course, he would begin it like this—“Now, therefore, the inquiry into the supplementary part of Dharma”, similar to “Now therefore an inquiry into the aim of a sacrifice (Kratu) or the highest aim of a man” (as in the Jaimini Sūtra 4.1.1). And as the knowledge of the unity of the Self and Brahma is not described to be the scope of the Shāstra of Dharma (i.e. Purva Mimāṃsā), it is quite logical that the beginning in the present case is thus—“Now therefore an inquiry into Brahma”. Therefore all injunctions and all other means of knowledge are valid only upto the realization thus—“I am Brahma”. For when the knowledge of the Self from which nothing can be discarded and to which nothing can be added has supervened, the right means of knowledge no longer continue to be the right means of knowledge. Besides it is said—when there has arisen (in a man’s mind) the know-

ledge viz. "I am the Sat, the Brahma is but myself", and when owing to the ablation of the conceptions of the son, the body etc. as being one's own Self, the figurative and false-ignorance about the Self has come to an end, how should then any Kārya i.e. effect (originating in wrong conceptions) exist any longer ? As long as the knowledge of the Self, which the Scriptures want us to endeavour after, has not arisen, so long, the Self is a knowing agent, but the same knowing agent becomes that which is searched after, viz. the Highest Self, which is free from all evil and blemish, when the real nature of the Self is realized. Just as the idea of the Self being the body is assumed as valid (in ordinary life), so also all the Pramāṇās (i.e. the means of right knowledge such as perception etc.) are valid only until the one and the only one Self is properly realized.—4.

Here ends the Sūtra-quartette (Chatussūtri).

#### 5. IKSHATYADHIKARAṆAM, Sū. 5-11.

So far we have said, how the passages of Vedānta, which have the knowledge of Brahma as their fruit or result, and which have been shown to have a regular sequence indicating the Self as Brahma, without their having any relation to action, ultimately culminate in (the understanding of) Brahma. We have also said how Brahma is omniscient and all-powerful and is the cause of the origin, preservation and destruction of the transient world. The Sāmkhyās and others however, who consider an ascertained entity to be capable of being understood only by other means of right knowledge and who infer the Pradhāna etc. as the cause, construe the Vedānta passages as indicating those to be the causes (i.e. Pradhāna etc.). They think that from all the Vedānta passages which have the origin (of the world) as their province, the cause is to be deduced from the effect by inference. The Sāmkhyās hold that the contacts of the Purusha are inferable and constant. The followers of Kaṇāda infer from these very passages the Lord (Īshvara) to be the accidental or efficient cause and the Atoms as the cause which is in constant concomitant relation with the effect, (i.e. that they are the material cause of the world). Other Logicians who depend upon fallacious passages and

logic, stand forth as opponents, in this connection. Therefore the Āchārya (Bādarāyaṇa), an authority on words, sentences and the right means of knowledge (i.e. Vyākaraṇa, Mimāṃsā, and Nyāya), in order to demonstrate that the Vedānta passages aim at the comprehension of Brahma, first states the wrong views derived from the fallacious passages and logic as the objections, and then refutes them. In this connection the Sāmkhyaś who hold the inert Pradhāna which is made up of three qualities to be the cause of the transient world, say—Those Vedānta passages which you have mentioned as indicating the omniscient and all-powerful Brahma to be the cause of the transient world, can even be shown to be equally applicable in the case of the view which holds the Pradhāna to be the cause. The all-powerfulness of the Pradhāna with regard to its own modifications is reasonably sustainable and even so is its omniscience. How is it so? What you consider as knowledge is the Sattva quality according to the Smṛiti passage—“Knowledge is generated from Sattva” (Bh. G. 14.17). It is well-known that some men equipped with bodies and sense-organs are omniscient and Yogins, because of knowledge which is the quality of Sattva. As is well-known it is when this quality ‘Sattva’ attains the highest unsurpassable perfection that omniscience results. It is not possible to imagine omniscience or the possession of even a modicum of knowledge in the case of the Puruṣa who is unequipped with a body and sense-organs but is possessed of mere intelligence alone. And because of the triple qualities of the Pradhāna—inert though it is in its Pradhāna state—omniscience is figuratively spoken of about it, because the Sattva quality which is the cause of all knowledge is inherent in the Pradhāna. You (Vedāntins) also, who understand Brahma as omniscient, must necessarily understand by omniscience referred to in the Vedānta passages, something which is equipped with the latent power for all knowledge. It cannot be that Brahma keeps on cognizing all the time (without interruption), because were Brahma to keep on cognizing eternally, its freedom (to do so only if and when it chooses to do so) would be lost. Again if we were to understand it as not cognizing eternally (but only intermittently) it may even refrain from cognizing (when it so chooses). Hence omniscience would be tantamount to mean



that it is only equipped with the potentiality for cognizing everything. Besides you desire to understand Brahma as not being equipped with the instruments for action, prior to the creation of the world. It is not reasonable that knowledge can possibly arise in any one in the absence of a body and sense-organs etc. which are the means of acquiring knowledge. Besides, Pradhāna being of a multiple composition, modification of it is possible, and it may—like clay etc.—be reasonably supposed to be the cause of the world, but not so Brahma which is unmixed (i.e. unconnected with anything else), and which is only a mere single unit in itself. The conclusion arrived at (by the Sāmkhyās) being this, the following Sūtra is begun :—

*On account of thinking—(Pradhāna) is not  
(the cause)—(it is) not based on the  
Scriptures.—5.*

In Vedānta, it is not possible to accept the non-intelligent Pradhāna as contemplated by the Sāmkhyās, to be the cause of the transient world. It is not mentioned in the Scriptures. How is it not mentioned in the Scriptures? Because of the word 'thinking'. Because the Scriptures refer to 'thinking' on the part of the cause (of the transient world). How so? Because the Scriptures, beginning with—"O Soumya, in the beginning 'Sat' alone without a second, was all this (i.e. the transient world)" (Chhān. 6.2.1)—say further—"that Sat *thought*, I shall make myself many and create, and it created Teja (the element of heat and light)" (Chhān. 6.2.3). There, having determined the transient world as evolved by names and forms, to be indicated by the word 'This', as being merely the Sat-Self in the beginning, the same Sat relevant to the passage, and denoted by the word Sat, is indicated to be the creator of Teja etc., after having previously *thought* about them. Similarly elsewhere it mentions 'thinking' as having been antecedent to creation, thus—"This world in the beginning was only the Self, nothing else was then actually active. He thought, 'I will create all the worlds', and then created He all these worlds" (Ait. 1.1.1). Somewhere else it alludes to the Purusha of sixteen parts and says—"He thought. He created the Prāṇa" (Pra. 6.3). By the verb 'to think' the

meaning of the verb is intended to be conveyed, like the verb 'to sacrifice', and not merely the root verb. Similarly, Scriptural passages such as—"He who is omniscient in the comprehensive sense and who perceives everything in detail and whose penance is knowledge and from whom the lower Brahma, names and forms and food were created" (Mund. 1.1.9)—which have the purport of conveying that the omniscient Lord is the cause (of the transient world), should be adduced as instances. What you (the opponent) have stated, viz. that the Pradhāna can be omniscient merely by means of 'knowledge' which is the quality of Sattva, is not reasonably sustainable. In the Pradhāna state when the qualities are in equipoise i.e. are evenly balanced, knowledge as the quality of 'Sattva' is not possible. (Because, according to the Sāmkhya tenet, creation by Pradhāna starts, when the equipoise of the three qualities i.e. Guṇās—viz. Sattva, Raja, and Tama—is disturbed and one quality predominates over the other two.) Oh, but have I not said (retorts the opponent), that it would be omniscient because of its potentiality for all knowledge? That also is not reasonably sustainable. For if you were to maintain, that even when there is a perfect equipoise Pradhāna can be omniscient by relying upon its potentiality for knowledge abiding in 'Sattva', sure enough, because of its potentiality for obstructing knowledge abiding in its Raja (passion) and Tama (darkness) qualities, you will have to say that the Pradhāna hardly has any knowledge at all. Moreover, a mere Sattva function as apart from a witnessing agent (immediate consciousness), is not capable of being expressed by the verb 'to know'. Nor is non-sentient Pradhāna such a witnessing agent. Therefore the omniscience of Pradhāna is not reasonably inferable, while the omniscience of Yogins brought about by the excellence of the 'Sattva' quality and because of their being animate beings is reasonably sustainable and so it cannot be an illustration in point. If however you imagine Pradhāna to be endowed with the capacity to 'think' as caused by its having such a witnessing agent, just as in the case of an iron ball its capacity to burn is caused by Agni, then, it being so, it would be reasonable to hold that that which you conceive to be the cause which brings about 'thinking', is itself the chief omniscient Brahma, which (according to us) is the cause of the transient world. To the objection

raised by you, viz. that constant cognizing by Brahma in the primary sense is not reasonably sustainable, as it would not then be possible for it to have freedom to do so (i.e. to cognize if and when it so pleases), we say—You (who raise this objection) ought to be asked—how can there ever be a loss of the omniscience (of Brahma) because of its constant cognizing activity? To say of one—whose knowledge is capable of making all objects manifest and who is eternal—that he is not omniscient, is contradictory. If knowledge were not to be eternal then Brahma would sometimes know and at other times would not, and then it may be that there may perhaps be no omniscience. No such fault is there, in the case of eternal cognizing. (If you were to object) that in the case of constant cognizing, the mention of freedom with regard to knowledge would not be reasonably sustainable, (we say)—No. Though the Sun with its constant heat and light is there, we find a reference to its freedom, such as (when we say) that the Sun scorches or it shines. But (says the opponent), it is only when the Sun is in contact with something which can be scorched or made manifest, that there is a reference to its scorching or shining, but as there is no connection between Brahma and the object of knowledge before the creation of the world, the illustration is not apt.\*

No (we reply), even in the absence of any object (of knowledge), we see a reference to the activity (of the Sun) as that the Sun shines. Similarly even in the absence of any object of knowledge, a reference to Brahma's activity as that 'it thought' is reasonably sustainable (in a secondary sense), and so there is no difficulty. If an object (of knowledge) is necessary (according to the opponent) Scriptural passages referring to 'thinking' by Brahma are all the more reasonably sustainable. What then (asks the opponent) is that object (of knowledge), which before the creation can be the province of the Lord's knowledge? Those names and forms—we reply—which are yet unevolved (Avyākṛita), but which are intended to be evolved, and with regard to whom it is not possible to say whether they are the same or different from Īshvara—are such objects.

\* Lele Shāstri translates Jnānakarma as Jnānakriyā, while Abhyankar Shāstri agrees with Thibout, who renders Jnānakarma as the object of knowledge.

Need it be said, that the knowledge of the eternally existing (Nityasiddha) Lord, with regard to the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world, is eternal, when those who are experts in the science of Yoga say that they have actual knowledge with regard to the past and future things through the favour of the Lord ? The objection that before the creation (of the world) Brahma which has no contact with a body etc. cannot be reasonably understood to be able to think, cannot be advanced (against us), as the eternal nature of the knowledge of Brahma (like the constant refulgence of the Sun) cannot be reasonably understood to have any necessity for the means of knowledge. Moreover, it may be that in the case of a transmigratory being affected by Nescience etc. the generation of knowledge may depend upon a body etc., but it cannot be so in the case of the Lord who is free from any obstruction to knowledge. The following Mantrās illustrate how the Lord has no need for a body and his knowledge is unhampered. "He is without a body and organs, nor is there any thing like unto Him or above Him, His power is pre-eminent and comprehensive, His cognizing and possessing strength is natural to His nature" (Shvet. 6.8). "Without hands and feet He grasps and speeds, sans-eyes He sees, sans-ears He hears, He knows all that is knowable, but there is no one who knows Him, and He is the primeval and the greatest Purusha" (Shvet. 3.19). But (says the opponent), is it not it, that as different from the Lord, there is no other transmigratory Self affected with the cause of obstruction to knowledge ? Because the Scriptures say—"There is no other seer than Him, there is no other knower than Him" (Brih. 3.7.23). And if so, how is it said, that in the case of a transmigratory Self the generation of knowledge is dependent on a body etc., but not so in the case of the Lord ? To that we reply—Indeed, it is true that there is no other such transmigratory Self, as apart from the Lord. Still we do accept (as necessary) a connection with a body etc., just as we accept in the case of the Ākāsha, connection with adjuncts such as a jar, a pot, a hill or a cave etc. In ordinary life we do see the use of such words as the cavity of a jar or a pot, because of such connection, even though the cavity is not different from the Ākāsha, and we do also see the erroneous conception of differences in the Ākāsha, such as the

Ākāsha of the jar etc., caused by it (viz. the same connection). Similarly here also, there is the erroneous conception of difference between the Lord and the transmigratory Self, caused by the absence of discrimination of the contact with the adjuncts, such as the union with a body etc. We do see that the Self even though it is but the Self only has an attachment for union with a body etc. (which is not the Self), as if it were the Self, the attachment being caused by an antecedent erroneous conception. This being so, the ability of the transmigratory Self to 'think', depending upon the body etc., is reasonably sustainable, during such transmigratory condition. What has been said before (by the opponent) that the Pradhāna consisting as it does of many elements can be properly understood to be the cause (of the world), like clay etc., which is the cause of a jar, but not Brahma which is not connected with anything, is refuted by saying that Pradhāna has no valid Scriptural authority. How, even by Logic and argument, it is possible to maintain that it is Brahma only which is the cause (of the world) and not Pradhāna etc. will be discussed hereafter by Sūtra (Bra. Sū. Bhā. 2.1.4).—5.

(The Sāmkhya opponent says here)—What you have said, viz., that the non-sentient Pradhāna cannot be the cause of the transient world, because the Scriptures refer to 'thinking', (we do not admit) as what we say is reasonably sustainable in another way, because it is seen that non-sentient things are figuratively referred to as if they are sentient. Just as, when the erosion of a (river) bank is seen to be imminent, even in the case of a non-sentient entity such as a bank, figurative use (of words) such as 'the bank is desirous of falling' (the desiderative form showing desire) as if it is a sentient entity is seen, similarly, in the case of a non-sentient entity like Pradhāna when creation by it is imminent, it would be possible to say about it figuratively, that "it (i.e. the Pradhāna) thought". Just as in ordinary life a person thinks that after having had a bath and dinner, he will, in the afternoon, proceed to the town by a chariot and then as a rule behaves accordingly, similarly the Pradhāna also when it proceeds to transform itself into the form of 'the great principle' (Mahat) is spoken of figuratively as if it is sentient. But why (say we) do

you imagine this 'thinking' in its primary sense, to have been used in a figurative sense ? (The Sāmkhya refutes this by saying)—Because it is seen that even non-sentient 'water' and 'Teja' are spoken of figuratively as if they are sentient, thus—"That Teja thought, the Āpās thought" (Chhān. 6.2.3,4). Therefore, it is understood that the act of 'thinking' by the Sat must be in the figurative sense, because it is mentioned in a context where figurative use is to be seen. (The Sāmkhya opponent wants to establish that as 'thinking' by Sat is mentioned in the Scriptures along with such non-sentient entities like the Teja and the Āpās as 'thinking', figuratively, it (i.e. Sat) must mean the Pradhāna and not Brahma, as the Vedāntin would have it.) The contention of the Sāmkhya being this, the following Sūtra is stated :—

*If it be said (that the word 'thinking') is used figuratively—(we say) no, because of the word 'Self'.—6.*

What is said (before), viz. that the word 'to think' is used in the figurative sense in connection with the non-intelligent Pradhāna which is indicated by the word 'Sat', just as it is used with regard to Āpa and Teja, is not so. Why ? Because of the word 'Self'. The Scriptures, beginning with—"Oh Soumya, this Sat alone was in the beginning"—and after having mentioned the creation of 'Teja', 'Āpa' and 'Anna' thus—"It thought, it created the 'Teja' (Chhān. 6.2.1,3), and after referring to the same 'Sat' which is relevant to the context as the one that 'thinks', and the same 'Teja', 'Āpa' and 'Anna', by the word Deities, say further—"This Deity here thought, Oh well, I myself, after having entered into these three Deities as the Jīva-Self, will make names and forms manifest" (Chhān. 6.3.2) etc. There, if the non-sentient Pradhāna is imagined figuratively as the one that thinks, then the same Pradhāna being relevant (to the context) would be referred to as "This here Deity". In that case the Deity would not designate the 'Jīva' by the word 'Self'. That the 'Jīva' of course is the sentient ruler of the body and the sustainer of the 'Prāṇās', is so because it is well-known, and is so etymologically also. How then can the 'Jīva' be the Self

of the non-sentient Pradhāna? The Self verily is one's own form (Svarūpa). The sentient-Jīva does not deserve to be the own form of non-sentient Pradhāna. If however the sentient Brahma is accepted to be the one that 'thinks' in the primary sense, then in that case, the use of the word 'Self' with reference to 'Jīva' is reasonably sustainable. Similarly, (in the Scriptures) in the passage—"That which is this subtle essence, is the Self of all this, that is the Truth, that is the Self, that thou art, Oh Shvetaketu" (Chhān. 6.14.3), the same 'Sat' relevant to the context, the subtle essence, the Self, is indicated as 'the Self', and the sentient Shvetaketu is told about that as being the Self of himself, thus—"Oh Shvetaketu, that thou art". Āpa and Teja on the other hand being sense-objects are non-sentient and because of their being referred to as sense-objects, with respect to whom evolution by names and forms etc. is to be made, and as there is no reason why it (i.e. thinking) should—as in the case of the word 'Self'—be taken in its primary sense, it stands to reason to hold, that the act of 'thinking', so far as 'Āpa' and 'Teja' are concerned, should, as in the case of the bank (of a river) be taken as being used in a figurative sense. Or rather, even the act of 'thinking' on the part of Teja and Āpa also should be understood, to be used in its primary sense, because of their being presided over by the 'Sat'. We have already said that in the case of 'Sat', because the word 'Self' is used with reference to it, the act of thinking is not used in a figurative sense.—6.

If you (the opponent) were to say—It would be possible to use the word 'Self' (figuratively) in the case of the non-sentient Pradhāna because it accomplishes all things desired by the Purusha, just as in the case of a king, as all things desired by him are accomplished for him by his servant, it is possible for him to use the word 'Self' figuratively for the servant, as for instance thus—Bhadrasena is my *alter ego* (Mamātmā). Pradhāna obliges a person's Self by accomplishing for the Self its enjoyments and Final Release, just as a servant of a king obliges him by acting in the matter of a treaty and war. Or, the same word 'Self' may be used in the case of both sentient and non-sentient entities, because we see a similar use in such words as "the

Self of the elements, the Self of the senses" etc. Or, just as the same word Jyoti (light of Brahma, Light as Supreme Spirit) is used both for 'Jyotishtōma' (a type of Soma Sacrifice) and fire. Hence, how do you (the Vedāntin) say that the word 'thinking' is used in its non-figurative sense? To that the reply is given:—

*Because there is instruction about Final Release for a man who is devoted to that (i.e. Sat), (the word self is not applicable to Pradhāna).—7.*

The non-sentient Pradhāna does not deserve to be the support i.e. the meaning of the word 'Self', because having recognized the 'Sat' the subtle essence relevant to the context to be the Self, and having instructed sentient Shvetaketu, who is to be helped in attaining Final Release, to have that (Self) as his support, (i.e. to know that he and the Sat are not different entities), further instruction about Final Release is given as follows:—"The man who has secured a preceptor, attains knowledge. He has to tarry only upto the time of his death to attain Final Release and become one with the Self" (Chhān. 6. 14. 2). If the sentient Shvetaketu who is desirous of attaining Final Release, is instructed to the effect, that he is the non-sentient Pradhāna indicated by the word Sat, then in effect the Shāstra would be instructing the sentient Shvetaketu, that he is the non-sentient Pradhāna, and then in that case the Shāstra which is flawless, would be instructing perversely and would lead a man to ruin and would be unauthoritative i.e. invalid. But it is not reasonable or logical to imagine the Shāstra which is flawless to be unauthoritative or invalid. If the Shāstra which is authoritative were to instruct a person, who though ignorant is desirous of attaining Final Release, that the non-sentient Pradhāna, which in fact is not the Self, is the Self in fact, and if such a person trusting (in such instruction) does not rid himself of the notion that the Pradhāna is the Self, in accordance with the maxim of the blind man holding the bull's tail, and does not succeed in understanding the proper Self which is different from the Pradhāna, then, he, under such circumstances would be foiled in (his pursuit of) the highest



aim of man and would lead himself to ruin. Therefore it is logical and reasonable to hold that just as the Shāstra instructs a person who is desirous of attaining heaven, about such means of attaining it, as Agnihotra etc., which are the proper means, similarly, the Shāstra instructs a person who is desirous of attaining Final Release, about the Self as it really is, viz. by a passage like—"He (is) the Self, that thou art, Oh Shvetaketu." It is only if it is so, that instruction about Final Release would be proper and reasonable, on the analogy of the illustration of "the ordeal of the acquittal of a truthful man by (his) taking the hot hatchet in hand". Otherwise, if the instruction about the Sat-principle is in a figurative sense, as for instance in the passage—"Know me to be the Uktha (i.e. Prāṇa or hymn)" (Ait. Āra. 2.1.2.6), it would be an instruction having a non-eternal fruit and would be of the nature of a fanciful combination i.e. imagining a small thing as great (Sampad-rūpam). In that case it would not properly and reasonably be instruction in Final Release. Therefore the use of the word 'Self' with reference to the subtle essence 'Sat' is not to be understood in a figurative sense.

In the case of the servant, of course, the difference between the master and servant being patent, the use of the word Self in the figurative sense, as—"Bhadrasena, (is) my *alter ego*"—is reasonably sustainable. Besides, it is not justifiable to imagine a figurative use (of words) in the case of things for which Scriptures are the only valid means of right knowledge, only because there is such figurative use in some stray instance, because it would then lead to doubt in all cases. As regards the argument which is advanced (by the opponent)—viz., that the word 'Self' could have a common application both in the case of sentient and non-sentient entities, as in the case of the word 'Jyoti' used commonly both for the Sacrifice of that name and fire—it is not so, because it is not logical to ascribe more than one meaning to a word. Therefore the word Self used in the primary sense only with respect to sentient entities, is used in the case of elements etc., as—the Self of the elements and the Self of the sense-organs—only with a view to speak about their sentiency figuratively. Even assuming the word Self to have a common application, it is not possible in the absence of any particular chapter (Prakaraṇa) or an

Upapada\* to determine that a word is used in one of the two senses (i.e. principal and figurative). There is no means, in this case, by which one could determine that the non-sentient (Pradhāna) is meant. The 'Sat', the one that thinks, is here relevant to the context, the sentient Shvetaketu is just near at hand, and we have already discussed how the sentient Shvetaketu could not have a non-sentient Pradhāna as his 'Self'. Therefore we conclude that the word 'Self' is here used with respect to a sentient object. The word 'Jyoti' also, which by custom is used for fire only in ordinary life, is used to indicate a sacrifice, only on account of a similarity with fire, imagined by Arthavāda, and is not therefore an apt illustration. Or it should be understood, that having discussed the word 'Self' in the previous Sūtra by dispelling all doubts about its being used in the figurative sense or about its being common (to more than one thing), the present Sūtra—"Because there is instruction of Final Release for a man who is devoted to that (i.e. Sat)" is for furnishing a separate reason for getting rid of the idea that the Pradhāna is the cause (of the world). Therefore the word Sat does not indicate the non-sentient Pradhāna.—7.

Then for stating another reason why Pradhāna is not indicated by the word Sat, (the Sūtrakāra) says further :—

*And also because there is no mention of its having to be discarded.*—8.

If (we were to hold) that the Pradhāna which is not the Self, is indicated by the word Sat, and if it is supposed, that the preceptor has here instructed Shvetaketu about that Pradhāna, in the passage—"He is the Self, that thou art", then the preceptor, in order that by hearing such instruction, Shvetaketu, because of his ignorance of the Self, may not put his trust in that (i.e. Pradhāna), and also with a desire to instruct him about the real Self, would naturally instruct him about discarding that Pradhāna. Just as a person desiring to point out the star Arundhatī (to some

\* Secondary word of a sentence, a preposition, particle etc. prefixed to a verb, or a noun derived from a verb, which determines or qualifies the sense of the verb.

other person) first makes him accept a big star near about Arundhatī, which in fact is not Arundhatī, as being Arundhatī, and afterwards asks him to reject that big star, and instructs him to accept that which is the proper Arundhatī, similarly the preceptor (who desires to instruct Shvetaketu about the real Self) would tell him that this (i.e. the Pradhāna indicated by him first as the Self) is not the real Self. But the preceptor has not said so. (We see that) right up to the end of the sixth chapter full reliance on understanding this Sat alone as the real Self is to be seen. The word 'also' in the Sūtra, is intended to demonstrate the augmentation of the non-contradiction of the original declaration. Besides, a contradiction of the original declaration would result, even if there were to be a statement about the discarding of the Pradhāna as the real Self. The declaration is that by the knowledge of the cause, every thing (which is its effect) is known. It is stated in the beginning—"But, Oh Shvetaketu, have you at all asked for that instruction, by which, what is not heard becomes heard, what is not perceived becomes perceived, and what is not known becomes known? What can that instruction be? (asks Shvetaketu of the preceptor, his father). (The preceptor says)—Just as, Oh soumya, by one ball of clay, every thing that in essence is earth, becomes known, modification is merely another name (for the cause) and is only an expression in speech (i.e. the modification is merely the cause in another form) and that it is merely clay only, is the truth. Oh soumya, this is the instruction." (Chhān. 6.1.1,3). Even if it is understood that the Pradhāna indicated by the word Sat, is the cause of the whole class of the objects of enjoyment, and even when it is known as being something which is either to be discarded or not to be discarded, even then, the class of experiencing Selves as a whole (i.e. the Jīva-Selves) is not known thereby, because the class of experiencing Selves is not a modification or an effect of Pradhāna. Therefore, the Pradhāna is not indicated by the word Sat.—8.

(Then for stating another reason) why the Pradhāna is not indicated by the word Sat (the Sūtrakāra) says further :—

*Because of the absorption into the Self.—9.*

With reference to that same cause, indicated by the word Sat, it is declared in the Scriptures—"When the Self (Purusha) sleeps, O soumya, he verily becomes one with his own Self, becomes absorbed into his own Self. Therefore he is said to be sleeping. He merges into the Self." (Chhān. 6.8.1). The Scriptural statement etymologically explains the verb 'Sleeps' which refers to the well-known name of the Purusha. By the word 'Sva' (one's own) is meant the Self or Ātmā. The meaning is that he becomes absorbed i.e. merged in the Self (Ātmā) which is relevant to the (present) context, and which is indicated by the word Sat. It is well-known that when the root 'ङ्' has 'अप्' as its suffix, it means 'to be absorbed in', and we find that the words 'Birth' and 'Absorption' are used synonymously with the words 'Creation' and 'Dissolution' respectively. When the Jiva-Self, on account of contact with the peculiar adjuncts of the nature of the operation of the mind or intelligence, perceives sense-objects, as one who has (for the time being) attained that particular condition (of the Self being in contact with a body, and of seemingly being under the influence of Nescience), he is said to be awake. When he (the Self) coloured with the impression (gathered in the waking state) sees dreams, he is then indicated by the word mind or intelligence. And when limiting adjuncts of both these sorts have ceased to operate, then in the condition of deep sleep, because of the absence of any special condition caused by the limiting adjuncts, he is as it were absorbed into himself, and it is then said of him—"He is absorbed in his own self". Just as the Scriptures have described the etymological derivation of the word 'Hridaya' thus—"He the Self abides in the 'Hrid' and therefore it is 'Hridayam'" (Chhān. 8.3.3), or just as the Scriptures describe the root cause of the words 'Ashanāyā' and 'Udanyā' (Āpa and Teja) thus—"It is water that carries (and digests) the food eaten, it is Teja which absorbs the water that is drunk" (Chhān. 6.8.3,5), similarly the Scriptures show by the etymological derivation of the word 'he sleeps', that the meaning is that he becomes absorbed in his own self which is indicated by the word Sat. It cannot be, that the sentient Self attains the non-sentient Pradhāna as being its own self. Again even if the word 'sva' is understood to mean 'as pertaining to itself' and is construed to be the Pradhāna,

still (to say) that a sentient thing is absorbed into a non-sentient thing would be contradictory and irreconcilable. Another Scriptural passage also, viz. "Embraced by the enlightened Self, he was conscious of nothing, either external or internal" (Brih. 4.3.21)—shows that there is a merger into a sentient entity in the condition of deep sleep. Therefore (the conclusion is)—That, into which all sentient things are absorbed, is the sentient one indicated by the word Sat, which is the cause of the world, and not the Pradhāna.—9.

Then for stating another reason why the Pradhāna is not the cause of the transitory world, (the Sūtrakāra says :)

*Because the trend (of all Vedānta passages)  
is uniformly the same.—10.*

If, as in the Shāstra of the Naiyyāyikās (Logicians), in the Vedānta also we had come across a trend showing different causes (of the transient world), as for instance the sentient Brahma, or the non-sentient Pradhāna, or perhaps a third one quite different from the first two, then perhaps, following the trend of opinion of those who claim Pradhāna to be the cause, we would have construed 'the thinking etc.' mentioned in the Scriptural texts in a like manner. But it is not (found to be) so. That the cause is the sentient being (Brahma) is the uniform common knowledge gathered from all Vedānta passages. The following Scriptural passages, viz. "Just as from burning fire scintillæ fly off in all directions, even so all vital airs (Prāṇās) fly off from this 'Self' to their respective destinations, and from the vital airs to the Gods, and from the Gods to the worlds (and reach their respective destinations)." (Kaush. 3.3), "From this Self the Ākāsha came into being" (Tait. 2.1), "All this (has come into being) from the Self" (Chhān. 7.26.1), "This vital air has come into being from the Self" (Pra. 3.3) etc., show, that the Self is the cause. We have already said that the word Self is indicative of a sentient entity. That all the Vedānta passages uniformly indicate a sentient cause, just as eyes etc. have a uniform function as regards Rūpa (form) etc., is a great reason for their being authoritative. Therefore,

because knowledge derived from all Vedānta passages has a uniform trend, the Omniscient Brahma is the cause of the transitory world.—10.

Whence again, is the omniscient Brahma the cause of the transitory world ?

*Also because it is directly so stated in the Scriptures.—11.*

In the Mantropanishad of the Shvetāshvatarās, that the omniscient Lord is the cause of the transient world is directly so stated. With reference to the omniscient Lord, it says thus :—"He is the cause, the Lord of the Lords of the sense-organs (Karaṇās). No body has been his creator or Lord." (Shvet. 6.9). It is therefore established, that the omniscient Brahma, and neither the non-sentient Pradhāna nor any other thing, is the cause of the transitory world.—11.

#### 6. ĀNANDAMAYĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 12.19.

We have so far propounded with the help of Nyāya (Logic), that the passages from Vedānta quoted by us in the Sūtrās, beginning with I.i.2 and ending with I.i.11, propound that the omniscient and all-powerful Lord is the cause of the creation, preservation, and dissolution of the transitory world. We have also described by observing, that the knowledge derived from all the Vedānta passages has a uniform trend, and that all the Vedānta passages maintain that an intelligent entity is the cause (of the world). Hence, (it may be objected) how does (any necessity of) a further treatise then arise ? We reply :—Brahma is understood to be of two sorts, one, characterized by the limiting adjuncts of the differences in modifications by name and form, and the other, different from it, viz. one, in which all limiting adjuncts are absent. The following sentences (from the Scriptures) in a thousand ways, indicate the two-fold nature of Brahma by distinguishing it with reference to the differences due to knowledge and Nescience, viz. "For where there is duality as it were, then one sees another, where however the Self only is all this, whom can (he) see, and with what ?" (Brih. 5.15), "Where one sees

nothing else, hears nothing else, knows nothing else, that is Bhūmā (The Great One)", "Where one sees something else, hears something else, knows something else, that is 'the little'", "That which is the Bhūmā is immortal, that which is 'the little' is mortal" (Chhān. 24.1), "The Self-possessed one, who having created all forms and named them, sits (quietly in repose) calling them by their names" (Tait. Āra. 3.12.7), "Who is without parts, without action, tranquil, without faults, and without taint, and who is the transcendent bund of immortality, and is like fire which has consumed the fuel" (Shvet. 6.19), (whatever is predicated to be Brahma) is "Not that, not that" (Brih. 2.3.6), "Neither gross nor atomic" (Brih. 3.8.8), "The one resort (i.e. qualified Brahma) is Jejune, and the other (i.e. unqualified Brahma) is full and satisfying to the mind."

In its Nescient condition, Brahma can play the dual role of the devotee (the Jīva-Self), as well as the object of devotion (the Highest Self i.e. Brahma). There, some meditations on Brahma, have secular prosperity as their aim, while some have Final Release by progressive stages as their aim, while some others have the richer augmentation i.e. maximization of religious actions, as their aim. These meditations are distinct from each other because of the distinction as between the different adjuncts viz. special qualities of each. Though it is but the only one, the Highest Self and the Lord, that is the object of devotion, as characterized by several distinct qualities, yet, the fruits of such meditations vary according to the particular aspect (of the Lord) with reference to which such meditations themselves vary. Because, the Scriptural text says:—"The way in which he (the devotee—the Jīva-Self) offers his devotion, so he becomes" and "Just how in his world a person wishes, so he, after death here, becomes" (Chhān. 3.14.1). Smṛiti also says similarly:—"Remembering whatever particular deity, he shuffles off this mortal coil, that deity he reaches, always bearing that deity in his mind." Though the same Self is immanent but hidden in all beings moveable and immoveable, still, because of the comparative and superlative degrees of the different limiting adjuncts of the intelligence of the Self, the Scriptures say that though the Self is unchanging, eternal, and of a uniform nature, it becomes manifest as possessing comparatively more or less degrees

of the different qualities of lordliness and power, as for instance in :—"He who knows the highest and the widest manifestation of the Self" (Ait. Āra. 2.3.2.1). So also in Smṛiti—"Whatever being, possessed of power, splendour, or might, be there, know it to have been created from portions of my own Teja." (Bh. G. 10.41). In whomsoever, this transcendent power is in evidence, he is the Lord, and so devotion to him is inculcated. Even so, here also, the Sūtra-kāra will hereafter tell you, that, by reason of the indicatory mark of his rising superior to every kind of evil, the person in the disc of the Sun possessing the structure of gold is the Highest Self. The same should be seen as applying to the Sūtra "The Ākāsha (is Brahma) because there is (here) a characteristic mark (of Brahma)" (Br. Sū. I. i. 22) etc. Similarly though the knowledge of the Self is the means of immediate Final Release, yet, in as much as instruction about it is given by way of special distinctive adjuncts, and thus there is a doubt as to whether such knowledge relates to the Apra i.e. Saṁguṇa Brahma (qualified Brahma) or whether, even though such instruction is given by way of special and distinctive limiting adjuncts, they are not in fact intended to be spoken of, and such knowledge relates to the Para i.e. Nirguṇa Brahma (unqualified Brahma), it is necessary to come to a determination of it, by considering the general trend of the Scriptural passages, as for instance, in the Sūtra "Ānandamaya (is Brahma) because of repetition." (I.i.12). It is with a desire to illustrate, that, even though Brahma is but one only, the Vedāntās are intended for instructing (a person) about it, either as being the object of devotion or as being the object of knowledge, according as it is desired to speak about its having a relation with limiting adjuncts, or as being absolutely divested of any such relation with limiting adjuncts, that the further portion of this treatise is begun. What has already been said before (by the Sūtrakāra) with a view to refute the idea about the non-intelligent Pradhāna being the cause of the transient world, by the foregoing Sūtra—"Because of the trend being uniform" (I.i.10)—is being amplified by him further by considering other Scriptural passages which deny that something other than Brahma (viz. the Pradhāna) is the cause (of the transitory world) :—



*Ānandamaya (i.e. one which structurally is bliss, and is the Highest Brahma) because of the constant repetition of it (as the Highest Self).—12.*

In the Taittiriya Upanishad (2.5) after having enumerated the Self as one having the structure of food, vital air, mind, and understanding respectively, it is said—"The Self which structurally is bliss and is the Ātmā (Self), and is different from and is still inner than the Self which has the structure of understanding." In this connection there is a doubt, whether, here, by the word 'Ānandamaya', the transcendent Brahma which is relevant to the context here, thus—"Brahma is Truth, Knowledge, and Infinite" (Tait. 2.1)—is meant here, or whether like Annamaya etc., something other than Brahma is meant? What then is the conclusion you have arrived at? (The opponent answers) —Ānandamaya is the Self (Ātmā) in a secondary sense, and is something different than Brahma. Why so? —Because it occurs in a series (lit., it has fallen in the stream) of non-principal Selves such as Annamaya, etc., (If the Vṛttikāra says)—It may well be, that Ānandamaya being the innermost of all the Selves (mentioned in order as stated above) is of course the principal Self, he says, No, it cannot be so, because the Scriptures mention the limbs of the body, such as Joy (Priya) etc., and also its embodied condition. Were this Ānandamaya Self to be the Highest Self i.e. the principal Self, we would not expect to hear of any connection between it and "Joy etc.". But here we do find it mentioned that "Joy is its caput". We also find that the Scriptures mention its being embodied. as follows :—"Of that former one, this one is the embodied Self" (Tait. 2.6). The meaning is— That which is this Ānandamaya Self is the embodied Self of the former i.e. of the Self which has the structure of understanding. It is not possible to avoid contact with joy or evil in the case of a Self which is embodied. Therefore the Ānandamaya Self is but only the transmigratory Self. With respect to the conclusion thus arrived at (by the opponent) the Vṛttikāra replies—"The Self which has the structure of bliss is the Highest Self because of the constant repetition (about its being the Highest Self)." The Ānandamaya Self

deserves to be Para i.e. (the Highest Self) only. How so ? Because of the repetition. (In this chapter) the word *Ānanda* (bliss) is very frequently mentioned as being synonymous with the Highest Self. With reference to the *Ānandamaya*, after glorifying it, by mentioning it to have the quality of being the *Rasa* (quintessence i.e. the cause of satisfaction) by the words "He verily is the quintessence", it is mentioned—"After having obtained this quintessence, he becomes one possessed of joy etc." "If this *Ākāsha* (i.e. the *Ātmā* abiding in the *Hridaya* in the form of the *Ākāsha*) were not to be 'the joy', who else would breathe and who else would live ? For he alone causes joy." (Tait. 2.7). "This is an interpretative analysis of Bliss." "(The man who has acquired knowledge) reaches this *Ānandamaya* Self." "He who knows the bliss of *Brahma*, does not have fear of anything (i.e. he becomes unafraid)." (Tait. 2.8, 9). "He understood that *Ānanda* i.e. Joy or Bliss is *Brahma*." (Tait. 3.6). In another scriptural passage—as for instance in "Knowledge and bliss is *Brahma*" (*Brih.* 3.9.28)—we find bliss used as a synonym of *Brahma*. In this manner, because the word *Ānanda* (bliss) is repeatedly used for *Brahma*, it is understood (by us) that the *Ānandamaya* Self is *Brahma*. The objection raised (above), that '*Ānandamaya*' thus occurring in the series (i.e. literally having fallen in the stream of the non-principal Selfs such as *Annamaya* etc.), it also is a non-principal Self, is not a fault (in our view), because *Ānandamaya* Self is the innermost of all. It is better to understand, that the *Shāstra* with a view to instruct (a person) in the principal Highest Self, but acting in conformity with the popular notion, and referring to the body which is a modification of earth etc. and which is not the Self, but which however is known by the extremely ignorant as being the Self, makes him understand, every successively inner non-Self, which—like ikons of molten copper poured into a mould—are all alike, and where each successive non-Self (in the series) is similar to the one that has come before—as the Highest Self, and expecting that it may thus be comprehended the more easily, gives instruction about the innermost principal *Ānandamaya* Self (as being the Highest Self). Just as in the illustration about *Arundhatī* (the star of that name), when, after having shown many stars which are not

Arundhatī as being Arundhatī, the one that is shown last, is really the principal and proper Arundhatī, similarly, here also the Ānandamaya Self, because it is the innermost of all, is properly the Highest Self. With regard to what you (the opponent) have stated (as an objection), that in the case of the principal Self, the notion of joy being the caput etc. cannot be reasonably sustainable, we reply, that the notion is caused by the immediately penultimate adjunct (in the form of a sheath having the structure of knowledge) and is not natural to the Highest Self, and so really there is no fault. The embodiedness of the Ānandamaya Self in a secondary sense can be demonstrated to be so by reason of its being in the series of embodied Selfs such as the Annamaya Self etc., and not because like the transmigratory Self it actually is embodied, and therefore the Ānandamaya Self alone, of course, is the highest Self i.e. Brahma.—12.

*(If it be said that the word 'Ānandamaya' does not mean the highest Self) because the word 'Maya' which means having the structure of, or being a modification (Vikāra) of, we reply—no, because (the word 'Maya') indicates plenitude (of that to which it is affixed).—13.*

Here the opponent raises the objection—Ānandamaya does not deserve to mean the Highest Self. Why? Because of the word 'Maya' which means, having the structure of or being a modification of (something to which it is affixed). In as much as the derivative affix 'Maya' in Ānandamaya has that meaning, the word Ānandamaya is different from the word 'Ānanda' which is meant to indicate a cause (Prakṛiti). Therefore, like the word Annamaya etc., the word Ānandamaya also denotes something which has the structure of bliss or is a modification of bliss. To this argument of the opponent, we reply—No, because it is said in the Smṛiti of (Paṇini) that the word 'māya' also means 'plenitude'. The Sūtra of Paṇini (5.4.21) says that 'māya' also means plenitude (of that to which it is affixed). For instance, just as "Annamayah Yajnah" (Tait. 2.8) means a sacrifice wherein there is a plenitude of food, similarly

Brahma which has such plenitude of bliss is termed *Ānandamaya*. That Brahma has plenitude of bliss, follows, because after first declaring, that beginning with man, right through the ascending series, in every succeeding class bliss is a hundredfold greater, and because it has been finally determined that the bliss of Brahma is understood to be unexcelled (by any other bliss). Therefore, the derivative affix 'maya' is indicative of plenitude.—13.

*Also because (Brahma) is mentioned to be the cause of that (bliss).—14.*

Because of this also, the affix 'maya' indicates plenitude (of that to which it is affixed), as the Scriptures declare that Brahma is the cause of bliss, thus—"For he alone causes bliss" (Tait. 2.7.). For it is well-known that he who confers bliss, has himself a plenitude of it. For just as in ordinary life, we understand that he who brings about 'richness' in others, must himself have such plenitude of wealth, similarly, it is like that. Therefore as the word 'Maya' may also mean plenitude (of that to which it is affixed), '*Ānandamaya*' is the Highest Self.—14.

*That same Brahma which has been expounded (in the previous Mantra) is (here) sung.—15.*

This is how again, '*Ānandamaya*' is, of course, the Highest Self, wherefore, having begun thus—"One who knows Brahma, attains Brahma,"—the same Brahma, which is relevant to the context, in the Mantra—"Brahma is Truth, Knowledge and Infinite" (Tait. 2.1)—and which has been determined to be characterized by the qualities of Truth, Knowledge and Infinitude, and from which all inanimate things and animate beings beginning with the *Ākāsha* were originated, and which (Brahma) having created these beings has itself entered into them, and which remains confined in a cave and is inside all and everything, and for making which comprehensible, "another Self inside this Self, another Self inside this Self" is stated, the same Brahma which has been referred to in the Mantra "One who knows Brahma, attains the highest" is

here sung thus—"Still another Self inside this Self, is the Ānandamaya (Self)" (Tait. 2.5). That, Mantra and Brāhmaṇa must agree in the same sense, is proper, because there is (supposed to be) no conflict between them. Otherwise it would be tantamount to giving up what is relevant and accepting what is not so relevant. Just as the 'Ānandamaya' Self is indicated to be inside the 'Annamaya' Self etc. similarly no other Self still inner than the 'Ānandamaya' is mentioned. The Lore (Vidyā) referred to in the Scriptural passage "This same is the Lore (Vidyā) which Bhrigu derived from Varuṇa" (Tait. 3.6) also is founded precisely on that i.e. Brahma. Therefore 'Ānandamaya' is the Highest Self.—15.

*The Ānandamaya-Self is not the other (i.e. the Jiva-Self), because it is not reasonably sustainable.—16.*

This again is how 'Ānandamaya'-Self is the Highest Self and not the other one. The other one, other than the Lord, is the transmigratory Jiva-Self, is the meaning. The Jiva-Self is not expressed by the word 'Ānandamaya'. Why? Because it is not reasonably sustainable. It is with reference to the Ānandamaya Self that the Scriptures say thus:— "He desired, may I be many and may I create etc., He went into penance. Having performed penance, created He all this i.e. whatever that there is etc." (Tait. 2.6). Here, contemplation by him before the creation of a body, the absence of any difference between the modifications created, and their creator, and the creation of all the modifications about to be created, is not reasonably possible in the case of any entity other than the Highest Self.—16.

*On account of the mention of distinction (Bheda) (the Ānandamaya is not the transmigratory Self).—17.*

This is why, again, the 'Ānandamaya Self' is not the transmigratory Self. In the 'Ānandamaya' chapter, the Scriptural passage "He verily is the quintessence (that satisfies) ; having obtained the quintessence he becomes

full of bliss" (Tait. 2.7) mentions the Jīva-Self, and the 'Ānandamaya-Self' as being distinct (from each other). For, the one who is the recipient cannot at the same time be that which is received.

If then it is said (says the opponent) that the recipient cannot at the same time be that which is received, how then (would you reconcile) the Scriptural and Smṛiti sentences—"The Self is to be sought for", "There is nothing higher than the attainment of the Self"? Oh, alright (we say). But the Self, even though it is something which never deviates from its own selfhood, yet, in ordinary life, we see (the phenomenon), that because of not having properly understood the truth, there is a conviction that the body etc. which really are not the Selves, are the Selves. And therefore in the case of the Jīva-Self which has (through Nescience) egoistically identified itself with a body, Scriptural instruction which makes a difference (between the highest Self and the Jīva-Self), thus—"The Self, which is not yet searched for, deserves to be searched, which is not yet heard, deserves to be heard, which is not yet cogitated upon, deserves to be cogitated upon, and which is not yet understood, deserves to be understood", becomes reasonably sustainable. But the Scriptures in the ultimate real sense do deny, of course, any seer or hearer, other than the omniscient supreme Lord, thus—"Than this, there is no other seer etc." (Bṛih. 3.7.23). As for the supreme Lord, he is different from the one, who through Nescience is wrongly conceived to be the cognitional Self (Vijnānātmā) and the agent or doer and the experiencer. Just as the real illusionist *par excellence* who stands on the ground, is different from the other illusory person, who appears to ascend into the sky by a rope with a sword and a leather shield in his hand, or just as the real Ākāśa uncircumscribed by any limiting adjunct, is different from the Ākāśa in a jar, which is circumscribed with such a limiting adjunct (viz. the jar). It is on the basis of the assumption of a distinction of this nature between the Highest Self and the cognitional Self, that the two Sūtrās (Brahma Sūtra I.i.16 and Brahma Sūtra I.i.17) are propounded.—17.

*On account of (the mention of) a desire (on the part of the 'Ānandamaya') there is no*

*necessity of accepting that which is inferred  
(by the Sāmkhyās) viz. the Pradhāna (as  
the cause).—18.*

Because of the mention in the Ānandamaya Chapter of one who is desirous, thus—"He desired, may I be many, may I create" (Tait. 2.6)—we should not expect, the inferred non-sentient Pradhāna, imagined by the Sāmkhyās, to be either the Ānandamaya Self or the cause (of the world). Though the Pradhāna (claimed by the Sāmkhyās as being the cause) has already been refuted by the Sūtra—"On account of thinking—is not—(it is) not based on Scriptures"—(Bra. Sū. I.i.5), it is again refuted here, casually, as occasion has offered, with reference to the Scriptural mention in the earlier Sūtra, of desire (on the part of the cause of the world), for the purpose of a further elaboration of the uniform trend (of the Scriptural passages).—18.

*(The Scriptures) teach the merging (Yoga)  
of this (i.e. the Jīva-Self) into this (i.e. in  
the Ānandamaya).—19.*

This is again why the word Ānandamaya is not applicable to the Pradhāna or the Jīva-Self. Because the Scriptures teach that the enlightened Jīva-Self becomes one with the Ānandamaya-Self which is the Self relevant to the context here. Becoming one with that Self means attaining its condition, i.e. attaining Final Release. The Shāstra teaches this becoming one with, thus—"When he (i.e. the Jīva-Self) finds freedom from fear and a firm support in this Invisible, Incorporeal, Undefined and Unsupported one, then he attains fearlessness, but when he is conscious of any the least little difference, then he must needs be assailed by fear." (Tait. 2.7) etc. It has been said—As long as he is conscious of the least little difference of the nature of non-identity between himself and the Ānandamaya Self, he does not get a relief from the fear of transmigratory existence (Samsāra) and as soon as he becomes firmly based, and becomes completely one with the Ānandamaya Self and completely coincides with the Ānandamaya Self, he finds a relief from the fear of transmigratory existence etc.. That is possible only when by Ānandamaya Self we understand

the Highest Self, and not when we take it to mean either the Pradhāna or the Jīva-Self. Therefore it stands established (says the Vṛttikāra) that Ānandamaya is the Highest Self.

It has to be said here however (says the Bhāṣhyakāra) that when there is this stream of 'maya' affixes which indicate the structure of or the modification of (that to which it is affixed), thus—"This Puruṣa here has the structure of the quintessence of food, and inside this 'Annarasamaya' there is the inner Self which has the structure of vital air (Prāṇamaya) and inside this Prāṇamaya there is the still inner Self which has the structure of the mind (Manomaya) and inside the Manomaya there is a still further inner Self which has the structure of cognition (Vijnānamaya)" (Tait. 2.1.1,2,3,4),—how can we capriciously on the analogy of the maxim of 'a half of the old hag' (Ardhajaratiya Nyāya) accept 'plenitude' as the meaning of this 'maya' affix in Ānandamaya, or that because of the 'maya' affix, Ānandamaya means Brahma? If you were to say, that it should be so understood because the chapter is about Brahma as referred to in the Mantra, we reply—No, because in that case there is the predicament of Annamaya etc. also meaning Brahma. Here (the Vṛttikāra) says—That the Annamaya etc. are not Brahma is only proper, because successively another inner Self and still another inner Self is mentioned in the case of each of these (first four), but no such other Self, inner than the Ānandamaya is mentioned, and therefore the Ānandamaya Self is Brahma, otherwise, there will be the predicament of discarding what is relevant to the context, and accepting that which is not so relevant. With regard to this it is said—even though the Scriptures do not speak of any Self still inner than the Ānandamaya, as they do after Annamaya etc., still Ānandamaya could not be Brahma, in as much as, with reference to Ānandamaya the Scriptures declare thus—"Joy is its caput, delight the right side, greater delight the left side, bliss (Ānanda) the Self, and Brahma the tail, the pedestal" (Tait. 2.5). And the same Brahma which is relevant to the Mantra passage—"Truth, Knowledge, and Infinite is Brahma"—is precisely stated here as being "Brahma the tail, the pedestal", and it is with a desire to impart the knowledge of that, that beginning with



Annamaya and ending with Ānandamaya these five sheaths are imagined. So whence can there be any discarding of what is revelant and accepting of what is not? But (says the Vṛttikāra) just as in the case of Annamaya etc., this "the tail, the pedestal" is mentioned as the limb of Annamaya, even so "Brahma the tail, the pedestal" is mentioned here as the limb of Ānandamaya. How can we then understand that here, Brahma is mentioned as the principal Brahma? To that we reply—Because it is the relevant thing. But (says the Vṛttikāra)—even if we understand Brahma (mentioned) as a limb of Ānandamaya it won't detract in any way from Brahma being the relevant thing here, because (as we suggest) Ānandamaya itself is Brahma. To this we reply—In that case, to understand once, that the Ānandamaya Self, the whole entity possessed of limbs (Avayavin) as Brahma, and then again, to understand Ānandamaya's caudal appendage i.e. "the tail, the pedestal" which is a part (Avayava), as Brahma, would be incongruous. When making a choice as between the two is inevitable, it is proper to accept an indication of Brahma in "Brahma the tail, the pedestal" as the word Brahma is actually mentioned in connection with that, and not in the sentence containing (the word) Ānandamaya, because of the absence of the word Brahma, in connection with that. Moreover in continuation of the mention of "Brahma the tail, the pedestal" it is said—"The verse is sung. The verse is that—He who understands that Brahma is not, himself does not exist, but if he knows that Brahma is, then he is known as existing" (Tait. 2.6). As without bringing up Ānandamaya any further, merit and demerit are mentioned as being the result of knowing Brahma as existing or not existing respectively, we understand that the principal Brahma by itself is mentioned in the sentence—"Brahma the tail, the pedestal". It would not be reasonable to doubt whether the Ānandamaya Self exists or does not exist, because the Ānandamaya Self as specially characterised by joy and bliss etc. is well-known to all. But (says the Vṛttikāra) how can Brahma which is the principal thing by itself, be mentioned as being the tail of Ānandamaya? To this objection we reply—This is no fault, because, the bliss of Brahma is the tail, like a tail, i.e. it is the support or pedestal, the last resort, the one and only

one nest (abode) of all worldly pleasures, is intended to be mentioned by this (i.e. Brahma the tail, the pedestal) and there is no intention of mentioning a limb (as such), because another Scriptural passage says—"All beings sustain themselves on portions of this bliss only" (Brih. 4.3.32). Moreover if by Ānandamaya we understand Brahma, we should understand it as Saṁguṇa (qualified by attributes) Brahma, because it is said to have limbs such as bliss etc.. Brahma uncharacterized by any attributes i.e. Nirguṇa Brahma is mentioned in the residuary passage as being unperceivable by speech or the mind in the Scriptural passage—"Unable to attain it (i.e. Brahma), speech along with the mind is turned back. One who has knowledge of the bliss of Brahma, has no fear from any quarter" (Tait. 2.9). Besides if we speak about a 'Plenitude' of bliss (about a thing) it necessarily is understood to imply the existence of at least some pain, because in the ordinary world 'Plenitude' (of any thing) does imply at least a small measure of its antonym also. In that case the Scriptural passage—"Where he sees nothing else, understands nothing else, he is the Bhūmā" (Chhān. 7.24.1)—where, the statement that in Bhūmā which is Brahma, everything else except that is absent, would be contradicted. 'Joy etc.' being different, in different bodies, the Ānandamaya Self also would be different in every body, while Brahma on the other hand does not so differ in different bodies, because the Scriptural passage—"Brahma is Truth, Knowledge, and Infinity" (Tait. 2.1) indicates its infinitude, and also because of another Scriptural passage—"He is the one and only one God hidden in all beings, he is all-pervading and the inner-Self of all beings" (Shvet. 6.11). Moreover the Scriptures do not show any repetition of the word Ānandamaya, but of only the radical part of the compound word, viz., Ānanda, thus—"He verily is the quintessence, he having attained that quintessence, becomes happy. By what else could any one sustain oneself if this Ākāśha (i.e. the Ātmā abiding in the Hridaya in the form of the Ākāśha) were not to be bliss? This here is the analytical interpretation of bliss. A man who knows the bliss of Brahma, is not afraid of anything." (Tait. 2.7,8,9). "He knew that Ānanda is Brahma." (Tait. 6.6). If it could be definitely concluded that the word Ānandamaya means Brahma, then we may

imagine that in the subsequent use of the mere word *Ānanda*, there is a repetition of the word *Ānandamaya*, but we have already stated, how by reason of (the mention of) "Joy is the caput" etc., *Ānandamaya* could not be *Brahma*. Therefore, as in another Scriptural passage—"Knowledge and bliss is *Brahma*" (*Brih.* 3.9.28) we find that only the radical part (of the compound word *Ānandamaya*) viz. the word *Ānanda*, is used in the sense of *Brahma*, it should be understood that in the Scriptural passage—"If *Ākāsha* were not to be *Ānanda*"—the word *Ānanda* is used in the sense of *Brahma*, and is by no means a repetition of the word *Ānandamaya*. The repetition of *Ānandamaya*, i.e. *Ānanda* with the 'Maya' affix, that is seen in—"He reaches beyond (i.e. gives up) the *Ānandamaya* Self" (*Tait.* 2.8)—does not refer to *Brahma*, as it is mentioned along with the stream of those other non-Selfs, such as the *Annamaya* etc., which are of the nature of modifications and which have to be abandoned by proper discrimination. But then (says the *Vṛttikāra*), if the *Ānandamaya* Self which has to be thus abandoned after proper discrimination, were, like the *Annamaya* etc., not to be *Brahma*, the Scriptures would not mention, that a person who knows thus, attains the fruit viz. the attainment of *Brahma*. To this objection we reply—This is no fault, because precisely by that very indication about the giving up of *Ānandamaya* by proper discrimination, the attainment of the fruit viz. *Brahma*, which is "the tail, the pedestal", also happens to be indicated, and also because of the further elaboration of the same made by the Scriptural passages—"That the verse is sung", and "from which the speech (*Vāk*) is thrown back" etc.

The Scriptural passage "He desired, may I be many" which is mentioned (by the *Vṛttikāra*) as being recited near the word *Ānandamaya* (in the sentence), being however connected with *Brahma*, as mentioned in "*Brahma* the tail, the pedestal", which is even still nearer to it, does not indicate that *Ānandamaya* is *Brahma*, and in as much as, the subsequent passage, viz. "He verily is the quintessence", is with reference to that, it has no concern with *Ānandamaya*. But (objects the *Vṛttikāra*) in the case of *Brahma* (which is the word of the neuter gender), the mention of the masculine gender as in "He desired " would

not be reasonably sustainable. To this we reply—This is no fault, because in the Scriptural passage “From that very Ātmā (Self) the Ākāsha was born”, Brahma has been referred to by the word Ātmā (Self) which is of the masculine gender. As regards the Lore (Vidyā) of Bhrigu, derived from Varuṇa viz. “He understood Ānanda to be Brahma”—in which there is no mention of the ‘Maya’ affix, or of “Joy is the caput” etc., that Ānanda means Brahma, is proper. Therefore, without having recourse to even an iota of qualifying distinction, it is not reasonably sustainable to ascribe to Brahma in itself any such (qualifying distinction) as “Joy is the caput” etc.. Because the Scriptures mention that Brahma transcends speech and the mind, it (obviously) is not intended to expound qualified Brahma here. Therefore, as in the case of ‘Annamaya’ etc. so in the case of Ānandamaya also, the Maya-affix should be understood as signifying ‘having the structure of’, or, ‘being the modification of’ and not plenitude. So, the Sūtras should be explained as follows :—

In “Brahma the tail, the pedestal” (Tait. 2.5) a doubt arises, thus—is it intended to mention Brahma as being a limb of Ānandamaya, or is Brahma itself as such, intended to be mentioned? (If the conclusion of the Vṛttikāra is)—Because of the word ‘tail’ it (i.e. Brahma) is intended to be mentioned as a limb—we reply, that in the Sūtra—“Ānandamaya (is Brahma), Because of the repetition” (I.i.12)—in the sentence, the Self is Ānandamaya, Brahma as such, is taught by the words “Brahma the tail, the pedestal”, because there is repetition (of Brahma). Because in the illustrative verse—“He is as if he is non-existent”—it is Brahma that is repeatedly spoken of. If it be said, it is not so, because of a word meaning ‘modification’ (Vikāra) (I.i.13), (we say)—no, because of plenitude. By the word modification here, a limb is meant. It is necessary to refute the doubt expressed—that as by the word ‘the tail’ a limb is indicated, Brahma as such is not its meaning. With regard to this (doubt) we say—This is no fault, because the word Bhūmā (Plenitude) also, may indicate a ‘limb’ which comes about to mean that in the passage many words meaning limbs are referred to. Limbs from head to tail having been mentioned in the case of ‘Annamaya’ etc., similar limbs are mentioned in the case

of Ānandamaya also, such as 'Caput' etc. and as in this way limbs are often mentioned (in the passages about Annamaya up to Vijnānamaya) it is also similarly mentioned in the case of Ānandamaya, thus viz.—“Brahma the tail, the pedestal”. But there is no intention here, of mentioning limbs, because earlier it has been established that Brahma is not mentioned as a limb, but Brahma as such is mentioned. It is because of this reason that we have explained that “by repetition” Brahma as such is indicated (in “Brahma, the tail, pedestal”). In the Sūtra—“Because it is propounded that it is the cause”—as Brahma is indicated as being the cause of the aggregate of modifications including Ānandamaya, thus—“(He) created all this, whatever there is” (Tait. 2.6). Brahma thus being the cause (of its modifications), it is not reasonably sustainable to say, that it is the limb of its own modification viz. Ānandamaya, by understanding the word 'limb' in its primary sense. The other Sūtrās also may, so far as possible, be understood to expound 'Brahma' as indicated by the sentence referring to the tail.—19.

#### 7. ANTARADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 20-21.

*The one inside (the sun and the eyes is the Highest Self) because (here) its attributes are propounded.—20.*

The Scriptures mention as follows:—“This aureate-complexioned Purusha that is seen in the Sun, having an aureate beard and hair, and who is aureate all over down to his nails”; “His eyes are (pink) like a lotus which is (pink) like the seat of a monkey ; his name is 'Ut', he has come out clear of all sin ; he who knows it to be like this, also comes out clear of all sin”; “This is with reference to the deities (Devās)” (Chhān. 1.6. 7, 8). Further on also, with reference to the body “This Purusha that is seen in the eyes” etc. (Chhān. 1.7.1,5). Now (in this case) the doubt arises, whether here the Scriptures mention some one who belongs to the transmigratory condition (Samsārin), who, because of the profundity of his knowledge (Vidyā) and action (Karma) has acquired great eminence (Utkarsha) and who as the one in the Sun and the eyes, is mentioned

as an object of devotion, or whether, the eternally perfect, Supreme Lord, is mentioned. What then is (the conclusion) arrived at (by the opponent)? That a Purusha in a transmigratory condition is meant. How so? Because the Scriptures mention the Purusha as one having a form. As regards the Purusha in the Sun, its form viz. his having an aureate beard, is mentioned, and by an extended application (Atiḍeśha), the same is made applicable to the Purusha in the eyes, thus—"The form of this one is the same as that of the other", while it is impossible to ascribe 'form' to the Supreme Lord, because the Scriptures mention that "he is sans-Sound, sans-Touch, sans-Form and sans-Decay" (Kāṭha. 1.3.15). Also, because of the mention by the Scriptures of an abode, thus—"He who is in the Sun, he who is in the eyes". There cannot possibly be any mention of an abode in the case of the Supreme Lord, who (according to Scriptures) is without any special abode, who is all-pervading and well-ensconced in his own glory, as is seen in the Scriptural passage—"Where, Oh revered one, has He his abode? (The reply is) In His own glory" (Chhān. 7.24.1). "Like the Ākāśha he is all-pervading and eternal" etc. Also because the Scriptures speak of their limited power, thus:—"He who is the Lord of the worlds beyond (the Sun) and of the desires of the deities (Devās)"—in the case of the Purusha in the Sun (Chhān. 1.6.8), and "Who is Lord of the worlds below and of the desires of men" (Chhān. 1.7.6)—in the case of the Purusha in the eyes. It is not possible to conceive of any limit in the case of the Supreme Lord as would be seen from the Scriptural passage—"He is the Lord of all, the head of all beings, the protector of all beings, and the bund that supports i.e. upholds the worlds, so that they may not be confounded (by promiscuity)" (Brih. 4.4.22)—which does not mention any limiting adjuncts. Therefore the Purusha in the Sun and in the eyes is *not* the Supreme Lord.

To this conclusion, we reply—"The one inside (the Sun and the eyes, is the Highest Self), because here His i.e. the Lord's attributes are propounded". The Purusha that is mentioned in "this Purusha in the Sun" and "this Purusha in the eyes"—is the Highest Lord, and not a person in a transmigratory condition. How so? Because, its (i.e. the Lord's) attributes are propounded. The attributes of the Highest Lord are here propounded thus—Having mention-

ed that "His name is Ut", the Scriptures etymologically derive the name of this Purusha in the Sun by mentioning his being free from all sin, thus—"He rises clear out of all sin", and then, the same name, which is etymologically so derived, is, by an extended application, mentioned as being the name of the Purusha in the eyes also, thus—"The name (of the one) is the name (of the other)." Separation from (i.e. having no contact with) all sin, is possible only in the case of the Highest Lord, as mentioned in the following Scriptural passages—"The Self (Ātmā) which is free from all sin" (Chhān. 8.7.1) etc.. Similarly, in the case of the Purusha in the eyes, he is definitely ascertained to be the self of the Rik and the Sāma etc., thus—"She is the Rik, that is the Sāma, and the Uktha (a special collection of hymns recited in a sacrifice), the Yajus, the Brahma". This, being the Self (of the Rik and the Sāma etc.), is reasonably sustainable only in the case of the Highest Lord, because, being the cause of all, and the Self of all, it is reasonably sustainable in his case. Then, having commenced by mentioning, that the Rik and the Sāma have the earth and the Agni respectively as their Selfs, with reference to the Devās (Adhidaivata), and that the same Rik and Sāma have the Vāk (speech) and the Prāṇa as their Selfs respectively, with reference to the body (Adhyātma), the Scriptures proceed to mention, thus—"With reference to the Devās (in the case of the Purusha in the Sun) the Rik and the Sāma are the joints (of the foot), and with reference to the body, joints in the former case, are the joints in the latter" etc. Now that is possible only in the case of one who is the Self of all. And the Scriptures show, that even in the case of singing, in the ordinary world, the same self of all is sung about, by mentioning thus—"And those who sing to the accompaniment of a Vīṇa (lute), sing about Him (i.e. the Self of all) only, and therefore they become possessed of wealth" (Chhān. 1.7.6). This fits in properly in the case of the Highest Lord only. For the Smṛiti says—"Whatever being, possessed of power, glory, or strength, is there, know it to have been generated from my Teja (energy)" (Bh. G. 10.41). Besides, the being possessed of the power to rule the worlds and desires without let or hindrance, that we hear mentioned, also indicates the Highest Lord. With regard to the objection (raised by the oppo-

nent), that the mention in the Scriptures, of form such as having an aureate beard etc., is not reasonably sustainable in the case of the Highest Lord, we reply—It may well be the illusory form assumed by the Lord, at will, with a desire to extend his grace to the devout worshipper, because the Smṛiti says, “What you see before you, Oh Nārada, is the Māyā generated by me. It is not correct to understand me as one endowed with all the attributes of beings.” However, where the form (Rūpa) of the highest Lord, divested of all kinds of adjuncts, is propounded, there the Shāstra is—“(The Brahma) is, sans-Sound, sans-Touch, sans-Form and sans-Decay” (Kāṭha. 1.3.15), etc. Because the Highest Lord is the cause of all, the Highest Lord as endowed with the qualities of its modifications is also indicated as an object of devotion, thus—“The repository of all actions, desires, fragrances and tastes etc.” (Chhān. 3.14.2). In the same way, it may well be that the Lord may also be referred to as one having an aureate beard. To the objection (of the opponent Vṛttikāra), that because of the mention of an abode, it cannot be the Highest Lord, we reply—The propounding of Him who is perfectly ensconced in his own glory, as one having an abode, may also be for the purpose of devotion, because Brahma being all-pervading, it can be reasonably sustainable, that like Akāsha, it is inside anything and everything. The Scriptural mention of a limit to his Lordly might, with reference to its division into its Adhidaivata and Adhyātma aspects, is also for the purpose of devotion. Therefore it is the Highest Lord that is propounded as being the Purusha in the sun and the eyes.—20.

*Besides, (the Purusha in the orb of the sun) is different (from the Jīva-Self), because there is a reference (in the Scriptures) to a distinction (between the two).—21.*

The Lord, the internal ruler is of course different from the Jīva-Self that identifies itself with the body of the Sun (Āditya) etc., because such a statement of difference (between the two) is mentioned in another Scriptural passage thus—“He who abides in the sun but is distinct from him, and whom the sun knows not, and whose body is the sun,



and who rules or regulates the sun from within, that same is your Self (Ātmā), the ruler or regulator from within, and the immortal one." (Brih. 3.7.9). There, (by the expression—who abides in the sun but is distinct from him, and whom the sun knows not), the internal ruler or regulator is clearly indicated to be different from the one who is meant to be the knower, viz. the sun, i.e. the cognitional Self. Therefore by reason of the parallel Scriptural passage, the very same (internal ruler or regulator) deserves to be the Purusha in the sun, here. Therefore it is clearly proved that in the passage (mentioned in the beginning of the Sūtra 20) instruction about the Highest Lord is given.—21.

### 8. ĀKĀSHĀDHĪKARĀṆAM. Sū. 22.

*The Ākāsha is (Brahma) because there is (here) a characteristic mark of it (i.e. Brahma).—22.*

(Shālāvatya a Brāhmaṇa asks Pravāhaṇa Jaivali, the Kshatriya King) "To what does this world go back (ultimately)? He replied—The Ākāsha, all these beings are born only out of the Ākāsha and are also absorbed into the Ākāsha, the Ākāsha verily is greater than these, and the Ākāsha is the ultimate resort" (Chhān. 1.9.1). A doubt here arises—Whether the Highest Brahma is mentioned by the word Ākāsha or the material Sky i.e. the atmosphere? Whence is the doubt? Because (the same word Ākāsha is observed to be used) in the case of both. The word Ākāsha which is well-known in the ordinary world and in the Scriptures, as being used in the sense of the material sky or atmosphere is also occasionally seen to be used for Brahma, where, for instance,—because of the complementary sentence, or because of the mention of an uncommon quality—it becomes established that Brahma is meant, thus —"If this Ākāsha were not to be bliss (i.e. Brahma)" (Tait. 2.7), or "It is the Ākāsha, that verily is the revealer of all names and forms, that, within which (these names and forms) are, that is Brahma" (Chhān. 8.14.1) etc. Therefore it is, that there is this doubt. What then is reasonably possible here? That it is the sky i.e. the atmosphere. Why so? because it is that, that quickly comes up to the mind i.e. intelligence (Buddhi) because of its more well-known use

(in that sense). It is not possible to understand, that the word Ākāsha can be used commonly for both, because it would, in that case, lead to the fault of one word having more than one (primary) meaning. Therefore when the word Ākāsha is used in the sense of Brahma, it deserves to have been used in its secondary or metaphorical sense, because, Brahma, having many attributes such as being all-pervading etc., is similar to Ākāsha. When the primary sense is possible, it does not deserve to be understood as being used in the secondary or metaphorical sense, and it is possible, here, to understand Ākāsha in its primary sense of the material sky or atmosphere. (But says the Vedāntin), if we understand it to mean the material sky or atmosphere, then the complementary passage—"All these beings are born out of this Ākāsha *only*"—would not be reasonably sustainable. (To this) the opponent says—This is no fault, because it is reasonably sustainable, that the material sky or the atmosphere also, can, by way of the serial order of air (Vāyu) etc. be understood to be the cause (of air etc.). Because it is known from the Scriptures thus—"From this self, verily, the Ākāsha was born, from the Ākāsha the air, and from the air the fire (Agni) etc." (Tait. 2.1). The qualities of "being greater and being the ultimate resort" are reasonably sustainable also in the case of the material Sky i.e. atmosphere, with reference to those other beings (born out of the material sky i.e. the atmosphere). Thus, therefore, it is proper to understand "the material Sky" i.e. the atmosphere by the word Ākāsha. This being the conclusion (arrived at by the opponent), to that, we reply—"The Ākāsha (is Brahma) because of the indicatory mark about it". It is but proper to take Ākāsha to mean Brahma. Why ? Because there is an indicatory mark about it. That "All these beings are born out of this Ākāsha *only*" is the indicatory mark of the Highest Brahma, and that all beings are born out of the Highest Brahma is the *terminus ad quem* of Vedānta. But (says the opponent) we have already demonstrated how the sky i.e. the atmosphere is the cause, by way of the serial order of air (Vāyu) etc.. (We reply) of course it is true you have demonstrated that. But if Brahma is not accepted as being the root-cause, the final determination—'From the Ākāsha (ether or space) *only*', and the adjective 'all' (*Sarvāṇi*) governing the be-

ings, would not be favourable (to such a construction, as you, the opponent, suggest). Similarly, the indicatory mark “that (*all beings*) become absorbed in the Ākāsha”, and “Ākāsha verily is the greater and ultimate resort”, which indicate the attribute of ‘being greater and being the ultimate resort’ also, (would not be favourable), because, this ‘being greater’ without reference to any other thing is mentioned by Scriptures, only in the case of the Highest Self, thus—“Greater than the earth, the sky, the heaven and all these worlds” (Chhān. 3.14.3), and this ‘being the ultimate resort’ is more reasonably sustainable in the case of the Highest Self only, as being the transcendent cause. The Scriptural passage is—“Knowledge and Bliss is Brahma the ultimate resort of the sacrificing host (from whom, the priests presiding at the sacrifice get money-gifts i.e. Dakshiṇā)” (Brih. 3.9.28). Besides, (Jaivali) after animadverting the case made out by Shālāvatya (that the Sāma is eternal), and with a desire to mention something which is ‘eternal’, accepts the Ākāsha as the eternal (one), and by treating the ‘Udgītha’ as the Ākāsha by imaginative contemplation, concludes thus—“He is the ‘Udgītha’ who is ‘greater than the great’ and he also is the eternal (one)” (Chhān. 1.9.2). That eternity (mentioned therein) is an indicatory mark of Brahma. To the objection, that, on the strength of its being well-known, the sky or the atmosphere comes up to the mind first, before any thing else, we reply—Because, after observing the attributes of Brahma as they are mentioned in the complementary passage, the sky i.e. the atmosphere, though it comes up to the mind or intelligence first, before anything else, has to be rejected. We have already demonstrated how the word Ākāsha is used for Brahma, thus—“Ākāsha verily is the revealer of names and forms” etc. Similarly we observe the use of the synonyms of Ākāsha for Brahma, thus—“The Vedās (Richās) are (based) in the imperishable (Akshara) and the highest Ākāsha, and all Gods have their base in it” (Rig. Sam. 1.164.39); “This is the Lore (Vidyā) of Bhrigu as derived from Varuṇa, which is based in the Akshara.” (Tait. 3.6); “Om, Ka (pleasure) is Brahma, Kha (Akshara) is Brahma” (Chhān. 4.10.5) and “Kha is the ancient one” (Brih. 5.1) etc. The word Ākāsha, which occurs in the introductory passage also, is to be understood as referring

to 'Brahma' on the strength of the complementary passage. We observe that even the word Agni (fire) which, though it occurs in the introductory passage—"Agni is studying the Anuvāka (a collection of Rik- and Yajur-veda hymns)"—is understood to mean a scholar (Mānavaka). Therefore, it is established that by the word Ākāsha, Brahma is indicated. —22.

### 9. PRĀṆĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 23.

*For the same reason, Prāṇa i.e. the Vital Air (is Brahma).—23.*

In the Udgītha chapter, after mentioning the introductory sentence "O Prastotri, that deity connected with the Prastāva (Prelude or introductory words of Sāma)", it is mentioned—"What then is the deity ; He replied—The Vital Air. All these beings merge in the Vital air only and spring from it, and this is the deity which is connected with the Prastāva etc." (Chhān. 1.11.4, 5). With regard to this, the doubt and the decision (on that doubt) should be understood to be similar to those stated herein-before (in the previous Sūtra). In the Scriptural passages—"O mild one, the mind is dependent on the Vital Air" (Chhān. 6.8.2), "The Vital Air of the Vital Airs" (Brih. 4.4.18)—the word 'Prāṇa' appears to have been used to denote Brahma, while its use as a word indicating the modification of Vāyu (air) is more well-known in the ordinary world and the Scriptures, and a doubt arises as to what should properly be understood by the word 'Prāṇa'. What then is proper here ? It is proper to understand by Prāṇa, that which is a modification of Vāyu and has a five-fold function, because we have already mentioned that Prāṇa is better known as that (i.e. as a modification of Vāyu). But (says the Vedāntin) because of the indicatory mark of that (i.e. Brahma) we should, as (we did) earlier, understand Prāṇa to indicate Brahma, because here also, the absorption into and rising from, of beings, is seen to be the work of the Highest Lord. No, (says the opponent), because the absorption into and rising from of beings is seen to be from the principal Vital Air also, because even so says the Scriptural passage—"When a Purusha sleeps, then in that condition, speech merges into the Vital Air, and similarly, the

eye, the ear and the mind also, merge into the Vital Air, and when he wakes up, these again arise from the same Vital Air" (Shata. Brā. 10.3.3.6). It also is actually evident that during the period of sleep, while the function of the Vital Air still continues, the functions of the sense-organs get absorbed, and they are revived at waking time. Beings having the sense-organs as their essence, the complementary passage which speaks of absorption into and rising from of the beings, is not contradictory, even in the case of the principal Vital Air. Besides, the sun and food which are the deities of the Udgītha and Pratihāra respectively, are indicated after Prāṇa, which is the deity of the Prastāva. They (i.e. the Sun and food) certainly are not Brahma, and therefore in common with them, the Vital Air also could not be Brahma. This being the conclusion (of the opponent) the Sūtrakāra replies—"For the same reason, the Vital Airs (are Brahma)". "Because of the indicatory mark of that" has been explained in the previous Sūtra.

Therefore, because of the indicatory mark of that (i.e. Brahma) that which is expressed by the word Prāṇa also deserves to be understood to be Brahma. The Scriptures mention, that even 'Vital air' has a connection with the indicatory mark of Brahma, as follows :—"All these beings, verily, are absorbed into the 'Vital air' and also rise from the 'Vital air'." (Chhān. 1.11.5). The mention of the absorption and rise of all beings from Prāṇa (Vital air) goes to indicate that Prāṇa (Vital air) is Brahma. But (says the opponent) we have said that, even if by the word 'Prāṇa' we understand the principal Vital air, the absorption into and rising (of sense-organs) from the principal Vital air is not contradictory, because we observe it to be so during sleep and on awakening. To this we reply—During sleep and on awakening, the absorption into and rising up (from Prāṇa) of *only* the sense-organs is seen, and not of *all* beings, while here (it is seen) to be generally of all beings endowed with the Jīva-Self and sense-organs and bodies also, because of the Scriptural passage—"All these beings". Even if we understand the Scriptural mention of beings, as referring to the (five) great elements, even then it would not be contradictory to understand that, as an indicatory mark of Brahma. But (says the opponent) we find it mentioned in the Scriptures that during sleep

and on awakening, there is absorption into and rising up from the 'Vital air', of sense-organs along with the sense-objects, as follows:—"When a man is asleep, he does not experience any dream, but becomes one with the 'Vital air' and at that time, speech along with all names is absorbed into it" (Kaush. 3.3). There also (we say) because of the indicatory mark of that (i.e. Brahma), by the word *Prāṇa*, Brahma alone is indicated. Then again, (the objection) that because of proximity with the sun and food (which certainly are not Brahma) the word '*Prāṇa*' also is not indicative of Brahma, is not reasonable, because when on the strength of the complementary passage, the word '*Prāṇa*' is properly understood to mean Brahma, mere proximity is helpless (lit., unable to do anything). Again, the objection, that the word '*Prāṇa*' is better known as meaning the Vital air with its five-fold function, should be refuted in the same way, as the objection with regard to the word *Ākāsha* is refuted. Therefore it is thus established that '*Prāṇa*' which is the deity connected with *Prastāva*, is Brahma.

In this connection, some others (commentators) quote the following passages—"The *Prāṇa* of *Prāṇa*", "Oh mild one, mind depends upon *Prāṇa*" (as ambiguous passages), but it is not reasonable, because on account of the difference in the Scriptural words and the subject matter of the chapter (*Prakarāṇa*), no doubt is reasonably sustainable. For instance, when we use the expression 'father's father', the father indicated by the genitive case of the first word 'father' is different from the person indicated by the word 'father' used in the nominative case, and means the father's father i.e. the grand-father. Similarly in the expression "the *Prāṇa* of *Prāṇa*" as there the two '*Prāṇa*' words are separate and distinct, we can determine that the *Prāṇa* of *Prāṇa* is different from the well-known *Prāṇa* (the Vital air). The same thing 'He', does not deserve to be distinguished from itself as 'His', (only by using the genitive case) and designating 'He' as 'His'.\* (And with regard to

\* The meaning of this sentence seems to be, that *Prāṇa* and *Prāṇasya* (the genitive form of *Prāṇa*) would not be distinguishable from each other because of the genitive case, but if *Prāṇasya* is used with *Prāṇa*, then '*Prāṇasya Prāṇah*' would mean something different from the meaning of this mere word '*Prāṇa*'—viz. it would then mean Brahma.

the second passage), if a thing is indicated in one chapter (as the topic of that chapter), then we conclude, that the same thing is indicated in the same chapter as that chapter's topic, even if it is referred to in it by some other name. As for instance, in the chapter dealing with Jyotishṭoma sacrifice, in the passage "In every spring a person should perform the Jyoti", the word 'Jyoti' refers to the Jyotishṭoma sacrifice, similarly in the chapter dealing with the 'Highest Brahma', when the Scriptural passage says, "O mild one, the mind is dependent on Prāṇa"—how could we understand the word 'Prāṇa' to mean only a modification of Vāyu? Therefore, there being nothing here to suggest a doubt, this cannot be an illustration in point. With respect to the deity connected with Prastāva, we have already discussed the doubt (arising from the use of the word) 'Prāṇa', the objection raised (with regard to it), and the final conclusion.—23.

10. JYOTISHCHARAṆĀDHİKARAṆAM. Sū. 24-27.

*(The word) Jyoti (is Brahma) on account of the mention of feet.—24.*

The Scriptures mention :—"Now, after what has gone before (viz., the devout meditation on Gāyatri as Brahma), the lustre (Jyoti) that continues to shine above this heaven, on the top of this world, on the top of everything in the best of all worlds than which no other world (Loka) is better (viz., the Satya-Loka), is the same as the lustre that is within this Purusha" (Chhān. 3.13.7). With regard to that, a doubt arises—Whether by the word lustre, a light such as the Sun is meant or the Highest Brahma. It is said (by us before) that a word which ordinarily denotes another object, is, because of there being an indicatory mark of that (Brahma), supposed to denote Brahma, but here (in the above Scriptural passage) as even such indicatory mark is not present, the matter deserves consideration. What, then, is your suggestion? (The opponent says)—By the word Lustre, the Sun etc. is understood. Why so? Because it is well-known. Darkness and Light are terms which are antonyms of each other. Nocturnal darkness etc. is the obstructor of the function of the eye. The verb 'Shines' occurring in the Scriptures is well-known to be in connec-

tion with the Sun etc. The Scriptures cannot predicate of the formless Brahma, that it 'shines' in the principal sense of the verb 'to shine', and the Scriptures also mention the heaven as the boundary, beyond which that (Lustre) is said to shine. Brahma which is the Self of all, and the source of all moveable and immoveable things cannot be said to have a boundary such as the heaven. But lustre which is a modification (as from a cause, and is circumscribed by a limit), can quite properly be said to have a boundary viz. the heaven. "Lustre beyond the heaven" is the Scriptural Brāhmaṇa passage. But (says the Vedāntin) even when lustre is such a modification (Kārya), it would be wrong to say about it also, that it has a boundary such as the heaven, because it is experienced everywhere. Then (says the opponent) let it be the untriformed (Atrivritkrita) lustre, which is born first (from Vāyu). No (retorts the Vedāntin), the untriformed lustre has no useful purpose (Prayojana). (To this the opponent retorts)—If it be said, that it is a thing which is the object of devout meditation is itself such a purpose,—No (replies the Vedāntin), because it is only things like the sun etc. which are employed for a different purpose, that are objects of devout meditation, because, there is the Scriptural passage :—"I will make each of these three, triform" which does not make any distinction (between any of these three). Besides it is not so well-known that the untriformed lustre also has the heaven as its boundary. Oh well (says the opponent), then, let that triformed lustre itself be understood to be the lustre (referred to here). But (says the Vedāntin) we have said that lustre in the form of fire etc. is observed to be below the heaven also. (To which the opponent replies) No, this is no fault, because it is not contradictory to speak of lustre which is known to be everywhere, as being understood to have a particular locus such as 'beyond the heaven', for the purpose of devout meditation, but it is not logical to think of Brahma which is uncircumscribed by any particular limit, as having any such special locus. The Scriptural passages about the plurality of abodes (Ādhārabahutvashruti) viz. "On the top of every thing in the best of all worlds than whom there is no better (i.e. in the Satya-Loka)" are more appropriate in the case of lustre which is a modification. In the Scriptural passage



“This verily is that (lustre) which is inside a Purusha” (Chhān. 3.13.7), it is the supreme lustre (i.e. Brahma) that is seen to be superimposed on the gastric fire. Superimpositions are caused by similarity in form, as for instance :— “Of him, ‘Bhū’ is the caput, the head (in a body) is one, and this letter is also one”. (Brih. 5.5.3). And it is patent, that gastric fire is not Brahma. And also in the Scriptural passages, “This is the means of seeing it actually”, “This is the means of hearing it” (Chhān. 3.13.7), it is mentioned that it has the special attributes of heat and sound, and one should meditate on this as that which is seen or heard. Also (the Scriptural passage)—“He who knows this in this manner, becomes handsome and well-known.” (Chhān. 3.13.8) could not indicate Brahma, because of a minor fruit. Devout meditation on Brahma is intended for a great fruit only. Besides in the sentence under consideration there is no other indicatory mark of Brahma, here, in the case of ‘Lustre’, as in the case of Prāṇa and Ākāsha. Nor is Brahma indicated in the preceding sentence, because in that sentence, viz. “Gāyatrī is all this creation”, there is only a statement about the Gāyatrī metre, and even if we suppose that Brahma is anyhow indicated in the preceding sentence, even then, there is nothing to make us aware that the same Brahma is indicated here. There, by the passage “Its three parts which are immortal are in heaven” (Chhān. 3.12.1, 6), the heaven is mentioned as the abode. But here (in the present sentence)—“Lustre above the heaven”—heaven is mentioned as the boundary. Therefore, it is only the Lustre which is an effect from a cause that should be understood to be referred to here. As regards this conclusion of the opponent, we reply—By the word ‘Lustre’ we should understand Brahma. How so ? Because of the mention of the feet. The meaning is that the foot (of a metre) is mentioned. Just in the previous sentence quadrupedal Brahma is indicated by the following Mantra :—“Only that much is the greatness of this (i.e. the Gāyatrī metre of four parts), greater than it is the Purusha, one foot of his represents all these beings, and the remaining three immortal feet are in heaven” (Chhān. 3.12.6). We know that the same three immortal feet of the quadrupedal Brahma which are mentioned in connection with the heaven there, are here indicated, because of the connection with heaven. If one were

to reject that and accept the ordinary light, (the fault of) giving up that which is relevant and accepting that which is irrelevant, would occur. It is not that Brahma has again been repeated from the previous sentence only, in the passage referring to 'Lustre', but (it will be seen) that in the subsequent 'Shāṇḍilya Vidyā' also, the same Brahma will again be repeated. Therefore here, by 'Lustre' (Jyoti) we should understand Brahma. The objection, that the words 'The Lustre shines' are well-known to be used in the case of 'Lustre' the effect (from a cause), (we reply)—it is no fault, because, when from the chapter, Brahma is understood (to be indicated), the words 'the Lustre shines' have not the effect of indicating an ordinary light (an effect from a cause) to the exclusion of Brahma, and it is possible to use the expression for Brahma, which is suggested by an effect (of Brahma, such as the Sun) having a shining Lustre. And also because of the words of the Mantra—"That (Brahma), kindled by whose Teja, the Sun shines" (Tait. Brā. 3.12.9.7). Or else it may also be, that the word 'Lustre' does not refer only to Lustre which helps the function of the eye, because, we find it used elsewhere also as follows :—"When the sun has set (i.e. in darkness), sound (Vāk) serves as light (for the Purusha)" (Brih. 4.3.5), "The mind of the partaker of ghee is lustre (i.e. Jyoti)." (Tait. Brā. 1.6.3.3). Therefore, whatever is the cause which makes different things manifest (and not only the sense-organ 'eye') is said to be the 'Lustre'. That being so, the word 'Lustre' is appropriate in the case of Brahma, which is of the nature of intelligence, because of its being the cause which makes the whole world manifest. And also because of the following Scriptural passages :—"After Him who continues to shine, all things shine, and it is by His effulgence that all this is illuminated" (Kaush. 2.5.15), and "Him, the Gods meditate upon devoutly, as the lustre of all lustres, as life itself (Āyu), as the immortal" (Brih. 4.4.16). With regard to the objection, that it is not reasonably sustainable in the case of Brahma which is all-pervading, that it has a boundary such as the heaven, we reply—Even in the case of the all-pervading Brahma, it is not contradictory to speak about its having a particular 'locus' for the purpose of devout meditation. But (says the opponent) we have already said that it is not reasonably sustainable

to imagine Brahma to be circumscribed when it is undelimited (i.e. is all-pervading), because even though it is so undelimited, it is reasonably sustainable to say about it, so long as it continues to be affected by any particular adjunct, that it is circumscribed or limited. In this manner it is, that Scriptures mention devout meditations on Brahma in connection with such definite objects such as the Sun, the eyes, and the Hridaya. On the strength of the above, the plurality of abodes, as in "On the top of everything", has been explained. The further objection, that inasmuch as the notion of the highest lustre is superimposed (during devout meditation) on the gastric fire inferred from its warmth and sound, and which is an effect (Kārya), the lustre 'beyond the heaven' should also be understood to be an effect (Kārya) only, is not proper and reasonable. Because, as in the case of the Nāma etc. (either names such as Vishṇu, Hari etc. or some Tāntrika device) which are used as a symbol, that the gastric fire also can be a symbol of Brahma is reasonably sustainable. The seeing or hearing as mentioned in the Scriptural passage "It should be meditated upon as that which is the means of seeing it or hearing it" can well be so by way of being a symbol (of Brahma). The objection, that because a minor fruit is mentioned by the Scriptures, the word 'Lustre' should not be understood to be Brahma, is similarly not reasonably sustainable, as there is no *raison d'être* for a rule that one should have recourse to Brahma for obtaining *that much* fruit only, and not for obtaining *this much*. Where the Highest Brahma devoid of all connection with any particular attributes is taught to be the Self of all, we understand (in that case) that there is a uniform fruit only, viz. Final Release, but where Brahma, as connected with distinguishing attributes, or as connected with outward symbols, is taught, (in that case) higher or lower fruits as they are known in this transmigratory existence, are found to be mentioned, as for instance in the following Scriptural passage—"He is the eater of all foods and the giver of wealth; he who knows it to be so, obtains wealth" (Brih. 4.4.24). Though in the present passage, there is no indicative mark of Brahma in the case of the word 'Lustre', still, the indicative mark which appears in the preceding sentence, should be accepted (for this Sūtra also). The same

is stated by the Sūtrakāra in the present Sūtra “Jyoti (is Brahma) on account of the mention of the feet”. As to the objection, as to how the fact of the proximity of Brahma in the former Scriptural sentence about Jyoti can cause the word ‘Jyoti’ mentioned in the Scriptural passage here to be diverted from its own proper subject, we reply—It is no fault, because when once the pronoun ‘yat’ which is mentioned earlier in the Scriptural passage “Yat atah paro divo Jyotih” has by its own power (of indicating what is near it) intimated Brahma which is known from its relation with heaven, and is indicated in the preceding Sūtra, then it is of course reasonably sustainable that the word ‘Lustre’ also indicates Brahma. Therefore, by the word ‘Lustre’ here, we should understand Brahma.—24.

*If it is said that (Brahma) is not indicated, because only the Gāyatrī metre is mentioned, (we reply)—no, because resigning of the mind is mentioned, and it is so seen from the Scriptures also.—25.*

Now what has been said, viz. that, as only the metre called Gāyatrī is mentioned (and not Brahma) in even the preceding Sūtra, in the Scriptural passage “Gāyatrī is all this creation, whatsoever all this is” (Chhān. 3.12.1) has to be refuted. (The Vedāntin says)—How can it be said, that because of the mention of only a metre, Brahma is not indicated, when, in that Scriptural Rik—“That much is its greatness etc.”—the quadrupedal Brahma is indicated? It is not so (says the opponent). When, having introduced Gāyatrī by the Scriptural passage—“Gāyatrī is all this”—and having described the same Gāyatrī in its different distinctive features such as, the elements, the earth, the body, the heart, speech, and vital air, and having also quoted the Mantra—“This Gāyatrī is quadrupedal and six-formed (‘four-quartered six-fold Gāyatrī’—Hume) and when, the Mantra that all this is, is made manifest by this Rik; that much is its greatness”—in connection with the same Gāyatrī which is explained in this form, is cited in illustration of it, how can the same Mantra suddenly indicate the quadrupedal Brahma? And again, when the word Brahma which in “Which verily is that Brahma” (Chhān.

3.12.5, 6) is also used in connection with the same 'metre', inasmuch as it is the same metre which is relevant (to this context), and when in the Scriptural passage "Who knows this (Gāyatrī) as 'Brahma-Upanishad' in this manner" (Chhān. 3.11.3) also, it is construed as 'Veda-Upanishad', how can it indicate the quadrupedal Brahma? Therefore, if it be said (by the opponent), that as only a 'metre' is mentioned, Brahma is not relevant (i.e. is not the subject dealt with) here, we reply—This is no fault, because it is in that manner that by the Scriptural Brāhmaṇa passage "Gāyatrī verily is *all* this" the resigning of the mind (in Brahma) is mentioned, by means of the fixing of the mind in abstract contemplation i.e. by resigning of the mind in Brahma, which is connected with this metre known as the Gāyatrī. It is not possible, that Gāyatrī which is merely a particular metrical arrangement of letters can be the Self of all. Therefore (we say) that Brahma, the cause of this transitory world, which is inherent in its effect known as Gāyatrī, is what is here described as 'all', as for instance in the Scriptural passage—"All this, verily, is Brahma" (Chhān. 3.14.1). We shall speak hereafter by the Sūtra "Tadananyatvamārambhanashabdādibhyah" (Bra. Sū. 2.1.14), that an effect is not different from the cause. In other places too we observe devout meditation on Brahma, in an indirect way through an effect or modification, thus—"The followers of Rig-Veda interpret *it* (Brahma) in the great Uktha, the followers of Yajurveda, in the sacrificial fire, and the followers of Sāma-Veda, in 'Mahāvratā'" (Ait. Brā. 3.2.3.12). Therefore also, even though in the preceding sentence, a metre is mentioned, it is the quadrupedal Brahma that is indicated, and the same is again referred to in the sentence containing the word 'Jyoti', with a view to enjoin another (sort of) devout meditation.

Others (the Vṛttikārās etc.) maintain that by the word Gāyatrī, Brahma itself is directly indicated (and not indirectly) because of numerical equality. Just as Gāyatrī (the metre), has four feet (charaṇās) consisting of six words in every foot, so Brahma also is quadrupedal. Similarly elsewhere also, a word signifying a metre is used to indicate another meaning, because of numerical equality. As for instance, beginning with "These five of one sort (viz. Vāyu, fire, sun, moon and water, in the Ādhidaivika

sense) and those other five of the other sort (viz. Vital air, speech, eyes, ear and mind in the Ādhyātmika sense), being ten in all, make the 'Kṛita'\*", it is further mentioned thus:—"So is this Virāṭ† which is the eater of all things" (Chhān. 4.3.8). According to the adherents of this view (Paksha), by the word Gāyatrī, Brahma is directly indicated and not only a metre. Be that as it may, we consider that in every way in the preceding sentence Brahma is the relevant thing.—25.

*(We must understand it) like this, as only in that way, the mention of the beings etc. as constituting the foot (of Brahma), can be reasonably sustainable. —26.*

Hence it is, that it has to be understood in this manner, viz. that in the previous sentence Brahma is the relevant thing, as the Scriptures mention beings etc. as constituting the foot (of Brahma). Having indicated the beings, the Earth, the body and the Hridaya, the Scriptures say—"This Gāyatrī is quadrupedal and six-form". If it (i.e. the Gāyatrī metre) is not accepted to be Brahma, (the mention) that a mere metre has beings etc. as constituting its foot, would not be reasonably sustainable. Besides, again, if we do not accept it (i.e. the metre) to be Brahma, the Rik "That much is its greatness" cannot be properly connected (with the preceding Rik). It is by this very Rik that Brahma alone is indicated, and it is by the Scriptural passage "All beings are its foot and its three immortal feet are in heaven" that "That Brahma is the Self of all" (Chhān. 3.12.5) becomes reasonably sustainable. Even in the 'Purusha-Sūkta', this Rik is mentioned as meaning Brahma. Smṛiti also similarly indicates Brahma to be of such nature, thus—"I stand supporting all this world by one portion of myself" (Bh. G. 10.42). The indication (by the Scriptural passage) "That which verily is Brahma" (Chhān. 3.12.7) can be said to be reasonably sustainable in its principal meaning, only if it is so. The Scriptural passage—"The five Brahma-Purushās (the door-keepers of the

\* A technical term in the game of dice in which the four sides of a dice are marked with 4 dots (Kṛita), 3 dots (Tretā), 2 dots Dvāpāra and 1 dot (Kali) respectively and Kṛita is that side of the dice which shows 4 dots.

† Virāṭ is the name of a metre having ten letters in each foot.

Brahma-Loka)" (Chhān. 3.13.6)—which speaks of Brahma-Purushās in connection with the five vents of the Hridaya (i.e. doors through which to attain Brahma) can only be possible, provided what is intended to be said, has a connection with Brahma. Therefore, it is Brahma that is relevant in the preceding sentence. The conclusion, that the same Brahma is recognizable in, and is referred to, in the sentence containing the word 'Jyoti', by reason of a connection with the heavenly world, thus stands (established).  
—26.

*If it be objected that (Brahma of the preceding sentence) cannot be understood (as Brahma, in the following sentence) because of the difference in the instruction, (we say) No, because as between them both there is no contradiction.—27.*

What also has been said—viz. that as, in the Scriptural passage "Its three immortal feet are in heaven" the locative case (Divi) is used to indicate that heaven is referred to as the support, and again (in the subsequent passage) "That which is beyond the heaven" the ablative case (Divah) is used to indicate heaven as a boundary, therefore, inasmuch as there is difference in the instruction, there is no recognition of that Brahma here (i.e. in the present sentence)—has to be refuted. With regard to this we say—This is no fault, because as between them both there is no contradiction (in using the locative and the ablative case for indicating Brahma). In both the instructions in which the locative and the ablative case is used, there is no contradiction as to what is understood by both the sentences. Just as in ordinary life, a falcon which has a connection with the top of a tree, is seen to be described either way, as for instance thus—in the top of a tree or beyond the top of a tree,—similarly, Brahma, even though it is in heaven, is described as being beyond the heaven. Another commentator says—Just as in ordinary life a falcon which really has no connection with the top of a tree, is seen to be described either way, as for instance, a falcon on the top of a tree or beyond the top of a tree, similarly even Brahma which is beyond the heaven, is referred to as being in the heaven. Therefore there is recognition of Brahma,

as indicated in the former sentence, in the latter sentence also.

Therefore it is established, that the transcendent Brahma alone is to be understood by the word 'Jyoti'.—27.

11. PRATARDANĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 28-31.

*Prāṇa (the chief vital air) is Brahma, because it is so comprehended.*—28.

In the Kaushītaki Brāhmaṇa Upanishad there is mention of the following Indra-Pratardana legend, which begins thus—"Pratardana the grandson of Divodāsa, once upon a time reached the abode of Indra by means of battle and his prowess or manliness". In that legend, it is mentioned thus—(Indra said) "I am the Prāṇa, the Intelligential Self, and you should meditate on me, who am such, as life and immortality". And later on—"It is the Prāṇa, which verily is the Intelligential Self, which seizes hold of this body and animates it". (Kaush. 3.1, 2, 3). Similarly also (it mentions)—"Do not care to know 'speech' (Vāk) but try to know the speaker etc.". And in the end—"This Prāṇa itself indeed is the Intelligential Self, bliss, and (is) ageless (i.e. unaging) and immortal etc." (Kaush. 3.8). In this connection a doubt arises as follows—Whether here, the word Prāṇa merely denotes Vāyu (air) or the 'Self' of a deity, or the Jīva-Self, or the Highest Brahma. (Here the opponent says)—that the word Prāṇa indicates Brahma, is described already in the Sūtra "For the same reason Prāṇa is Brahma" (I. i. 23). Here also there is an indicatory mark of Brahma viz. "Bliss, ageless (i.e. unaging) and immortal etc.". Whence then, could any doubt be possible? (To this) we reply—(a doubt arises) because there are more than one indicatory marks. Not only is there an indicatory mark of Brahma, but there are other indicatory marks also. (For instance,) Indrā's words—"You should know me only" (Kaush. 3.1), are the indicatory mark of the Self of a deity; "Which seizes hold of this body and animates it i.e. rouses it to action" is an indicatory mark of the Chief Vital Air; "Do not care to know speech, but try to know the speaker" is the indicatory mark of the Jīva-Self, and so, a doubt validly arises. (With regard to this, the conclusion of the opponent being) because it is so well-known, (only) Vāyu



(air) is the Prāṇa, (we reply)—By the word Prāṇa, we should know, that Brahma is meant. How so? Because that is how we have to understand it, because, if we consider the sentence (i.e. as a whole from the beginning to the end), and the natural construction of the words and their meaning, it appears that it is intended to propound Brahma. So far as the beginning is concerned, when Pratardana is spoken to, by Indra, thus—"Choose a boon"—Pratardana chooses as the boon the highest aim of man, thus—" (Oh Indra,) do please choose for me that boon which you consider as most beneficial to man." Then, how can Prāṇa, about which instruction is here given to Pratardana as being the most beneficial, not be the Highest Brahma? There is nothing, except the knowledge of the Highest Brahma, whose acquisition is the most beneficial, because the Scriptural passage says—"It is by knowing Brahma that a man conquers Death, there is no other path for going (out of the transmigratory existence)" (Shvet. 3.8). Similarly the Scriptural passage—"The person who knows me is not by any act of his deprived of his fruit (Loka i.e. Moksha), even though he commits a theft or causes the death of a man learned in Vedās" (Kaush. 3.1)—fits in, only if we understand Prāṇa to be Brahma. It is well-known that through the knowledge of Brahma, all 'Karma' is worked out or exhausted, for the Scriptural passage says—"When that Parāvara (one that is both the higher and the lower) is realized, all the Karma of a man is exhausted". (Muṇḍ. 2.2.8). That Prāṇa is the Intelliential Self would be reasonably possible, only if it is accepted that Prāṇa indicates Brahma. It is not possible that the non-sentient 'Vāyu' could be the sentient Self. Similarly in the peroration also, blissfulness etc. referred to in "Bliss, ageless (unaging) and immortal" could not be reasonably sustainable, unless by these words we understand Brahma. (Also the Scriptural passage)—"He does not add to his stature by good deeds, nor does he become any the less in stature by bad action; for he makes those, whom he desires to uplift from these regions, do good deeds, and makes those, whom he desires to lead towards the abyss, do bad deeds" etc. and "He is the head of this world, and the ruler of it" (Kaush. 3.8). It is possible to understand all this in this manner, only if we understand

that by Prāṇa, the Highest Brahma is meant, and not the 'Chief Vital Air'. Therefore Prāṇa means Brahma.—28.

*If it be said that (Brahma) is not (indicated), because the speaker instructs about his own-self, (we reply)—no, because there is here (in this Adhyāya) a profusion of Adhyātma relation (i.e. the relation of the Jīva-Self with the Highest Self).—29.*

Objection is here raised to the statement (of the Vedāntin) that Prāṇa is Brahma, thus—Highest Brahma is not expressed by the word Prāṇa. Why? Because the speaker gives instruction about his own-self. The speaker, by name Indra, who is a particular deity endowed with a body, speaks about his own-self to Prataṛdāna, thus—He (Indra) begins by saying "Know me only" and then says in an egotistic manner (Ahamkāravādena), "I am Prāṇa the Intelligential Self". How then, can this Prāṇa, about which instruction is given (by Indra) about its being the self of the speaker, be Brahma? It is not possible that Brahma can express itself in speech, because the Scriptures mention that Brahma is "Sans-speech, sans-mind" (Bṛih. 3.8.8). Similarly Indra praises himself as possessing attributes associated only with a body, which could not be possible in the case of Brahma, thus—"I killed the three-headed Tvāshtrā, threw the Yatis who could not recite the Vedās properly (Arunmukhān), to the wolves" etc. That Indra can be Prāṇa, is reasonably possible, because of his might, because it is known that "Prāṇa verily is might". It is a well-known that Indra is the deity possessing might, and any deed requiring might is known as the work of Indra. And because the self of a deity possesses unobstructed knowledge, it can be described as being the Intelligential Self. It is said that deities possess unobstructed knowledge. When, therefore, it is determined that the instruction is about the self of a deity, words referring to 'being most beneficial' (Hitatamatva) should so far as possible be construed as referring to that deity. Having in this manner raised the objection that, as the instruction is, that as the speaker Indra is referring to his own-self as Prāṇa, it cannot be Brahma, it is refuted as follows—That there is a profusion of 'Adhyātma' relation (i.e. the relation between the

Jīva-Self and the Highest Self), i.e. a profusion of a relation to the Universal Self, in this. The Scriptural passage—"As long as Prāṇa resides in the body, so long there is life"—shows that only Prāṇa which is the Intelligential and the Universal Self, has the freedom (Svātantrya) of conferring and taking away life, and not any particular Deity which has come into existence later on. Similarly the Scriptural passage "There is however a superior excellence among the vital breaths" (Kaush. 3.2) indicates the Prāṇa (i.e. the Chief Prāṇa) as the highest good of the sense-organs which abide in it. Similarly beginning with the Scriptural passages—"Prāṇa alone, which is the Intelligential Self, seizes hold of the body and animates it i.e. rouses it to action" (Kaush. 3.3), and "Do not care to know speech, but desire to know the speaker"—, the Scriptural passage—"Just as the tyre of a chariot is set on the spokes and the spokes are set in the nave, even so, entities like Earth, water etc. and their attributes viz. smell etc. (i.e. Bhūtamātrās) are set in sense-organs like the ear etc. and their sensations (i.e. Prajñāmātrās) are set in the Prāṇa and this Prāṇa is the Intelligential Self, bliss, ageless and immortal"—in the end, concludes, that "the Prāṇa is the Universal Self which is unconquered by the interaction of the sense-organs," and the final conclusion—"Know him to be my-self"—would be sound, only if (by Prāṇa) the Universal Self is accepted, and not any other entity which has come into existence later on. Another Scriptural passage is—"This Self is Brahma, the all-perceiving" (Brih. 2.5.19). Therefore it is because there is this profusion of Adhyātma relation (i.e. the relation of the Jīva-Self with the Highest Self), that the instruction is only about Brahma and not about the Self of a deity.—29.

How then is it that, here, the speaker is seen to give instruction about his own self ?

*The Instruction (by Indra to Pratardana)  
is in conformity with the realization of the  
truth of the Shāstra (by Indra), as was in  
the case of Vāmadeva.—30.*

The deity Indra, realizing with the intuition of a Sage, that according to the Shāstra his own self was the

Highest Self i.e. that he himself was the Highest Brahma, gave instruction (to Pratardana) thus—"Know me only", just as the Sage Vāmadeva, realizing this Brahma, understood (i.e. arrived at the knowledge), "I was Manu and the Sun" and "Whosoever amongst the Gods became enlightened, he indeed became that" (Brih. 1.4.10). The objection (of the opponent), that Indra has praised his own self, by mentioning his killing of Tvashtṛā with the help of the attributes of his body, and in saying "Know me only"—has now to be refuted. To that we say—The killing of Tvashtṛā etc. is not mentioned by Indra, with a view to praise himself as his being the one to be known, by saying "Because this is my handiwork, therefore you should know me." How then (are the killing of Tvashtṛā etc. mentioned) ? We reply—Indra has said so, with a view to praise knowledge, and it is because of this reason, that having mentioned such heroic deeds as the killing of Tvashtṛā etc., he subsequently continues the praise of the knowledge (of the Highest Self), in this manner—"Who knows me thus, also would not lose the fruit of Final Release." What this (sentence) means is this—Not a hair of mine, who am one with Brahma, is injured, even though I have perpetrated cruel deeds like these, nor will any other person who knows me (as Brahma), will by any action of his, be deprived of the fruit of Final Release. That which is to be known, is, of course, Brahma, which is described subsequently (by the next sentence) thus—"I am Prāṇa, the Intelligential Self". Therefore, this sentence refers to Brahma.—30.

*If it be said (that Prāṇa does not indicate Brahma) because of there being indicatory marks of the Jīva-Self and the principal Vital Air, (we say)—No, because there would thus be three-foldness of devout meditation, and because also of acceptance (of this meaning, Brahma, elsewhere), and also because of the mention here of being connected (with the indicatory marks of Brahma).—31.*

(The opponent says—) Even though the instruction is not (according to you, the Vedāntin) with regard to the

Self of a deity which has come into existence later on, because there is, as is seen, a profusion of many things, (with respect to) the Adhyātma relation (i.e. the relation of the Jīva-Self with the Highest Self), still the sentence does not deserve to be a sentence indicative of Brahma. How so? Because of the indicatory marks of the Jīva-Self and the Chief Vital Air. As far as the Jīva-Self is concerned, we find that there is a clear indicatory mark of the Jīva-Self in this sentence, thus—"Do not care to know 'speech' (Vāk) but desire to know the 'speaker'" etc.—because here, the Jīva-Self, which is the ruler or controller of the body and sense-organs, and which is engrossed in the sense-organs such as speech etc., is mentioned as the one that should be known. Similarly there is the indicatory mark of the Chief Vital Air also, thus—"It is verily Prāṇa the Intelligential Self that supports this (Idam) body and rouses it to action." To support the body is the function of the Chief Vital Air, because in the Prāṇa-dialogue, with reference to speech and other sense-organs (the Scriptures mention as follows)—"The highest Prāṇa said to them, do not be deluded, it is I only that divide myself five-fold and support this body and rouse it to action." (Pra. 2.3). In the case of those who recite thus—"Giving support to this (Imam) body"—it should be explained as follows—(I) support this Jīva-Self or the collection of sense-organs and rouse the body to action. It is reasonably sustainable to say of the Jīva-Self, that it is the Intelligential Self, because of its sentiency. It is reasonably possible to say even in the case of the Chief Vital Air, that it is the Intelligential Self, because of its being the support of the other sense-organs which are the instruments of perception. If it is understood that both the Jīva-Self and the Chief Vital Air are meant by the word Prāṇa it is reasonably possible to understand the indication to be both ways (Ubhayathā Nirdeśha), viz., the indication of identity between them (Abhedanirdeśha), because of the co-ordinated parallel function (Sahavrittīvena) of the Prāṇa and the Intelligential Self, and the indication of distinction between them (Bhedanirdeśha), because of their having their own separate form (Swarūpeṇa), as follows—"Verily what is Prāṇa is intelligence, and what is intelligence is Prāṇa (which shows their non-difference) and they reside together in

this body, and move out together (which shows the difference between them)." If however Prāṇa were to be accepted as Brahma, then what ever can be so distinguished from each other? Therefore, here, by Prāṇa, we should understand the Jiva-Self or the Chief Vital Air or both, but (certainly) not Brahma. (To this, we reply)—It is not so, because of the threefoldness of devout meditation. Because if we were to understand it like that, it would mean threefold devout meditation—devout meditation on the Jiva-Self, on the Chief Vital Air, and on Brahma, and it is not proper to understand all this (as meant) in one sentence. From the introductory and the concluding sentence also, it is understood that there is but one sentence only, because beginning with "Know me only" and having then said "I am Prāṇa, the Intelligential Self, you should contemplate devoutly on me, as life and as immortality" in the end, (the Scriptures say) "This very Prāṇa is the Intelligential Self, Bliss, the ageless and immortal" and thus the introductory and the concluding portions appear to be of the same nature. That being so, it is logical to understand that there is but one meaning only. It is not possible to construe the indicatory mark of Brahma, as being an indicatory mark of something else, for the ten existential elements (Bhūta-mātrās) and the ten intelligential elements (Prajñāmātrās) cannot be reasonably understood to have been tenoned and mortised into anything other than Brahma. Besides, it has been accepted in another place also (in Sūtra 23 above) that because of the indicatory mark of Brahma, the word Prāṇa serves to indicate Brahma. Here also because of the relation (of the word Prāṇa) to the indicatory mark of Brahma, by way of a reference to "being most beneficial", it is understood that this also is instruction about Brahma only. What has been indicated as the indicatory mark of the Chief Vital Air by the sentence "Supports this body and rouses it to action", is really not so, because, as the function of the Chief Vital Air also, depends on the Highest Self, it is possible figuratively to construe that function as appertaining to the Highest Self, for the Scriptural passage says—"It is not because of the Prāṇa (which has an upward tendency) and the Apāna (which has a downward tendency), that any mortal lives. They live because of another, in whom the Prāṇa and the Apāna rest" (Kāṭha. 2.5.5). That,

which has been known as the indicatory mark of the Jīva-Self, by the passage—"Do not care to know 'speech' (Vāk) but desire to know the speaker"—also, is unable to preclude the view that it refers to Brahma, because, the Jīva-Self in fact is not something absolutely different from Brahma, because of the Scriptural passages—"That thou art", "I am Brahma" etc.. It is by resorting to a special aspect (of Brahma), as a result of adjuncts such as intelligence etc., that the Jīva-Self, even though in fact it is Brahma, is described as the agent and the experiencer. It is therefore not contradictory to give instruction to a person in order to direct his mind towards the Universal Self, and in order to make him realize his own nature (Brahma) by getting him to shed his peculiar adventitious aspect as caused by adjuncts, by such a passage as "Do not care to know 'speech' (Vāk) but desire to know the speaker" etc. The Scriptural passage—"That which is not made manifest by speech, but which makes speech manifest, that you should know to be Brahma and not this, on which you are meditating devoutly" (Kena. 1.4) etc.—shows, that the Jīva-Self itself, which is engrossed in actions such as speech etc., is Brahma. With regard to the other objection (of the opponent), viz., that the fact, that Prāṇa and the Intelligential Self are seen to be two different entities, as evidenced by the Scriptural passage "They reside in the body together and also move out from it together", is not reasonably sustainable, in the Brahma-vāda (i.e. the doctrine that Prāṇa means Brahma), we say—It is no fault, because, as it is reasonably sustainable to conceive of an indication of difference between intelligence and Prāṇa, which constitute the support of knowledge and of the power to act, and which have become the adjuncts of the Universal Self, there really is no difference in the nature of the Universal Self as such which has been affected by these two adjuncts, and hence there is no contradiction in equating the Prāṇa with the Intelligential Self. Or the following part of the Sūtra, viz. "Upāsā-traividhyāt, Āshritatvāt, iha tat yogāt" can have the following other meaning (according to the Vṛttikāra). Supposing the indicatory marks here to be of the Jīva-Self or of the Chief Vital Air, it would not be contradictory, even if this sentence were to be a sentence referring to Brahma. How so? Because of the threefold devout meditation on

Brahma, viz., in its character of being the Prāṇa, or of being the intelligence, or in its capacity as being itself (i.e. Brahma). There the passages "Meditate devoutly (on me) as life (Āyu) and immortality, life is Prāṇa", "Supports this body and rouses it into action", "Therefore meditate devoutly on this only as Uktha" indicate its character as Prāṇa. Thereafter beginning with—"Now we shall describe how all beings become one in that intelligence", the further passage—"Speech gave one portion of itself to intelligence; name is its externally correlated existential element; with intelligence (Prajñā) having mounted on speech; with speech one obtains all names", etc.—indicates its character as Intelligence. Then the following passages—"These ten existential elements (Bhūta-Mātrās) verily are with reference to intelligence (adhiprajna), the ten intelligential elements (Prajñā-Mātrās) are with reference to elements. For truly if there were no elements of being, there would be no elements of existence; verily, if there were no elements of intelligence there would be no elements of being. For truly from either of them alone no appearance (Rūpa) whatsoever would be effected. They are not different (from each other)", "That just as the tyre of a chariot is set on the spokes and the spokes are tenoned and mortised in the nave, similarly, the existential elements are set in intelligence and the intelligential elements are tenoned and mortised in the Prāṇa. This Prāṇa is the Intelligential Self"—indicate its character as itself i.e. Brahma. Therefore, it is but one devout meditation on Brahma in its character as affected by these two sorts of adjuncts and in its own character as itself, which is mentioned here in a threefold way. Elsewhere also, it is seen that devout meditation on Brahma is resorted to in its character as affected by adjuncts, as for instance in—"He whose structure is the mind and whose body is the Prāṇa" (Chhān. 3.14.2.). Here also, the same is fit and proper, by reason of the introductory and the concluding passages, because, we have understood it to have the same one meaning, and because we find here the indicative marks of Prāṇa, Intelligence and Brahma. Therefore it is established that this is a sentence which propounds Brahma.—31.

*Here ends Pāda I of Adhyāya I.*



## ADHYĀYA I—PĀDA 2

### 1. SARVATRAPRASIDDHYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 1-8.

In the first Pāda, it has been said that according to the Sūtra “Janmādyasya yatah” (Bra. Sū. I. i. 2.), Brahma is the cause of all this transitory world such as the Ākāsha etc., and by that, impliedly it is as good as said, how Brahma, the cause of all this world, has the attributes of being all-pervading, eternal, omniscient, all-powerful and the Self of all. After stating that certain words well-known to have another meaning, are in fact indicative of Brahma, and that certain sentences, though they are clearly the indicatory marks of Brahma, are doubted as being so, it has also been determined that they refer to Brahma. Again there are certain other sentences which do not clearly seem to be the indicatory marks of Brahma, and are doubted as to their significance, i.e. it is doubted whether they propound Brahma or something else. The second and the third Pādas are begun with a view to determine that.

*(Because) throughout instruction about  
that which is well-known (i.e. Brahma)  
is given.—1.*

The Scriptures say—“All this, verily, is Brahma, (and that it is) ‘Tajjalān’. Let a man meditate devoutly on it with a calm and collected mind. Man verily is an embodiment of desire ; just how a man desires during this life, so he becomes after his exit from here. He should therefore have a firm determination.” “(The Self) has mind as its structure, Prāṇa as its body, and is possessed of the nature (Rūpa) of lustre.” (Chhān. 3.14.1, 2) etc. In this connection a doubt arises, whether by the attributes such as “having the mind as its structure” etc., instruction is given about the Jīva-Self as the one to be devoutly meditated upon, or about the Highest Brahma. What then is your conclusion ? It is that the embodied Jīva-Self is meant. How so ? Because it is the embodied Jīva-Self which is the master of the body and the sense-organs, it is he that is well-known to be so connected with the mind etc., and not the Highest Brahma, which in view of the Scriptural passage—“He is sans-vital air, sans-mind, and is pure”

(Mund. 2.1.2) etc.—is not so connected. But (says the Vedāntin) here, by the Scriptural sentence—“All this verily is Brahma”—it is Brahma as indicated by its own word that is accepted. How can then there be any doubt that the embodied Jīva-Self is here meant to be devoutly meditated upon? (To this the opponent replies)—This is no fault. This sentence is not meant for giving an injunction for devout meditation on Brahma. What then (is it for)? It has the purport of giving an injunction to be calm and collected, because it is said, “All this verily is Brahma, and therefore being calm and collected one should meditate devoutly on Tajjalān as that.” It means to say—because all this, which is a modification (as from a cause), is in substance Brahma only, and because it is Tajjalān (i.e. from which all things spring up, in which all things end, and in which all things live), and because all this is but one i.e. the Self only, there is no possibility of passions etc. arising, therefore, being calm and collected, one should meditate devoutly. Therefore the sentence being meant for giving an injunction to meditate devoutly by being calm and collected, it cannot also indicate devout meditation on Brahma. Devout meditation however is prescribed by the injunction—“He should have a firm determination (Kratu)”, and it means Samkalpa or meditation, and with a view to indicate the object of that meditation, the Scriptures say—“Having mind as its structure and Prāṇa as its body”—(which is) the indicatory mark of the Jīva-Self. Again, the Scriptural mention about its being “that to whom all works and all desires belong”, also, in this manner, becomes reasonably sustainable in the case of the Jīva-Self. The reference to the Hridaya, as being the abode, and as to its extreme minuteness, in the Scriptural passage—“This my Self, which is in the ‘Hridaya’ and is smaller than a grain of rice or barley”—is possible to be conceived of only in the case of the Jīva-Self which is as small as the point of a prod, and not in the case of Brahma, which has no finite determinations. But, (retorts the Vedāntin), the passage—“Greater than the Earth (Prithivī)”—is not possible to be conceived of in the case of that which has a finite determination (i.e. the Jīva-Self). (To this the opponent replies)—This, being very minute and also being great, cannot be accepted in the case of one and the same thing at once,

because of their being contradictory to each other. Therefore, when we have to accept only one of the two alternatives, it is proper to accept 'being minute' which is mentioned first. As to its being greater, it may also be possible (in the case of the Jīva-Self), because in the ultimate sense the Jīva-Self is after all, Brahma. When it is finally determined that the passage refers to the Jīva-Self, the mention, in the end, of its being Brahma, by the words "This is Brahma" (Chhān. 3.14.4), should also be understood to have reference to the Jīva-Self, because it is meant for the purpose of a reference to what is relevant. Therefore, because of the attributes of "having mind as its structure" etc., it is the Jīva-Self on which devout meditation is to be made. (To this conclusion of the opponent) we reply—Because of the attributes, as having mind as its structure etc., it is the Highest Brahma alone that is to be devoutly meditated upon. How so? Because, as the instruction everywhere is about what is well-known to be so, it is proper and reasonable to think that the cause of the world, which depends upon the word 'Brahma' (for its meaning), which is here mentioned by the Scriptures in the beginning as "All this verily is Brahma", is the same about which instruction is given, as being characterized by attributes such as having mind as its structure, and it is only in this way that the fault of rejection of that which is relevant and the acceptance of that which is not so relevant, would not occur. But (says the opponent) we have said that in the beginning Brahma is indicated for the purpose of mentioning the injunction to be calm and collected and not with the purpose of mentioning Brahma itself. To this, we reply—(even though you say) that it is with a view to be calm and collected that Brahma is mentioned, yet when instruction is given about attributes such as having mind as its structure etc., the same Brahma is in close proximity. That the Jīva-Self however is neither anywhere proximate, nor is it mentioned in so many words, is the difference between the two views.—1.

*Because attributes intended to be expressed (by the Scriptures) are, moreover, reasonably sustainable (only in the case of Brahma).—2.*

Those attributes intended to be spoken of, are attributes meant to be expressed. Even though a desiderative form (*Ichchhārtha*) is not possible in the case of the Scriptures which have no author as such who can speak (of what is intended to be expressed), inasmuch as they are neither created by man nor by God (*Apaurusheya*) yet it can be taken to be so used in a figurative sense on account of the fruit or result (which follows after what is said in the Scriptures) and which is accepted (for consideration). In ordinary life also, that which is expressed in words and is intended to be accepted, is said to be so meant to be expressed, and that which is not so meant to be accepted, is not so meant to be expressed. Similarly in the Scriptures also, that which is spoken of as fit to be accepted, is said to be intended to be expressed, and all else as not intended to be expressed. As to what is intended to be accepted or not intended to be accepted, is understood from whether the Vedic text means that to be the gist or not. Similarly here, those attributes such as the attribute of having true purposes etc., which are intended to be expressed as being fit to be accepted for devout meditation, are reasonably sustainable in the case of the Highest Brahma, because that attribute of 'having a true purpose' is possible to be conceived of as belonging to the Highest Self only, because of its possessing unobstructed power in the matter of creation, preservation and destruction. It is also in the passage beginning with "That Self which is free from sin" (*Chhān. 8.7.1*) that the attributes of "having true desires and purposes" are mentioned as attributes belonging to the Highest Self. The words "whose Self is the *Ākāsha*" mean, whose Self is like the *Ākāsha*, because Brahma's similarity to the *Ākāsha*, is on account of its attribute of being all-pervading etc. By the words "Greater than the Earth" also, a similar thing is indicated. Even if it were to be construed as 'one whose Self is the *Ākāsha*', even then it would be possible to say of Brahma, which is the Self of all and the cause of all the transitory world, as having the *Ākāsha* as its Self. Hence also (Brahma is described as)—"He to to whom all works belong" etc. In this way the attributes intended to be expressed as being fit for devout meditation, are reasonably sustainable in the case of Brahma. As regards what is said (by the opponent)—viz. "Having mind

as its structure and Prāṇa as its body” is an indicatory mark of the Jīva-Self, and therefore, it is not reasonably sustainable in the case of Brahma,—we say that that also is reasonably sustainable because Brahma is all-pervading, and the terms ‘having mind as its structure and Prāṇa as its body’, which have a relation to the Jīva-Self, are applicable also in the case of Brahma. The Scriptures and the Smritis also are to the same effect—“Thou art woman as well as man, youth as well as maiden, thou art the aged one going about with (the help of) a staff and thou art born (i.e. thou manifestest thyself) in all directions” (Shvet. 4.3). Also, “Having hands and feet in all directions, having eyes, heads, and faces in all directions, having ears in all directions and encompassing everything” (Bh. G. 13.13). That the Scriptural words ‘sans-Prāṇa, sans-mind, and pure’ are with reference to the unqualified Brahma and ‘having mind as its structure and Prāṇa as its body’ are with reference to qualified Brahma, is the distinguishing feature in this. Hence, as the attributes which are intended to be expressed, are reasonably sustainable (in the case of Brahma), it is understood that it is the Highest Brahma about which instruction is given here, as being that which is fit for devout meditation upon.—2.

*But the embodied Jīva-Self is not (indicated by these attributes), because it is not reasonably sustainable.—3.*

It has been said in the former Sūtra, how the attributes intended to be expressed as being applicable to Brahma, are reasonably sustainable. By this Sūtra it is proposed to say how they are not reasonably sustainable, in the case of the embodied Jīva-Self. The word ‘but’ is meant to indicate final determination. According to the reasoning given (above) Brahma alone is endowed with attributes such as “having mind as its structure” and not the embodied Jīva-Self, because, such attributes as “His desires are true ; Ākāśa is its self”, “(It is) sans-speech, sans-desire, greater than the Earth” are not correctly or reasonably sustainable in the case of the embodied Jīva-Self. Shākira is one that exists in a body. But (says the opponent) the Lord also exists in a body. (We reply)—Of course, he does so exist  
S. B. 7.

in the body, but not *only in the body*, because the Scriptures mention that he pervades everything, by the passage—"Greater than the Earth, greater than the space between heaven and the Earth (Antariksha), (he) pervades *everything* like the Ākāsha, and is eternal". The Jiva-Self exists in the body, which is his seat of enjoyment or pain, because it has no function outside the body.—3.

*(It is not the Jiva-Self), also because, there is a mention of an object (of action) and of one who acts i.e. an agent (Karma-kartri).—4.*

Thus again is how the embodied Jiva-Self is not the one who possesses the attribute of 'having mind as its structure', because there is a mention in the Scriptures, of an object and an agent, thus—"Departing from here (from the body i.e. dying) I shall be one that has obtained this (i.e. Brahma)" (Chhān. 3.14.4). By this (Etam) here, the relevant Ātmā (Brahma) possessed of the qualities of 'having mind as its structure', which is the object of devout meditation, is indicated as the object which is to be attained (by the meditator), and by 'I shall have obtained' the one who attains and the one who meditates devoutly, i.e. the embodied Jiva-Self, is indicated. 'Shall have obtained' means 'shall have reached'. As far as possible it is not logical to indicate the same entity, as being at once both the object and the agent. Similarly, the possibility of one being the devout meditator and the other being that which is to be meditated upon, also depends upon their being different (entities). For this reason also the embodied Jiva-Self is not the one that has the attribute of 'having mind as its structure'.—4.

*Because (the Scriptures) mention different words.—5.*

It is because there are different words in a chapter on a similar subject in another Scriptural passage, that again it is, that the one endowed with the attribute of 'having mind as its structure' is different from the embodied Jiva-Self, thus—"Like a grain of rice or barley or canary or

kernel of a canary seed, is the aureate-complexioned Purusha which is *within* the inner-Self" (Shat. Brā. 10.6.3.2). The word which expresses the Self endowed with the special quality of having 'mind as its structure', viz. the word 'Purusha' in the nominative case, is different from the other word inner-Self which is in the locative case, viz. the inner-Self (Antarātman), and means the embodied Jīva-Self. That is how difference between the two (i.e. the Purusha and the Shārīra) becomes clear to us.—5.

*Because of the Smṛiti also.*—6.

Smṛiti also indicates the difference between the embodied Jīva-Self and the Highest Self, thus—"Oh Arjuna, the Lord is immanent in the region of the Hridaya of all beings, making them go round and round by his power of illusion (Māyā) as if they are riding on a machine". (Bh. G. 18.61). Here a doubt is raised by one, as follows: "Who again is this embodied Jīva-Self (Shārīra) as distinguished from the Highest Self, who is rejected by the third Sūtra of this Pāda?" The Scriptural passage—such as "There is no other seer but this, no other hearer but this etc." (Bṛih. 3.7.23)—, in effect, denies any Self other than the Highest Self. Similarly Smṛiti also—such as "Oh Bhārata, know me to be the knower of the body in all the bodies" (Bh. G. 13.2).

To this we reply—It (i.e. what you say) is of course true. It is but only the Highest Self which comes to have finite determination (as it were), by reason of limiting adjuncts such as body, sense-organs, the mind and intelligence, and which is mistakenly and in a figurative sense accepted by the ignorant as the embodied Jīva-Self, just as the Ākāsha (Nabha) which in fact is unlimited, appears as if it is limited, on account of limiting adjuncts such as a jar or a pot etc. And taking into consideration this difference with reference to it (i.e. the limiting adjuncts), the treating of the one as the object (i.e. the Highest Self) and the other as the agent (i.e. the Jīva-Self), is not contradictory, as long as a person has not received instruction about the Self (Ātmā) being the only one, by such Scriptural passage as "That thou art" etc. When once the fact that the Self (Ātmā) is but one only is grasped, then there is

an end to all the notions about the conditions of bondage and Final Release.—6.

*(If it be objected that Brahma is not indicated) because of the tiny-ness of the nest (i.e. abode), and because it is so mentioned, (we say)—No, because that is how (it is instructed) the Highest Brahma should be contemplated. (The case is) similar to that of the Ākāsha.—7.*

The word 'Arbhaka' means tiny and the word 'Okas' means a nest. The objection raised, that because the Scriptural passage "This Self (Ātmā) of mine within the Hridaya" shows a limited abode, and also because another Scriptural passage "Minuter than the grain of rice or barley" makes a reference to the minuteness (of the Self) in so many specific words, instruction about the Jiva-Self which is only as small as the point of a prod, is here given, and not about the all-pervading Highest Self—has now to be refuted. We reply—This is no fault. It is not reasonably sustainable in any way to say of an entity which has a finite determination, that it is all-pervading, but because an all-pervading entity is necessarily present everywhere, it is possible to say about such an entity with reference to some particular connection, that it is circumscribed in a limited space, just as, the King of the whole world can also be described as the King of Ayodhyā. In what connection, however, can the Lord, all-pervading though he is, be described as having a tiny nest (i.e. abode) and as being as minute as an atom? Because, we reply, he is to be contemplated in this way. The instruction given is, that the Lord endowed with a set of attributes such as being as minute as an atom, is to be contemplated as being in the lotus of the Hridaya, just as Hari (is contemplated) in the Shālagrāma (a stone symbol of Hari) because it is there (in the lotus of the Hridaya) that intelligence can grasp it. All-pervading though the Lord is, He vouchsafes His grace to one who meditates devoutly on Him as being there. It should be seen that the case is similar to that of the Ākāsha. Just as the Ākāsha, all-pervading though it is, is spoken of as having a tiny nest or as being minute, when



considered in relation with a needle or a net, even so, is Brahma. Therefore, it is, when considered in its relation to contemplation, that this view of Brahma as having a tiny nest or as being minute, is there, and not in its ultimate real sense. This also refutes the objection of some to the opinion of the Vedāntins, that because Brahma has the Hridaya as its abode, and as each different body has a different Hridaya as an abode, therefore, just as parrots etc., who have their separate individual abodes, are seen to be subject to faults, such as being more than one, having limbs, and being non-permanent etc., even so, is Brahma subject to a similar predicament.—7.

*If it be objected (that being connected with the Hridaya of every person) Brahma also will be subject to the experience of pleasure and pain, (we say) no, because there is a distinction (between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self).—8.*

(If it is argued by the opponent) that Brahma being all-pervading like the Ākāsha and being connected with the Hridayās of all beings, and being undistinguishable from the embodied Jīva-Self because of the nature of intelligence (in the case of both), it will, in common with the embodied Jīva-Self, necessarily have experience of pleasure and pain, and also because of their being one and the same entity, because the Scriptural passage mentions—“Than this there is no other cognizer” (Brih. 3.7.23), there is nothing like a transmigratory Self as such, as apart from the Highest Self, and therefore it is precisely only the Highest Self which experiences pleasure and pain inherent in the transmigratory existence. (To this objection we say) —No, because there is a difference or speciality here, and because of that, Brahma is not involved in any such predicament of having to experience pleasure and pain, like the embodied Jīva-Self, by reason of its being related with the Hridayās of all beings. There necessarily is a distinction between the embodied Jīva-Self and the Highest Lord. One (the embodied Jīva-Self) is an agent, an experiencer, the instrument of meritorious and unmeritorious actions, and is liable to pleasure and pain, while the other one (the

Highest Lord) is quite the opposite of that, and is one who is endowed with the attribute of being free from sin etc. Hence because of this distinction between these two, one is subject to the experience of pleasure and pain, and not the other. If by ignoring the powers of entities, we were to understand them to be connected through their effects, merely by reason of their proximity, then the Ākāśha etc., also may suffer the predicament of being scorched (when anything burns). A similar doubt and a similar refutation of it, would apply in the case of those who hold that there are many Selfs and they all are all-pervading. With regard to the objection that as Brahma is the only one Highest Self and that as there is no other Self, therefore, when the embodied Jiva-Self experiences pleasure or pain, Brahma also is in the predicament experiencing pleasure or pain, we say—Oh thou, the favourite of the Gods (which means, a fool), thou deservest to be asked this—Whence hast thou determined that there is no Self other than Brahma? And if thou sayest, that thou hast determined it to be so, because of such Scriptural passages as “That thou art”, “I am Brahma”, “There is no other knower than this”, then we reply that the purport of a Shāstra ought to be understood, according to the Shāstra itself (and in no other way), and thou canst not, in the case of one and the same thing, accept only a part of it, and reject the rest. (*‘Na tatra ardhajaratīyam labhyam’* i.e. one cannot accept only a part of a thing, but one must accept the thing as a whole). The Shāstra “That thou art”, which gives instruction, that Brahma, which is free from all sin, is the Self of the embodied Jiva-Self, rather obviates any experience of pleasure and pain even by the embodied Jiva-Self itself, and so, how can such (fancied) experience of pleasure or pain by the Jiva-Self ever involve Brahma in the predicament of having to experience similar pleasure or pain? If, however, the unity of the embodied Jiva-Self and Brahma, is not realized, then the experience of pleasure and pain by the embodied Jiva-Self is caused by false-ignorance only, and it cannot contaminate Brahma in the ultimate sense. It is not, that because ignorant people imagine that the sky has concavity and that it is dusty, that the sky really is so (i.e. that it, in fact, has concavity and that it is dusty). The Sūtrakāra says the same thing by the expression—“No,

because there is a distinction",—and even though the embodied Jīva-Self and Brahma are in fact one, Brahma is not in the predicament of having to experience pleasure and pain, by reason of the experience of pleasure and pain by the embodied Jīva-Self, as there is a distinction between false-ignorance, and true knowledge. Experience of pleasure and pain is due to false-ignorance, and the fact of the unity (between the Shārīra and Brahma) is realized through true knowledge. A thing experienced through true knowledge is not affected by the experience of pleasure and pain imagined through false-ignorance. Therefore one cannot imagine, that the Lord can ever have even the least little whiff of any experience of pleasure and pain.—8.

## 2. ATTRADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 9-10.

*(The Highest-Self is) the devourer because all movable and immovable entities are devoured (by it).—9.*

We read in the Kāṭhāvallī as follows: "He, to whom Brāhmaṇās and Kshatriyās serve as but rice, and Death as but the pouring (over the rice, of either ghee or butter-milk), who is there who knows, where He, who is like that, is?" Here we find, that as suggested by rice and its pouring, a devourer is indicated. In this connection, a doubt arises, whether 'fire' is meant to be the devourer, or the Jīva-Self, or the Highest-Self, as no particular distinguishing criterion (which would determine, which of these three is meant) is known. Because it is understood that questions with respect to all these three are propounded here (in Kāṭhāvallī). Then, what, do you suggest, is meant? (The opponent says)—Fire is the devourer meant here. Why so? Because of the mention in the Scriptures—"Fire the devourer of food" (Brih. 1.4.6), and also because fire is well-known (to be the devourer), or, may be, the Jīva-Self is the devourer meant, because it is seen (from the Scriptures) that "One of these two partakes of the delectable Pippal (a fruit)". But (certainly) not the Highest-Self, because it is seen (from the Scriptures) that "The other one does not partake of it, but only keeps

looking on" (Muṇḍ. 3.1.1). Our reply to this conclusion (of the opponent), is thus: It is the Highest-Self that deserves to be the devourer meant here. Why so? Because (whoever is meant to be the devourer) is mentioned as devouring all that is movable and the immovable. The whole movable and immovable (world) for which death serves as the pouring, is here seen to be the material fit to be devoured, and no one else other than the Highest-Self could possibly be the devourer of all this, comprehensively. That the Highest-Self which destroys the whole aggregate of creation, is the devourer of everything, is only what is reasonably sustainable. But (says the opponent) the devouring of all the movable and immovable world, is not found (mentioned) here, so how can you adopt the devouring of the whole movable and immovable world to be so readily available as a reason for determining (that the Highest-Self is meant)? To this objection we reply—This is no fault. From the mention of Death serving as but a 'pouring' we do properly understand, that the entire world of beings is indicated and that the Brāhmaṇās and the Kshatriyās as being chiefly important, are mentioned only illustratively to be the kind of food devoured by the Highest-Self. To the objection raised—viz. that it is not possible that the Highest-Self can be the devourer, as the Scriptures mention that "The other one does not partake (of the Pippala) but merely keeps looking on"—, we reply, that this mention is for the purpose of denying the experience of the fruit of action (on the part of the Highest-Self), as that is proximate, in the context. Such mention is not for the purpose of denying the destruction of the whole creation, because, in all the Vedāntās, Brahma is well-known as the cause of the creation, preservation and destruction (of the transitory world). Therefore it is the Highest-Self alone, that deserves to be the devourer referred to here.—9.

*And because of the chapter (being about the Highest-Self).—10.*

This again is why the Highest-Self alone deserves to be the devourer (meant here), as this chapter deals with the Highest-Self. The Scriptural passage—"The Knowing-Self is neither born nor does it die" (Kaṭha. 1.2.18)—shows, that

it stands to reason to accept what is relevant here (viz. the Highest-Self). Again the passage "Who indeed knows, where such a one as He, is", which shows that the Highest-Self is difficult to comprehend, is an indicatory mark of the Highest-Self.—10.

### 3. GUHĀPRAVISHTĀDHIKARĀṆAM. Sū. 11-12.

*The two who have entered the cave (of Hridaya), are the two-selves (the Jīva-Self and the Highest-Self), because it is so seen.—11.*

In the Kāṭhāvallī itself, it is said—"Those two (Selves) who imbibe the fruits of actions in the 'world acquired by good deeds' (i.e. in the body), and have entered the exalted Ākāsha-like cave of the Hridaya which deserves to be half the location of the Highest-Self (Parārdha), and with regard to whom, those who have realized Brahma and those who have maintained the five fires (viz. the house-holder's fires) and have kept the three Nāchiketa fires, say, that they are (as different as) the light and shade." (Kāṭha. 3.1).

A doubt here arises, whether intelligence (Buddhi) and the Jīva-Self are here indicated, or, the Jīva-Self and the Highest-Self are indicated. If it is understood that intelligence and the Jīva-Self are here indicated, then that would mean—that the Jīva-Self is different from the aggregate of body and the sense-organs which have intelligence as their chief factor, is what is here propounded. It is expected that it *would* deserve to be so propounded here, because in the following Scriptural passage, the question (which Nachiketā asks) is, as follows :—"When a man dies, the doubt that men have, some saying that he (continues) to exist, and others that he *does not* exist, that, instructed by you (i.e. by Death) I would like to know. That is the third amongst the boons." (Kāṭha. 1.1.2). If (on the other hand), it is understood that the Jīva-Self and the Highest-Self are here indicated, then it would appear, that the Highest-Self which is different from the Jīva-Self is what is propounded here. In that case also, it is expected that it *would* be so expounded, because in the Scriptural passage the question also asked (by Nachiketā) is as follows:—

"That something other than duty properly performed (Anyatra Dharmāt), and other than undutiful conduct (Anyatra Adharmāt), other than this effect (i.e. the created thing) and the cause, other than the past and the future, that you know, and that you should impart to me." (Kaṭha. 1.2.14). Here, some other opponent intervenes and says :— Neither of these two views is possible. Why so ? Because, drinking of the fruit of actions means experiencing the fruit of actions, because of the indicatory mark, "The world of good actions i.e. the body". To have a body is possible only for a sentient Knower of the body (Chetanasya Kshetrajnasya) and not for the non-sentient intelligence or mind. By the dual form 'Pibantau', the Scriptures indicate drinking by two, and hence, the view that the two may be intelligence (Buddhi) and the Jīva-Self, is not possible, and for a similar reason (Ata eva) the view that the two may be the Jīva-Self, and the Highest-Self, is also not possible, because in the case of the Highest-Self though it is sentient, drinking is not possible, because of the Mantra-words—"The other does not partake of the Pippala, but only keeps looking on." With regard to this objection, it is said : This is no fault, because, if amongst many men going along, even if only one man amongst them may have an umbrella, it is said figuratively about all of them, that persons carrying umbrellas are going. Similarly, even when only one of these two drinks, it is figuratively said that both drink. Or it may also be said, that the Jīva-Self is the one who drinks, and the Lord causes the Jīva-Self to drink, and even though the Lord only causes the Jīva-Self to drink, he himself is said to drink, just as, one who causes others to cook, is said to be the one who cooks. It is even possible to say, that the two may be Intelligence (Buddhi) and the Knower of the body, because, we see, that (figuratively) action is predicated of an instrument of action, as for instance, we find it said like this : "The fuel is cooking." In a chapter dealing with the Adhyātma (the relation of the Jīva-Self with the Highest-Self) any other pair of drinkers (other than the Jīva-Self and the Highest-Self), is not possible. Therefore, it is, that a doubt arises (as said by the opponent, above) whether the pair of Intelligence and the Jīva-Self is meant here, or the pair of the Jīva-Self and the Highest-Self. What then

is your view? (The opponent says) that Intelligence and the Knower of the body are meant here. Why so? Because it has been so particularized in the words—“(The two) have entered the cave.” Whether, by the word cave, we understand the body or the Hridaya, in either case it is reasonably sustainable that those who are supposed to have entered the cave are, Intelligence (Buddhi) and the Knower of the body, and so far as it is possible, it is not proper to imagine that the all-pervading Brahma is circumscribed i.e. confined to a particular region. The words “the world of good actions” (which mean a body) show that there is no escaping the influence of action (on the part of these two). The Highest-Self is on the other hand beyond the sphere of good or bad actions, because of the Scriptural passage—“He does not either increase or decrease (in his status) by action.” The words “light and shade” indicate, that it is reasonably sustainable, that there is an indication of sentient and non-sentient entities being as different from each other, as light and shade. Therefore it is the Intelligence (Buddhi) and the Jīva-Self that are spoken of here. As to this conclusion (of the opponent) we reply :—It is the Cognitional Jīva-Self and the Highest-Self that are here spoken of. Whence is it so? Because, both of them are selfs and sentient, and have a common nature. For we find that in the ordinary world, when we hear of any reference by way of enumeration by number (Sankhyāshravaṇe), we experience that it is so said, about things which have a common nature. When it is said (by somebody) that ‘a fellow for this bull should be looked for’ it is a *bull* that is searched for and not a *horse* or a *man*. So here, when one (of the two) is ascertained to be the Cognitional Jīva-Self, on the strength of the indicatory mark “Drinking the fruit of action”, and another like it is to be searched for, the Intelligent Highest-Self, which has a nature common with it (i.e. the Jīva-Self) is to be understood. But (says the opponent) we have said, that because being in a cave is to be seen here, the Highest-Self ought not to be understood. As to this we reply—It is precisely because of that (i.e. that “being in a cave” is to be seen here) that the Highest-Self should be understood here. Because we see more than once, in the Scriptures and the Smritis, that “being in the

cave" is mentioned in connection with the Highest-Self, as for instance—"The ancient one who is hidden in the cave and is in an un-get-at-able region" (Kaṭha. 1.2.12) ; "One who knows the Purusha hidden in the cave of the great Ākāsha" (Tait. 2.1) ; "Look for the self which is hidden in the cave" etc.. Besides we have already said, that all-per-vading though Brahma is, it is not contradictory to give instruction about it, as having a finite determination in a particular limited region for the purpose of its realization. Though, being present in body, is applicable to one only (i.e. the Jiva-Self), it would not be contradictory if it is so said about both, on the analogy of many persons being described as persons equipped with umbrellas, even when only one amongst them happens to be equipped with an umbrella, nor is the expression "light and shade" also contradictory, because being in a transmigratory condition (i.e. being yet unenlightened) and not being in a transmigratory condition (i.e. being enlightened or liberated) is being as different from each other as darkness and light. Transmigratory condition is the result of Nescience, and 'not being in the transmigratory condition' is the real transcendental condition. Therefore, the Cognitional Jiva-Self and the Highest-Self should be understood to be mentioned here.—11.

Whence is it again that the Cognitional Jiva-Self and the Highest-Self are to be understood ?

*Because of the particularization.*—12.

Because, here, a distinction is (seen to be) made, which is possible, only as between the Cognitional Self and the Highest-Self. Because, in the passage "Know the Self to be the charioteer and the body to be the chariot" (Kaṭha. 1.3.3.), by the allegorical conception of the charioteer and the chariot, the Cognitional Self, the charioteer, is imagined (by the Scriptures) to be the traveller passing through transmigratory existence towards Final Release, and by the passage "He reaches beyond the end of the way and attains the seat of Vishnu" (Kaṭha. 1.3.9) is indicated the Highest-Self, which is to be ultimately reached (by the traveller i.e. the Cognitional-Self). Similarly by the preceding passage—viz. "The wise one, by contemplative



study of Adhyātma (the relation between the Jiva-Self and the Highest-Self), knows the ancient One, who is difficult to discern, who has been a mystery, and who has, as it were, entered into a cave, and who rules from an inaccessible place, and ultimately renounces pleasure or pain" (Kāṭha. 1.2.12)—also, the same two are differentiated from each other, one of the two, i.e. the Jiva-Self, as being the one that contemplates, and the other, i.e. the Highest-Self, as being the object of such contemplation. Besides, this chapter also deals with the Highest-Self. And the passage "Those who have realized Brahma, speak" by which a special category of speakers is understood, fits in properly, only if we understand the Highest-Self (to be meant as being one of the two). Therefore, here, the Jiva-Self and the Highest-Self are referred to. The same reasoning (Nyāya) applies in the case of the passages such as—"Two birds, inseparable friends" (Muṇḍ. 3.1.1) etc.. There also, the chapter being one dealing with Adhyātma, it could not be said to refer to ordinary birds. One may well be the Cognitional-Self, because of the indicative mark of eating, viz. "One of them partakes of the sweet Pippala fruit",—and the other may well be the Highest-Self because of his abstention from the partaking of it, and because of its being sentient, (as indicated) by the passage "The other one does not partake (of the fruit) but keeps looking on". Again in the following Mantra—"The Purusha engulfed in the same tree (i.e. the body), grieves bewildered, because of the absence of the realization of any ruling power in him (Anīshayā), but when he sees the other as the one who is the Lord, and who is worshipped by those who endeavour to realize Him, and beholds His glory (Mahimānam), then he goes beyond grief" (Muṇḍ. 3.1.2)—the same two are indicated as being different from each other, one of them being the seer (i.e. the Jiva-Self) and the other, as the one that is seen (the Highest-Self). Some other opponent maintains that this Rik—viz. "Two birds" etc.—has not the conclusion arrived at (by the Sūtrakāra) in this Adhikaraṇa, because (according to him) the Paingī-Rahasya-Brāhmaṇa, has interpreted it in another way, viz., that by "One of these two partakes of the sweet fruit" intelligence (i.e. Sattva) is indicated, and by "The other one does not partake (of the

fruit) but keeps only looking on" the 'Jna' (ज्ञ), the Knower, is indicated, and it is this pair of 'intelligence' and 'the Knower in the body' that should be understood. The suggestion that the word 'Sattva' indicates the Jiva-Self and the word 'Kshetrajna' indicates the Highest-Self, is not correct, because the two words (Sattva and Kshetrajna) are well-known as being used for the internal organ (Antahkarana) and the embodied Jiva-Self (respectively). Besides they are so explained even there thus:—"That which is intelligence, by means of which he sees dreams, and the one who, constructively, is the Seer i.e. the embodied one, the cognizer in the body, are the two who form this pair of 'Sattva' and 'Kshetrajna'." Nor does this Rik support the conclusion of the opponent's view (Pūrva-paksha). This Rik does not intend to speak of the embodied Jiva-Self, the knower in the body, the one affected by the attributes of transmigratory existence such as the attributes of being an agent or an experiencer, but on the other hand it is intended to speak, as shown by the Scriptural passage "The other one does not partake (of the fruit) but merely keeps looking on, and is the Knower (Jna)", about the one who is beyond the attribute of transmigratory existence and has the inherent nature of Brahma i.e. pure sentiency, and that is so, also because of the Scriptural and Smṛiti passages such as "That thou art" and "Also know me as the cognizer in the body" (Bh. G. 13.2). It is only if we understand it in this manner, that the conclusion arrived at in this instruction (Vidyā) is justified, viz.—"Those two are the 'Sattva' and the 'Kshetrajna' and no ignorance (Raja) clings to him who knows it to be like this." But (says the opponent) if we accept this interpretation or this view, how is it possible to understand the reference to eating in the case of 'Sattva' which is non-sentient, as is to be seen in the passage "One of the two partakes of the sweet Pippala fruit", as meaning the Sattva? To this we reply—This Scriptural passage does not start with a desire to speak of the non-sentient 'Sattva' as an experiencer, but with a desire to say, that the sentient cognizer in the body is *not* the experiencer, but that it has the nature of Brahma. And it is with that purpose that the attribute of being an experiencer is superimposed on 'Sattva' which is affected with such notions, as that of pleasure etc.. It is thought that

the attributes of being an experiencer and an agent, are the result of the failure to discriminate properly between the respective natures of 'Sattva' and 'Kshetrajña', while in the ultimate true sense, it is not at all possible in the case of either, inasmuch as the 'Sattva' is non-sentient and the 'Kshetrajña' (cognizer in the body) is not liable to modifications. It is even less possible in the case of 'Sattva' whose nature is brought about by Nescience. Even so, says the Scriptural passage—"Where things, as it were, appear to be different, there, it is possible for one to see another"—which shows that all this behaviour as an agent etc., is quite as much the result of Nescience as is the behaviour of an elephant as seen in a dream. The Scriptural passage—"Where he sees all this as but only his own Self, what can he see and by what"? (Brih. 4.5.15)—shows that in the case of one who is able to discriminate properly, there is absence of any such behaviour as that of an agent.—12.

#### 4. ANTARADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 13-17.

*The Purusha that is inside (the eye, is Brahma), because that is reasonably sustainable.—13.*

A Scriptural passage is as follows:—"He (the Āchārya) said that the Purusha that is seen inside the eye is the Self, it is the immortal one, the fearless, it is Brahma." It is seen that if one were to drop either ghee or water in the eye, (it does not cling to the eye, but) it promptly runs out towards the eye-lashes." (Chhān. 4.15.1). With regard to that the doubt arises, whether the Self as the reflection in the eye is meant here, or the Cognitional Self, or the Self of a deity which presides in the sense-organ called the eye, or the Lord. What then is the conclusion you arrive at? It is, that it is the reflection of the Self, the exact image of the Purusha. How so? Because, that it is so seen is well-known, and instruction about it is given in the Scriptures as being so well-known, as follows: "The Purusha that is seen inside the eye". Or it would be logical to say that there is a reference to the Cognitional-Self here, because it is he, that is in close proximity in the eye, seeing form or colour (Rūpa) with it (i.e. the eye). The word 'Self'

(used here), is favourable to the view which is interpreted here. Or may be, it means that it refers to the Purusha in the Sun, which helps the eyes, because a Scriptural passage says as follows:—"He dwells in the eye by way of the rays" (Brih. 5.5.2). The attributes of immortality etc., can somehow be understood to be possible in the case of the Self of the deity. But in no way can it ever mean the Lord, because a particular circumscribed abode is here indicated. To this conclusion (of the opponent) we reply—It is the Lord alone about whom instruction is here given as the Purusha that is in the eye. How so? Because *that* is what is reasonably sustainable. The aggregate of attributes about which instruction is here given appears to be reasonably sustainable only in the case of the Lord, for selfhood (Ātmatva) in its chief primary sense is reasonably sustainable in the case of the Lord, because of the Scriptural passage—"That is the Self, that thou art." We have seen that Scriptures more than once have mentioned immortality and fearlessness in connection with it (i.e. the Lord). Similarly, the eye as an abode, is proper in the case of the Highest Lord. Just as the Highest Lord is free from all faults, as being free from all sins, similarly instruction about the eye as an abode is given, as being free from all contamination, because the Scriptural passage says as follows: "That if one were to drop either ghee or water in the eye it promptly runs out towards the eyelashes". Besides the instruction, that he is the one to whom all blessings go etc., is reasonably possible to be imagined only in his case. The Scriptural passage says—"It is called 'Samyadvāma' because all blessings go to him. It is called 'Vāmanī' because it is that which conveys all the fruits of good actions (to beings, who perform such good actions). It is called 'Bhāmanī' because it is that which shines in all the worlds" (Chhān. 4.15. 2, 3, 4). Therefore, inasmuch as it is reasonably sustainable in this way, the Highest Lord is the one that is within (the eye).—13.

*Also because an abode etc. is mentioned.*—14.

How, again, can a small abode like an eye, be reasonably sustainable in the case of the Ākāsha-like all-pervading, Brahma? To this we reply—Such inappropriateness may

well occur, if that abode only (i.e. only the eye) were to have been indicated as the abode of Brahma, but other abodes as well such as the Earth etc. are indicated (as the abodes of Brahma), by the Scriptural passage "He who dwells in the Earth etc." (Brih. 3.7.3), and *inter alia*, the eye also is therein mentioned, thus—"He who dwells in the eye etc.". This is indicated by using the word Ādi (etc.) in the word "Sthānādi" in the Sūtra. Here, not only an abode (as for instance, the eye) which is really inappropriate (as an abode of Brahma) is seen to be indicated, but even such other things as name and form which also have no appropriate use in the case of the nameless and formless Brahma, are also seen to be indicated, as for instance in the Scriptural passage—"His name is 'Ut', he has an aureate beard" (Chhān. 1.6.7, 6) etc. And it has also been stated that, Brahma, being as it is without any attribute, is, in various places, taught as being endowed with attributes for the purpose of devout meditation. Just as (for the purpose of devout contemplation) a special abode of Vishnu viz. Shālāgrāma (is mentioned), even so, it is not contradictory, that Brahma, all-pervading though it is, has, for the purpose of its realization (Upalabdhyartham), a circumscribed abode.—14.

*Also because of the mention (of Brahma)  
as possessing (the characteristic of)  
pleasure.—15.*

Besides, in this connection, indeed, no discussion, as to whether Brahma is spoken of in this sentence or not, need be made, because it is established that the passage refers to Brahma, precisely because it is mentioned as possessing (the characteristic of) pleasure. In the beginning of the sentence, that very Brahma which is distinguished by (the characteristic of) pleasure and which is mentioned thus—"Prāṇa is Brahma, 'Ka' is Brahma, 'Kha' is Brahma"—is the same that is spoken of here, because it stands to reason that what is accepted as relevant to the subject in the beginning should be accepted as having been meant here. By a Scriptural passage—"The Āchārya, however, will speak to you about the way" (Chhān. 4.14.1)—(the sacred fires have said) that only the way will be told you (by the

Āchārya, and not that he will introduce a new subject).

Again, how do we understand that in the beginning of the sentence Brahma as possessed of (the characteristic of) pleasure, is spoken of? We reply :—Upakosala, on hearing the words “Prāṇa is Brahma, ‘Ka’ is Brahma, ‘Kha’ is Brahma”, mentioned by the sacred fires, said, “I can understand that Prāṇa is Brahma, but I do not understand what ‘Ka’ and ‘Kha’ mean.” And there the reply is—“That which is ‘Ka’ is verily ‘Kha’, and that which is ‘Kha’ is verily ‘Ka’” (Chhān. 4.10.5). Now, there the word ‘Kha’ is known by people to be a word used for the element Ākāsha. Now, if we don’t take the word ‘Ka’ which means pleasure as an adjective of ‘Kha’, then, in that case, it would be understood that the word ‘Brahma’ is used in connection with the mere element Ākāsha, in the sense of a symbol, just as a Nāma is understood as a symbol (of Brahma). Similarly the word ‘Ka’, being a word which is well-known as being used for pleasure not unmixed with pain resulting from the contact of the sense-organs with their objects, if we do not take the word ‘Kha’ to be an adjective of the word ‘Ka’, then the realization would be that mere worldly pleasure is Brahma. When, however, the words ‘Ka’ and ‘Kha’ are used (as here) as qualifying each other, then the two together, would indicate Brahma having the nature of pleasure. Now, if the word (Brahma) is not supposed to be used twice in the sentence and the sentence were to read thus—‘Kam-Kham Brahma’—then the word Ka having been appropriated as an adjective of Kha, the attribute ‘pleasure’ would not be understood to be one which should be contemplated upon, and it is with a view to avoid this that both the words Ka and Kha are headed by Brahma (Brahmashirastvam) i.e. the word Brahma is placed after them thus—“Ka is Brahmā, Kha is Brahma”. It is necessary that the attribute ‘pleasure’, also along with the object which is endowed with that attribute (i.e. the qualified Brahma) should be meditated upon. Hence in this manner, in the beginning of the sentence, instruction about Brahma as possessed of the attribute of pleasure is given. Each one of the sacred fires, viz. the Gārhapatya (the householder’s Agni) and others, having given instruction (to Upakosala) about their own greatness or glory, indicate, as they conclude the subject by mentioning, by

the passage "Oh mild one (we have told you) this is our knowledge pertaining to ourselves and our knowledge about Brahma", that it is Brahma that is indicated earlier. The sentence "The Āchārya will speak to you about the way", which promises the mention (by the Āchārya) of the way only, precludes the possibility of any desire to speak about anything else. The Scriptural passage—"Just as water does not adhere to the leaf of a lotus, even so, sin does not contaminate one who knows this in this way"—, which speaks of one who knows the Purusha in the eye as the one who is not assailed or overwhelmed with sin, also indicates the Purusha in the eye as being Brahma. It is because of this, that having spoken of Brahma, which is relevant here, as having its abode in the eye, and as being endowed with the attribute of 'Samyadvāma', the Scriptures, purporting to mention the 'Path of the Archi etc.' as being the path of those who know it to be so, begin by mentioning—"He said : This, the Purusha that is seen in the eye, is the Self etc." (Chhān. 4.15.1).—15.

*Also because of the declaration of the path of one who has heard (i.e. realized the esoteric significance of) the Upanishads.*  
—16.

This again is why the Purusha whose abode is in the eye is the Highest Lord, because the 'Devayāna Path' of those, who have understood the inward or esoteric significance of the Upanishads and have realized Brahma, is well-known from the Scriptures, thus—"Those who have sought out the Self by penance, celibate life, faith and knowledge, reach the Āditya (after death) by the northern path. This verily is the abode of the Prāṇas (the abode of Hiranyagarbha considered singly and cosmically), this the immortal one, free from fear, and the sheet anchor from where (having once reached) they do not (have to) return." (Pra. 1.10). In Smṛiti also, thus—"Agni, Jyoti, the day, the bright fortnight, the six months of Uttarāyaṇa (six months during which the Sun appears to change its position gradually from South to North). By this path, after death those who know Brahma reach Brahma." (Bh. G. 8.24). The same Path is seen to be mentioned by the Scrip-

tures for those who know the Purusha in the eye, beginning as follows—"With regard to a person who had died, whether his funeral and obsequies are performed or not (by his sons etc.), such person reaches the Archi i.e. light of the sun", and thereafter (the path is indicated thus)—"From the Sun he reaches the moon, from the moon to the lightning. There a being that is non-human (i.e. who is a super-man) leads them on to Brahma. This is the path of the Gods, the path of Brahma. Those who reach (Brahma) by this path do not revert to the condition of recurring birth and death." (Chhān. 4.15.5). In this way, here, it is determined that the one whose abode is in the eye, is Brahma, because of the mention of the path of those who know Brahma.—16.

*None other but Brahma (can be the person in the eye) on account of the reflected Self's either not always existing or because of the impossibility (of its having the attributes mentioned).—17.*

With regard to what is said, viz. that the Purusha in the eye may be the reflected Self, or the cognitional Self, or the Self of a deity, we reply—No, the reflected Self etc. or any such other entity does not deserve to be accepted (as the Purusha in the eye). Why so? Because of (its) not being an always existing entity. As for the reflected Self, it is not possible that it can always be present in the eye. Whenever some person is right in front of one's eye, his reflection is to be seen in the eye, and it is not so seen, when such person has gone away. The Scriptural passage, which says, "The Purusha that is seen in the eye", gives instruction that the Purusha that is seen in the eye, being in close proximity, should be devoutly meditated upon. It is not possible to imagine, that at the time of devout meditation, one places a person near the eye for affording a reflection, and then meditates devoutly. The Scriptural passage—"It (the reflected self) is also destroyed along with the destruction of the body" (Chhān. 8.9.1)—shows how the reflected Self also, is not an always existing entity. Besides it cannot be that the person in the eye could be the reflected Self, because it is not possible, and the attributes



of being immortal etc. (which have been predicated of the Purusha in the eye, in this passage) are not seen to be present in the reflected Self. Similarly, the cognitional Self's connection with the whole body and the sense-organs being everywhere in general, it is not possible to say that it is present in the eye only. With regard to Brahma, even though it is all-pervading, it is seen that Brahma is associated with a particular region, such as the Hridaya etc., for the purpose of its realization there. The absence of the association of attributes, such as immortality etc., also in the cognitional Self, is seen to be common (with the reflected Self). It cannot be said to be reasonably sustainable, that immortality and freedom from fear can belong to the cognitional Self, even though it really is not different from the Highest Self, because of mortality and fear being superimposed on the cognitional Self as a result of Nescience, desire, and the performance of duties (Karma). Nor is it reasonably sustainable to suppose the attributes of Samyadvāmatva etc., to be inherent in the cognitional Self, because of its not possessing Lordly power. As for the Self of a deity (like the Sun), though it could be said to be present in the eye, because of the Scriptural passage—"It is present in the eye through the rays"—, still the nature of being 'the Self' is not possible in its case, as it has a visible external form. Nor are immortality etc. possible, because the Scriptures mention creation and dissolution (about it). Besides the supposed immortality of the deities is also relative because of the deities having a comparatively longer span of life (than men). Whatever Lordly power they possess is also not natural, but is dependent on the Highest Lord, because of the Mantra words which are as follows :—"It is through the fear of the Highest Self, that the wind blows, the Sun rises and Agni and Indra also (behave as they do), and Death, the fifth (in the mentioned list), stalks about" (Tait. 2.8). Therefore, it should be realized, that the person in the eye is the Highest Lord only. So, in this view of the matter the mention (of the person in the eye) as "is seen" as if it is well-known, should be explained as being only with reference to the Shāstra and is in reference to learned people (who realize the Highest Self in this way) and is also for the purpose of creating a liking (for devout meditation etc.).—17.

## 5. ANTARYĀMYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 18-20.

*The internal Controller dwelling in deities  
etc. (is the Highest Self) because of the  
mention of its attributes.—18.*

A Scriptural passage, beginning with “He who controls this world, the world beyond, and all the beings, internally”, goes further on to say—“One who dwells in the Earth and one whom the Earth does not realize, whose body is the Earth, who controls the Earth from within, He is the one who is your Self, the internal Controller (Antaryāmi) and the immortal one” (Brih. 3.7.1, 2) etc. Here in this passage the Scriptures mention some internal Controller who controls from within, as the one dwelling within the Gods, the world, the Veda, the Sacrifice, the beings, and the Self of the body. Here, as a strange name is seen (to be mentioned by the Scriptures) a doubt arises as to whether the Scriptures refer to some Self of a deity which attaches itself to it, or to some Yogi who has acquired Lordly powers such as ‘Ānimā’ (i.e. the power to make oneself as minute as an atom i.e. *anu*) etc., or whether it means something else altogether. How does it then strike you? It seems to me (says the opponent) that the name (as mentioned here) being unfamiliar, the object to which such name is applied, must (like the unfamiliar name) mean something which is similarly unfamiliar. Or perhaps it may be that it is not possible to understand it to mean some other entity (such as Brahma) which has no definitely described form as such. As the word ‘Antaryāmi’ is etymotologically derived from (a root) which means ‘controlling from within’, it is after all not so very unfamiliar. Therefore, it may well be that the ‘Antaryāmi’ is some deity which presides over the Earth etc., because, we find it so mentioned in the following Scriptural passage—“He whose body is the Earth, fire is the sight (Loka) and mind is the light” (Brih. 3.9.10) etc.. It would be proper to conclude that the Self of a deity which being endowed with a body and sense-organs dwells in the body and controls it from within, is the Controller. Or, it may be that the con-

trolling power may be of some Yogi who has acquired superhuman powers and has thereby access into everything, but in no case can it be understood to be the Highest-Self, as it has not (the advantage of) a body and the sense-organs. This being the conclusion (of the opponent), we reply—The internal controller mentioned in the Scriptures as being the deity dwelling in the Deities etc., can only be the Highest-Self and none else. How so? Because there is mention of its attributes. It is to be seen that the attributes of that Highest-Self are indicated here. That the ability to control is the attribute only of the Highest-Self, who, dwelling in the aggregate of all this varied creation, such as the Earth etc. and in the deity etc., controls all from within, is alone reasonably sustainable. Omnipotence is reasonably sustainable in the Highest-Self alone, as being the cause of all creation. The attributes of being the Self and possessing immortality, as referred to in the Scriptural passage “This is your Self, the controller from within, and the immortal one”, are reasonably sustainable only in the case of the principal Highest-Self. The Scriptural words—“Whom the Earth does not realize”—which purport to say that the deity viz. the Earth does not realize the Antaryāmi, show that the Antaryāmi is something different from the deity viz. the Earth, because the deity, Earth, would of course know that it is the Earth. Similarly the references to “the unseen”, “the unheard of” in the Scriptures are reasonably sustainable only in the case of the Highest Self who is devoid of any form (Rūpa). With regard to the objection, that as the Highest Self is without any body or sense-organs of its own, it could not be properly understood to be the internal Controller, we reply—That is no fault, as it can reasonably be said to be possessed of a body and the sense-organs vicariously through the body and the sense-organs of that which it controls viz. the Jīva-Self. It is not possible, that our view would be open to the fault of *regressus ad infinitum* or the vicious infinite (by arguing that the Controller would presuppose another Controller and so on *ad infinitum*), because of the absence of any difference (between the Jīva-Self and the Highest-Self). If there were to be any such difference, then of course our view would be open to the fault of *regressus ad infinitum*. Therefore, the Highest Self alone is the Antaryāmi.—18.

*(The Pradhāna) of the Smritis, is not 'the Antaryāmi', because, (here) its attributes are not stated.—19.*

It may well be (says the opponent), that the attributes such as being the "Unseen" etc. are reasonably sustainable also in the case of the Pradhāna as contemplated by the Smṛiti of the Sāmkhyās, because they understand the pradhāna as formless etc. Because the Smṛiti says, "(It is) incomprehensible by reason, is unknowable, and is as it were dormant on all sides" (Manu. 1.5), and being the cause of all creation, it can reasonably be sustainable to understand it as having the power to control. Therefore, the Pradhāna can be synonymous with the Antaryāmi. Though the Pradhāna (claimed as being the cause of all creation) has already been rejected in the Sūtra "Īkshaternāshabdham" (Bra. Sū. 1.i.5), still, a doubt is here again raised (as to whether it cannot be the cause), because of the possibility of its being referred to as "the Unseen" etc. To this we give reply—The Pradhāna of the Smṛiti does not deserve to be synonymous with the word Antaryāmi. Why so? Because its attributes are not mentioned here. For though it may be possible to speak of it as the 'Unseen', still it could never be described as being the 'Seer', because they (i.e. the Sāmkhyās) understand it to be non-sentient. The complementary passage here is—"Unseen yet seeing, unheard of yet able to hear, unperceivable yet one able to perceive, unknowable yet one able to know" (Bṛih. 3.7.23). Again it is not reasonably possible for the Pradhāna to be the Self.—19.

(The opponent here retorts)—Well, if the Pradhāna cannot be understood to be the Antaryāmi, because of the impossibility of its being the Self or the Seer, then let the embodied Jīva-Self be the Antaryāmi because it at least is sentient and can be the 'seer', 'hearer', 'contemplator' and the 'knower', and can also be the 'Self' because of its being the innermost. Similarly he is immortal also, because experience by him of the fruits of meritorious and unmeritorious actions (in another body), is reasonably sustainable (in his case). The attributes of being 'unseen' etc. are well-known in the case of the embodied Jīva-Self, because it is contradictory that action (Kriyā) like seeing etc. can ever

have a tendency to operate on the agent of such action (i.e. one who is the subject (Kartā) cannot himself be the object (Karma) of an action (Kriyā), and also because of the Scriptural passages such as "Thou canst not see the Seer of sight" (Brih. 3.4.2). Besides it (i.e. the embodied Jīva-Self) being an experiencer, it is his natural tendency to control the complex (Sanghāta) of the body and the sense-organs from within. Therefore it is the embodied Jīva-Self that is the Antaryāmi. To this conclusion (of the opponent) the reply is—

*The embodied Jīva-Self also could not be (the Antaryāmi) because, both (the recensions of the Brihadāraṇyaka i.e. of the Kāṇva and of the Mādhyandina) recite it as being different (from the Antaryāmi).*  
—20.

The word 'not' is to be understood as following from the previous Sūtra. The embodied Jīva-Self is not to be accepted as the Antaryāmi. Why so? Because though attributes such as the 'Seer' etc. are possible in its case, still, having a finite determination like the Ākāsha in the jar as a result of limiting adjuncts, it cannot dwell in the Earth etc. or control them fully and comprehensively. Besides the followers of both the branches (Shākhās), viz. the Kāṇvās and the Mādhyandinās, recite this Antaryāmi as being different from the embodied Jīva-Self, which like the Earth etc. is fit for being the basis of and being controlled by (the Antaryāmi). The Kāṇvās recite thus—"That (Paramātmā) which dwells in knowledge" (Brih. 3.7.22), and the Mādhyandinās thus—"He (the Paramātmā) that dwells in the Self (Ātmā)." In the recension (of the Mādhyandinās)—viz. "He (the Paramātmā) that dwells in the Self (Ātmā)"—the word Self is indicative of the embodied Jīva-Self. And in the recension (of the Kāṇvās)—viz. "That (Paramātmā) which dwells in knowledge (Vijnāna)"—also, the embodied Jīva-Self is spoken of by the word 'Knowledge', as of course the embodied Jīva-Self is one whose structure is Knowledge. Therefore, it is proved that some one other than the embodied Jīva-Self, is the Lord and the Antaryāmi. How again, (says the opponent) can two 'Seers'—of which one is the Lord and the

Antaryāmi, and another the embodied Jīva-Self—, being in one and the same body, be reasonably sustainable? (To this the reply is)—Why should it not be reasonably sustainable? Because (says the opponent) in that case the Scriptural passage “There is no other Seer than this” will be contradicted, because any ‘seeing’, ‘hearing’, ‘contemplating’ and ‘knowing’ Self other than the Antaryāmi which is relevant here, is denied by it. If it be said (by the Vedāntin) that the passage is meant to deny any other controller, (we the opponents say)—No, because here there is no predicament of the possibility of any other controller, nor is there any specific Scriptural mention of the absence of any other controller. (To this argument of the opponent) we reply—This difference between the embodied Jīva-Self and the Antaryāmi mentioned here, is occasioned by limiting adjuncts in the form of a body and sense-organs, which are the result of Nescience, and not in the ultimate real sense. There could be only one universal Self (Pratyagātmā) and there could never be *two* of that kind, and it is as the result of adjuncts only that the same one universal Self is spoken of as two different selves, just as, the Ākāsha in the jar is spoken of as being different from the great Ākāsha. It is only if we understand it to be so, that the Scriptural passages which speak of the difference between the ‘Knower’ and ‘the object to be known’, the means of proof such as direct perception etc., the experience of the transmigratory condition, and the Shāstra which lays down injunctions and prohibitions, become reasonably sustainable. The Scriptural passage also is similar. Thus the passage “It is only when there is a consciousness of duality as it were, that one sees another” indicates, that it is only in the realm of Nescience that all worldly conduct is to be seen, and the Scriptural passage “When all else becomes but the Self to him, how can he see, and, with what?” precludes the possibility of any worldly conduct in the realm of knowledge.—20.

## 6. ADRISHYATVĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 21-23.

*That which has the attributes of being invisible etc. (is Brahma), because there is a mention of its attributes.—21.*

There are Scriptural passages as follows: "Now (i.e. after what has gone before) the Higher Knowledge, by means of which the Imperishable is known," "That which is invisible and incomprehensible, nameless and colourless, and that which is sans-eyes, sans-ears, sans-hands and sans-feet and is eternal and all-pervading, and which reaches everywhere, which is super-subtle and imperishable and which is regarded by the wise as the source of all beings" (Muṇḍ. 1.1.5, 6). With regard to this, there is a doubt. Can this Bhūta-Yoni (source of all beings) having attributes such as being invisible etc., be the Pradhāna, or the embodied Jīva-Self, or the Highest Lord? Here (the opponent) says, that it is the Pradhāna that can properly be the Bhūta-Yoni because only non-sentient things are referred to here by way of an illustration of it, thus—"Just as a spider throws out and withdraws its thread, or just as trees grow out of the Earth, or just as hair etc. grow out of a living person, similarly this universe is born out of this—the Imperishable." (Muṇḍ. 1.1.7). But (if the Vedāntin says)—It is the sentient spider and person that are here taken as illustrations, No (replies the opponent), because it is not the purely sentient one that is here seen to be the source of the thread or the hair. It is well-known that it is the non-sentient body of the spider, presided over by a sentient being, that is really the source of the thread, and it is the body of a person, that is the source of hair etc.. Besides in the earlier Sūtra, the Pradhāna could not be accepted (as the cause of the universe) because, though it could be understood to be the 'unseen', it was not possible to understand it as being the 'Seer'. Here, however, the attributes of being 'invisible' etc. are possible in the case of the Pradhāna, and there is no mention here of any attribute incompatible with the Pradhāna. (The Vedāntin retorts), Oh, but the complementary sentence—"He who is omniscient and who perceives i.e. knows everything" (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9)—could not be possible in the case of the non-sentient Pradhāna. How then can you recognize the Pradhāna as the Bhūta-Yoni? To this (the opponent replies)—After mentioning the Bhūta-Yoni by the word 'Imperishable' as having attributes such as being the invisible etc., by the Scriptural passages "By which this Imperishable is attained", and "That which is invisible", the Scriptures will here-

after further proceed to mention towards the end, thus—“(It is) further beyond the ‘Imperishable’, which itself is beyond” (Munḍ. 2.1.2). Here that which is mentioned as being beyond the Imperishable may well be the Omniscient and all-perceiving. The Pradhāna however which is indicated by the word ‘Imperishable’, may well be the Bhūta-Yoni. Even if, however, the word ‘source’ (Yoni) is taken to be indicative of a cause, the embodied Jīva-Self also may very well be the Bhūta-Yoni, because it is by way of the meritorious and unmeritorious actions of the Jīva-Self that it is the cause of all this aggregate of beings coming into being.

(To this conclusion of the opponent), we reply—It is the Highest Lord alone which can be the Bhūta-Yoni possessing attributes such as being the ‘invisible’ etc., and none else. How do you understand it like that? Because of the mention of its attributes. It is seen that the attributes of the Highest Lord are here mentioned, thus—“He who is omniscient and perceives everything”. It is not possible that either the non-sentient Pradhāna, or the embodied Jīva-Self whose vision is circumscribed by limiting adjuncts, can possess the attributes of omniscience or the perceiving of everything. But (says the opponent), we have already stated that the attributes of omniscience or the perceiving of everything, may be of that which is beyond the Bhūta-Yoni which is indicated by the word Imperishable, and that they do not appertain to Bhūta-Yoni. To this we (the Vedāntins) reply—It is not possible that it could be so. Having indicated Bhūta-Yoni which is relevant here as the cause of everything that is about to be created by the Scriptural passage “This Universe is born of this Imperishable”—the Scriptures, also, later on, indicate the same omniscient entity as the cause of all things about to be created, by the Scriptural passage—“He who is omniscient and he who perceives all, whose penance has pure knowledge as its content, from Him is born this Brahma (supersensible effects), names and forms, and food (or Earth)”. We understand, therefore, that both (i.e. Akshara and Bhūta-Yoni) having been indicated to be the same by a similarity of indication, the attributes of omniscience and of being the perceiver of all, are spoken of of the same Imperishable Bhūta-Yoni which is relevant here. In the case



of the Scriptural passage—"The one that is beyond the Imperishable, which itself is beyond"—also, none other is mentioned as being beyond the Imperishable but the Akshara Bhūta-Yoni which is relevant here. How is it known like that? Because by the Scriptural passage—"The teacher should truthfully teach the pupil the knowledge of Brahma (Brahma-Vidyā) as it is, in such a way that it will make the pupil understand correctly the Purusha, the Imperishable." (Mund. 1.2.13)—we are able to know that it is intended to speak of the Imperishable Bhūta-Yoni which has the attribute of being 'invisible'. How is it then (says the opponent) that it is indicated as being "Beyond the Imperishable, which itself is beyond"? (The Vedāntin says), we will answer that in the next Sūtra. Besides, here it is mentioned, that there are two kinds of 'Knowledge' (Vidyās) which should be known. One is Parā-Vidyā and the other the Aparā-Vidyā. In that connection, having spoken of the Aparā-Vidyā which is of the nature of the Rig-Veda etc., the Scriptures proceed to say—"Now about the Parā-Vidyā by means of which the Imperishable is known." Here the Imperishable is mentioned as being the subject of the Parā-Vidyā. If, therefore, we imagine that the Imperishable which possesses the attribute of being invisible, is something different from the Highest Lord, then it would not be the Parā-Vidyā. This distinction between Vidyās (knowledges) into the Parā and the Aparā is with reference to the fruit of such Knowledges, viz. secular prosperity (as that of the Aparā) and absolute bliss (as that of the Parā). Nobody understands the Knowledge of Pradhāna as having absolute bliss as its fruit. According to your view, by which, the Highest Lord supposed to be beyond the Imperishable Bhūta-Yoni, is intended to be propounded, there would have to be a declaration about three kinds of Vidyās, but here only two kinds of Vidyās are indicated as fit to be known. The expectation of being able to know everything by knowing only one thing, referred to in the Scriptural passage, thus—"Oh Bhagwan, what is that, by knowing which, everything else becomes known automatically" (Mund. 1.1.3)—, can only be possible, if it is intended to speak of Brahma only as being the Self of all, and not (if it is intended to speak) of Pradhāna, the cause of the non-sentient things

only, or of the experiencer (Jīva), as distinguished from the objects of experience. Moreover, having in the beginning introduced Brahma-Vidyā as the chief topic by the Scriptural passage—"He (Brahmadeva) spoke about the knowledge of Brahma (Brahma-Vidyā) as the basis of all other knowledges, to his eldest son Atharva (Muṇḍ. 1.1.1)" —, the Scriptures, after demonstrating the distinction between the Parā and the Aparā Vidyā, further demonstrate the Parā Vidyā as the one which leads to the knowledge of the Imperishable, and ultimately indicates it as the Brahma-Vidyā. This knowledge referred to as the Brahma-Vidyā would be wrongly so called, if the Imperishable, which is understood by means of that knowledge, were not to be Brahma. The lesser knowledge of religious duties (Karma-Vidyā), which is of the nature of the Rig-Veda etc. and is referred to in the introduction to Brahma-Vidyā, is for the glorification of the latter i.e. Brahma-Vidyā, as illustrated by the censure clause thus—"These barques of the nature of a sacrifice in which religious duties of less importance are performed by the team of eighteen (i.e. 16 Sacrificial priests viz. 'Ritvijās' and the sacrificer (Yajamāna) and the sacrificer's wife) are frail and unsafe. These ignorant people who consider this as the ultimate bliss, become subject to old age and death over and over again" (Muṇḍ. 1.2.7). Having thus censured the Aparā Vidyā, the Scriptures indicate the eligibility of those who have turned away in disgust from Aparā Vidyā to Brahma-Vidyā, thus:—"A Brāhmaṇa, having examined (the value of) all these worlds (such as the heaven) which are gained by the performance of religious duties, and after experiencing a feeling of revulsion from them, and realizing that, that which is without a cause, viz. Brahma, can never be obtained by that which is only an effect from that cause, should, with a desire to know Brahma-Vidyā, approach a teacher, who is well versed in the Vedās and who has put his faith in Brahma, with sacrificial sticks in his hand" (Muṇḍ. 1.2.12). As regards the objection taken, viz. that as non-sentient things such as the Earth are here referred to as illustrations, the thing to which such illustration refers (viz. Bhūta-Yoni) also must necessarily be non-sentient, we reply—There is no such invariable rule that an illustration and that which is illustrated by it, should

be exactly similar. Besides, it is not understood by you also that because gross and material things such as the Earth are taken as illustration, the Bhūta-Yoni, which these illustrations illustrate, should also be understood as gross and material. Therefore, the Bhūta-Yoni which possesses the attribute of being invisible, is none else but the Highest Lord.—21.

*The other two (i.e. the Pradhāna and the embodied Jiva-Self) are not (the Bhūta-Yoni) because of the statement of distinctive attributes and of difference.—22.*

This is again why the Highest Lord only is the Bhūta-Yoni and not the other two, viz. the Pradhāna and the embodied Jiva-Self. How so? Because of the reference to distinctive attributes and differences. The Bhūta-Yoni which is relevant to the context here, is distinguished from the embodied Jiva-Self as being entirely dissimilar, thus—“The Purusha is celestial, incorporeal, and one that is both outside and inside and is unborn. He is without the Vital Air and is mindless and pure etc.” (Muṇḍ. 2.1.2). These distinguishing attributes such as being celestial etc. would not be reasonably sustainable, in the case of the embodied Jiva-Self, which fondly considers itself as having finite determination by names and forms brought about by Nescience, and which imagines such attributes as appertaining to its own Self. Therefore, it is the Purusha of the Upanishads that is directly spoken of here. Similarly, the Scriptures also refer to the Bhūta-Yoni which is relevant to the context here, as distinguished from the Pradhāna, thus—“Which is beyond the Imperishable, which itself is beyond.” The Scriptures indicate that it is intended to speak of the Highest Self, as being different (from the Pradhāna) by stating that it is beyond the Imperishable, which is a subtle element, and which has the nature i.e. form of being the seed (i.e. origin) of names and forms, which is yet unmanifested, and which itself depends upon the Lord, and constitutes the limiting adjuncts of the Lord Himself, and which, without being an effect as such, is beyond all other effects. It is not as if (in this Sūtra) having understood the Pradhāna to be some independent element, it then is

distinguished from something else. Now even if you insist upon understanding the Pradhāna to be that subtle element as expressed by the word 'Unmanifested', by avoiding any conflict with the Scriptures, you are welcome to do so. All that we wish to expound is, that as distinguished from it, the Bhūta-Yoni here, is the Highest Lord.—22.

Whence again (is it) that Bhūta-Yoni means the Highest Lord ?

*Also because of the statement of the form  
(of that).—23.*

Because we see, moreover, that after having spoken about the creation of all the elements beginning with the Vital Air etc. and ending with the Earth etc. by the passage "From it the Vital Airs are created" which comes after the passage "Beyond the Imperishable which itself is beyond", the form of the Bhūta-Yoni as being the Self of all modifications is stated thus—"Fire is the caput, the moon and the sun are the eyes, the directions or quarters are the ears, the revealed Vedās are the speech, the air is the Prāṇa, the Universe is the Hridaya, from his feet the Earth (is created), and he is the internal Self of all beings" (Munḍ. 2.1.4)—, which is fit or proper, only in the case of the Highest Lord as being the cause of all creation, and not of the embodied Jīva-Self whose greatness is comparatively small, nor can it be possible that it is the mention of the form (Rūpa) of the Pradhāna, because it is not possible that it could be the inner-Self of all beings. Therefore we consider that by Bhūta-Yoni, the Highest Lord (is indicated) and not the other two (viz. the Pradhāna and the embodied Jīva-Self). How do we know that the statement about the form, is with regard to the form of the Bhūta-Yoni ? (To that, we reply)—Because of the chapter, and also because of the bringing forward of the pronoun 'this one' (Eshah) which refers to that which is relevant to the context. The statements—"From him the Prāṇa is born" (Munḍ. 2.1.3) and "He is the inner-Self of all beings" (Munḍ. 2.1.4)—used with reference to the Bhūta-Yoni, can only be with reference to the Bhūta-Yoni. Just as, for instance, when with reference to a religious preceptor it is said 'You should

learn from him, he is an expert in the Vedās and Vedāṅgās (subjects subsidiary to the Vedās)', the statement is one with regard to that religious preceptor.

How again (says the opponent), is it possible that the Bhūta-Yoni which has the attribute of being 'invisible', can be said to have a corporeal form? (To this, we reply)—There is no fault, because this has been said with the intention of conveying that it is the Self of all, and not with the intention to convey that it has a corporeal form, just as, for instance, a person who has realized Brahma, with a view to convey that he is the Self of all, says (as in the Scriptural passage)—"I am the food, I am the consumer of the food etc." (Tait. 3.10.6). Some others\* here take the view, that there is no statement here, of the form (Rūpa) of the Bhūta-Yoni, but of the things which are about to be originated from the Bhūta-Yoni. The Scriptural passage, before the present one, viz. "From him is born the Prāṇa, mind, and all the sense-organs, Akāsha, air (Vayu), light, water and the Earth which supports the world", mentions the aggregate of beings, beginning with the Prāṇa and ending with the Earth, as being born, and another passage which comes after, beginning with "From him is born the Agni, of which the Sun is the fuel" and ending with "And from him also are born the herbs and Rasās", also shows similarly that it all is born out of it. How, then, all at once can the Scriptures be understood to mention (between these two passages) the form (Rūpa) of the Bhūta-Yoni? That the Bhūta-Yoni is the Self of all, will also be mentioned subsequently, after finishing the mention of the creation, by the passage—"All this, the work of the Universe, is this Purusha" etc. (Muṇḍ. 2.1.10). From the Scriptures and the Smritis, we find mention of the birth etc. of Prajāpati (i.e. Hiranyagarbha) who has the threefold world as his body, thus—"Hiranyagarbha came into being first, and having come into being, became the Lord of all beings which were created. He established the Earth and the Heaven. We should propitiate him by oblations etc." (Rig-Veda-Sam. 10.121.1). The word 'Samavartata' means 'came into being'. (And the Smṛiti says) similarly—"He is the first embodied one, and is call-

\* Abhyankar Shāstri has a note here that "others" here refers to the Bhāshyakāra himself.

ed the Purusha. He, Brahmā, i.e. Hiranyagarbha, was the creator of all beings and was himself the first to be born". This Hiranyagarbha, who, of course, is himself a modification, can very well be the inner self of all beings, because, he dwells in all beings in the Adhyātma relation, by being himself of the nature of Prāṇa. In the case of this view it should be explained, that the mention of the form of all, by the passage "All this work of the universe, is this Purusha" etc., is the means of understanding the Highest Lord (as meant by the word Bhūta-Yoni).—23.

#### 7. VAISHVĀNARĀDHIKARĀṆAM. Sū. 24-32.

*Vaishvānara\* (is the Highest Self), because though the two Scriptural words are common, (for one and the same entity), a distinction between them has been mentioned.—24.*

The Scriptures begin thus—"What is our Ātmā, what is Brahma?" and "You know the Vaishvānara Ātmā, please tell us about it" (Chhan. 5.11.1, 6)—, and then, by censuring each separate meditation, on the Heaven, the Sun, the Vāyu, the Ākāsha, the Water, and the Earth, which have the attributes of Sutejā (having good light) etc., respectively, and after mentioning that each of these, i.e. the Heaven, the Sun, etc., were but only the head, the eyes, etc. respectively of the Vaishvānara, say thus—"He who meditates on the Vaishvānara-Ātmā which has the dimensions of only a span and which is Abhivimāna (i.e. one, as

\* Five Rishis, Prāchīnashāla and others, once gathered together and had a discussion amongst themselves, wherein they posed a question amongst themselves,—viz. What is our Ātmā and what is Brahma?—and not agreeing about it, went to the sage Āruṇi Uddālaka and said to him—"Now, you know this one, the Vaishvānara—the Ātmā. Please tell us about him." (Chhan. 5.11.1, 6). Āruṇi Uddālaka himself did not know the answer to the question, so he took them all to Kaikeya Ashvapati. He asked each of them, as to what each of them meditated upon as the Ātmā. They answered, that they meditated upon the Heaven, the Sun, the Air, the Ākāsha, Water, and the Earth respectively. Kaikeya-Ashvapati said to them, that what each of them considered to be the Ātmā, was each, in fact, only one member of its body, viz. the head, the eyes, Prāṇa, the torso, the bladder and the feet respectively, and described graphically the punishment they would have incurred if they had blindly persisted in their mistaken notion, and then told them how the Vaishvānara was the Highest-Self.

being the universal Self, is understood to be the ego), eats food in all the worlds, in all beings and in all selfs, and of this Vaishvānara-Ātmā, the head is the brightly shining Heaven (Sutejā), the eye is the Sun (the multi-form), Prāṇa is the Vāyu which moves in diverse ways, the torso is the Ākāsha (Bahula), the bladder is wealth, the feet are the Earth, the chest is the altar, the hair is the sacrificial grass, the Hridaya is the Gārhapṭya fire, the mind is the Anvāhāryapachana fire, and the mouth (Āśya) is the Āhavanīya fire" (Chhan. 5.18.2).

With respect to this there is a doubt as follows : Is the word Vaishvānara, about which instruction is here given (by the Scriptures), the gastric fire, or 'Agni' the created element, or a deity presiding over such Agni, or the embodied Jīva-Self or the Highest-Self? What again is the *raison d'être* of this doubt? Because the use of the word 'Vaishvānara' is common to all these three, viz. the gastric fire, the elemental fire, and a deity presiding over the elemental fire, and the word 'Ātmā' is common to the embodied Jīva-Self, and the Highest-Self. Under these circumstances the doubt is, as to what would be proper to accept and to reject. What then is your (i.e. the opponent's) conclusion? (The opponent says) that (by Vaishvānara) the gastric fire is meant. Whence is it so? Because we see that it is used particularly in that sense sometimes, thus :—"This is the fire Vaishvānara that is inside a man, and by means of which what is eaten is digested." (Brih. 5.9). Or it may mean the ordinary fire (Agni) because the use of the term is common (to both the fire and the Sun), thus :—"The Vaishvānara fire (i.e. the Sun) the sign of the day, was created by the Gods for the whole world". (Rig. Sam. 10.88.12). Or may be, it may mean the deity having fire as its body, because we find the use of the word Vaishvānara possible in its case, as the Scriptural passage "May we be in the good graces of Vaishvānara, he is the King of the worlds and is the cause of pleasure, and is powerful or shining", and some other passages, show that it is so possible in the case of deities equipped with power etc.. (If you the Vedāntin were to object and say) that because of the fact that the word Vaishvānara is used with the same case-ending (Nom. sing.) as the word Ātmā, and because the mere word Ātmā is used in the introductory

sentence "What is our Ātmā and what is Brahma?", the word Vaishvānara should be so interpreted as to be in agreement with the word Ātmā—(we the opponents say) that it may mean the embodied Jiva-Self, because in its role of an experiencer, he is close to the Vaishvānara (the gastric fire), and also because the distinctive feature of 'having the dimensions of a span' is possible in its case, because of its being circumscribed by the limiting adjuncts. Therefore, it cannot be that Vaishvānara could mean the Lord. (To this conclusion of the opponent) we give reply :—The Vaishvānara deserves to be the Highest-Self. How so ? Because, a distinguishing feature is mentioned in connection with the words which are common to both. 'Sādhāraṇa-shabda-visheshah' means the distinguishing feature of the words which however are common (one word 'Vaishvānara' is common to three things and the other word 'Ātmā' to two things). Though these two words Ātmā and Vaishvānara are common (to the two and three things respectively) i.e. the word 'Vaishvānara' is common to three things and the word 'Ātmā' is common to two things, still we are able to discern a distinguishing feature, by means of which we are able to understand both these words to mean the Highest Lord, the distinguishing feature being, as in the sentence—"Of this Vaishvānara-Ātmā, the head is the bright Heavenly light (Sutejā)" (Chhan. 5.18.2). We are able to understand here that the Highest-Lord as being the cause of all, and as being characterized as one having the Heaven as his caput etc., and also as having attained another condition (of the nature of Adhyātma and Adhidaiva), is here hinted at, as being the Universal-Self, for the purpose of meditation. A cause being always present in all the conditions of every effect (of which it is the cause), it is reasonably sustainable to say of this cause (i.e. the Highest-Lord), that it has the heaven etc. as a part of it. Besides, the fruit that is mentioned by the Scriptures here, viz. "He eats food in all the worlds, in all the beings, and in all the Selves", which is comprised of all the worlds etc., is reasonably sustainable, only if (by Vaishvānara) we understand the Highest-Cause (i.e. the Parameshvara), and also, the mention by the Scriptures, of the incineration of all sins of him who knows this as being so (i.e. who knows that Vaishvānara means the Highest-Lord) thus :—" (Just



as cotton on the tip of an arrow is consumed in fire), even so are his sins incinerated." (Chhan. 5.24.3).

Such indicatory marks, as the use in the introductory portion of the words Ātmā and Brahma, in the passage "What is our Ātmā, what is Brahma?", also inform us that Vaishvānara is the Highest-Lord. Therefore, Vaishvānara means the Highest-Lord.—24.

*Also because what is stated in the Smṛiti justifies an inference (of its having a Scriptural text as its source).—25.*

This is also why the Vaishvānara is the Highest-Lord only; because the Smṛiti mentions the form of the Highest-Lord only as being the self of the threefold world, as, that Agni is his mouth, and heaven the caput, thus:—"Let salutation be to him who is the Self of the world and who has Agni as his mouth, heaven as the caput, Ākāsha as the navel, Earth as the feet, the Sun as the eye, and the Directions as the ears etc."

This means, that the form which is mentioned in the Smṛiti and which leads us to an inference of the original Scriptural text as its source, furnishes the indicatory mark, which informs us that the word Vaishvānara means the Highest Lord (because all Smṛitis are supposed to be based on some Scriptural text). The word 'Iti' in the Sūtra means 'a reason'. Because there is this indicatory mark, therefore also Vaishvānara means the Highest-Self only. Even though the passage "Let Salutation be to the Self of the world" constitutes a glorification, such significance of glorification in this way would not be possible, in the absence of a sentence in the Scriptures which serves as a source (for the Smṛiti). A similar Smṛiti passage—"He whose head, the learned say, is the Heaven, the Ākāsha is the navel, the Sun and the Moon the eyes, Directions the ears, Earth the feet, know him to be the incomprehensible Self and the creator of all beings"—should also be quoted here as an illustration.—25.

*If it be said (that Vaishvānara is not the Highest Self or Lord), because of the Scriptural words etc. (having different meanings)*

*and also because it has its locus inside (the body), (we say) no, because the instruction is, to look upon it that way, and also because some (Vājasaneyins) recite (the Vaishvānara) as a Purusha.—26.*

Here it is said (by the opponent)—The Vaishvānara does not deserve to be the Highest Lord. How so ? Because of the words etc. (having different meanings) and also because the locus (of the Vaishvānara) is inside (the body). As regards the argument about the Scriptural word—the word Vaishvānara cannot possibly be understood to mean the Highest Lord, because according to firmly established usage, it has another meaning. Similarly also, because of the word ‘Agni’ in “This Agni is Vaishvānara” (Shata. Brā. 10.6.1.11). By the word ‘etc.’ in the Sūtra, is meant the imagining of the triad of sacrificial fires referred to in “The Hridaya is the Gārhapatya fire” etc. (Chhan. 5.18.2). By the Scriptural passage—“The food (Bhakta) that comes in first is meant for the purpose of a sacrifice” (Chhan. 5.10.1) etc.—praise is offered (to Vaishvānara) as its being the repository of the oblation to the Prāṇa. Because of these reasons, by Vaishvānara one should understand the gastric fire. Similarly, Scriptures mention about its having a locus internally (in the body) thus : “He knows him as being inside the Purusha”, which is possible only in the case of the gastric fire. To the suggestion made, that because of the mention of the special feature—viz. that the ‘Sutejā’ is its head etc.—the Vaishvānara should be understood to be the Highest Lord, we (i.e. the opponent) say—The Special feature is seen to be possible equally in both cases (i.e. in the case of both the Highest Lord and the gastric fire), so how do you then arrive at a determination that the special feature should be accepted as applying to the Highest Lord only, and not to the gastric fire ? Or it may be, that what the Scriptures indicate is the element ‘fire’, which can have a locus both in the body and outside it. We understand from the Mantra-words that the ordinary fire is associated with the Heaven etc., thus—“He who with his lustre has pervaded the Heaven, the Earth, the Ākāsha (space) and Antariksha” (Rig-Veda-Sam. 10.88.3) etc.. Or else it may be that the being inside and outside,

may refer to the deity which has fire as its body, and which, because of the power which it has, can be said to have the heavenly world etc. as a limb. Therefore, Vaishvānara cannot be the Highest-Lord. To this conclusion of the opponent we reply—It could not be so, because the instruction is that one should look upon it as the Highest Lord. It is not proper, that because of reasons such as Scriptural words etc., the Highest Lord should not be understood as being indicated by the word Vaishvānara. How so? Because the instruction is about looking upon Vaishvānara as the Highest Lord, without giving up the looking upon Vaishvānara as the gastric fire. The instruction here is, to look upon the gastric fire as the Highest-Lord, just as in the passage “Meditate devoutly on the mind as Brahma” (Chhan. 3.18.1) (the instruction is that mind should be looked upon as Brahma), or that the Highest Lord, as affected by the limiting adjunct of the gastric-Vaishvānara, should be looked upon as the one to be seen, as for instance in the passage “(He) having mind as his structure, breath as his body, and lustre as his form” (Chhan. 3.14.2) (the instruction is that the Highest Lord having mind etc. as his adjuncts should be meditated upon). Were the Scriptures desirous of referring to the gastric fire only and not desirous of referring to the Highest Lord, the distinctive feature, such as ‘Sutejā is the head’, would be impossible. How, even by resorting to the deity or the element ‘fire’ (as being the Vaishvānara), it would not be possible to propound the distinctive feature (viz. that the head is the Sutejā) fittingly, we shall say in the Sūtra which follows. If it was intended to speak of the gastric fire only, then, merely that it is inside the man, would alone be possible, but not that it was the Purusha also. But the Vājasaneyins recite, that he is the Purusha also, thus:—“This Agni Vaishvānara which is a Purusha. He who knows this Agni Vaishvānara as being like the Purusha and as having a locus inside a man” (Shata. Brā. 10.6.1.11). The Highest Lord being the self of all, that it can at once be both the Purusha and be also inside a Purusha, is reasonably sustainable. In the case of those who recite “Purushavidham api cha enam adhīyate” as a part of the Sūtra, the meaning is—If by Vaishvānara we were to understand merely the gastric fire, it would be only possible that it has a locus

inside a Purusha, and not that it is the Purusha also. But the Vājasaneyins recite (the Vaishvānara) as being like a Purusha also, thus—“(He who) knows him as being like a Purusha, and also as having a locus inside a Purusha.” From the chapter, “(Vaishvānara) being like a Purusha” is understood, in both the ways, viz., in its cosmic aspect in relation to Gods, beginning with “the heaven being its head” and ending with “being firmly set in the Earth”, and in its aspect in relation to Adhyātma, as its “being the head” (of the meditator) in its ordinary physical sense, in the beginning, and ending with “being firmly set in the chin”.—26.

*And for the same reason therefore (Vaishvānara) cannot either be the deity (of Fire) or the element (Fire).—27.*

Again the statement which has been made before, viz., that, as in the words of the Mantrās we are able to observe a connection between the element Agni and the heavenly world etc., the imagining of the parts of a body, thus—Sutejā is the head (of the Vaishvānara)—, may be with reference to the element ‘fire’ or that it may be with reference to the deity (fire) on account of its powerfulness, has to be refuted. With regard to that, we say—for the same reasons, Vaishvānara can neither be a deity nor the fire. As regards the element ‘fire’ which has the qualities of heat and light only, imagining it as having the heaven as the head etc. is not reasonably sustainable, because an effect or modification cannot ever be the Self of another effect or modification. Nor can it be possible, in the case of a deity possessing power, to imagine, that it has ‘Heaven as its head’, because it (the deity) is not the cause of anything (being itself an effect only) and because its power is dependent upon the Lord. In all these views, moreover, the objection about the impossibility of Vaishvānara being the Self, is also common of course.—27.

*Jaimini is of opinion that there is no contradiction in holding, that here, direct meditation on the Highest Lord is intended.—28.*

It has been said in the preceding Sūtras, that the High-

est Lord having the gastric fire as its symbol or its limiting adjunct, he is indicated to be the one to be devoutly meditated upon, in accordance with the reason that the Vaishvānara has a locus inside a person. Here in this Sūtra Achārya Jaimini considers, with regard to the passage about Vaishvānara in this Sūtra, that no contradiction is involved even if we accept that a direct devout meditation on the Highest Lord is indicated, without imagining his being affected by any adjunct or his being a symbol. But (says the opponent)—If we do not understand that by Vaishvānara the gastric fire is meant, then the statement that it has a locus inside, as also the reasons based on Scriptural words etc., would be contradicted. To this the reply given is—So far as the statement “having a locus inside” is concerned, it is not contradicted. The statement made here, viz. “Knows him to be like a Purusha and that he has a locus inside”, is not made with a desire to convey that the gastric fire is meant, because that is not relevant to the context here, nor is it so mentioned by the Scriptures in so many words. How then is it ? The statement “being like a Purusha and having a locus inside” is made, so as to indicate that the ‘being like a Purusha’ which is relevant here and which is imagined in the bodily parts of a Purusha, beginning with ‘the caput’ and ending with ‘the chin’ (Chibuka), is just like seeing the branches of a tree as having a firm base in the tree. Or it may be that the words ‘Knows it to have a locus inside a Purusha’ are mentioned with the intention of conveying the pure and the merely witness-like nature of the Highest Self, which is relevant to the context here and which in its Adhyātma and Adhidaivata aspects is referred to as being affected by such limiting adjuncts as “being like a Purusha”.

When once it is finally determined, by means of the consideration of what has gone before and which follows after (the passage considered in the Sūtra), that the Highest Self should be understood to be indicated by the word Vaishvānara, then that word (Vaishvānara) used in this sense, could anyhow be shown to be properly so used, by some sort of etymological derivation as follows :—He who, as being universal, is the man (Nara) i.e. Jīva, or he who is the maker of all modifications, or he of whom all men are the creation, is the Vaishvānara and the Highest Self,

as he is the Self of all. (It is a rule in grammar) that the Taddhita suffix ( ञ ) when it is applied to a word does not change the original meaning of the word. Just like the words Rākshasa and Vāyasa (which are the Taddhita suffix forms of Rakshas and Vayas). The word 'Agni' also, by having recourse to a similar etymological derivation, such as 'one who leads to the fruits of action', may well indicate the Highest Self. Imagining of the Vaishvānara as the gastric fire or the repository of oblations, is reasonably sustainable in the case of the Highest Self also, as being the Self of all.—28.

If by Vaishvānara we understand the Highest Lord, how again can the Scriptural statement about his being of the size of a span, be reasonably sustainable ? To explain this, it is said :—

*Because of the manifestation (vyakti), says  
Āshmarathya.—29.*

It is possible for the Highest Lord, who transcends any notion of measurement, to manifest himself, as one having the measurement of a span, with a view to discover himself (to the devout meditator). (It may be understood) that the Highest Lord manifests himself as being of the measurement of a span, for the sake of those who devoutly meditate on him, and he manifests himself particularly in places suited for such manifestation, such as the Hridaya etc. Therefore Āchārya Āshmarathya thinks that the Scriptural passage about 'being of the measurement of a span' is reasonably sustainable in the case of the Highest Lord, whenever he wishes to manifest himself.—29.

*Because of the thinking (of one thing to  
the exclusion of all others), says Bādari.  
—30.*

He is described as having the measure of a span, because he who has his location in the Hridaya which is of the measurement of a span, is thought of by the mind, just as barley which is measured by a unit of measurement called (Prastha), is called a Prastha (of barley). Or rather,

it may be that barley which has a dimension of its own, inherent in itself, is revealed by being associated with the Prastha. Here, however, it is not, as if the Highest Lord has any dimensions, which could be said to be revealed by his association with the Hridaya, but as he is described in the Scriptures as having 'the measurement of a span', so, anyhow, meditation on him is a sort of a ground to enable one to say so. Or else it might be said, that in order to justify the Scriptural passage as having a proper sense, he who is by no means measurable by a span, should be thought of as having this measurement of a span. In this way, the Āchārya Bādari thinks, the Scriptural passage about 'being of the measurement of a span' may be understood to mean the Highest Lord, as thought of or remembered (by his devout worshippers).—30.

*Jaimini thinks that (the Highest Lord may be described as having the measurement of a span) because of Sampatti (i.e. imagining a small thing to be a great thing). The Scriptures also indicate similarly.—31.*

The Scriptural passage about (the Highest Lord being of the measurement of a span) may be due to Sampatti, (thinks Āchārya Jaimini). How is it so? Because so does a similar chapter in the Vājasaneyi Brāhmaṇa (describe it) by imaginatively identifying the several parts of Vaishvānara, which has the nature of the three worlds such as the Heaven etc., upto the Earth, in their Adhyātma aspect, in terms of the parts of a body (of the devout worshipper), such as the head etc., upto the chin, and thus shows the Highest Lord to be of the measurement of a span, thus :—  
 "So indeed did the Gods realize him, as being of the measurement of a span. I will now demonstrate to you the several parts of him, by which I will have shown you, how (the Highest Lord) has the measure of a span. So instructing them about the head he said, "This is the Atishṭhā i.e. the topmost part i.e. the head of the Vaishvānara." Instructing them about the eyes, he said, "This is the Sutejā (i.e. one having great splendour)" i.e. the Sun-like Vaishvānara. Instructing them about the nostrils he said, "This that moves in all ways is the Ātmā or Prāṇa of Vaishvā-

nara". Instructing about the Ākāsha in the mouth, he said, "This is Bahula (Profusion) of Vaishvānara." Instructing them about the Chin he said, "This is the pedestal (Pratishṭhā) of Vaishvānara". By 'Chubuka' is meant the lower jaw. Now, though in the Vājasaneyi Brāhmaṇa, heaven is mentioned as having the quality of being the head and the Sun as the Suteja, and in the Chhāndogya, the heaven is indicated as the Sutejā, and the Sun is mentioned as being multiform, still this sort of little difference between these two statements, does not do any harm, because the statement about him who is described as having the measurement of a span, in the Vaishvānara-Vidyā is common to both, and all the different branches intimate that very same thing. Āchārya Jaimini considers this Scriptural passage about being of the measurement of a span, due to 'Sampatti', as having a fitter application.—31.

*Also (The Jābālās) mentioned (the Highest Lord as one that resides) in this i.e. between the head and the chin.—32.*

The Jābālās also mention the Highest Lord as located in the space between the head and chin, thus:—"This eternal and unmanifest Self (Ātmā) is located in the Avimukta i.e. the Jiva-Self (i.e. one who is considered as a finite entity because of the limiting adjuncts, for the purpose of devout meditation). Where is this Avimukta located? In between the Varāṇā and the Nāsī is it located. And what is Varāṇā and what is Nāsī?" Here the Scriptural text having etymologically derived the word Nāsikā (nose) as Varāṇā and Nāsī, thus—that which prevents sins of the sense-organs from occurring is the Varāṇā, and that which destroys the sin committed by the sense-organs is the Nāsī, the Scriptures say again:—"Where is its location? It is in that place where the eyebrows and the nose meet and the place where the heavenly world (the Dyuloka) and the Para (Brahma-Loka) meet." (Jābāla. 1). Therefore, that the Scriptural passage about 'being of the measurement of a span' indicates the Highest Lord, is reasonably sustainable. The term Abhivimāna mentioned in the Scriptures indicates the Universal Self. It is Abhivimāna because it is known by all beings as 'being the Uni-



versal Self', or because it is realized by all as the Universal-Self, and as also one who is beyond any notion of measurement, as being the Universal-Self, and as being measureless. Or, that, it is the one that as being the cause of this transitory world, creates it and therefore is Abhivimāna. Therefore, it is proved that by Vaishvānara, the Highest Lord is meant.—32.

*Here ends Pāda 2 of Adhyāya I.*

## ADHYĀYA I—PĀDA 3

### 1. DYUBHVĀDYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 1-7.

*The abode of the Heaven and the Earth etc. (is Brahma) because it is so expressed by the word 'Sva' (the Self) meaning one's own.—1.*

A Scriptural passage mentions as follows:—"Know that one only—the Self—wherein the Heaven and Earth and the Antariksha (the space between the Earth and the Heaven) are woven (as weft) and also the mind along with all the Prāṇās (sense-organs). Give up all other talk. He is the bund i.e. causeway leading up to immortality" (Muṇḍ. 2.2.5). Here, it is doubted whether that something which is understood as some sort of an abode or sanctuary (Āyatana), by reason of the words "in which the Heaven etc. are woven", means the Highest Brahma or something else. The conclusion (of the opponent) is that the word 'Abode' may mean something else (than Brahma). How is it so? Because the Scriptures mention: "He is the bund i.e. causeway leading up to immortality". In ordinary life it is well-known that a bund or causeway has something beyond it (which is reached after crossing it). Now, it cannot be understood that the Highest Brahma has anything beyond itself (to which Brahma as the bund or causeway leads up), because the Scriptures mention it as being "eternal and as having nothing beyond it" (Brih. 2.4.12). Now, if something else (than Brahma) is understood to be the meaning of the word 'Abode', it may be understood to mean the Pradhāna well-known in the Sāṃkhya Smṛiti, because it is reasonably sustainable, that the Pradhāna as being the cause (of the world, according to the Sāṃkhya) can be said to be the Abode (of that of which it is the cause). Or else, it may also be understood to mean the Vāyu (air) well-known in the Scriptures, as being the upholder, thus:—"Oh Gautama, Vāyu is the thread, because it is by Vāyu, the thread, that this world, the world beyond, and all the beings are held together (as flowers in a garland)" (Brih. 3.7.2). Or may be, it may mean the embodied Jiva-Self, because it is reasonably sus-

tainable that being an experiencer it can be said to be the 'Abode' of all these manifold things which are the objects of its enjoyment. To this conclusion (of the opponent), we reply thus:—"The Abode of the Heaven and the Earth" etc. The compound word 'Dyubhvādi' is dissolved as follows:—The Heaven and the Earth is 'Dyubhuvau' and that of which 'Dyubhuvau' is the first, is the 'Dyubhvādi'. The Highest Brahma deserves to be the abode of the transitory world comprising of the Heaven, the Earth, the Antariksha, and the mind with all the Prāṇās i.e. the sense-organs, which have been indicated as being woven in it. How is it so? Because it is so expressed in its own term (sva), i.e. the 'Ātmā'. Here we find the word-Ātmā mentioned thus:—"Know that one only—the Ātmā". The word Ātmā can be properly understood, only if by it we understand the Highest Self, and no other thing. Occasionally Brahma's being the Abode is expressed by the word (sva) expressive of itself thus:—"O Soumya, all these created things have their root in the Being (the Sat), have their Abode in the 'Being', and have the 'Being' as their pedestal" (Chhan. 6.8.4). Here, also, preceding and following the passage (discussed in this Sūtra) Brahma is mentioned in its own terms, thus:—"The Purusha precisely is all this Karma (such as Agnitotra etc.), penance, Brahma and the super-immortal" (Muṇḍ. 2.1.10). "What here is in front (in the East) and behind (in the West) and in the South and in the North, is only this Brahma, the immortal." (Muṇḍ. 2.2.11). There, however, because the Scriptures mention the relationship (between Brahma and the creation) as that of the abode, and that of which it is the abode, and by the common case-endings of the words 'Sarvam' and 'Brahma', a doubt may be possible, that, just as a tree is made up of such different parts as branches, the stump and the roots, and is therefore of a manifold nature, similarly Brahma also may be of a manifold and variegated nature consisting of different Rasās, and to remove that doubt, it is declared with a confident determination, thus:—"Know, that one and one only—the Ātmā". By that is meant—the Ātmā should not be understood as having manifold forms as characterized by the heterogeneous creation. How then (should it be known)? Rather, that by effacing the idea of this manifoldness of

creation brought about by Nescience by means of true knowledge, one should realize the one and the only Self, which is of a homogeneous structure, as being the only one abode. Just as when it is said, that, that on which Devadatta sits should be brought, the prayer-carpet is brought, and not Devadatta, similarly instruction is here given that the Self which is of a homogeneous structure and which is the abode (of everything that is created), is that which has to be realized. Similarly the Scriptures censure one who puts his faith in the unreal creation (as being the reality) thus :—"One who sees things as different from each other (i.e. fails to realize the unity of things) goes from death to death" (Kāṭha. 2.4.11). The common case-ending of 'Sarvam' and 'Brahma' is for the purpose of removing the idea of the heterogeneity of creation, and not for the purpose of emphasizing that Brahma has a diversity of essential structure, because we find that the Scriptures mention the homogeneous structure of Brahma, thus :—"Just as a lump of salt has nothing inside it which is different from the outside, but has an entirely homogeneous structure of salinity, even so (Oh Maitreyī) is the Self without any inside and outside (as different from each other) but has a total uniformity of structure of pure knowledge". (Bṛih. 4.5.13). Therefore, it is the Highest Brahma that is meant by 'the abode of the Heaven and the Earth'. With regard to the objection mentioned, viz. that as the Scriptures mention a bund or causeway, and as it stands to reason, that a bund or causeway has something beyond it, something other than Brahma should be understood by the words "Abode of the Heaven and the Earth", we reply—The Scriptures mention the bund or causeway, only with a view to signify its attribute of being a support, and not with a view to convey that it has anything beyond it (to be reached, after crossing it). And even though in ordinary life we find that a bund or causeway is built of earth and timber, still, we do not understand that the bund or causeway referred to here is also similarly built of earth and timber. The meaning of the word bund or causeway also, is that it upholds or supports something and not that there is anything beyond it, because it is derived from the root 'Si' which means the action of upholding or supporting. Another (opponent) says, the knowledge of the Self which

is mentioned here by the words "Know that and that one only, the Ātmā", and the instruction to give up all other talk, by the words "Leave off all other talk"—the Self is here mentioned by the Scriptures by the word "bund or causeway" as being the means of attaining immortality, by the words "It is the bund or causeway leading up to immortality", and not with the intention of emphasizing that it is the abode of the Heaven and the Earth. Therefore, the objection taken, viz. that because the Scriptures mention a bund or causeway, "the abode of the Heaven and the Earth" means something other than Brahma, is not proper.—1.

*Because of the statement about the attainment (of Brahma), by those who have attained Final Release.—2.*

This is again how the abode of the Heaven and the Earth, is the Highest Brahma, because we find that it is indicated as the object of attainment by those who have attained Final Release. That, which is attained by those who have attained Final Release, is what it attained by the liberated. When a person entertains a notion that his body etc.—which are not the Self—are the Self, it is Nescience (Avidyā). This leads to attachment (Rāga) for the worship etc. of the body, and to hatred towards things which cause injury etc., to fear and delusion of mind at the prospect of its destruction, and this continuous stream of manifold evils of countless different sorts, is directly known to us all. Conversely, this abode of the Heaven and the Earth, which is referred to as relevant to the present context, is indicated as that which is to be attained by those who have attained Final Release from such faults as Nescience, attachment and hatred etc. How (is it so indicated)? Because, after mentioning, "The knots of the Hridaya are cut asunder and all doubts are resolved, and the Karma (aggregate of actions) of a person is exhausted when this (Brahma) which itself is both the cause (Para) and the effect (Avara) is realized (by a person)" (Mund. 2.2.8), the Scriptures say—"So the person who has realized (Brahma) and who is released from (the bondage of) names and forms, reaches the celestial Purusha (i.e. the Highest Self) which is greater than the great unmanifested" (Avyakta i.e.

Māyā). (Muṇḍ. 3.2.8). That, Brahma is that which is to be attained, is well-known from the Shāstra, thus :—"When all the desires which are in the heart of a mortal are given up, then he becomes immortal and attains Brahma here and now" (Brih. 4.4.7). The Pradhāna etc. are not any where known to be fit to be attained by a person who has attained Final Release. Because what has been referred to here, as the abode of the Heaven and the Earth and the one that should be known, after having given up all talk, by the Scriptural passage "Know that one Ātmā only, leave off all other talk. He is the bund or causeway leading up to immortality", is in another passage seen to have reference to Brahma, thus :—"Let a wise Brāhmaṇa, after realizing Him, concentrate his attention on Him. He should not waste his words, because that is only a weariness of speech" (Brih. 4.4.21). It is because of this also, that the abode of the Heaven and the Earth is the Highest Brahma. —2.

*(The abode of the Heaven and the Earth)  
is not the inferred one (i.e. the Pradhāna)  
because there is no word indicating it.—3.*

There is no special particular reason present i.e. available here which will be able to propound, why "the abode of the Heaven and the Earth etc." means some other thing (i.e. the Pradhāna), just as the Scriptures mention a particular special reason why "the abode of the Heaven and the Earth etc." means Brahma. 'The abode of the Heaven and the Earth' should not therefore be understood to mean the Pradhāna inferred by the Sāmkhya Smṛiti. Why ? Because there is no word (in the Scriptures) indicating that. A word indicating the non-sentient Pradhāna is 'tatshabdah' and a word that does not indicate that, is 'Atatshabdah'. Here there is no word which would indicate the non-sentient Pradhāna, by which we may understand the Pradhāna as the cause (of the world etc.) or the abode (of the heaven and Earth etc.), but there is a word which is indicative of a sentient entity dissimilar to it, viz.—"One who is omniscient, and all-knowing" (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9). We cannot therefore, for the same reason, accept the Vāyu also as being the 'abode of the Heaven and the Earth'—3.

(Nor) the one that supports the *Prāṇa*  
(i.e. the *Jīva-Self*) also.—4.

Nor should the cognitional *Jīva-Self*, even though 'being the Self' and 'being sentient' is possible in its case, be accepted to be the abode of the Heaven and the Earth etc., for the same reason, viz. that there is no word indicative of that (i.e. the *Jīva-Self*) and, in as much as its knowledge is circumscribed by limiting adjuncts (such as a body etc.) and, as omniscience is not possible in its case. Nor can 'being the abode of the Heaven and the Earth' be appropriate in the case of the *Prāṇabhṛt* i.e. the *Jīva-Self*, which has a definite determination as a result of limiting adjuncts and which is not all-pervading.\*

This stating of a separate Sūtra (*Prithagyogakaraṇam*) is in view of the next Sūtra (i.e. *Uttarārtham*).—4.

This is again why the *Jīva-Self* should not be accepted to be the abode of the Heaven and the Earth etc. :—

*Because a difference (between the Jīva-Self  
and the Highest Self) is mentioned.—5.*

In the Scriptural passage "Know that and that one only, the *Ātmā*", distinction is made between that which is to be known (i.e. the Highest Self) and the knower (i.e. the *Jīva-Self*). Therein, we understand that the *Jīva-Self* which is desirous of attaining Final Release is the knower, therefore the other remaining entity which is the one to be known, viz. *Brahma* indicated by the word *Ātmā*, is the abode of the Heaven and the Earth, and not the one that supports the *Prāṇa* (*Prāṇabhṛt*) i.e. the *Jīva-Self*.—5.

Whence again is it that the *Jīva-Self* should not be accepted as the abode of the Heaven and the Earth ?

\* This separate 4th Sūtra is purposely stated by the Sūtrakāra—even though the *Prāṇabhṛt* i.e. the *Jīva-Self* could have been included in the 3rd Sūtra (on the ground of 'Atatshabdāt')—so that, in the 5th Sūtra, along with the *Jīva-Self*, the *Pradhāna* also should not be understood to be meant, for the arguments in the 5th Sūtra apply only to the *Jīva-Self* and are not applicable to the *Pradhāna*.

*Because of the chapter (which deals with Brahma)—6.*

This chapter also, besides, is with regard to the Highest Self. Because the expectation is, that by knowing that one (i.e. Brahma) all else would be known, as for instance in the Scriptural passage—"By knowing what, Oh Bhagawan, all this becomes known?" (Mund. 1.1.3). It is only when the Highest Self which is the Self of all is known, that all this (i.e. the world etc.) will be known, and not when merely the Prāṇabhrit (i.e. the Jīva-Self) is known.—6.

Whence again is it that the Jīva-Self should not be accepted to be the abode of the Heaven and the Earth?

*Because of the mere standing by (on the part of the Highest Self) and the partaking (of the fruit, by the Jīva-Self).—7.*

With reference to the 'abode of the Heaven and the Earth' the Scriptural passage—"Two birds, inseparable friends etc." (Mund. 3.1.1) indicates the mere standing by and the partaking, thus:—"One of the two partakes of the sweet Pippala" indicates the partaking of the fruits of action, and "The other one refrains from partaking and merely keeps looking on" indicates mere passive standing by (i.e. indifference). By these mere standing by and partaking, the Highest Lord and the Jīva-Self (i.e. the Kshetrajña) respectively are understood to be spoken of there. Provided the Scriptures desire to speak of the Lord only as the abode of the Heaven and the Earth, the mention thus of the Lord who is relevant to the context, separately and as distinguished from the Jīva-Self (i.e. the Kshetrajña) is properly understandable, otherwise, it would be only an irrelevant and also an unexpected and groundless statement. But (says the opponent) as regards your point of view also the mention of the Jīva-Self as distinguished from the Lord, would be equally unexpected and groundless. To that we reply—No, because, the Jīva-Self as such is not desired to be spoken of here. The Jīva-Self as an agent and an experiencer, and as connected with individual bodies by limiting adjuncts such as intelligence etc., is well-known in ordinary life, and is not desired to be spoken of as such



by the Scriptures. The Lord as such, however, not being so known in ordinary life, is intended to be spoken of by the Scriptures, and it would not be proper or logical to say that its mention is unexpected or groundless. In the previous Sūtra, viz. "The Ātmās that have entered the cave" (Bra. Sū. I.ii.11) also, this is indicated, viz. that in the Rik "Two birds etc." the Lord and the Jīva-Self (Kshetrajña) are spoken of. Even though the interpretation in Paingī Upanishad is that in this Rik, intelligence (Sattva) and the Jīva-Self are spoken of, still there is no contradiction whatsoever. How so? Because, here the Jīva-Self (Prāṇabhṛit), which is experienced in every individual body as being affected by such limiting adjuncts as intelligence etc., like the Ākāsha in the cavity of the jar, is rejected by saying that it cannot be the abode of the Heaven and the Earth, while the one which is discerned to be unaffected by limiting adjuncts in all bodies, can alone be the Highest Self. Just as the Ākāsha in the cavities of the jars, when it is unaffected by the limiting adjuncts, viz. the jars, is but the great Ākāsha only, similarly, as the Jīva-Self's (i.e. the Prāṇabhṛit's) being different from the Highest Self is not reasonably sustainable, any denial (of its being the abode of the Heaven and the Earth) is also not reasonably sustainable. So, what therefore is rejected as being the abode of the Heaven and the Earth is the Jīva-Self affected by such limiting adjuncts as intelligence (Sattva) etc. Therefore, it is the Highest Self (Brahma) that is the abode of the Heaven and the Earth. That however has already been established by the Sūtra—"Adrishyatvādiguṇako Dharmokteḥ" (Bra. Sū. I.ii.21). In that passage referring to "the source of all beings" it is said as follows—"In which the Heaven, the Earth and the Antariksha (are woven)." The same is here mentioned for the purpose of further elaboration.—7.

## 2. Bhūmādhikaraṇam. Sū. 8-9.

*'Plenitude' (Bhūmā,\* is Brahma) because instruction about it comes after instruction about the condition of deep sleep (Samprasāda).—8.*

\* Hume translates Bhūmā as 'Plenum', i.e. space completely filled with matter.

The Scriptures mention thus—"It is precisely Bhūmā, i.e. Plenitude, which should be desired to be understood, therefore, Oh Bhagawan, I desire to understand Bhūmā." "Where one does not see anything else, hear anything else, or understand anything else, that is Bhūmā, wherein one sees something else, or hears something else, or understands something else (i.e. where one sees differences in things), that is mortal (Alpa)" (Chhān. 7.23, 24). In this connection a doubt arises, viz. which of the two, i.e. the Vital Air (Prāṇa) or the Highest Self, is Brahma? Whence is the doubt? Because by Bhūmā, Plenitude is expressed, as according to the Smṛiti (of Pāṇini) it is a word which ends in a 'Bhāva-Pratyaya'\* and as a result of that the word 'Bahu' is dropped and is substituted by the word 'Bhū'. Then when there is a desire to know particularly as to what the nature of 'Plenitude' is, we understand from the Scriptural passage "Prāṇa is greater than hope" (Chhān. 7.15.1) that because of proximity, Prāṇa is Bhūmā. On the other hand, from the topic in the beginning of the chapter, viz. "I have heard from persons like you, that one who realizes the Self, transcends grief. Oh Bhagawan, I am in such a grief. May you please lead me beyond grief" (Chhān. 7.1.3), it also appears that by Bhūmā, the Highest Self is meant. That being so, a doubt crops up, as to what should be accepted and what should be rejected. What then is your conclusion? It is that Prāṇa is Bhūmā. How is it so? Because it is observed that there is a series of good many questions and replies. For instance, (to the question) "Is there anything greater than Name (Nāma)?" (the reply is) "Speech (Vāk) indeed is greater than Name (Nāma)", and (to the question) "Oh Bhagawan, is there anything greater than Speech?" (the reply is) "Mind verily is greater than Speech"; and in this manner, beginning with Name (Nāma) and upto Prāṇa, it is seen that a stream or chain of many questions and replies is set up. It is not observed however that there is any more such question or reply after Prāṇa, a question for instance like this—Oh Bhagawan, is there anything greater than Prāṇa? Or any reply like this—This (something) verily is greater than Prāṇa. Having spoken elaborately—beginning with Name (Nāma) and

\* A suffix (Iman) which indicates the condition of that to which it is applied.

ending with Hope—as to how Prāṇa is greater than all, by the passage “Prāṇa verily is greater than hope, etc.”, and also having spoken about the Ativāditva\* of one who understands Prāṇa (as being greater than all), and by acknowledging his Ativāditva, by the passage “(on being questioned) Are you an Ativādi ?, he should reply that he is an Ativādi, he should not deny it”, and by bringing up the same Ativāditva about Prāṇa being greater than all, by the passage “He alone is an Ativādi who is an Ativādi by (basing his claim on ) Truth” and without discarding Prāṇa, and establishing Prāṇa as the Bhūmā by way of the series of Truth, etc., it is understood that Prāṇa alone is considered to be Bhūmā. (The Vedāntin says)—If you thus explain that Prāṇa is Bhūmā, how can you explain the Scriptural passage “Where he does not see any thing else” (i.e. when he sees the unity of all) which purports to give the characteristics of Bhūmā ? (The opponent replies)—Because we observe that when during the condition of sleep the sense-organs having all been absorbed into Prāṇa, and the functions of all sense-organs such as ‘seeing’ etc. having ceased altogether, it is possible that the characteristics of ‘not seeing anything else’ etc., can properly be applicable to Prāṇa. The Scriptures, having spoken of the condition of deep sleep as being one in which the functions of all sense-organs cease, by the passage “He does not hear, he does not see” and also speaking of the wakefulness of Prāṇa with its five-fold functions, by the passage “The fires of Prāṇa alone are wakeful in this body (during deep sleep)” (Pra. 4.2.3), show that, during the condition of deep sleep, it is Prāṇa that is chiefly in evidence. The bliss of Bhūmā about which the Scriptures speak in “That which is Bhūmā is bliss” (Chhān. 7.23) is also not contradictory (to what the opponent says), because the Scriptural passage “Here the Deva (i.e. the sentient Jīva-Self), does not dream dreams and thus when there is bliss in the body” (Pra. 4.6) says that there is bliss only in the condition of sleep. The Scriptural passage “That which is Bhūmā, is immortality” (Chhān. 7.24.1) is also not contradictory as applied to Prāṇa, because the Scriptures say—“Prāṇa is immortality” (Kaush. 3.2). How

\* An Ativādi is one who exclusively establishes his own assertion, and Ativāditva is the position of a person who is an Ativādi in this manner.

(objects the Vedāntin) in your case, in which you consider Prāṇa to be the Bhūmā, can the Scriptural passage "One who knows the Self, goes beyond, i.e. transcends grief" which starts the chapter with a desire to know the Self (Ātmā), be reasonably sustainable? We (the opponents) reply that here the desire to say is, that Prāṇa alone is the Self, because that is how the following Scriptural passage makes Prāṇa to be the Self of all, thus—"Prāṇa is verily the father, mother, brother, sister, teacher, and Brāhmaṇa" (Chhān. 7.15.1). And also the passage—"Just as spokes are tenoned and mortised in the nave, so everything is centred in the Prāṇa." Prāṇa can well have the nature of 'Plenitude', i.e. the nature of Bhūmā, because of its being the Self of all, and also because of the illustration of the spokes and the nave. Therefore the conclusion is, that Prāṇa is Bhūmā. To this (we reply)—It is only the Highest Self that deserves to be the Bhūmā and not Prāṇa. Why so? Because, the instruction (about Bhūmā) comes after the instruction about the condition of deep sleep (Samprasāda). Samprasāda is said to be the condition of deep sleep because of the etymological derivation—the condition in which (a man) is well pleased. Also because, in the Brihadāranyaka it is mentioned along with the conditions of dreams and wakefulness, and in as much as the Prāṇa remains wakeful in the Samprasāda condition, it is implied that Prāṇa indicates the condition of deep sleep, i.e. Samprasāda, and because instruction about Bhūmā comes after (the instruction about) Prāṇa. Were Prāṇa to be Bhūmā, that would mean that instruction about Prāṇa (as Bhūmā) is again given, after instruction about Prāṇa has already been given once before, which (of course) would be ununderstandable. We do not observe, that after instruction about Name (Nāma) is given, instruction is again given that Name (Nāma) is greater than itself (in the foregoing portion), but we find that (after Name) instruction is given about 'Speech' which is something other than 'Nāma' thus—"Speech verily is greater than Name". Similarly (it is observed that), beginning with 'Speech' and upto 'Prāṇa', instruction about some different thing is given, as coming after that which has already gone before, in every case. Therefore Bhūmā, about which instruction is given after the instruction about Prāṇa, deserves to be something

different from Prāṇa. (The opponent here intervenes)—There is no question here, such as ‘Oh Bhagawan, is there anything greater than Prāṇa?’ Nor is there any reply here, such as ‘There is this (something) greater than Prāṇa.’ How do you say then, that after Prāṇa instruction about Bhūmā is given? We observe that the same Ativāditva with reference to Prāṇa, is brought forward later on thus—“He alone states something exclusively establishing his own assertion, who asserts something as exclusively established on the strength of Truth.” Therefore, there is no instruction about anything after the instruction about Prāṇa. To this our reply is—It is not possible to be able to say, that the ‘Ativāditva’ which has been brought forward, is the same as that with reference to Prāṇa, because there is a special feature here, viz. “He who states something exclusively establishing his own assertion, *on the strength of Truth*”. But (says the opponent) this special feature even, may well be with reference to Prāṇa. How can it be so? Because, for instance, if one were to say “This Agnihotri, who speaks the truth”, the condition of his being an Agnihotri, is not the result of his speaking the truth, but it is the result of the Agnihotra itself. Speaking the truth is only the mention of a special feature of the Agnihotri. Similarly when it is said “He states something exclusively establishing his own assertion, on the strength of Truth” the Ativāditva is not because of his speaking the truth, but because of his correct understanding of Prāṇa (as being Bhūmā i.e. the Highest Self), which is relevant here. Speaking the truth, is only intended to be spoken of, as a special feature of one who has correctly understood Prāṇa.

To this, we reply—No, because that would involve the predicament of the rejection of the meaning of the Scriptures. The Scriptures here mean to indicate Ativāditva, *on the strength of truth*, thus “He alone states something exclusively establishing his assertion, who does so, *on the strength of Truth*”. Here there is no mention of the correct understanding of Prāṇa. May be, the correct understanding of Prāṇa, may have such a relation, with the general topic of the chapter, but in that case it would mean, that the Scriptures are rejected, by reason of conforming with the general topic of the chapter.

And the word ‘But’ (Tu), which has the force of show-

ing, that the subject of the sentence which follows, is different from the subject of the sentence which has gone before, as in the Scriptural passage 'Esha tu vā ativadati', would not (in your view) construe properly with the sentence. The Scriptural passage "Truth alone should be desired to be known" (Chhān. 7.16) which involves the making of another effort (of the nature of desire), suggests that it is desired to speak of something else (than Prāṇa). Therefore it should be looked upon like this—When praise of one who has studied one Veda is the relevant topic, to say, that this (another) is a *great* Brāhmaṇa who has studied the four Vedās, means that the one who has studied the four Vedās, and who is different from one who has studied one Vedā, is praised. There is no such rule that the desire to speak of some other thing should only be in a question and answer form, because, the desire to speak of a different thing is evidenced by the rendering of the connection of such a thing, with that which is relevant to the context, impossible. Here, Sanatkumāra voluntarily elucidates a further thing to Nārada, who has remained silent after listening to the instruction upto Prāṇa, as follows:— "Ativāditva, resulting from the correct understanding of Prāṇa which has reference only to a modification (i.e. Vikāra) which is unreal, is really not Ativāditva at all, because it is only he, who states something exclusively establishing his own assertion *on the strength of Truth alone*, that is an Ativādi". In this connection, the word 'Truth' means the Highest Brahma, because of its nature (Rūpa) of being the transcendent entity also, because of another Scriptural passage—"Brahma is Truth, knowledge, and infinite" (Tait. 2.1). It is then, that Sanatkumāra gives instruction about 'Brahma' to Nārada, to whom all this is explained and who asks, 'Oh Bhagawan, can I be such Ativādi' on the strength of Truth?—by means of a series of devices such as contemplation (Vijnāna) etc.. So we think that, that Truth which has been promised to be spoken of after Prāṇa is here referred to as 'Bhūmā'. Therefore, as instruction about Bhūmā comes after the instruction about Prāṇa, it is the Highest Self, which is different from Prāṇa, that deserves to be Bhūmā. It is only in this way that the beginning of the chapter which expresses a desire to understand the Self, becomes

reasonably sustainable. It is not reasonably sustainable, that there is a desire to speak of Prāṇa as the Self, because the word Prāṇa in its primary sense can never be the Self, nor can there be cessation of grief in any way other than the knowledge of the Self, because another Scriptural passage says—"There is no other way to go" (Shvet. 6.15). Beginning with "May Bhagawan take me beyond grief", the Scriptures conclude thus—"Bhagawan Sanatkumāra leads him, whose attachment to worldly objects has been removed, beyond the darkness" (Chhān. 7.26.2). By darkness is meant Nescience, the cause of all grief etc.. Were the instruction to be about Prāṇa, the Scriptures would not mention Prāṇa as depending on some other thing, as for instance in the Brāhmaṇa passage—"Prāṇa is created from the Self" (Chhān. 7.26.1). (The opponent says)—The Scriptures may well desire to speak of the Self towards the end of the chapter, but Bhūmā of course is just the Prāṇa only. To this we reply—No, because, the Scriptural passage "Oh Bhagawan, wherein is he (the Bhūmā) firmly ensconced? In its own great glory" (Chhān. 7.24.1) shows, that the same Bhūmā is brought forward right up to the end of the chapter. The nature of Bhūmā which has the nature of 'Plenitude' as its Self, is more reasonably sustainable in the case of the Highest Self, because of its being the cause of everything.—8.

*Because the attributes (ascribed to Bhūmā) are reasonably sustainable (only in the case of Brahma).—9.*

Besides, the attributes mentioned in the Scriptures as pertaining to Bhūmā, are seen to be reasonably sustainable only in the Highest Self. The Scriptures inform us of the absence of such activities as 'seeing' etc. in Bhūmā, in the passage—"Where one does not see anything else, or hear anything else, or understand anything else, that is Bhūmā". Such absence of activities of seeing etc. are known to be precisely in the Highest Self, for another Scriptural passage mentions—"Where however to him everything has but become the Self only, by what then will he see, and what?" (Brih. 4.5.15).

Even this absence of the activities of seeing etc. during the condition of sleep spoken of by the Scriptures, is mentioned with a view to convey the absence of any attachment in the Self, and not with a desire to speak of the nature of Prāṇa, because the chapter relates to the Highest Self. Again this supreme bliss which is spoken of as existing in that condition, is also similarly mentioned with a desire to intimate the blissful nature of the Highest Self alone, for the Scriptures say—"This is his highest bliss, all other beings subsist only on a small portion of this bliss" (Brih. 4.3.32). Here in the present passage also, viz. "That which is Bhūmā, verily is bliss. There is no bliss in perishable things (Alpe), Bhūmā is bliss", which negatives the existence of bliss mixed with sorrow in Bhūmā, shows that Bhūmā alone which has a blissful nature, is Brahma. The immortality referred to by Scriptures, in the passage "That which is Bhūmā is immortality", also makes us understand that it is the Highest cause uncaused (i.e. Brahma), because the immortality of modifications (viz. Vikārās i.e. effects), is merely relative, as another Scriptural passage lays down that "Everything other than this is perishable" (Brih. 3.4.2). Similarly the attributes of being true, being ensconced in its own great glory, being all-pervading and being the Self of all, mentioned by the Scriptures, are reasonably sustainable, only in the Highest Self and nowhere else. Ergo, it is established that Bhūmā is the Highest Self.—9.

### 3. AKSHARĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 10-12.

*The imperishable (Akshara) is Brahma, because it supports (all created things) ending with (and including) the Ākāsha.—10.*

The Scriptures mention—"Into what indeed is the Ākāsha woven warp-and-woof-wise? He said, Oh Gārgi, it verily is this, which, those who have understood Brahma (Brāhmaṇāh), call the 'imperishable', and which is neither gross nor atomic" (Brih. 3.8.7, 8) etc.. With regard to this the doubt (arises)—Whether by 'Akshara', only a letter or a sound (Varṇa) is meant, or the Highest Lord. With regard to this (the opponent says), in the Akshara-Samām-



nāya\* etc., the term 'Akshara' means only a letter or a syllable, as it is not proper to disregard what is so well-known, and as a letter or a syllable has been understood to be Brahma, the Self of all, for the purpose of devout meditation in another Scriptural passage thus—"The letter 'Om' (Omkāra) is all this" (Chhān. 2.23.3)—, the term 'Akshara' means a letter or syllable only. (To this conclusion of the opponent, the Vedāntin replies)—The term 'Akshara' indicates the Highest Self only. Why so? "Because it supports all created things ending with and including the Ākāsha". Beginning with the Earth and ending with and including the Ākāsha all created things are supported by it. There, the Scriptures, having mentioned that all created things which are separated from each other by the past, present and future, and are firmly based in the Ākāsha, in the passage "That is woven in the Ākāsha warp-and-woof-wise", pose the question—"And wherein is this Ākāsha woven warp-and-woof-wise?"—and by way of the reply, introduce the 'Akshara'. It also concludes thus—"It is even in this 'Akshara', Oh Gārgi, the Ākāsha is woven warp-and-woof-wise". This, i.e. being the support of everything upto and including the Ākāsha, is not possible for anything, other than Brahma. The passage "Omkāra is all this" should be looked upon as being only in glorification, because of its being a device (Sādhana) for the meditation on Brahma. Therefore, the 'Akshara', which does not perish and pervades everything, and is therefore eternal and all-pervading, is but the Highest Brahma only.—10.

If it is understood (says the opponent) that this supporting of all things upto and including Ākāsha, is because of the fact, that all effects depend upon their cause, then it may be, that it may be reasonably sustainable in the case of those who hold the Pradhāna as the cause. How can you then understand that the Akshara, because of its being the support of all things upto and including the Ākāsha, means Brahma?

*Because this (supporting of all things including Ākāsha) is on account of the command.—11.*

\* The Collection of 14 Sūtras such as अ, ई, उ, ऋ etc. and which Paṇini received from the Lord Shankara. See Abhyankar Shāstri's note.

This supporting of all things including Ākāsha, is the work of the Highest Lord. How is it so ? Because of the command. We find the Scriptures mentioning such a command, thus—"Oh Gārgi, it is at the behest of this Akshara that the Sun and the Moon stand thus regulated" (Brih. 3.8.9) etc.. This command of course is the work of the Highest Lord. It cannot be possible in the case of the non-sentient Pradhāna. We do not find any such capacity in the Earth etc., for instance, to issue a command to the Jars etc. of which the Earth is the cause.—11.

*Because of the exclusion (by the Scriptures), of the possibility of Akshara being something different from Brahma.—12.*

Brahma is necessarily indicated by the word Akshara, by reason of the exclusion of the possibility of its being anything else. Because this work of supporting all things including the Ākāsha is of that (Brahma) alone, and of none else. What is this exclusion from being anything else ? 'Anyabhāva' means being something else, and exclusion of a thing from being such something else, is the exclusion of that thing from being something else. It is said—The Scriptures exclude the Akshara, which supports all things including the Ākāsha, from being that something else (i.e. something other than Brahma), which, it is doubted, the word Akshara indicates, thus—"Oh Gārgi, that verily is this Akshara, which, while being the seer, is itself not seen, being the hearer, is itself not heard, being the perceiver, is itself not perceived, being the knower, is itself not known" etc. (Brih. 3.8.11).

This mention about being itself not seen etc., is possible in the case of Pradhāna, but it being non-sentient, mention about its being the seer etc. is of course not possible. Nor can 'Akshara' be supposed to indicate the embodied Jiva-Self which is affected by limiting adjuncts, because of the denial by the Scriptures of its being different from the Akshara i.e. the Highest Self, thus—"There is no other seer than this, no other hearer than this, no other perceiver than this, and no other knower than this", and also because, its (i.e. Akshara's) being affected by limiting adjuncts is denied by the passage—" (It is) sans-eyes, sans-ears, sans-

speech, and sans-mind" (Brih. 3.8.8). There indeed cannot ever be any such thing as an embodied Jīva-Self unaffected by limiting adjuncts. Therefore, that the 'Akshara' is the Highest Brahma, is the definite conclusion.—12.

4. *ĪKSHATIKARMAVYAPADESHĀDHİKARĀṆAM*. Sū. 13.

*On account of his being spoken of as the object of the act of seeing, it is He (i.e. the Highest Self).—13.*

The Scriptures having mentioned thus—"Oh Satya-kāma, this Omkāra verily is the Para and Aparā Brahma (the attributeless one i.e. Nirguṇa and a modification i.e. Saṅguṇa respectively), therefore, the wise one, even by this (Omkāra) as the sanctuary (Āyatanena) attains either of these two", go on further and mention—"And the one who again contemplates on the Highest Puruṣha by means of the letter 'Om' (ॐ) consisting of three Mātrās" etc. (Pra. 5.2.5). Here, (the doubt arises) whether in this sentence, the instruction is about the Highest Brahma (Para) as the object of contemplation, or about the Lower (i.e. Aparā) Brahma, because it is mentioned in the beginning, that by this one sanctuary alone he seeks either of these two (i.e. the Highest and the Lower Brahma), because both are relevant here. In this connection (the conclusion of the opponent is)—It is the Lower Brahma that is here meant. Why so? Because it is mentioned that the person who realizes that, obtains a fruit which is delimited in space, viz. "He enters the Teja in the form of the Sun", "He is conveyed to the Brahma-Loka by the Sāma hymns". As the Highest Brahma is all-pervading, it would not be proper to say, that a person who realizes the Highest Brahma, obtains as a fruit, a place which is delimited in space. (Here the Vedāntin says)—But, if we understand that the Lower Brahma is meant, then the particularization as 'The Highest Puruṣha i.e. Para' would not be reasonably sustainable. This (the opponent replies) is no fault, because it is reasonably sustainable that as compared with the gross body (Piṇḍa = Virāṭ) as such, Prāṇa (Sūtratmā) is higher. To this conclusion, we give reply—Here, the instruction is about the Highest Brahma which is to be devoutly medi-

tated upon. Why so? Because, it is spoken of as the object of the act of seeing. 'Iksha' is to see. That thing which is seen, is the object of the act of seeing. In the complementary passage, there is mention of the Purusha that is to be devoutly contemplated upon, as the object of the act of seeing, thus:—"He sees the Purusha i.e. the one who occupies this tabernacle (Purishaya) who is even higher than this High Jiva-Ghana and which occupies this tabernacle viz. this body." Now, a thing which does not even exist as such can be an object of devout contemplation, for instance, even that which is merely an imagined thing can be the object of the act of contemplation. In ordinary life, however, it is seen that it is only a thing actually existing as such that is the object of the act of seeing. Therefore, we understand that it is this Highest Self alone, which is the object of proper and correct intuitive understanding, that is here spoken of as the object of the act of seeing, and we can recognize the same Highest Self (referred to in the first sentence), as the one to be devoutly contemplated upon, by the words Para and Purusha. (The opponent says) Oh, but it is the Para Purusha that is spoken of as the one to be devoutly meditated upon, and it is that Para that is even beyond the Para (transcendent), that is spoken of as the object of the act of seeing, how can we then recognize the one (indicated in one place) as the one indicated in the other place? To this we reply—The words Para and Purusha are common to both. It cannot be, that here, by the word Jiva-Ghana, the Para (transcendent) Purusha that is relevant to the context here as the one to be meditated upon, is referred to, because of which, the other Purusha out-transcending the first transcendent Purusha (i.e. Parātpara) which is the one to be seen, can be some other Purusha different from the first transcendent Purusha. (Says the opponent) who then is this 'Jiva-Ghana'? We reply—"Ghana" means an icon (Mūrti) (in which form a Jiva-Self inheres in it). That particular portion of the Highest Self, which is like a small lump of salt, and which is of the form of an embodied Jiva-Self, and is brought about by limiting adjuncts, and which is higher than the sense-organs and their objects, is here referred to as the Jiva-Ghana. Some other commentator says—That Brahma-world which is indicated

by the penultimate sentence "Who is transported to the Brahma-world by Sāma-hymns" and which is higher than the other worlds, is referred to here as the Jīva-Ghana. The Brahma-world can also be the Jīva-Ghana, as it would be reasonably sustainable to say, that all the individual Selfs surrounded by their sense-organs cluster together in the Hiraṇyagarbha, who is the Self of all sense-organs and who abides in the Brahma-Loka. Therefore, it is understood that the Highest Self, which is higher than that (Jīva-Ghana) and which is the object of the act of seeing, is also the object of the act of devout contemplation. The particularization viz. 'Parama-Purusham' is possible to be imagined, only if by it we understand the Highest Self. The Para Purusha can only be the Highest Self, because there is nothing that is Higher than that, as is expressed in another Scriptural passage—"There is none higher than the Purusha, he is the last limit (*the ultima Thule*) and the highest refuge or asylum." Having made a distinction in Brahma in the sentence "The Omkāra is the Para and the Aparā Brahma", and having afterwards mentioned, that the Purusha that is Para (beyond) is to be contemplated upon by means of the Omkāra, the Scriptures make us understand, that the Para Purusha is but the highest Brahma only. The Scriptural sentence—"Just as a snake is relieved of his slough, even so, verily is he relieved of the sins"—which speaks of the fruit, viz. being rid of all sins, suggests that the Highest Self is the one to be contemplated upon. As regards the objection taken, that it is not proper that a person who contemplates on the Highest Brahma should have a fruit limited by environment, we reply—This is quite faultless when it is explained that this may indicate Final Release by gradual stages, as follows :—Attainment of the Brahma-Loka is the fruit obtained by one who devoutly contemplates on the Highest Self by means of the Omkāra of three Matrās, and then gradually after that, complete intuitive knowledge of Brahma supervenes.—13.

5. DAHARĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 14-21.

*The Small i.e. subtle (Ākāsha) (is Brahma)  
because of reasons which follow.—14.*

The Scriptures mention :—"In this body (lit. City of Brahma) there is a small lotus-like palace. There is inside it a small i.e. subtle Ākāsha. That which is inside it should be searched for and desired to be known"\* (Chhān. 8.1.1) etc.

Now, it is doubted, with regard to what the Scriptures mention as "This small i.e. subtle Ākāsha which is inside this small lotus of the Hridaya" viz., whether this small Ākāsha is the created element Ākāsha (Bhūtākāsha) or the Cognitional Jīva-Self or the Highest Self. Whence is this doubt? Because of the words, Ākāsha and Brahmapura which occur here. It is seen, that this word Ākāsha is used, both in the sense of the element-Ākāsha and the Highest Self. Therefore, in this connection, the doubt is, whether by small i.e. subtle (Dahara) Ākāsha, the element Ākāsha is meant, or the Highest Self. Similarly, whether 'Brahmapura' means the body of the Jīva-Self that is here called Brahma-pura, or whether it means the city (i.e. the body) of the Highest Self. In this connection, the further doubt is, as to which of these two, viz. the Jīva-Self or the Highest Self, should be understood by the small Ākāsha, as the owner of the Pura (i.e. the body). (With regard to this the conclusion of the opponent is) that the use of the word Ākāsha as indicating the element Ākāsha being firmly established, the word 'small' (Dahara) should be understood to mean the element Ākāsha only. It is here designated as 'small' (Dahara) with reference to the small abode (Hridaya) in which it happens to be. Similarly, a comparison can be instituted between the Ākāshās (one being made the standard of comparison, and the other the subject of comparison), on account of the difference made between them, by reason of one being the outer and the other the inner Ākāsha, as in the Scriptural passage—"The Ākāsha as circumscribed by the Hridaya is of the same dimension as the dimension of this (outer) Ākāsha" (Chhān. 8.1.3). Similarly, the Heaven and the Earth can be said to be contained inside it, because the

\* It should be noted that Thibaut has translated 'tasmin yat antah' in this sentence as—"Now what exists within that ether." The correct translation is given by Abhyankar Shāstri. According to him 'tasmin' refers not to Ākāsha but to the 'veshma' (i.e. palace), as will be seen from the discussion in the Sūtra).

Ākāsha and the small (Dahara) Ākāsha are identical, inasmuch as Space (Avakāsha) is the Self of both. Or it should be understood that by the small (Dahara) Ākāsha, the Jīva-Self is meant, because of the word 'Brahma-pura', inasmuch as the body, being the Pura of the Jīva-Self, is called the Brahma-Pura, because it is acquired by the Jīva-Self by its own action (Karma), and that the use of the word Brahma, to indicate the Jīva-Self, is in a secondary or metaphorical sense, because there is no relationship between the body and the Highest Self, as there is between one's own property and oneself as the owner of such property (Sva here means one's own i.e. one's property). Again it is observed, that the owner of the Pura (i.e. a town) is seen to reside in a part of it, just as a king (stays in a part of his capital). Now the Jīva-Self has the mind as its limiting adjunct, and mind generally is located in the Hridaya, therefore, it may well be, that the Jīva-Self may be understood to reside in the Hridaya. Again it is possible to imagine the Jīva-Self to be 'small' as it is compared to a fine point of a goad (Shvet. 5.8). And it may well be, that it is compared with the Ākāsha, with a view to speak of its being non-different from i.e. identical with Brahma. Besides, the Scriptures do not here mention that the small Ākāsha is to be sought for or desired to be known. Because, by the words "that which is inside it" a particularization of the Highest Brahma is to be accepted. (To this conclusion of the opponent) we reply—It is only the Highest Lord that here deserves to be the small Ākāsha, and neither the element Ākāsha nor the Jīva-Self. Whence is it so? Because of the reasons mentioned in the later complementary passage. For instance, with respect to the small Ākāsha which has been prescribed as the one to be sought for by the Scriptures beginning with "Were they to say", there is afterwards a sentence which resolves a doubt raised earlier by the question "What is it, that there is in it (i.e. the Hridaya) that should be sought for and desired to be known?" (Chhān. 8.1.2), thus—"He (the teacher) should reply, that this Ākāsha within the Hridaya is of the same dimension as this Ākāsha (the element, the outside Ākāsha), and both the Heaven and the Earth are contained within it" (Chhān. 8.1.3) etc.. There it is understood, that (the teacher) thus comparing the Ākāsha which has

acquired its smallness because of the smallness of the lotus-like palace, with the well-known Ākāsha the element, dis-abuses (the pupil) of the *smallness* of the small Ākāsha, and also removes the idea, that the small Ākāsha may be the element Ākāsha. Though the use of the word Ākāsha for the element Ākāsha is well established, yet, as it would not be reasonably sustainable to compare a thing with itself, the doubt that the small Ākāsha may be the element Ākāsha, also thus happens to be removed. But (says the opponent) I have said, that, imagining one and the same Ākāsha to be different from itself by an imagined distinction (between them), such as the inside and outside Ākāsha, it is possible to say that one is the standard of comparison and the other is the subject of comparison. To this we reply—This cannot possibly be so. To have resort to an imaginary distinction (with regard to one and the same thing), is the last resort (of a person) in a helpless condition. And even if a comparison were to be instituted by assuming such difference, the internal Ākāsha being of a finite determination, it could never be reasonably sustainable to ascribe to it the dimensions of the external Ākāsha. But (says the opponent), because another Scriptural sentence describes the Highest Lord as “Greater than the Ākāsha” (Shat. Brā. 10.6.3.2), it would also not be reasonably sustainable to ascribe the dimensions of the external Ākāsha to the Highest Lord. (To this, we reply) This is no fault, because, the sentence purports to reject the ‘smallness’ (of the Daharākāsha) caused by its being enveloped in a lotus (of the Hridaya), and not to propound that it is like that (i.e. the well-known Ākāsha). Besides there would be a split of the sentence, if it were to propound both these meanings. Besides, that the Heaven and the Earth are accommodated in only a part of the Ākāsha which is enveloped in a lotus and which is imagined to be different (from the external Ākāsha because of limiting adjuncts), would not be reasonably sustainable. The attributes of ‘selfhood’ and ‘being free from sin etc.’, as mentioned in the Scriptural passage—“This Self is free from sin, not subject to old age or death, or grief or hunger, or thirst, and is one whose desires are true and whose purpose it true” (Chhān. 8.1.5), are not possible, in the case of the element Ākāsha. Though the use of the word Self is possible in



the case of the Jīva-Self, still, because of other reasons, the doubt, that the small-Ākāsha may mean the Jīva-Self, is negated. It is not possible to negative the 'smallness' (Daharatva) of the Jīva-Self, caused by the envelope of the lotus (of the Hridaya), as the Jīva-Self is delimited by limiting adjuncts and is compared to the fine point of a goad. Were somebody to argue, that it may be understood, that it is desired (by the Scriptures) to say that the Jīva-Self is all-pervading etc., because of the desire (of the Scriptures) to speak about its being ultimately identical with Brahma, then it would be more logical to say that it is intended by the Scriptures to speak of that very Highest Brahma which constitutes the Jīva-Self's Selfhood, and because of which the Jīva-Self may be considered to be all-pervading (as the opponent is supposed to say), as being all-pervading etc.. With respect to what is said (by the opponent) about Brahma-Pura, (in which Pura is qualified by Jīva), viz. that the Jīva-Self may be the one that resides in a part of the Pura, being like a King the master of the Pura, we say,—The body is said to be Brahma-Pura, as it is the Pura of the transcendent Highest Self, because the word Brahma is used, in its case, in the primary sense. It also has a relation with the Pura (i.e. body) as being the seat in which it becomes manifest (to a person contemplating on it), because of the Scriptures which say—"He sees the Purusha, that out-transcends this transcendent Jīva-Ghana (i.e. Hiraṇyagarbha), and occupies this body" (Purishayam) (Pra. 5.5), and also—"This is the Purusha which occupies all these bodies" (Brih. 2.5.18), etc.. Or else (we may have it) that in this tabernacle of the Jīva-Self, Brahma itself is proximate and present, just as Viṣṇu is proximate and present in the Shālāgrāma. The Scriptures, first speaking of the perishable nature of the fruits of actions, by the passage "As here the enjoyments of the world of actions perish, even so, in the world hereafter also, the enjoyments of the world of merits also perish" (Chhān. 3.1.6), and afterwards, speaking of the imperishable nature of the fruit of the knowledge of the small Ākāsha, in the passage—"Those who depart from here after having understood the Self (by contemplation), and these true desires, have a complete freedom of movement at will, in all worlds", suggest that it (i.e. the small Ākāsha) is the Highest Self.

With regard to what is said (by the opponent), viz. that the Scriptures do not mention that the small Ākāsha is to be sought for or desired to be known, because of its being appropriated as a particularization of the transcendent (Brahma) (Para-visheshanātvena), we reply—If, as you say) the Ākāsha (i.e. small Ākāsha) is not mentioned by the Scriptures as the one to be sought for, then the description of the nature of that Ākāsha, in the passage “The Ākāsha in the Hridaya has the same dimensions as the dimensions of this Ākāsha (i.e. the element Ākāsha)”, would not have any purpose. But (says the opponent), that may be said to have been so stated to show the existence of the entity within (i.e. the small Ākāsha), because, having first enquired by the passage “Were they to ask, as to what is there that has to be searched for and to be known in that small (Dahara) Ākāsha which is in the Lotus-like palace in the Brahmapura (i.e. the body)” etc., we observe that, in the reply, the Scriptures, after beginning by instituting a comparison between the Ākāshās speak of the Heaven and the Earth etc. as being contained in it. To this, we (the Vedāntins) reply—It is not like this. Because, if it were to be so, then, it, in effect, will have been said, that the Heaven and the Earth etc. which are contained in it (i.e. the small Ākāsha) are the things to be sought for and desired to be known, in which case the complementary passage would not be reasonably sustainable. Because the Scriptures, having brought forward the Ākāsha, which is relevant, and which is the receptacle for holding the Heaven and the Earth within it, by the sentences “In which all desires are contained” and “This is the Self which is free from sin”, indicate by the complementary sentence, that the Self, which is the receptacle of desires, as well as the desires also, by the use of the word ‘also’ (Cha) which has a cumulative meaning, and which occurs in the Scriptural passage—“Those who depart from here after understanding the Self *and* those true desires are the things to be known”. Therefore, in the sentence in the beginning also, it is only the small Ākāsha which has its seat in the lotus of the Hridaya, that is to be understood, along with the Heaven and the Earth and the true desires that are contained in it. And that Dahara-Ākāsha, of course, because of the reasons mentioned, is the Highest Lord.—14.

*(The small Ākāsha is Brahma) because of (the mention of) progress (towards Brahma), and because of the Scriptural word. So, it is seen. (There is) an indicatory mark also.—15.*

It has been mentioned (in Sūtra 14) that the small Ākāsha is the Highest Lord, because of the reasons which follow. Those very reasons will now be elaborated in detail. It is because there is mention of progress (Gati) (towards Brahma), and a mention of a Scriptural word, in the passage complementary to the passage about the small Ākāsha, which propounds that the small Ākāsha is but the Highest Lord only, thus :—"All these creatures who every day keep going on to this Brahma-Loka, fail to obtain it" (Chhān. 8.3.2). Here having spoken of the small Ākāsha by the word 'Brahma-Loka', the progress of the Jīva-Selfs, which are expressed by the word 'Prajāh', towards it, spoken of (by the Scriptures), makes us comprehend that the small Ākāsha is Brahma. Similarly, in another Scriptural passage, the going of the creatures every day during the condition of sleep to Brahma, is seen, thus :—"Oh Soumya, (he) then becomes united with the Sat" (Chhān. 6.8.1), etc.. In ordinary life also, we find, that a person in deep sleep is spoken of as having become Brahma or reached Brahmahood (or as having become 'in tune with the infinite'). Similarly, the word 'Brahma-Loka' used for the small Ākāsha which is relevant here, dispels the doubt that (by the word 'Small Ākāsha') either the Jīva-Self or the element Ākāsha may be meant, and makes us understand that it means Brahma. But (says the opponent) the word Brahma-Loka may indicate the world of one who has a lotus as his seat, i.e., 'Brahma-Deva'. (To this we reply)—It would do so, if the compound word Brahma-Loka is explained by way of its being a genitive Tatpuruṣa compound thus :—the world, of Brahma. But if we explain it (by saying that both the words Brahma and Loka have the same case-ending) as a Karmadhāraya compound, and dissolve it as 'Brahma which itself is the Loka, i.e., Brahma-Loka', then it would indicate the Highest Brahma. And this going to the Brahma-Loka that is seen day after day, is the indicatory mark for understanding Brahma-Loka as a Karmadhāraya compound. It

is not possible to imagine, that these creatures day after day go to the world of the effect, Brahmā (Brahmā, which is a creation of the Highest Brahma, i.e., Hiraṇyagarbha) which is called the Satya-Loka (the world of the true).—15.

*Also because of the mention of 'supporting',  
(the small Ākāsha is Brahma), because this  
glory is seen to be His.—16.*

By reason of the mention of this 'supporting' also, the small Ākāsha is the Highest Lord only. How? Having mentioned it as the relevant thing by the passage "In it there is the small Ākāsha", and having mentioned how everything is contained in it, by comparing it with the element Ākāsha, and using the word 'Self' in connection with the very same (small Ākāsha), and having also given instruction that it (the small Ākāsha) possesses the quality of being free from sin, the Scriptures indicate the self-same 'small Ākāsha' about which the topic of the chapter is still unfinished, (the Scriptures say), thus:—"This Self (so described before) is the bund or causeway, i.e., the support of the worlds, so that they may not be destroyed by promiscuity" (Chhān. 8.4.1). Here, the word 'support' being used with the same case-ending as the word 'Self', means 'the one who supports', for as the Smṛiti (of Pāṇini) shows, the suffix 'Ktich' indicates the agent or Kartā. Just as in ordinary life, a contour bund, which stems the flow of water so that the wealth of a field may not be destroyed, is called a 'Setu', even so, is this 'Self' called the supporter of the worlds which are distinguished from each other by their Ādhyātmika and other differences of all the castes and Āshramās, so that they may not be destroyed by promiscuity. Similarly, here, the Scriptures have indicated this greatness which has the characteristic of being a support, as belonging to the small Ākāsha which is the present relevant topic. Now this greatness is of the Highest Lord only, as understood from another Scriptural passage, thus:—"It is at the behest of this 'Imperishable', Oh Gārgi, that the Sun and the Moon stand regulated", etc.. Similarly, in another passage which indisputably refers to the Highest Lord, the Scriptures mention, thus:—"He is the Lord of all, the King of all created beings, their protector, and (he is)

the bund or support of the worlds so that they may not be destroyed by promiscuity." Therefore, by reason of this 'supporting', this small Ākāsha is the Highest Lord only.

*And also because (the meaning) is well-known.—17.*

That "In it there is the small Ākāsha" means the Highest Lord only, is because of this also, viz., that the use of the word Ākāsha to indicate the Highest Lord, is well-known. We see such use of the word in—"Verily it is the Ākāsha that makes names and forms manifest" (Chhān. 8.1.4) and "All these beings come into being, only out of the Ākāsha" (Chhān. 1.9.1). On the other hand, we never see the word Ākāsha used to indicate the Jīva-Self. As regards the element Ākāsha—even though the word Ākāsha is well-known as being used for it—that it (i.e., the element Ākāsha) should not be understood to be indicated (by the small Ākāsha) by reason of the impossibility of making out one and the same thing to be both the standard of comparison (Upamāna) as well as the subject compared (Upameya), has already been mentioned.—17.

*If it be said that because there is a reference to the other (i.e., the Jīva-Self), he is meant (by small Ākāsha) (we reply)—no, because of the impossibility.—18.*

(Says the opponent—) Even if on the strength of the complementary passage we understand that (by small Ākāsha) the Highest Lord is meant, still there is also a reference to the other, i.e., the Jīva-Self, in the complementary passage, thus—"This Jīva-Self in the serene condition of deep sleep, after having arisen out of this body and attained the condition of the Highest Light, becomes manifest in its own form, this is the Self. Thus spake He." (Chhān. 8.3.4). With regard to this, the word 'Samprasāda', which in another Scriptural passage is seen to be used as meaning the condition of deep sleep, can only establish that it means such Jīva-Self in that condition and none else. Again this arising out of the body can be possible in the case of only that Jīva-Self which has taken its resort in

a body, just as the arising out of the Ākāsha can only be of the Vāyu, etc., which have their resort in the Ākāsha. Just as the word Ākāsha, which, in ordinary life, is not seen to refer to the Highest Lord, is still understood to refer to the Highest Lord (in the Scriptural passage) "The Ākāsha verily makes the names and forms manifest" because the attributes of the Highest Lord are mentioned together (with the attributes of the Ākāsha), even so can it be understood to refer to the Jīva-Self also. Therefore, if it be said (by the opponent) that because there is a reference to another (i.e., the Jīva-Self), it is the Jīva-Self that is spoken of in the passage "In it there is a small Ākāsha", we reply—This could not be so. How? Because of the impossibility. The Jīva-Self, while it fondly imagines itself to have a finite determination by reason of the adjuncts such as intelligence, etc., cannot be compared with the Ākāsha. Nor can the attributes of being free from sin, etc., be possible in the case of one who fondly identifies himself with the attributes of his limiting adjuncts. This has already been discussed in detail in the first Sūtra (of the Adhikaraṇa, i.e., Sūtra I.iii.14), but has been mentioned here again, to remove a further doubt (which is referred to in the next Sūtra). The Sūtrakāra will lay down hereafter the Sūtra—"The reference (to the Jīva-Self) is for another purpose (Brah. Sū. I.iii.20).—18.

*If it be said that the Jīva-Self is meant because of the subsequent sentence (we reply) but it is of course so, in as much as it (the Jīva-Self) has become manifest in its own nature.—19.*

The doubt that arose because of the reference to the other (i.e., the Jīva-Self) was cleared on the ground of impossibility. Now, like the resuscitation of the dead by the sprinkling of an elixir, the same doubt, about the Jīva-Self being meant here, is again revived, because of the following sentence of Prajāpati, wherein, after declaring that it is the Highest Self whose attribute is to be free from sin that should be sought for and desired to be known, Prajāpati, by saying "This person that is seen in the eye, is the Self" (Chhān. 8.7.4), indicates that the Jīva-Self which

is the seer in the eye, is the Self. Then by referring to the same again and again, by the sentence "I shall further explain the very same one to you again", he speaks about the very same Jīva-Self as the one who has acquired another condition (i.e., of the Highest Self) by the passages—"He who while in a dream moves about prosperous and happy, is the Self" (Chhān. 8.10.1) and "There, where this one who is asleep and is completely serene and does not experience any dream, is the Self". He (Prajāpati) also indicates how he (the Jīva-Self) is free from all sin by the passage—"This is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahma". Again, Prajāpati, after having discovered a defect in this condition of sleep, by the passage "Alas, now in this condition he verily does not himself know, that he is himself, nor does he know these beings" (Chhān. 8.11.1, 2), and by again saying "I shall again explain to you the very same one and none other", and thereafter, by first animadverting its connection with a body, demonstrates the same Jīva-Self as the Highest Purusha that has risen from a body, by the passage "This serene Purusha who having risen from the body, and having attained the condition of the 'Highest Light', becomes manifest in his own real nature, this is the Highest Purusha". Therefore there is a possibility of the Jīva-Self possessing the attributes of the Highest Lord. Hence, if one were to say, that by 'In it there is a small Ākāśha' the Scriptures speak of the Jīva-Self only, you should reply, thus :—(The Jīva-Self is so), however, when it has become manifest in its own nature. The word 'But' (in the Sūtra) has the sense of refuting the view of the opponent. The meaning is, that a doubt about the Jīva-Self being meant is not possible, even because of the sentence which follows. Whence is it so ? Because there also, it is desired to speak about that Jīva-Self which has become manifest in its own true nature. (Āvirbhūtasvarūpah is one whose nature has become manifest—a Bahuvrīhi compound.) That the word Jīva-Self is used for it (even when it has become manifest in its own true nature) is in view of the conventional use of that term (for it), as it was there (before it became so manifest). That amounts to saying "Having indicated the 'Seer' that is seen in the eye", by the sentence "This, that (is seen) in the eye", and having refuted the view of its possessing corporeality, by the 'Brāhmaṇa (passage) about

the water trough' (Udasharāva-Brāhmaṇa), and having again and again brought him forward, as being the subject for explanation by the words "This very same (I shall explain in detail to you)", and by way of making allusion to the conditions of dreams and sleep, (Prajāpati), by the sentence "having attained the highest light, becomes manifest in its own true nature", speaks of that very same Jīva-Self as the Highest Brahma, which is the Jīva-Self's true nature, and not with a view to speak of the Jīva-Self as in fact having the nature (Svarūpa) of the Jīva-Self. What the Scriptures say about the Highest Light that is to be attained, is only the Highest Brahma. That (as we know) has the attribute of being free from sin, and that in reality is the true nature of the Jīva-Self, according to the Shāstra "That thou art", etc., and not that other nature, which is imagined through limiting adjuncts (Nescience). The Jīva-Self's Jīva-selfhood lasts, only as long as it does not get rid of its ignorance, i.e., Nescience which has the characteristic of duality, similar to a man's mistaken belief that a post is a man, and as long as it does not realize its own self as Brahma, which has the nature of being eternally immoveable and ever-seeing (Drik-svarūpa').\* When however, the Scriptures, by rousing him (i.e. Jīva-Self) from (his wrong notion of) being an aggregate of body, sense-organs, mind, and intelligence, makes him realize thus:—You are not an aggregate of body, sense-organs, mind and intelligence, you are not the one that is really subject to transmigratory existence, but that you are that, which is the Truth, that 'Self' which has the nature of pure intelligence only,—then, the Jīva-Self, having realized himself to be of the nature of being eternally immoveable and everseeing, and having risen above identifying himself with the body etc., himself becomes the Self which is eternally immoveable and everseeing, as expressed by the Scriptural passage—"He who knows this Highest Brahma, himself becomes Brahma" (Mund 3.2.9). That alone is his nature in the truest sense, wherein he manifests himself in his own nature, after rousing himself from the body. But here, the opponent intervenes. How ever can it be possible in the case of that entity which is eternally immoveable, that

\* Abhyankar Shāstri translates Drik-svarūpa as 'Chaitanya-svarūpa'.



that very entity manifests itself in its own true nature ? May be, that in the case of such things as gold etc., whose nature has become obliterated by their contact with other things, and whose peculiar speciality has thus become unobservable, and who are being purified by means of salts, acids etc., it is possible, that such things may thus manifest themselves in their own nature. Similarly, it may be that the stars etc. whose light is obscured during the day, do reappear in their proper form, when during the night, they are separated from the daylight which obscures them. But a similar obliteration of that, which is eternal and whose light of intelligence is inherent in itself, by anything, is not possible, because like the Ākāsha (Vyoma) it is never in real contact with anything, and also because it is contrary to (our) experience. This seeing, hearing, understanding and cognizing constitute the nature (Rūpa) of the Jīva-Self. This (nature) is seen to be always manifest even when the Jīva-Self has not arisen from the body. It is by seeing, hearing, understanding and cognizing that all Jīva-Selfs carry on worldly transactions, for otherwise, worldly transactions would not be reasonably sustainable. If that were to be possible in its case only after it has roused itself from the body, then worldly transactions which are observable before its rousing itself from the body would be contradicted. Hence, of what nature is this rousing itself from the body, and of what nature is this becoming manifest in its own true nature ? To this we reply—Prior to the generation of understanding by means of proper discrimination, the Jīva-Self's cognitional faculty of the nature of light (Jyotiṣṣvarūpa) by way of seeing etc. (Drishtyādi), is, as it were, undistinguishable from such limiting adjuncts as the body, sense-organs, mind, intelligence, objects of sense-organs and feelings. Just as the nature of a pure crystal, viz. its purity and whiteness, is undistinguishable as it were, on account of such limiting adjuncts as redness and blueness, prior to its being understood with proper discrimination, but after it is so understood with proper discrimination resulting from Pramāṇa i.e. means-of-proof, the crystal, so understood afterwards, is said to appear in its own nature of purity and whiteness, even though it **was** the same crystal even before, similarly, the discriminating cognition by the Jīva-Self produced in it by the Scriptures,

undiscriminated as it is on account of the limiting adjuncts of the body etc., is just 'this rising from the body', and the fruit of such proper discrimination is in its becoming manifest in its own nature, and in its realization of its nature as the pure (Kevala) Self. Moreover, it is as a result of this want of discrimination or proper discrimination respectively that the Self (Ātmā) is considered to be either embodied or unembodied, as described by the Mantra words—"Unembodied amongst the bodies" (Kāṭha. 1.2.22), and also by the Smṛiti thus—"Though dwelling in the body, Oh Kaunteya, it neither acts nor is it contaminated" (Bh. G. 13.32), which speak about the absence of any special distinction between the embodied and unembodied conditions. It is because of this, therefore, that it is said, that the Self, which is not manifest by reason of the want of discrimination, becomes manifest in its own nature as a result of understanding by proper discrimination. There could not in fact possibly be any such, both equally true, manifest and unmanifest conditions, of the real nature of a thing, as it has its own real nature (right enough all along). It is only in this manner, therefore, that the so-called distinction between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Lord is caused by false-ignorance or Nescience, and it is never inherent in the thing itself, because, this absence of any real contact with anything, is common between it (the Self) and the Ākāśha. Oh, but how is one to understand it to be like this? (You ought to understand it to be so) because after first giving instruction about "This Puruṣha that is in the eye", Prajāpati proceeds to impart the further instruction—"This is the immortal, and the fearless, it is Brahma". Were the well-known seer in the eye, who is understood by way of his attribute of being the seer, to be different from Brahma which has the attribute of being the immortal and fearless, then there could not be the same case-ending for both the seer and the immortal and fearless Brahma. Nor can Prajāpati be understood to indicate this reflected Self in the eye (as the indicatory mark of Brahma), because that would expose him to the predicament of being one who speaks to a falsehood. Similarly in the second chapter also, in the passage "This one who moves about with great glory during dreams" (Chhān. 8.10.1), no one, other than the one that is indicated in the first chapter as the Puruṣha

in the eye and the seer, is indicated, because the introductory part says, "I shall explain the very same in greater detail, to you again" (Chhān. 8.9.3). Besides a person who has waked up (from a dream) says—Today I saw an elephant in a dream, but I do not see any elephant now (when I am awake), and thus rejects what he has seen (in the dream), but he knows that the seer during both these conditions is the same, viz., I who saw a dream am the same that am now seeing (in this wakeful condition). So also in the third chapter, Prajāpati merely indicates that there is absence of any special cognition during sleep, by the passage "He verily does not know himself as himself, nor these beings" (Chhān. 8.12.1), but he does not deny the existence of (himself) as the cognizer. Now what is said there, viz., "He has gone into utter annihilation" (Chhān. 8.12.2) is also meant to convey the annihilation of the special cognition only, and not meant to convey the utter annihilation of the cognizer, because of another Scriptural passage as follows :—"There is no annihilation of the cognition of the cognizer, precisely because of the indestructibility (of cognition)" (Brih. 4.3.30). Similarly in the fourth chapter, starting with "I shall explain the same to you again in detail and none other" (Chhān. 8.11.3), and then by explaining further in detail by the passage "Oh Maghavan, verily this body is mortal" (Chhān. 8.12.1) and by rejecting the possibility of any relation (of the Highest Self) with such limiting adjuncts as the body etc., and showing the Jīva-Self, indicated by the words 'the serene one', as having attained the nature of Brahma by the words, "Becomes manifest in his own true nature" (Chhān. 8.12.3), Prajāpati shows how the Jīva-Self is not different from the Highest Brahma which has the nature of being immortal and fearless. Some others, who consider the bringing forward of the Jīva-Self by the words "This same (I will explain in detail) to you" as not logical, when the intention is to speak of the Highest Self, consider, that the same (Highest) Self, which has been suggested in the opening sentence and which has the attributes of being free from sin etc., is the one that is sought to be further explained in detail. In their view of the case, the mention by the Scriptures of the pronoun 'this' (Etam) which governs what is proximate to it, would be contradictory (i.e. it would govern some-

thing which is not proximate) and would also go against the mention of the word 'again', because in that case that which is spoken of in the previous chapter, will not have been spoken of in the next chapter. It would also mean that Prajāpati after promising "The very same (I would explain to you again)", would be, in effect, speaking of a different thing in all the chapters before the fourth chapter, and would thus bring upon himself the charge of being a prevericator.

Therefore, (it must be understood) that the unreal nature of the Jiva-Self brought about by Nescience, which is rendered impure by the faults of desires and aversions of the Agent and experiencer, and which is connected with many evils, is thus dissolved by true knowledge, and shown to be of the opposite nature i.e. of the nature of the Highest Lord, which has the attribute of being free from sin etc., just as a rope etc. is understood to be really a rope, after the false notion of its being a snake etc. is dissolved.

Some others again, including some from amongst us, consider that the nature of the Jiva-Self is in fact real. It is with the intention of making these people, who have ranged themselves as the opponents of the view of the unity of the Self and correct knowledge, that this Shārīraka is begun (by the Āchārya), (the correct view being) that there is but one and only one, the Highest Lord, who is eternally immoveable and has the essence of knowledge as his structure, who under the influence of ignorance i.e. illusion (Māyā) is, as by an illusionist, made to appear in different ways, and that there is nothing else which has this essence of knowledge as its structure. Now, the fact, that the Sūtrakāra, in the passage dealing with the Highest Lord, first raises the doubt, that it indicates the Jiva-Self, and then rejects it by the Sūtra, "No, because of the impossibility" (Bra. Sū. 1.3.18), can be said to purport to mean as follows:—Just as it is imagined, that the Ākāsha has concavity and that it is dusty, similarly it is imagined, that the Highest Self, which has as its nature, eternal purity, knowledge, and freedom (from worldly existence) and which is eternally immoveable and uncontaminated, is of the opposite nature, viz. that of the Jiva-Self. And it is with a view to remove that misconception, by passages which establish the unity of Self, and which conform to reasoning

and which reject the opinion of duality, that the Sūtrakāra emphasizes the distinction as between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Lord. The Sūtrakāra does not desire to assert that the Jīva-Self is different from the Highest Lord, but only refers to the popular notion about the Jīva-Self as imagined through Nescience. It is understood (by us), that it is only in this way, that any opposition to the injunctions to action which proceed with reference to the natural Kartritva and Bhoktritva of the Jīva-Self, is avoided. That the unity of the Self is the meaning of the Shāstra, and is what is to be expounded, is indicated (by the Sūtrakāra) by the Sūtra "The instruction (by Indra to Pratardana) is in conformity with the view of the Shāstra, as was in the case of Vāmadeva" (Bra. Sū. I.i.30) etc.. We have already refuted the objection, that our view goes against (the Shāstra of the) injunctions to actions, by means of the distinction between those who have knowledge (of Brahma) and those who have not.—19.

*The reference (to the Jīva-Self) is for the sake of the other (i.e. the Highest Self).—20.*

(With regard to the opponent's objection) that the reference to the Jīva-Self indicated in the passage complementary to the sentence about the small (Ākāsha), thus—"This serene being" (Chhān. 8.3.4) etc.—would be rendered useless if the instruction were to be neither about devout meditation on the Jīva-Self, nor about the particular special thing relevant here (viz. the small Ākāsha), and if we were to explain the small (Ākāsha) to mean the Highest Lord, we reply—This reference is for the sake of the other (viz. the Highest Self) i.e. it is not meant to culminate in showing that the Jīva-Self is meant. To what does it then refer? It is meant to culminate in showing that the Highest Lord is meant. How so? (It is to show that) the Jīva-Self indicated by the word 'the serene being', becoming first, the presiding authority over the cage of the body and sense-organs during the wakeful condition, and next, becoming one as moving in the Nādis and experiencing dreams caused by the desires (of the wakeful condition), and (then) being exhausted and desirous of obtaining some sanctuary, and rising above the false pride i.e. vanity of identifying itself

with both the kinds of (the gross and subtle) bodies, and attaining, during deep sleep, the Highest Light i.e. the Highest Brahma which here is expressed by the word Ākāsha, and also in that condition giving up its ability for special cognition (in its capacity as the Jiva-Self as affected by limiting adjuncts), becomes manifest in its own true nature. This Highest Light which it attains, and its own nature in which it so manifests itself, means this 'Self' which has the attribute of being free from sin, and which is the object of devout meditation. And it is, for this purpose, that this reference to the Jiva-Self can be reasonably sustainable in the case of those who hold that by the 'small' (Ākāsha) the Highest Lord is meant.—20.

*If it be objected that the Scriptures mention (the smallness of the Ākāsha), it has already been answered.—21.*

(Now, what the opponents have said)—viz. that the smallness of the Ākāsha, about which the Scriptures speak in the passage "In it there is the small Ākāsha", is not reasonably sustainable in the case of the Highest Lord, but such smallness is possible in the case of the Jiva-Self which is compared with the point of a goad—has to be refuted. In the Sūtra (Bra. Sū. I.ii.7), it has already been refuted by saying that the smallness of the Highest Self is reasonably sustainable in relation to the contemplation of Brahma, as having a tiny nest. This Sūtra suggests, that the same refutation should be followed here. The Scriptures themselves have refuted this relative smallness, by comparing it with the well-known element, Ākāsha, thus—"The measure of the Ākāsha in the 'Hridaya' is the same as the measure of the element, Ākāsha."—21.

#### 6. ANUKRITYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 22-23.

*It is because of the shining in the wake of, and also because of, the word 'His' (meaning the Highest Self, that everything is made manifest).—22.*

The Scriptures mention—"In its presence (Tatra =

Tasmin Svātmabhūte Brahmani) the Sun does not shine, nor the moon and the stars, nor lightning, and much less, fire. All this shines in the wake of its shining. By its (borrowed) lustre all this shines" (Muṇḍ. 2.2.10). Now, the doubt is as to whether, that, in whose wake all this shines, and by whose lustre all this becomes manifest, is some lustrous matter (Tejodhātuh), or it is the Highest Self. The conclusion (of the opponent) is, that it is some lustrous matter such as the Sun etc.. That the moon and the stars who have the nature of lustre, do not manifest themselves, when the Sun, whose nature also is lustre, shines during the day-time, is well-known. So, we think that, that something in whose presence (i.e. when it is shining) the moon and the stars along with the Sun do not shine, must also be something having the nature of lustre. This shining in the wake (of something) is reasonably sustainable in the case of things which have lustre as their nature, because we see that things which have similar nature imitate each other. For instance, it is only when there is already a man that is walking, that another is said to follow him. Therefore (what is meant in the above passage) must be something which possesses lustre. This being the conclusion (of the opponent), we reply—It is only the Highest Self that deserves to be what is meant. Why so? Because of the imitation (i.e. shining in the wake of). The word 'Anukriti' means doing likewise. It is only if we understand the Highest Self as meant by "All this shines in the wake of that which shines" that it becomes reasonably sustainable, because the Highest Self is mentioned as being "one whose nature is lustre", and as "one whose desires are true" (Chhān. 3.14.2). To be lustrous is common to such things as the Sun etc., and they do not require anything of a similar nature, in whose wake they must needs shine. One lamp does not shine in the wake of another (i.e. one lamp does not help the other to shine). The objection stated—viz. that we see imitation (such as shining in the wake of) in things which have a similar nature—(can be answered by saying) that there is no such invariable rule, because, we find that there is such imitation even when the two things are dissimilar. For instance, a red-hot iron ball, imitating fire, burns like fire, or a blowing wind sucks dust in its wake. This imitation is meant to suggest 'becoming mani-

fest after'. The words 'Tasya cha' (in the Sūtra) suggest the fourth quarter of the Shloka. The shining of the Sun etc. which the Scriptures mention as caused by it (in the fourth quarter of the Shloka) makes us understand that the Highest Self is meant. The Scriptures speak of the Highest Self as follows:—"The Gods meditate devoutly on it as the Light of Lights, as immortal life" (Brih. 4.4.16). It is not known and it is contrary (to experience) to say that the Sun etc. shine by the help of any other body of light, because one light neutralizes another. Besides, the shining in the wake of that as its cause mentioned in the Shloka is not of the Sun etc. only, because the Scriptures which mention 'All this' without any exception, show, that the manifestation of names and forms and actions, agents and fruits is due to the existence of the light of Brahma, just as the manifestation of all forms etc. is due to the existence of the light of the Sun. The word 'Tatra' used in the passage "In its presence (Tatra) the Sun does not shine" shows that we should understand it to mean that which is relevant here, and that of course is Brahma, as mentioned by the Scriptures in "In which the Heaven and the Earth and the sky are woven as warp" (Mund. 2.2.5). Subsequently also it is said—"It is known by those who have realized it (i.e. Brahma), that in the transcendent aureate chrysalis (Kosha), there is Brahma which is free from external contamination and which is without parts (Nishkala), which is intrinsically pure and which is the Light of Lights". The objection as to how it becomes the Light of Lights is answered by—"In its presence the Sun does not shine". With regard to the objection, that just as other things (such as the moon and the stars) do not shine when the Sun is shining, the Sun also would not shine when there is another such light shining, it has been explained that such light can be nothing else than Brahma, in whose presence alone it is possible that it cannot shine. Whatever becomes manifest becomes so manifest because of the lustre called Brahma, and Brahma is not made manifest by any other light, because it has the nature of being self-luminant, and the Sun etc. cannot make Brahma manifest. So say the Scriptural passages—"Brahma alone makes other things manifest. He sits in the light of his own Highest Self" (Brih. 4.3.6), and "It is unperceivable and is not perceived" (Brih. 4.2.4).—22.



*Besides, the Smritis also say so.—23.*

Moreover, that it is the Highest Self only that is of this form, is spoken of in the Smritis as follows :—“The Sun cannot make it manifest, nor the Moon, nor Fire. My highest abode is there from where a man does not return to this transmigratory existence” (Bh. G. 15.6) ; “You should know that the light in the Sun, which makes the whole world manifest and which also is in the Moon and the Fire, is the Teja inherent in me” (Bh. G. 15.2).—23.

#### 7. PRAMITĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 24-25.

*It is precisely because of the Scriptural word (that the Purusha that is said to be of the dimension of a thumb) is understood (to be the Highest Self).—24.*

The Scriptures mention—“A Purusha having the dimension of a thumb is standing inside the body (Ātmani)” (Kaṭha. 2.1.12); also—“A Purusha having the dimension of a thumb only, who is a smokeless Light as it were, and a ruler of the past and the future, He that is today and will be tomorrow (i.e. who is eternal), *this is that* (Brahma)” (Kaṭha. 2.1.13). Now with regard to this the doubt is—Is the Purusha of the dimension of a thumb, spoken of by the Scriptures, the cognitional Jīva-Self or the Highest Self? (The opponent says) in so far as there is instruction about a dimension, the conclusion is that it is the cognitional Jīva-Self. That the dimension of a thumb can ever be the dimension of the Highest Self which is limitless in extent, is not reasonably possible, while it is possible by some stretch of imagination to conceive of the dimension of a thumb in the case of the cognitional Jīva-Self, by reason of its being affected by limiting adjuncts. Smṛiti also says—“Yama extracted by force from the body of Satyavān, the Purusha of the dimension of a thumb, which was caught in his net and which was completely at his mercy” (Mahā-Bhā. 3.297.17). It is not possible that Yama could extract the Highest Lord by force, therefore, it was there concluded that it was the transmigratory Jīva-Self of the dimension of a thumb (that was extracted by Yama),

and the same is meant here also. This conclusion (of the opponent), we answer thus—It is only the Highest Lord that deserves to be the Purusha having the dimension of a thumb. How so? Because of the Scriptural words—“The Ruler of the past and the future”. No one other than the Highest Lord can be the absolutely autocratic ruler. That relevant thing (Brahma), about which a question has been asked (in the foregoing portion), is here referred to by the expression ‘This is That’. The sense is, that what is questioned about (in the foregoing portion), viz. Brahma, ‘That verily is this’. Here the question is about Brahma, thus—“That which is different (Anyatra) from the mere following of the Shāstra (i.e. Dharma) and from the effect and the cause, and is also different (Anyatra) from the following of that which is against the Shāstra (i.e. Adharma), and is also different (Anyatra) from the past and the future (including the present)”, “Tell me about that, which you know” (Kaṭha. 1.2.14). It is understood, that because of the Scriptures and because of the Scriptural mention of the name, viz. the ‘ruler’ (Īshānah), that the Highest Lord is meant.—24.

But (says the opponent) how, in the case of the all-pervading Highest Self, is this instruction about its having a measurement, (possible)? To this we reply—

*Because a man alone is competent (to engage) in the pursuit of the realization of Brahma) and by reason of the expectation of (Brahma's being realized) in (a man's) Hridaya (that it is said to have the dimension of a thumb).—25.*

This mention of the dimension of a thumb is, by reason of the expectation of the Highest Self abiding in the Hridaya (of a man), even though it is all-pervading, even as the Ākāsha is said to be of the dimension of a cubit (‘Aratni’—a measure of length from elbow to end of middle finger), with reference to the segment of a bamboo, because, that the Highest Self which is beyond any measure can be of the dimension of a thumb, cannot be otherwise reasonably sustainable. Besides it has already been said,

that no one other than the Highest Self deserves to be understood here, because of the word 'ruler' (Ishānah) etc.. But (says the opponent), as the dimension of a Hridaya varies with the dimension of every person, it would not be reasonably sustainable to say that the Highest Self has the dimension of a thumb, even though its dimension of a thumb is with reference to its having its abode in the Hridaya. To this we reply—"Because of the competency of a man alone" (for engaging himself in the pursuit of Brahma). Though the Shāstra has emanated in a general way (for all beings), it considers man alone as competent (to act, according to the Shāstra) because of his presentability, his desire, his not being forbidden, and the fact of his being initiated by the ceremony of a sacred thread etc., as described in the Adhikāra-Lakṣhaṇa (the chapter on competency in Jaimini Pū. Mī. 6.1). The body of a man has a definite proportion, and his Hridaya also is, in proportion to it, of the dimension of his thumb. Therefore it is reasonably sustainable, that as the Shāstra holds a man alone as competent (to follow it), and that the dimension of a thumb, as ascribed to the Highest Self, is with reference to his abiding in the Hridaya of a man. Again, with regard to what is said—viz. that because the instruction (of the Shāstra) is about a particular dimension, and because of the Smṛiti also, it is the transmigratory Self only that should be understood by "One having the dimension of a thumb"—, it is said, in refutation of it, that like the statements "This is the Self", "That thou art", this instruction given here, about the one that is of the measurement of a thumb—despite its being a transmigratory Jīva-Self—, is, because the Jīva-Self itself is Brahma. Vedānta passages have a two-fold significance or trend, viz., some are in the nature of an exposition of the form (Rūpa) of the Highest Self, and some are in the nature of an instruction, emphasizing the unity of the cognitional Jīva-Self and the Highest Self. Thus here, instruction about the unity of the cognitional Jīva-Self and the Highest Self is given, and not that any particular entity has the dimension of a thumb. This same thing will be further made clearer by the Sūtrakāra by the passage "This Puruṣa of the dimension of a thumb, the inner self, is always firmly settled in the Hridaya of men. A man should pick him out with determination, from

his own body, just as one draws out the inner tube from the outer tube of the Munja grass, etc.. Know that, to be the purely bright one and the immortal." (Ka. 2.6.17).—25.

8. DEVATĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 26-33.

*Bādarāyaṇa is of opinion that Gods (that is those who are above a man) also, are competent, because of possibility.—26.*

It has been said, that as, according to the Shāstra, man is competent (to pursue the quest of Brahma), the Scriptural statement about the 'dimension of a thumb' is with reference to the Hridaya of a man. In connection with that it is said—Oh well, the Shāstra does consider man as competent, but there is no rule, in the matter of this knowledge of Brahma, that it considers man *only* as competent. The Āchārya Bādarāyaṇa is of opinion, that the Shāstra also confers competency on Gods etc. who are above men. How so? Because of the possibility. In their case also, the reasons which confer competency such as 'desire' etc., are possible. The desire for 'Final Release' is possible in the case of God etc., because of such desire being the result of reflection on the transitoriness of the exalted rank of Gods etc., who are but modifications (Vikārās) only. Similarly, 'ability' also is possible in their case, because, as according to Mantrās, Arthavādās, History, Mythology and the ways of the world i.e. general custom, the Gods are understood to possess corporeality, there is no bar of any sort operating against them. Nor can the Shāstra about Upanayana (investiture with a sacred thread) defeat their competency, because Upanayana is necessary for the purpose of the study of the Vedās, while the Vedās manifest themselves to them, i.e., flash in their minds, spontaneously. Besides, in their case the Scriptures indicate that the Gods observe the vow of celibacy (Brahmacharya) for the attainment of 'knowledge', thus:—"Indra stayed with Prajāpati for a hundred years observing the vow of celibacy" (Chhān. 8.11.3) and "Bhrigu the son of Varuṇa approached his father, (and said) Oh Bhagawan, teach me what Brahma is" (Tait. 3.1) etc.. With regard to what is stated as a reason for the absence of such competency in them for Karma—

viz. "That Gods cannot perform Karma (such as a sacrifice etc.) because of the absence of any other deity (similar to themselves)" and "that Rishis also, cannot perform Karma, because of the absence of other Rishis" (Jaimini Pū. Mī. 6.1.5.6.7)—(we say) that it i.e. such reason is not applicable in the case of the knowledge of Brahma. Indra and others when they are vouchsafed competency (for obtaining instruction) for knowledge, do not have to do any act having reference to their own selves (as is necessary in Karma), nor have (the Rishis) Bhrigu and others anything to do, in their capacity of belonging to the same Bhrigu Gotra (Clan). Therefore who can deny competency for the knowledge of Brahma in the case of Gods and others? In the case of Gods etc., who have such competency the Scriptural statement about the 'dimension of a thumb' being in this case with reference to their own particular thumb, is not contradicted.—26.

*If it be said that (corporeality in Gods) would be incompatible with Karma, (we say) no, because according to the Scriptures (the Gods) can assume more than one form (Rūpa).—27.*

If it be said, supposing it is understood that Gods are competent to acquire knowledge of Vidyās, because they have corporeality, then it may be like this, i.e., Indra and others having such corporeality, they may—like the Ritviṇḍa priests at a sacrifice—form a subsidiary part of Karma, by their actual presence in their own physical form (at a sacrifice), but in that case it would be incompatible with Karma (religious duties such as a sacrifice). It is neither seen that Indra and others constitute a subsidiary part of a sacrifice by their actual presence in their own physical form, nor is it so possible, because it is not reasonably sustainable, that Indra could be actually present in his own physical form at more than one sacrifice at one and the same time. If that is the conclusion (of the opponent) we reply—There is not this incompatibility. Whence is it so? Because of the reasonable sustainability of the assumption of more than one body (on the part of the Gods), for it is possible that a deity by itself can assume more than one body

simultaneously. How do we know it to be so? Because of the authority (Prāmānya) of the Scriptures. For the Scriptures, by starting with the posing of a question (by Vidagdhashākalya to Yājñavalkya)—viz. How many Gods are there?—declare that they are three and three hundred, and, three and three thousand, and when a further question is asked as to who they are, again declare, that, it is only their glory, i.e., they are only the exalted prototypes (Vibhūti), but that they are in fact only thirty-three, and thus show, how the single Self of a deity can simultaneously assume more than one form. Similarly, the Scriptures, by saying that the thirty-three are really contained in six (and then successively in five, four, three, two and one), and again on being asked as to who the only one (God) is, by replying, “Prāṇa, and that the Prāṇa is the only one form (Rūpa) of all the deities”, show that one Prāṇa can assume more than one form simultaneously. So is there a similar Smṛiti thus—“O Bharatarshabha (the bull, i.e. the best, amongst the Bhāratas), a Yogi can provide himself with many bodies by acquiring powers (Bala) and move in them all over the Earth. By means of some bodies he can obtain all sense-objects (i.e. worldly pleasures) and by means of some others he may do penance, and can again withdraw them all, just as the Sun withdraws its set of rays”—which shows that Yogins who have acquired great powers such as that of ‘assuming a subtle body’ (Āṇimā) etc. can have more than one body simultaneously. That being so, how much more possible, then, must it be in the case of the Gods who are born with such great powers? And it may be, that because of the possibility of the assumption of more than one form, a Deity might well divide itself into many forms and may be present at many sacrifices simultaneously, and thus can constitute itself into a subsidiary part of each. It is reasonably sustainable that by reason of having the power of rendering themselves invisible, others are not able to see them. The following is another way of explaining this (observation about the) assumption of more than one form (Rūpa). Even in the case of those who possess bodies, it is seen that there are more ways than one, by which such persons can become a subsidiary part of action (Karmāṅga). In some cases one individual is not able to form a subsidiary part in more

than one place simultaneously, as for instance, one man cannot be simultaneously entertained to dinner by many persons wishing to do so. In some cases it is seen that even one person can play a subsidiary part in more than one function simultaneously, as for instance when one person is saluted by many at one and the same time he can return the salute of all simultaneously. Similarly here also, a sacrifice being of the nature of having an aim of sacrificing to some deity and of offering of an oblation (in fire), many persons may simultaneously offer their own individual offering to one and the same Deity possessing a body. Hence corporeality of Deities would not be incompatible in religious action (Karma).—27.

*If it be said that there would be contradiction in the case of the Scriptural word, (we reply)—No, because (the world) is born of the Scriptural word, on the authority of the Scriptures (Shabda) and the Smritis (Anumāna).—28.*

May be, that there may not be any contradiction in the case of religious action (Karma) even if it is understood that Gods etc. have corporeality, but such contradiction would certainly result in the case of the Scriptural word. How so? Because by holding that there is a natural i.e. inborn eternal relation between the Scriptural word and its meaning, the authoritativeness of the Vedās has already been established by the Sūtra “Because of its independence (Anapekshatvāt) of other means of proof” etc. (Pū. Mī. 1.1.5). Now, however, even if it is argued here, that a deity understood to possess corporeality, may, because of its possessing great powers, be able simultaneously to enjoy oblations in connection with different religious acts such as Sacrifices (Karmās), still, by reason of its very corporeality itself, it would (like us) be subject to birth and death, and there would thus be a contradiction of the authoritativeness of the Vedic words, which stands established by the realization that the eternal word has an eternal connection with its eternal meaning, we reply, that no such contradiction would result. Whence is it so? Because (the world i.e. everything) is created out of this (i.e. the word). It is

out of this Scriptural word, indeed, that this world i.e. everything including the Gods etc. is created. (To this, if the opponent says)—Oh, but in Brahma-Sūtra I. i. 2 (Janmādyasya Yatah) creation of this transitory world (Jagat) from Brahma has already been established. How can you then speak here, about its creation from the 'word' (Shabda) ? Besides, even if it is understood that this (transitory world) is created from the 'Vedic word', how can that, by itself, be able to overcome the objection about contradiction in the case of the Scriptural words, when, entities such as the 'Vasus', the 'Rudrās', the 'Adityās', the 'Vishvedevās', and the 'Maruts', must necessarily be non-eternal, because of the fact of their being created (from the Scriptural words) ? And if these entities are non-eternal (because of the fact of their being created), how can the non-eternality of Scriptural words such as 'Vasus' etc. which denote these entities, be possible to be overcome i.e. refuted ? (Because the generic Scriptural word 'Vasu' must have come into existence, after the individual Vasus came into existence.) It is well-known in ordinary life, that it is when Devadatta has actually a son born to him, that a name, say Yajnadatta, is given to him (the son). Therefore there would necessarily be a contradiction in the case of the Scriptural word. Now, to this conclusion (of the opponent) we reply—No, because it is observed that there is an eternal relation between generic words such as 'Cow' and the object denoted by it viz. an actual individual cow. It cannot necessarily be, that because individual cows are subject to birth, their 'Ākritis' i.e. their forms (Gk. *Eidos*) also must necessarily be subject to birth. It is only individuals (of Ākritis i.e. forms) that are born out of materials, attributes and actions (Dravya-Guṇa-Karmanām) and not their Ākritis or forms, and the relation of words is with the Ākritis and not with their individual entities, because such individual entities being infinite, to conceive of a relation between words and them would not be reasonably sustainable. Therefore even if individual entities may be subject to birth, the Ākritis i.e. forms being eternal, there is no contradiction in the case of words such as 'Cow' etc.. Similarly, it would be seen, that even if it be understood that individual Gods etc. are subject to birth, there is no contradiction so far as the words 'Vasu' etc. are concerned, as



their Ākritis or forms are eternal. That Gods etc. have a particular Ākriti or form should be understood, because according to Mantra, Arthavāda etc. they do possess corporeality. Words such as 'Indra' etc.—like the word 'Commander-in-chief' (Senāpati)—owe their origin to a special relation to a special position, and therefore whosoever ascends to that position is referred to by the word Indra etc., and hence there is no fault. This 'being born of a word' is not meant to be spoken of as meaning, that like Brahma the 'Word' is the material cause (Upādāna Kāraṇa) of the world. How is it then? The word being eternal by reason of its having a denotative power in itself, and by reason of its having an eternal relation to the object (so denoted by it), Generation i.e. Prabhava (from such word) of an individual entity fit to be expressed by such word, in ordinary parlance or practice, is 'Atahprabhavaḥ'. But (says the opponent) how is it understood, that the transitory world is created out of a word? We reply:—"Because of the Scriptures (Pratyaksha) and the Smritis (Anumāna)." Pratyaksha means the Scriptures, which are independent of means of proof, and Anumāna means the Smṛiti which is dependent (on some Scriptural origin of it) for its own authoritativeness. They show that words precede creation. A Scriptural passage says:—"Thinking of 'these' (Ete) Prajāpati verily created the Gods (Devās), thinking of 'Blood' (Asrigra) he created men, thinking of 'Moons' (Indavah) he created the manes (Pitrun), thinking of 'the concealment of Soma' (Tirahpavitra) he created the Sacrificial cups (Grahān), thinking of 'Some thing which contains' (Āshavah) he created 'a collection of Riks' (Stotram), thinking of 'those who enter' (Vishvān) he created 'the collection of Mantrās' (Shashtra), thinking of 'the greatest good' (Abhisaubhaga) he created all other beings (Anyāh Prajāh)". (Rigveda, Maṇḍala 9, Sūkta 62). Similarly in another place also, thus—"By the mind, he joined himself with speech (Vāk)" (Bṛi. 1.2.4),—the Scriptures mention that words have preceded creation. The Smṛiti also says thus—"In the beginning Svayambhū (the Self-born) uttered 'Speech' which was without a beginning and without an end, eternal, containing the Vedās, and heavenly, and all other activities proceed from it" etc.. This origination of Speech also should be looked upon only as

being of the nature of promoting an oral tradition, because, there could be no other manner of origination in the case of this (Speech) which is without any beginning or end. Similarly also—"The Great Lord in the beginning created the names and forms of things and promoted religious observances (Karma) from the Vedic words" (Manu. 1.21) and "He created in the beginning all the different names and forms of things and karmās from the Vedic words and all the different proper modes of life". Besides, that everybody that sets out to do any desired thing, first brings to his mind the words which are indicative of those things and afterwards does the things themselves, is evident to us all. Similarly we understand that before creation, Vedic words occurred to Prajāpati the creator and thereafter he created the objects according to those words. That the Scriptures also say similarly viz. that he uttered the word 'Bhūh' and created the Earth—which shows that words such as 'Bhūh' etc. first occurred to the mind as words, and from them the worlds 'Bhūh' etc. were afterwards created. But then what is the nature of this 'Word' with reference to which this 'being born from the world' is mentioned? It is said that it is of the nature of a 'Sphoṭa'.\* In the case of the view, which considers them i.e. words as letters, as letters vanish as soon as they are pronounced, it would not be reasonably sustainable to say that individual entities such as Gods etc. are born out of them, because letters, which vanish as soon as they are produced, are experienced to be distinct and separate, every time they are pronounced. Similarly, a person who is not actually visible (to us) is recognized as being a particular person, merely on hearing the sound of his recitation, as for instance (when we say) —This is Devadatta who is reciting, this is Yajnadatta who is reciting etc.. Now, this experience of the letters being distinct and separate, cannot be considered to be false-ignorance, in the absence of any *other* actual experience, which invalidates this experience. Nor is it reasonable to say that the knowledge of the meaning (of a word) arises from letters. It cannot be, that each letter (of the word) by itself causes one to understand the meaning (of a word)

\* Sphoṭa : (Apte's Dic.) The idea which bursts out or flashes on the mind, when a sound is uttered, the impression produced on the mind at hearing a sound.

because that would involve the fault called 'Vyabhichāra'\*. Nor is there an experience of a collection of letters as a whole altogether simultaneously because the letters follow in a particular order. If it be said, that the final letter of a word, along with the collective impressions of the letters which have preceded it, would enable one to comprehend the meaning (of a word), we reply—it is not so, because it is absolutely necessary (for a person) to comprehend the relation existing between a word and its meaning, before a word can intimate its meaning, as, for instance, smoke etc. (which enables us to infer the existence of fire, only when smoke itself is apprehended). There is no experience here of the last letter (of a word) along with the impressions produced from the experience of letters which precede it, because impressions are not perceptible by sense-organs. If it be argued, that the experience of the last letter along with the impressions of the preceding letters, caused to be experienced by their effects (Kārya), would enable one to comprehend the meaning (of a word), we reply—no, because the remembrance of the whole word which is the effect of the impressions, also takes place in a particular order. Therefore a word is of the nature of a 'Sphoṭa'. This Sphoṭa suddenly flashes on the intelligence which is the sense-organ which apprehends an object, as the object of only one single apprehension, when the seed in the form of impressions created by the apprehension of each letter singly, is ripened by the apprehension of the last letter (of a word). This one single apprehension is not the remembrance of all the letters as a whole, because letters being many, it would not be reasonably sustainable to understand them as the object of one apprehension. The eternality of the Sphoṭa is due to its apprehension (by us) at every utterance, while the apprehension of separateness or distinctness, is with respect to the letters. It is from this eternal word, which is of the nature of a Sphoṭa, and which is the denoter, that the thing denoted viz. the transitory world, as characterized by actions, agents and fruits of actions, is born. (N. B.—This theory of 'Sphoṭa' is of the

\* The fault of Vyabhichāra occurs, when, if the rule is that the meaning is understood from one letter, it is seen that the meaning of a word is *not* understood from one letter of the word only, or when the meaning is understood from one letter, and the other letters are found to be useless.

Vaiyyākaraṇis i.e. Grammarians). Bhagavān Upavarsha however says—These letters themselves, exactly, are our word. But (says the Grammarian) we have spoken about the vanishing of the letters as soon as they are produced. (We reply)—that is not so, because they are recognized as the self-same letters. But if it be urged (by the Grammarian) that the recognition is caused by similarity, as in the case of the hair, we reply—No, because it is not reasonably sustainable that such recognition is ever invalidated by other means of proof. If it be said (by the Grammarian) that the recognition is caused by the Ākṛiti (form), we reply—no, because the individual entity is recognized as such. If, at every utterance, individual letters could be recognized as different letters—like individual cows for instance—then it would be that the recognition is caused by the Ākṛiti (form). But it never is so, for the individual letters are recognized to be the same at every utterance, and we do understand that the same word (cow) is uttered twice, and not that two distinct and separate words ‘cow’ are uttered. But (says the Grammarian) we have already said above, that we are able to recognize even the words as distinct and separate, because we are able to experience the difference (between them), merely by our hearing the sound of the recitation by Devadatta and by Yajnadatta. To this objection, we reply—The definite recognition of the same letters being there, this peculiar experience about the letters (as being distinct and separate) is caused by the special glosso-epiglottic idiosyncrasy of the person uttering (the letters) as the letters are made manifest by the conjunction and disjunction (of the air on the one hand, and the palate, lips, teeth, etc., on the other), and is not due to any distinctive separateness in the nature (of the letters themselves). Besides in the case of those who hold the view that there is distinctness and separateness in the same individual letters, they also have to imagine Ākṛitis (forms) for establishing the fact of such recognition, and they have also further to imagine, that this experience of distinctness and separateness is caused by extraneous limiting adjuncts. So, there would certainly be brevity of imagination, to assume that the recognition of distinctness and separateness in individual letters is the result of extraneous adjuncts (such as conjunction and disjunction), and that the

recognition of the letters (as being the same) is caused by their intrinsic nature. This recognition, properly so called, is nothing else but this apprehension, which invalidates the apprehension of distinctness and separateness in the letters themselves. Otherwise, how else can the same syllable 'Ga' ( ग ) when uttered by many at one and the same time, appear to have such different aspects as Udātta, Anudātta, Svarita, Anunāsika and Nirānunāsika? On the other hand, no such fault would be there, if (we understand) that this distinctness in the apprehension (of the same letter as Udātta etc.) is not caused by the letters themselves, but by tone (Dhvani). But (asks the Grammarian) what is this tone, any way? It is (we reply) that which reaches the ear (lit., descends on the path of the ear) of a man listening from a distance, who then is unable to distinguish the letters each from the other, and which, when the man is very near it, invests letters with the distinctness in the qualities of high and low pitch. It is on this 'Dhvani' that such special features as the Udātta accent etc. depend, and not on the intrinsic nature of the letters, because the letters every time they are uttered are recognised as being the same. It is only in this way that accents such as Udātta etc. could have a basis, otherwise we will have to understand, that the letters as they are, have no distinction, and such special features as the Udātta accent etc. are caused by the conjunction and disjunction (of the air on the one hand, and the palate or lips or teeth on the other hand). Now, these conjunctions and disjunctions being unperceivable by sense-organs, it would not be possible to attribute these special features depending on them, to the letters themselves, and as a consequence, the apprehension of such special features would be without any basis. Besides it should not be urged or advanced as an argument, that a distinctness in the letters apprehended, may be due to the distinctness of the accents such as Udātta etc., because a distinctness in one thing does not deserve to cause a distinctness in another thing which does not admit of any distinctness. No one would consider, that there are distinctions in the same species, because individuals of that species are distinct and separate from each other. Besides as it is possible to apprehend the meaning directly from the letters themselves, the conception of a Sphoṭa is futile. But (says

the Grammarian) I am not merely imagining a Sphoṭa, but I have a direct perception of it, and in as much as it, i.e. the Sphoṭa, suddenly flashes on the intelligence which has received impressions from the recognition of the successive letters (of a word), I am actually conscious of it. To this we reply—No, because even such intelligence (i.e. intelligence which has received such impressions) is with regard to the letters only. This comprehensive recognition (Ekā Buddhīh) which comes after apprehending the letters singly one after another, as for instance 'this is a cow', is with respect to the aggregate of letters only and nothing else. How is that understood? Because in such comprehensive recognition even, the syllables 'Ga' ( ग ) etc. alone are apprehended, and not the syllables 'Da' ( ढ ) etc., and if this Sphoṭa were to be different from the comprehensive recognition of the syllable 'Ga' ( ग ) etc., then like the syllable 'Da' ( ढ ) the syllable 'Ga' ( ग ) also would be excluded from such comprehensive recognition. But it does not so happen. Therefore the comprehensive recognition is but the act of the remembrance of the letters only. But (says the Grammarian) we have already said that the letters being more than one, it would not be reasonably sustainable to conceive of a comprehensive recognition of them all. To this we reply—It is possible that several letters also can be the object of a comprehensive recognition, as for instance in the case of (words such as) 'row', 'wood', 'army', 'ten', 'hundred' or 'thousand'. Now the recognition that there is only this one word 'cow', is, like the recognition of such words as 'wood' or 'army', only in a metaphorical or a secondary derived sense, as it depends on the fact that many letters together form one word signifying a definite meaning. It is here objected (by the Grammarian) that if several letters together can be the object of one comprehensive recognition, so as to form a word (Pada), then there would be no specific different recognition of the words 'Jārāh' and 'Rājāh' or 'Kapi' and 'Pika', as being different from each other, in as much as the same identical letters appear in both such pairs of words. This objection we refute thus—Even though there is a comprehension of the same aggregate of letters, yet, just as ants going one after another in the order of a particular single file only, can be said to constitute the comprehensive recognition of

a 'row', similarly, letters following each other in a particular order only, give rise to a comprehensive recognition of a word in such a case, the comprehension of a particular word as resulting from a particular order (of letters) is not contradicted, even though the letters may be the same (in such pairs of words as Jārāh and Rājāh etc.). Considering the usage of old people, where these letters happen to be in a particular order, and are such that their relationship to a particular meaning is duly comprehended, it would be an easier thing to suppose, that in the case of any other individual person also, after each single word is apprehended, they appear to such individual to be similar, in the comprehensive recognition of all of them together, and unerringly convey the same meaning to him. In the case of those who hold the theory of 'Sphoṭa', however, there occurs the fault of the abandonment of what actually is seen, and the wrong assumption of what is not seen. It would be a laborious or roundabout procedure to suppose, that letters which are comprehended in a particular order, first suggest a Sphoṭa, and that Sphoṭa thereafter suggests the meaning. Besides, even if it is supposed, that the same letters as they are uttered again and again, are distinct and separate from each other, even then, it would be necessary to assume a 'species' as the basis of a comprehensive recognition, and the theory about the way in which letters are comprehended, would have to be extended to the 'species' as well. Hence, it would not be contradictory to say that Gods etc. are born of eternal words.—28.

*Hence (i.e. because the world is born from words) it is, that (the Vedās) are eternal.*  
—29.

The eternity of the Vedās having been determined (in Pū. Mi.) on the ground of the absence of any remembrance of any definite author etc., and there-after, raising a doubt that there would be a contradiction in holding that individual Gods etc. were liable to be born and therefore non-eternal, and after refuting the same by the previous Sūtra "Atah Prabhavāt" (I.iii.26), the Sūtrakāra now in this Sūtra strengthens the same already established eternity of the Vedās, by the Sūtra "Hence it is that (the Vedās)

are eternal". Thus—it is also because this transitory world which consists of definite forms such as the Gods etc. is born from the Vedic words, that the eternity of the Vedic word should be understood. A Vedic Mantra also is of similar import—"The sacrificers—Yajnikās) attained the path of Vedic words by sacrifices (i.e. meritorious actions performed in the previous life) and then obtained the Vedic words which were in the custody of the Rishis" (Rig. Sam. 10.71.3), and it shows that the sacrificers obtained the Vedic words which were already existing and which became manifest to them (Rig. Sam. 10.71.3). Veda-Vyāsa also in the Smṛiti says similarly—"The Rishis, with the previous permission of the self-born (Brahmā—Hiraṇyagarbha) obtained by austerities performed (in the previous Kalpa), acquired the Vedās along with History, which at the end of the previous millennium (Yuga) had vanished out of sight."—29.

*Because of the same names and forms (recurring) when there is a regeneration (of the world), no contradiction arises (about the eternity of the Vedic words) as is to be seen from the Scriptures and Smritis.*  
—30.

It may be (says the opponent), that were individuals such as Gods etc. understood to be recurrently created and destroyed like individual animals etc., then perhaps, as a result of the non-interruption of the relation between the names, the things named, and the giver of these names (or as between the teachers and the taught) and by reason of such relation being thus eternal, any such contradiction as regards the Scriptural word would be removed. But when tenets of the Scriptures and Smritis mention, that this entire three-fold world, after divesting itself of such names and forms, gets completely reabsorbed without leaving any trace, and is then born afresh, how could there be no contradiction? With regard to this it is said—"Because of the same names and forms (recurring)"—and even if such absorption and regeneration is accepted, we do have to accept the transmigratory existence as having no beginning. The Āchārya will hereafter expound, as to how transmi-



gratory existence is without beginning, in the Sūtra 'It is reasonably sustainable and is also perceived to be so' (Bra: Sū. II. i. 36). It should be understood that in the beginningless transmigratory existence, even though there is complete reabsorption and regeneration respectively at the end of the Kalpa and the beginning of another, there is no contradiction, even as there is no contradiction in the case of sleep and awakening (where there is complete cessation of consciousness during sleep and there is a reappearance of consciousness on awakening), and the practical worldly transactions (of a man) are the same after the reappearance of consciousness, as they were before the cessation of consciousness. The Scriptures speak of the absence of consciousness and its reappearance, in the conditions of sleep and awakening respectively, thus:—"When (a man) is asleep and does not experience any dreams, but becomes as it were, one with the Prāṇa, then speech (Vāk) along with all names merges in it, the eye along with all forms merges into it, the ear along with all words merges into it, the mind along with all meditations merges into it, and when he wakes up, just as in the case of burning fire, scintillae are thrown out in all directions, even so, from this Self, all sense-organs proceed towards their respective places, and from the sense-organs the deities (presiding at these sense-organs), and from the deities the sense-objects" (Kaush. 3.3). (The opponent here says)—It may be, that during sleep, as the practical worldly transactions of a man other than the one who is asleep are not interrupted, even so, in the case of a man who has awakened after being asleep, there is a possibility of his still retaining (after awakening) the memory of transactions performed by him in the previous condition of wakefulness, and, there may not thus be any contradiction. But there is difference in the case of the great general deluge i.e. re-absorption (Pralaya), because there is complete cessation of all practical transactions, and as it is impossible to remember the transaction of the previous Kalpa, it is impossible to have any remembrance of the transactions of the previous birth. To this, we say—This is no fault. It is reasonably sustainable, that even though there is this great general deluge which causes the destruction of all practical transactions, still as a result of the grace of the Highest Lord, such mighty personalities

(supermen) as Hiranyagarbha and others are able to retain the memory of the transactions of the previous Kalpa. Because it is seen that ordinary beings do not retain any memory of the transactions of the previous birth, it cannot be maintained that the case of such mighty personalities (supermen) ought also to be similar to the case of ordinary beings. Though the attribute of being a living being (Prāṇitva) is common to all beings, it is seen, that beginning with man down to a blade of grass, there is a progressively greater and greater obstruction to knowledge and power, all along the series downwards, and similarly from man upto Hiranyagarbha there is a progressively greater and greater manifestation of knowledge and power, all along the series upwards, and it cannot be said about all this which we understand from the Scriptural and Smṛiti discussions, that it is not so. Hence it is reasonably sustainable that such mighty personalities (supermen) as Hiranyagarbha etc. who have practised religious actions (Karma) along with superior knowledge in the previous Kalpa, and who have been born again in the present Kalpa, and to whom the Grace of the Highest Lord has been vouchsafed, do possess—like one who has awakened from sleep—the memory of the transactions of the previous Kalpa. The following Scriptural passage also similarly says—“He who first creates the Brahmā (Hiranyagarbha) and then inspires his intelligence with the knowledge of the Vedās, in Him, the Deva who shines with the Intelligence of his own Self, I, who aspire for Final Release, do seek refuge” (Shvet. 6.1.8). Shaunaka and others also have mentioned in the Smṛitis, how Madhuchchhanda and other Rishis saw (i.e. had intuitive or inspired knowledge of) the Dāshatayyās (a set of hymns in the tenth Maṇḍala of the Rig-Veda). Similarly in every Veda there is a mention of the Rishis of all the Kāṇḍās (i.e. Chapters). The Scriptures also show, how every Mantra is pronounced after first recalling the Rishi (connected with the Mantra) thus—“One who causes a sacrifice to be performed or teaches without recalling the name of the Rishi, the metre, the Deity and the Brāhmaṇa, is reduced to the condition of an immoveable thing (such as a tree etc.) or gets consigned to the pit (i.e. Hell)” (Sarvānu.), and they further mention, that every one must know all these details about every Mantra.

Meritorious action is enjoined on a man so that he may thereby obtain happiness, and unmeritorious actions are prohibited so that he may not suffer pain. A man's predilection for and hatred of (a thing) is caused as a result of pleasure and pain actually experienced or as known from the Scriptures, and not for other pleasures and of other pains (not so experienced) and hence ( it ought to be understood that) the world which comes into existence as a result of the fruits of merits or demerits, is exactly like the previous world. A Smṛiti says—"In the case of beings, whatever actions they did in the former world, to the same sort of action they are again born : be his actions ferocious or harmless, gentle or cruel, meritorious or sinful, or true or false." Having been impressed with these sentiments (in the former world) they are born with the same sentiments again, and so they prefer to do the same things. The creation, when it comes to be annihilated or dissolved still retains that residuary potentiality and this same potentiality is the root-cause of its regeneration, otherwise there would result the predicament of a result occurring without a cause. Now, it is not possible to imagine these potentialities to be of many varieties or forms. Hence we have to understand that these flowing streams of the worlds such as earth etc. which again and again get destroyed and are reborn, and the flowing streams of the aggregate of beings such as the Gods, the beasts and men, and all the definite settled arrangements of race, Āshramās and fruits of actions, have a definite arrangement in this beginningless transmigratory existence, similar to the definite constant arrangement of the relation between the sense-organs and the sense-objects. We cannot imagine that the transaction as seen in the relationship existing between the sense-organs and the sense-objects, is different in each new creation, for instance we cannot imagine a sixth sense and a sixth object of such sixth sense. Hence, because of the practical transactions appertaining to all Kalpās being similar, and because mighty personalities (supermen) possess the power of remembering their transactions in the previous Kalpa, in every fresh creation, the same peculiarities of names and forms recur again and again. There is no contradiction of the authoritativeness of the Scriptural word, because the same names and forms repeat themselves, even if the transitory world

is understood to be subject to a recurring great creation and great deluge alternately. That there is an identity of names and forms, is mentioned in the Scriptures and Smritis, thus :—"The creator (Dhātri), even as before, modelled the Sun and the Moon, the Heaven and the Earth, and the Sky." (Rig-Veda Sam. 10.190.3). The meaning is, that just as in the previous Kalpa, this transitory world consisting of the Sun and the Moon was created, so was it created by the Highest Lord, in this Kalpa also. Similarly, the following Scriptural passage should be cited in illustration—"Fire desired that it should be the consumer of the food offered to Gods, so it offered the Puroḍāsha (rice oblations) on eight potsherds, to the deities residing in the Pleiades (i.e. the Krittikās, the 3rd of the 27 constellations)" (Tait. Brā. 3.1.4.1)—which shows that the fire that offered the oblations in the ritual 'Nakshatreshti', and the fire in which it offered them, have similar names and forms. Similarly the Smriti says—"The unborn (i.e. Brahmā) gives the same names etc. and the same intuitive insight into the Vedās, to the Rishis born after the night of deluge, as they possessed before, just as the several signs of the spring reappear again and again. So in different Yugās (millennium) the same beings are born." That—"The Gods which are in existence at present are similar to the Gods which existed before, and have the same predilections for things as the former Gods had"—should also be quoted in illustration.—30.

*Jaimini is of opinion that (Gods etc.) have no competency (for Brahma-Vidyā) as such competency (in them) in the case of Madhu-Vidyā is not possible.—31.*

What has been declared (in the foregoing Sūtrās) viz. that even Gods etc. have competency (for Brahma-Vidyā) is here referred to again (by the Sūtrakāra). Jaimini is of opinion that Gods etc. have no competency (for Brahma-Vidyā). How so ? Because such competency is not possible in Madhu-Vidyā. If once it is understood that Gods etc. have such competency, the nature of a Vidyā as a Vidyā, being common both to Madhu-Vidyā and other Vidyās, it has necessarily to be understood that they (i.e. the Gods etc.) must possess competency for Madhu-Vidyā also, but

this is not possible. How so ? Because in the Scriptural passage "This Āditya (Sun) verily is the Madhu of the Gods" (Chhān. 3.1.1), men are enjoined to meditate devoutly on the Āditya by superimposing the notion of Madhu on the Āditya. Now if it is understood that Gods etc. are such devout meditators, what other Āditya (as Madhu) would the Āditya meditate on (if Āditya were to meditate devoutly) ? Again the Scriptures after making reference in the beginning to the five kinds of ambrosia or nectar such as Rohita etc. (Lohita—red ?), and further giving instruction that the five categories of Gods, viz. the Vasus, Rudrās, Ādityās, Maruts, and Sādhyās, subsist on these five kinds of ambrosia or nectar respectively, and after stating "He that knows this ambrosia or nectar in this manner, becomes one of the Vasus, and under the leadership of Agni (Agninā mukhena) looks upon the ambrosia or nectar and is satisfied", show that those who know that the Vasus etc. subsist on these five kinds of ambrosia or nectar, themselves attain the greatness of Vasu and others. Now, what other Vasus etc. subsisting on such ambrosia or nectar, can the Vasu know of ? What other sort of greatness of Vasus (as apart from their own greatness) can such Vasus possibly attain ? Similarly, in such devout meditations on the selfs of deities as are mentioned in the Scriptures, thus—" (After stating that the Ākāsha is Brahma) Agni is the foot (Pāda), Vāyu is the foot, Āditya is the foot, the directions are the foot" (Chhān. 18.2), "Vāyu is the absorber" (Chhān. 4.3.1), "The instruction is that Āditya is Brahma" (Chhān. 3.11.1), it is not possible that these self-same Selfs of these deities can possess competency (for Brahma-Vidyā). Similarly in the case of devout meditations connected with Rishis, such as "These are Gautama and Bhāradvāja, this (right ear) is Gautama and this (left ear) is Bhāradvāja" (Brih. 2.2.4), it is not possible, that these self-same Rishis (viz. Gautama and Bhāradvāja) can possess competency (for Brahma-Vidyā).—31.

Whence again is it, that Gods etc. have no competency ?

*This is again, why Gods etc. have no competency (for Brahma-Vidyā) because (words such as 'Sun' and 'Moon') are used to indicate mere spheres of light.—32.*

To this orb of light, which is located in heaven, and which, revolving day and night, illumines the transitory world, terms such as 'Āditya' etc., which indicate deities, are applied. This we know because it is well-known in ordinary life, and from the complementary passages (in Scriptures, such as that the Āditya rises in the East). It is not possible to understand, that this orb of light, which, because it, like the earth, is understood to be non-intelligent, can have any relation (Yoga) either with a physical body i.e. with a Hridaya etc., or intelligence or a desire (for Final Release). By what we have said so far about this orb of light, (the question about) Agni also will be as good as explained. (The Vedāntin may say)—It may be, that there is no fault because we know from Mantrās, Arthavādās, Itihāsa and Purāṇa and transactions in ordinary life (Loka), that Gods possess corporeality. To this we (i.e. the opponents) reply—No, because what indeed is known as ordinary worldly experience is in no way any independent means-of-proof. It is when anything is proved by such means-of-proof as direct perception etc. (i.e. Pratyakshādi), in an ordinary way, without giving consideration to any peculiarity (Avichārīta-visheshebhyaḥ), that a thing is said to be proved by transactions in ordinary life. Now here, there is none of such means-of-proof as direct perception etc., present in this case. Itihāsa and Purāṇās also as being the work of mere mortals presuppose the existence of some means-of-proof (Pramāṇa) as an original source, on which to base themselves. Arthavādās also, which form a syntactical whole with an injunction, and are construed as meant for glorification (of the injunction), cannot, by way of having any separate meaning of their own, constitute themselves as a reason for concluding that Gods etc. possess corporeality. (Mīmāṃsakās also maintain) that even Mantrās, which are recited at the time of some Scriptural ritual as being enjoined by the Scriptures, are useful for giving information about the things which are requisite for such ritual, and are not by themselves a means-of-proof of anything. Therefore, there is absence of any competency in Gods etc. (for Brahma-Vidyā).—32.

*But Bādarāyana (is of opinion), that (Gods) have competency. Besides, there are*

*(passages indicating possibility of such competency).—33.*

The word 'Tu' (But) in the Sūtra has the effect of overruling the above. Āchārya Bādarāyaṇa on the other hand considers that even Gods etc. have such competency (for Brahma-Vidyā). Even though there may not be competency for Madhu-Vidyā etc., which are mixed up with deities, still there is possibility of (Gods etc.) having competency for pure Brahma-Vidyā, as competency (for Brahma-Vidyā) depends upon the ability for having a desire for it (i.e. Brahma-Vidyā) and its not having been ruled out. It would not be proper to take away competency wherever it is possible, merely because, it is not possible in any other particular case. Even in the case of men, not all men, viz. Brāhmaṇās and others, have competency for all kinds of sacrifices, viz. Rājasūya and others. (For instance, in the Rājasūya Sacrifice, only the Kshatriyās have such competency.) The reasoning which is applicable in that case is applicable here also. With reference to Brahma-Vidyā there is a Scriptural mention suggesting that Gods etc. have such competency, thus—"Whosoever amongst the Gods realized (Brahma), himself became that (i.e. Brahma), the same is (the case) with regard to Rishis, and men." (Brih. 1.4.10). Also, "(They conferred amongst themselves) well, let us search for that Self, by successfully searching for which, a person attains all the worlds and fulfils all desires. So, Indra from amongst the Gods and Virochana from amongst the Asurās approached (Prajāpati)" (Chhān. 8.7.2) etc.. The Smritis also mention similarly about the discussion between the Gandharva and Yājñavalkya etc.. With regard to the objection (raised in the previous Sūtra) that, as the terms (such as Āditya etc.) are used to indicate (non-sentient) Jyoti etc., (Gods etc. have no competency), we reply—the terms Āditya etc. indicating deities, used though they are in connection with mere spheres of light etc., culminate in indicating the various intelligent selfs of deities endowed with lordly power, because they are used in that sense in the Mantrās, Arthavādās etc.. The deities being endowed with great powers, have the power to be the Selfs of the Jyotis etc., and to assume, as they please, various different bodies. Even so it is mentioned in Subrahmaṇya Arthavāda,

thus—"Oh ram of Medhātithi". "Indra by assuming the form of a ram kidnapped Medhātithi the descendant of Kaṇva" (Shāḍvinsha Brā. 1.1). The Smṛiti also says thus—"Āditya assuming the form of a man had intercourse with Kuntī". (The 'Ha' in the sentence means to show that it is a fact based on history.) We also understand how intelligent deities have their abode in the earth etc., thus—"The Earth spake, the waters spake" etc. It is also known that material things such as light etc. which abide in the Sun etc., are non-intelligent, but we have already said, that the Selfs of Deities which abide in them are intelligent, as seen from the Scriptural Mantrās and Arthavāda transactions. With respect to the objection taken—viz. that because Mantrās and Arthavādās have a different purpose, they have no power to indicate that Deities have corporeality etc.—we say that the fact that one is able to experience or is not able to experience a thing is the reason (for determining) the existence or non-existence of that thing, and not the circumstance as to whether it is meant for that purpose or not meant for that purpose. Similarly, one who sets out with a particular object in mind, is still able to understand that the grass or leaves etc. which may be lying on the way, do actually exist. (To this the opponent says)—This illustration is not in point. In this case there is positive direct perception of the grass and leaves by which their existence is understood. But here (in the point under discussion), on the other hand, the Arthavāda being understood as being in syntactical harmony with what is indicated by an injunction, with a view to the glorification (of the injunction), it would not be possible to understand it (i.e. the Arthavāda) in an entirely different sense, viz. as having a tendency to establish the existence of a thing. When the principal sentence as a whole conveys a particular sense, a subsidiary portion of that sentence could not convey a different sense. For instance in the sentence "(One) may not drink wine"—a sentence implying a negative, the three words being related to each other—the only sense to be understood from it, is a prohibition of the drinking of wine, and not, that there is also an injunction to drink wine, by taking only the two words 'drink' and 'wine' together. To this we reply—This (your) illustration is not in point. It is proper in the case of a prohibition to drink wine—the construction of



the sequence of the words being one only—to reject the meaning of a subsidiary part. In the case of an Arthavāda and an injunction, however, the words of the Arthavāda sentence first attain a different construction of the sequence establishing the existence of another thing, and subsequently, it is only when it has to be considered as to what the significance of the Arthavāda sentence is, that (we understand) that the Arthavāda sentence may well (Kāmam) attain the power to express itself as a glorification of the injunction. For instance, in the sentence “One desirous of attaining prosperity should sacrifice a white (animal) to the Deity Vāyu” (Tait. Sam. 2.1), all the words such as ‘Vāyavya’ etc. which occur in connection with the aim of an injunction, have a relation to the injunction, while it is not so in the case of the words of the Arthavāda sentence “Vāyu verily is a fleet-footed Deity. He (the sacrificer) runs up quickly towards Vāyu with his own quantum of happiness (Bhāgadheyena) and it is the Deity (Vāyu) that confers prosperity on him (i.e. the sacrificer)”, because the sentences do not construe to mean either that Vāyu should sacrifice or that the fleet-footed Deity should sacrifice. The words of an Arthavāda sentence (which is a subsidiary i.e. an Avāntara sentence) first have their own independent construction and they describe the nature of Vāyu, and then they have the effect of glorifying the injunction by conveying, that this sacrificial action is meant for a deity which has such and such special attributes. Now, where the meaning of the subsidiary (i.e. Arthavāda) sentence, is perceivable by another means-of-proof, there the Arthavāda acts as an Anuvāda (i.e. it only recalls a fact), and where it is not so perceivable by another means-of-proof, it acts as a Guṇavāda (i.e. it refers only to a quality suggested by the Arthavāda sentence). When neither of these alternatives is available, and when there is a doubt as to whether, in the absence of any other means-of-proof, a Guṇavāda should be understood to be present, or, whether in the absence of any conflict with any other means-of-proof, an Anuvāda should be understood to be present,—then, in such a predicament, those who wholly depend upon actual perception or apprehension and consider it to be the Vartamāna Vāda i.e. Anuvāda, should construe it to be a Vartamāna Vāda and not a Guṇavāda. By this reasoning

the Mantra also is duly explained. Besides those injunctions, which direct oblations connected with Indra etc. to be offered to Indra etc., necessarily imply the form (Svarūpa) of Indra etc.. It is not possible (for a sacrificer) to implant on his mind i.e. to conceive of deities such as Indra etc. as having no form (Svarūpa) of their own, nor can oblations be offered to particular individual deities if they are not already firmly established on the mind. The Scriptures mention thus—"When an oblation is taken up in hand for being offered to a particular deity, (the sacrificer) should meditate on that deity while pronouncing 'Vashaṭ'" (Aitareya Brā. 3.1.1). It is not possible that a word by itself could be the form (Svarūpa) of a thing (indicated by the word), because, a word and the thing which it denotes, are distinct or separate. Therefore, it would not be reasonable for a man who believes in the authoritative-ness of Scriptural words to deny that the particular form that is attributed to Indra and others by the Mantra and the Arthavāda is not so. Similarly Itihāsa and Purāṇa also, in as much as they have Mantrās and Arthavādās as their source, are able to establish the corporeality of deities etc. in the way explained (above). Itihāsa and Puraṇās may possibly have a source such as direct perception etc. also. It is quite possible, that what is not directly perceivable by us may well have been directly perceivable by the ancients. Similarly, Smritis mention how Vyāsa and others held direct converse with Gods etc.. But (a person) who would say that even the ancients, like the moderns, did not possess the power to hold converse with God etc. may just as well also deny the variety of this transitory world. He would also similarly say, that just as in modern times there is no Kshatriya ruling the entire world, even so, there was no Kshatriya ruling the entire world at other times also, and would thereby even deny the injunction to perform the Rājasūya sacrifice. He would also think that even as in modern times, in the past also, the duties of castes, Āshramās and religion were in the same almost disordered condition (as they happen to be now), which would render the Scriptures, which prescribe such arrangements, unmeaning. Therefore it would be but proper to understand, that because of their eminent religiosity, the ancients could have direct converse with Gods etc.. Similarly the Smṛiti

says—"As a result of the study of Scriptures there is union (Samprayoga) with the desired deities" (Yoga Sū. 2.44), It would not be possible recklessly to deny that what is stated in the Smṛiti, viz. that Yoga has the acquisition of divine powers such as 'Aṇima' etc. (the power to assume a subtle body at will etc.) as its fruit, is not so. Scriptures themselves proclaim the greatness of Yoga, thus—"When all the five subtle elements viz. the Earth, Water, Teja, Vāyu and Ākāśha have come up i.e. become manifest, and when all the essential qualities of these five subtle elements are experienced by a man who is practising Yoga, such a man—i.e. one who has, as a result of that, acquired a body whose structure is the fire of Yoga—is free from disease, old age and death etc." (Shvet. 2.12). It would not be proper to compare the power of persons like us, with the power of these Rishis who have had Mantrās and Brāhmaṇās revealed to them. Therefore, Itihāsa and Purāṇās necessarily have a Scriptural source on which they are based. And so far as is possible, it would also not be proper to consider ordinary worldly experience also as being without any support. Therefore, it is reasonably possible to consider, on the evidence of Mantrās etc., that Gods etc. have corporeality. Hence, from that, it is also reasonably possible to understand, that Gods etc. have competency for Brahma-Vidyā. Scriptural declarations, about Final Release by stages (Krama-Mukti), would be reasonably sustainable only on such a supposition.—33.

#### 9. APASHŪDRĀDHĪKARAṆAM. Sū. 34-38.

*(Jānashruti) felt grief (at hearing) dispa-  
raging remarks, and (his) rushing to  
(Raikva) through grief, is also suggested.  
—34.*

Just as it has been said (above)—by denying the rule about a man (alone) being competent (for Brahma-Vidyā)—that Gods etc. also have competency for Brahma-Vidyā, similarly, this subject has been started for the purpose of expelling the doubt, that it may be that, as an exception to to the rule viz. a twice-born alone has competency (for Brahma-Vidyā), the Shūdra also (who is not a twice-born)

has such competency. On this point the conclusion (of the opponent) is that even the Shūdra can have such competency, because in his case, such desire and ability (for Brahma-Vidyā) is possible, and like (the prohibition) “Therefore, a Shūdra is not competent for a sacrifice” (Tait. Sam. 7.1.1.16), the Scriptures do not mention that a Shūdra is not competent for Brahma-Vidyā. That reason for such want of competency for a Shūdra for religious action, viz. that he does not perform Agnihotra (lit., he who does not keep a fire), which you consider as an indicatory mark furnishing a cause against a Shūdra having competency for Vidyās, is not an indicatory mark at all, for furnishing a cause against (a Shūdra’s) incompetency for Vidyās. It is not as if one who does not keep the Āhavanīya fire, etc., is not able to know Vidyā, and besides, there is an indicatory mark which supports the competency of a Shūdra (for Vidyā), thus—“O Shūdra, may you retain for yourself, the neckless, and the cart, along with the cows” (Chhān. 4.2.3), wherein, in Samvarga Vidyā, (Raikva) addresses Jānashruti, the great-grandson of Janashruti who wants to know the Vidyā (from Raikva), as a Shūdra. Smṛiti also refers to Vidura and others, even though born of a Shūdra woman, as possessing superior special knowledge. Therefore, a Shūdra does possess competency for Brahma-Vidyā. To this conclusion (of the opponent), we reply—The Shūdra has no such competency, as the study of Vedās is absent (in his case). It is only one who has studied the Vedās and understood their meaning that has competency in Vedic matters. A Shūdra is precluded from the study of the Vedās, as Upanayana (investiture with the sacred thread) is a *sine-qua-non* for the study of Vedās, and as it is prescribed for the three Varnās only (i.e. for Brāhmaṇa, Kshatriya and Vaishya). The argument about (a Shūdra) having desire (Arthitva), does not constitute a reason conferring competency, in the absence of ability. Nor can mere worldly ability be a reason for conferring competency, because in matters relating to Shāstrās, ability in conformity with Shāstrās is necessary, and because (in the case of a Shūdra) ability in conformity with Shāstrās has been ruled out, by the ruling out of the study of Vedās (in his case). That, which has been referred to above, viz. that a Shūdra is not competent for a sacrifice,

also shows his want of competency for Brahma-Vidyā, because, the reasoning is commonly applicable to both. Again, the reference to the word 'Shūdra' in Samvarga-Vidyā in the Scriptures—which you consider to be an indicative mark—is not such an indicative mark, because there is absence of logical reason in it. An indicative mark can indicate, only if there is a logical reason. There is no such reason here. Besides, here this word 'Shūdra' may at the most mean that a Shūdra possesses competency in Samvarga-Vidyā only, as it occurs in connection with that (Vidyā) but not in all Vidyās. Occurring as it does in an Arthavāda passage it does not even have power to confer competency on a Shūdra in any matter. It is possible to use the word 'Shūdra' even in the case of those who have such competency (i.e. the Brāhmanās, Kshatriyās and Vaishyās). If you ask how, we reply—We understand that Jānashruti the great-grandson of Janashruti on hearing the sentence of the Hamsa (Bhallāksha, the myopic)—“With what greatness do you consider Jānashruti to be endowed, that you are talking about him, as if he is the very Raikva who has (i.e. goes about in) a cart?”—experienced grief at this disparaging remark about himself, and the Rishi Raikva, with a view to show his knowledge of things beyond ordinary ken, suggested it by using the word 'Shūdra', (and it is not that he considered that Jānashruti was really a Shūdra by caste), because a person who by birth is a Shūdra (i.e. who is not a twice-born) has no competency (for Vidyā).\* (The opponent) asks, how again does the word 'Shūdra' indicate the grief produced? We reply—Because grief overwhelmed (him). Etymologically, it can be derived as either—‘one who through grief’, or ‘one to whom grief arrives’, or ‘one who through grief approaches in haste (to meet Raikva)’ is a Shūdra, because the combined meaning of the two members of the word Shūdra is possible, and the meaning of Shūdra established by custom (i.e. a born Shūdra) is not possible (here). That this (etymological meaning) is possible in the legend here, is clearly seen.—34.

*Because of the indicative mark, viz. a subsequent mention along with Chaitrarathin,*

\* For this Scriptural legend, see Hume's 'Thirteen Principal Upanishads', English Translation, p. 215 and also Abhyankar's Marathi translation, II edition, p. 296.

*(Jānashruti's) being a Kshatriya should be understood.—35.*

This is, again, why Jānashruti is not a Shūdra by birth. Because, it is understood, by a proper consideration of the chapter, that he (i.e. Jānashruti) was a Kshatriya. It can be known from the indicatory mark, viz. the mention of him (i.e. Jānashruti) along with Chaitrarathi Abhipratārin, who himself was a Kshatriya. For later on, in the sentence complementary to Samvarga-Vidyā, Chaitrarathi Abhipratārin is mentioned thus—"Now (which shows the beginning of the Arthavāda sentence), while Shaunaka the descendant of Kapi (Kāpeya) and Abhipratārin the descendant of Kakshasena were being waited on by attendants at dinner, a Brahmachārin begged them for alms" (Chhān. 4.3.5). We have to understand Abhipratārin as Chaitrarathin from his being mentioned in conjunction with Shaunaka (Kāpeya), because the connection of Chaitraratha with Shaunaka (Kāpeya) is understood from the Scriptural passage—"Kāpeya caused a 'Two Night' (Dvirātra) sacrifice to be performed at the hands of Chaitraratha" (Tāṇḍya Brā. 20.12.5). Usually, the descendants of the same particular family (of officiating priests), are the officiating priests at a sacrifice performed by descendants of the same (another) particular family, and from the passage "From him i.e. Chaitraratha, the Kshatriya king Chaitrarathi was born", it should be understood that he was a Kshatriya. And as Jānashruti is mentioned along with the Kshatriya Abhipratārin in connection with the same Vidyā, the Kshatriyahood of Jānashruti is thus indicated. For usually persons of similar status are mentioned together. Jānashruti's Kshatriya-hood is also known, as inferred from his lordly power of despatching a charioteer etc. in search of Raikva). Therefore a Shūdra by birth has no competency (for Brahma-Vidyā).—35.

*Because there is reference to Sacrament (Samskāra) (in the case of the twice-born) and the mention of the absence of the same (in the case of those who are only born once).—36.*

This is again why a Shūdra has no competency, as in the province of Vidyā, sacraments (Samskārās) such as Upanayana etc. are mentioned, thus—"He performed his Upanayana" (Upanayana is a rite which confers ceremonial competency to the three upper classes) (Shatapatha Brā. 11.5.3.1); "He approached him saying, Oh Bhagawan, please teach me" (Chhān. 7.1.1); "They, i.e. those who had studied the Vedās completely and had fixed their faith in Saguṇa (i.e. qualified) Brahma (Brahmaparāḥ Vedapāragāḥ) and were engaged in the quest of Nirguṇa (the Highest unqualified) Brahma, expecting that Bhagawān Pippalāda would instruct them fully, approached him with Samidhās (sacrificial fuel sticks) in their hands" (Pra. 1.1). The Scriptural passage—"He (Ashvapati) without performing their Upanayana said" (because, one of a lower caste, should teach another of a higher caste, without performing Upanayana) (Chhān. 5.11.7)—also shows, that it is necessary to have Upanayana performed (in the case of the twice-born). So far as Shūdrās are concerned, the absence of any sacrament (Samskāra) in their case is often mentioned, thus—"Shūdra is only born once and is of the fourth caste" (Manu. Sam. 10.4), also, "No sin attaches to a Shūdra, nor does he deserve to have any sacrament (Samskāra)" etc. (Manu. Sam. 10.12.6).—36.

*Because (Gautama-Hāridramata) proceeded  
(to perform the Upanayana of Satyakāma-  
Jābāla) after ascertaining (that Satyakāma-  
Jābāla was a Brahmana and not a  
Shūdra).—37.*

This is again why a Shūdra has no competency (for Brahma-Vidyā) because, it is understood that Gautama, after ascertaining that Jābāla was not a Shūdra—because of his truthful speech—, proceeded to perform his Upanayana and to teach him, by the indicatory mark stated in the Scriptures thus—"No one who is not a Brāhmaṇa would talk like that (i.e. truthfully). Oh mild one, bring Samidhās, I shall perform your Upanayana, you have not swerved from the Truth" (Chhān. 4.4.5).—37.

*Because of Smṛiti there is prohibition (for a Shūdra) to hear and learn the Vedās and do Vedic Karma.—38.*

This is again why a Shūdra has no competency (for Brahma-Vidyā), because in the Smṛiti there is prohibition against a Shūdra hearing, learning, knowing (the Vedās) and performing Vedic Karma. The prohibition against hearing Vedās is as follows :—"He who listens to the Vedās should have his ears filled with lead or tin and lac"; "A Shūdra is nothing but a walking cemetery, therefore, one should not learn (the Scriptures) in his presence." From this of course follows the prohibition against (a Shūdra) learning the Vedās, because when in his presence Vedās are not even recited, how ever can he learn them ? Again a sentence of cutting off of the tongue is prescribed for a Shūdra guilty of uttering Veda word and his body is to be cut off if a Shūdra memorizes (Thibaut—preserves ?) the Vedās. Hence of course a prohibition of the knowledge and performance of Vedic Karma follows thus—"One may not explain (the meaning of Vedās) to a Shūdra", "For Learning, sacrificing, and making a gift, only a twice-born is competent." In the case of those such as Vidura, Dharma-Vyādhya, etc., who happen to have acquired knowledge as a result of the Samskāras of the actions done in the previous births, it is not possible to prohibit them from acquiring the fruit of (their knowledge), because knowledge surely must have its fruit. Smṛiti, however, by the passage "He should let all the four castes hear" allows all the four castes to acquire the knowledge of Itihāsa and Purāṇa. So the conclusion is, that the Shūdrās have no competency for the Vedās (and therefore for Brahma-Vidyā).—38.

#### 10. KAMPANĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 39.

*Because of the vibrating (of the world in it) (Prāṇa is Brahma).—39.*

The adventitious discussion about competency is now finished, and we will now revert to the consideration of the meaning of Scriptural texts, which is our present purpose. (The Scriptures mention—"All this transitory



world which is thus created, vibrates in Prāṇa. It (Prāṇa) is a great terror, a bolt raised aloft. Those who have comprehended this, become immortal" (Kaṭha. 2.3.2). This sentence is particularly noticed (by the Sūtrakāra) with reference to the fact that here the root 'Ej' ( एज् ) is in the sense of 'to vibrate'. In this sentence the Scriptures tell us that all this transitory world vibrates, as supported by Prāṇa. Scriptures declare that something, which is the cause of a great terror and which is expressed by the word 'bolt', has been 'raised aloft', by knowing which, immortality results. In this connection, when what that is, is not understood, and it is considered as to what this Prāṇa is, and as to what this terror-inspiring bolt is, the conclusion arrived at (by the opponent) is that, as is well-known, Vāyu with its five-fold functions (such as Prāṇa, Apāna etc.) is what is meant by Prāṇa. Also because it is well-known, that thunderbolt (Ashani) may be that bolt. This is a description of the greatness of Vāyu. All this transitory world, depending upon this Vāyu of five-fold functions, which is expressed by the word Prāṇa, vibrates because of that. This terror-inspiring bolt which is raised aloft is caused by Vāyu. It is said that, it is when Vāyu manifests itself as rain, that lightning, thunder, pouring rain and thunderbolt are produced. And it is only from the knowledge of Vāyu that this immortality results. Similarly another Scriptural passage says—"Vāyu is both the distributive pervasion ('Vyashti'—aggregate or whole viewed as made up of many separate parts) and the collective pervasion (Samashti—an aggregate which is considered as made up of parts, each of which is substantially the same as the whole) and one who knows that conquers death." Therefore, it should be understood, that by Prāṇa, Vāyu is meant. To this conclusion (of the opponent) we reply—

Here, it is this Brahma, which should be understood. How so? Because of taking stock of what has preceded and what has followed. We find, that in the preceding portion of the chapter, and in the portion which comes after, it is Brahma alone that is indicated, so, here, in between the two, how ever can it be understood capriciously, that Vāyu is indicated? So far as the preceding portion is concerned, it is Brahma that is indicated, thus—"That precisely is the Bright one, that is Brahma, that is what is

spoken of as the immortal. All the worlds have supported themselves on it, and no body can transgress it" (Kāṭha. 2.3.1)—, and we understand that the same is here indicated, because of its being in proximity, and also because we realize that it has the quality of being the support of the world from the Scriptural passage—"All this transitory world vibrates because of it". It is seen, that in the sentence "The Prāṇa of Prāṇa" (Bṛih. 4.4.18) this word Prāṇa also is used in the case of the Highest Self only. Besides, the quality of enabling the world to vibrate, can be reasonably sustainable in the case of the Highest Self only, and not in the case of mere Vāyu. A similar view is expressed in the Scriptures, thus—"Man the mortal does not live because of Prāṇa (one of the 5 functional aspects of Vāyu) or Apāna. They live only because of that (Prāṇa which is Brahma) in which these two (i.e. Prāṇa and Apāna, along with Vyāna, Udāna, and Samāna) rest." (Kāṭha. 2.2.5). In the subsequent passage also—viz. "Through fear of it (i.e. Brahma), the fire and the Sun, respectively, burn and shine, and Indra and Vāyu and Death, the fifth (in this series), hasten (to do their duty)." (Kāṭha. 2.3.3)—it is Brahma alone that is indicated and not Vāyu, because it is mentioned that it is the cause of terror to the transitory world along with (i.e. including) Vāyu. We are, therefore, able to understand, that here also, because of the proximity, and its recognition as the cause of terror, by the word 'great terror' and a 'bolt raised aloft', it i.e. the same (Brahma) is indicated. The word 'bolt' (Vajra) is also used in the common meaning of being the cause of terror. Just as people as a rule obey the commands of a King etc. through fear that, if they do not obey his order, a bolt raised aloft would fall on their heads (like the sword of Democles), similarly this transitory world consisting of fire, Vāyu and the Sun etc. also, behaves regularly through the fear of Brahma, and so Brahma is comparable to the terror-striking bolt. There is a similar Scriptural passage relating to Brahma, as follows—"Through fear of it the wind blows, the Sun rises, the fire burns, and Indra, and Death as the fifth, hasten (to do their duty)." (Tait. 8.1). We also understand that it is no other than Brahma, because immortality is mentioned by the Scriptures as the fruit (as a result of knowing it). It is only through the know-

ledge of Brahma that immortality can be gained, because the Mantra-words say—"It is by knowing it (i.e. Brahma) only that (a person) transcends Death, and by nothing else. There is no other way to go by" (Shvet. 6.15). The statement (of the opponent) about the acquisition of immortality through the knowledge of Vāyu is only relative, because in connection with that (very statement), by starting a separate chapter, the Scriptures speak of the Highest Self, and describe the perishability of Vāyu and others by the sentence—"Everything else than this is perishable" (Brih. 3.4). From the chapter itself results the definite ascertainment of the Highest Self, because the question 'Anyatra Dharmāt etc.' (asked by Nachiketā to Death, in the Kathopanishad) shows that the Highest Self was inquired into (see end of Bra. Sū. I.ii.24).—39.

#### 11. JYOTIRADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 40.

*Jyoti (is Brahma) because it is so seen.—40.*

The Scriptures mention—"This serene being (Samprasāda) i.e. the Jīva-Self, after arising from this tabernacle (i.e. getting rid of the wrong notion that it is his body), and having attained this highest Jyoti, becomes manifest in its own nature (as the Sat-Self)." (Chhān. 8.12.3). Here, it is doubted whether that which is termed Jyoti is Light (Teja) which, as being an object of the sense-organ the eye, destroys darkness, or whether it is the Highest Brahma. What then is your conclusion? The term Jyoti means the well-known Teja. How so? Because the use of the term Jyoti in that connection is well established. In Bra. Sū. I.i.124, of course, because of the chapter, the word Jyoti discards its own proper meaning and assumes the sense of Brahma. Again in the chapter dealing with Nādis, the person desirous of attaining Final Release is said to reach Āditya (the Sun), thus—"Afterwards, when he goes out of this body, he ascends by the very rays (of Light)" (Chhān. 8.6.5). Therefore, the well-known Teja is indicated by the term 'Jyoti'. This being the conclusion of the opponent, we reply—The term Jyoti means the Highest Brahma only. How so? Because it is so seen. Because it is seen that the same (Brahma) is referred to

in this chapter as the thing to be spoken about. Because, that Self which has the nature of being free from sin etc., as referred to in the Scriptural passage "This Self which is free from sin" (Chhān. 8.7.1), is the same as is understood to be that which should be searched for and known. The Scriptural passage "I shall further explain the same (Self) to you in detail" (Chhān. 8.9.3) also, is a continuation of the same topic. Then again, by the Scriptural passage "On him, who has become disembodied, neither pleasure nor pain make any impression" (Chhān. 8.12.1), the attainment by him of this Jyoti, is for the purpose of the attainment (by him) of disembodiedness, because, that otherwise than by attaining Brahma, disembodiedness can be attained, is not reasonably sustainable, and also because, it is particularized as "The Highest Light, the best Purusha" (Chhān. 8.12.3). With regard to what is said (by the opponent) about a person desirous of Final Release reaching the Sun, we reply—This is not the absolute Final Release, because it involves movement of progress (from one stage to another) and evolution towards it. We will explain hereafter, how, in the case of absolute Final Release there is neither movement and progress nor evolution.—40.

12. ARTHĀNTARATVAVYAPADESHĀDHIKARĀṆAM.  
Sū. 41.

*The Ākāsha (is Brahma) because of the mention of its being different (from names and forms).—41.*

A Scriptural passage mentions—"Ākāsha, verily, is the revealer of names and forms. That within which these (names and forms) are (contained) is Brahma, that is immortal, that is the Self" (Chhān. 8.14.1). (The opponent says)—when it is considered as to whether by the word Ākāsha the Highest Brahma is meant or the well-known created element (which also is called the Ākāsha), it is reasonable (to conclude) that it means the created element, because the use of the word Ākāsha in that sense is well established, and also because, due to the revelation of names and forms by way of affording space (Avakāsha), it is possible to use that term for it (i.e. the created element), and

also because of the absence of any mention in the Scriptures here, of any clear indicatory mark of Brahma, such as its creativity etc. (To this conclusion of the opponent), our reply is—It is the Highest Brahma alone that deserves to be expressed by the term Ākāsha. Why so? Because of the mention of its being a different entity (from names and forms) etc.. The passage “That within which these (names and forms) are contained” indicates the Ākāsha as being something different from names and forms. Now, it is not possible that anything else except Brahma can be different from names and forms, because the creation as such is precisely evolved by names and forms. Besides, the unfettered and free revelation of names and forms is not possible in the case of anything other than Brahma, because the Scriptures have mentioned the creative agency (Kartritva) of Brahma thus—“I will now enter (the creations) by the Jīva-Self and evolve names and forms” (Chhān. 6.3.2). But (says the opponent) it is actually seen that the Jīva-Self also has the power to reveal names and forms. We reply—all right, it has, but the passage here precisely purports to emphasize the non-difference (between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self). The very fact of the revelation of names and forms is tantamount to a mention of an indicatory mark of the creativity (Kartritva) of Brahma. “That is Brahma, that is the immortal, that is the Self” are the indicatory marks of the view about Brahma (being the immortal Self). This is merely an amplification of the Sūtra “Ākāsha is Brahma (because it is the indicatory mark of Brahma)” —(Bra. Sū. I.i.22).—41.

13. *SUSHUPTYUTKRĀNTYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 42-43.*

*During the conditions of deep sleep and going away (from the body) there is designation of difference (between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self).—42.*

The word designation follows up here also. In the sixth chapter (Prapāṭhaka) of Brihadāraṇyaka, beginning with the sentence—“What is this Self? It is that, which is of the structure of cognition amongst the Prāṇās (sense-organs), the Purusha, the Self-effulgent Light in the

Hridaya" (Brih. 4.3.7), there is an exhaustive discussion about or elaboration of the Self. Now, the doubt is whether this sentence is intended to make a further statement about the transmigratory nature (of the Jīva-Self) or to propound and establish the non-transmigratory nature (of Brahma). What then is the conclusion? It is, that it is with respect to the Jīva-Self's transmigratory nature. How so? Because of the introductory and the concluding portions. In the introductory portion, the passage "This, which is of the structure of cognition amongst the Prāṇās (sense-organs)" is an indicatory mark of the embodied Jīva-Self. Also in the concluding portion—"This is the great, the unborn Self which is of the structure of cognition amongst the Prāṇās" (Brih. 4.4.22), the same is not abandoned, and in between the two, by way of mentioning the condition of wakefulness, the same (Jīva-Self) has been further discussed. This being the conclusion (of the opponent), we reply—This sentence has the purport of giving instruction about the Highest Lord only, and not that of making a further statement about the embodied Jīva-Self. How so? Because of the mention of the Highest Lord as distinguished from the embodied Jīva-Self, during the conditions of deep sleep and that of the going out (of the body). So far as the condition of deep sleep is concerned, it mentions the Highest Lord as being different from the embodied Jīva-Self, by the sentence—"This Purusha embraced as he is by the intelligent Self (Prājña), is not conscious of anything without or within" (Brih. 4.3.21). Now, here the Purusha can only be the embodied Jīva-Self, because it is he who is the knower. When the question is about the consciousness of anything without or within, it is possible to be denied only in his case, while the Highest Self, i.e. the intelligent Self, is never dissociated with intelligence, as being of the nature of Omniscience. Similarly during the conditions of going out (of the body) also, the Highest Lord is distinguished from the embodied Jīva-Self (by the Scriptures) in the sentence—"This embodied Jīva-Self mounted on by the intelligent Self, goes out groaning" (Brih. 4.3.35). There also the embodied Jīva-Self is distinguished from the Highest Lord, as the one having control or dominion over the body, and the intelligent Self (Prājña) is the same Highest Lord. Therefore we

understand that here it being mentioned as being different from (the embodied Jīva-Self) during the conditions of deep sleep and going out of the body, it is the Highest Lord that is desired to be spoken of. With regard to the statement, that as both in the beginning and the end and in between, because of that indicatory mark being of the embodied Jīva-Self, it is the embodied Jīva-Self that the sentence in between the two sentences purports to speak about, we reply—So far as the introductory portion is concerned, by the sentence “This one who has the structure of cognition amongst the Prāṇās” it is not intended to speak of the nature of the transmigratory Self, but rather to emphasize its oneness with the Highest Brahma, by dispelling the notion of its being of a transmigratory nature, because, the trend of the Scriptural passages which follow—viz. “He contemplates as it were, sports as it were”—appears to be to dispel the notion of the Jīva-Self itself having a transmigratory nature. Similarly, in the end also, the passage concludes as it begins—“This, verily, is the great unborn Self, which has the structure of cognition amongst the Prāṇās”. The meaning is that this (supposedly) transmigratory being having the structure of cognition, verily, is the great unborn Self, the Highest Lord, is exactly what has been propounded by us. Anybody, however, who considers that because of the reference to the conditions of wakefulness etc., the nature of the transmigratory Self is meant to be spoken of, would, even if he be deliberately sought to be set out towards the East, persist in going towards the West, because, the passage does not purport to say anything about the Self being affected by conditions or having a transmigratory nature, by mentioning the conditions of wakefulness etc., but, that it is not affected by any condition, and that it has no transmigratory nature. How (says the opponent) is it understood to be so? Because, at every step Janaka says—“Do now say something about the way of attaining Final Release”. And Yājñavalkya at every step replies—“He is untouched by whatever he enjoys or suffers (i.e. by Bhoga) in that state, for this Purusha is unattached” (is the full sentence) (Brih. 4.3.14, 15), and also, “He (in this form) is untouched by merit, untouched by demerit, for he then happens to be beyond all the woes of the Hridaya (i.e. intellect)” (Brih. 4.3.22). Therefore, it

should be understood that this sentence has the purport of propounding the non-transmigratory nature (of the Highest Self).—42.

*Also because of (the use of) the words  
'Lord' etc.—43.*

This is again why this sentence should be understood to have the purport of propounding the non-transmigratory nature (of the Highest Self) only, because in this sentence words such as 'Lord' etc. have the purport of propounding the non-transmigratory nature (of the Highest Self). Words of the type of 'Lord of all, Ruler of all, Protector of all' have the purpose of propounding the Highest Self's non-transmigratory nature. "He does not become any the higher in status by good actions, nor does he become one of a lower status by evil actions" are the type of words which deny the transmigratory nature (of the Highest Self). Therefore, we understand that it is the non-transmigratory Highest Lord that is spoken of here.—43.

*Here ends Pāda III of Adhyāya I.*



## ADHYĀYA I—PĀDA IV

### 1. ĀNUMĀNIKĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 1-7.

*If it be said that the inferred one (i.e. the Pradhāna of the Sāmkhyās) is spoken of in some branches (Shākhās) of the Scriptures, by a word (meaning the Pradhāna), we say—No, because (the word ‘Avyakta’) in the metaphor (Rūpaka) of the body, is understood to mean the body. Besides, the Scriptures also say so.—1.*

Having declared that there would be an inquiry into the desire to know Brahma, the characteristic of Brahma has been stated in Sū. I.i.2. Having raised a doubt, that the characteristic is common i.e. equally applicable to the Pradhāna also, the same is resolved by mentioning that it (the Pradhāna) has no Scriptural authority, by the Sūtra—“Ikshaternāshabdam” (I.i.5). Then it has been discussed in the preceding portion, as to how all the Scriptural passages have a uniform trend or sequence, culminating in showing that Brahma—and not the Pradhāna—is the cause (of the transitory world). Now, it is further doubted by the Sāmkhyās, as not having been referred to nor refuted before, as follows:—What you have said before, viz. that the Pradhāna has no Scriptural authority, is not yet conclusively established, because, in some branches (Shākhās), the Scriptures have referred to certain words which seem to create an impression, that they culminate in indicating the Pradhāna. Therefore, it comes to this, viz. that the Pradhāna is the cause (of the world) is proved by the Vedās, and that it has been accepted as such by great and venerable sages such as Kapila and others. Therefore, as long as it is not properly explained that these words indicate an entity other than the Pradhāna (viz. Brahma), even if it is propounded that the Omniscient Brahma is the cause (of the transitory world) it would still remain shaky i.e. vitiated. Therefore, the portion (of the treatise, Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāshya) which follows is intended for explaining how these words indicate an entity other than the Pradhāna (i.e. Brahma). According to the Sāmkhya opponent, in the

case of the followers of some Shākhās (branches of the Vedās) this inferred one (i.e. one deduced as an inference), viz. the Pradhāna, appears to have been indicated by the Scriptural word. The Kaṭhopanishad says—"The undeveloped i.e. unmanifest (Avyakta) is higher than 'the great one' (Mahat i.e. intelligence—a technical term of the Sāmkhya), and the Purusha is higher than the undeveloped or unmanifest 'Avyakta'" (Kaṭha. 1.3.11). The words 'Mahat', 'Avyakta' and 'Purusha' which are well-known in (Sāmkhya) Smṛiti, are here recognized as having been used precisely in the same order and by the same terms, therefore, we say that by the word 'Avyakta', because it is well-known in (Sāmkhya) Smṛiti, and because it is devoid of sound (Shabda) etc., and because it is etymologically derived thus—"that which is not developed is undeveloped", the Pradhāna well-known in (Sāmkhya) Smṛiti is spoken of here, and as it is mentioned in the Scriptures, it is not reasonably sustainable to say that it has no Scriptural authority, and therefore, that very same Pradhāna is the cause of the transitory world, by reason of its being well-known in the Scriptures and the Smṛitis, and also because it stands to reason. Because, it is (thus) mentioned in the Scriptures, it is not reasonably sustainable to say that it has no Scriptural authority. If it is urged therefore (by the Sāmkhya) that, that (Pradhāna) precisely is the cause of the transitory world (Jagat), we reply—It is not so. This sentence in the Kaṭhopanishad has not the purpose of intimating the existence of 'the Great One' (Mahat) and the 'Undeveloped' (Avyakta) as known in the (Sāmkhya) Smṛiti. Nothing like the Pradhāna, which in the (Sāmkhya) Smṛiti is recognized as the independent cause, and which possesses the triple constitutive qualities (of Sattva, Raja, and Tama) is to be seen here (in the Kāṭhaka passage). We know only this much, viz. that here, only the mere word 'Avyakta' is used. This word etymologically derived as 'that which is not developed, is undeveloped' could be used for anything which is subtle and supersensible (i.e. not perceivable). Nor is it, that by any settled usage the word is used for any particular thing. Such a settled usage (of that word) by those who hold the Pradhāna to be the cause (of the transitory world) being confined to the technical terminology (of

their own system) would not serve as a means of determining the meaning of the Vedās. In the absence of a recognition of the nature (Rūpa) of a thing, it is not reasonably sustainable to understand a similar meaning here, simply because an identical order (of words) is present here. No one who is not a fool, seeing a cow in the very same place where once there was a horse, would conclude that it is a horse (and not a cow). And when the chapter is scrutinized, it is not understood that the Pradhāna imagined by the Sāmkhyās is indicated here, because, here in the metaphor (Rūpaka) about the body the word 'Avyakta' is understood to mean the body. (In a Rūpaka, the Upameya is identical with the Upamāna.) The body which is referred to in the metaphor of the chariot, is here understood by the word 'Avyakta'. How so? Because of the chapter, and also because of the inference (Parishesha) in as much as it is the only thing remaining (to be identified) which completes the metaphor. Even so does the earlier portion of the passage show the idea of the Self and the body being referred to in the metaphor, as the Lord of the chariot and the chariot respectively, thus :—"Know the Self as the Lord of the chariot, the body as the chariot, Intelligence as the charioteer, the mind as the reins, the sense-organs (are spoken of) as the steeds, and the objects of senses as the course, and he who is so equipped with the body, the sense-organs, and the mind, is called the experienter, by the wise" (Kaṭha. 1.3.3, 4). (Then the text shows) that when the sense-organs are not under control, a man attains transmigratory existence, and when the sense-organs are well under control (a man) reaches the end of the road, which is the Highest seat of Viṣṇu, and thereafter when there is the desire to know as to what that Highest seat of Viṣṇu at the end of the road is, the passage shows, that the Highest seat of Viṣṇu at the end of the road, which is higher than the sense-organs etc. relevant to the passage, is the Highest Self, i.e. the Highest seat of Viṣṇu, thus :—"The sense-objects are higher than the sense-organs, the mind is higher than the sense-objects, Intelligence is higher than the mind, and the great Self i.e. the Mahān Ātmā (which here means the body) is higher than Intelligence, the undeveloped (Avyakta) is higher than the 'great' (Mahat), the Purusha is higher than the 'undeveloped'

(Avyakta), and there is nothing higher than the Purusha which is the *Terminus ad Quem* and the highest evolution (Gatīh). The same sense-organs etc. which in the earlier idea of the metaphor of the chariot, are described as being the steeds etc., have to be understood here also as such, so as to avoid the fault of giving up what is relevant and of accepting what is not so relevant. As far as the sense-organs, mind, and Intelligence are concerned, they are the same both here and in the metaphor. Sense-objects such as Sound etc. which are referred to in the metaphor as the course or the road for the sense-organs as the steeds are higher than the sense-organs, as referred to in the Scriptural passage—"Sense-organs are the tethering ropes i.e. Grahāḥ and sense-objects are higher than them i.e. they are Atigrahāḥ" (Brih. 3.2). The mind is higher than the sense-objects, because the interaction of the sense-organs and sense-objects, has its origin in the mind. Intellect is higher than the mind, because the aggregate of the objects of experience, uses the Intellect as the steed or mount and approaches the experiencer (Bhoktri). The great Mahat Ātmā, in the passage "Know the Self (Ātmā) as the Lord of the chariot" referred to as the Lord of the chariot, is higher than the Intellect. How so? Because the word Self (Ātmā) is used, and as it would be reasonably sustainable to say, that the experiencer is higher than the object of experience. It is reasonably sustainable to predicate its greatness, because of its proprietorship (of the body). Or else, the Intellect of the first-born 'Hiranyagarbha', as referred to in the Smṛiti and the Scriptural passage "The Intellect of Brahmā is variously called as the Mahat (the great one), reflection (Mati), Brahmā, the reservoir of all the objects of enjoyment, Intellection, enunciation (Khyāti), the Lord, the highest knowledge, consciousness, thought, remembrance" and "He who first creates the Brahmā and then projects the Vedās to him" (Shvet. 6.18), may be understood to be referred to here as the great Self (Mahat). This (Intellect of Hiranyagarbha) which is already understood by the word 'Intellect', is however separately referred to, because it is reasonably sustainable that it necessarily is higher than the intellect of persons like us. According to this view, the Self referred to here as the Lord of the chariot, should be understood to be the highest Purusha, higher

(than the Avyakta) as stated in the later sentence, because in the truest sense there is no distinction between the Highest Self and the cognitional Jiva-Self. In this manner (i.e. after having paired off all other words but one in the metaphor and the passage from the Kāthopanishad) the word 'Body' alone remains (to be paired off), and we understand that, the Scriptures having enumerated the sense-organs etc. which are relevant here, with a view to indicate the Highest seat of Viṣṇu, by the last remaining word 'Avyakta', the only other remaining word viz. 'Body' is indicated. What the Scriptures are desirous of mentioning here, is the realization of the Universal Self i.e. Brahma, by describing the evolution of the experiencer—who is under the influence of Nescience and is attached to a body, sense-organs, mind, intellect, objects of sense-organs, sensations, during the transmigratory existence—towards Final Release. Similarly, after mentioning the abstruse nature of the Highest seat of Viṣṇu (i.e. Brahma) by the Scriptural passage "This Self is hidden in all beings and does not manifest itself, but is realized (lit., 'seen') by observers possessing acute discernment, by means of their keen and subtle intellect" (Kāṭha. 1.3.12), the Scriptures further show, how 'Yoga' is the way to the knowing of it, thus :— "The wise one should withdraw speech into the mind, the mind into the knowing Self, the knowing Self into the Great Self, and the Great Self into the calm and serene Self" (Kāṭha. 1.3.13). This means that the wise man should give up the activity of the outward sense-organs, and should function only as the mind. Then he should withdraw the mind intent upon various objects of sense, and should rest it on the Intellect, which is capable of discriminating and deciding properly, and which is understood by the word 'Knowledge'. Then he should withdraw this Intellect into the real Self, the experiencer, and should sublimate it into acute intelligence. He should then base the 'Great Self' on the calm and serene Self which is the relevant subject of this chapter, and is the Highest Puruṣa, and the *Terminus ad quem* (of all Vedāntās). Therefore, considered in all the ways, there is no scope for the inferred Pradhāna here. —1.

(The word 'Avyakta' means) the subtle

*body, because the word deserves to be used for that.—2.*

It has been said that both by reason of the chapter, and because the words 'Avyakta' and 'body' are the only two words remaining to be paired off, Avyakta means the body. Now, it is further doubted, thus—How can the word 'body' deserve to have the word 'Avyakta' used for indicating itself, when a body, because of its being a gross entity (too clearly perceivable by the sense-organs), deserves to have the word 'developed' (Vyakta) used for it, and when the word 'undeveloped' (Avyakta) indicates that which is not clearly perceivable? Hence, the answer is thus stated—It is the subtle body, which, as being the cause of the gross body, is here intended to be spoken of, because a subtle body deserves to be referred to by the word 'Avyakta'. Even though this gross body by itself, does not deserve to be referred to by the word 'Avyakta', still, the subtle element which is the originator of the gross body, deserves to have the word 'Avyakta' used for indicating it. It is seen that the word originator or cause (Prakriti) is used to indicate its own modification (Vikāra), as for instance in the Scriptural passage "Mix the Soma with the cow" (the word 'cow' the cause of milk is here used to indicate the effect viz. 'milk') (Rig-Veda. 9.46.4). Similarly, another Scriptural passage—"Verily, all this (world) was then (in its original antecedent condition) unmanifest (i.e. not manifestly distinguished by names and forms)"—shows, that this very transitory world divided into various entities by names and forms, was fit to be indicated by the word 'Avyakta', when after having given up all its names and forms (which made it manifest) it relapses into its antecedent condition of a potential seed.—2.

*(The antecedent condition of the world)  
being dependent on that (i.e. the Highest  
Lord and not the Pradhāna) it makes sense.  
—3.*

(Here the Sāmkhya opponent says)—If it were to be understood, that the transitory world, while it is in its antecedent seed stage in which it is not revealed by names and

forms, deserves to have the word 'undeveloped' applied to it, and if it were to be similarly declared that the body also as being in itself similar, deserves to have the word 'undeveloped' applied to it, then it would precisely come to this, viz. that it being so, the same Sāmkhya doctrine that the Pradhāna is the cause (of the transitory world) is arrived at, because it is understood (by us) that this antecedent condition of the transitory world is the Pradhāna. As regards this (argument), we reply—If we were to understand any absolutely independent antecedent condition as such to be the cause of this transitory world, then perhaps it would mean, that the doctrine of the Pradhāna being the cause (of the transitory world) is thus arrived at (by us). But we understand this antecedent condition of the transitory world to be dependent on the Highest Lord, and not independent in any way. It must necessarily be so understood, because it is only in this way that it can have any meaning, as without such supposition (of creationism), the creative activity of the Highest Lord is not established. And in the absence of any such power inherent in the Highest Lord, neither his proceeding to create, nor the non-liability of those who have already attained Final Release to be born again, would be reasonably sustainable. How so? Because the potential power of the seed (to sprout up into a new life) is destroyed by the true knowledge. This potential power of the seed is of the nature of Nescience, and it is indicated by the word 'undeveloped' (Avyakta), and has the Highest Lord as its basis, and is of the nature of an illusion (Māyā), and is the great sleep in which the transmigratory Jīva-Selfs unaware of their own true nature (Rūpa) continue to slumber on. This same 'undeveloped' (Avyakta) is occasionally indicated by the word Ākāsha, as in the Scriptural passage—"Verily, Oh Gārgi, in this, the imperishable one, is the Ākāsha woven weft-and-warp-wise" (Brih. 3.8.11). Occasionally it is expressed by the word 'Akshara' as in the Scriptural passage "Higher than the high Imperishable" (Muṇḍ. 2.1.2), and occasionally it is suggested to be the illusory power (Māyā) thus—"You should know the Prakṛiti (the cause) to be but the illusory power—Māyā (and not the Pradhāna of the Sāmkhyās), and the Highest Lord as the master-illusionist" (Shvet. 4.10). It is this Māyā that is this 'undeveloped'

(Avyakta), because, it is not possible to predicate about it, that it either is different from it (i.e. Brahma) or not different from it. That is why it is said "The undeveloped is higher than the Mahat"—because Mahat has its origin in the 'undeveloped', when it is understood that the intelligence of Hiranyagarbha is Mahat, and on the other hand, when by Mahat we understand the Jiva-Self, in as much as the existence of the Jiva-Self is dependent upon the undeveloped (Avyakta), it (i.e. Avyakta) is said to be higher than the Mahat (the great one). The undeveloped of course is Nescience. It is precisely because the Jiva-Self is affected by Nescience, that the constant activity of the Jiva-Self comes about. This, being higher than the Mahat, which is properly applicable to the undeveloped, is figuratively applied to the 'body' which is a modification of the undeveloped, because, being cause and effect respectively, they are figuratively considered as not being different from each other. Though both the body and the sense-organs have the nature of being modifications, common as between themselves, we have to understand that by the word 'undeveloped', only the 'body' is meant, because, figuratively no distinction is made between them, and the sense-organs having been already understood by their having been mentioned directly by their own names, it is the 'body' alone that remains (to be paired off with the word 'Avyakta'). Some others say here—The 'body' is of two kinds, the gross and the subtle. The gross is the one that is actually perceived (by the sense-organs). The subtle one is spoken of later, thus—"The Self goes (out of the body) enveloped (with the subtle parts of elements), with a view to obtain a fresh body: even so it is known from the question and answer (in the Scriptures)" (Bra. Sū. III.i.1). This body of both the kinds was mentioned without any distinction, in the metaphor, as the chariot. Here we have to understand only the subtle body to be meant by the word 'undeveloped', because it deserves to have that word applied to it. And because the conditions of bondage and the Final Release of the Jiva-Self depend on it (i.e. on the undeveloped) it is higher than the subtle body, just as it is said that the sense-objects are higher than the sense-organs, because all the functions of the sense-organs depend upon the sense-objects. (With regard to this, we say) It is for



them (i.e. those who have just said so above), to explain—when in the foregoing metaphor both these kinds of body are meant to be spoken of as the chariot, and both are relevant, and both together remain to be paired off—as to how they can say that the subtle body alone is to be understood here and not the gross body also. If you (our opponents) were to say that you are competent only to interpret the meaning of the Scriptures and not to question them (as to why they have or have not stated any particular thing), and the word ‘undeveloped’ mentioned by the Scriptures means the subtle body and not the other one (i.e. the gross one, because of its being developed), we reply—No, the determination of the meaning (of a word etc.) is dependent upon syntactical harmony. These earlier and later Scriptural statements, would be unable to intimate their proper meaning, unless their syntactical harmony is secured, as otherwise there would result the predicament of the fault of giving up what is relevant and the acceptance of some new thing which is not so relevant. There could not be any syntactical harmony (between two sentences) in the absence of an expectancy (of what is stated in one sentence being necessary in the other sentence), and when the expectancy is that both kinds of bodies are necessary to be understood to complete the sense, if one were not to understand the relation to be according to such expectancy, syntactical harmony itself would be vitiated, and in that case, how ever can the meaning of the Scriptures be understood? It should not be thought, that as it is difficult to determine the nature of the subtle body by reason of its abstruseness, that alone should be meant to be understood here, and not the gross one, in as much as its nature is easy to determine, because, its disgustingly loathsome nature is patent—because it is not intended here to speak about the nature of anything, nor is there a mention of anything which prescribes that, while as indicated in the preceding sentence, it is here desired to speak about the highest seat of Viṣṇu, and surely that is why, that after having said “this is higher than that, and this is higher than that” it is further said that there is nothing higher than the Puruṣha (the Highest Self). Besides, however you take it to be, it does not harm us (i.e. our withers are unwrung), as long as it is reasonably possible to refute the possibility of the

Pradhāna ever being meant. So, well may it be, as you put it.—3.

*(The undeveloped (Avyakta) is not the Pradhāna), because it is not mentioned (here) as one which should be known.—4.*

The Sāmkhyās, who maintain that perfect isolation (Kaivalya i.e. detachment of the Soul from matter and its identification with the Supreme Spirit) is attained through realizing the difference between the constitutive qualities (Guṇās of the Pradhāna) and the Purusha (the Highest Self), also mention in their Smṛiti that the Pradhāna is something which should be known. They also maintain, that it is not possible to know the difference between the constitutive qualities (Guṇās) and the Purusha, without knowing the nature of the constitutive qualities. Occasionally their Smṛiti also says, that in order to be an exalted prototype (Vibhūti) and to acquire special super-human powers, the Pradhāna should be known. Now the undeveloped (Avyakta) is not however mentioned here as something which should be known. Only the mere word 'undeveloped' (Avyakta) occurs here. There is no sentence here to the effect that the undeveloped (Avyakta) should be known or devoutly meditated upon. Nor would it be reasonably sustainable to say that the knowledge of anything about which there is no instruction (in the Scriptures), could be for the attainment of the chief object of man (i.e. Purushārtha). Because of this also, by the word undeveloped (Avyakta), Pradhāna is not spoken of. On the other hand, so far as our view is concerned, this statement being intended for indicating the Highest seat of Viṣṇu, by following up the idea of the metaphor of the chariot, our view is flawless.—4.

*(If the Sāmkhyās were to say) that the Scriptures mention (that the undeveloped i.e. Pradhāna should be known), we reply—No, because of the chapter (which indicates) The Intelligential Self (i.e. Prājña).—5.*

Here the Sāmkhya says—(the allegation of the Vedāntins) that the Scriptures do not mention the

'undeveloped' (Pradhāna of the Sāmkhyās) as a thing to be known, is not proved. How so? Because, further on in the Scriptures, there is a passage which says that the Pradhāna which is understood by the word 'undeveloped' (Avyakta), should be known thus—"One who has perceived, that the undeveloped (Avyakta) which is sans-sound, sans-touch, sans-form, sans-decay and also sans-taste, and which is eternal and sans-smell, sans-beginning and sans-end, and which is higher than the Great (Mahat), and is constant, is released from the jaws of Death" (Kaṭha. 2.3.15). The same Pradhāna, which in the (Sāmkhya) Smṛiti is said to be sans-sound etc., and to be higher than the Great (Mahat), is here indicated as the one that should be perceived, and therefore, this (i.e. the undeveloped 'Avyakta' is nothing else but Pradhāna, and the same is here indicated by the word 'undeveloped' (Avyakta). To this objection of the Sāmkhyās), we reply—It is not the Pradhāna that is indicated here as the one to be perceived. It is understood, that it is the intelligential Highest Self that is here indicated as the one to be perceived. How is it so? Because of the chapter. Here, it is a chapter about the intelligential Highest Self *in extenso*. Because it is indicated by the Scriptures, thus—"Nothing is higher than the Purusha (the Highest Self), that is the *Terminus ad quem* and the Highest goal" etc., and the passage "This Self is hidden in all beings and does not make itself manifest", which speaks of abstruseness, shows that there precisely is a desire to know that (Highest Self) only. Besides the passage "One should draw the Speech into the mind" enjoins, that Speech etc., should be controlled for the purpose of understanding that (Highest Self) only, because it is said to have the fruit in the form of release from the jaws of Death. It is not maintained by the Sāmkhyās, that it is by knowing the Pradhāna only that one is released from the jaws of Death. In all Vedānta passages, the quality of being sans-sound etc., is mentioned as belonging to the intelligential Highest Self alone. Therefore, it is not the Pradhāna that is either spoken of as a thing to be known, or indicated by the word 'undeveloped' (Avyakta).—5.

*Besides (in the Scriptures) there is mention only of three things in this way and the*

*questions also are three only, (and none about the Pradhāna).—6.*

This is again why neither the Pradhāna is indicated by the word 'undeveloped' (Avyakta), nor is it (mentioned as) the thing to be known. Because we see that in the Kāṭhāvalli there is mention about three things, viz. the (sacrificial) Fire, the embodied Jīva-Self, and the Highest Self only, as the things to be spoken of on the strength of the conferment of the boons (by Yama to Nachiketā). The question also refers to these things only, and there is neither a statement nor a question about any other thing. With respect to this, the question relating to Agni is as follows:—"Oh Death, thou knowest the (sacrificial) Fire which leads to heaven. Do please tell me who have faith, about it" (Kāṭha. 1.1.13). The question relating to the Jīva-Self is as follows:—"The doubt that men have when a person has departed (i.e. has died)—viz. some say he exists and others that he does not exist—, that is what, taught by you, I desire to know, and this would be the third of the three boons (granted by you)" (Kāṭha. 1.1.20). The question relating to the Highest Self is as follows:—"That which is different (Anyatra) from the mere following of the Shāstrās (i.e. Dharma), its fruit and the agent etc., and that which is different (Anyatra) from the following of that which is against the Shāstra (i.e. Adharma) and that which is different from both the effect (Kṛita) and the cause (Akṛita), and is also different from the past and the future (including the present), tell me about that which you know" (Kāṭha. 1.2.14). The reply to the question about the (Sacrificial) Fire, is as follows:—" (Death then told Nachiketā) about the Fire, which was the first amongst the worlds, and also about the sort of, and the requisite number of, bricks (for building the Vēdi (altar) on which fire is lighted)". (Kāṭha. 1.1.15). Then further on at some distance (from the information about the Fire, Death spoke to Nachiketā) at some length about the Jīva-Self, thus:—"Very well, Oh Gautama, I will tell you about that mysterious and ancient Brahma, and what the Jīva-Self becomes, after a person has met his death. Some enter a womb to be born as the embodied Jīva-Selfs, while some others become inanimate matter, according to their Karma (i.e. their

meritorious and unmeritorious actions) and according to the extent of their attainment of knowledge". (Kaṭha. 2.2.6, 7). And then (Death tells Nachiketā) at great length about the Highest Self, thus :—"The knowing-Self is neither born nor does it die" (Kaṭha. 1.2.18). There is no such similar question about Pradhāna and therefore there is thus no necessity to refer to it. (Here the opponent says)—How is it that the question (asked by Nachiketā) about the Self thus—"The doubt that men have when a person dies etc.", is again brought forward in the passage—"That which is different (Anyatra) from the mere following of the Shāstrās etc." ? Or, is it, that there is an entirely new question ? (The Vedāntin retorts)—Assuming it is an entirely new question, so what ? (The opponent Sāmkhya says)—If you (the Vedāntin) were to say that the same question is again brought forward, then both these questions about the Self, being virtually one and the same in substance, it would come to this, that there are only two questions, one about the (Sacrificial) Fire, and the other about the Self, and you should not therefore say that there is a statement about three questions and answers. And on the other hand, if you were to suggest that it is a distinctly new question, then, if in imagining a question thus beyond the scope of the boon you do not notice any fault, then you have to admit, that there would not be any fault either, in holding, that there is here a statement about Pradhāna, even though it would be beyond the scope of the boon. (To this objection of the Sāmkhya) we reply—We say on the strength of the introductory passage, that we are not here imagining any question different from those involved in connection with the granting of the boon, and beginning with the conferment of the boons, it is observed that there is the same one tendency running through the dialogue between Death and Nachiketā, right till the end of the Kāthavalli. Death has conferred three boons on Nachiketā who was sent to Death by his father. By the first boon Nachiketā desired the re-establishment of his father's benignity (towards himself). By the second boon he asked for instruction about the (sacrificial) Fire, and by the third he has asked for the knowledge of the Self which is understood from the indicatory mark "This is the third of the boons", in the passage beginning with "The doubt that men have,

when a person has departed i.e. he has died" (Kaṭha. 1.1.20). So, if it were to be said that the passage "That which is different (Anyatra) from the mere following of the Shāstrās" suggests an entirely new and an extraordinary question, then by imagining that there is a question beyond the scope of the boons conferred, the sentence would be vitiated. But (says the Sāṃkhya opponent), this question deserves to be a distinctly new one, because the subject matter about which the question is asked is different. The former question is about the Jīva-Self, because a doubt is expressed in the passage—"The doubt that men have when a man dies, whether he exists (after death) or does not so exist". Now the Jīva-Self, being connected with Dharma, does not deserve to be the subject of a question such as "being beyond Dharma", while the intelligential Self which is beyond Dharma etc. could very properly be the subject of such a question as "being beyond the Dharma" etc.. Nor is the nature (lit., complexion) of the questions similar. The former question is concerned with the existence or non-existence (of the Jīva-Self after death), and the latter question is concerned with something which is beyond Dharma. Therefore, because of the want of identity (between the two questions) the questions are different and it cannot be said that the former question is brought forward. (To this objection of the Sāṃkhya), we reply—No, because it is understood that the Jīva-Self and the Intelligential Self are but one and the same. Were the Jīva-Self however to be different from the Intelligential Self, then it may well be that because of the difference in the subjects about which the questions are asked, the questions also would be different. But they are not so different (from each other), because of the other Scriptural passages such as—"That thou art" etc. Here the reply to the question, "That which is different (Anyatra) from the mere following of the Shāstrās", viz. that "The intelligential Self is neither born nor does it die, which is propounded by the denial of the birth or death (of the Jīva-Self), shows that the Jīva-Self and the Highest Lord are not different from each other. Denial becomes logically necessary, only when (in the absence of such a denial) a predicament arises. The predicament of birth and death becomes possible in the case of the Jīva-Self owing to its contact with a body,

but not in the case of the Highest Self i.e. the Parameshvara. Similarly the Scriptures show, how the Jīva-Self is not different from the Intelligential Self, by showing that there is complete elimination of sorrow or grief as a result of devout contemplation of the Intelligential Self which is characterized by the attributes of greatness and Omnipresence, by the Jīva-Self which experiences the conditions of dreams and wakefulness, by the passage—"The wise one, by realizing that (the Intelligential Highest Self) by the help of which the Jīva-Self perceives the conditions both of dreams and wakefulness, is the one which is great and omnipresent, does not grieve" (Kaṭha. 2.1.4). And the conclusion of all Vedānta passages is that grief is eliminated by the realization of the Intelligential Highest Self. Similarly, in the foregoing portion, the Scriptures censure the looking upon the Jīva-Self and the Intelligential Highest Self as different, thus:—"Whatever is here is there and *vice versa*, and any one who sees these as different from each other, goes from death to death" (Kaṭha. 2.1.10). Similarly, after the question on the subject of the existence or non-existence of the Jīva-Self after death, when Death saw that Nachiketā could not be made to swerve (from his inquiry) by the various temptations in the form of the objects of desire (such as women etc.), then, by saying to Nachiketā who was desirous of acquiring knowledge, "Oh Nachiketā, you may ask for another boon from me" etc., Death, after explaining to Nachiketā the difference between secular prosperity and Final Beatitude, and the difference between Nescience and Knowledge, and having praised Nachiketā who was desirous of acquiring Knowledge, thus—"These various objects of desire failed to tempt you" (Kaṭha. 1.2.4), and also having praised his question, says thus—"The wise man realizing the Deva (i.e. the Ātmā, the Self), which is difficult to understand, and which has entered into a deep forest, and is hidden in a cave, and dwells in an abyss, and is ancient, by means of Adhyātma Yoga (which consists in withdrawing the mind from the sense-organs and fixing it on the Ātmā) gets rid of pleasure and sorrow" (Kaṭha. 1.2.12). From this also we understand that it is here desired to speak about the non-difference between the Jīva-Self and the Intelligential Highest Self. Now if Nachiketā after receiving praise from Death in con-

nection with his particular question, were afterwards to give up that question and were to be supposed to raise an entirely new question, then all this praise will have been showered (by Death) in the wrong place. Therefore (it must be understood) that the same question (that has been asked by Nachiketā) in the passage "The doubt that men have etc." is carried forward in the passage "That which is different (Anyatra) from the mere following of the Shāstrās". The objection that the nature (i.e. complexion) of the questions appears to be dissimilar, is no fault, because (in the second question) a special feature of that about which the first question is asked, is asked for by the second question, viz. that the former question refers to the existence or otherwise of the Jīva-Self as a separate entity from the body, and the latter question refers to the non-transmigratory condition or otherwise of the same Self. As long as Nescience is not removed, the Jīva-Self is possessed of all the attributes, and the condition of its being the Jīva-Self is not removed, but when once Nescience is removed, the Jīva-Self is caused to be understood as the Intelligential Highest Self, by the Scriptural passage—"That thou art" etc. Both during such influence and after it is removed, the entity (i.e. the Self) is the same all through and not different. Just as a man mistaking a rope lying about in semi-darkness to be a snake, is frightened and tremblingly runs away, but when another person assures him that it is merely a rope and not a snake, and that he should not be frightened, overcomes his own fear on hearing so and ceases to tremble and to run away, while both during the time he wrongly fancied the rope to be a snake, and after his mistaken notion about it is removed, the thing (the rope) was the same all through and without any difference, so should this be understood. Hence the passage—"It is neither born nor does it die" is the reply to the question about the existence of the Self (after death). The Sūtra should be utilized on the assumption of the difference between the Jīva-Self and the Intelligential Highest Self as imagined through Nescience. Even though the question is the same i.e. about the Self, still in the earlier part, the question refers to the Jīva-Self, because of the discussion therein about the existence of the Self as separated from the body during the condition of death and also because the notion



about its being an agent etc. during the condition of transmigratory existence is not then removed. The later passage should be understood to be with regard to its condition of being the Intelligential Highest Self, as it is described to be beyond all attributes etc.. Hence it is proper to understand that the Scriptures here make a statement about the (sacrificial) Fire, the Jiva-Self and the Highest Self. With regard to the supposition (of the Sāmkhyās) that the Pradhāna is meant here, it should be seen that there is no boon concerning the Pradhāna, nor is there a question or a reply (about it) and this exactly is the disparity.—6.

*Also, like the word Mahat (the great one),  
(the word Avyakta is not used here in the  
sense of the Sāmkhya terminology).—7.*

The word Mahat is not used in the Vedic literature in the same sense in which it is used by the Sāmkhyās, viz. intelligence (Buddhi), the first created entity (Sattā) which is (of the nature of) mere existence, (and by means of which a person obtains experience (Bhoga) and heaven (Apavarga), the reason being that in the following passages the word Ātmā is used (along with the word Mahat) thus :—  
“The great Self (Ātmā) is higher than intelligence” (Kaṭha. 1.3.10), “The great omnipresent Self (Ātmā)” (Kaṭha. 1.2.22), “I know this great Purusha” (Shvet. 3.8). Similarly the word ‘Avyakta’ also, as used in the Vedic literature does not deserve to indicate the Pradhāna. Hence also the inferred Pradhāna has no Scriptural authority.—7.

## 2. CHAMASĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 8-10.

*(The word Ajā is used in the Scriptural  
passage) without its having any special sig-  
nificance (as Pradhāna). The case is similar  
to the case of the sacrificial ladle (Cha-  
masa).—8.*

The Sāmkhya again says, that the proposition that Pradhāna has no Scriptural authority, is not established, and (if asked) ‘Why so ?’ says—Because the words of the

Mantra, thus—"One ram (aja, explained by the Sāmkhyās, as being the Purusha) consorts with and lies by the side of a ewe (ajā, explained by the Sāmkhyās as Prakriti) which has variegated colour markings such as red, white and black, and which brings forth numerous progeny of a similar form, and another ram deserts that ewe which has already been enjoyed by it" (Shvet. 4.5). In this Mantra (the Sāmkhya maintains that) the terms red, white and black indicate Sattva, Raja, and Tama. The red is Raja because it excites passions. The white is Sattva because it shines, and the black is Tama because it has the nature of veiling the real nature of things (i.e. material mental ignorance). The perfectly balanced and equipoised condition of these three qualities (which mean the Pradhāna) is here indicated by qualities of its component parts, by the words red, white and black. (The Sāmkhya says)—the word ajā, which can be explained as 'that which is not born is ajā i.e. unborn', is understood in (Sāmkhya terminology) as the fundamental matter out of which everything is born and which itself is not an effect of any other cause. But (interposes the Vedāntin) by custom the word Ajā is used to indicate a sheep. Well, even if it be so (retorts the Sāmkhya) in as much as this chapter deals with the subject of knowledge, such custom, if any, cannot be accepted here. That Ajā (i.e. Prakriti) brings forth numerous progeny possessing the three qualities (Traigunya). One Purusha (i.e. Self) has consorted with her, and is attended upon by that Ajā i.e. Prakriti, and lies by her side. That Self, through Nescience (i.e. being affected by limiting adjuncts) considers it (the Ajā) as its own Self, by not being able to discriminate properly, and fancies itself as being either happy, unhappy or ignorant, and carries on a transmigratory existence. Another Purusha (i.e. another Self i.e. Aja i.e. ram) in whom discriminating knowledge has arisen and who has turned away from passions with aversion, deserts the Ajā (i.e. Prakriti) after having consorted with the Ajā (i.e. Prakriti) which has afforded it experience and Final Release. Therefore we (the Sāmkhyas) say, that the tenet of the followers of Kapila, viz. Pradhāna, has its root in the Scriptures i.e. it has Scriptural authority after all. (To this conclusion of the Sāmkhya opponent), we reply—It is not possible to accept on the authority of this Mantra

alone, that the tenet of the Sāmkhyās has Scriptural authority. This Mantra by itself is not able to support any such Sāmkhya tenet independently. Because it would be reasonably possible to imagine such qualities of an Ajā (Prakriti) in anything, as one pleases, and also because there is no special reason available here to determine that it is the tenet of the Sāmkhyās that is meant to be referred to here. The case is analogous to the ladle (Juhu, used in a sacrifice). Just as it is not possible to say, that, this is the particular ladle meant, independently, in the Mantra "The Juhu which has its bottom facing upwards and its hollow part facing downwards" (Brih. 2.2.3), because it is reasonably sustainable to say wheresoever one pleases, that this something, which has its hollow part facing downwards, is meant. Similarly, in this particular Mantra about "the Ajā" there is no special significance (viz. that it indicates Prakriti). Therefore it is not possible to say, that in this Mantra, by the word Ajā, the Pradhāna is meant.—8.

Assuming the Sāmkhya opponent says—In the ladle (chamasa) passage from where this quotation about the ladle is taken, by means of the complementary sentence "This ladle with its bottom upwards and hollow downwards, is that caput", what particular ladle is meant is understood, but, what may we understand by the word 'Ajā' here? With regard to this, we say :—

*But (by the word Ajā) the three elements beginning with Teja (i.e. Teja, Āpa, and the Earth should necessarily be understood), for the followers of one branch (the Chhandogās) recite that way (in their recension).—9.*

By the word Ajā, that which constitutes the primal cause (Prakritibhūta) of all the fourfold created things, and which itself is born of the Highest Lord, and which is characterized by the three elements viz. the 'Tejobanna' (Teja, Āpa and Anna), should be understood. The word 'but' (in the Sūtra) is for emphasizing that it should be so understood. This word Ajā should be understood to mean

the three elements (Teja, Āpa and Anna) and not the one that is characterized by the three qualities (Guṇās), viz. the Sattva, Raja and Tama, of the Sāmkhyās. Why is it so ? Because, so do the followers of one branch (the Chhando-gās) recite (in their particular recension), viz. that the three elements are born of the Highest Lord, and also mention them as having the red, white and black form (Rūpa) thus—"The red form of Fire is but the red colour of Teja, the white form is but the white colour of water, and the dark form is but the dark colour of the earth". The same three elements, viz. the Teja, water and the earth, are here recognized, because the words red etc. are common (in both the passages), and the words red etc. are used in their primary sense in the case of forms i.e. colours etc., and they are used in the secondary sense only to express the Guṇās (qualities such as Sattva etc.). It is considered to be just and proper, that ambiguous passages should be interpreted on the strength of passages which are not so ambiguous (but have a definite meaning). So here also, beginning with the passage "What sort of a thing is this Brahma, the primal cause, ask the sages who are discussing Brahma" (Shvet. 1.1), we understand from the passage coming earlier than the passages referred to in the present Sūtra, that the same power of the Highest Lord which creates all this world etc. is referred to thus—"They who follow the path of meditation (as a means of understanding that which is meditated upon), see the power of the Self of the Deva enveloped in its own qualities" (Shvet. 1.3). And it would not be possible to maintain that some other primal cause such as the Pradhāna (of the Sāmkhyās) is indicated by this Mantra about the Ajā, because, from the complementary passages, viz. "Know the Māyā (illusive power) as the primal cause and the Highest Lord as the Māyin (the master illusionist)" and "That one (the Highest Lord) who is the controller of every root-cause (such as Māyā)" (Shvet. 4.10.11), we understand the same power of the Highest Lord (to be referred to in the Sūtra passage). Besides we say on the strength of the subject matter of the chapter, that this Mantra rather speaks of the same divine power which is the antecedent condition of names and forms, i.e. the nature of undeveloped names and forms, and the same is here spoken of as having a triple form, with

respect to the triple form of its effects or modifications.—9.

But (says the Sāmkhya opponent) how ever can you understand that the word Ajā here, is to be understood as something having a triple form of Teja, water and the earth in as much as 'Tejobanna' (Teja, water and earth) has not the form of a sheep, and, when the word Ajā, which indicates something which is not subject to birth, could not possibly be used for Teja, water and earth, when from the Scriptures they are known to be created things? In reply to this objection, we say :—

*There is no contradiction (in the use of the word Ajā to denote the three elements, Teja, water and earth) because the instruction is in the form of a metaphor or Trope, just as in the case of Madhu-Vidyā (a metaphor in which Madhu i.e. honey is to be looked upon as the Sun).—10.*

The word Ajā used here is not meant to indicate creatures having the form of a sheep, nor is it used in its etymological sense (meaning something which is not born). How then is it (used)? It is a kind of instruction given by way of a metaphor. Instruction is here given about the root-cause or source from which all sentient and insentient things are born, and which is characterized by Tejobanna, by the use of the metaphor of an Ajā (ewe). Just as in the ordinary world, by a mere adventitious circumstance, there happens to be a ewe of variegated colours, such as red, white and black, which has a prolific progeny having similar colours, and, just as equally casually, a ram consorts with that ewe and lies by her side, and another (ram) deserts her as one who has already been consorted with, similarly, this primal cause of all beings which has three colours, and is characterized by Teja, water and earth, creates this aggregate of modifications having similar forms, such as the sentient and insentient beings, which is enjoyed by one Jīva-Self that is ignorant of its own nature because of Nescience, while another Jīva-Self, which, after having had his pleasure with it, has attained knowledge, gives it up. One should not here entertain a doubt, that because one Jīva-Self consorts with it (i.e. the Ajā,

the primal cause) while another deserts it, therefore the distinctions between the Jīva-Selfs, entertained by certain others, is real (i.e. Pāramārthika), as it is not the intention here to propound that there is a real difference between the embodied Jīva-Selfs, but the intention is to propound the arrangement of the conditions of bondage and Final Release (of the Jīva-Selfs), and it is by referring to this well-known difference that the conditions of bondage and Final Release are here propounded. The difference (as it is understood) is caused by limiting adjuncts and is merely imagined through false-ignorance, and is of course false (Mithyā-jñāna-kalpita) and not real, as is shown by the Scriptures, thus :—"He is the one and only one Deva immanent in all beings, pervades all beings and is the Self of all beings." Now about the metaphor of the Madhu (in the Sūtra), just as the Sun which really is no honey at all, is merely imagined to be honey (Chhān. 3.1), just as 'Speech' which really is no cow by any means, is merely imagined to be a cow (Brih. 5.8), or, just as the heavenly worlds etc. which really are no Fire at all, are merely imagined to be Fire (Brih. 8.2.9), similarly, Tejobanna, which really is not an Ajā, is merely imagined to be an Ajā. Therefore there is no contradiction in the use of the word Ajā to indicate the root-cause Tejobanna (Teja, water and earth).—10.

### 3. SANKHYOPASAMGRAHĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 11-13.

*Even if (the Tattvās i.e. categories of the Sāmkhyās are understood to be stated) by the aggregate number (in the Scriptures), (the Pradhāna cannot claim Scriptural authority), because of the difference, and also because there is excess (over twenty-five).—11.*

Even though the claim (of the Sāmkhyās) based on the Ajā-Mantra is refuted, the Sāmkhya opponent again comes forward with another Mantra (in support of his claim, viz. that Pradhāna has Scriptural authority) which is as follows :—"I believe that, in which the five five-classes (Pancha Pancha-janāh) and the Ākāsha are well ensconced, to be the Self, which is the immortal Brahma, and knowing

that, I consider myself to be immortal i.e. Brahma" (Brih. 4.4.17). In this Mantra, by Pancha Panchajanāḥ, one number five is mentioned in connection with another number five, because it is seen that the word 'five' is used twice. That means that these five quintettes together amount to twenty-five. So, those things that are sought to be enumerated by this number twenty-five, are just those Tattvās i.e. categories enumerated by the Sāmkhyaś, viz. "One Primal cause, which is not a modification ; seven, which are at once both causes and modifications, such as the Great (Mahat) etc.; and sixteen kinds of modifications ; and the Purusha, which is neither a cause nor a modification" (Sāmkhya Kārikā 3). So, as (according to the Sāmkhyaś) by the number twenty-five mentioned in the Scriptures, the twenty-five Tattvās i.e. categories of their Smṛiti are seen to be enumerated, it again comes to this, that Pradhāna etc. do have Scriptural authority after all. As regards this, we say—No such hope should be entertained (by the Sāmkhyaś) of establishing Scriptural authority for the Pradhāna etc., on the ground that the Tattvās are collectively stated by the number twenty-five (in the Scriptures). Why so ? Because there is dissimilarity (between each of the categories). These twenty-five categories (of the Sāmkhyaś) are all different from each other. There is no common attribute as such observable amongst any of these sets of five, making in all such twenty-five. It is not possible to say of things which are all dissimilar, that there are, say, sets of twos etc. amongst them, unless such sets of twos have some common attribute amongst them. If you (the Sāmkhya) were to say, that the aggregate sum twenty-five is itself here expressed by means of its five component sets of five each, just as the Scriptures mention the twelve years draught (period without rain) thus—"Indra (i.e. Shatakratu i.e. one who has performed a hundred sacrifices) did not cause rain for five and seven years (i.e. twelve years)" even that would not be reasonably possible, as the fault in such a case would be, that a resort will have to be had to indirect indication (Lakṣhaṇā). Besides, here the word 'Pancha' along with another word 'Janāḥ' has formed the compound word 'Panchajanāḥ', and because of the Pāribhāshika accent, we are able to determine that 'Panchajanāḥ, is one word, and also because in another place where

the same word is used, as for instance in “Panchānām tvā Pancha-janānām” (Tait. 1.6.2.2), we are able to understand that there is one word only, and that it has only one accent and only one case-ending. Inasmuch as one word ‘Pancha’ has been compounded with another word ‘Jana’, it cannot be said that there is repetition of the word ‘Pancha’—as Pancha Pancha—nor can we understand that there is a pair of quintettes (Panchaka-dvaya). Nor can the first word ‘Pancha’ be a qualification of the other word ‘Pancha’ (which is compounded with Jana) so as to express five quintettes, because the secondary member of a compound i.e. Upasarjana\* (here the word ‘Pancha’ in Panchajanah) cannot have any relation with a qualifying word. But (argues the Sāmkhya opponent) the classes (Janāh) which have been enumerated once by the number five being again qualified by the qualifying word ‘Pancha’ can be understood to be in all twenty-five just as five pools of five would mean twenty-five pools. To this, we say—No. It is but proper that the word ‘Panchapūlyah’ being a Samāhāra-Dvigu compound, when it is desired to know as to how many different pools are there, it is possible to understand that the first Pancha word is a qualification of the other word, but here, on the other hand, (because ‘Panchajanāh’ is not a Samāhāra-Dvigu compound) in as much as the consciousness of the five different classes is present already, therefore, as there could be no further desire to know as to how many different ones they are, the first word ‘Pancha’ cannot be a qualification of the word ‘Panchajanāh’. And even if it be conceded that it acts as a qualifying word, it would govern the number five only and we have said already how that would be a fault. Therefore ‘Pancha Pancha-janāh’ cannot mean the twenty-five categories (of the Sāmkhyās). Besides, because of the excess also, it cannot mean the twenty-five categories (of the Sāmkhyās). The categories, the Self and the Ākāsha, constitute the excess over the number twenty-five. The Self has been mentioned as the pedestal or support of the five Janās, because the Scriptural passage “I consider that alone to be the Self”, which brings forward the Self, shows that what is

\* Upasarjana in grammar is a word which either by composition or by derivation loses its original independent character, while it also determines the sense of another word.



meant by the word 'in which' (Yasmin)—which has a locative case-ending—is the Self. (According to the Sāmkhyās), the Self is the sentient Purusha, and that having been already included in the twenty-five (categories) cannot properly be both the pedestal (Ādhāra), and the thing that rests on such pedestal (Ādheya) at one and the same time. If by 'the Self' we understand some other thing, there would again be an excess over the number twenty-five, which would be contrary to the Sāmkhyā's own doctrine. Again the separate mention of the Ākāsha which is already included in the twenty-five (categories) in the passage "In which the Ākāsha rests" would not be logically understandable, and we have already said, how, understanding it in any other sense would be open to a fault. Besides, by the mere mention of the number twenty-five, how can the twenty-five categories (of the Sāmkhyās) not mentioned by the Scriptures as such, be ever understood to be so meant, when the word Jana is not by constant usage understood to mean the categories? Besides, even if we were to understand something other than the Sāmkhya categories by the word Jana, even then the number twenty-five can be properly explained. How do you then interpret the words "Five five-classes"? (asks the Sāmkhya). We reply—On the authority of Paṇini's Smṛiti Sūtra "Words indicative of quarters and number, by forming a compound with the word which follows, merely mean names (Dik-Samkhye Samjñāyām)" (Paṇini-Sū. 2.1.50), the word Pancha combines with the word Jana in a compound and merely means a name. So, the word 'Pancha-Janāh' indicates something which is known as 'Panchajanāh' (like for instance Gandharva or Brāhmaṇa etc.) and not the Sāmkhya categories. And when the desire is to know as to how many they are, the word Pancha is used again. Those that are Pancha-Janāh are only five, just as the Saptarshis (the constellation of seven stars called 'the Great Bear') are seven.—11.

But then (asks the Sāmkhya opponent) who are the 'Pancha-Janāh' any way? We reply :—

*On the strength of the complementary passage, the word 'Pancha-Janāh' means the Vital Air etc.—12.*

In the passage which comes after (the passage) "In which the five classes", five things viz. the Vital Airs etc. are indicated for the purpose of expounding the nature of Brahma, thus—"Those who understand the Prāṇa of Prāṇās, the eye of eyes, the ear of ears, the food of foods, the mind of minds (can definitely understand the nature of Brahma)" (Brih. 4.4.18). These five things which occur in the complementary passage and are in proximity (to the present passage about Panch-Janāh, are meant to be spoken of by the word 'Pancha-Janāh'. But (says the Sāmkhya opponent) how again can you say that this word 'Jana' is used in the sense of Prāṇās etc.? (To this the Vedāntin retorts) well, for the matter of that, how can you (the Sāmkhya) also say, that the word 'Janāh' is used in the sense of your categories? When the transgression of the well-known meaning of a word (Jana) is common (to both of us), one has necessarily to understand on the strength of the complementary passage, that the Vital Airs are meant (by the word Pancha-Janāh). Because of the connection of the Vital Airs etc. with men, the Vital Airs etc. themselves have the word 'Jana' used to indicate them. The word Purusha which is a synonym for the word 'Jana', is used for the Prāṇas in "These present five Brahma-Purushas" (Chhān. 3.13.6). A Brāhmaṇa passage also says—"The Vital Air verily is the father, the Vital Air verily is the mother etc." (Chhān. 7.15.1). It is not contradictory to understand on the strength of the compound word 'Pancha-Janāh' that the use of the group of words 'Pancha-Janāh' is based on custom (Rūḍhi) (i.e. it is not improper to understand that the word 'Pancha-Janāh' means the Prāṇās etc., instead of its having only its etymological meaning, 'Five people', just as in the case of the compound word 'Ashvakarṇa' we accept the customary meaning—the herb 'Ashvakarṇa' (and not the mere literal meaning—viz. 'a horse's ear'). But (says the Sāmkhya opponent) how is it possible to accept any such custom when its initial use is absent? (We reply) It is possible, just as, for instance, it is possible in the case of (the word) 'Udbhida' etc. When a word whose meaning is not well-known, is used in proximity to a word that is well-known, we can from its association with the well-known word, understand it with reference to the well-known word, as for instance in the

passages—"He should perform the Udbhida Sacrifice", "He fashions a sacrificial post (Yupa)", "He constructs a Vēdī". Similarly, this word 'Pancha-Jana' which has been ascertained to mean a name or appellation (Samjñā), because of the fact that it is a compound word, as is seen from the *chapter* in grammar, and which, therefore, expects something to which such name or appellation can be applied, is by reason of its association with the complementary passage, made to refer to the Vital Airs. Some (are of opinion) that 'Pancha-Janāh' are the five classes (viz. the Gods, the manes, the Gandharvās, the Asurās, and the Rakshasās). Some others think that it means the four Varnās (Brāhmaṇa, Kshatriya, Vaishya and Shūdra) with the Nishādās as the fifth. Though rarely, it is seen also to be used to indicate the people, as in "By the Pāṇcha-Janya subjects" (Rig-Veda Sam. 8.53.7). There is no objection (on our part) to understand the word in these senses. The Āchārya (Sūtrakāra) however has stated this Sūtra, merely for showing that it is not understood here (i.e. in the case of the Pancha-Jana passage), that the twenty-five categories (of the Sāmkyās) are meant by the word (Pancha-Janāh).—12.

May be (says the Sāmkyā opponent) that in the case of the followers of the branch of the Mādhyandinās, Prāṇa and others may well be the Panchajanās, as they recite 'food' (Anna) as one of the five things along with Prāṇa etc., but how could the Prāṇās be the Panchajanāh in the case of the followers of the Kāṇvās who do not so recite 'food' (Anna) as one of the five things along with Prāṇa? To that (the Vedāntin) replies :—

*In their case (i.e. of the Kāṇvās) (the five are made up) by the inclusion of Jyoti, though they do not recite 'food' (Anna) (as being one of the five Prāṇās).—13.*

Though the Kāṇvās do not include 'food' in the number five, the inclusion of Jyoti completes their number of five. They also, in the Mantra which precedes the Mantra "In which the five five-classes", do mention the Jyoti precisely for the purpose of expounding the nature of

Brahma, thus—"The deities praise the Jyoti of Jyotis." But (says the Sāmkhya) how is it that though the followers of both (the Branches) equally recite Jyoti, in the case of one, it is included in the number five in the Mantra common to both, and in the case of the other, it is not so (included)? We reply—Because in the case of these two (Branches) the expectation is different. The Mādhyandinās have no necessary expectation of Jyoti, as they have the five Prāṇās in the common Mantra available to them to complete the Pancha-Janāh, but the Kāṇvās to whom they are not so available, do require the Jyoti (to make up the number five). It is precisely because of this difference in expectation, that in one and the same Mantra the Jyoti is included or excluded (in making up the number five), just as, even though the Atirātra Sacrifice is common, still because of the difference in the Scriptural word, the Shodashī cup (used for drinking Soma) is optionally used or not used. All the same, however, the Scriptures do not furnish any authority for the Pradhāna. We will hereafter refute the (so-called) authority of the Smritis and logic (Nyāya) (in support of the Sāmkhya doctrine).—13.

#### 4. KĀRAṆATVĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 14-15.

*(Brahma) is mentioned as the cause, in the case of the Ākāsha etc., because it is spoken of (in other branches of the Scriptures), even as it is indicated (in one text).—14.*

The characteristics of Brahma have been expounded (in what has preceded) and it has also been expounded, as to how the common trend of the Scriptural passages leads towards Brahma (as being the cause of all). Similarly it has also been expounded, as to how the Pradhāna has no Scriptural authority. Now, again with respect to this, another doubt is raised thus—It is not reasonably sustainable to understand Brahma as the cause (of all), or that the common trend of Scriptural passages generally leads towards Brahma. Why so? Because we see that there is discrepancy (Vigāna). In the various different Vedānta passages, we find that different orders of creation are met with. For instance, one passage, viz. "From the Self the

Ākāsha was created" (Tait. 2.1), shows creation in which Ākāsha was the first thing created. In another passage, viz. "It created the Teja" (Chhān. 6.2.3), Teja is said to be the first (in the order of creation). Elsewhere, in one passage, viz. "He created the Prāṇa and from Prāṇa, Faith (was created)" (Pra. 6.4), Prāṇa is the first in the order (of creation). In another passage creation without any specific order (of creation) is mentioned, as for instance in—"He created these worlds. The watery world i.e. the Heaven, the Antariksha world, the mortal world, and the Pātāla." (Ait. 4.1.2). In one place it is mentioned, that creation had the non-existent i.e. void (Asat) as the pre-existing entity, thus—"This in the beginning was merely the non-existent and verily 'Sat' (the existent) was born out of it" (Tait. 2.7), and also, "This in the beginning was merely the non-existent (Asat), it then became existent, it became manifest" (Chhān. 3.19.1), while in another place, the 'doctrine of the non-existent' i.e. void (Asat) is first refuted, and it is asserted that creation had 'the existent' (Sat) as the pre-existing entity, as for instance, beginning with "With respect to that (i.e. the cause) some say, that only the 'non-existent' void (Asat), was, in the beginning" (it further goes on to say)—"O mild one, how ever can it be so? How can the existent (Sat) be born from the non-existent i.e. the void (Asat)? The existent (Sat) alone, of course, was, in the beginning" (Chhān. 6.2.1.2). In one place creation of the world is said to be spontaneous, thus—"This, then, was unmanifest, it then became manifest by name and form". (Brih. 1.4.7).

So, there being such confusion in these various ways, and as no option of any kind is even reasonably sustainable in the case of a thing (whose existence is evident), it would not be reasonably logical to consider that the Scriptures are authoritative as to the cause of the world (being Brahma), while it would be proper to understand something else (say, the Pradhāna) as the cause of the world, on the authority of Smritis and reasoning. To this we reply—Even though in different Scriptural passages, discrepancies with regard to the order in which the Ākāsha etc. were created, occur, there is no such discrepancy with regard to the creator (i.e. the Self or Brahma). How so? Because, He is spoken of in the same way in the one as in

the other. Just as, he is, in fact, said to be the cause, in one Scriptural passage, thus—"He is omniscient, the Lord of all, the Self of all without a second", even so, is he indicated in other Scriptural passages, as for instance—"Truth, Knowledge and Infinite is Brahma" (Tait. 2.1). Here in the passage indicating (Brahma) by the word 'Knowledge', and further on, with reference to it, speaking about its 'desiring' and thereby indicating it to be intelligent, it (i.e. the Scriptural passage) speaks of Brahma as the cause, and as not being dependent on anybody else, and speaks of the Lord as the cause. And further on elsewhere using the word Self (Ātmā) for it (i.e. Brahma), it has finally ascertained it, as being the innermost universal Self (Pratyagātmā), by reason of its having been said to be inside the body and the other sheaths. The Scriptures again have spoken about the Ātmā as having become many by the Scriptural passage "May I be many and may I bring forth progeny" (Tait. 2.6)—and have also spoken about the non-difference between the modifications which are being created and itself as their creator. Similarly, the Scriptures, having by the passage "(It) created all this, whatever all this is" (Tait. 2.6) indicated the creation of the whole transitory world, further mention, as to how, before the creation, the creator alone was the one without a second. Now, this same identical Brahma, which has been said to be the cause, and which is said to have certain characteristics, is known from other Scriptural passages also, as for instance in the Scriptural passage "Oh mild one, 'Sat' alone was in the beginning, the only one without a second, it thought that it might be many and that it might bring forth (progeny), it created the Teja" (Chhān. 6.2.1.3), and also, "The Self alone *was* in the beginning and nothing else vibrated or pulsated", "He thought that he would create the worlds" (Ait. 4.1.1.2). That there is no discrepancy about the creator, is so, also because, all such sets of Scriptural passages which expound the nature of the cause, do not show (that they have) any discrepant significance. Discrepancy with regard to the things created is no doubt observable, inasmuch as sometimes it speaks of creation, in which the Ākāsha is created first, and sometimes, it speaks of creation, in which Teja is created first. It is not therefore possible to be able to say, on the ground of this

discrepancy as regards the order of creation, that the cause i.e. Brahma also, which is understood from the Scriptural passages as not having any discrepancy, deserves to be something which is not intended to be spoken of, because, it would be indiscrete or imprudent i.e. it will have the most extra-ordinary implications (Atiprasaṅgāt). The Āchārya will, later on, refute the alleged discrepancy about the order of creation also, beginning with the Sūtra—“Ākāsha is not created (because) it is not so stated by the Scriptures” (Bra. Sū. II. iii. 1). Besides, discrepancy with regard to things created, may well be there because the Scriptures do not purport to expound that. It is not here intended to speak at length about the creation. We neither see nor find it mentioned by the Scriptures that any particular consummation devoutly to be wished for by man (Puruṣārtha) is bound up with it, nor is it possible to imagine so, because it is understood from the introductory and concluding portions, that the details about creation are in complete conformity with passages in various places dealing with Brahma. The Scriptures further do indicate how the account of the creation *in extenso* has the purpose of making one understand Brahma from it, thus—“Oh mild one, seek out from the sprout (i.e. root cause) in the form of the earth, the root-cause in the form of ‘water’, by the sprout (i.e. root-cause) in the form of water, seek out the root-cause in the form of Teja, and by the sprout (i.e. root-cause) in the form of Teja, seek out the root-cause in the form of Sat” (Chhān. 6.8.4).

It is understood from the illustration about clay etc., that it is with a desire to speak as to how the effect is not different from the cause, that the Scriptures give an account of creation *in extenso*. Those who are conversant with the tradition of the Scriptures also say similarly—“The different illustrations about clay, gold, and the sparks of fire, which make us understand the diversity of creation in different places, are only meant to serve as an expedient for making a person realize (Brahma), though Brahma as such, does not admit of any differences” (Māṇḍukya 3.15). Scriptures moreover mention a fruit as being connected with the realization of Brahma, thus—“One who realizes Brahma reaches the farthest limit (the *Ultima Thule*)” (Tait. 2.1), “One who knows Brahma transcends grief”

(Chhān. 7.1.3), "It is by realizing that (i.e. Brahma), that a person transcends death" (Shvet. 3.8). Besides, this fruit is directly realized as such (by man), because the realization that the Self is not of a transmigratory nature being there from the passage "That thou art"—(the fanciful notion) that the Self is of a transmigratory nature, immediately vanishes.—14.

Now, we have again to refute the alleged discrepancy in the Scriptures as regards the cause, as is said to be indicated by the passage—"In the beginning 'Asat' verily was there" etc.. With regard to this we say :—

*On account of (Brahma) having been brought forward (in the subsequent Sūtra, non-existence or 'Asat' does not mean absolute non-existence, but it means Brahma).—15.*

The Scriptural passage "This in the beginning was 'Asat' i.e. merely a non-existent (a mere void)" (Tait. 2.7) does not intend to mention the sans-Self absolute non-existence as the cause of the world, because, after having denied the doctrine of the non-existent Asat by the passage "He who understands Brahma to be Asat (i.e. merely a non-existent, a mere void) himself becomes non-existent, but he who understands it as existent is known (by us) to be himself existent," and definitely ascertained Brahma which has the characteristic of existence as the innermost Universal Self (Pratyagātmā) by means of the successive series of sheaths (such as 'having the structure of food' etc.), and after having brought up the same (Brahma) by the clause "He desired", and having mentioned creation at detailed length as originating from it, and after having finally concluded with the clause "(the wise) call that as the 'Truth', and saying "of this there is a Shloka", quotes by way of illustration that same thing which is relevant to the context, thus—"This in the beginning was Asat i.e. merely non-existent." If therefore the 'sans-Self absolutely non-existent' were to be understood as intended to be referred to in this Shloka, it would mean that when one thing (i.e. Sat i.e. Brahma) is brought up, an illustration of an entirely different thing (viz. Asat i.e. a mere non-existence, a void) is given after-



wards, and in this way the sentence would be rendered incoherent. Therefore, considering that the word Sat is generally known (to be used) in connection with a thing which has been evolved by name and form, (it should be understood) that Brahma which before creation is of course Sat is here spoken of in a secondary sense, as if it is Asat, with reference to the fact, that before creation there was absence of any differentiation by way of names and forms (as is to be seen, now, in the created world). The same construction should be put on the passage "In the beginning Asat alone was there" (Chhān. 3.19.1), because the same has further on been brought up as "It was Sat (i.e. existent)." Now, if by "it absolutely was Asat" absolute non-existence were to be understood, then what possibly could afterwards be brought up as "It was Sat" (the existent) ? The Scriptural passage "That some said that in the beginning it was Asat (non-existent)" (Chhān. 6.2.1) does not mean that by this other Scriptural passage, an authority for the opinion held by some persons, is thus furnished, because, no scope for any option is possible in the case of an entity, as it is in the case of action (Kriyā). Therefore, it should be seen i.e. understood in this way, viz., that it is only in order to strengthen the Scriptural view "that Sat (existent) alone was in the beginning", that the view of some ignorant people, viz. that "in the beginning it was Asat (non-existent)", is merely stated and refuted. By the Scriptural passage "That this (i.e. the world) therefore was then undifferentiated but it was afterwards made manifest by names and forms" (Brih. 1.4.7) also, it is not meant to convey the evolution of the transitory world without any creator (Niradhyaksha), because in the passage "That 'he' then entered into the creation right down to the end of the nails (down to the finger tips) i.e. fully and completely" the same creator is brought up as the one who entered into his own creation, because, if we understand all this differentiation or evolution to have come about without a creator, then who else could be supposed to be referred to later on, by the pronoun 'He', which (as a pronoun) governs the thing relevant to the context here, but the same one who entered the creation ? The Scriptures say that it was the sentient Self that entered the body, because they mention that the one that entered the creation was sentient, in the passage

—“as he sees, he is called the eye, as he hears, the ear, and as he thinks, the mind” (Brih. 1.4.7). Besides, it is understood, that just as the present transitory world differentiated by names and forms, was evolved by a creator (i.e. it did not spring up from nothing), so must it have been in the initial creation also, because, it would not be reasonably sustainable to imagine something, absolutely different from what is actually seen. Moreover, another Scriptural passage also, viz. “(I) shall now myself enter (the creation) as the Jīva-Self and evolve names and forms” (Chhān. 6.3.2), indicates the evolution of the world by a creator. The intransitive form of the verb ‘Vyākriyate’ should be looked upon as indicating the ease and facility with which evolution was accomplished, when it is taken for granted that the Highest Lord was the one who caused the evolution, just as even when an able crop-cutter (i.e. harvester) is there, we say that the crop cuts itself (which shows the ease with which it is cut). Alternatively, we may understand it as the transitive form with reference to a creator whose necessity is implicit from the meaning. For instance, (when we say) the village is being approached (we necessarily have to assume that it is so approached by somebody who actually is approaching it).—15.

5. BĀLĀKYADHIKARĀṆAM. Sū. 16-18.

*(That the one whose Karma is this, transitory world, is Brahma), because the word (Karma) denotes this transitory world.—16.*

In Kaushītaki Brāhmaṇā, in the passage about the discussion between Bālāki and Ajātashatru, the Scriptures mention—“Oh Bālāki, verily He who is the creator of these Purushās, or rather (Vā) the one whose Karma (i.e. handiwork) is this transitory world, he alone is the one who should be known” (Kaush. 4.19) etc.. Now, the doubt with regard to this is, as to whether instruction is here given about the Jīva-Self as the object of knowledge, or about the Chief Vital Air, or about the Highest Self. So what is the conclusion (of the opponent) ? (It is) that, it is the Chief Vital Air (about which instruction is here given). Why so ? Because the Scriptures say—“Or rather,

the one whose handiwork (Karma) is this." The handiwork whose characteristic is movement depends upon the Vital Air. Because in the complementary passage "(during sleep) it becomes one with the Vital Air" also, it is seen that the use of the word *Prāṇa*, in the sense of the Chief Vital Air, is well-known. So also in the preceding portion these same *Purushās* which have been indicated by *Bālāki* thus—"That the person who is in the sun, the person who is in the moon etc." (Kaush. 4.3.4), have also the *Prāṇa* as their creator, because the Selves of the deities such as the Sun etc., are but the special conditions of *Prāṇa*, as is well-known from another Scriptural passage—"Who is that one *Deva* (of whom all the other *Devās* are but special forms) ? It is the *Prāṇa*, and this *Prāṇa* is *Brahma*, it is called 'Tyat'" (*Brih.* 3.9.9). Or, may be, it is the *Jīva*-Self about which instruction is here given as the one that should be known. It is possible, that the Scriptures may have mentioned this *Jīva*-Self, as the one whose action (Karma) is of meritorious or unmeritorious nature, thus:—"Or rather whose Karma (handiwork) is this." It is also reasonably sustainable to say of the *Jīva*-Self by reason of its being the experiencer, that it is the creator of the *Purushās* who serve as the implements of its experience. In the complementary passage also, we find an indicatory mark of the *Jīva*-Self, because, *Ajātashatru*, with a desire to impart to *Bālāki*—who has approached him in order to know the creator of these *Purushās*, which has been stated to be the one to be known—the knowledge of that creator, after calling the person in deep sleep by his name, and after having taught *Bālāki* as to how the *Prāṇa* etc. were not the experiencers as they could not hear (*Ajātashatru* calling the person sleeping, by his name), and thereafter by waking up of the person sleeping, by beating him with a stick, ultimately teaches *Bālāki* that the *Jīva*-Self which is different from the *Prāṇās*, is the experiencer. Similarly also, in the portion that follows, an indicatory mark about the *Jīva*-Self is discernible, thus—"Just as a *Shreshṭhi* (president of a merchant's guild) experiences along with his own people or retinue, or his own people or retinue experience at the expense of the *Shreshṭhi*, even so does the intelligential Universal Self experience along with these *Jīva*-Selves, and even so, do these *Jīva*-Selves experience (at the expense of) this Intelligential

Universal "Self". (Kaush. 4.20). And because the Jiva-Self sustains the Prāṇās, it is reasonably sustainable to indicate it by the word Prāṇa. Therefore, here, either the Jiva-Self or the Prāṇa i.e. the Chief Vital Air should be understood, but not the Highest Lord, as no indicatory mark about him is noticeable. This being the conclusion (of the opponent) we reply :—

It is the Highest Lord alone, who could possibly be the creator of these Purushās. How so ? On the strength of the introductory passage. Here Bālāki has started his conversation with Ajātashatru by saying—"I shall speak to you about Brahma" (Kaush. 4.1). He, however, having talked to Ajātashatru about some Purushās, the presiding deities in the Sun etc., who are not the principal Brahma-as-such, held his peace. On which, Ajātashatru having censured him for having talked only about the secondary or non-principal Brahma, thus—"Falsely have you professed that you would speak to me about Brahma", has then introduced another one as the creator of these Purushās and as the one that ought to be known. Now, if even that about whom Ajātashatru spoke, were to be that which is not Brahma-as-such, then that would vitiate the introductory portion. Therefore it is the Highest Lord alone who deserves to be this (i.e. Brahma-as-such). Besides nobody but the Highest Lord can be imagined to be the independent creator of these Purushās. The words "Or rather the one whose Karma is this" also, are not an indication of Karma (function) of the nature of movement or of the nature of meritorious or unmeritorious action performed by the Jiva-Self, because neither of these (actions) are relevant here, nor are they specifically mentioned in so many words. Nor is this an indication of the Purushās as they have already been referred to in the clause "One who is the creator of these Purushās", and also because of the disparity between the gender and number (Purushās being of masculine gender and plural number, and Karma being of neuter gender and singular number). Nor again is the word (Karma) an indication of the meaning of the verb 'Karoti' (creates), viz. the creative function of the creator, or of the fruit of such action, viz. the creation of these Purushās, because both these happen to be already apprehended by the word 'creator' (as it necessarily implies action and the

result of such action). Therefore, the only thing remaining i.e. the transitory world which is proximate, is indicated by the pronoun 'this' and it is that same transitory world that is indicated by the verb 'is created'. But (says the opponent) the transitory world also is neither relevant nor is it stated in so many words. (We reply) that it is so, is no doubt true, but when no special mention of any particular thing is available here, it is understood, that it is an indication of the thing which is proximate (viz. the transitory world) because 'proximity' is the ordinary significance of the pronoun 'Etat', and not an indication of any specific thing, because there is absence of the proximity of any such specific thing here. And as the Purushās (of the Āditya-Loka etc.) which are only a part of the world have been already referred to earlier, it is understood that it is only the transitory world in general that is to be accepted here. It is said—what then is the point or propriety in particularizing (the creator) as the creator of only a part of the whole world, viz. the Purushās, when the whole transitory world itself is his creation? The word 'or rather' (the 'vā' in 'Yasya vā etat Karma') is used here precisely for rejecting the notion of the creator's creation of only a circumscribed portion (of the whole world). The reason for this special mention is for the purpose of establishing the non-Brahmic nature of the Purushās that were spoken of by Bālāki, to be Brahma. In this manner, on the authority of the maxim of the Brāhmaṇa and the peripatetic Sanyāsin (Parivrājaka), the instruction given here is about the creator of the transitory world by stating about his nature both generally and particularly. All Scriptural texts without exception, also speak of the Highest Lord as the creator of the whole transitory world.—16.

*If it be said that it is not so, (i.e. the Highest Lord is not meant) because of the indicatory marks about the Jīva-Self and the Chief Vital Air, (we reply) we have already refuted or expounded that.—17.*

Now, what is said—viz. that because of the indicatory marks about the Jīva-Self and the Chief Vital Air which occur in the complementary passage, it is reasonably sus-

tainable to determine that it is either of these two only that is to be understood and not the Highest Lord—has to be refuted.

With regard to this we say that (that view) has already been demolished in the foregoing Sūtra (I.i.31), wherein (we have pointed out, that if what the opponent says were to be accepted), it would mean that threefold devout meditation is here indicated, viz. that of the Jīva-Self, the Chief Vital Air, and the Highest Lord, which is not reasonably justifiable, because we understand from the introductory and the concluding portion of this sentence that it refers to Brahma, and it is also seen, that, because the Scriptures mention a fruit than which no other fruit is higher, it refers to Brahma, thus—"He who knows it to be like this, having all sins destroyed thereby, obtains greatness over all beings, sovereignty (Svārājya—above being regulated) and Supremacy or overlordship (Ādhipatya)"—and that the concluding portion also refers to Brahma. But (says the opponent), in that case, the sense of this sentence will have been determined already, by the determination of the sense of the passage about the dialogue of Indra and Prataṛdana. To this (we say) it would certainly not be so determined because, there, the sense of the clause "Or rather, whose Karma is this" was not determined as referring to Brahma. Therefore, here, the doubt which arises again, viz. that it may mean the Jīva-Self or the Chief Vital Air, is refuted. The word Prāṇa also is seen to refer to Brahma, in the sentence—"O mild one, the mind has the Prāṇa as its support" (Chhān. 6.8.2). The indicatory mark about the Jīva-Self also should be construed as purporting to indicate the non-difference (between the Jīva-Self and Brahma) as both the introductory and the concluding portions are with reference to Brahma. —17.

*Jaimini (is of opinion) that the reference (to the Jīva-Self) is for another purpose, (as is seen) from the question and the exposition. Besides, even so do some others (recite).—18.*

Nor should it be argued here, as to whether the sentence

has the Jīva-Self as its topic, or whether it is Brahma, because, Āchārya Jaimini is of opinion, that the reference to the Jīva-Self in the sentence, is for the comprehension of Brahma. Why so ? Because of the question and the exposition. After having made Bālāki understand how the Jīva-Self was different from the Prāṇa etc., by waking up the person in sound sleep, it is seen, that the question again appears to be about something which is different from the Jīva-Self, thus—"O Bālāki, where was this person sleeping, and where (in fact) was he, and whence did he return ?" (Kaush. Brā. 4.19), and the reply (by Ajātashatru to the question so posed by himself) is likewise, thus—"When he is in deep sleep he sees no dreams, but becomes one with the Prāṇa itself" and "from that Self the Prāṇās proceed to their respective places, from Prāṇās the Gods and from the Gods the Lokās (Worlds)" (Kaush. Brā. 4.20). During the period of sleep, moreover, the Jīva-Self becomes one with the Highest Brahma. All Vedāntās culminate in inculcating that all this transitory world of Prāṇa etc. originates from the Highest Brahma. So, it is understood that, that, wherein the Jīva-Self sleeps, oblivious of any specific consciousness, and in utter purity, and wherein its nature (Rūpa) is devoid of any specific cognition as caused by limiting adjuncts, and the Jīva-Self's return from which, means the discontinuity of the condition of sleep, is the Highest Self, which the Scriptures have here mentioned as the one that should be known. Moreover, the followers of one branch, viz. the Vājasaneyins, in this very passage about the discussion between Bālāki and Ajātashatru, clearly refer to the Jīva-Self as the one whose structure is cognition (Vijnānamaya) and then mention the Highest Self as one distinct from the Jīva-Self, in a question, thus—"Where, then, was this person whose structure is cognition, and whence has he now returned (into this sleeping body) ?" (Brih. 2.1.16). And in the reply also suggest the same thus—"This one (the Vijnānamaya) who sleeps in the Ākāsha (i.e. Brahma) that is inside the Hridaya." Besides, the word Ākāsha is used to indicate the Highest Self, in the passage—"Inside this is the small Ākāsha" (Chhān. 8.1.1). And in this way, the Scriptures which speak about the Selfs affected by limiting adjuncts, as starting off from somewhere else (Highest Self i.e. Brahma) thus—"All

these Selfs start off", necessarily speak of the Highest Self alone as being the cause (of the world). The instruction which is given by waking up the persons in deep sleep, explains how the Prāṇa (Chief Vital Air) is not meant (by the passage) and furnishes an additional cumulative reason for determining that the instruction is about one which is different from the Prāṇa (i.e. the Chief Vital Air).—18.

6. VĀKYĀNVAYĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 19-22.

*Because the sentence happens to be properly construed (in this way i.e. by understanding, that the word 'Self' in 'Ātmā vā aré' etc. means the Highest Self).—19.*

In the Brihadāraṇyaka in the Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa (the famous dialogue between Yājñavalkya and his wife Maitreyī), after beginning with "It is not for the sake of the husband etc.", it is recited, "Oh Maitreyī, verily it is not for the sake of all that all becomes dear, but it is for the sake of the Self that everything becomes dear, verily the Self should be seen, heard, cogitated upon and constantly meditated upon. Oh Maitreyī, it is by seeing, hearing, cogitating upon, and by knowing the Self, that all this is known". (Brih. 4.5.6) etc.. Here the doubt arises as to whether instruction is here given, to see, hear etc. the cognitional Jīva-Self, or the Highest Self. Whence has this doubt arisen? Because it appears (to us) that as the introductory passage refers to a Self, which is an experiencer—as suggested by a reference to dear things (such as wife, husband etc.)—, the instruction is about the cognitional Jīva-Self. Again, as the instruction is that by knowing the Self everything else is known, it appears (to us) that the Highest Self is meant. What then is your conclusion? (My conclusion is that the instruction is about the cognitional Jīva-Self.) How so? On the strength of the introductory passage. Because, (the Scriptures) referring in the introductory passage to the Self, which is the experiencer and which is suggested by dear things (such as husband, wife, etc.), by mentioning that all this transitory world consisting of husband, wife, son and lucre etc., which is the object of experience, becomes dear for the sake of the Self, and when the Scriptures after that, give instruction about



seeing that Self etc., to what other Self can they possibly refer? In the middle portion (of this Brāhmaṇa) also, the Scriptures, after mentioning "This great Being, which is eternal and limitless and is knowledge incarnate, after originating from these beings (i.e. Bhūtās), gets destroyed along with them, and that after death supervenes there is no special cognition" (Brih. 2.4.12), and thus referring to this great Being which is relevant to the topic and which is the one to be seen, and speaking of its originating from these beings (i.e. Bhūtās) in the condition of the cognitional Jīva-Self, show that this 'seeing' has reference to the cognitional Jīva-Self only. Similarly, in the concluding portion of the Brāhmaṇa, by a word indicating an "Agent" (i.e. doer) thus— "How, Oh Maitreyī, should one know the knower"?, the Brāhmaṇa shows that it is the cognitional Jīva-Self about whom instruction is here given. Therefore, the passage speaking of the knowledge of everything by the knowledge of the Self, should be looked upon as being in the secondary sense, because all this aggregate of things meant for being experienced is meant for the experiencer.

To this conclusion (of the opponent) we reply:—The instruction here is about the Highest Self only. Why so? Because, it is only that way, that the sentence can have a connected sequence. The sentence looked upon as a whole (lit., in its earlier and later part) appears (from its different parts) to refer to the Highest Self, when construed in its proper sequence. If asked as to how it is so, we explain (as follows):—When Maitreyī, after having heard from Yājñavalkya "There is no hope of immortality by lucre", says, "What use have I of that by which I cannot attain immortality? The Bhagawan should tell me about what he knows", Yājñavalkya who is requested by Maitreyī to instruct her about immortality, gives her this instruction about the knowledge of the Self. Discussions in the Scriptures and Smritis say, that immortality cannot be attained by anything other than a knowledge of the Highest Self. Similarly, the mention of the knowledge of everything by the knowledge of the Self, cannot be imagined to have been made in the principal sense, in the case of any thing other than the knowledge of the Highest cause (i.e. Brahma). It is not possible to accept, that this is meant

to be in the secondary sense, because, having declared that by the knowledge of the Self the knowledge of everything else is attained, the Scriptures by the subsequent portion, explain the same, thus :—"Brahmahood forsakes him who sees Brahmahood as different from the Self" (Brih. 2.4.6). The Scriptures, after having refuted this view of difference, by telling the man, who erroneously thinks that the transitory world of Brāhmaṇahood and Kshatriyahood etc. has attained the condition of existence independently and otherwise than by the Self, that the same erroneously understood transitory world consisting of Brāhmaṇahood and Kshatriyahood etc. forsakes him (i.e. leads him away from the path of 'Shreyas'), deduces the non-difference of all things from the Self, by the passage—"That which is this Self, is all this" (Brih. 2.4.6). This same non-difference is further strengthened by similies such as that of the drum. Yājñavalkya, further on, by mentioning by the passage "That which is this Rig-Veda, is but merely the breath of this Great Being (Divine afflatus)" that this Self, which is the relevant topic, is the cause of this detailed creation by names, forms and action, makes us understand that it is the Highest Self. Similarly, further, in the passage about the only one abode i.e. Ekāyatana (Brih. 4.5.12) Yājñavalkya speaks of the Highest Self, as being the one and the only one abode of the transitory world with its objects of senses and the organs-of-sense along with the mind (the internal organ), and as being neither inside nor outside, and as being, comprehensively, knowledge-incarnate, and makes one understand the Self relevant here, to be the Highest Self.

Therefore it is understood that this instruction to see etc. is about the Highest Self only.—19.

With respect to the remark, again, made (by the opponent)—that because in the introductory passage there is suggestion of that which is dear, therefore, the instruction 'should be seen etc.' is only with regard to the cognitional Jīva-Self"—we say :—

*Ashmarathya (is of opinion) (that the reference to the Jīva-Self as that which is to be seen) is an indication of the fulfilment of the solemn declaration.—20.*

There is a solemn declaration here—"Provided the Self is known, all this becomes known just as well", and also—"All this is but this Self". And the statement about the Jīva-Self which is suggested to be something which is dear, as being that which should be seen, is an indication of the fulfilment of the solemn declaration. Were the cognitional Jīva-Self (in fact) *different* from the Highest Self, then, even if the Highest Self were known, as the cognitional Jīva-Self would not be known (thereby), the solemn declaration that by knowing the one (i.e. the Highest Self) everything else would be known just as well, would be vitiated. Therefore, Āchārya Āshmarathya is of opinion that it is for the fulfilment of the solemn declaration, that the cognitional Jīva-Self and the Highest Self are represented in the introductory statement as being non-different from each other.—20.

*Audulomi (is of opinion that the cognitional Jīva-Self and the Highest Self are thus represented to be non-different) because it (i.e. the cognitional Jīva-Self) becomes just so (i.e. it becomes the Highest Self) when it goes out (of the body).—21.*

The Āchārya Audulomi is of opinion that the introductory statement about the non-difference (of the cognitional Jīva-Self and the Highest Self) is made, because it is reasonably sustainable that the Jīva-Self which happens to be inquinated by contact with the concourse of limiting adjuncts such as the body, the sense-organs, the mind and intelligence, and which is (afterwards) rendered serene through the application of such means as knowledge, meditation etc., attains unity with the Highest Self when it passes out of this concourse (of the limiting adjuncts) such as the body etc.

The Scriptural statement also is similar—"The serene one having risen from this body and having attained transcendent lustre manifests itself in its own form" (Cñhān. 8.12.3). The Scriptures in some other place inform us by way of an illustration of a river, that names and forms depend upon the body only (and not on the Self) thus:—"Just as, rivers as they flow discard their names and forms

and become extinct in the sea, so does a man who has attained knowledge and is relieved from name and form, reach the Highest Purusha (i.e. the Highest Self) of transcendental luster" (Munḍ. 3.2.8). In order, therefore, that the illustration and the things illustrated may be properly balanced, the sense to be understood here must be, that just as in ordinary life rivers discard the names and forms which depend on them and become extinct in the sea, similarly, the Jīva-Self also discards the name and form which depend on it, and merges into the Highest Purusha i.e. the Self.—21.

*Because of the abiding in, it is so (said),  
(is the opinion of) Kāshakritsna.—22.*

Āchārya Kāshakritsna is of opinion that it is because of the abiding of the Highest Self itself in this condition of the cognitional Jīva-Self, that the statement in the introductory passage, of non-difference (between the two), is reasonably possible. A Brāhmaṇa passage also says similarly, thus—"I shall enter into (the body) as the Jīva-Self and evolve names and forms" (Chhān. 6.3.2), which shows that it is only the Highest Self that abides (in the body) in the condition of the Jīva-Self. The words of a Mantra also are of a similar purport—"After having created all the bodies the Omniscient One gives them names and settles down calling them by their names." (Tait. Ār. 3.12.7). The Scriptures in their account of the creation of the elements such as Teja etc., do not say about any special creation of the Jīva-Self, (on the authority of which it can be said) that the Jīva-Self is a modification of the Highest Self and is different from it.

The opinion of Āchārya Kāshakritsna is that the Highest Lord unmodified in any way is Himself the Jīva-Self. Though the non-difference of the Jīva-Self from the Highest Self is acceptable and is desired by Āshmarathya, it is thought (by us) that as he speaks of their being an effect and a cause respectively, by saying—for the purpose of the fulfilment of the original proposition—that he seems to accept, to a certain extent at any rate, the interdependence as an effect and the cause (between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self). In the case of Audulomi again, it is thought (by him) clearly that the difference and non-difference (between the Jīva-

Self and the Highest Self) is dependent on the particular different condition (in which the Highest Self is as a Jīva-Self).

Here it is thought (by us) that the opinion of Kāsha-kritsna accords with the Scriptures which mean to inculcate the same thing by such Scriptural passages as "That thou art" etc.. That being so, it is from the knowledge of that (i.e. the non-difference of the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self) that immortality can properly be said to be possible. If the Jīva-Self were to be understood to be of the nature of a modification, there would be the predicament of a modification completely merging itself into its cause, were it to come into contact with its cause, and then in that case immortality resulting from the knowledge thereof would not be properly possible.

Hence the abiding of the name and form in the Jīva-Self not being possible (in the true sense), the name and form which abides in the limiting adjuncts is figuratively said to abide in the Jīva-Self. Hence when the Scriptures sometimes somewhere speak of the origination of the Jīva-Self, illustrating it by the instance of the fire and its scintillae, the origination should be understood to abide in the limiting adjuncts only. With regard again to the objection taken (by the opponent), that the Scriptures by showing how the Great Being, which is the relevant subject here, and which is the one that has to be seen, arises out of the elements as the cognitional Jīva-Self, indicate, that it is the cognitional Jīva-Self that is to be seen, the same trio of Sūtrās should be employed (for its refutation). The first of this trio of Sūtrās is—"Āshmarathya is of opinion that there is an indicatory mark of the fulfilment of the solemn declaration". The solemn declaration here is—"When the Self is known, all this becomes known automatically", and, "All this is but the Self" (Brih. 2.4.6). This has been already established by expounding that the effect and cause are non-different, by means of the fact that all this diversity of names and forms and actions, arises out of and merges in one and the same thing, and by way of the illustration of the drum etc.. And Āchārya Āshmarathya is of opinion, that when the Scriptures speak about how the great being, which is the thing to be seen, rises out of the elements in the form of the cognitional Jīva-Self, it is an indicatory

mark of the fulfilment of the solemn declaration. It is only when there is non-difference, that the solemn declaration, that the knowledge of one (i.e. the Highest Self) results in the knowledge of everything, becomes possible.

(The second Sūtra is)—“As it (i.e. the Jīva-Self) goes out (of the body) it becomes like that (i.e. the Highest Self). That is the opinion of Audulomi.” The Āchārya Audulomi is of opinion, that this reference to non-difference is because of the possibility of the cognitional Jīva-Self, which is rendered serene through the strength of knowledge and meditation, becoming one with the Highest Self. The third Sūtra is—“Because of the abiding in, (it is so said) is the opinion of Kāshakritsna.” Āchārya Kāshakritsna is of opinion that this statement about non-difference is because there is a reasonable possibility of the Highest Self thus abiding in the condition of the cognitional Jīva-Self. But (says the opponent) the Scriptural statement “Having risen out of the elements, it (i.e. the cognitional Jīva-Self) ceases to exist, immediately after the elements (cease to exist) and having died, there is no cognition” (Brih. 2.4.12) is virtually a statement of the total destruction (of the cognitional Jīva-Self). How ever can it thus be a statement of non-difference? (To this we reply)—This is no fault. By this reference to total destruction, the destruction of only the specific cognition is meant, and not the destruction of the Self (Ātmā), because, after raising an objection (through the mouth of Maitreyī) thus—“By stating that there is no cognition after death has supervened, Oh Bhagawan, you have caused bewilderment in my mind”, the Scriptures have indicated their different meaning by another Scriptural passage, thus—“Oh Maitreyī, I have not talked so as to bewilder you. The Self indeed is non-perishable and has the nature of indestructibility. (What really happens is) that there is but only a separation of it from the sense-organs”. What virtually is said by this is—That the Self is unchanging, eternal and is knowledge incarnate. There never is any predicament of its total destruction. It only becomes separated from the sense-organs which are of the characteristic of physical senses which originate from Nescience, as a result of knowledge. It is on account of the absence of specific qualified cognition caused by the sense-organs, as a result of the absence

of contact, that it is said, that after death there is no specific cognition. Again, the objection taken, viz., because of the conclusion by a word which signifies an agent, thus—"By what can the knower be known?", it is the cognitional Jiva-Self that is meant to be the object of seeing, should also be removed by the opinion of Kāshakritsna. Moreover, beginning with "Where there is duality as it were, one sees another" etc. (Brih. 2.4.13), and having spoken at length about its (i.e. of the Highest Self in the condition of the Jiva-Self) specific cognition as characterized by seeing etc. as being under the influence of Nescience, the Scriptures talk about the absence of such specific cognition as characterized by seeing etc. in the condition of knowledge, thus—"Where, to it (i.e. the Self), all else is but the Self only, then, by what can one see, and whom?". And also, again, by raising a doubt, the Scriptures say (through the mouth of Yājñavalkya—"By what can one know the knower?"). Hence, it is thought (by us), that in as much as the sentence has the purport of expounding the absence of any specific cognition, knowledge-incarnate though the cognitional Self is, it is referred to in accordance with its traditional condition, by the 'Tri' suffix which indicates an agent. That the opinion of Kāshakritsna is in accord with the Scriptures, has already been indicated (by us) above. Hence that (the conventional) distinction between the cognitional Jiva-Self and the Highest Self is due to the limiting adjuncts such as the body etc., which are produced by names and forms, which are projected by Nescience, and which do not exist in the absolutely real sense, is what should be understood by those who are the adherents of the Vedānta view, on the strength of the following Scriptural passages—"‘Sat’ alone was in the beginning, the only one without a second" (Chhān. 6.2.1), "All this is the Ātmā (Self)". (Chhān. 7.25.2), "All this is Brahma" (Muṇḍ. 2.2.11), "All this is that which is the Self" (Brih. 2.4.6), "There is no seer other than this" (Brih. 3.7.23), "There is no other seer, but this (Self)" (Brih. 3.8.11).

Also on the strength of the Smṛiti passages such as :—  
 "All this is but Vāsudeva" (Bh. G. 7.19), "Know me, Oh Bhārata, also to be the Self (Kshetrajna) in all bodies (Kshetrās)" (Bh. G. 13.2), "(Know me) to be the Highest Lord abiding equally in all beings" (Bh. G. 13.27).

Also on the strength of the Censure (by the Scriptures) of the wrong conception of difference thus:—“(One who thinks) that He (i.e. the Deity) is one and he is another, does not know. He is like an animal to the Gods” (Brih. 2.4.10), “He goes from Death to Death, who sees difference, as it were, in it” (Brih. 4.4.19).

Also by the passage which denies any modifications of the Self thus—“That great unborn (Self) which is undecaying, immortal, deathless, fearless, the Brahma” (Brih. 4.4.25). If it were not to be understood like that, any possibility of irrefutable knowledge dawning on those who desire Final Release, or of any definiteness of meaning would not be reasonably sustainable. As the Scriptural passage “Those who have properly ascertained the meaning of Vedānta” (Mund. 3.2.6) shows, irrefutable knowledge of the Self which satisfies all doubts, is desired (by aspirants). Similarly also, there is another Scriptural passage—“What bewilderment, what sorrow could possibly affect one, who has realized the unity ?” (Isha. 7), and also the Smṛiti passage which explains the characteristic of a man whose intelligence is well-poised (Bh. G. 2.54).

Because, when the unity of the Jiva-Self (Kṣhetrajña) and the Highest Self is once established, the so-called difference between the terms ‘Kṣhetrajña’ and Paramātmā being but only nominal, any such distinction between the Selves, viz. that the Kṣhetrajña Self is different from the Highest Self and *vice versa*, is absurd or meaningless, and (it would be seen) that the Self being but one only, it is talked of as being of many kinds, by a mere difference in the nomenclature only (i.e. it is a distinction without difference).

When the Scriptures say “One who knows that Brahma is truth, knowledge, and that it is eternal, and that it abides in the cave” (Tait. 2.1), they do not mean that the reference is to some particular cave (other than the one where the Jiva-Self abides). The Scriptural passage “Having created that, it entered into it” (Tait. 2.6) makes it clear, that no Self other than the Highest Self abides in the cave. Those who create any such dispute, as a matter of fact vitiate the meaning of Scriptures and obstruct perfect knowledge, which constitutes the way to perfect Beatitude (Shreyas). They thereby imagine ‘Final Release’ as something which is artificial and non-eternal. Nor would they



thus be conforming with reason.—22.

7. PRAKRITYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 23-27.

*(Brahma is) also the material cause, because it is only when it is considered that way, that there is no conflict between the solemn declaration and the illustration.—23.*

It has already been stated, that, just as religious actions deserve an inquiry into them as they are the cause of secular prosperity, similarly, an inquiry into Brahma is necessary, as it is the cause of Final Beatitude. Brahma has been defined before, as that from which the world has its origin etc..

That characteristic (of Brahma) of being the material cause is common as between it and clay and gold, which are the material cause of a jar and an ornament respectively, and also as between it and the potter and the goldsmith, considered as the accidental cause respectively, and so the doubt arises as to what sort of a cause Brahma is (i.e. whether it is the material cause or the accidental cause of the world). It appears to us (says the opponent) that it (i.e. Brahma) is merely the accidental cause. Why so? Because, the Scriptures mention the actual creative activity (of Brahma) as preceded by reflection. The Scriptural passages "He thought" (Pra. 6.3) and "He created the Vital Air" (Pra. 6.4) show that Brahma's creative activity was preceded by reflection. Now, we see such creative activity to be preceded by reflection, only in the case of accidental causes, as for instance a potter etc.. Similarly, we see in ordinary life, that the attainment of the fruit of an action is preceded by many causes. The same reasoning can logically be made applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, in the case of the original creator, and also because he is well-known as the Lord. Supermen such as Kings and Vaivasvata etc. are understood to be an accidental cause only, of the world (Loka) of which they are the Lords, similarly, it is but proper to understand the Highest Lord also to be only an accidental cause (of the world). Now this creation, viz. the world, appears to consist of parts, and is non-intelligent and impure, and as causes and their modifications are seen to be similar, its cause also must be similar. Brahma how-

ever is not understood to be of such a nature, because (the Scriptures say that) it is without parts, inactive, not liable to modifications, flawless, and untainted (Shvet. 6.19). Therefore, the only alternative that remains is that some such cause of an impure nature as is known from the Smṛiti (Sāṃkhya Smṛiti) and which is other than Brahma should be understood to be the material cause, because the Scriptural statement about Brahma being a cause (of the world) culminates in indicating it to be only an accidental cause.

To this conclusion (of the opponent) we reply:—Brahma should be understood to be both the material cause and the accidental cause, and not only an accidental cause, because (understood that way alone) there is no conflict between the Scriptural solemn statement and the illustration. It is in this way that a conflict between the Scriptural solemn statement and the illustration does not take place.

The solemn statement for instance is:—"Have you by any chance asked (him) for the instruction of that, by means of which that which is not heard becomes heard, that which is not perceived becomes perceived, and that which is not known becomes known?" (Chhān. 6.1.2), and from that it is understood, that by the knowledge of one, all else which is not known, becomes known. *That* knowledge of every thing, is possible, only by knowing the material cause, because a modification is non-different from its material cause, while no such non-difference of the modification from the cause is seen in the case of an accidental cause, because in the ordinary world an architect (lit., a carpenter) is seen to be different from the palace (he builds).

The illustration also on the other hand—"Just as, Oh mild one, by knowing a clod of earth, every other thing made of earth becomes known, modification is but only a name which is made current by speech, and the essential truth is that (the modification) is but merely the earth, in fact"—as given by the Scriptures is indicative of the material cause. Similarly (the Scriptural statements)—"By (knowing) one hollow ball of gold (Loha-maṇi) every thing that is made of gold becomes known, and by (knowing) one nail-cutter everything that is made of steel becomes known" (Chhān. 6.1.4.56), and "Oh Bhagawan, by

knowing what, does all this become known automatically ?” (Muṇḍ. 1.1.2)—are the illustrations. Also, “When the Self is seen, heard, perceived and known, all this becomes known automatically” is the solemn statement, and the illustration is—“When a drum is being beaten, the external sounds are not perceived, but they become so perceived when the drum or the striking of the drum (which generates a sound) is perceived” (Brih. 4.5.6.8). In this way, in every Vedānta, the solemn statements and the illustrations prove in a way in which it becomes possible, that the material cause (is Brahma). The ablative case used in the word ‘Yatah’ in the Scriptural passage “From whence these beings are born” should be understood as an ablation indicating the material cause, in accordance with the special Smṛiti (of Paṇini) as “the material cause which gives birth” (Pāṇ. Sū. 1.4.30). Its (Brahma’s) being the accidental cause also should be understood on account of the absence of any other agent. Though, in the ordinary world, material causes as clay and gold expect an accidental cause such as a potter and a goldsmith to excite their activity (towards producing a pot and an ornament), there is no such expectation in the case of Brahma—material cause as it is (of the world)—of any other agent, because it is understood (by us) that before creation, Brahma alone was, without a second. The absence of any other accidental cause or agent (other than Brahma) should be understood to be implied from the fact, that only in that way, no conflict between the solemn statement and the illustration arises, because were we to understand the existence of an agent, apart from Brahma, which of course is the material cause, then, inasmuch as in that case the knowledge of all by the knowledge of that one (Brahma) only, not being possible, a conflict between the solemn statement and the illustration would surely arise. Therefore, as there is absence, of any other agent (i.e. an accidental cause), or of a material cause other than the Self, it is both the material and the accidental cause (of the world).—23.

*(Brahma is both the material and accidental cause of the world) because of the instruction (in Scriptures) about its (i.e. Brahma’s) desire.—24.*

The instruction about desire also, as for instance, the Scriptural passages such as "He desired, may I be many and may I give birth (to Prajās)", "He thought, may I be many and may I give birth (to Prajās)", indicate its being the material and the accidental cause also. Here, it is understood that it is the accidental cause i.e. the agent, because of the independent activity preceded by desire. And it is the material cause because, desire to be many, as shown by the words "May I be many", is the province of the Universal Self.—24.

*(Brahma is both the material as well as the accidental cause) because of the direct mention to that effect) in the Scriptures.—25.*

This is an additional cumulative reason as to how Brahma is the material cause. Brahma is the material cause, because Brahma has been directly accepted as the cause of both the creation and its ultimate dissolution, by the Scriptures, thus—"Verily, all these things are born of the Ākāsha alone, and have their final dissolution in it" (Chhān. 1.9.1). It is quite well-known, that that from which any thing is born and in which it ultimately is dissolved, is the material cause. Just as, for instance, the Earth (is the material cause) of rice and barley. The word 'direct' shows the rejection of any other material cause, as also the passage "From the Ākāsha alone". It has already been noticed that the dissolution of any modification (takes place) nowhere else than in the material cause.—25.

*(Brahma is the material cause) because the Self creates itself by itself, (which is possible) by way of modification.—26.*

This is how again Brahma is the material cause. The Scriptural passage in which creation by Brahma is mentioned thus—"It alone created itself" (Tait. 2.7), shows the Self to be both the agent and the object, 'Created itself' shows its being the object (Karmatva) and 'It alone' shows its being the agent. The opponent says—How ever can the 'Self', existing already and known to be the agent, be construed to be the object to be produced also? To this we

reply—Through modification (Pariṇāma). Already in existence as the Self is before creation, it causes itself to undergo modification, as the Self of the modification. It is patent how there is modification of material causes such as clay etc.. We understand from the word 'itself', how there is no expectation of any other accidental cause. Or else, we may construe 'Through modification' (in the Sūtra) to be a separate Sūtra. It means—because Brahma's modification by way of modified Selfs is indicated by the same case-ending, thus—"It became Sat (i.e. the three elements—Earth, water and Teja), it became 'Tyat' (i.e. Vāyu and Akāsha), the defined and undefined (i.e. something which can and cannot be demonstrated as such and such).—26.

*(Brahma is the material cause) because,  
the Scriptures mention it as the origin  
(Yoni).—27.*

Again, Brahma is the material cause because the Vedānta texts speak of it as the origin also, thus—"(When a person sees) the Maker, the Lord, the Purusha, whose origin is Brahma" (Muṇḍ. 3.1.3) and "When the wise ones perceive that as the origin of beings" (Muṇḍ. 1.1.6). In ordinary life also, the word 'origin' is understood to mean the material cause, thus—"The Earth is the origin of herbs and trees". The uterus also by way of its components (such as the ovum etc.) is the origin of the foetus. Sometimes the word means a place also, thus—"Oh Indra, I have made a Yoni i.e. a place for you to sit upon" (Rig.-Sam. I. 104.1). Here, however, because of the concluding portion—"Just as a spider creates a thread and again absorbs it into itself" (Muṇḍ. 1.1.7)—we understand the word to be indicative of the origin i.e. the material cause. So, in this manner it is proved that Brahma is the material cause. With regard to the objection raised, viz. that it is only in the case of accidental causes such as the potter etc., that we do observe making, after first desiring, and not in the case of the material cause, we reply—In this case, it cannot be supposed to be as we ordinarily observe in the world, because this matter is not subject to inferences of reasoning. As it can only be known from the Scriptures, we must accept it as being so. We have already said as to how the

Scriptures propound that the Highest Lord who is the one who desires, is the material cause (of the world). We shall hereafter deal with the topic again, comprehensively.—27.

8. SARVAVYĀKHYANĀDHĪKARAṆAM. Sū. 28.

*By this (i.e. all that has gone before) all (other systems) which are opposed to Advaita (Monism) stand (in effect) refuted.—28.*

Beginning with “On account of thinking—not—(it is not based on the Scriptures)” (Bra. Sū. I.i.5), the school of those who consider the Pradhāna as the cause (of the world) was refuted after raising doubts again and again (about its validity) in various Sūtras, as dull-witted persons would be prone wrongly to construe in the Vedānta some indicatory marks appearing to support the partisans of that school. That school, because it accepts that a cause and its modification are non-different, is nearest to the Vedānta School (of Monism). So a great effort was made to refute that school, supported as it was, by some Sūtra-kārās of religious Duty (Dharma), such as Devala and others, while no such trouble was taken to refute the school of those who consider the Atom (Aṇu) as the cause (of the world). They also deserve to be refuted, in as much as they also are opponents of those who consider Brahma as the cause, because some dull-witted persons may, possibly at the first blush, wrongly discover some Vedic indicatory mark as supporting them. Therefore this Sūtra extends the applicability of the arguments used against the Sāmkhya System (by Atidesha) on the strength of the maxim (Nyāya) about ‘the knocking out of the best athlete (Malla)’, thus—By this, i.e. this group of logical reasonings which refute the view that the Pradhāna is the cause (of the world), the school of those who consider the Atom (Aṇu) as the cause (of the world) etc. should also be considered as refuted. Because, like the school of the Sāmkhyās, they also have not only no support in the Scriptures, but, on the other hand, they contradict the Scriptures. The repetition of the word ‘Refuted’ indicates the end of the Adhyāya.—28.

*Here ends Pāda IV of Adhyāya I, and Adhyāya I also.*

## II—AVIRODHĀDHYĀYA

### ADHYĀYA II—PĀDA 1

#### 1. SMRITYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 1-2.

In the first Adhyāya, it has been propounded by co-ordinating the statements in Vedānta, that the Omniscient Lord of all, is the cause of the origination of the world, even as clay and gold etc. are (the cause of the origination) of a pot and an ornament respectively, that he is the cause of the preservation of the created world, even as the illusionist is (the cause) of the illusion, that he is again the cause of the absorption into himself of the world spread out (i.e. projected) by himself, even as the Earth (is the cause of the absorption) of the four classes of creatures, and that he is the Self of us all. The doctrines that Pradhāna etc. are the cause, have been refuted on the ground of there being no Scriptural authority for the same.

Now the second Adhyāya is begun for the purpose of propounding the refutation of the opposition of Smṛiti and Nyāya to our own view i.e. to show as to how the doctrines of the Pradhāna etc. (as the cause) are supported by fallacious reasoning, and as to how in every Vedānta the doctrines about the mode of the Genesis of all things in general, are not in conflict with each other.

(The Sūtrakāra) therefore, now in the first place states the opposition (to the Vedānta view) based on Smṛiti, and refutes it, thus :—

*If it be said (that Brahma is not the cause of the world) because there would be the predicament of the fault of want of scope for a certain Smṛiti, (we reply), no, because, thus, there would be the predicament of a fault of the want of scope for another Smṛiti.—1.*

(Says the opponent)—What you have said, viz. that the Omniscient Brahma alone is the cause of the world, is not logical. How so ? Because thereby occurs the predicament of the fault of the want of scope of a (certain) Smṛiti.

Because, in that case the Smṛiti known as (Sāmkhya) Tantra, promulgated by the great sage (Kapila) and accepted by learned people, and the other Smṛitis which follow this (Tantra) Smṛiti would be without any scope. In those Smṛitis the non-sentient Pradhāna is spoken of as the independent cause of the world. On the other hand, the Smṛitis of Manu and others, which purport to mention all matters of religious duties such as Agnihotra etc. as having the characteristic of an injunction, would be having due scope ; as for instance—that (a man of) such and such caste should receive initiation by the investiture of a sacred thread at such and such time and by such and such rite, it has such and such rule of conduct, its study of Vedās should be in such and such a way, a pupil's return home after finishing his course of holy study should be in such and such a way, and in such and such a way should he enter wedlock (i.e., lit., should be joined with a coadjutor in religious duties). They give injunctions about the proper aims of life, and the various religious duties of the castes (Varṇās) and the various types of the orders of life (Āshramās).

The Smṛitis of Kapila etc. have no such scope with regard to the subject of the performance of rites, as they have been written with special reference to the correct knowledge as a means of bringing about Final Release, and if they don't have scope even for that, then they would be rendered meaningless. Therefore, Vedāntās ought to be explained by avoiding any conflict with them. But when the meaning of Scriptures is determined thus, viz. that the Omniscient Brahma alone is the cause of the world, on the grounds of "thinking etc.", how ever can it be objected to on the ground of any such predicament as that of a fault of want of scope for a certain Smṛiti ? May be, no such objection can arise in the case of those whose intellect is independent, but in the case of ordinary men who depend upon others for knowledge, and are unable to understand the meaning of the Scriptures independently, and who may well depend upon Smṛitis written by well-known authors (such as Kapila), and who would understand the meaning of Scriptures on the strength of these Smṛitis, and, as naturally, they would have great respect for the writers (of such Smṛitis), they would not believe in our (i.e. of



the Vedāntin's) explanation. Smritis speak of the knowledge of Kapila and others, as being Rishi-like and unobstructed. A Scriptural passage moreover says thus—"He, who in the beginning produced out of himself the aureate-complexioned one i.e. Hiranyagarbha (Kapila) and sustained him by wisdom." (Shvet. 5.2). Therefore, it is not possible to consider the opinion of such as these, as improper. They determine the meaning by having recourse to reasoning. Therefore, the objection again is, that Vedānta texts should be explained on the strength of Smritis.

The refutation of this (objection, is by the latter part of the Sūtra) thus :—" (In that case) there would result the predicament of the fault of there being no scope for (these) other Smritis". If the doctrine of the Lord being the cause, were to be objected to, on the ground of the predicament of a fault of want of scope for some Smritis, then, other Smritis which lay down that the Lord is the cause, would have no scope left for them. We will cite them by way of illustration :—(The Smṛiti) after saying with reference to the Highest Brahma "That this which is subtle and unknowable", says, "it is said that he is the Universal Self of all beings, and the knower of the Kshetra (i.e. the body)". It further says—"Oh, the best of the twice-born, from that (i.e. Brahma) was born the undeveloped i.e. unevolved (Avyakta), having the three qualities (Guṇās)". In another place also, it says—"Oh great Brāhmaṇa, the unevolved is absorbed in the Puruṣa (Brahma) which has no qualities." The Purāṇa also says—"Hence, listen to this conclusion, that the ancient Nārayaṇa is all this. He creates everything at the time of creation, and at the time of destruction consumes all this". The Bhagavadgīta says—"I am both the source (Prabhava), as also the great flood (Pralaya) of the whole world." (Bh. G. 7.6). Āpastamba with reference to the same Highest Self says—"All bodies are born from it, it is the root cause and is everlasting and unchanging" (Dha. Sū. 1.8.23.2). In this manner, even in the Smritis, often, the Lord is explained as being the material and the accidental cause. This Sūtra, which mentions the fault of the want of scope for some other Smritis (in the latter half), is so stated, because it is desired to refute him—who raises an objection on the strength of (the fault about) the want of scope for some Smṛiti—by raising a similar objection

with regard to some other Smritis. That the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the world is the substance of the Scriptures, has been shown already. When Smritis differ, and when one has necessarily to be accepted and the others rejected, those which follow the Scriptures are an authority and the others are irrelevant. This is mentioned in the *Pramāṇa Lakṣhaṇa* (Jai. Sū. 1.3.3)—“When a Smriti conflicts with the Scriptures, it is to be neglected, and where it does not, the inference is (that it follows some original Scriptural text)”. It is not possible to understand, that a person can perceive supersensuous things without (the help of) the Scriptures, as there is no valid reason for that. If it be said, that it is possible because gifted persons such as Kapila and others have unobstructed knowledge, (we reply)—no, because super-natural faculty itself is dependent upon the performance of religious duty, of which injunction is the characteristic. Hence the meaning of an injunction which is in existence already, cannot be doubted by reliance on the word of a person who has become so gifted, afterwards. Even if we were to accept the idea of resorting to a person who has attained such supernatural faculty, such persons being many, in the case of a conflict of Smritis in the manner indicated (above), there is no other means of arriving at a decision except by a resort to the Scriptures. Even in the case of one who is dependent on others for knowledge, his sudden partiality i.e. predilection for a particular Smriti, is not logically justifiable, because, if any one has such partiality or predilection, then there would be the predicament of truth remaining unsettled, as men’s intellects are of the nature of the variety of the universe. So, even in his case, his intellect deserves to be focussed or fixed on the right path, by explaining to him the disparity between Smritis, and by way of explaining the point as to how some Smritis are in accordance with the Scriptures, and that some others are not. It is not possible to believe in the doctrine of Kapila (the Sāṃkhya sage) contrary as it is to the Scriptures, merely on the authority of a Scriptural passage which has been cited as showing superabundance of his knowledge, in as much as, it merely mentions the name Kapila, because one Smriti also refers to another Kapila, called Vāsudeva, the tormentor of the sons of Sagara.

If any thing is stated casually in connection with a

passage which purports to indicate an altogether different thing, then that thing stated so casually, is not established by the passage in which it is mentioned so casually (Anyārthadarshanasya prāptirahitasya asādhakatvāt).\*

There is besides another Scriptural passage establishing the greatness of Manu, thus :—"Verily, whatever Manu has said, is medicine" (Tait. Sam. 2.2.10.2). Manu, who extols looking upon everything as the Self, thus—"One who sees the Self in everything, and everything in the Self, and is a sacrificer to the Self, verily attains Final Release—Svārājya" (12.91), seems thereby to censure i.e. to disapprove of the doctrine of Kapila, who does not agree with the doctrine of seeing the Self in everything, in as much as he holds that there is difference between Selves (and that they are many).

In the Mahābhārata also, when the question is whether there are many Purushās or there is only one, after laying down first the view of the opponent thus—The follower of Sāṃkhya and Yoga doctrines, consider the Selves to be many—, it refutes it, and establishes the doctrine of the Universal Self, by stating in the beginning—"I shall explain to you that Universal Self which transcends the Guṇās, and also as to how it is said to be the one and the only one origin of all Purushās", and afterwards by stating—"It is the witness of all, the Self of mine and yours too, and the Self of all embodied beings, and is not comprehensible by anybody. He is the Universal head-arms-legs-eyes-and-nose, and alone moves as it pleases Him amongst the things."

There is a Scriptural passage also, about the Self of all, thus—"When a person sees that all beings are but the Self only, then, to him who sees such unity, what infatuation, what grief, can possibly affect?" (Isha. 7). Hence it is established that because of his doctrine of the plurality

\* I.e. when, for instance, in the particular verse under consideration, viz., Shvet. 2.5, the expression Rishi Kapila is used, but the verse as a whole purports to indicate the Highest Lord, and the highest Lord is therein described as the one who has produced out of himself and Rishi Kapila i.e. the aureate-complexioned Hiraṇyagarbha, such casually mentioned word 'Kapila' is not able to establish that it means 'Kapila' the promoter of the Sāṃkhya system, because such meaning of the word Kapila is not possible of being arrived at, considering the general trend and context of that verse.

of Selfs also, the system of Kapila is against the Scriptures (Vedās), and against the statement of Manu who follows the Vedās, and not merely because of his imagining the doctrine of Prakriti (i.e. the Pradhāna of the Sāmkhyās) in an independent manner.

The authority of the Vedās is direct and independent, with respect to matters which come in their own province, just as that of the Sun in the province of form (Rūpavi-shaye). The authority of the statements of mere men (i.e. of Smṛitikārās) depends upon another thing (i.e. the Scriptures) and is further away from directness (of authority) because of (their having to rely on) the memory of the speaker, and the necessity of their having to have some other source (viz. the Scriptures). Hence, the predicament of a fault of want of scope for a Smṛiti, when it occurs in a subject which is opposed to the Vedās, is no fault.—1.

This is how, again, the predicament of want of scope for (a certain) Smṛiti, is no fault.

*Because some others (i.e. things other than the Pradhāna) are not perceived (in the Vedās).—2.*

Mahat etc. which are different from the Pradhāna, but are conceived by the Smṛiti to be the modifications of Pradhanā, are not to be met with, either in the ordinary world or in the Vedās. As for things, such as elements and sense-organs, well-known as they are in the ordinary world and the Vedās, they may well be mentioned in the Smṛiti, but it could not be possible for Smṛitis to refer to Mahat etc.—as they are not to be met with, either in the ordinary world or in the Vedās—any more than they can possibly refer to a sixth sense-organ and a sixth sense-object. Even though the Scriptures may occasionally appear to refer to such things (as Mahat etc.), it has been already explained in Brahma-Sūtra (I.iv.1)—“The inferred one (i.e. the Pradhāna) etc.”—that they could not possibly refer to such things (as the Pradhāna and the Mahat). What is meant by this is, that as Smṛitis which refer to modifications (of the Pradhāna) such as Mahat etc., are not authoritative, even so, the Smṛitis which refer to their cause (i.e.

the Pradhāna) are properly not authoritative. That is why, want of scope for a certain Smṛiti (which refers to the Pradhāna) is no fault. The objection (to Brahma as the cause) based on reasoning (Tarka) will be refuted (by the Sūtrakāra) hereafter, beginning with the Sūtra—"No, because of dissimilarity" (Bra. Sū. II. i. 4).—2.

## 2. YOGAPRATYUKTYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 3.

*By this (refutation of Sāmkhya Smṛiti)  
the Yoga Smṛiti also is refuted.—3.*

The Sūtrakāra extends the application (of these i.e. the first two Sūtrās in refutation of the Sāmkhya Smṛiti) to Yoga Smṛiti, by saying, that the Yoga (Smṛiti) also should be looked upon as refuted similarly. The Yoga Smṛiti also, contrary to the Scriptures, imagines the Pradhāna to be the independent cause and Mahat etc. to be its modifications, though they are not so known both in the ordinary world and in the Vedās. (Says the opponent)—If it be so, as this ground is covered already by what has gone before, why is it then indicated again by the Atidesha (i.e. extended application)? The answer is—well, there is this further doubt. The Scriptural passage "(The Self) should be heard, cogitated upon and meditated upon" (Bṛih. 2.4.5), prescribes Yoga as the means of realizing correct knowledge. It is seen that in the Shvetāshvatara Upanishad the practice of Yoga, preceded by the taking up of certain postures (i.e. Āsanās) etc., has been enjoined at great length, thus :—"Keeping the body in perfect poise with the three parts held erect" (Shvet. 2.8) etc.. There are thousands of Scriptural indicatory marks about Yoga, such as —"A steady abstraction of sense-organs, is considered to be Yoga" (Kaṭha. 2.6.11) and "(Having obtained) this knowledge (of Brahma) and the whole technique of Yoga" (Kaṭha. 2.6.18). In the Yoga Shāstra itself, Yoga has been accepted as the means of realizing correct knowledge thus —"Now (is begun) Yoga, the means of realizing the principle of Truth". Hence (it may be maintained) that because of the agreement (of both disputants i.e. the Sāmkhya and the Vedāntin) with regard to the meaning of a part of the Yoga-Smṛiti being in conformity with the Scrip-

tures, the Yoga-Smriti—like the Ashtakā Smriti etc.—may well be rendered unobjectionable. Even this further doubt also is removed here by this ‘Atidesha’ (extended application), because even though one part of the Yoga-Smriti is in conformity with the Scriptures, still, as has already been indicated above, another part of the Yoga-Smriti is in conflict with the Scriptures. Even though there are many Smritis on the subject of Adhyātma (the relation between the Supreme Self and the Jīva-Self i.e. the individual soul) an attempt is made here to refute the Sāṃkhya and Yoga Smritis only, because, they, as having the reputation of being the means of attaining the highest aim of life, have been accepted by the wise, and have been supported by i.e. bolstered up with indicatory marks in the Scriptures, such as:—“He who has understood that cause (of the world) which can be known from the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga, is relieved from all nooses or fetters” (Shvet. 6.13).

The refutation (of the above) is, that final beatitude is not attained by the mere knowledge of Sāṃkhya Smriti or the path of Yoga, without reference to the Veda. The Scriptures obviate the possibility of any other means of attaining Final Beatitude, except the knowledge of the unity of the Selfs referred to in the Vedās, thus—“It is by knowing that (Ātmā i.e. Brahma) alone, that a person transcends death, and there is no other path to final emancipation” (Shvet. 3.8). The followers of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga doctrines are dualists (i.e. they recognize duality of Ātmās) and do not countenance the unity of the Self. As to the instance quoted—viz. “That cause which is known from the Sāṃkhya and Yoga”—, it should be understood that by the words “Sāṃkhya and Yoga”, only knowledge and meditation as understood by the Scriptures is meant, because of their proximity (to the subject). So far as that portion of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga Smritis which does not conflict (with the Scriptures) is concerned, we welcome that portion of Sāṃkhya and Yoga as having due scope, as for instance, when the Sāṃkhyās understand by their definition of quality-less Purusha, the purity of the Purushas well-known in the Scriptures, thus—“That this Purusha is unattached” (Brih. 4.3.16). Similarly, when the followers of Yoga, by its injunction with regard to the order of religious mendicants, understand it to be the same, as belief

in actionlessness, by instruction about renunciation of the world, well-known in the Scriptures, thus :—"Then the Parivrājaka (i.e. a Sanyāsin who has renounced the world) who wears colourless dress, is shaven, and is without a wife or other possessions or attendants (attains Final Release)." (Jābāla 5). By this (refutation), all Smritis based on reasoning should be refuted. If it be said, that they also are helpful for the attainment of knowledge, by means of inferences by reasoning, well may they indeed be so helpful, but the knowledge of truth can only be attained by Scriptural passages, such as—"No one who does not know the Vedās, knows the great one" (Tait. Brā. 3.12.9.7) and "I am asking you about the Purusha of the Upanishads". (Brih. 3.9.26).—3.

### 3. VILAKSHAṆATVĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 4-12.

*No (i.e. Brahma is not the cause of the world), because of this (the world) being dissimilar (to Brahma). That it is so (i.e. it is dissimilar) is known from the Scriptures.—4.*

The objection to the view—that Brahma is the material as well as the accidental cause of the world—, based on Smṛiti, has been refuted. Now the objection based on reasoning is being refuted. (Says the Vedāntin)—But whence can there be any scope for a doubt based on reasoning, with regard to the meaning of Scriptures which has already been determined? Just as Scriptures are independent of any other thing with regard to matters pertaining to religious duty, even so should they be understood to be independent in the case of Brahma also. (The opponent replies)—Well, such determination would be there, provided, like matters of religious duty which have to be performed, and which are to be understood from the Scriptures only, Brahma also were liable to be determined with the help of the Scriptures alone, and were not to be understandable by other means-of-proof. But Brahma is of the nature of an actually established entity and with regard to such an established thing, like the earth etc., there is scope for other means-of-proof. Just as, when there is a conflict between Scriptural passages, all the rest have necessarily to be coordinated with only one of them, similarly when

there is a conflict of the other means-of-proof with the Scriptures, they i.e. the Scriptures, ought to be coordinated with the other means-of-proof. Reasoning, which establishes invisible entities, on the ground of their similarity with a thing which is visible, is nearer to experience, than the Scriptures which convey their meaning in a traditional dogmatic manner (like an *Ipse dixit*) and they are further removed from experience. Knowledge of Brahma however culminates in experience, and by removing Nescience becomes the means of Final Beatitude, and only if it is so understood, can it be said to have a fruit which is visible or tangible. The Scriptures by enjoining thus—“(The Ātmā) should be seen and cogitated upon” i.e. by enjoining cogitation in addition to hearing, show that here, reasoning also should be welcomed with respect (as a means). That is why an objection based on reasoning is here taken, thus—“No, because of this (the world) being dissimilar”. It is not reasonably sustainable to say—as is said—that sentient Brahma is the material as well as the accidental cause of the world. Why so? Because of this alleged modification or effect of Brahma (i.e. this world) being dissimilar to the material cause (Brahma). This world which is alleged to be a modification of Brahma appears to be non-sentient and impure and therefore dissimilar to Brahma, while the Scriptures declare Brahma to be sentient and pure i.e. dissimilar to the world. No relationship such as that of a cause to its effect is ever seen where there is dissimilarity (between two things). Modifications such as ornaments etc. cannot have clay as their material cause, nor can earthen pots etc. have gold as their material cause. Modifications having the nature of earth are effected from earth alone, and those having the nature of gold from gold alone. Similarly, this world, non-sentient and of the nature of pleasure, pain, and infatuation,\* as it is, deserves to be the modification of a cause which similarly is of the nature of pleasure, pain, and infatuation, and not (a modification) of Brahma which is dissimilar. Dissimilarity of this world from Brahma should be understood from the world's impurity and from its being non-sentient. The world after all is impure, because, on account of its nature of pleasure, pain, and infatuation, it is the cause of happiness, grief and dejection.

\* i.e. of Sattva, Raja and Tama.



tion, and because of the diversity of the world with its high and low abodes, such as heaven and hell etc.. This world is non-sentient, again, as it is understood that it constitutes itself as the subservient instrument of the intelligent Self by means of a body and sense-organs. When there is similarity (between two things), there never is a relationship between them, by way of the one helping and the other receiving such help. For instance, two lamps do not help each other. But (says the Vedāntin) even a sentient instrument may subserve the enjoying Self, on the analogy of the maxim of a master and a servant ?

To the foregoing argument, the opponent replies :—No. In the master and servant illustration also, it is only the non-sentient part (of the servant) that serves the sentient (master). It is the non-sentient property of Buddhi (which is considered to be a sense-organ) of one sentient thing that helps the other sentient thing, and not that one sentient thing itself either helps or causes impediment to another sentient thing. The Sāmkhyās hold that sentient things (such as Selves) are sans-qualities and inert. Therefore, the modifications such as a body and sense-organs are non-sentient. There is no authority to hold that things such as wood or clay are sentient. The division of things into sentient and non-sentient is popularly well-known. Therefore, since this world is dissimilar to Brahma, it cannot have Brahma as its material cause.

If somebody were to argue in this connection, thus—As the Scriptures declare that the world has a sentient entity (Brahma) as its material cause, I would on the strength of that very statement hold that the whole world is sentient, because the nature of the cause is invariably seen to inhere in the modification or effect, and that the non-manifestation of sentiency (in the modification) may well be due to a peculiarity of the modification. And just as, even though the sentiency of Selves is patent, yet it is not manifest during the condition of sleep or swoon, even so, the sentiency of a piece of wood or a clod of earth may not be manifest. And it may well be, that, because this peculiarity of the existence of form (Rūpa) etc. or its absence, is due to the manifestation or non-manifestation of sentiency, that, it is, that even though the quality of sentiency is common both to effects and their causes, i.e. the Selves, there is no conflict between them, by

way of one amongst them being subordinate and the other superior. And just as, even though meat, soup, and rice have the common quality of being earthy, they become mutually helpful on account of the peculiarity of each of them in themselves, so may it well be, in the present case, and thus there would be no conflict with respect to the well-known division (of things being sentient and non-sentient). But (says the opponent), that may at the most be able to refute the dissimilarity of the nature of things being sentient and non-sentient, but all the same it won't be able to refute the dissimilarity of the natures of purity or impurity (as between Brahma and the world). Nor can even dissimilarity of the sort referred to above (i.e. sentient and non-sentient) happen to be really refuted thus, because (as the Sūtra says)—“The Scriptures declare it to be so”. Even if the sentient nature of all things (i.e. effects), though non-discernible in the ordinary world, were to be so predicated of them, and even if all those things were to be so understood, because the Scriptures declare them to have a cause of a sentient nature (i.e. Brahma), by merely considering the Scriptures as the sheet-anchor of authority, even then, it is contradicted by the Scriptures themselves, because, that they are so dissimilar, is understood even on the authority of the Scriptures themselves. Because, ‘Tathātvam’ here means, being dissimilar to the material cause (i.e. Brahma). The Scriptures themselves speak about this non-sentiency of a part, thus—“It became that which is endowed with knowledge (Vijnāna) and that which is devoid of knowledge (Avijnāna)” (Tait. 2.6), and they also declare the non-sentient and inert world to be dissimilar to the sentient Brahma.—4.

But—says some other opponent—the Scriptures themselves speak of the sentient nature of the elements and sense-organs which have been understood to be non-sentient, thus—“The Earth spake, the waters spake” (Sha. Brā. 6.1.3.2.4). With regard to the sense-organs the Scriptures say—“Now these Prāṇās (sense-organs) disputing amongst themselves as to which of them was pre-eminent amongst them, approached Brahmā” (Brih. 6.1.7), “They said to Speech (Vāk), do thou recite (Sāma) for us” (Brih. 1.3.2) etc. To this objection the Sūtrakāra replies :—

*But, because of special characterization (Visheshā) and relation (Sambandha), this reference is to those presiding (deities).—5.*

The word 'But' removes the doubt. Scriptural passages such as "The Earth spake, the waters spake" etc. should not be suspected of referring to the sentient nature of elements and sense-organs, because this reference is to the presiding entities (deities). When with reference to elements and sense-organs, activities such as speaking and discussing—proper only to sentient entities—are attributed to them, it is really the sentient entities (deities) which preside over speech (Vāk) and Earth etc., that are meant, and not the elements and sense-organs themselves. Whence is it so? "Because of the special characterization and connection". The difference between the enjoying Selfs on the one hand, and the elements and sense-organs on the other, as characterized by a division between those that are sentient and those that are non-sentient, has already been referred to before. Were all to be sentient, reference to such a difference (between them) would not be reasonably sustainable. Besides, those who follow the Kaushītaki branch, distinguish between them by the use of the word 'deities' in the dialogue of the Prāṇās, thus:—"Those deities, each disputatiously claiming to be pre-eminent (went to Brahmadeva) etc." and also thus—"All these deities knowing Prāṇa (the Chief Vital Air) to be pre-eminent" (Kaush. 2.14), in order to remove the suspicion about the sense-organs (being understood to be meant), and to enable the presiding deities (of the sense-organs) to be understood. These sentient presiding deities are also understood to have a relation (with the elements and sense-organs) as seen from Mantrās, Arthavādās, Itihāsās and Purāṇas. The Scriptural passage beginning with "Agni transforming itself into speech (Vāk) entered the mouth" (Ait. Āra. 2.4.2.4) shows that the deity which vouchsafes its favour on the sense-organs is meant. In the concluding portion of the dialogue of the Prāṇās also, by the Scriptural passage, "Those Prāṇās approached the original parent, Prajāpati, and said" (Chhān. 5.1.7), which speaks of their approaching Prajāpati for the determination, as to which amongst them was the highest, there is the ultimate realiza-

tion by the Prāṇās, by each in turn going out (of the body) as instructed by him, and by positive and negative instances (i.e. Anvaya and Vyatireka) of the pre-eminence of the Prāṇa (the Chief Vital Air). And such ordinary activities of the sense-organs, which resemble those of human beings such as ourselves, in the passage "The making of offerings to him (by all the sense-organs)" (Brih. 6.1.13), strengthens the view that the reference is to the presiding deities. In the passage "The Teja thought" also, it should be understood that this 'thinking' is indicated to have been done, only by the presiding deity (viz. the Highest Brahma) which inheres in its own modification. Therefore, this world is dissimilar to Brahma, and being so, Brahma is not its material cause. This objection (of the opponent) is now being answered.—5.

*But it is seen (to be like that).—6.*

The word 'But' refutes the opponent's view. The objection taken—viz. that this world being dissimilar (to Brahma), Brahma is not its material cause—is not conclusive. We find in the ordinary world that from men etc., who are known to be sentient, hair, nails etc. which are dissimilar to them are produced, and scorpions etc. are produced from cowdung etc. which are known to be non-sentient. But (says the opponent) we have said already, that it is the non-sentient bodies of men etc. which are the cause of the non-sentient hair, nails, etc., and the non-sentient bodies of the scorpions etc. that are the effects of the non-sentient cow-dung etc.. (We reply)—But even then, dissimilarity does still persist, in as much as some non-sentient things *only*, constitute the basis for sentient things, while some do not. Great indeed is this disparity of nature, due to modification (of cause into effect), between men etc., and hair and nails etc., because of dissimilarity of form etc. between them, and similarly also between cowdung and scorpions etc.. Were there to be complete identity of form (between two things) the very relationship between them as cause and effect would be dissolved. If it were to be said (by the opponent), that a certain quality of 'earthiness etc.' in men etc., continues to inhere at least in the hair and nails, etc., and a similar quality of 'earthiness etc.' in cowdung etc., at least continues to inhere in scorpions.

etc., (the Vedāntin would retort) that Brahma's nature of having the characteristic of existence as such (*sattā-lakṣaṇaḥ svabhāvaḥ*) at least appears to continue to inhere in *Ākāśa* etc.. Now you, who wish to vitiate the doctrine of the world having Brahma as to its material cause, on the ground of dissimilarity, have to say, whether by dissimilarity, you mean the non-appearance of the total comprehensive nature of Brahma (in the effect i.e. the world), or the non-appearance of any particular nature, or the non-appearance of the nature of sentiency. In the case of the first alternative, there would be the predicament of the complete destruction of the relationship of cause and effect as between them, because, in the absence of there being something extra (in an effect), there would be no such thing as cause and effect. As regards the second alternative, it cannot be substantiated, because it has already been said that the nature of 'existence as such' (*sattā*) inherent in Brahma (the cause) is seen to reappear in *Ākāśa* etc. (the effects). So far as the third alternative is concerned, there is absence of any illustration (to prove it). To what entity—which is at once non-sentient but which is not seen to have Brahma as its cause—can you possibly refer to (as actually existing), as an illustration (of your alternative), in answer to the doctrine of a follower of Vedānta (i.e. *Brahmavādin*) who holds that all things have Brahma as their cause? The opposition of the Scriptures (to the view of the opponent) is well-known, because it has already been established, that the conclusion of the Vedās is, that sentient Brahma is both the accidental and the material cause of the world.

As regards the objection (of the opponent), viz. that as Brahma is an already established entity, other means-of-proof can come into operation (for establishing Brahma), (we reply)—that it is mere wishful thinking. This entity (Brahma) devoid of any form as it is, is neither perceptible by any direct (ocular) means-of-proof, nor is it perceptible by inference etc., as there is absence of any indicatory mark about it (i.e. Brahma). Like religious duty, it (i.e. Brahma) is understandable from the Scriptures alone. So say the Scriptures also—"This knowledge cannot be acquired by reasoning. Oh dear one, it becomes properly understood only when it is taught by another (competent person)."

(Kāṭha. 1.2.9), "Who indeed knows whence came this creation", and "From what did it originate" (Rig-Veda 1.30.6). These Vedic Riks show how difficult it is even for Gods who have acquired super-human powers, to understand this cause of the world. The Smṛiti also says—"These entities are inscrutable, and one should not try to understand them by reasoning." Smṛitis also are of the same type, thus :—"He is said to be unmanifest or unevolved, inscrutable and unchangeable" (Bh. G. 2.25). "Not even these hosts of Gods know my origin, as I myself am the comprehensive origin of the Gods and Rishis" (Bh. G. 10.2). With regard to the objection, viz. that it has been said that as the Scriptures enjoin cogitation in addition to the hearing of it, it shows that they welcome reasoning also with due respect, (our reply is)—mere empty reasoning cannot justify its own help (to the understanding of Brahma) on some such pretext. It is only such reasoning as is in consonance with the Scriptures that can be resorted to as a subordinate auxiliary to experience. For instance,—that (1) as the conditions of dreams and wakefulness mutually differ from each other, the Self is not connected with either of these conditions and (2) in as much as in the condition of deep sleep, the Jīva-Self gives up its phenomenal existence and becomes one with the Highest Self, its nature is purely that of 'Sat' Self (i.e. Being) and has no phenomenal existence, and (3) as all phenomenal existence originates from Brahma, in accordance with the maxim of the cause and effect not being different from each other, it is not different from Brahma.

The Sūtrakāra will hereafter illustrate the fallaciousness of mere reasoning, by the Sūtra—"Because of the inconclusiveness of reasoning" (Bra. Sū. II. i. 11).

He, who, on the strength of the Scriptures that speak of a sentient cause, conjectures that the whole world is sentient, may be able to explain the division into sentient and non-sentient as referred to by the Scriptures in "He becomes knowledge (Vijnāna), and becomes that which is not-knowledge (Avijnāna)" as being due to the manifestation or the absence of manifestation of sentiency. But this division referred to by Scriptures would not be of any help to the other (i.e. our opponent). How is that? Because the Scriptures by the passage "(He became) know-

ledge (Vijnāna) and (became) that which is not-knowledge (Avijnāna)" speak about the Highest cause (i.e. Brahma) as constituting itself as the entire world. So, as according to him, by reason of dissimilarity, it is not reasonably possible to consider, that a sentient cause can become a non-sentient effect, similarly, a non-sentient cause (such as Pradhāna) also, cannot modify itself into a sentient effect. Therefore, as the objection based on dissimilarity thus stands refuted, (the view) that the cause (of the world) is sentient as spoken of by Scriptures, has necessarily to be accepted.—6.

*(If the opponent were to say) (that before creation) it (i.e. the effect) was non-existent (Asat), (we reply) No. (To say so) would be but only a mere negation.*  
—7.

(If the opponent were to say)—If you (the Vedāntin) were to have it, that the sentient, pure, and soundless etc. Brahma is the material cause of quite a dissimilar effect, i.e. an effect which is non-sentient, impure, and is endowed with the quality of sound etc., then it would necessarily be, that before creation, the effect was non-existent, which of course would not be acceptable to you, an adherent of 'the view of the pre-existence of an effect before its origination' (Satkāryavāda). (We would reply)—This is no fault, because it (i.e. what you the opponent have said) would but amount to a mere negation only, having nothing substantial at all of which it can be a negation. This sort of mere negation cannot possibly be able to deny the pre-existence of the effect prior to its creation. How can it be so? It is understood, that just as even at the present moment the effect having its self as its cause does exist, even so does the effect exist before its creation (in the form of the Self, which is its cause). Even at the present moment, the effect does not have existence, independently of the Self of its cause, because the Scriptures say thus :—"Everything ousts (i.e. abandons or outlaws) him who looks upon everything as (existing) apart from its Self" (Brih. 2.4.6). The existence of the effect before its creation, however, as the Self of its cause, is not different (from the existence of the

effect, as an effect having that cause as its Self). Oh, but (says the opponent) Brahma which is soundless etc., is the cause of the world (isn't it what you hold?). (The Vedāntin replies)—Certainly, but an effect which is equipped with the quality of sound etc. is never without its cause 'the Self' inhering in it, before its creation, nor is it so now (after the effect is created). Hence, it cannot be maintained that an effect is non-existent before its creation. We will speak at greater length about this, when we discuss the subject of the doctrine of the cause and effect not being different from each other.—7.

*(The doctrine of the Vedāntin) is absurd i.e. incongruous because, during the resorption of the world there would be the predicament (of the cause i.e. Brahma) becoming like the effect (i.e. the world).—8.*

(Says the opponent here)—If you (the Vedāntin) were to understand that this effect (i.e. this world) which has the qualities of grossness, of having parts, of having no sentiency, of being circumscribed i.e. limited, and impure, has Brahma as its cause, then during resorption, i.e. during the great flood when the effect is being reabsorbed and is becoming one with its cause, it will contaminate the cause with its own qualities, and so during resorption there would result the predicament of the cause (i.e. Brahma) acquiring the nature of the qualities of impurity etc.; and thus the Upanishadic doctrine, that the Omniscient Brahma is the cause of the world, would appear to be absurd i.e. incongruous. It would also appear to be absurd, i.e. incongruous, because, after all the effects have once become one with the cause, in the absence of any rule to guide the recreation (of the effects), there would not be any recreation of the experiencing Selves and the things to be experienced etc., separately. Besides if one were to understand, that after the experiencing Selves have once become one with Brahma and when Karma (as the cause of recreation) has been destroyed, they are all liable to be recreated, then, there would result the predicament that those who have obtained their Final Release, would also be liable for a rebirth, and thus again, the doctrine would appear to be absurd,



i.e. incongruous. If it were to be maintained again that even after resorption the world would continue to retain its distinctive condition separate from the Highest Brahma, then in that case resorption itself as such, would not be possible, because no effect (according to your doctrine) can possibly exist without its cause being inherent in it. Thus again the doctrine would appear to be absurd.—8.

*(To this objection of the opponent) the Vedāntin says—It is not so, however, because there are illustrations.—9.*

There is not the least absurdity or incongruity in our doctrine. What you (the opponent) have said, viz. that the effect as it becomes one with its cause, would contaminate the cause with its own qualities, is no such fault at all. How is it so? Because, there are illustrations which show, how, when an effect merges into its cause, it does not contaminate the cause with its qualities. For instance, earthen troughs etc. which are effects, having earth as their material cause, and which while they exist as effects are individually separate entities having big, small and intermediate dimensions, do not contaminate their cause, when they merge back into it (i.e. the earth); nor do ornaments etc. which are the effects of gold, contaminate gold with their own qualities when they merge into it. Similarly also, all these beings of the four categories, which are the effects of earth, do not, during resorption, infect the earth with their qualities. The followers of your (i.e. the opponent's) view on the other hand have no such illustration to cite. Resorption itself would not take place, were the effect to (try to) retain its distinctive quality while merging with its cause. We will speak hereafter in the Sūtra (Bra. Sū. II. i. 14) how, even though cause and effect are not different from each other, it is the effect alone which has the cause as its Self, and it is not as though the cause has the effect as its Self. It would be a very jejune statement that during resorption the effect would contaminate the cause with its own qualities, because, the same predicament would occur while the effect exists as an effect, because it is well understood that there is non-difference between a cause and its effect. Scriptural passages, such as "All this

is the Self" (Brih. 2.4.6), "The Self is all this" (Chhān. 7.25.2), "Immortal Brahma is this, which is here right in front" (Muṇḍ. 2.2.11), "Verily all this is Brahma" (Chhān. 3.14.1), purport to say, that without exception during all the three times (i.e. past, present and future), the effect is never different from the cause. The refutation in such cases—viz. that as both the effect and its qualities are the result of superimposition through Nescience, the cause is not affected by them—is common to resorption also. There is this other illustration also. Just as an illusionist is never affected during all the three times, by the illusion projected by himself, in as much as it (i.e. the illusion) is insubstantial, even so, the Highest Self is never affected by the illusion of transmigratory existence. Also, just as a person who experiences a dream is never affected by the illusory nature of the dream vision, in as much as it does not persist during the conditions of deep sleep and wakefulness, even so, this one unchanging, constant and immediate witness of all the three conditions (viz. the Highest Self i.e. Brahma) is not affected by the three changing transmigratory conditions (of creation, preservation, and resorption). This manifestation of the Highest Self, by its existing as the Self of these three conditions, is—like the appearance of a snake etc. in a rope—but a mere illusion. With regard to this the Āchārya who is fully conversant with the traditional meaning of Vedānta has said—"When the Jiva-Self that is in deep sleep brought about by the beginningless Māyā, wakes up, it realizes the unborn, sleepless, dreamless, non-duality (Brahma)" (Gauḍapāda Kā. 1.16). Hence, when it is said that during resorption there would result the predicament of the cause being affected by the fault of grossness etc. quite as much as the effect, it would not at all be proper. Again, when it is said, that when all this differentiated world has become one (with Brahma) there is no regular cause for its being recreated in its usual differentiated form, it would, again, not be a fault, precisely because an illustration is available. Just as during sleep and meditative trance, even though there naturally is a complete oneness (of the Jiva-Self and the Highest Self), false-ignorance not yet having been eradicated, differentiation (as it was before sleep and the mystic trance) is re-established on the waking up (of the Jiva-

Self), even so would it be, in this condition (of resorption). There is this supporting Scriptural passage—"All these beings having become one with the 'Sat' (Brahma) still do not realize that they have attained this unity with the 'Sat', and they again become what they were here before, viz. whether (they were) a tiger or a lion, a wolf or a boar, a worm or a midge, or a gnat or a mosquito" (Chhān. 6.9.23).

Just as, even though there is no differentiation in the Highest Self, still, under the binding influence of false-ignorance, such differentiated condition persists continuously, without let or hindrance, as in a dream, even so, the existence of a potential power of differentiation, due to the binding influence of false-ignorance, may be inferred as still surviving during the condition of resorption also. This would effectively answer the objection about the predicament of the likelihood of those who have already obtained Final Release having to be born again, because true knowledge will have by then supplanted false-ignorance. The last alternative (of the opponent) referred to towards the end, viz. that the world would continue to remain differentiated from Brahma even during resorption, cannot be countenanced, as it never is so understood (by the Vedāntin). Hence the Upanishadic doctrine, therefore, is perfectly cogent.—9.

*Also because the faults (pointed out by the Sāmkhya opponent, against the doctrine of the Vedāntin) will apply to this own doctrine.—10.*

The same faults (which are alleged against the doctrine of the Vedāntin) would be commonly applicable to the doctrine of our opponent also. The same allegation, viz. that on account of dissimilarity this world could not have Brahma as its material cause, is equally applicable to the doctrine (of the Sāmkhyās), as they understand that this world has the Pradhāna as its material cause, in as much as, in that case also, the world which possesses the quality of sound etc. would have the soundless Pradhāna as its cause. And therefore, in as much as it is understood (by the Sāmkhyās) that effects dissimilar to the cause come

into existence, there is the same predicament of the view of the non-existence of the effect (such as the world), prior to creation, being equally applicable (to the Sāmkhyās). Similarly, (as understood by the Sāmkhyās) when the effects have become one with their cause during resorption there would result the same predicament (as in the case of the Vedāntin). Similarly, when once during resorption all the special characteristics of the effects have been effaced by their becoming one with their cause, it would not be possible at the time of the recreation (of the world) to regulate the identical reproduction of the distinctive special characteristics of every person before resorption, such as that this particular thing is the material cause of this man, and this particular thing, of the other, because of the absence of any such regulating cause. Were we to imagine gratuitously the existence of such a regulating cause, (when there is none), the absence in fact of the existence of such regulating cause being common, there would result the predicament, in the case of those who have already obtained Final Release, of being again subjected to the bondage (of transmigratory existence). If (it be said), that during resorption, only some distinctive characteristics become one (with the cause) and others do not, then those that do not attain such oneness, would not be the effects of the Pradhāna, and thus, all these faults being common to both the doctrines, they could not be properly directed (by the Sāmkhya opponent) against his opponent (the Vedāntin), and hence our view that these faults are no faults at all would be strengthened, as it would necessarily have to be accepted.—10.

*If it be said (by the opponent) that reasoning being without any sure basis, (i.e. it being inconclusive), an inference otherwise may be drawn, even then the predicament of the non-attainment of Final Release would occur just the same.*  
—11.

This is just why, in the case of entities which are understood through the traditional teaching of the Scriptures alone, no objection on the strength of mere reason-

ing should be made, because, reasonings, which are not derived from Scriptural traditions and which depend solely on the conjectures of man, happen to be inconclusive, in as much as such conjectures are unfettered. Reasonings or deductions made by some highly competent persons with great effort, are seen to be demonstrated as fallacious by more competent persons, and those made by these latter ones, are also in their turn demonstrated to be equally fallacious by some other persons, and hence as men's understanding differs, it is not possible to accept that reasonings have sure basis and that they are conclusive. Even if one were to rely on reasoning, acceptable to men of well-known intellectual eminence such as Kapila and others, as having a sure basis and as being conclusive, even so, inconclusiveness would be there all the same, because it is seen that Tīrthakarās (i.e. founders of religions or philosophical schools) such as Kapila and Kaṇāda whose intellectual eminence is well-known are seen mutually to differ from each other. (If the opponent were to say)—we would infer in such other way as would not cause the fault of inconclusiveness, because it cannot possibly be said that there never can be any reasoning which is conclusive, we say, that you cannot say so because even this inconclusiveness of reasoning is itself established by reasoning alone, viz. by conjecturing, that because some reasonings are seen to be inconclusive, other reasonings of a similar nature also are inconclusive. Besides, if all reasoning were to be inconclusive, there would result the predicament of the destruction of all worldly transactions. It is seen, that people in general are impelled towards activity in their future course, either for acquiring happiness or avoiding pain, by its similarity to the past or the present course. When there is contradiction in Scriptural passages, it is only by means of reasoning, which explains the general force or import of sentences, and by refuting their wrong and apparent meaning, that the correct ascertainment of their meaning is accomplished. Manu also thinks similarly when he says thus:—"Those who desire the purity of Dharma (i.e. the desire to be able to distinguish Dharma—law of religious duties—from Adharma i.e. wrong notions about it), have to know well the triad of direct perception, inference and Shāstra based on different traditional know-

ledges of various sorts", and "He alone and none other really knows Dharma, who combines the instructions about religious duties by sages, with reasoning which is not opposed to the Vedic Shāstra" (Manu-Smṛiti 12. 105, 106). That reasoning is by nature inconclusive, is indeed in itself something which constitutes its glory or ornament (Alankāra). It is exactly because it is so, that faulty reasoning is rejected and faultless reasoning has to be arrived at (just as by refuting the really faulty view of an opponent, the Siddhānta (i.e. final conclusion) is arrived at). There is no justification for a person to be an ignoramus because his ancestor happened to be so. Hence, if it be said that, that reasoning is without a firm basis and is inconclusive, is no fault, (we reply)—that way also in the case of reasoning there would still be the predicament of the absence of escape from fault just the same. Even though with regard to some particular subject, reasoning is seen to have a firm basis i.e. it is conclusive, still so far as the present subject is concerned, the objection that reasoning cannot escape the fault of having no firm basis and being inconclusive, does apply all the same. Barring traditional instruction of the Vedās, it is not possible even to indulge in any conjecture about the very deep nature and positive existence of an entity (Brahma) as such, on which Final Release depends. Because we have said already, that due to its being formless etc., it is not perceptible directly, and due to its being without any indicative mark etc., it is not amenable to inference etc.. Besides all those who believe in Final Release, understand, that perfect knowledge (of Brahma) results in Final Release. That perfect knowledge, which is dependent on the thing-in-itself (for its validity), is of a uniform nature. That entity which exists uniformly is the highest entity. In the ordinary world, knowledge about it is understood to be perfect knowledge, as for instance the knowledge that 'fire is hot'. It being so, it would not be reasonably sustainable to understand that men can have differences about perfect knowledge. Mutual differences amongst men, about knowledges as a result of reasoning, are notorious. That, whatever is expounded by one logician as perfect knowledge, is upset by another, and that established by him, is upset by yet a third, is well-known in the ordinary world. How ever, then,

can knowledge arrived at by reasoning, which is not of one settled aspect, be correct knowledge ?

It is not as if a follower of the doctrine of the Pradhāna is accepted by all logicians as the best amongst the professors of logic, so that we can understand that, that which is understood by him to be correct knowledge, is in fact so. It is not possible to get together all the past, present and future logicians at one time and in one place, so that the uniform nature of their knowledge about an entity, could be correct knowledge. The Scriptures on the other hand being eternal and being the cause of the attainment of knowledge, it would be reasonably sustainable to understand them to have the ability to possess well-established knowledge of an entity, so that, it is not possible for the whole lot of past and future logicians to deny the correctness of the knowledge arising from them (i.e. the Scriptures). Hence, the correctness of the Upanishadic knowledge alone is firmly established. In as much as correct knowledge anywhere outside this, is not reasonably sustainable, the predicament of non-release from transmigratory existence would necessarily result. Hence, on the strength of the traditional instructions of the Scriptures, and with the help of reasoning conformable to such traditional instructions of the Scriptures, it is thus firmly established that the sentient Brahma is the material as well as the accidental cause of the world.—11.

#### 4. SHIṢṬĀPARIGRAHĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 12.

*By this (refutation of the Sāmkhya doctrine) others (i.e. other views) also which competent persons have categorically rejected, and also answered.—12.*

So far objection to the Vedānta passages based on reasoning, by the adherents of the doctrine of the Pradhāna being the cause of the world, is thus refuted, as it (i.e. Pradhāna doctrine) is nearest to the Vedānta doctrine, and as it is further reinforced by weighty reasoning, and as it has been to a certain extent accepted by learned persons who are followers of the Vedās. Now, some slow-witted persons taking their stand on the Atomic doctrine have raised

doubts based on reasoning about the Vedānta passages, so (the Sūtrakāra) extends the application of the foregoing refutation (of the Sāmkhya doctrine) to the doctrine of the atom, following the maxim of 'the knocking out of the best (lit., chief) athlete.' (Here the Bhāshyakāra explains the word 'Shishtëparigrahaḥ' thus:—what is accepted is 'Parigraha', what is not accepted is 'Aparigraha', what is not accepted by the learned is 'Shishtëparigrahaḥ'). By reason of this refutation of the doctrine of the Pradhāna being the cause of the world, the Atomic and other doctrines of the cause (of the world) which are not accepted in the least (i.e. are categorically rejected) by learned persons such as Manu and Vyāsa, should also be understood as having been explained as rejected, i.e. refuted, because the reasons of refutation are the same, and there is no room for any thing further to be doubted. The reasons which constitute the refutation, viz. the ineligibility of understanding the very deep i.e. abstruse cause of the world (viz. Brahma) by reasoning, the inconclusiveness of reasoning which has no firm basis, and the non-attainment of Final Release even if an inference in another way is drawn, and conflict with the traditional instructions of the Scriptures, being the same in this case, as they were in the earlier one.—12.

##### 5. BHOKTRĀPATYĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 13.

*If it be said, that (if the thing to be experienced) becomes merged into the experiencer or vice versa, non-separation (between the two) would result, the reply is—that such separate existence may well continue as it is met with in the ordinary world.—13.*

The doctrine of Brahma being the cause, is again objected to in another way on the same ground viz. that of reasoning. Even though the Scriptures are authoritative with regard to their own subject, still, when that which is their province is taken out of their own scope by another means-of-proof, they deserve to be construed in a secondary sense, as for instance in the case of the Mantrās (Vedic



Riks) and Arthavādās. Even reasoning (applied) beyond its own particular province, would be inconclusive, as (for instance) in the case of Dharma and Adharma (meritorious and unmeritorious actions). Supposing it is so—(says the Vedāntin—so what ?)—(the opponent says) it would be improper if the Scriptures were to deny (the truth of) what has been established by another means-of-proof. In what way (it is asked) do the Scriptures purport to deny what has been established by another means-of-proof ? The reply (of the opponent) is—this distinctive division of the experiencer and the things to be experienced, is well-known in the ordinary world, as for instance that the sentient Jiva-Self is the experiencer, and the objects-of-sense such as Sound etc., are the things to be experienced—to wit—that Devadatta is the experiencer and the boiled rice is the thing to be experienced. If the experiencer were to attain the condition of the thing to be experienced, non-existence of the distinction between them would take place. It would be so, also if the thing to be experienced were to attain the condition of the experiencer. So these (i.e. the experiencer and the thing to be experienced) being non-different from the Highest cause Brahma (as the Vedāntins claim), attainment by them of each other's condition would thus result. But it is not proper that the well-known distinctive division between them should get obliterated. We have necessarily to assume that this distinctive division between the experiencer and the things to be experienced, which obtains, and is seen to exist to-day, must have been so in the past, and will continue to be so in the future. Hence if one were to say, that to understand that Brahma is the cause (of the world) is not proper, as that would lead to the predicament of the absence of any distinctive division between the experiencer and the thing to be experienced, which is well-known, we would reply—Well may such distinctive division exist, just as it is seen to exist in the ordinary world. It is reasonably sustainable, that even in our view of the matter (i.e. of the Vedāntin, that effect is non-different from the cause) such distinctive division is seen to exist because it is so observed to exist in the ordinary world. As for instance, even though the sea is not different from water which constitutes its self, the foam, waves, and bubbles (of the sea) etc., which are modi-

fications of the sea, and are not different from it, are sometimes seen to display a behaviour characterized by being distinctively different from each other, and at another time being in conjunction with each other. These modifications of the sea, viz. the foam, waves etc., even though they are non-different from their cause, i.e. the sea, which has water as its self, still they (i.e. the modifications) do not attain each other's condition, and just as even when they do not attain each other's condition, they are not different from the nature of the sea which is their self, similarly in the present case also, the experiencers and the things to be experienced do not attain each other's condition, nor do they (because of that) become different from the Highest Brahma. Even though the experiencer (i.e. the Jiva-Self) is not (in fact) a modification of Brahma, and as according to the Scriptural passage "Having created it, he entered into it" (Tait. 2.6), the unevolved Brahma is declared by the Scriptures to be itself the experiencer, as a result of its entering into its own creation, still by reason of its having so entered, there does come about a distinctive difference, as a result of limiting adjuncts, even as the Ākāsha (has distinctive difference) due to the limiting adjunct in the shape of an earthen pot etc.. Hence, it is said (by the Sūtrakāra) that distinctive difference between the experiencer and the thing to be experienced—non-different though they are from their cause viz. the Highest Self i.e. Brahma—is reasonably sustainable on the analogy of the maxim of the sea and the waves etc.—13.

#### 6. ĀRAMBHAṆĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 14-20.

*That cause and its effects are non-different from each other, follows from the word 'Ārambhaṇa' (making current) etc. (occurring in the Scriptures).—14.*

Having provisionally accepted this practical distinctive difference between the experiencer and the things to be experienced, the Sūtrakāra has (in the previous Sūtra) rendered the refutation (of that objection on the ground of reasoning) by saying—'it may well be so, as observed in the ordinary world' (the latter part of the previous Sūtra).

This distinctive difference, however, does not exist in the real sense, because it is understood that the cause and its effects are non-different from each other. The effects comprise of this diverse world, such as the Ākāsha etc. and the cause is the Highest Self i.e. Brahma. It is understood that in a real sense the effect is non-different from the cause i.e. the Highest Self, i.e. it has no existence as apart from its cause, the Highest Self. Whence is it so ? Because of the word 'Ārambhana' and others. As for this word 'Ārambhana', the Scriptures, after declaring that by knowing the one (i.e. Brahma) everything else becomes known, and with a desire to cite an illustration, say—"Oh mild one, just as by knowing one clod of earth, everything that is made of earth becomes known. The effect (viz. a pot etc.) is merely a name made current by speech, while that it is earth merely, is the truth" (Chhān. 6.1.1). By this is meant that when a clod of earth is understood to be in essence but mere earth only, all things made of earth such as a jar, a trough and a water-pot, automatically become known, because, having the earth as their Self is common (to them all), and hence it is (that it is said) that an effect is merely a name made current by speech, and its existence as an effect is because of speech only. The effect viz. a jar or a trough or a water-pot is not in existence substantially as an effect as such, but is merely a name, and is false or untrue, and that it merely is but earth only, is the truth. This is stated as an illustration of Brahma. Therefore, because of the word 'Ārambhana' occurring in the Scriptures, it is understood that, in the case of the thing illustrated also, all creation as a class as such, has no existence as apart from Brahma. Again, the Scriptures after speaking of Teja, Water and the Earth as being the effects of Brahma, proceed to speak about the absence of the existence of the effects of Teja, Water and the Earth also as apart from them, thus :—" (In this way) Agni has lost its property of being Agni as such, and the effect (Agni) as such is merely a name made current by speech, and that it is but the three colours (Rūpās, by which the three elements Teja, Water and Earth are expressed individually by Lakṣhaṇā) only, that constitute the real substance". (Chhān. 6.4.1). By the word 'etc.' in the passage "because of the word 'Ārambhana' etc.", the following several Scriptural passages—viz. "In

that all, this has its self, it is the Truth, this is the Self, that thou art" (Chhān. 6.8.7); "All this, is that which is the Self" (Brih. 2.4.6); "All this is Brahma" (Muṇḍ. 2.2.11); "The Self is all this" (Chhān. 7.25.2); "There is no diversity here about anything" (Brih. 4.4.19)—which have the purpose of expounding the unity of the Selfs, should also be understood to have been cited (in illustration). Otherwise, it would not be possible to uphold in any other way, that by the knowledge of one, the knowledge of everything else is attained. Therefore it should be seen, that just as Akāśhās circumscribed by jars and water-pots are non-different from the great Ākāśha, or just as mirages etc., whose nature is that they seem and then again seem not, and whose nature is thus inexplicable, are non-different from the sandy plain etc., even so, this aggregate of trans-migratory existences consisting of experiencers and the things to be experienced, have, as apart from Brahma, no real existence.

But (says the opponent) Brahma is of more than one form and just as a tree has many branches, even so Brahma is equipped with various powers and propensities (for creating effects), so that, (its) oneness and manifoldness are both necessarily equally true, just as, for instance, a tree as a tree is one, but considered in its aspect as one consisting of branches it is manifold, or just as the sea as sea is one, yet considered in its aspect as foam, waves etc. it is manifold, or just as the earth is one only, but considered in its aspect as a jar or a trough, it is manifold. The circumstances being such, Brahma, considered in its aspect of being one only, may well accomplish the process of Final Release, and considered in its manifold aspect, may help the accomplishment of worldly transactions and Vedic observances appertaining to the "Karmakāṇḍa". It is only in this way that the illustrations of the earth etc. can be appropriate. (To this, we reply)—No, it could not be like that. By the passage "That it is but earth merely, is the truth" it is understood that in the illustration it is the material cause alone that is considered to be true, and by the words 'made current by speech' the whole aggregate of effects is spoken of as being unreal. In the case of that which is illustrated, also, by the passage "In all that, this has its Self, that is the truth", that one, the highest cause

alone, is understood to be true, because in the passage "He is the Self, that thou art, Oh Shvetaketu" the instruction is, that the embodied Jiva-Self is, in essence, Brahma. It is only about this Jiva-Self's having Brahma, which is an already well-established thing, as its Self, that instruction is here given, and also that it (Brahma) is something which cannot be attained with any extraneous effort. Hence it is this Brahma-hood of the Jiva-Self, which is understood to be based on the Shāstra, that serves to obliterate the natural notion of a man, about the Jiva-Self being of the nature of the body, even as the appreciation of the rope etc., as a rope, obliterates the notion of a snake (which is, till then, entertained about the rope). All this notion of phenomenal worldly transactions depending upon the Jiva-Self, for substantiating which you (the opponent) would want to hold that Brahma has a manifold aspect also, would itself become obliterated, when once the notion that the Jiva-Self is of the nature of a body, is itself obliterated. The Scriptures, by the passage "When all this becomes but the Self to him, by what can he see and whom" (Brih. 4.5.15) etc., would discover to a person who understands Brahma as the Self of all, the non-existence of all phenomenal transactions such as actions, agents and the fruit of actions. It would not be proper to say, that this non-existence of all phenomenal transactions is spoken of as confined to any special condition (such as that of Final Release), because the Scriptural words "That thou art" show that the realization (of the fact) that Brahma is the Self of all, as mentioned in these very words, is not confined to any particular specific condition. The Scriptures also show by the 'illustration of the thief', that one who banks on falsehood convicts himself i.e. becomes tied down (to phenomenal existence), and one who depends on truth, secures an acquittal i.e. attains Final Release, and they also show further, that the oneness of Brahma is the only one and the highest truth (Chhān. 6.16) and that its (so-called) manifoldness is merely the display of false-ignorance. For, if both could be true, how could a person observed to be involved in phenomenal worldly existence be said (by the Scriptures) to bank on a falsehood? The Scriptures indicate this very thing, by finding fault with the viewing of things as different, by the passage—"He who sees differences

in things meets with death after death" (Bri. 4.4.19). The doctrine (of our opponent) does not recognize Final Release as resulting from knowledge to be reasonably sustainable, because it does not hold (like the Vedānta doctrine) that false-ignorance which is capable of being removed by true knowledge, is the cause of all transmigratory existence. If both the unitary and the manifold aspects of Brahma were to be true, how ever would the knowledge that Brahma is one and one only, be able to obliterate the knowledge of its manifoldness ?

But (argues some other opponent here), if one were to understand the pure absolute oneness (of Brahma), then (in that case) its manifoldness being necessarily non-existent, all those worldly means-of-proof, such as direct perception etc., would cease to operate as such means-of-proof, because of the absence of any scope for their operation, just as they would cease to operate as means-of-proof, for instance, when in the case of a pillar etc., there is a realization that it is a pillar and *not* a man. Similarly, a Shāstra which enjoins the doing of something, or inhibits some other thing, would—as it depends on the manifoldness of things—be rendered *hors de combat* in the absence of such manifoldness, and equally so would be the Shāstra of Final Release also, which depends (for its validity) on the distinctive difference between the teacher and the taught, in the absence of any such distinction between them. How could this truth about the absolute one-ness (of Brahma) as propounded by this (palpably) untrue Shāstra of Final Release, be reasonably sustainable ?

To this the reply (of the Vedāntin) is—This is no fault. It would be reasonably sustainable to understand that prior to the realization of Brahma as the Self of all, all transactions (of the phenomenal world) for the time being are real enough, even as the transactions in dreams are real enough (for the time being) until waking consciousness returns. As long as the truth of the one-ness of the Self is not realized, the knowledge, that all these effects, i.e. modifications, as characterized by the means-of-proof, the thing to be known, and the fruit, are unreal, does not arise in any one, and on the other hand, people in general under the influence of Nescience, consider these effects or modifications as being their own Selves, viz., that this body is myself,

or that this is mine, by ignoring their own Brahmic nature. Therefore, prior to the realization of Brahma as the Self of all, all worldly and religious transactions based on the Scriptures, are reasonably sustainable i.e. valid, even as an ordinary man, while he is asleep and dreaming, sees all the high and low entities, and definitely considers his experiences quite as real as they are when they are directly perceived, and has no notion, then, of their having only an unreal appearance (of direct perception).

But (says the opponent) how ever can the realization of the unity of Brahma as the Self of all, in fact, arise, through such palpably untrue Vedānta passages? A man who thinks he is bitten, by what in the place of a rope he considers to be a snake, does not die thereby, nor can anybody make use of the water as seen in a mirage, for drinking or bathing etc..

(The reply is)—This is no fault, because we do observe an effect such as death, supervening by reason of even the suspicion of being poisoned (by a snake-bite). And it is also seen that a man experiencing a dream sees actions such as that of his being bitten by a snake or of his having a bath. If the opponent were to say, that like the dream itself, even that action in a dream (of a snake-bite or of bathing) is untrue, we reply that though the action of being bitten by a snake or having a bath, experienced by a person dreaming, is no doubt untrue, the fruit of that action, viz. his experience of that action, is indeed true enough, because that experience is not effaced or removed even after such person awakens. No man, who after waking up from a dream considers the action of such a snake-bite or his own bath as experienced by him in his dream as unreal, ever considers his knowledge of the experience of that action also, as unreal.

This non-effacement of the knowledge of the dream experience of a person, should be understood to invalidate the doctrine (of the Lokāyatikās), that the body as such alone is the Self. Similarly, a Scriptural passage—"When a man who engages himself in some religious ritual with a desire to gain some end, sees a woman in a dream, he should infer from his dream experience, the certain fulfilment of his desire" (Chhān. 5.2.9)—which shows that even by his experience of the unreal dream, there is a very

real fulfilment (of his desire). Similarly Scriptures in another place, after saying that "When some ill omens are seen one should know that he would not live long", indicate further that by the very experiencing of that dream, which (of course) is of an unreal nature, death, which indeed is too real, is suggested, by the passage—"Now about dreams—if one sees a dark man with black teeth, he kills him". It is well-known, that experts in the interpretation of dreams, by positive and negative instances, interpret how a dream of one sort indicates a good result and a dream of another sort indicates a bad result. It is similarly seen, how, by mere letters of the nature of lines which are unreal in themselves (in as much as they are mere conventional symbols), the *Akāra* (i.e. the letter 'अ') etc., which are very real, are indicated. Now what is more is, that this is the final conclusive means-of-proof which declares the oneness of Self, and there is nothing further which is desired to be known. Just as in the ordinary world, when an injunction to perform a sacrifice is given, it is necessary to know with what (material) and how one should perform the sacrifice, but when it is said "That thou art" or "I am Brahma" and one understands how the *Ātmā* i.e. Brahma is the Self of all, there is nothing which need be known beyond that, for it is only when there still remains something which ought to be known, that there can be any further desire to know, and as apart from one's unity with the Self nothing still remains which one would further want to know. It is not possible to say that such realization cannot arise, for a Scriptural passage says—"He (i.e. Shvetaketu) understood that (viz. the oneness of Self) from him (i.e. his father)" (*Chhān.* 6.16.3), and there is besides instruction (in Scriptures) about listening to the Scriptures and reciting them, as the means of such realization. Nor is it possible to say that such realization is meaningless or is a delusion, because it is seen, that it has the result of removing ignorance, and there is absence of any other knowledge, which would invalidate it. We have already said before, that prior to the realization of one's identity with the Self, the course of all these falsely-true worldly and religious transactions, runs uninterrupted. In this way, therefore, when one's identity with the Self is duly propounded with the help of this ulti-



mate means-of-proof, there is no scope for imagining Brahma to be of diverse types, because all the earlier consciousness of distinctive differences happens then to be eliminated.

But (says the opponent), by adducing the illustration of clay etc., the Shāstra seems to accept Brahma to be capable of undergoing modification. In the ordinary world also things like clay etc. are understood as undergoing modification.

To this we reply—No. The Scriptures by the following passages such as “Indeed the great unborn Self i.e. Brahma is undecaying, undying, immortal and fearless” (Brih. 4.4.25), “This Self (which can be only expressed negatively as) ‘not this’, ‘not this’” (Brih. 3.9.26), “(The Self) is neither gross nor atomic” (Brih. 3.8.8), which deny every kind of modification of Brahma, understand Brahma as absolutely unchangeable. The same one and only one Brahma cannot at one and the same time be understood, both to possess the quality of modification and yet be unchangeable i.e. without that quality of modification also. (If the opponent were to suggest)—It may well be (like something which is both) stationary and at the same time have movement, we reply—no, because it has been particularized as being absolutely unchangeable. It is not possible, that one and the same unchangeable Brahma can at one and the same time be the substratum of many (opposite) qualities, such as being fixed and yet capable of movement. We have already said that Brahma is unchangeable and eternal because of the denial (by the Scriptures) of its undergoing any modification. Nor is it, that just as the realization of the doctrine of Brahma being the only one Self leads to the fruit of Final Release, the knowledge that it is capable of modification in the form of this world also leads to some other independent fruit, because there is no authority for it. It is by the realization of the unchangeable Brahma alone that the Shāstrās show that there is a fruit, because the Scriptures after first stating that—“This Self (which can only be expressed negatively as) ‘not this’, ‘not this’” indicate by the passage “Oh Janaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness” (Brih. 4.2.4), that there is a fruit of that type (viz. Final Release). So this much is established, that in the chapter dealing with Brahma, when

it is stated that the desired result is obtained only by realizing that Brahma is devoid of any special attributes, and some other thing having no such fruit is also mentioned along with it—such as, that Brahma has the quality of modification in the form of the world—, it should be employed only as a means of realizing Brahma, in accordance with the maxim of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā—viz. “Whenever something which is fruitless is mentioned in proximity with something which has some fruit, the former should be understood as being subordinate to the latter, and also that it has no independent fruit of its own.” As Final Release is unchangeable and eternal, it would not be proper to say that the knowledge, that Brahma undergoes modification, is itself the fruit which the Jīva-self acquires by such knowledge. (If it be said by the opponent) that if according to the adherent of the doctrine of the unchangeable Brahma, this eternal oneness (of Brahma) is the only view, it would mean the absence of the relationship of a ruler and the ruled, and it would contradict the declaration that the Lord is the cause, (we reply)—No, the omniscience (of Brahma as the Lord) depends upon the evolving of the seed of the nature of names and forms which are the result of Nescience, and on the Scriptural passage—“The Ākāsha was born of this very Self” (Tait. 2.1), and that the origin, preservation and resorption of the world proceed from the Lord who is of an eternally pure, wise, and free nature, and neither from the non-sentient Pradhāna nor from any other things, is what is declared (by the Sūtrakāra) by the Sūtra—“From whom is the origin etc. of this world” (Bra. Sū. I. i. 4). That declaration still holds the ground as before, and nothing contrary to that is here suggested. (The opponent says)—How can you say that you do not say so (i.e. you do not contradict the declaration) when you talk of the Self’s eternal one-ness and non-duality ? (We reply)—Listen, how we do not say so. It is declared by both the Scriptures and the Smritis, that names and forms which are imagined through Nescience and which are as it were the Self of the Omniscient Lord, and about which it is impossible to say, either that they are one with Brahma or that they are different from it, and which are the seeds of this entire expanse of transmigratory existence, are the illusion-causing power and the nature (Prakṛiti) of the Lord.

That the omniscient Lord is different from them is indicated by the Scriptural passage "The Ākāsha is the revealer of the names and forms, and that in which they are contained, is Brahma" (Chhān. 8.14.1), and also according to the Scriptural passages—"May I evolve names and forms" (Chhān. 6.3.2); "Having created all beings and given them names, the Lord keeps on voicing them" (Shvet. 6.12). It is in this way that the Lord (as the Īshvara) conforms to the limiting adjuncts of names and forms produced by Nescience, just as the Ākāsha conforms to the limiting adjuncts of the jars and pots. During the condition of phenomenal existence, the Lord rules over the so-called Jiva-Selfs i.e. the cognitional Selfs, which are but only his own *alter egos* and which conform to the multitude of effects and causes brought about by names and forms, which in their turn are brought about by Nescience, and stands in the same relation to these Jiva-Selfs i.e. cognitional Selfs, as the great Ākāsha stands to the Ākāsha of the jars and pots. So the Lord's over-lordship, omniscience and omnipotence, depend upon the determinate distinctions caused by the limiting adjuncts of Nescience, while in the truest sense, in the case of the Self whose limiting adjuncts have been swept off by knowledge, all such behaviour as that of being the ruler and the ruled or of being an omniscient entity etc., cannot be reasonably sustainable. The Scriptures also say so, thus—"Where one does not see, hear or know anything, other than its Self, that is the great one" (Chhān. 7.24.1); "But when the Self alone has become all this, by what can one see, and whom (can one see)?" (Brih. 4.5.15). And in this manner, all Vedānta texts declare, that in the condition of the Highest Truth, there is absence of all phenomenal transactions. In the Īshvara-Geeta also, in the passage "The Lord does not create in any one, the capacity to act, nor any actions, nor their connection to the fruit, but they tend towards activity by reason of their own nature. He neither receives the sins nor the merits of any person. Knowledge is enveloped in Nescience and hence creatures become infatuated i.e. confused" (Bh. G. 5.14, 15), it is indicated that there is absence of all behaviour as that of a ruler or the ruled in the condition of perfect knowledge, while in the condition of phenomenal existence, even the Scriptures do speak of the Self's behaviour as the Lord,

thus—"He is the Lord of all, the King and the protector of all beings, and he is the bund which upholds the worlds so that they may not be confounded (by promiscuity)" (Brih. 4.4.22). Similarly it is said in the Īshvara-Geeta again—"Oh Arjuna, the Lord is immanent in the region of the heart of all beings, and by this power of Māyā makes them go round and round as in a whirligig" (Bh. G. 18.61). The Sūtrakāra also speaks of the non-difference of cause and effects, in the real sense only, and so far as the phenomenal transactions are concerned, he has likened Brahma to the ocean, in the preceding Sūtra thus—"It may well be so, as observed in the ordinary world". He (the Sūtrakāra) accepts and does not refute the view about Brahma being liable to modification, in so far as it can be made use of in meditations on Brahma in its qualified (Saguṇa) aspect.—14.

*(Cause and effect are non-different) because it is only when the cause exists, that the effect exists.—15.*

Again why the effect is non-different from its cause, is, because it is only when the cause exists, that the effect is seen to exist, and not when it does not. For instance, it is in the presence of clay only that a pot is seen to exist, and in the presence of yarns only that cloth is seen to exist. It is not, that when one thing exists, that, as a rule, another thing is to be seen to exist. It is not, that a horse, different as it is from a cow, exists, only when a cow exists. Nor is it, that a pot is seen to exist only when a potter exists, even when there subsists a relation of an effect and an accidental cause between them, because the one thing is different from the other (and hence there is no non-difference between them). (The opponent says)—But it is seen that when a particular thing exists, as a rule another particular thing is seen to exist, as for instance, smoke necessarily is seen to exist, when fire exists. (To this) we reply—no, because smoke held up in a cowherd's pot is seen (to exist), even after the fire is put out. If the opponent were to say—if smoke is particularized by a certain condition (such as, smoke which has ascended high up into the sky from something on the ground), then such and such par-

ticular smoke does not exist, if fire does not exist—, even then (we reply), there is no fault whatever even if it were to be so (understood), because we say, that the reason for holding, that there is non-difference between cause and effect, is (not only that an effect is to be seen to exist only when the cause exists) but that intelligence (Buddhi) coloured by (i.e. impressed with) the consciousness, of the cause being always jointly discernible with the effect, also is such a cause, and such consciousness does not exist in the case of fire and smoke, (because there never is a consciousness that the smoke which is perceived is Agni).

There may also be another reading of this Sūtra, thus —“Bhāvāt cha upalabdheh”. It means, that it is not only because of the Scriptures (that we say) that there is non-difference between cause and effect, but also because it is directly seen to be so. Such non-difference between cause and effect does happen to be directly perceived. It is this way :—In the case of a cloth which is a construction of threads, we do not of course perceive merely an effect, viz., the cloth as such, as apart from the threads themselves, but what we actually and directly see are merely the threads only in their condition as warps and woofs, and similarly, we perceive fibres only, in the condition of threads, and minute parts of the fibres only, in the condition of fibres. And thus by this same process of direct observation, it ought to be inferred that the minute parts of the fibres are but the three colours viz. the red, white and black (representing the fire, water and earth), and thereafter, that the three colours are but the Vāyu, and that Vāyu is but merely the Ākāsha (Chhān. 6.4), and thereafter that the Ākāsha is but the transcendent Brahma, which is one only without a second, and in which, as we have already said, all means-of-proof have their ultimate culmination.—15.

*Because an effect (Avara) (i.e. one which comes into existence later on) already exists (as the cause).—16.*

This again why the effect is non-different from the cause, viz. because the Scriptures say, that the Avara i.e. the one which comes into existence later on as the effect,

is, before its creation, already in existence in the cause, as the cause itself, because in the Scriptural passages "Oh mild one, this was mere existence 'Sat' only, in the beginning" (Chhān. 6.2.1), "This in the beginning was only the Self (Ātmā)" (Ait. Āra. 2.4.1.1), the word 'this' (Idam) by which the effect (i.e. this world) is understood, and the cause the Ātmā (the Self), have the same case-endings (showing their oneness). That (viz. the effect) which does not happen to exist in that form in any thing which is its cause, can never come into existence from it, as for instance, oil (which does not exist in the form of the sand as the cause of itself, can never be produced) from sand. Therefore being in fact non-different (from the cause) before creation, it is understood, that the effect even when it is created, is non-different from its cause. Just as Brahma during all the three times (i.e. past, present and future) never deviates from existence (Sattva), even so, the effect viz. this world also during all the three times never deviates from existence (Sattva). And again as existence itself as such (i.e. Sat) is but one only, it follows that the effect is non-different from the cause.—16.

*If it be said, that as an effect (Kārya) is said to be non-existent i.e. 'Asat' (before its creation, and that, therefore, the doctrine of the Vedāntin is) not (correct), (we reply)—No (i.e. it is not that an effect is not 'Sat' i.e. Existent), because from the complementary part of the passage, it is seen (that it is called non-existent i.e. Asat) because of its having a different attribute (Dharma).—17.*

But (says the opponent) the Scriptures do also occasionally refer to the effect before its creation as non-existent (Asat), thus :—This merely was non-existent in the beginning" (Chhān. 3.19.1), and also "In the beginning this indeed was non-existent" (Tait. 2.7.1). Therefore, if it be said, that by reason of an effect being non-existent (Asat) before creation, effect does not exist (before its creation, we reply)—no. This reference to an effect before its creation, as non-existent (Asat) is not meant to

convey its absolute or total non-existence. What then is meant? What is meant is that the condition (of an entity) in which its name and form have become evolved, is a condition different from its condition, in which such name and form have not yet been evolved, and this reference to an entity as being non-existent (Asat) (in the Scriptures) is with respect to this latter condition, non-different though the effect is from its nature as the cause. How is it understood to be so? Because of the complementary passage. The meaning of the sentence, which, in the introductory portion, is ambiguous in meaning, is made definite from the complementary passage. As for the sentence here (under consideration), viz. "This was but merely non-existent (Asat) in the beginning", what (yat) in the introductory portion was indicated by the word 'non-existent' (Asat), and is again referred to by the word 'that' (Tat), is (afterwards) particularized as 'existent' (Sat) by the sentence—"That was Sat i.e. existent". The use of the word 'Āsīt' (in the sentence 'it *was* existent') cannot be reasonably sustainable because, 'Asat' (non-existent) has no connection either with the past or the future time. In the sentence "This of course was non-existent in the beginning" also, absolute i.e. total non-existence could not be meant, because it is particularized (as 'it') in the complementary passage—"It made itself manifest". Hence this reference to an entity before its creation, as 'non-existent', is with reference to this other condition of it. It is well-known in the ordinary world, that it is only a thing which is evolved with name and form that deserves to have the word 'existent' (Sat) applied to it. Hence, prior to its evolution by name and form, a thing is figuratively referred to as 'was non-existent as it were'.—17.

*Because of reasoning, and because of another Scriptural word also (non-difference between cause and effect and the identity between them is understood).—18.*

The existence of the effect (prior to its creation) and its non-difference with the cause is understood by reasoning (Yukti) and by another Scriptural word also. Now, for the present, reasoning will be described. It is seen in the

ordinary world that those who desire to have curds or pots or ornaments, as a rule invariably make use of milk, clay and gold respectively, which are their definitely well-established causes. Those who desire to have curds do not make use of clay, and those who desire to have pots do not make use of milk, which would not be reasonably sustainable, so far as the doctrine of the non-existence of an effect prior to its creation (i.e. *Asatkāryavāda*) is concerned. Non-existence of everything everywhere prior to its creation, being general i.e. common, why is it that curds is produced from milk only, and not from clay, and why are pots produced from clay only, and not from milk? (If the opponent were to say)—even though the non-existence of effects prior to their creation is common i.e. general (to all effects), there is a special property i.e. idiosyncrasy (*Atishaya*) of curds, that subsists in milk only, and a special property or idiosyncrasy of pots, that subsist in clay only, then (the assumption of) such property or idiosyncrasy of their prior state (of effects), would necessarily mean the abandonment of the doctrine of the non-existence of effect prior to its creation (i.e. *Asatkāryavāda*), and the establishment of the doctrine of the prior existence of the effect as the cause, prior to its creation (i.e. *Satkāryavāda*). If such potentiality capable of regulating the effect were to be imagined to exist (in a cause), then, if it is either different (from the cause and the effect) or non-existent, it would not regulate the effect, because if it is either non-existent or different (from the cause and the effect) it will not be able to regulate the creation of a particular effect, because of common non-existence (*Asattva*) and common difference (*Anyatva*), (in as much as, on the one hand it is as non-existent as the non-existent effect, and on the other hand it is quite as different from the cause and the effect, as the cause is different from the effect). Therefore, this potentiality (*Shakti*) is the essential nature of the cause, and the essential nature of such potentiality, is the effect (which ultimately means that the cause, the potentiality and the effect are both one and the same thing). Besides in the absence of the existence of any notion of difference—such as there is as between a horse and a buffalo—between cause and effect, and also as between substance and quality etc., their identity i.e. unity



must necessarily be understood. Even in the assumption of a Samavāya relation (invariable concomitance) if it is understood that there is a relation as between the Samavāya on the one hand, and the two entities between which such Samavāya exists (viz. the Samavāyins) on the other, then such another Samavāya relation of that, and then still such another Samavāya relation of that, *ad infinitum*, will have to be imagined, and hence the predicament of a *regressus ad infinitum* would result; and if it is not assumed that there is a relation between a Samavāya and the Samavāyins, then the predicament of the destruction of any such notion of a Samavāya relation between two entities (such as cause and effect) would result. Now (if the opponent were to say) that a Samavāya itself being of the nature of a relation, establishes such relation (between two entities) without requiring any other relation (of another Samavāya), then (we would reply) that contact or conjunction (Samyoga), also, being of the nature of a relation, it would establish such Samyoga relation, without necessarily requiring a Samavāya (which according to you is necessary). Moreover, as an identity between substance and quality etc. (by etc. a material cause and an effect should be understood) is actually experienced, the notion of such a Samavāya is meaningless. Moreover in which manner (according to you, the opponent) does the material (i.e. Dravya) of an Avayavī (effect) subsist or abide in the material (Dravya) of the Avayava (the cause)? Does it subsist in all the parts i.e. Avayavās (of the cause) together, or in each individual part (i.e. Avayava)? Supposing it subsists in all parts (i.e. Avayavās) together, there would be no perception of the Avayavī (i.e. the effect) because the (necessary) connection (Sannikarsha)\* between the sense-organ and the objects of sense i.e. all the Avayavās together, would be impossible, because, plurality or manyness (Bahutva) which subsists in all the substrata together, would not be perceivable by perceiving any one substratum only. Now (if the opponent were to say) that the Avayavī material subsists Avayava by Avayava, on all the substrata of the cause (i.e. the Avayava material), then it would be necessary to imagine that the

\* 'Sannikarsha' in Nyāya Philosophy means the connection of an organ of sense with its object. It is of six kinds.

Avayavī (i.e. effect), has Avayavās, different from those which started the bringing about of the Avayavī i.e. effect by which the Avayavī could subsist Avayava by Avayava on the Avayavās which started the bringing about of the Avayavī. A sword (for instance) occupies its scabbard by Avayavās different from the Avayavās of the scabbard. And as it would be necessary to imagine other and still other Avayavās so that they may subsist in those Avayavās (which come in the series, earlier) *ad infinitum*, it would lead to a *regressus ad infinitum*. Now, supposing the Avayavī material, together, subsists in every Avayava of the material (Dravya) of the cause, one by one in a series, then it would be that while it operates in one place it could have no operation in another place. Devadatta while he is living in Srughna cannot on the same day be living in Pāṭaliputra also. Being present in two places simultaneously would mean the predicament of there having to be more than one person, as for instance, when Devadatta and Yajnadatta simultaneously reside in Srughna and Pāṭaliputra respectively. (If the opponent were to say) that like the cowness (of a cow) the Avayavī-material may subsist in every Avayava, and hence there would be no such fault, (we would reply)—No, because it is not so actually perceived. If like the cowness which abides in every cow, the Avayavī were to abide fully in every Avayava, then just as the 'cowness' (of a cow) is directly perceived to be abiding in every individual cow, even so, would the Avayavī be directly perceivable in every individual Avayava, but it is not perceived to be so invariably. Besides if the Avayavī were to abide fully in every Avayava, then as it is but one only, and is competent to function, it may accomplish the function of the udders with a horn, and the function of the back with the chest. But it is not so experienced. Again if an effect were to be non-existent (Asat) prior to its creation, then creative action would be without an agent, and it would not have a Self. Creation, indeed, is an action, and, like motion etc., action deserves to have an agent. It would be a contradiction in terms to speak of there being action and such action (taking place) without an agent. (If the opponents' doctrine of the non-existence of effect prior to creation were to be accepted) when the creation of a pot is spoken of, it

would have to be imagined that it is not caused by the pot (as it is not in existence before its creation), but by some other agent. Similarly when the creation of the two halves of a pot is spoken of, it also would have to be imagined that it is caused (not by the two halves but) by some other agent. If it were to be so, then, when it is said that a pot is being created, it would be tantamount to saying, that its causes, such as the potter etc., are being created (because as a pot cannot be its own maker, when it is said that a pot is being created, it would mean by implication, that the causes of a pot are being created), but in the ordinary world when the creation of a pot is spoken of, it is not experienced, that its causes such as the potter etc., are also being created simultaneously, but on the other hand it is experienced that they have already been in existence. Now, (if the opponent Asatkāryavādī were to say) that the creation of an effect, merely means the establishment of its relation with its cause, and the obtainment by the effect of its own existence (Sattā), then the opponent has to explain, as to how, anything which has not as yet acquired its own existence, can ever establish its relation (with something else). It is when two entities are in existence that a relation between them is possible, and not when one exists and the other does not, nor when neither of them are in existence. Besides non-existence by itself being of the nature of falsity or unreality (Nirupākhyaṭva), it would not be reasonably sustainable to set a time limit to it, such as, non-existence prior to the creation (of an effect). In the ordinary world, it is when there are already existing things such as a field or a house that it is seen that a limit is set to them, and never to mere non-existence. By setting a limit of this sort for instance, viz. that the 'son of a barren woman' became a king *before* the coronation of Purnavarman, it can never be that an absolute non-entity (Tuchcha-Vastu) such as the 'son of a barren woman', ever was, is, or will be, a king. If even 'the son of a barren woman' could come into existence, after the operation of a casual agent, then it may also be that an effect which is non-existent prior to its creation, may also come into existence after the operation of a casual agent. What we see, however, is that non-existence being common both to the (non-existence of the) 'son of a barren woman' and

(the non-existence of) an effect prior to its creation, just as the 'son of a barren woman' does not ever come into existence by and after the operation of a casual agent, even so, the non-existent effect (which is non-existent prior to its creation), cannot ever come into existence by and after the operation of a casual agent.

But (says the opponent Asatkāryavādi) in that case the operation of a casual agent would be rendered purposeless. Just as no one endeavours to bring about a cause which already exists, even so, no one would bother to bring about an effect which exists already, and is non-different from the cause (as you the Satkāryavādi hold), but we do see that people always do so endeavour (to bring about effects). So, in order that the operation of a casual agent may not be rendered purposeless, we believe in the non-existence of an effect prior to its creation. (To this, we reply)—This is not proper, because it would be reasonably sustainable to say, that operation by a casual agent, which modifies the cause into the form of an effect, could have a purpose. We have said already, that the form of an effect-as-such, is but the form of the cause itself, and nothing that has no form in itself can ever be set on (to establish an effect in a similar form). A thing as such does not become another different thing altogether, by merely appearing in a different aspect. Devadatta, whose hands and legs are (at one time) in a flexed position, and Devadatta whose hands and legs are (at some other time) in an extended position, and who is thus to be seen in such different attitudes (at different times), does not merely on that account, become different persons, because he is still recognizable as the same one person (Devadatta). Similarly, a father etc. who every day happen to be in different capacities do not become different individuals because they are recognized as being—'my father', 'my brother' and 'my son' etc.. (If the opponent Asatkāryavādi were to say)—In that case it may well be so, because of their having (during such capacities) no connection with birth and death, but it is not so, in other cases, (we reply)—no, because milk etc. also are directly seen to materialize as curds etc. (without undergoing destruction). When seeds of the Vaṭa (Banyan) tree etc., which are not visible, become visible as sprouts, as a result of their cells multiply-

ing themselves into many such cells, and ultimately developing into a sprout, it is termed (their) 'birth', and when as a result of the diminution of these very cells, they again become invisible, it is termed (their) 'death'. Now (if the opponent Asatkāryavādi were to say), that what is non-existent (Asat) becomes existent (Sat) because of its having no connection with birth and death, (we reply) that in that case there would result this predicament, viz., that the unborn embryo, and a new-born child lying face upwards on its back, would become different entities. Similarly there would also be the predicament, of the same man in his childhood, youth and old age, being different entities, and there would also be the predicament of the destruction of the use of such conventional terms as father etc.. By all this (preceding argument) the doctrine of all existence being momentary (Buddhistic doctrine) should also be understood to be refuted. In the case of the adherents of the doctrine of the non-existence of the effect prior to its creation, the operation of a causal agent would not have any object (such as a cause) on which it can operate, and again non-existence not being an object, it cannot also be the object of any operation by a causal agent, even as the Ākāsha cannot be the object, for the purpose of mowing it down by striking it with a sword etc.. (Now if the opponent Asatkāryavādi were to say) that the operation of a causal agent may have the material cause (of an effect)—such as earth etc.—as the object of its operation, (we reply)—No, because it would in that case lead to a strange result (Atiprasanga) viz. that by the operation of a causal agent on one object (i.e. earth), another different object (i.e. a pot) would be produced. (If the opponent Asatkāryavādi were to say) that an effect is but an idiosyncrasy of the Self of the material cause, (we reply)—No, as it would lead to the establishment of Satkāryavāda i.e. the doctrine of the existence of the effect prior to creation, (which would be awkward for the opponent Asatkāryavādi). Therefore, in as much as substances such as milk etc., only when they attain the form of curds etc., acquire the name of an effect, it is not possible even after (wrangling about it for) a hundred years, to establish, that an effect is different from its cause. Similarly, it is only the fundamental cause, which, like an actor, assumes different forms as

effects right down to the last effect, and becomes amenable to all worldly transactions. In this way it is understood through 'reasoning' that the effect does exist prior to its creation, and that it is non-different from the cause. The same proposition is proved by other Scriptural passages. In the preceding Sūtra a passage which indicated the Scriptural word 'Asat' (i.e. non-existent) was cited and now the word 'Sat' (i.e. existent) i.e. a Scriptural word different from it (Shabdāntara), is cited, in the passage—"Oh mild one, the 'Sat' alone was existing in the beginning, the only one without a second" etc., after challenging the view of the non-existence of the effect (before creation) thus—"Some said, this was not in existence in the beginning", and then by saying thus—"How can existence spring from non-existence?", it is finally concluded by the Scriptures, thus—"Sat alone was existing in the beginning" (Chhān. 6.2.1). Now in as much as it is understood from the Scriptures that the effect which is indicated by the word 'Idam' has the same case-ending as the cause indicated by the word 'Sat' (existing) i.e. there is oneness between them, the existence of (the effect) prior to its creation and its non-difference with the cause, becomes established. If on the other hand, an effect prior to its creation were to be non-existent and were it to establish a relation with the material cause after its creation then it would be an entity different from the cause, and in that case the original declaration, viz., "By which that which is unheard becomes heard" (Chhān. 6.1.3), would be contradicted, and it is only by understanding that the effect exists prior to its creation and that it is non-different from the cause, that the original declaration can be upheld. —18.

*Also, similarly to a piece of cloth (the effect is non-different from the cause).—19.*

Just as when a piece of cloth happens to be folded, it is not definitely understood whether it is a piece of cloth or some other material, but when it is unfolded it becomes clearly understood to be a piece of cloth, or, it is understood to be a piece of cloth even when it is yet folded, but it is not understood as to how long and broad it is, but when it is unfolded it is known to be of a particular dimen-

sion in length and breadth and that it is not a piece of cloth different from the one which happened to be in a folded condition, similarly, an effect such as a piece of cloth etc., unrecognizable as it is, while it is in the condition of its cause viz. as threads etc., becomes clearly recognizable when it is made manifest by the operations of the causal agents, such as the shuttle, the loom and the weaver. Hence the meaning is, that it is precisely in accordance with 'the maxim of the folded and unfolded piece of cloth' that an effect is non-different from its cause.—19.

*Also like the (minor) Prāṇās (Vital Airs,  
the effect is non-different from the cause).  
—20.*

Just as in the ordinary world, when the different kinds of minor Prāṇās such as the Prāṇa, Apāna (ascending and descending Prāṇa) etc. are controlled, (and put out of action) by Prāṇāyāma (breathing exercises) and they then subsist merely in the form of a cause, only the life (of a man) is sustained and no other function such as the flexion or stretching (of the limbs) takes place, and when these different Prāṇās start functioning again, flexion and stretching (of the limbs) in addition to mere living also is restored. Now just as during all this time, the different minor Prāṇās, though they appear to be different, are not essentially different from the chief vital Prāṇa, because of the chief vital Prāṇa and the other minor Prāṇās being all of the same nature of air, even so, the effects are non-different from their causes. Hence, as the whole world is an effect of Brahma (as its cause), and is non-different from it, the Scriptural declaration—"By (the knowledge of) which, what is not heard becomes heard, what is not perceived becomes perceived, what is not known becomes known" (Chhān. 6.1.1)—is thus established.—20.

#### 7. ITARAVYAPADESHĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 21-23.

*Because of the reference to the other (i.e. the Jīva-Self is of the nature of Brahma), a fault—viz. that which is beneficial is eschewed etc. (by the Self)—attaches.—21.*

Again, the doctrine of a sentient thing being the cause (of the world) is objected to. If it is accepted that the creation of the world is due to a sentient cause (such as Brahma), faults such as the eschewing (by it) of what is beneficial etc. do attach themselves (to Brahma). Whence is it so? Because of the reference to other (i.e. the Jīva-Self). The Scriptures indicate that the other, i.e. the Jīva-Self, has Brahma as its Self (i.e. both are one and the same), by enlightening (Shvetaketu), thus—"That is the Self, that thou art, Oh Shevtaketo" (Chhān. 6.8.7). Or else (it may be construed) that the Scriptures declare, that the other (i.e. Brahma) is the Self of the embodied Jīva-Self, thus—"Having created that (world) it entered into it" (Tait. 2.6), by stating the Creator (Brahma) which never undergoes any modification, as entering into that which it has created (viz. the body etc.). The Scriptural passage "May I, by myself entering (into my own creation) as the Jīva-Self, evolve names and forms", by indicating that the transcendent deity (i.e. Brahma) refers to the Jīva-Self as its own Self, shows, how the Jīva-Self is not different from Brahma. Hence the creative activity of Brahma is but the creative activity of the Jīva-Self only. Hence being thus an independent creator in itself, it (i.e. the Jīva-Self) would rather create what is beneficial to itself and conducive to its own satisfaction, and avoid creating that which is not so beneficial, such as this snare of all the evils of birth, death, old age, and disease. No one who is not dependent ever voluntarily creates a prison for himself and enters into it. No one who himself is extremely pure and stainless, would ever accept this extremely unclean body as his own (tabernacle). Even if anything is done by him which causes pain, he would voluntarily give it up and would undertake only that which gives happiness. Further he would also remember that he himself has created this wonderful sphere of the universe. All persons who have done any definite thing, necessarily remember it as their own handiwork. Just as an illusionist, at will and without any effort withdraws an illusion spread by him, even so would the embodied Jīva-Self, at will, demolish his own creation. The Jīva-Self, however, is not easily able even to do away with its own body. Hence, as it is not seen that a thing which is beneficial is done (by the embodied Jīva-



Self), it is understood that the acceptance of the theory that the world is created by a sentient being, is not reasonable.—21.

*But (Brahma is) greater (and therefore, other than the Jīva-Self) because of the mention of a distinction (between Brahma and the Jīva-Self).—22.*

The word 'But' rebuts the (opponent's) view. We maintain that Brahma, which is omniscient, and omnipotent, and which possesses a nature which is eternally pure and enlightened, and which is free and is greater than the Jīva-Self, and is different (from it), is the creator of the world. The faults of not doing what is beneficial etc. do not attach themselves to it. Possessing as it does the nature of being eternally free, it has no duties either to perform anything beneficial or not to perform anything unbeneficial (to itself). Because of being omniscient and omnipotent there is also not the least let or hindrance either to its knowledge or power. The Jīva-Self on the other hand is unlike that and the faults of not doing what is beneficial etc. do of course attach to it, but, we do not maintain that the Jīva-Self is the creator of the world. How is that? Because of the mention of a distinction (between it and Brahma). Scriptural passages such as "The Self (Oh Maitreyi) is to be seen, heard, cogitated upon and constantly meditated upon" (Brih. 2.4.5), "He should be sought for and desired to be known" (Chhān. 8.7.1), "He in that condition (of deep sleep) becomes one with the Sat" (Chhān. 6.8.1), "The embodied Jīva-Self being mounted upon by the intelligential Self (Prājña)" (Brih. 4.3.35), which speak of a distinction as between an agent (Kartā) and an object (Karma) etc., show that Brahma is greater i.e. other than the Jīva-Self.

But (says the opponent) there is a mention also of the non-distinction between the two, such as—"That thou art". How can distinction and non-distinction which are contrary to each other be both possible? (We reply)—this is no fault, because we have already established in several proper places, that according to the maxim of "The Ākāsha and the Ākāsha of the pot", both are possible. Besides

when the non-distinction (between the two) comes to be realized, by means of such reference to non-distinction, as "That thou art", then the nature of the transmigratory existence of the Jīva-Self, and the creative activity of Brahma, both vanish, on account of the removal of the entire set of transactions, depending upon the notion of distinction which is but only a display of false-ignorance, by true knowledge. Whence could then there be any creation (of the world) at all or any such faults of not doing that which is beneficial? We have said more than once, that this transmigratory existence characterized by the avoidance of what is beneficial etc., is nothing but a delusion, caused by the failure to realize the limiting adjuncts, such as the aggregates of bodies and organs of sense, and names and forms brought about by Nescience, and it is not as if it exists in the truest sense, and that it (i.e. this delusion) is of a piece with the supposed notions, of birth or death or of being hurt or wounded. As long as the notion of distinction (between the Jīva-Self and Brahma) continues unobliterated, the notion of Brahma being different from (and more than) the Jīva-Self, as understood from the Scriptural passage "He should be searched for and understood", precludes the possibility of the attachment to Brahma, of any such faults as the not doing of things beneficial etc. (to itself).—22.

*And (this) being similar to the case of stones etc., that (i.e. the objection of the opponent of the Vedānta view) is not reasonably sustainable.—23.*

Just as in the ordinary world, though stones in general are the effects of earth, we find that there is quite a variety in them, as for instance, some are highly precious such as diamonds and lapis lazuli, some are of an intermediate quality such as crystals and sun-stones, and some are of the lowest type, fit only to be thrown at dogs and crows, or just as in the case of seeds which are all planted in earth, we find a great variety of leaves, flowers, fruits, smells and tastes, as in sandalwood and Kimpāka (Giant Palm fruit) or just as from one and the same food chyle, a variety of effects such blood etc. and hair and down etc.

result, in the same way in the case of Brahma, one only though it is, such distinction as by way of the Jiva-Self and the intelligent Self is possible, and also a variety of its effects, is reasonably sustainable, and hence the objection raised by the opponents of the Vedānta view, is not reasonably sustainable. The meaning is that the fault imagined by the opponent is not reasonably sustainable. Also other reasons, such as that the Scriptures are the ultimate authority, that effects (Vikārās) are such as are merely made current in speech, and that there is a variety of dream experiences (though the person who experiences dreams is but one only), can be cumulatively mentioned.—23.

8. UPASAMHĀRADARSHANĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 24-25.

*(If it be said that the Vedānta view) is not correct because it is seen (in the ordinary world) that (for producing an effect) there is preparation or an assemblage (of means, we reply)—No, because it (Brahma) is like milk.—24.*

What is said by the opponent—viz., the statement (by the Vedāntin) that sentient Brahma, which is alone without a second, is the cause of the world—is not reasonably sustainable. Whence is it so? Because it is seen that there is preparation or assemblage (of means). In the ordinary world, it is observed that potters (and weavers) etc., the manufacturers of pots and cloth etc., accomplish those different things, after furnishing themselves with the necessary means or implements, by assembling together clay, staff, wheel and threads, etc., and many such causal agents, while you maintain that Brahma is without any such help. Hence how can it be reasonably sustainable, that Brahma, which you understand to have no such helpful means, can have the ability to create in the absence of any such assemblage of means? Ergo, Brahma could not be the cause of the world. (To this, we reply)—This is no fault. It is reasonably so sustainable, because Brahma, like milk, is a special peculiar material (Dravya). Just as in the ordinary world, milk and water, by themselves undergo modifications into curds and snow respectively without

expecting any extraneous means, even so, it might be the case here (i.e. in the case of Brahma). If the opponent says) How do you say that the case is analogous to milk, when even milk etc. do require such outside help as heat etc. ? (We reply)—this is no fault, because whatever modification milk undergoes in turning into curds is by itself only, and whatever potentiality or the limit of potentiality which milk has in itself for the modificatory process of conversion into curds is but merely accelerated by heat etc., that is all. Because, were milk not to possess in itself this potentiality of modifying itself into curds, it would never undergo such modification per force alone, by means of heat etc.. Ākāsha and Vāyu, for instance, do not modify themselves per force into curds, by heat etc., and (in the case of milk) its capacity (for modification) is merely perfected by the assemblage of means. Brahma on the other hand is fully powerful by itself, and nothing else is necessary to make its capacity perfect. For the Scriptures say—“There is nothing that it has to create, nor has it any extraneous instrument or means, (it may also mean—it i.e. Brahma has neither a body nor any sense-organ), nothing equal to or greater than it, is to be seen, and its powers are (seen to be) manifold and transcendental, and it has the natural power to know all things and to regulate and overcome everything by its mere presence” (Shvet. 6.2). Therefore, only one, as Brahma is, that it has diverse powers inherent in itself, and that it can, like milk, modify itself in diverse ways, is reasonably sustainable.—24.

*(The case of Brahma) may be, as it is in the ordinary world, like that of Gods etc. (it may also become active).—25.*

May be (says the opponent), it may be reasonably sustainable, that non-sentient milk and such things may modify themselves into curds etc. without expecting any extraneous means (to aid them), because it actually is so seen. But potters etc., who are sentient, are seen to proceed to do their various different works only by depending on extraneous means (to help them). How then can Brahma, which is sentient, proceed to work unaided ? We reply, that, it may be so, as in the case of Gods, etc.. Just as in the

ordinary world it is understood on the authority of Veda, Mantrās, History and Purāṇās, that Gods, the manes and sages etc., very powerful and sentient as they are, and unaided by extraneous means as they are, are seen to create bodies of different sorts, and chariots and palaces etc. merely by themselves by means of their special power and by mere meditation, and by mere volition, or just as a spider produces its own threads itself, or just as a crane conceives without insemination, or just as an assemblage of lotuses proceeds from one lake to another without any extraneous means of movement, even so, Brahma, sentient as it is, may, well by itself, create the world unaided by any extraneous means.

(If the opponent were to say)—But these Gods etc., which are cited (by the Vedāntin) as illustrations for Brahma, bear no similarity to Brahma, which is sought to be illustrated by them. It is the non-sentient *body* of the Gods, and not their sentient selves, that furnishes the material for producing other bodies, and it is the saliva of a spider which becomes coagulated by feeding on inferior insects, that modifies itself into threads, and the crane conceives on hearing the sound of thunder, and an assemblage of lotuses, impelled by an indwelling sentient being, moves with its non-sentient body from one lake to another, just as a creeper climbs up a tree, and not that the non-sentient assemblage of lotuses, by itself endeavours to move towards another lake. Therefore these cannot be illustrations with regard to Brahma.

We would reply—This is no fault, because, what we wish to stress, is only the dissimilarity of the illustrations such as that of the potter etc. (which you, the opponent referred to). Just as, though sentiency is common both to the potter and the Gods, it is only the potter etc. that need extraneous means (to help them) in doing their work, but not so the Gods, even so, all that we wish to say by the illustration of the Gods, is that sentient Brahma, also need not require any extraneous means (to help it in creating the world). What we therefore mean, is, that it is not an invariable rule, that just as a particular power is observed to exist in one thing, similarly all other things also must necessarily have the same power.—25.

## 9. KRITSNAPRASAKTYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 26-29.

*(If Brahma be the cause of the world, the conclusion would be), that the entire Brahma undergoes modification, or else the Scriptural declaration that Brahma has no parts would be vitiated.—26.*

It is established, that Brahma, which is the only one without a second, and which undergoes modification without expecting any extraneous means (to help it)—like milk or like the Gods—, is the cause of the world. Objection however is taken to this (by the Sūtrakāra himself), for securing the purification of the meaning of the Shāstra, thus—A conclusion, that there would be modification of the entire Brahma, into its effects, would result, as Brahma is without any parts. Were Brahma to have parts like the earth for instance, it may be that while one part of it would undergo modification the other part may remain as it is. But it is understood from the Scriptures which deny any special attribute in Brahma, that Brahma has no parts, thus—“(Brahma is) without parts, without action, tranquil, faultless and untainted” (Shvet. 6. 19), “That celestial and incorporeal Purusha is both inside and outside and is unborn” (Muṇḍ. 2.1.2), “This great being, is infinite, endless and fully knowledge-incarnate” (Brih. 2.4.12), “(Whatever is predicated to be Brahma)—it is not that, not that, it is the Self” (Brih. 3.9.26), “Neither gross nor atomic” (Brih. 3.8.8). Hence, as there is the impossibility of only a part of Brahma undergoing modification, and the conclusion about its modification in its entirety being therefore inevitable, the destruction of the very basis itself (i.e. Brahma) would thus result. Now, as effects as such (of Brahma) are recognizable without any effort, the Scriptural instruction that “it (Brahma) should be seen” would be rendered purposeless, and the existence of Brahma as apart from its modification would not be possible, (as Brahma will have undergone modification in its entirety). Besides, it would militate against the Scriptural declaration of its not being subject to origination (Ajatva) etc.. If, in order to remove this fault, it is understood, that Brahma has parts, then the Scriptural statements cited in illustra-

tion of its being without any parts would be contradicted. Besides, if it is understood to have parts, the predicament of its not being eternal would arise. Hence (the opponent avers) it is not possible to reconcile this (Vedānta) view.—26.

*But (the objection of the opponent is not correct) because of Scriptural passages, and also because it (Brahma) has the Scriptures as its basis (lit. root).—27.*

By the word 'But' (the Sūtrakāra) refutes the objection (of the opponent). Really there is no fault of any kind in our view (i.e. the view of the Vedāntin). In the first place there is no modification of Brahma in its entirety. Whence is it so ? Because of the Scriptures. Just as the Scriptures speak of the creation of the world from Brahma, they also speak of the existence of Brahma, as apart from its modifications, inasmuch as they speak of the cause (i.e. Prakriti, Brahma) and its modification (Vikāra) as being different from each other, by passages of the type of "This deity thought, I will now enter into these three divinities (i.e. into the Prithivī, Āpa and Teja) as the Jīva-Self and evolve names and forms" (Chhān. 6.3.2) and "So much is its greatness, and the Purusha is even greater than that. His one foot (i.e. quarter) represents all the beings, and the other three feet (quarters) represent that which is immortal in heaven" (Chhān. 3.12.6). Also, as the Scriptures speak of the Hridaya as its (Brahma's) abode, and that in deep sleep, it, i.e. the Jīva-Self, becomes one with the 'Sat' (Brahma). Were entire Brahma to be used up in modifying itself into effects, then the special mention, in the Scriptural passage "Oh mild one, in deep sleep the Jīva-Self becomes one with the 'Sat' (Brahma)" (Chhān. 6.8.1), about this peculiarity pertaining to deep sleep, would not be reasonably sustainable, because (in such a case) it (i.e. the Sat i.e. Brahma) would always be as one with the modified Brahma, (because according to the opponent, the entire Brahma would have modified itself) and because there would be no unmodified Brahma as such. And also because it is denied (by the Scriptures) that Brahma is perceptible to sense-organs, and it is reasonably sustainable

that the effects (i.e. the world etc.) are perceptible to sense-organs. Therefore, unevolved Brahma does necessarily exist. There can be no contradiction of the Scriptural statement about Brahma being without any parts, as it is understood from Scriptures themselves that Brahma has no parts. As Brahma has the Scriptures as its basis, and Scriptures alone and not the sense-organs are authoritative about it, it should necessarily be understood to be just as it is spoken of in the Scriptures. And the Scriptures speak of Brahma as being both without parts and at the same time as not modifying itself wholly. Even ordinary things of the world such as gems, Mantrās and herbs are observed to possess powers to exhibit properties producing incompatible effects depending upon the varieties of environment, time, and occasion, and in the absence of any instruction about them, it cannot be known merely by reasoning, that they possess such and such powers, which require such and such help and which produce such and such effects and are effective for such and such purposes. Need it be mentioned, therefore, that it is not possible to explain the inscrutable nature of Brahma, without (the help of) the Scriptures? The Puraṇikās also say, similarly—"Do not employ reasoning to entities which are unthinkable. To be beyond the material effects (Prakṛiti) is the criterion of that which is unfathomable". Therefore, the realization of the supersensuous Brahma, as it is in fact, depends upon the Scriptures as its source.

But (says the opponent) things which are contradictory—as for instance, that Brahma which is without parts, modifies itself but not entirely—cannot be realized even on the authority of the Scriptures. If, Brahma is (in fact) without parts, it will either not modify itself at all, or modify itself entirely. If it were to be supposed that it has different aspects, so that it modifies itself in some of its aspects and remains unmodified in some other of its aspects, it would mean necessarily that it has parts. In the case of matters connected with actions (Karma), when a conflict is discernible, such as "He uses the Shodashī cup in Atirātra sacrifice", and "He does not use the Shodashī cup in Atirātra sacrifice", as action depends upon a man, a resort to an option constitutes the means of removing the contradiction, but in the present case, even a resort to option



would be unable to remove a contradiction, because, an entity (Vastu) as such is independent of man, and therefore, it is difficult to reconcile this (contradiction).

(To this we reply) This is no fault, because here it is understood that these different aspects of Brahma are imagined through Nescience. A thing is not rendered as being a thing having parts, merely by imagining through Nescience (Avidyā) that it has different aspects. The moon, for instance, does not in fact become more than one, merely because she appears to be more than one, to an eye affected by double vision (Timira i.e. Diplopia). Brahma appears to become susceptible of (i.e. appears to be the basis of) all phenomenal behaviour by way of modifications etc., by reason of the distinctions of aspects or forms characterized by names and forms imagined through Nescience, which are at once both evolved and unevolved, and about whom it is not possible to predicate that they either are or are not Brahma, while in its truest nature Brahma subsists only in its unmodified aspect, and is beyond all phenomenal behaviour, and, as names and forms imagined through Nescience are but merely made current by speech, the fact that Brahma has no parts is not thereby vitiated. Besides, on the one hand this Scriptural statement about the modification (of Brahma) is not meant to propound the fact of modification itself, as such realization is not understood to have any fruit as such, while on the other hand it is intended to establish how Brahma which is the Self of all is devoid of any *real* phenomenal behaviour, as it is understood that a fruit results by such realization. The Scriptures, after declaring in the beginning that “(whatever is predicated to be Brahma) is not that, not that”, proceed to say later on—“Oh Janaka, verily hast thou attained fearlessness” (Brih. 4.2.4). Therefore there could never be a predicament of any kind of fault attaching to our view (i.e. that of the Vedāntins).—27.

*It is similar in (the case of) the Ātmā (Jīva-Self) also, (during dream experiences), and such different (creations exist in the case of Gods, illusionists etc.).—28.*

It should not be disputed in this matter (of Brahma),

as to how creations of different sorts, originating out of Brahma which is but one only, can be possible without the destruction of its own nature, since the Scriptures speak of similar creations of different sorts in the case of the dreaming Jīva-Self also without any destruction of its own nature thus—“(In the dream condition) there are no chariots, nor steeds, nor roads, but he creates chariots, steeds and roads etc.” (Brih. 4.3.10). It is seen in the ordinary world also, that Gods, illusionists etc. cause such creations as elephants and horses, without their own forms undergoing destruction, and hence, even in the case of Brahma, one and only one as it is, there may well be creation of different sorts without involving destruction of its own nature.—28.

*Also because the faults (attributed to the Vedānta doctrine by the opponents) are common to their own (i.e. of the opponent's) view.—29.*

The same faults are common to their own view (i.e. to the view of the opponents of Vedānta). Their own view also is, that the Pradhāna which is without parts, undelimited, and devoid of attributes such as sound etc., is the cause of effects which have parts, which are delimited and which have the attributes of sound (such as the world etc.). In that case also, the Pradhāna being without parts, there would also be the same conclusion, viz., that the Pradhāna as a whole undergoes modification, or that the assumption that Pradhāna has no parts would be contradicted.

(The opponent may suggest)—they (i.e. the opponents) do not understand that the Pradhāna is without parts, because its three qualities (Guṇās) of Sattva, Raja, and Tama are eternal and Pradhāna means their condition of balanced equipoise, and that it is because of these three qualities (Guṇās) that their Pradhāna has parts. (We say to this)—they would not be able to remove the present fault by any such supposition about the Pradhāna being endowed with parts, because (according to them) each of their Guṇās viz. Sattva, Raja or Tama is by itself equally partless, and each one of these three helped by the other two,

is the material cause of diverse creations, homogeneous to themselves (i.e. having all these qualities in every creation), and therefore, there would be the same common predicament of a similar fault occurring in their own view also.

(If the opponent says)—As this reasoning (viz. that each of these three qualities i.e. Guṇās of Pradhāna has no parts) has no basis, we understand that the Pradhāna has parts, even then (we reply) there still would occur the predicament of its being non-eternal etc. (because a thing which has parts is not everlasting i.e. is Anitya).

(Again if the opponent says) We assume that the diverse potential powers of the Pradhāna, as suggested by the variety of created effects themselves, constitute the parts of the Pradhāna, then (we reply) that the assumption of such potential powers is equally common to the Vedānta view.

Now, in the case of the Atomists (Vaisheshikās) also, when one atom combines with another, it would combine entirely because atoms are without parts, and then as no dimensions i.e. extensions would emerge (from such combination of partless atoms) there would occur the predicament of the resulting combination (of one atom with another) also being atomic. If it then be said, that an atom combines with only one part (of it) with one part (of another), it would contradict their own assumption of atoms being without parts, and the fault would then be common to the Atomist's view also. Such a fault therefore being in such a case common to both the views (of the Vedāntin's and the Atomist's) it would not be proper (for any one) to urge it only against one's opponent's view only. The possibility of any fault attaching to the Vedānta view has already been refuted by the adherent of the Vedānta view.—29.

## 20. SARVOPETĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 30-31.

*(Brahma) is equipped with all powers, because it is so seen (from the Scriptures).*

—30.

It has already been said that though Brahma is one only, its modification in the form of this diverse world

appearance, is reasonably sustainable, because of its being equipped with all powers. Again (it may be asked), how is it known that the Highest Brahma is equipped with diverse powers? (We reply)—Because it is seen that it is so equipped (with diverse powers). It has necessarily to be understood that this Highest deity is equipped with all powers. Whence is it so? Because it is seen (from Scriptures) that it has all such powers, thus—"He, to whom all actions, all desires, all smells, all tastes belong, who is immanent in i.e. occupies all this (world appearance), who has no speech and who is indifferent and calm" (Chhān. 3.14.4); "His desires are true, his resolutions are true" (Chhān. 8.7.1); "Who is omniscient and who cognizes everything" (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9); "Oh Gārgi, it is at the behest of him who is unperishable that the sun and the moon hold themselves suspended in position (in space) (Brih. 3.8.9).—30.

*(If it be said)—not being endowed with sense-organs, (Brahma) (cannot effect modifications) (we reply) it has been answered already.—31.*

The Scriptures have stated that the transcendent deity (Brahma) is not endowed with organs, thus—" (Brahma is) sans-eyes, sans-ears, sans-speech and sans-mind" (Brih. 3.8.8). How then, can such transcendent deity be able to effect modifications, even though it be equipped with all powers? Intelligent and equipped with all powers as Gods etc. are, they are understood to be able to effect all such several modifications, only when they are possessed of physical organs as the means (of effecting modifications). (If it be said)—how is it possible, that a deity which can be referred to only negatively as "not that, not that" (Brih. 3.9.26) and about which all specific attributes are thus denied, can still have a connection with all such powers? (We would reply)—All that can be said in reply to this has already been stated before. This extremely solemn Brahma is capable of being understood only through the Scriptures and never through reasoning. There is no such rule that because one entity is observed to possess certain powers, any other entity must necessarily possess all these powers. That it is possible, that Brahma,

with regard to which all special attributes are denied, may yet possibly possess all powers when it is borne in mind that it has already been stated that even though all specific attributes are denied in the case of Brahma, still when it is assumed that it has different forms or natures imagined through Nescience (Avidyā), it becomes possible that it can have a connection with all powers. Even so teaches the Shāstra (Scriptures), viz., that unequipped with physical organs though Brahma is, it still is possessed of all powers, by the passage—"Though he has neither hands nor feet, he grasps and is capable of swift movement, he sees even though he has no eyes and hears even though he has no ears to hear" (Shvet. 3.19).—31.

#### 11. PRAYOJANAVATTVĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 32-33.

*(Brahma) is not the cause of the world,  
because (all endeavours by sentient entities  
are) with some object.—32.*

Again in another way an objection is raised (by the opponent) to (the doctrine of) this transitory world being the handiwork of a sentient entity (i.e. Brahma). Verily this sentient Highest Self (i.e. Brahma) does not deserve to create (i.e. be the creator of) this world-sphere. Why so? Because all endeavours presuppose an objective (behind such endeavour). (For instance) in the ordinary world a sentient man whose every endeavour is invariably preceded by previous thought, is never seen to engage himself in any the least endeavour which is useless for his own objective. How then about this stupendous undertaking? There is a passage in the Scriptures which agrees with ordinary well-known worldly experience, thus—"All this does not become dear for the sake of all, but it all is so dear, because it is desired by one's own self (Ātmā)" (Brih. 2.4.5). It is a stupendous undertaking this, viz. the creation of this worldly sphere, which is comprised of all such high and low worldly phenomena. Now, if it were to be conceived that this endeavour of the Highest Self is useful to itself because of its own desire, then such supposition would contradict the Scriptural statement about the Highest Self being always quite contented. If, on the other hand,

one were to conceive no such purpose (behind such endeavour), one would have to concede that (in such a case) there would not be any such endeavour, (if one were to say) that it is seen that if a person even though sentient, happens to be unsound in mind, such person, through the fault of his intellect, is seen to be engaged in activity quite useless to his purpose, by reason of his inability to discriminate properly, and even so, may the Highest Self also endeavour, then (in such a case) the Scriptural statement about the Highest Self being omniscient, would be contradicted. For these reasons, therefore, (the doctrine) that the creation (of this world) is by a sentient being, is not tenable.—32.

*But (the act of creation) is a mere sport  
(of the Lord) even as is seen in the ordinary  
world.—33.*

The word "But" refutes the objection. Just as in the ordinary world, in the case of a king who has attained all his desires or of his minister, their activities in sports and pastimes are merely of the nature of a sport and are indulged in without any particular aim in mind, or just as the inspiration or expiration etc. (of a man) takes place naturally, without any extraneous purpose, even so may the Lord also engage in such sportful activity without any purpose, and merely as the result of his nature. It is not possible to explain on the ground of reasoning or the Scriptures that there is any other purpose on the part of the Lord. It is not possible to question the nature (of the Lord). Though the creation of this world-sphere appears to us as a stupendous undertaking, yet to the Lord, it is but a mere pastime, because of his measureless power. May be, that in the case of the ordinary world, we may imagine perhaps some minute purpose even for sports, but here in the case of the Lord, it is not possible to imagine any such purpose, because of the Scriptural statement about His being one who has obtained all his desires. Nor can we say that the Lord has no such activity or that such activity is that of a person who is possessed of an evil spirit or of one who is insane, because of the Scriptural statement about creation and about his being Omniscient. Nor should

it ever be forgotten, that even this Scriptural statement about creation (by the Lord) is not so in the truest sense, but with reference to the perception of the transactions of names and forms being merely imagined through Nescience, and also because it purports to propound how Brahma is the Self (of everything).—33.

## 12. VAISHAMYAN AIRGHRINĀDHĪKARAṆAM. Sū. 34-36.

*(Faults of) discrimination and cruelty do not (attach themselves to the Lord) because of (the Lord's) having regard (for the merit or demerit of a person). The Scriptures themselves bear it out.—34.*

Objection is again taken (by the Sūtrakāra himself) to the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the creation etc. of the world, in order to confirm the declaration of that doctrine, in accordance with the 'maxim of driving a pile deeper (in order to make it firm) (Sthūpānikhanana Nyāya)', thus—It is not reasonably sustainable that the Lord is the cause of the world, because (supposing it is so) there would result the predicament of (the fault of) discrimination and cruelty (attaching themselves to the Lord). It would be reasonably sustainable to hold, that the Lord in bringing about such unequal creation—such as Gods etc. who enjoy great happiness, animals etc. who suffer great misery, and men etc. who enjoy happiness or suffer misery in moderation—is like an ordinary man subject to passion and hatred. It would thus bring about the effacement of the Lord's nature of extreme purity as understood from the Scriptures and the Smritis. Similarly by his inflicting misery and by destroying all his creation, faults of such pitilessness and cruelty, as would be abhorred even by a villain, would attach themselves to the Lord. Therefore, because of the predicament of (the faults of) discrimination and cruelty resulting, the Lord could not be the cause of the world.

To this (we reply)—(The faults of) discrimination and cruelty do not affect the Lord. How is this so? Because of the regard (which the Lord has for the merit or demerit of a person). Were the Lord to bring about such

unequal creation without any such regard (for a person's merit or demerit), then surely (the faults of) discrimination and cruelty would attach themselves to Him, but no one who has no such regard, has any such creativity i.e. an impulse to create. It is because the Lord just has such regard (for a person's merit or demerit) that he brings about such unequal creation. What then, is his regard about? We say that he has a regard for the merit or demerit of persons. Surely it is no fault of the Lord, that his bringing about of such unequal creation is due to the regard he has for the merit and demerit of the beings about to be created. The Lord should rather be looked upon to be like 'rain'. Just as rain is the general cause which makes rice and barley grow, while the different potentialities inherent in their seeds, are the cause of the disparity between such rice and barley, even so in the creation of Gods and men etc. the Lord is but the general common cause only, while for the inequality between Gods and men etc., they have their own different individual actions as the cause, and in this way, the Lord, because of this regard (for men's merits and demerits) is not vitiated by (such faults as of) discrimination and cruelty. But, how again is it understood that the Lord brings about such low, middling and high transmigratory existences because of such regard on his part (for a person's merits and demerits)? The Scriptures themselves state so, thus—"The Lord when he wishes to raise a person higher than this world, he causes such person to do good deeds, and when he wishes to lead him down to the nether regions, he causes him to do bad deeds" (Kaush. Brā. 3.8); also, "A man becomes meritorious by meritorious actions and sinful by sinful actions" (Brih. 3.2.13). Smṛiti also shows how the vouchsafing of grace by the Lord (to a person) or his condemnation (of him) depends upon the particular actions of these beings, thus—"I respond to men in the same measure in which they serve me"—(Bh. G. 4.11).—34.

*(If the Lord's having regard (for merit or demerit) is objected to as being impossible, on the ground that, prior to creation, because of the absence of distinction (between merit and demerit), there is no Karma*



(action),—(we reply) No, because (transmigratory existence) is beginningless.—35.

If the objection (by the opponent) is thus: Because as it has already been understood from the Scriptural passage "Oh mild one, in the beginning, 'Sat' alone, one without a second, existed" (Chhān. 6.2.1) there could be no action (Karma), having regard to which there would be this disparity in the creation, inasmuch as it is understood that prior to creation, differences did not exist. Action would take place only after creation, depending upon differences such as physical bodies etc., and differences such as physical bodies etc. would depend upon action taking place, and thus there would occur (the fault of) mutual interdependence (Itaretarāshrayatva). Hence, well may the Lord function, having regard to action, after such differences (of bodies etc.) have taken place, but because of the absence of action which is the cause of the variety (of creation) prior to such differences, it would come to this, that creation would be homogeneous. (We reply)—This is no fault, because of transmigratory existence being beginningless. The fault (as referred to by the opponent) may well occur provided transmigratory existence were to have a beginning. But transmigratory existence being beginningless, there need not be any objection for action and the variety of creation, to act alternately as cause and effect of each other, like the seed and the sprout, and to have a tendency for creation having such disparity.—35.

But (says the opponent) how is it understood that this transmigratory existence is beginningless?

*(The Sūtrakāra) replies (that transmigratory existence is beginningless) is reasonably sustainable and is understood (from the Scriptures) also.—36.*

That transmigratory existence is beginningless is reasonably sustainable. If it were to have a beginning, then it having come into existence capriciously without any cause, the predicament of persons who have attained Final Release being again involved in transmigratory existence, would take place, as also the predicament of 'fruit' arising

without any action having taken place, because (under such supposition) there would be no cause for the disparity between pleasure and misery (to come into existence). It has already been said that the Lord cannot be the cause for such disparity, nor can mere Nescience also be the cause of such disparity, because it is of a uniform nature. Nescience at best could produce such disparity, if it were to depend on action produced by subconscious impressions of misery resulting from passion etc.. (Assuming that a physical body is the cause of variety) Without action, a physical body would not result, nor would action result in the absence of a physical body, and hence it would all result in the fault of mutual interdependence. If on the other hand, transmigratory existence is understood to be beginningless, then it would all be reasonably sustainable in accordance with the maxim of "the seed and the sprout" and hence there would not be any fault. That, transmigratory existence is beginningless, is understood both from the Scriptures and Smritis. So far as the Scriptures are concerned, they in the beginning of creation by referring to the embodied Self by the word Jīva, which comes into use by reason of the action of sustaining life (Prāṇadhāraṇa), by the Scriptural passage—"By this Jīva-Self" (Chhān. 6.3.2), show, that transmigratory existence is beginningless. If it were to have a beginning, then lifeless as the Self (Ātmā) would necessarily be, how could the embodied Self be ever referred to, in the beginning of creation, by the term Jīva-Self, which becomes applicable because of the sustaining of life? It cannot be said, that it would be so referred to in anticipation, because a relationship which is already in existence has greater force than a relationship which is yet to supervene, because it (the first relationship) is an already established thing. The Scriptural Mantra passage—"The Creator created the sun and the moon as before" (Rig-Veda 10.109.3), shows the existence of a prior Kalpa\*. That transmigratory existence is beginningless, we find mentioned in the Smṛiti thus—"Neither is its (i.e. Brahma's) form known here (like for instance the form of an earthen pot), nor its beginning, existence and end" (Bh. G.

\* Kalpa = a day of Brahma = 1000 Yugas, being a period of 432 millions of years of mortals, and measuring the duration of time.

15.3). In the Purāṇās also it has been well established, that there is no measure of the past and future Kalpās.—36.

13. SARVADHARMOPAPATTYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 37.

*(The Vedānta doctrine is valid) because all qualities (attributed to Brahma) are reasonably sustainable.—37.*

The Āchārya (Sūtrakāra) has thus refuted the faults attributed by the opponent of Vedānta to the doctrine of Brahma being the material and accidental cause of this world, by the Sūtra "On account of dissimilarity (between cause and effect) etc.". Now with a view to begin the subject chiefly dealing with the refutation of the opponent's doctrines, the Āchārya proposes to conclude the chief subject of the establishment of his own (Vedānta) doctrine, in as much as, when once this Brahma is accepted as the cause of this world, all qualities attributable to the cause, become reasonably sustainable in the manner indicated, viz.—that Brahma is omniscient, omnipotent and possesses the great power of Māyā, and that therefore one should not doubt the Upanishad doctrine over much.—37.

*Here ends Pāda I of Adhyāya II.*

## ADHYAYA II—PĀDA 2

### 1. RACHANĀNUPAPATTYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 1-10.

*That the inferred one (of the Sāmkhyās, i.e., the Pradhāna, is the cause of the world) is not (correct), also because (on that assumption) the proper arrangement (of this world) is not reasonably sustainable.—1*

Although this Shāstra has been commenced with a view to propound that the Vedānta passages mean thus and thus, and not with a view—like the Shāstra of reasoning—either to establish or vitiate a particular conclusion by mere reasonings, still it is but proper that learned scholars critically explaining the Vedānta passages should refute the doctrine of the Sāmkhyās and others, who have ranged themselves in opposition to the doctrine of correct knowledge (Samyagdarshana), and it is with this view that the following chapter is commenced. As the ascertainment of the correct meaning of Vedānta is meant for the purpose of the determination of the doctrine of correct knowledge, we have first established our own doctrine by ascertaining the correct meaning, because that was more desirable than the refutation of the opponent's doctrine.

But (it may be said by the opponent),—it is proper, only to establish one's own view for the purpose of explaining the doctrine of correct knowledge as the means for the attainment of Final Release for those who desire to be so liberated, so why trouble yourself then, about the refutation of the opponent's doctrine which is calculated only to engender their hatred? Well, it is as you say, but some slow-witted persons, when they know, that these great doctrines of the Sāmkhyās and others, which, albeit they proceed under the semblance of a true doctrine, are accepted by great people, may expect that the same should be accepted by them also, for the purpose of (attaining) correct knowledge. It may also be, that because they are the result of acute reasoning and are propounded by omniscient sages, such people may pin their faith on them i.e. such other doctrines, and hence an attempt is therefore made to expound their meaninglessness. But (it may again be urged

by the opponent) that the Sāmkhya and other doctrines have already been refuted by Sūtrās, such as Brahmasūtra I.i.5, I.i.18, I.iv.28. So what is the point, then, in doing it all over again? To that we say—The Sāmkhyās and others, with a view to establish their own doctrine, even cite Vedānta passages as illustrations, and interpret them in such a way as to make them applicable i.e. conformable to their own doctrines, and what has been done so far before, is, that it has been shown that their interpretation (of the Vedānta passages) is fallacious and not a correct explanation at all. Now, however, the special feature here is, that without reference to the Vedic passage, an independent refutation of their reasoning is made.

Now, with regard to the present subject, the Sāmkhyās hold, thus—Just as in the ordinary world it is seen that such things as earthen pots and jars etc., which have but clay as their common substance, have but clay as their general material cause, similarly, all these Bāhya (external) and Ādhyātmika (having a relation with bodies) effects (Bhedās), which have pleasure, misery, and ignorance as their general common nature, deserve to have something which has the same pleasure, misery and ignorance as their general common nature, as their material cause, and what this general common substance (viz. pleasure, misery and ignorance taken collectively) is, is but the Pradhāna, comprising of the triple qualities (of Sattva, Raja and Tama), which, like the earth, is non-sentient, and which, by virtue of its own nature, undergoes various modifications (as effects) with a view to fulfil the chief purpose of the sentient Purusha. They also infer this same Pradhāna (as the cause) because of such indicatory marks as the property of dimension i.e. extension etc. (viz. dimension or extension, the power to be active, proper sequence, origination of effect from a cause, and the merging of the effect into the cause).

To this, we reply—If it is sought to explain this, only on the strength of illustrations, (we may point out that) in the ordinary world no non-sentient thing, independently and without being guided by some sentient entity, is seen to be able to bring about any modifications or effects, which are able to fulfil any particular purpose of man. It is seen that in the ordinary world things like a house, a palace, a bed-stead, a seat or a pleasure-ground, calculated to make

for pleasure or for the avoidance of discomfort or pain, are created by sentient artisans at the required proper time. How could non-sentient Pradhāna, then, be able to create this entire external i.e. visible world, comprising of this earth etc. which is fit for the experiencing of the fruit of various actions, and this Ādhyātmika world of physical bodies of different classes, each having its own particular regular i.e. set arrangement of organs, affording basis for the experience of the fruits of various actions, which is not possible even to be mentally imagined by the most respected and highly intelligent architects ? Because, it is not seen, that lumps of earth or stones ever accomplish such things. Even in the case of clay etc. it is only when they are directed or presided over (and taken up and manipulated) by potters etc. that they assume particular forms, so (even if one were to concede that Pradhāna is the cause) there would result the predicament of this Pradhāna also, having to be directed by some other sentient entity. There is no such restrictive rule that the root cause (of any thing) should be determined by having recourse to the qualities having a substratum of the nature of a material thing only (such as earth etc.) and not by having recourse to the qualities of any external (efficient) causes such as potters etc.. This being so, not only nothing is contradicted thereby, but on the other hand the Scriptures would thus be supporting us (because of this agreement of views) by reason (of the fact) that the Scriptures culminate in indicating a sentient entity as the cause (of the world etc.). Hence it is precisely because of this very reason (stated by the opponent), viz. "That proper arrangement is not reasonably sustainable", that it cannot be feasible to infer, that a non-sentient entity must be the cause of the world. The world 'Also' (i.e. 'Cha' in the Sūtra) cumulatively shows that the other reasons such as Anvaya (logical continuance) etc. (stated by the Sāmkhyās as arguments in addition to the argument about Rachanā i.e. arrangement or design) are not reasonably sustainable. Again Anvaya (i.e. logical continuance) is not reasonably sustainable in the case of external (Bāhya) effects or Kāryās (such as sound i.e. Shabda etc.) and internal (Ādhyātmika) effects or Kāryās (such as a body and sense-organs etc.) of which we have experience, as they have no relation to pleasure, pain, and infatuation i.e.

ignorance (Moha), in as much as pleasure etc. are internally apprehended and sound (Shabda) etc. are externally apprehended, and also because sound etc. are apprehended as being the cause of pleasure etc., and also because, though words etc. are the same (in every case) they create a particular pleasurable or painful sensation depending upon the particular impression or fancy (of the hearer). Again, noticing that objects such as roots and sprouts which have definite dimensions (i.e. extension) spring up as a result of an antecedent contact (of materials), if you were to infer, that external and internal Ādhyātmika differences (Bhedās) i.e. effects also having dimensions, are similarly the result of an antecedent contact (of materials), you will land yourself into the predicament that the Sattva, Raja and Tama (of which the Pradhāna is made up) also have dimensions (i.e. extension) in common with the above and are the result of an antecedent contact (of materials). But because a relation of cause and effect is seen to exist in the case of beds and seats etc. which are created at will, it is not possible to infer that because a relation of cause and effect exists in the case of external and Ādhyātmika differences (Bhedās) i.e. effects, they also are the result of a non-sentient cause.—1.

*Also (on account of the impossibility of) a tendency (in Pradhāna).—2.*

Let this (discussion about a) proper design or arrangement wait (for the time being). It is not reasonably sustainable that the non-sentient Pradhāna could independently by itself ever at all secure the necessary disturbance in its perfectly balanced condition of equipoise of Sattva, Raja, Tama (the three constituents of Pradhāna) i.e. by their converting themselves into a condition of reciprocal superiority or inferiority with regard to each other, and its acquiring the necessary tendency towards accomplishing any particular effect, because it is not to be seen, either in the case of (such non-sentient things as) clay etc. or a chariot etc.. It is not observed, that clay etc. or a chariot etc., which themselves are non-sentient, when not guided by intelligent entities such as potters etc. or horses etc., ever acquire a tendency towards a particular effect, and we have

to determine about what cannot be seen, from what is actually observed. Therefore also, because of the reason of the acquisition of such a tendency not being reasonably sustainable, it is not inferable that the non-sentient one (Pradhāna) could be the cause of the world. But (the opponent may urge), neither is such tendency observable in the case of a mere sentient entity. (We reply) It is no doubt true, but the non-sentient chariot etc. are seen to have such tendency *only* when they are in conjunction with a sentient entity. (Says some third person here) What then, under such circumstances, is logical? Does such tendency, in fact, belong to that (non-sentient entity) in which it is observed, or to that (sentient entity) with which it (i.e. such non-sentient entity) is in conjunction? (The opponent says) It is reasonable that such tendency should belong to that in which it is actually observed, because both these (i.e. the tendency and that in which it occurs) are actually perceived, while a merely sentient entity is not actually perceived to be the basis (Āshraya) i.e. the source of such a tendency, just as chariots etc. (for instance) are actually perceived to be the basis of such a tendency. That a living body is actually seen to be different from a non-sentient entity such as a chariot etc., is the reason for merely inferring the certain existence only of a sentient entity being in conjunction with a non-sentient body etc. which furnish themselves as the basis of such a tendency. It is precisely for this very reason, viz. that sentiency is observed when a body is actually perceived and not observed when such a body is not perceived, that the materialists (Lokāyatikās) also understand that 'sentiency' belongs only to such a body. Therefore (the conclusion of the opponent is that) it is the non-sentient entity to which such tendency belongs. With regard to this we say—We do not say that such tendency does not belong to that non-sentient entity in which it is observed. Well may it so belong to it. Only, we maintain, that it results from a sentient entity, because, it exists when that sentient entity exists (in conjunction with the non-sentient thing) and it does not exist when such sentient entity does not exist (in conjunction with such non-sentient thing). Just as, the properties of burning and emitting light, which, even though they subsist in fuel etc., are not perceivable in mere fire as such (as with-



out fuel, mere fire does not exist), but they are in fact caused by it (i.e. fire only), because they are seen, when it (fire) is in conjunction (with fuel) and are not seen, when it is not in such conjunction. Even the materialists hold that as it is seen that it is the sentient body that imparts the tendency to non-sentient chariots etc., therefore, that the power to impart such tendency belongs to the sentient body, is incontrovertible. (Even if it be said by the opponent)—In your case even, in as much as, even though the Self is in conjunction with a body etc., it is not reasonably sustainable that the Self has such tendency as apart from its nature of mere knowledge, therefore, that the Self could have such power to impart such a tendency, is not reasonably sustainable. (We reply)—no, like the magnet or like form (Rūpa) etc., it is reasonably sustainable that an entity which is devoid of any such tendency in itself, may however possess a power to impart such a tendency.

Just as a magnet having no such tendency in itself, still has the capacity to impart such tendency to iron, or just as sense-objects such as form (Rūpa) etc. which do not possess such tendency, are still able to induce activity in the organ of sight etc., similarly it is reasonably sustainable that the Lord, being all-pervading, the Self of all, omniscient, and omnipotent, may, even though He Himself is without any such tendency, still induce such activity in everything.

If it be said—the Lord being but one only (without a second) and there being nothing else (in existence) in which he could induce such tendency, that he could still possess such a capacity to impart a tendency, is not reasonably sustainable, (we reply)—No, because that has already been refuted more than once, on the ground of the influence of Māyā (illusory power) in the form of names and forms which are brought about by Nescience. Therefore the existence of such a tendency is possible in the case of the omniscient (Brahma) which is the cause (of the world), and it is not so possible in the case of a non-sentient entity (like the Pradhāna) which is supposed to be such a cause (of the world.—2.

*If it be said (by the opponent) that (the Pradhāna may show such tendency) even as*

*milk or water do, (we reply)—even there also (such tendency results from a sentient entity).—3.*

May be (says the opponent), just as milk, non-sentient as it is, because of its own nature, flows for promoting the growth of a young one, or just as water naturally flows in order to oblige men, even so may the Pradhāna, non-sentient though it is, act by virtue of its own nature for securing the highest aim of man. (To this we reply)—This can't be said to be well spoken, because even in those cases (i.e. of milk or water) we would infer that such tendency either in milk or water is because of its being controlled by a sentient entity, inasmuch as, such tendency is not observed in merely non-sentient entities, such as chariots etc. which are well-known to both of us disputants. The Shāstra speaks of all kinds of movements of things as seen in the world to be due to being presided over by the Lord, thus :—"Who, dwelling in water, governs it from within" (Brih. 3.7.4) ; "It is at the behest of this Akshara (the imperishable), Oh Gārgi, that one set of rivers flows eastward" (Brih. 3.8.9). Therefore, because the instances given by you, viz. "like milk and water", are of a piece with that very much disputed view which you want to establish (viz. that the Pradhāna is the cause of the world), they do not furnish a ground for consideration (Anupanyāsah i.e. Na Vichāra-Bhumih), because it is reasonably sustainable, that it is the sentient cow that at her will stimulates the flow of her milk, through instinctive affection (for the calf), and also because the sucking by the calf causes the milk to be drawn out (from the udders). Nor is it, that water also does not need any other help in its tendency to flow, because, it does need a sloping ground-level etc. so that it may flow. That in all cases, a sentient entity is needed, has however been shown. In Brahma-Sūtra Bhāshya II.i.24, so far as ordinary worldly experience is concerned, it has been indicated, that a cause depending only on itself, may bring about an effect without needing any outside means ; but from the point of view of the Shāstra, the conclusion that is inevitably arrived at in this Sūtra is that in all cases, effects have to depend upon the Lord, and it does not contradict (what is stated in the previous Sūtra).—3.

*(The Pradhāna is not the cause) also because nothing else (other than the Pradhāna) exists, on which it can count for help.—4.*

According to the Sāmkhyās, their three Guṇās existing in perfectly balanced equipoise, mean the Pradhāna. But barring that, there is nothing which is expected as existing outside or apart from it, which has a capacity to induce a tendency or to prevent any tendency arising, in the Pradhāna. The Puruṣa is passive i.e. apathetic (and according to the Sāmkhyās takes no part in creation) and as such, has neither the capacity to induce, or to prevent any such tendency (in Pradhāna) and hence, Pradhāna having nothing else on which it can depend, it is not reasonable (to say) that it sometimes does, and at other times does not, modify itself into the form of 'Mahat' (greatness) etc.. In the case of the Lord, however, because of his being omniscient, omnipotent, and being always in association with the great Māyā (illusory power) his either having such a tendency and or not having such a tendency in Himself (just as it pleasees Him), is not incompatible (with reason).—4.

*(The Pradhāna) could also not have—like grass—a tendency to modify itself (as is supposed by the Sāmkhyās), because grass etc. do not show such tendency for modification in other cases.—5.*

May be (says the Sāmkhya opponent), just as grass, leaves, water etc. by virtue of their own nature modify themselves in the form of milk etc., without needing any other means, even so, may the Pradhāna modify itself in the form of Mahat etc.. (If we i.e. the Sāmkhyās—are asked), how do you know that grass etc. do not need any other means (to help them), (we reply) because, no such other means are observed. Were we to find any such other means we could then have, at will, manufactured milk from grass etc. (with the help of such other means), but we are not able to do so (i.e. manufacture milk from grass, with the help of any other means). Therefore, modification of

grass etc. (into milk) takes place because of its own nature, and even so, there may similarly be a modification of the Pradhāna also (because of its own nature).

To this we (Vedāntins) reply—If we were to hold that such modification of grass, comes about by virtue of its own nature, then it may well happen that modification of Pradhāna also may take place by virtue of its nature, but not only we do not understand it to be so, but we do (on the other hand) know, that there is such other cause (because of which grass is turned into milk). (Says the opponent) How do you know that there is such other cause? Because it (i.e. the turning of grass into milk) is absent in any other cases. It is grass etc. which is consumed by the cow only, that modifies itself into milk, and not that which is either rejected (by the cow) or is consumed by a bull etc.. Were grass to require no other means (such as a cow, for modifying itself into milk), grass would have modified itself into milk elsewhere also, and not when in conjunction with the body of a cow only. That men are unable to manufacture milk at will, is no reason for holding that there is no means at all, because some effects are fit to be accomplished by men and some others through Divine pleasure. Besides, even men are able to produce more milk by using proper means, as for instance by using grass etc.. Those who desire plentiful milk, feed the cow with plentiful grass and that way get plentiful milk. Therefore, it cannot be, (as the opponent claims) that, like grass, the Pradhāna modifies itself by virtue of its own nature.—5.

*Even if it (i.e. the Sāṃkhya doctrine that the Pradhāna has such tendency) is assumed (to be correct), (the Pradhāna cannot be the cause of the world) because of the absence of any purpose.—6.*

That there is no such natural i.e. spontaneous tendency in the Pradhāna, has been established. Even though falling in in line with your (i.e. opponent's) belief, however, we were to understand that there is such natural i.e. spontaneous tendency in the Pradhāna, still the same fault attaches itself just as well (to the Sāṃkhya doctrine). Whence is it so? Because of the absence of any purpose

(to be fulfilled). If it be said that such tendency of the Pradhāna is natural i.e. spontaneous and nothing else is here needed, then, just as no auxiliary is needed (by the Pradhāna), even so, no purpose also can be expected (to be fulfilled), and hence the declaration (of the Sāmkhyās) that the Pradhāna acts in order to fulfil the aim of the Purusha, would be contradicted. If he (the Sāmkhya) were to say, that it is not, that there is no purpose, but merely, there is no need of an auxiliary (for the Pradhāna), still if some purpose for such tendency has to be ascertained, it can either be experience (Bhoga i.e. experience of pleasure or pain by the Self) or Final Release, or both. Now, if experience is supposed to be such a purpose, what particular kind of experience could be imagined in the case of a Purusha, in whom there is no such scope for any addition (Atishaya) of the nature of the experience of pleasure or pain? Besides in such a supposition there would be the predicament of non-release. If such purpose on the other hand is supposed to be Final Release (of the Self), then, that being an already established thing, prior to such activity of the Pradhāna, such activity would be meaningless or superfluous. There would also be the predicament of the non-perception of sound etc. (which are the means of experience). If, both experience and Final Release, are understood to be such a purpose, the effects i. e. modifications of Pradhāna which are fit for experience being infinite, there would still be the predicament of the impossibility of Final Release. Such tendency could not also be due to the reversal of the desire for activity (in the Pradhāna), nor could such ardent desire be possible in the case of the pure and partless Purusha. If it be said, that such tendency (on the part of the Pradhāna) may be due to apprehension i.e. fear, that the power to witness (Drik-shakti in the Purusha, as the witness of everything), and the power to create (on the part of the Pradhāna), would be rendered unfructuous, still as there can never be the destruction of the power to create even as there can never be the destruction of the power of (the Purusha) to be the witness, there would never be the destruction of the power (of the Pradhāna) to create, and, as there would never be the destruction of transmigratory existence, it (in its turn) would cause the predicament of there being no Final Re-

lease just the same. Hence it is not reasonable to say, that the tendency of the Pradhāna is for securing the aim of the Purusha.—6.

*(If it be said that the Purusha would stimulate the Pradhāna to act) as in the case of a man or a magnetic stone (we reply) even then it would mean just the same (i.e. the same fault would attach).—7.*

May be, it may be this way (says the Sāmkhya), by ranging himself in opposition (to the Vedāntin) and trying to justify his position by illustrations, thus—Just as some lame person possessing the power of sight but not the power of movement, riding pick-a-back on another who is sightless but possesses the power of movement, makes the latter move, or just as a magnet which while it itself does not move, makes iron move (i.e. attracts it), even so, would the Purusha cause the Pradhāna to act. To this we reply—Even so, there is no escaping the fault. In the first place, the fault viz. the discarding of the position assumed as hypothesis (by the Sāmkhya) would arise, because you (the Sāmkhya opponent) hold that the Pradhāna possesses such tendency, and you do not hold that the Purusha (Self) can cause activity (in Pradhāna). How can the apathetic Purusha ever stimulate the Pradhāna to act? The lame man also, directs the blind one to move by words etc., but no such influence for causing movement is possible in the case of the Purusha who is apathetic i.e. inactive, nor can it, like a magnet, cause movement by mere proximity, because (were we to suppose so) there would thus be the predicament of perpetual activity induced by the constant proximity (between the Pradhāna and the Purusha). To say (as the Sāmkhya opponent avers) that it may be, as in the case of a man or a magnet, is no proper illustration, because, as the proximity of a magnet (to iron) is not constant, it may have such influence due to such proximity, and besides there still is the necessity of cleansing it (i.e. the magnet) etc.. Again, that there could be any relation between the Pradhāna and the Purusha, is not reasonably sustainable, because the former is non-sentient and the latter is apathetic, and there is absence of any third entity which could bring about any such relation between these two. If

it be said that there would be the relation of capacity i.e. *Yogyatā* (between the *Purusha* and the *Pradhāna* to see and be seen), then, on account of the indestructibility of such a relation between them, there would, all the same, be the predicament of the absence of Final Release. Further, as in the previous *Sūtra*, the alternatives about the purpose (i.e. whether it is experience, Final Release, or both) should be considered (to show that the *Pradhāna* can have no such purpose). In the case of the Highest Self, however, its tendency towards creation depends upon its association with its power of *Māyā*, and apathy of its own nature (as realized by the *Jīva*-Self on the attainment of knowledge), and that is where there is this peculiarity (*Atishaya*) in the case of the Highest Self.—7.

*(The Pradhāna cannot have a tendency because a relation of being subsidiary to a principal, as between Sattva, Raja and Tama) is not reasonably sustainable.—8.*

This is again why the *Pradhāna* cannot have any tendency. When *Sattva*, *Raja* and *Tama*, give up their condition of being reciprocally principal and subsidiary to each other, and they subsist merely in the condition of balanced equipoise of their own individual natures, that, constitutes the condition of *Pradhāna*. While in that condition and when their nature is such, that they do not need each other's help, it is not reasonably sustainable that they would convert themselves into having a reciprocal relation as that of being principal and subsidiary to each other, because of the apprehension of the destruction of their own nature. Again, in the absence of any extraneous entity to excite them (into activity), the creation of *Mahat* (the great principle) etc. which results from such disturbance of their balanced equipoise would not take place.—8.

*Also, even if an inference is drawn in another way, because of the absence (in the Pradhāna) of the power of being a sentient entity, (the same fault would attach).—9.*

May be, I will draw an inference in such other way that the fault referred to above would not occur (says the

Sāmkhya opponent). I do not hold that the Guṇās (of the Pradhāna viz. Sattva, Raja and Tama) are either unchangeable by nature or such as need no mutual help, because there is no authority or means-of-proof (for that). The nature of the Guṇās is understood from the effects (resulting from them). I understand that they are just of that nature as the nature of the effects they bring into existence. It is understood (by us) that the Guṇās are of an unsteady nature, therefore they may, even during the condition of equipoise, subsist in a condition, fit for attaining disparity i.e. the relation of being principal and subsidiary (to each other). (To this we reply) Even if (it is understood) this way, because of the absence in the Pradhāna of the power of being sentient, the faults referred to above, viz. that the proper design or arrangement (of his world) is not reasonably sustainable etc., stand as they are (i.e. unrefuted). If our opponent were to infer that the Pradhāna has such power of being sentient, the result would be that he would cease to be our opponent, because it would mean, that there would be the predicament for him of (having to accept) the doctrine of Brahma viz. that the only one sentient entity (Brahma) is the material cause of this manifold world appearance. Even though the Guṇās may have a fitness in them for attaining inequality (i.e. of attaining a principal and subsidiary relationship as between themselves, by a disturbance of the condition of balanced equipoise) still, when once they are in the condition of equipoise, they would either never again attain inequality, because of the absence in that condition of equipoise of any cause (for a change), or assuming they do so attain inequality, the absence of a cause (for a change) being common (to both the alternatives), the predicament would be, that the fault, viz. that they will always continue in that condition of disturbed equipoise, would necessarily occur all the same.—9.

*(The Sāmkhya doctrine is) also incongruous because of the contradictions.—10.*

The Sāmkhya doctrines are moreover mutually contradictory. In one place, they enumerate the sense-organs to be seven, and then again eleven in another place. Similar-



ly in one place the instruction is that the subtle sense-organs (Tanmātrās) have their origin from Mahat (the great one) and elsewhere that they have their origin from Ego (Ahamkāra). In one place, they describe the internal-organs to be three (viz. Ego, intelligence and mind), and then again, as only one, in another place. Besides their opposition to the Scriptures, which declare the Lord to be the cause (of the world), and to the Smritis, which follow the Scriptures, is well-known. Therefore also, the doctrine of the Sāmkhyās is incongruous. To this the Sāmkhya replies—Oh, but the doctrine of the Upanishads also is equally incongruous, in as much as they do not recognize the ‘tormented’ (Tapya) and the ‘tormentor’ (Tāpaka) as being two different categories, because those who understand the one and only one Brahma, the Self of all, alone, to be the cause of all this world-appearance have necessarily to understand, that the ‘tormented’ (Tapya) and the ‘tormentor’ (Tāpaka) are but two different aspects of the same one Self (Brahma) and that they do not belong to different categories. Now, if the ‘tormented’ and the ‘tormentor’ are but only two special aspects of one and the same Self (Ātmā) then as the Self can never be freed from being both these viz. the ‘tormented’ and the ‘tormentor’, the Shāstra which gives instruction that the truth should be known in order that torment may be assuaged, would be meaningless. It would not be reasonably sustainable that the lamp which possesses the properties of heat and light, can, as long as it is in that particular condition (of being a lamp) be ever free from these properties. With regard also to the statement about water on the one hand, and ripples, waves, and foam of water on the other, (we the opponents say) that, even these special forms (of water), viz. the waves etc., essentially one and the same as they are, as water, are, even though they alternately appear and disappear, eternal, and for water itself also (as much as for a lamp) there is a similar want of freedom from having the nature of waves etc..

Besides, in the ordinary world, that the ‘tormented’ and the ‘tormentor’ are different categories (or entities) is well-known. Similarly also, a person desiring to possess a particular thing (Arthī) and the thing so desired (Artha) are actually seen to be mutually different from each other. Were the thing desired not to be an entity different from

the person desiring such thing, and if the thing desired were to be eternally available to the person desiring such a thing, then such person would never in fact be a person desirous of such things, just as a lamp, which by itself has the form of light, and would have such light ever available in itself, could never be an entity that could itself ever have a desire for light, because, it is only with respect to a thing which has yet to be acquired, that a person can be said to be desirous of acquiring (it). Similarly a thing desired cannot have the characteristic of being a thing desired (unless the person desiring such a thing, and the thing so desired are different) and, if ever such a thing, is a desired thing (Artha), it can have such desire only in and for itself. But this is never so. 'A person desiring' and the 'thing desired' (by him), are in fact two things having a mutual relation between them, and a relation can subsist only when there are two things having a mutual relation between them, and not when there is but one thing alone, and therefore, 'a person desiring' and the 'thing desired' are in fact different (from each other), and similarly, 'a person who has an undesired thing thrust on him' and such 'undesired thing' (also are different). That which is favourable to a person desiring, is a desirable thing, and that which is unfavourable to him, is a thing not desired by him (but still it has itself thrust upon him), and a person alternately comes into contact with these two (i.e. the desired and the undesired thing). Now, as (comparatively) what is desired by a person is so little, and what he does not desire, (but which he finds willy-nilly thrust upon him), is so much, that both these (desired and undesired things) together, in effect, practically mean a thing not desired, and it is called the 'tormentor' and the person who thus alternately comes into contact with it is the person 'tormented', and hence, if (according to you—the Vedāntin) the 'tormentor' and the 'tormented' were to be but one entity, then (the possibility of) Final Release is not reasonably sustainable. But if they were supposed to belong to different categories, and if the cause of their coming into contact (viz. false-ignorance) is removed, then perhaps Final Release (Moksha) may perchance be so reasonably sustainable.

To this the reply is—No. It is precisely because of (the Self) being one only, that it is not reasonably sustain-

able that there could be any such relation as between the 'tormentor' and the 'tormented'. This fault might perhaps occur, if, even though the 'tormentor' and the 'tormented' are but one and the same single entity, such entity were to be able to attain a relation with itself, as between the object (Vishaya) and the subject (Vishayī) (i.e. as between the 'tormentor' and the 'tormented'). But precisely because it (i.e. the Self) is essentially one only, it cannot be so. Though in the case of fire (Agni), one as it is, even though there is a distinction in its attributes viz. 'light' and 'heat', and it is liable to undergo modification, it is precisely because fire is but one entity only, that fire can neither burn or illuminate itself. Need it be said then, that the one, unchangeable Brahma cannot possibly have in itself a relation as between the 'tormentor' and the 'tormented'? (The opponent may here ask)—where again then is this relation as between the 'tormentor' and the 'tormented'? The reply is—why, can't you see, that the living body, which is the object of the action (of being scorched), is the one that is tormented, and that the sun is the tormentor? (The opponent says) This torment indeed is pain, and pain can affect only a sentient entity, and never an inert body. Were torment to be of the body only, it itself would be destroyed, when the destruction of the body takes place and it would not be necessary to wish for some means to bring about its destruction. To this the reply is—It is not observed, that a mere sentient entity, in the absence of a body, is ever affected by torment. Nor do you (the opponent) desire or hold, that a merely sentient entity is subject to an affection (Vikriti) viz. torment, nor can it be, that a body and a sentient entity get mixed up together, as that would lead to the predicament of the fault of impurity, etc. (in the Self), nor again of course would you understand that 'torment' itself could be tormented. How then would you also assume the existence of a condition, in which one entity) is the 'tormentor' and another (entity) the 'tormented'? If you were to say that the Guṇa 'Sattva' is the 'tormented' and the Guṇa 'Raja' is the 'tormentor', (we reply)—no; it cannot be reasonably sustainable that these (Guṇās) can ever be in conjunction with i.e. can ever get mixed up with a sentient entity. If you were to argue, that the sentient entity while conforming with the Guṇā

'Sattva', is tormented '*as it were*', then it would come to this, that in the truest sense, it is in fact *not* tormented at all, precisely because of your using the expression '*as it were*'. If in fact it is not tormented then it would not be a fault to use the expression '*as it were*'. If it is said (by any body) that an amphisbaena is '*as it were*' a snake, it would not, simply because it is so said, become a poisonous snake, nor would a snake become non-poisonous, simply because it is said, that, it is, '*as it were*' an amphisbaena. Therefore it should be understood, that this condition of one being the tormentor and the other being the tormented, is caused by Nescience and has no ultimate reality. And our withers are unwrung, even if it were to be so. If however, you understand that a sentient entity (the Self) is in the truest sense tormented, then as you of course understand the tormentor (the Pradhāna) to be eternal, there would be so much the greater reason why there would be no Final Release. If it be said (by the opponent) that even though the capacities of being the tormentor and being the tormented respectively are everlasting, yet as torment (Tapti) is in need of the conjunction of the cause i.e. ignorance, and these two (i.e. the tormented and the tormentor), when the cause (viz. ignorance, of the fact that the Pradhāna and the Purusha are different) for such conjunction is not to be seen, there is a total cessation of conjunction, as a result of which, absolute Final Release is reasonably sustainable, we reply—no, because this, 'not to be seen' (Adarshana), depends upon Tama (i.e. ignorance) which (as you hold) also is equally everlasting. Also, as the manifestation or the obliteration of Guṇās is uncontrolled or irregular, the cessation of the cause of conjunction, also, is uncontrolled and irregular, and hence their disunion also being necessarily uncontrolled or irregular, non-release in the case of the Sāmkhyās, is unavoidable.

So far as the Upanishadic teaching goes, however, as it understands the Self to be but one only, and that inasmuch as one entity can at once be both the subject and object (of the torment) is not reasonably sustainable, and as the Scriptural instruction is, that all the different effects are merely made current by speech (while in fact in the truest sense they do not exist), no doubt about non-release can ever arise, even in a dream (in the mind of a Vedāntin).

So far as the phenomenal world of experience is concerned, however, the well-known condition of one being the tormentor and the other being the tormented, is as valid as it is seen to be for the time being, and so it does not become necessary (in such a case) either to raise an objection or to have to refute it.—10.

## 2. MAHATDĪRGHĀDHĪKARĀṆAM. Sū. 11.

The doctrine that the Pradhāna is the cause (of the world) is (already) refuted. The doctrine that the Atom is the cause (of the world) has now to be refuted. In this connection, firstly, the fault which the Atomist (Aṇu-vādi Vaisheshika) has levelled against the upholder of Brahma as the cause (Brahma-vādi), is refuted. This is how the Vaisheshikās understand (their doctrine)—(It is inferred that) qualities which inhere in the material constituting the cause, produce other similar qualities in the material constituting the effect, because it is seen that from white threads, a white piece of cloth is produced, and we don't see any contrary result (occurring). Therefore, if sentient Brahma is understood to be the cause of the world, then in the effect (i.e. the world) also, sentiency ought to inhere. But as it is not seen to be so, Brahma does not deserve to be the cause of the world. The Sūtrakāra now vitiates this conclusion (of the Vaisheshika opponent) with his (i.e. Vaisheshika's own system ("The engineer is hoist with his own petard").

*Or just as the 'Great and long' (dimensions) can be the effect of the 'short and spherical' (dimension of the atom) (even so the world may be the effect of Brahma).—11.*

Their system amounts to this—The various kinds of infinitesimal Atoms (Paramāṇus) which possess their respective qualities proper to them and are spherical in dimension or form of extension, merely stand by for the nonce (i.e. during periodical resorption i.e. Pralaya) and refrain from starting on producing effects. Then afterwards, led by the unseen principle (Adrishta i.e. the meritorious and unmeritorious action of the Jīva-Self, taken collectively) and aided by conjunction (Samyoga), they start pro-

ducing the entire aggregate of effects, in a regular order, of the binary atomic compound (Dvyaṇuka) etc., and the qualities of the cause, reproduce other similar qualities in the effects. When the two Paramāṇus (infinitesimal Atoms) begin producing a binary atomic compound, particular qualities such as 'whiteness etc.' belonging to the Paramāṇus, begin producing other such similar qualities etc., in the effect (i.e. the binary atomic compound), but that special quality of the Paramāṇus viz. its sphericity, does not begin to produce a similar other quality of sphericity in the effects, the tenet (of the Vaisheshikās) being, that a binary atomic compound has another Parimāṇa (form of extension or dimension). They describe 'minuteness' (Aṇutva) and 'shortness' (Hrasvatva) to be the Parimāṇās that inhere in the binary atomic compound. When two such binary atomic compounds start producing a quaternary atomic compound (Chaturaṇuka), there is a similar reproduction of the whiteness and other qualities inherent in themselves, in the quaternary atomic compound, but they refrain from reproducing in such quaternary atomic compounds, the form of extension or dimension of 'minuteness' and 'shortness' inherent in themselves, because the Vaishe-  
shikās hold that quaternary atomic compounds have their own different form of extension or dimension, viz. 'Bigness' (Mahat) and 'Length' (Dīrgha). The same arrangement takes place when many Paramāṇus, or many binary atomic compounds, or a Paramaṇu or a binary atomic compound, begin producing 'effects'. This being so, just as a binary atomic compound which has the 'minute and short' dimension or form of extension or a tertiary atomic compound which has 'greatness and length' as its dimension or form of extension, (but not sphericity), result from a Paramaṇu which is spherical, or just as from a binary atomic compound, 'minute' and 'short' as it is, a tertiary atomic compound having 'a dimension or the form of extension of 'greatness' and 'length' and not 'minuteness and shortness', results, similarly, if it is understood (by us the Vedāntins) that the non-sentient world may well result from the sentient Brahma, how does it harm you (i.e. why should you, a Vaisheshika, have an objection)? Now, if you (the Vaisheshika) were to consider thus—(I understand) that the material constituting such effects as a binary atomic

compound, is encompassed with a dimension or form of extension having a nature contrary to the nature of its cause, and that is why 'Sphericity', the dimension or the form of extension of the cause, which starts the effect, does not encompass the effect with itself, while it is not that the world—an effect—is encompassed with any such quality as is contrary to sentiency, so that the sentiency inherent in the cause may not reproduce similar sentiency in the effect. Non-sentiency is not some quality which is *contrary* to sentiency, because it is a mere negation of it, and therefore, as sentiency is a quality dissimilar to the quality of sphericity etc., it comes to this that sentiency (of the cause) will necessarily reproduce itself (in the effect viz. the world).—(We, the Vedāntins would say)—Do not consider it to be so. The two cases are only to this extent common, viz., just as the qualities of sphericity etc. inherent in the cause, do not begin to reproduce similar qualities in the effect, similarly sentiency (which is inherent in the cause) does not begin to reproduce itself in the effect (i.e. the world). (It should not be said)—That the effect has a different dimension encompassing it, is not a reason why the sphericity (of the cause) does not begin to reproduce sphericity in the effect, because it is reasonably sustainable to hold that prior to the beginning of the production of a different dimension or form of extension in the effect, the sphericity (of the cause) *can* start reproducing a similar dimension in the effect, because you understand, that an effect which has been started to be produced, exists for a moment without any quality, before qualities begin to be produced (in the effect). It is not either, that because the spherical dimensions are engrossed in producing other dimensions, that they do not reproduce dimensions of their own kind (in the effect), for you understand that there is an entirely different cause for the dimension or form of extension (in the effect) being of a different kind. The Aphorisms of Kaṇabhuk (i.e. Kaṇāda the propounder of Vaisheshika school) are as follows :—"Mahat (the great) results from the plurality of the cause, from the bigness of the cause, and an accumulation by a special loose contact" (Vai. Sū. 7.1.9); "The Aṇu dimension is the contrary of that" (Vai. Sū. 7.1.10) and "Thus, are length and shortness explained" (Vai. Sū. 7.1.17).

It should not be argued, that because of some special kind of proximity (Sannidhāna), 'plurality' (Bahutva) of causes etc. alone produce qualities in effects, but not sphericity, etc. (as they have no such special kind of proximity), because when a new material or a new quality starts on being produced, all the qualities of the causes inhere in the same common substratum viz. such new material or new quality. Therefore, it should be understood, that just as dimensions such as sphericity etc. do not reproduce themselves (in the effect) because of their own peculiar nature, even so it is, in the case of sentiency also. It is because it is seen that dissimilar substances etc. are produced as a result of 'conjunction' (Samyoga), that there is a departure from the uniform reproduction of similar species. If it is said (by the Vaisheshika opponent), that when the relevant subject (under discussion) is a substance, it is not logical to adduce an illustration about quality, (we reply)—no, because by the illustration, we merely wish to point out (the fact of) the starting of the production of dissimilar effects. Besides there is no reason for (there being) a rule, that an illustration about a substance only, should be adduced in the case of a substance, and an illustration about a quality only, in the case of a quality. Even your own Sūtrakāra has adduced an illustration about a quality for a substance, in the Sūtra :— "Because the relation of conjunction (Samyoga) between the perceptible and non-perceptible, is not perceptible, a body cannot consist of the five (elements, viz. Earth, Teja and Water which are perceptible, and Air and Ākāsha which are not)" (Vai. Sū. 4.2.2). For instance, just as a conjunction, which inheres between the Earth and Ākāsha which are perceptible and non-perceptible respectively, is not perceptible, similarly a body in which perceptible and non-perceptible elements inhere, should properly be not-perceptible. But it actually is so perceptible, therefore, it is not the result of the (conjunction of the) five elements. For it has been said—conjunction is a quality, while a body is a substance. In the Sūtra "But it is so seen" (Bra. Sū. II.i.6), creation of a dissimilar thing is discussed. (The opponent says) If that is so then the matter is really finished there. (We reply) no, that was in reply to the Sāmkhyās, while this, is in reply to the Vaisheshikās. But (says the opponent) you



have also extended the application of that Sūtra about the refutation of the Sāmkhyās, to other systems, on the ground of parity of reasoning, by the Sūtra—"By this, these systems also which are not accepted by the learned, are also explained" (Bra. Sū. II.i.12). (We reply) no doubt it is so. The same thing, however, is further elaborated here, where we begin discussion about the Vaisheshika system, by adducing instances adaptable to their own system.—11.

### 3. PARAMĀṆUJAGADAKĀRAṆATVĀDHIKĀRAṆAM.

Sū. 12-17.

*Considered either way (i.e. that the Paramāṇus are led by the unseen principle i.e. Adrishṭa or aided by conjunction i.e. Samyoga) no action is possible, hence the absence of that (i.e. Creation and Pralaya).  
—12.*

(The Sūtrakāra) now proceeds to refute the doctrine of atoms being the cause (of the world). This is how the doctrine is presented. In the ordinary world it is seen that materials like a piece of cloth etc. consist of parts, and are begun (to be produced) by the very threads etc. which are inherent in them, and which are aided by the relation of conjunction. In common with that, it is understood that all things which consist of parts are produced out of similar materials inherent in them, which are aided by the relation of conjunction. A Paramāṇu is that entity, where during the process of division this distinction between a thing consisting of parts and its parts disappears, and when such thing consisting of parts is reduced to that utmost limit of subdivision into parts, beyond which no further division is possible. This entire world, consisting of mountains and seas etc. which consists of parts, is, for that very reason, something which has a beginning and an end. An effect cannot be without a cause, thinks Kaṇabhuk (i.e. Kaṇāda), and hence he holds that the Paramāṇus are the cause of this world. Now knowing that the four elements viz. the Earth, Water, Teja (fire) and Vāyu (Air) are understood to consist of parts, it is assumed, that there are four kinds of Paramāṇus, and in as much as they have reached the

utmost limit of subdivision, and, in as much as no further division of them is possible, after they are thus reduced to their utmost limit (of subdivision), the destruction of the Earth etc., when they are in the process of destruction, goes right down to the stage of Paramāṇus, and *that* is the stage of Pralaya (Final Dissolution). Thereafter, at the time of creation, activity is generated amongst the Paramāṇus of Vāyu, due to the unseen principle (Adrishtā) as the cause, and this activity combines the atoms (Aṇus) in which such activity takes place, with other similar atoms (Aṇus) and thus, in the order of the binary atomic compound etc., Vāyu results, and the same is the case with Agni (fire), Water and Earth, and the physical body along with the organs-of-sense. And (the followers of Kaṇāda understand), that in this manner the whole world is created from atoms (Aṇus), and as in the case of threads and a piece of cloth, the qualities etc. of the atom (Aṇu) are reproduced in the binary atomic compounds etc.

To this, we have to say thus—It has to be understood, that such conjunction between atoms (Aṇus) in the state of such separate division, depends upon activity, because it is seen that it is due to activity in threads etc., that conjunction between them takes place. Activity again being an effect, a cause for it has necessarily to be presumed. If no such cause is presumed, then, in the absence of any cause, there could be no initial activity in the atoms (Aṇus). Even if such a cause is presumed, and if any causes such as endeavour or impact etc. as they are seen, are understood, still that being impossible, initial activity amongst the atoms (Aṇus) would not be possible. In that condition (of Pralaya), endeavour, as an attribute of the Self (Ātmā), is not possible, because of the absence of a physical body, for it is only after there is a conjunction of the Self with the mind which has its seat in a physical body, that any endeavour as an attribute of the Self, can at all arise. It is because of this same reason, that any cause as is ordinarily observed (in the world) such as impact etc. has also to be discounted. All that, is (possible) after creation (takes place), but it cannot possibly be the cause of initial activity. Again, if it is said that the unseen principle (Adrishtā) is the cause of the initial activity, then it can either be inherent in the Self or inherent in the atom (Aṇu).

In neither case can it be imagined, that activity in the atom (Aṇu), is due to the unseen principle, because of its being non-sentient. It has already been remarked during the refutation of the Sāṃkhya theory, that no non-sentient entity which is not guided by a sentient entity, can either act independently or cause any activity (in any other entity), because during that condition (of Pralaya) the Jīva-Self, in which sentiency has not till then become manifest, is non-sentient. Besides even if the unseen principle is understood to be inherent in the Jīva-Self, then in the absence of the necessary relation of conjunction between the unseen principle and the atoms, the unseen principle cannot be the cause of activity in an atom (Aṇu). If it be said, that there is conjunction between the atoms (Aṇus) and the Jīva-Self which has the unseen principle inherent in it, then, such conjunction being constant, there would be the predicament of the tendency for action being constant, in the absence of any other controlling principle. This being so, in the absence of any definite cause for (starting) activity, no initial activity would take place, and in the absence of activity, conjunction which depends upon such activity, would not take place, and in the absence of such conjunction (Samyoga), the whole gamut of effects such as a binary atomic compound, etc., which depend upon such conjunction, would not result. Besides, this conjunction of one atom (Aṇu) with another can either be total or in only a part of it. If the conjunction is total, then, as any increase in the form of extension or dimension would not be reasonably probable, there would be the predicament, of there being but one atom (Aṇu) only (as a result of the total conjunction of two Aṇus), and also a predicament of its being contrary to what is ordinarily observed (viz. that when two things merge into each other there is an increase in the form of extension or dimension) would result, because conjunction is observed to be only between two things, each of which has a dimension.

Now, (if it be said) that the conjunction (of the two Aṇus) is only between a part of each Aṇu, the predicament would be that it would mean that an atom (Aṇu) *has parts* (which is against the Vaisheshika assumption). Again, if it be said, that Paramāṇus have imaginary surfaces, then as an imagined entity is unreal (i.e. there can

never be an entity existing in fact), the conjunction (of such Paramāṇus) would necessarily be unreal, and it could not be the efficient (i.e. Asamavāyi) cause of a real thing or effect, and in the absence of an efficient (i.e. Asamavāyi) cause, any material constituting an effect, such as a binary atomic compound, would not come into existence. Just as at the initial creation, in the absence of a cause, activity in the atoms (Aṇus) for effecting conjunction would not be possible, similarly, even in the great absorption (Pralaya), activity in the atoms (Aṇus) for effecting separation (of the Aṇus) would not be possible, as in that case also, no definite cause for it can be observed. Again, the unseen principle (Adrishta) is for the purpose of effecting experience, and not for the purpose of effecting Pralaya, and hence, in the absence of a cause, no activity either for bringing about conjunction or separation between atoms (Aṇus), can be possible. Therefore, in the absence of conjunction or separation, neither creation nor Pralaya which depend upon them, would take place. Therefore, the doctrine of atoms being the cause (of the world), is not reasonably sustainable.—12.

*And as a Samavāya relation (invariable concomitance) is understood to exist (by a Vaisheshika), because of parity (of reasoning) a regressus ad infinitum would result (if the Vaisheshika doctrine is accepted).—13.*

(The clause)—“Because of the assumption (by the opponent) of a Samavāya relation”, there is absence of it (i.e. there is absence of creation or Pralaya), in the Sūtra, connects with the present subject of discussion, viz. the refutation of the theory of atoms being the cause (of the world). You (the Vaisheshika) understand, that a binary atomic compound which results from two atoms (Aṇus) and is quite dissimilar to the atoms (Aṇus), is in a relation of Samavāya (invariable concomitance) with the atoms (Aṇus), and because you understand it that way, you would not be able to substantiate the theory of atoms being the cause (of the world). How is it so? Because of parity (of reasoning), a *regressus ad infinitum* would result. Just

as (according to a Vaisheshika) a binary atomic compound, quite dissimilar as it is to the atoms (Aṇus), is related to the atoms (Aṇus) by a Samavāya relation, similarly, Samavāya relation itself, quite dissimilar as it is to the two entities having such a Samavāya relation between them (i.e. the Samavāyins), will necessarily have to be understood to be related to them (i.e. the Samavāyins) by an altogether separate relation, again of the nature of a Samavāya, because, the circumstance of 'being absolutely dissimilar' is common (to both these cases). Hence, thus, another and yet another such unending series of Samavāyās will have to be presumed (to exist), and so a *regressus ad infinitum* would result. (But if it be said by the Vaisheshika opponent)—that here, a Samavāya relation which is actually perceivable, is perceived as being eternally related with the Samavāyins (viz. the Dvyanuka and the two atoms), and it is not that it is not so related or that it needs another such (Samavāya) relation (for being so related), and hence any other separate relation of it, which would inevitably lead to a *regressus ad infinitum*, need not be imagined, we reply—No, because if it be so (understood) then the relation of contact (Samyoga) between two entities which are in such contact (Samyoga) also, would be similarly eternal, and like Samavāya, would not need any other separate relation (to establish the contact i.e. Samyoga relation). (If it is said) that 'contact' being an altogether different thing (from the two things which are in such contact i.e. Samyoga) it must needs require another relation, then Samavāya also being a thing altogether different from the Samavāyins must needs require another such relation. It would not be proper to say, that 'contact' (Samyoga) being a quality (Guṇa) does need another relation, while Samavāya not being a quality does not require it, because, the reason for the need for such a relation (viz. that both Samyoga and Samavāya being things different from the two things between which such Samyoga or Samavāya exists) is common to both these cases, and the terminology (of the Vaisheshikās) which represents contact as a quality (Guṇa) has no bearing on the need or otherwise (of such another relation). Therefore, in the case of those who (like you, the opponent) understand Samavāya to be a thing different (from the Samavāyins), *regressus ad infinitum* must

necessarily result. And when such *regressus ad infinitum* results, (as no particular Samavāya relation can be proved to be the last Samavāya relation in all the Samavāyās of the series, all the other preceding relations of Samavāyās in the infinite series also cannot possibly be proved), and when one Samavāya fails to be established, all Samavāyās (of the series) equally fail to be established, and hence a binary atomic compound will by no means result from two atoms (Aṇus). Therefore also, the theory of atoms being the cause (of the world) is not reasonably sustainable.—13.

*Also, because of (a tendency for activity or inactivity) being constant (the atomic theory is unsustainable).—14.*

Besides, atoms (Aṇus) have necessarily to be understood to have the nature, either of a tendency for activity or inactivity, or of both or neither, as no other alternative is possible. But none of these four kinds (of possibilities) is reasonably sustainable. If their nature is that of a tendency for activity, such activity would continue eternally, and there would be the predicament of the absence of final dissolution. If their nature is of inactivity, as such inactivity also would continue eternally, there would be the predicament of the absence of any creation. Their having both these natures at one and the same time, would be, because of the contradiction (involved), incongruous. If it be supposed, that they have neither of these natures, and that a tendency for activity or inactivity depends upon a cause, a cause such as the unseen principle (assumed by the Vaisheshikās to be such a cause, albeit wrongly, as shown before), being constantly available i.e. near at hand, such a tendency for activity would be eternal, leading to the predicament of constant activity (making final dissolution impossible). Now, supposing the unseen principle is not accepted (by the Vaisheshikās as a part of their theory) the predicament of constant inactivity would result. For these reasons also, the theory of atoms being the cause (of the world) is not reasonably sustainable.—14.

*Also because of (the Atoms) being possessed of colour etc. (i.e. Rūpa etc.), (a result)*

*contrary (to Vaisheshika assumption) would result, because it is (actually) observed (to be so).—15.*

The accepted tenets of the Vaisheshikās, viz. that these Paramāṇus (infinitesimal atoms) are of four kinds, that they result when materials which consist of parts undergo division upto that stage beyond which no further subdivision is possible, that they possess the four qualities of Rūpa etc., that they are the initial starting cause of the four kinds of elements, and things resulting from the elements, which possess the four kinds of qualities, and that they are eternal, would be without any support, because there would result the predicament of the loss and reversal of their atomicity and eternal nature, as the result of their possessing such qualities. The meaning is, that contrary to their assumption, in comparison with the Highest Cause (Brahma), they (i.e. the four kinds of Paramāṇus) would happen to be gross and non-eternal. Whence is it so? Because in the ordinary world, it is observed to be so. In the ordinary world, anything which possesses colour etc., is seen to be gross and non-eternal, in comparison with its cause. For instance, a piece of cloth is relatively gross and non-eternal as compared with the threads (the cause of the piece of cloth), and the threads (in their turn) are relatively gross and non-eternal as compared with their minute subdivisions (which are the cause of the threads), and similarly, as these Paramāṇus are understood by them to possess colour etc., therefore, they also, as being necessarily effects from their cause would be rendered relatively gross and non-eternal as compared with their cause. What they (Vaisheshikās) mention as the cause for a thing being eternal, viz. "Whatever exists and is not the effect of some cause, is eternal" (Sadakāraṇavannityam) (Vai. Sū. 4.1.1), would not hold good in the case of atoms (Aṇus), because in the manner referred to above, it would be reasonably sustainable to understand, that the atoms (Aṇus) do have a cause. The second reason for being eternal mentioned (by them) is:—"The absence of any specific denial (of being eternal) such as that a particular thing is non-eternal" (Anityamiti cha visheshatah pratishedhābhāvah) (Vai. Sū. 4.1.4). That also does not necessarily establish that the

Paramāṇus are eternal. If some eternal entity does not exist i.e. unless some eternal entity exists, a 'Naña' ( नञ्, a prefix of negation) cannot possibly enter into a compound with 'nitya' thus: Na nityah—Anityah. (One cannot deny anything as being eternal, unless we know of an entity which is eternal.) Again it is not as if the Paramāṇus (infinitesimal atoms) must, therefore, be necessarily understood to be eternal, because (according to the Vedāntins) Brahma, the eternal, and the Highest Cause, is there, already available. It is not that the existence of an entity (Artha) is established, merely because a word signifying that entity is actually in common use, because it is only when its existence is proved by other means-of-proof that words and their meaning are received into common use. Now with respect to the third reason for assuming the atoms (Aṇus) to be eternal, viz. the Sūtra "Also Nescience" (Avidyā cha) (Vai. Sū. 4.1.5), if it is explained like this, viz. that Nescience is the failure to perceive the causes of effects which actually exist and are perceivable, then (according to that reason) even the binary atomic compound (Dvyaṇuka) would be eternal. If the additional proviso, viz. 'not having any causal material for producing them', is read into the definition of Nescience to qualify it, then it would amount to this, that the circumstance of there being no cause for an effect, would itself be a reason for its being eternal, and that having been already mentioned (Vai. Sū. 4.1.1 above), 'Also Nescience' would be a repetition. Now if it be explained thus, viz. that Nescience means the impossibility of the existence of any third cause for the destruction of a thing, over and above two such causes, viz. 'the division of a cause' or 'the destruction of a cause', and that this 'Nescience' would establish the eternal nature of Paramāṇus, (then we would reply)—there is no such rule, that a thing which is in the process of destruction, must perish by either of these two reasons only. It would be so, if it is understood that more than one causal material, aided by the 'contact' (Samyoga) relation, start the productive process, of another material effect. When, however, it is understood, that a cause which is devoid of any special attribute of any kind, and which has only a general characteristic (such as being earthy), initiates the process of bringing an effect into existence, merely by the cause itself attaining



another special condition, then in that case destruction will be achieved merely by the disintegration of the solidity (of the effect), similar, for instance, to the melting of the solidity or hardness of ghee. Thus in the case of Paramāṇus a result contrary to that which is assumed (by the Vaisheṣikās viz. that the infinitesimal atoms are minute and eternal) would take place, because of the fact, that Paramāṇus possess colour etc.. Therefore also, the theory of atoms being the cause (of the world) is not reasonably sustainable.—15.

*Also, because (considered) either way, a fault is inevitable.—16.*

The Earth has qualities of smell, taste, colour and touch and it is gross ; water has the qualities of taste, colour and touch and it is fine, Teja has the qualities of colour and touch and it is finer, and Vāyu has only the quality of touch and it is superfine, and in this way in the ordinary world it is seen that these four elements have an increasing and decreasing number of qualities and they are gross, fine, finer and superfine comparatively, and (the question is) whether the Paramāṇus also have to be imagined to possess similar increasing and decreasing number of qualities respectively. (Considered) either way, its being open to fault is inevitable. If it be assumed that the qualities increase or decrease in number, then such increasing qualities will produce grossness in them (i.e. the Paramāṇus) and they will cease to be Paramāṇus (as conceived by the Vaisheṣikās), and it is contended that such increase in qualities without a corresponding increase in grossness is not possible, because in the ordinary world (it is seen) that as qualities of effects (i.e. created things) increase, they tend to augment their grossness. Now, if the assumption of an increase or decrease of qualities in the Paramāṇus is rejected and it is understood for the purpose of ensuring their similarity that all Paramāṇus have only a single quality each, then in the Teja there would be no perception of touch, in Water of colour and touch, and in the Earth of taste, colour and touch respectively, because the quality of an effect is understood to be reproduced from the quality of its cause. Again, if all these (different Paramāṇus) are

assumed to have all these four qualities, then Water will evince the quality of smell, Teja of smell and taste, and Vāyu of smell, colour and taste respectively. But it is never observed to be so. Therefore also, the theory of atoms being the cause is not reasonably sustainable.—16.

*(The theory of atoms being the cause of the world) cannot be accepted, also because, the learned have not accepted it.—17.*

The theory about the Pradhāna being the cause (of the world) has been accepted to a small extent at least, by Manu and others learned in the Vedās on the ground of its being helpful by reason of its supporting the Satkārya-vāda (viz. the theory that an effect always pre-exists as a cause, before it is created etc.). But the theory of atoms being the cause, has not been accepted by the learned, even to the least little extent and should not therefore be countenanced at all by those who accept the Vedās (as authoritative i.e. Pramāṇa). Besides the Vaisheshikās hold that there are six categories, propounded in their Shāstra, called—‘substance’ (Dravya), ‘quality’ (Guṇa), ‘action’ (Karma), ‘generality’ (Sāmānya), ‘particularity’ (Viśeṣa) and ‘inherence’ (Samavāya), which are absolutely different from each other and have absolutely different characteristics, like a man, a horse, or a hare (which are different from each other and have different characteristics), and while holding thus, they also hold, in a way quite contrary to it, that all the other five categories are completely dependent on the category ‘substance’ (because, substance is a *sine qua non* for their existence). This of course is not reasonably sustainable. How is that? Just as in the ordinary world, a hare, grass or a tree which are absolutely different from each other are not mutually interdependent, even so, the categories such as ‘substance’ etc. being absolutely different from each other, categories such as ‘quality’ etc. do not deserve to be dependent on the category ‘substance’, inasmuch as they would then exist only when a ‘substance’ exists, and would not exist when a substance does not exist, and it would then come to this, that it is the ‘substance’ only that comes to have these several terms applied to it, and becomes the object of

knowledge, according to the different forms and conditions in which it happens to be. Just as, Devadatta, one only as he is, becomes the object of different terms and perceptions according to the particular different conditions in which he happens to be, even so it is, in this case. But, if it is understood to be so, there would occur the predicament (for the Vaisheshika), of (the acceptance of) the Sāmkhya doctrine (similar also to Vedānta), and of his going counter to his own theory. But (says the Vaisheshika), even though 'fire' is a different entity (than smoke), 'smoke' is seen to be dependent upon 'fire'. (We reply) yes, it certainly is seen to be so, but it is precisely because of the perception of their being different, that it is concluded that fire and smoke are different (entities). Here, however, in the case of a substance such as a white blanket or a dun cow, or a blue lotus, it is the substance itself, which, because of a particular qualification, is perceived to have its own particular quality, and not that a substance and its quality are perceived to be entities different from each other, like fire and smoke. Therefore, quality has substance as its self. It thus happens to be explained (i.e. by what is said about quality), that, the remaining five other categories viz. action (Karma) etc., have substance as their selves (because they are not perceived to be different from substances).

If it be said (by the Vaisheshika) that this dependence of 'quality' etc. on 'substance' is, because substances and qualities have a relation of inherence between them (i.e. they are Ayutasiddha), then (we say that) their having such a relation of inherence (i.e. Ayutasiddhatva) can happen to be because of their being non-separate (from each other) with reference either to space or time or nature, but none of these alternatives would be reasonably sustainable. So far as their being non-separate in space is concerned, it would be contradictory to their own assumption. Why would it be so? (Because the Vaisheshikās hold that) a piece of cloth which is produced from threads exists in the space occupied by its threads, and not in any separate space of its own, but the qualities of the piece of cloth, i.e. its whiteness etc., occupy the space of the piece of cloth and not the space occupied by the threads. Their Sūtra also lays down that—"Substances reproduce other substances, and qualities reproduce other qualities" (Vai.

Sū. 1.1.10). Threads which are the causal material produce a piece of cloth, viz. the substance of the effect, and the qualities of the threads such as whiteness etc. produce similar qualities in the effect i.e. the piece of cloth. This assumption (of the Vaisheshikās) would be vitiated, if a substance and its qualities were to be understood to be non-separate in space. Now, if it is said that their being Ayutasiddha is because of their not existing in different times, then it would come to mean that the right horn and the left horn of a cow (having been created at one and the same time) are Ayutasiddha (i.e. have a relation of inherence between them). Similarly, if by Ayutasiddhatva (i.e. having a relation of inherence), non-separateness in nature is understood, then there would be no difference in the Selfs of substances and qualities, as they would be perceived to be identical. Their (i.e. of the Vaisheshikās) tenet, that the relation of Yutasiddha entities is the relation of 'contact', and that of the Ayutasiddha entities is the relation of 'inherence', is fallacious and futile, because, to say, that the cause which already exists prior to an effect, and the effect, are Ayutasiddha, is not reasonably sustainable. Now, (if the Vaisheshikās say) that they understand by an Ayutasiddha relation, the relation of only one of the two Ayutasiddha entities with the other (and that it is not reciprocal), i.e. the Ayutasiddha relation of the effect only, with the cause, is 'inherence' (Samavāya), even then, any relation of an effect with its cause, prior to its creation, when it has not yet attained its existence and has not yet attained its own Self is not reasonably sustainable, because relation depends upon (the existence of) two entities. Again if it is said, that it (i.e. an effect) may establish a relation (with its cause) after it comes into being, and if it is also understood that an effect comes into being prior to its establishing any relation with the cause, then, in the absence of an Ayutasiddha relation (which the Vaisheshika holds as existing), to say that, as between an effect and a cause there is neither contact nor disjunction, would be an unhappy utterance (on the part of a Vaisheshika). Just as the relation of an effect-material (Kārya-Dravya) which has come into being but is yet inactive, with another material, viz. the all-pervading Ākāsha, is that of 'contact' only and not 'inherence' (Samavāya), even so the relation

between an entity and its cause would be that of 'contact' (Samyoga) only and not 'inherence' (Samavāya). Besides, there is no authority i.e. means-of-proof as to the existence of a relation (Sambandha), either of 'contact' or 'inherence', between two entities, as apart from the two entities themselves which are supposed to have any such relation between them. Now, if it be said (by the Vaisheshika) that the existence of such terms (Shabda) as 'Samyoga' and 'Samavāya' is to be seen, because of the perception of the existence of the two terms 'Samyoga' (contact) and 'Samavāya' (inherence) as apart from the existence of the terms i.e. the names of the entities which themselves are so related, (we reply)—no, because it is seen that even though there is but one entity only, it is seen to be expressed by different terms, and there is a different perception of it, depending upon its own nature and its external aspect. For instance, just as Devadatta, only a single entity though he is, is with reference to his own nature or his external nature (as caused by other things), known by different terms such as, a man, a Brāhmaṇa, one well-versed in the Vedās (Shrotriya), generous (Vadānya), a child, a youth, an old man, a father, a son, a brother, a son-in-law ; or, just as for instance, a mere line, one as it is, when placed in another position is (because of its relative position), understood differently, viz. either as one (Eka), a ten (Dasha), a hundred (Shata) and a thousand (Sahasra) etc., similarly, entities which have a relation between them, apart from having their own names, and being known as such entities, become the objects of such terms as 'Samyoga' (contact) and 'Samavāya' (inherence) and their experience as such, and it is not that they establish the existence of such contact (Samyoga) or inherence (Samavāya) as entities different in themselves, and hence, there is non-existence of any such other entity that has attained the criterion of its own actual experience. Nor is it, that because the perception of the names which express relationship, belongs to the province of the entities which are so related, there would be the predicament of the perception of their existence eternally, as that has already been answered, by our stating, that it is with reference to the nature of such things and their external aspect, that they acquire several names and there are several perceptions of them.

Again, as the Aṇu, the Self (Ātmā), and the internal organ (Mana) have no tangible surfaces (i.e. parts) as such, contact with them is not possible, because, it is only an entity which possesses a tangible surface i.e. a part, that is observed to have a contact (Samyoga) relation with another such entity. If it be said (by the Vaisheshika) that the Aṇu or the Self, or the internal organ, may be imagined to have such tangible surfaces i.e. parts, (we reply)—no, because, if a non-existing entity were to be imagined to exist, it would lead to the predicament of the establishment of the existence of any and every thing at pleasure (Sarvārthasiddhi-prasanga), because, there is no *raison d'être* for any such restrictive rule, that only such and such particular non-existing entity, whether contradictory to reason or otherwise, may be imagined to exist, and no other, and also because imagination being solely dependent upon itself, it is limitless or prolific. There is no restrictive reason why more categories than the six categories imagined by the Vaisheshikās, say a hundred or a thousand for instance, may not be imagined, and hence anything which anybody may wish for, would result. Some kind-hearted soul may wish that this preponderatingly painful transmigratory existence itself, may not be there at all, while another, a vicious person may wish that even those who have already secured Final Release should revert to the transmigratory existence, and who can prevent them? Besides this, it is not reasonably sustainable to expect cohesion, i.e. intimate contact, between two atoms which have no surfaces i.e. parts, and a binary atomic compound having such parts, just as it is not possible for a binary atomic compound (Dvyaṇuka) to have cohesion or intimate contact with the Ākāsha. The Ākāsha has no such cohesion or intimate contact with the Earth etc., as there can be, for instance, between lac and wood. If it be said (by the Vaisheshika) that it is absolutely necessary to assume a relation of inherence, as otherwise it would not be reasonably sustainable to understand, that as between a cause and an effect, the condition of one being the abode (Āshraya) and the other being the abider (Āshrita) exists, we reply—no, because (by such assumption) the fault of mutual interdependence would result. Because, it would be only after a distinction between a cause and an

effect is established, that a condition, in which one is an abode and the other is the abider, would be established, and it would be only after a condition in which one is the abode and the other is the abider is established, that a distinction between a cause and its effect can be established, and thus according to 'the maxim of the bowl and the berry tree ('Kunḍa-Badara-Nyāya') the fault of mutual interdependence would occur (because to say that the bowl is near the berry tree and *vice versa*, fails to locate either definitely). The Vedāntins do not hold that there is any distinction between the effect and its cause, or that as between the cause and the effect there is a condition of one (i.e. the cause) being the abode and the other (i.e. the effect) being the abider, because they hold that an effect is but only a particular special condition of the cause. Moreover, as Paramāṇus have a definite extension, they must have, therefore, as many parts as there are directions, be they six or eight or ten, and because they have parts they necessarily are non-eternal, and thus, the assumption (of the Vaisheshikās) that the Paramāṇus are eternal and without parts would be vitiated. If they were to say, that the very parts, which, you say, would be there because of such directions, are exactly what we mean by our Paramāṇus, we reply—No, because it would be reasonably sustainable to understand, that they get destroyed in a way in which they happen to become smaller and smaller, i.e. from gross to fine and from fine to finer, right down upto the Highest Cause. Just as the Earth which is the most gross, in comparison with the binary atomic compound, which (according to you), even though it substantially exists, ultimately, gets destroyed, even so, things, comparatively fine and finer than the Earth, but which belong to the same category as the Earth, get destroyed, and after them, the binary atomic compound and the Paramāṇus also, which belong to the same category as the Earth, do therefore get destroyed. If it is said that, even when they thus get destroyed, it is only by way of a process of being divided into their parts, we reply, this is no fault, because it has already been said by us, that it would be reasonably sustainable to understand their destruction, to be of the same type, as that of the melting of the hardness or solidity of ghee (Ghritakāṭhi-nyavilayanavat). Just as ghee and gold etc. without

destruction of their parts, become liquefied by contact with fire and thus lose their hardness, even so, in the case of the Paramāṇus, the destruction of their solidity is attained, by their merely merging into the Highest Cause. Similarly, it is not that the creation of the effects starts merely by the conjunction of parts, because it is seen that milk and water, without undergoing any other different contact (of their parts) begin to turn themselves into effects, such as curds and snow.

Therefore, inasmuch as the Vaisheshika theory of Paramāṇus being the cause (of the world) is thus bolstered up by the most vapid reasoning and is contrary to the Scriptures, which declare the Lord to be the cause (of the world), and is not accepted by respected persons such as Manu and others, it should be totally rejected. And a passage such as "those who desire to secure their spiritual well-being" should be understood to be a complementary portion of the sentence (of the above Sūtra).—17.

#### 4. SAMUDĀYĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 18-27.

*Aggregates, assumed to result from both the kinds of causes, would not take place.*—18.

It has already been stated that inasmuch as the vicious doctrine of the Vaisheshikās is bolstered up by faulty reasoning, and is opposed to the Vedās, and is not accepted by respectable people, it should not be accepted. We will now propound, how—it (i.e. the doctrine of the Vaisheshikās) being semi-Nihilists in nature (because they consider only a few entities, such as Paramāṇus etc., as eternal and the rest as non-eternal), and by reason of its similarity with Nihilism—the vicious doctrine of total Nihilism (of the Buddhists) has to be still more overlooked. This doctrine (of the Buddhists) consists of a variety of forms, both because it propounds different views, and because of the different mental calibre of the disciples (of Buddha). There are in this, three kinds (of disciples) holding three different views. Some are those who hold that all things really exist (Sarvāstivavādins i.e. Realists), some are those who hold that thought-forms or ideas (Vijnāna) alone (and not actual entities) really exist (Vijnānavādins i.e. Idealists), and



others again are those who hold that nothing really exists (Shūnyavādins i.e. Nihilists). We now would refute the Sarvāstivādin who hold that external (i.e. Bāhya) and internal (i.e. Āntara) things do in fact exist, viz. elements i.e. Bhūta and things resulting from elements i.e. Bhautika (are external i.e. Bāhya), and mind i.e. Chitta and things resulting from the mind i.e. Chaitta (are internal i.e. Āntara). The elements are the earth etc., and the things resulting from the elements are colour (Rūpa) etc., and the organ of sight (Chakshu) etc.. The Buddhists hold that the quartette of Paramāṇus viz. those of the Earth, Water, Teja, and Vāyu, having a hard, viscid, hot and mobile nature respectively, come together to form the Earth etc.. They also hold that five groups i.e. Skandās (of internal things) such as Rūpa (sensation), Vijnāna (thought-form or idea), Vedanā (feeling), Samjñā (verbal knowledge), Samskāra (impressions) come together and constitute the basis of all Adhyātmika transactions. In connection with this it is said, thus—with regard to the two kinds of aggregates, viz. the aggregates of the nature of the coming together of the elements, and entities resulting from such elements as caused by the Aṇus, on the one hand, and the aggregates of the five groups (Skandās) as caused by the coming together of these five groups (Skandās) on the other, assumed by others (i.e. the opponents of the Vedānta), we say that even supposing they are assumed to be so, they would not materialize i.e. such aggregates would not result. Whence is it so ? Because the components of such aggregates are non-sentient. Besides, the flashing of intelligence in the mind, again, is dependent upon such an aggregate materializing. Besides, in the absence of the assumption of any other sentient, experiencing Self, or steady ruler, who can bring about such an aggregate, supposing such a tendency (for aggregation) is understood to be independent of anything, then there would be the predicament of such tendency never ceasing to be active. Also the Āshaya (i.e. the constant stream of the cognitions of the ego) cannot be such a cause, as it is incapable of being described as being either the same (as knowledge) or otherwise. Also because, if the Āshaya is supposed to be momentary, then as it cannot have any activity, the assumption of any such tendency in the Āshaya is not reasonably sustainable. And

if this coming about of the aggregate (assumed by the Buddhists) is not reasonably sustainable, then in the absence of such an aggregate this stream of mundane existence (Lokayātrā) which depends upon it, would necessarily dry up.—18.

*(If it be said that aggregates may well result, because Nescience etc. are mutually the cause (Pratyayatva) of each other, (we say)—no, because they merely are the efficient cause of each other.—19.*

(The Buddhists say)—Even though a sentient, experiencing Self or a steady ruler is not understood to be the one who brings about an aggregate of the Paramāṇus and the Skandās, still, as Nescience etc. are mutually the cause of each other, the fact of such a stream of mundane existence, is reasonably sustainable, and being so reasonably sustainable, nothing else is necessary. These Nescience etc., viz. Nescience, impression, knowledge, name, form, the tabernacle of the six (i.e. five sense-organs and intelligence) i.e. the body, touch, feeling, desire, activity (of speech, body and mind), birth, species, decay, death, grief, lamentation, pain, mental affliction and things *ejusdem generis* with these, which, in the Buddhist doctrine, are understood to be the mutual cause of each other, are sometimes indicated briefly and at other times treated in detail. Besides, this group of Nescience etc. is not denied by the followers of other systems. If it be said—This group of Nescience etc. therefore, recurring constantly like (the pots of) a water-wheel, and being mutually the cause and the effect of each other, and being actually in existence, the existence of an aggregate has necessarily to be understood by implication, to be reasonably sustainable—we reply: it is not so. Why is it not so? Because these entities are mutually the cause of each other's creation only. If any cause as such for such an aggregate is actually known, then only, such an aggregate is reasonably sustainable. Because, assuming Nescience etc. to be mutually the cause of the creation of each other, if each preceding one (in the series) would be the cause merely of the coming into existence of the one that comes after it, it may well be so, but even so, no cause for the

coming into existence of an aggregate is possible (merely because of that). But (says the Buddhist), it has been stated that an aggregate has to be presumed to exist by a necessary implication. To this we reply—If it is meant to say, that as Nescience etc., cannot come into existence without an aggregate and hence the existence of an aggregate is to be understood by implication, then some cause for such aggregate has to be stated. It has already been stated during the examination of the Vaisheshika doctrine, that even if the Atoms (Aṇus, which are understood to be eternal) and the experiencing-Selfs (the abode of the unseen principle which is the abider) are in existence, no cause for an aggregate is possible. How very much less possible, therefore, must it be, when (as the Buddhists hold) the Atoms (Aṇus) have only a momentary existence and when they are devoid of any such relation, in which one is the abode and the other the abider, and when there are no experiencing-Selfs? Again, if it is meant that Nescience etc. are themselves the cause of the aggregate, then how ever can Nescience etc., which themselves depend upon an aggregate for coming into existence, be themselves the cause of such aggregates? Now if you (the Buddhist) think that aggregates by themselves recur constantly in this beginningless transmigratory existence, and Nescience etc. abide in them, even then, an aggregate which comes into being from another aggregate, will either as a rule be similar to it, or in the absence of any rule, be either similar or dissimilar to it. If it is understood that it will come into being as a rule, it will imply the impossibility of a human body ever attaining the body, either of a God, or of an animal (Tiryagyoni), or of that of a denizen of Hell (Nāraka), and if no such rule is assumed then it may amount to this, that it (i.e. the human body) may at one moment become an elephant or a God, and may again revert, and be a man. Both these (consequences) would be contrary to their own doctrine (viz. that a body suffers death every moment). Besides your (Buddhist's) doctrine is, that any such steady experiencing-Self for whose experience this aggregate is to come into being, does not exist. Hence, such experience will be for its own sake alone (i.e. it would be useless) and no one else can wish for it. Similarly, Final Release also will be for its own sake alone, and

no one else can be an aspirant for such Final Release. If it is assumed that some one, other than themselves, viz. a man, may wish for both these, then he will necessarily have to be in existence both during the time of experience and at the time of Final Release, and if so, it will be contrary to your own assumption of the doctrine of 'momentariness' (Kṣhaṇikatva). Therefore, Nescience etc. may well be (if you so insist) mutually the cause of each other, still an aggregate cannot be proved to result, merely from that, because of the absence of an experiencing-Self. —19.

*(Nor can the earlier one in the series of Nescience etc. be the cause of the one next to it) because when the next (momentary) entity comes into existence, the preceding one ceases to exist.—20.*

It has been said, that as entities such as Nescience etc. are merely the cause of the coming into existence (of the momentary entity (Kṣhaṇa) which is the later one in the series), the aggregate does not result. Now, it will be propounded, how, even their being the cause (of the coming into existence of the momentary entity next in the series) also, is not possible. Those who hold that everything is momentary (such as, the Buddhists), understand, that when an entity, that comes into existence at a subsequent moment, does so, the entity that exists in the penultimate moment, ceases to exist. And those who hold in this way would never be able to justify the relationship of cause and effect between the entity that exists during the earlier moment and the one that comes into existence at a later moment, because, when the entity that exists in the earlier moment is ceasing to exist, or has ceased to exist, it is swallowed up into non-existence and that it can ever be the cause of the coming into existence of an entity that comes into existence at a later moment, is not reasonably sustainable. Now, if it is meant that an entity that exists during the earlier moment and which actually has come into the condition of existence and has attained the condition of a definite ascertained entity, constitutes the cause of the entity that comes into existence at the later moment, even then, it is not reasonably sustainable, because, if an

entity that has actually come into existence (during the earlier moment) were to be supposed to engage itself into any operative activity, there would be the predicament of its continuing a relationship with the subsequent moment (in which the next entity comes into existence). If it again be said, that the very existence of that entity itself (which exists during the earlier moment) means its operative activity, even that view is not reasonably sustainable, because it is not possible that an effect (i.e. the entity which is supposed to come into existence at a subsequent moment) which is not coloured with the nature of its cause, can ever come into existence. And if it is understood that the nature of the cause persists in the effect, then as such nature of the cause would continue to exist during the time (i.e. the next moment) of the existence of the result, there would be the predicament (for the Buddhist) of having to abandon his doctrine of the momentariness of entities (Kṣaṇikatva). Again if the assumption is that there is a relationship of cause and effect, without the effect being coloured by the nature of its cause, then, as such a condition of things would be available at all times, it would thus lead to the predicament of an impossible position (Atiprasaṅga). Now the 'coming into existence' of an entity, and its 'destruction', can indeed either be the nature of such entity, or they may mean another condition of it, or they may be altogether different entities. None of these alternatives are however reasonably sustainable. If the 'coming into existence' and the 'destruction' of an entity are themselves the nature of such entity, then the term 'entity' and the terms 'coming into existence' and the 'destruction' would be synonymous. Now, if it is understood that an entity is a condition intermediate between the condition of the coming into existence and destruction of an entity, which are the initial and final conditions of the entity, the doctrine of the momentariness of entities will have to be abandoned, because even if it be so the entity would necessarily be connected with three moments, viz. the initial, the intermediate and the final moment. And again if it is understood, that the 'coming into existence' of an entity, and its 'destruction' are entirely unconnected with the entity itself—as a horse and a buffalo for instance are entirely unconnected with each other—then as the

entity would necessarily have no connection whatsoever with either its 'coming into existence' or 'destruction', there would be the predicament of the entity being rendered eternal (which is against the Buddhist doctrine). Now, if, the 'coming into existence' of an entity or its 'destruction', is understood to be its perception or non-perception respectively, even then, such perception or non-perception being the properties of the person (i.e. Jiva-Self) who so perceives or fails to perceive, they could not be the properties of the entity, and thus again the predicament of the entity being eternal would result, just the same. For these reasons also, the doctrine of 'Sugata' (i.e. Buddha) is incongruous.—20.

*If it be supposed that in the absence (of a cause, an effect takes place), the original declaration would be opposed to it, or, otherwise (there would be) contemporaneity (of cause and effect).—21.*

With respect to the doctrine of the momentariness of an entity (i.e. destruction of an entity existing at one moment, as another entity comes into existence at a later moment—Kṣaṇabhāṅgavāda) it has been said that an entity existing at the earlier moment being swallowed up into destruction it cannot possibly be the cause of an entity which comes into existence at the subsequent moment. Now, if it is said, that a result may take place even in the absence of a cause, then, the original declaration would be contradicted. The declaration, that mind and mental phenomena come into existence after having acquired four kinds of causes (viz. Adhipatipratyaya, Sahakāri Pratyaya, Samānāntara Pratyaya and Ālambana Pratyaya), will, in the event of such assumption, have been abandoned. If it be said, that results take place without any cause, then in the absence of any impediment i.e. an obstructing reason (such as that every effect must have a cause) anything might come into existence in any place. If it be said, that an entity existing at an earlier moment (i.e. the cause), continues to exist till an entity which exists in the subsequent moment (the effect), comes into existence, then it would mean that cause and effect are contemporaneous.

That way also, the original declaration would be contradicted just the same. Besides, the original declaration that all entities (Samskārās) have a momentary existence would be contradicted.—21.

*No deliberate annihilation or natural annihilation can be arrived at, because of, the absence of interruption (i.e. destruction).*  
—22.

Moreover the Vaināshikās (i.e. Buddhists who belong to the Nihilist school) hold, that all that is cognized by intelligence and is different from the triad, is something which is artificial (i.e. Samskrita) and momentary, and they mention this triad of entities to consist of the 'Deliberate Annihilation' ('Pratisamkhyānirodha') and the 'Natural Annihilation' (Apratisamkhyānirodha), and the Ākāsha (i.e. space). They consider each of these three to be a mere non-entity, mere non-existence and formless, and describe Deliberate Annihilation to be the intentional destruction of an entity, and Natural Annihilation to be the opposite of that, and the Ākāsha (space) to be merely the absence of any covering entity. The Sūtrakāra will speak about the Ākāsha later on, and will for the present refute the two kinds of annihilations. Neither Deliberate Annihilation nor Natural Annihilation can be arrived at i.e. they are not possible. Whence is it so ? Because of, absence of interruption (i.e. destruction). For these Deliberate or Natural Annihilations ought to be either perceivable with reference to the stream (of momentary entities) or with reference to the entities themselves. Now, they cannot possibly be perceivable with reference to the stream (of momentary entities), because there is no possibility of the interruption of the stream (of momentary entities), as the constituent members of the stream happen to be in an uninterrupted relation of cause and effect, nor can these annihilations possibly be perceivable with reference to the entities, because an annihilation in which the annihilated entity leaves no unrecognizable form, is not possible, inasmuch as during all the conditions (during which they are undergoing annihilation) they are still recognizable as being such entities, and have

a connected existence (i.e. there is absence of interruption i.e. destruction). In those conditions also, in which they are not so recognizable, an inference as to their existence i.e. non-interruption or absence of destruction etc. can still be drawn from the instances in which such non-interruption i.e. absence of destruction of the entities, and their relationship to each other, is clearly recognizable. Therefore annihilations of these two kinds, imagined by our opponents (the Vaināshikās) are not reasonably sustainable.—22.

*Because faults do arise in both the cases.*  
—23.

How does this annihilation of Nescience etc., which is included in this Deliberate and Natural Annihilations, as is imagined (by the Vaināshikās), result? Is it through correct knowledge with its auxiliaries (viz. Self-restraint, rules etc.), or is it spontaneous? So far as the first alternative is considered, there would result the predicament of the abandonment (by the Vaināshikās) of the doctrine that such annihilation occurs without any cause, and so far as the second alternative is concerned, there would result the predicament of the teachings (of Sugata) as to the right path, being rendered useless. In this matter, inasmuch as, considered either way, the predicament of a fault resulting cannot be avoided, the doctrine of Sugata is incongruous.—23.

*With regard to Ākāsha (Space) also, (the doctrine of the Vaināshikās that it is formless is not reasonably sustainable), because of (the Ākāsha) not having any special peculiarity.*—24.

With regard to what they (i.e. the Vaināshikās) themselves hold, viz. the doctrine about the two varieties of annihilation and Ākāsha being formless or non-existent, that (part of it) which holds the two varieties of annihilations to be formless or non-existent, has been refuted earlier, and now (the other part), that the Ākāsha also is formless or non-existent, is being refuted. It is unreasonable to



apply the doctrine of formlessness to Ākāsha, because, in common with the two varieties of annihilations, it is reasonably sustainable to hold the 'Ākāsha' to be an existing entity. On the authority of the Scriptures, viz. the passage "The Ākāsha came into existence from the Self" (Tait. 2.1), Ākāsha is well-known to be a definite existing entity. Those however who are dissenters (from this authority of the Scriptures), should be answered by the fact, that the Ākāsha is inferred to be an existing entity from its having the quality of sound, inasmuch as, qualities such as smell etc. are observed to abide in entities such as the earth etc.. In the case of those who hold that Ākāsha is merely the 'absence of any covering entity', when one bird is already flying (in the sky) and when such a covering entity, to wit, a flying bird, is actually present (in the sky, and when, because of such covering entity there could thus be no Ākāsha), the predicament of another bird wanting to fly but not having any space (Ākāsha) available for flying, would take place. If the Vaināshika says that the other bird may by all means fly in that part i.e. where there is no such covering entity (as the first bird), then that 'particular part' by which such 'absence of covering entity' is particularized, would itself be a definite Ākāsha entity, and it would not merely mean the 'absence of any covering entity'. Besides he (a follower of Sugata) who holds the Ākāsha to be merely the absence of any covering entity would range himself in opposition to Sugata's own doctrine. Because in the Saugata doctrine, in the stream of replies to questions such as "Oh Bhagawan, in what does the earth abide?" after the Earth etc. are dealt with, the reply to the question "In what does Vāyu abide?" is "Vāyu has Ākāsha as its abode". Now this would not be plausible, if Ākāsha were not to be an entity. Hence also, it would not be reasonably sustainable to hold the Ākāsha to be a non-entity. Besides, it would be contradictory to hold at one and the same time, that this triad, consisting of these two varieties of annihilations and the Ākāsha, are formless or non-existent and non-entities, and again to hold that they are eternal entities. Because, in the case of a non-entity, it is not possible to say either that it is eternal or it is non-eternal, because, a relationship as between a quality and an entity possessing such a quality, depends

upon the existence of such an entity. And when a relationship as between a quality and an entity possessing such quality exists, then alone—like a pot—there is bound to be the existence of such an entity and there would be no formlessness.—24.

*Because of (the fact of) remembrance i.e.  
memory also, (the Self is not momentary).  
—25.*

Besides, the Vaināshika who understands that all entities have but a momentary existence, must necessarily hold that the Self, the percipient, also, has only a momentary existence. But that is not possible. Because of (the fact of) memory i.e. remembrance, which is something which arises following in the wake of perception or experience. Such perception (followed by memory or remembrance) is possible only if the perception is by one and the same person. It is never observed that when the perception is experienced by one, it is remembered by another person. Unless the person who perceives first and the person who perceives afterwards, are one and the same, how possibly can perception such as 'I who saw that (yesterday), am seeing this (today)' be possible? Besides, it is well-known in the ordinary world, that it is only when the person who sees and the person who remembers are one and the same, that there can be such direct cognition, thus—I saw that (yesterday), and I see this (today). If the one who perceives and the one who remembers are different, then the perception would be thus—It is I that remember, (but) it was another who perceived. But no one ever experiences that way. When the cognition is in that manner, all persons in this world understand that the person who perceives and the person who remembers are different entities, thus—I remember that he saw. In the present case, however, even the Vaināshika himself knows that it is he himself alone that both perceives and remembers, when he says—'I saw this'. And just as he would not care to say, that fire is not hot and that it does not give out light, even so, he does not care to deny what he himself has perceived, and does not say that he has not perceived. This being so, when one and the same person

is connected with the two moments, the one of perceiving, and another of remembering respectively, a Vaināshika is not in a position to avoid the abandonment of his own doctrine of the momentariness of entities. How can then, a Vaināshika, who professes to hold the doctrine of the momentariness of entities, but knows the successive perceptions to be by himself only, i.e. who from his first breath since his birth upto now and from now on upto his last breath, definitely knows all past and future perceptions to have been accomplished by himself alone, not feel ashamed ? Now, if he were to say, that this may well happen as a result of similarity (of successive perceptions), we can retort, that inasmuch as similarity, as for instance that "this is similar to that", necessarily depends upon two entities, and, as in the case of a person who holds all entities to be momentary, there is absence of any one perceiver as such, of two entities similar to each other, it would be but mere incoherent jargon only, were he to say, that such cognitions are caused by similarity, because, were he to hold one and the same person to be the perceiver of the similarity between entities that exist in an earlier and in a later moment respectively, then such a person must, in that case, necessarily exist during these two moments, and thus, the initial declaration about the momentariness of all entities would be contradicted. If it is said, that the cognition 'This is similar to that' is an altogether different cognition (unrelated to the things) and is not a recognition caused by perceptions relating to earlier and later moments, (we reply)—No, because (to say that) *this* is similar to *that*, necessarily presupposes the acceptance of two different entities. Were perception with reference to similarity to be an altogether different cognition, a sentence such as 'This is similar to that' would be meaningless. (In such a case) 'Similarity exists' would be the sentence used. Whenever, anything which is quite well-known in the ordinary world, is not accepted by experts, then, an attempt by one expert, both for the establishment of his own doctrine and the refutation of (i.e. the attributing of a fault in) his opponent's views, fails to be properly grasped either by the other expert or by him who makes such an attempt. What is definitely ascertained, as 'This is so and so'—that alone should be spoken about. If anything other than that is

spoken, it would only serve to establish one's garrulity only. It is not reasonable to attribute transactions (such as—I saw that yesterday ; I see this today) to similarity, because the cognition is of the existence of an entity, and not that of a mere similarity. There may well be a doubt perhaps with regard to an external (Bāhya) entity resulting from optical illusion, as to whether an external entity is the same entity (as is perceived) or whether it is similar to it, because such doubt is possible, but no such doubt can possibly arise in a cognizer about himself, viz. as to whether the cognizer is in fact he himself or somebody similar to him, because, the realization of the cognizer's existence is definite, thus—I who saw yesterday, am the same myself that remembers today. Therefore, also, the doctrine of the Vaināshika is not reasonably sustainable.—25.

*Existence (i.e. an entity) does not (result)  
from non-existence (i.e. non-entity),  
because it is not so observed.—26.*

This is again how the doctrine of the Vaināshikās is not reasonably sustainable, because, (the fact of) their not recognizing a cause which is stable and which continues to persist (in the effect) would lead them towards an undesirable conclusion, viz. that effects result from non-existence (of any cause). They do, however, indicate, by the sentence 'Without the destruction (of the cause) no result takes place', that entities result from non-existence. For instance, it is only from a seed which has undergone destruction that a sprout results, and from milk which has undergone destruction that curds results, and from earth (which has undergone destruction) that an earthen pot results. (They say) if effects were to result from one unchangeable cause (such as Brahma) then such unchangeable cause being everywhere common, everything would come into existence, on every side simultaneously. Therefore they consider, that as sprouts result from seeds which have been swallowed up into non-existence, entities result from non-existence.

To this, the reply is, by the Sūtra "Existence (i.e. an entity) does not (result) from non-existence because it is not so observed"—i.e. an entity does not result from non-existence. Were an entity to result from non-existence,

such non-existence being common everywhere, any assumption of a special cause (for an effect) would be meaningless. Non-existence as caused by the destruction of seeds, and the non-existence of the horns of a hare, being typically the same, because the nature of non-existence is common, there could not be any such special distinction in such non-existence, as a result of which, a sprout should result *only* from a seed, and curds should result *only* from milk, by reason of which the assumption of any such type of special cause could have any meaning. And if non-existence, without having any special type, were to be assumed to be the cause (of effects, as the Vaināshika holds), then sprouts etc. may just as well result from the horns of a hare (which are totally non-existent) etc., but it is never observed to be so. If, however, one were to assume (the existence of) a special attribute of non-existence—like, for instance, the blueness of a lotus—as a special quality, then precisely because of the assumption of the existence of a special quality pertaining to non-existence, such non-existence would itself become an existing entity, quite as much as a lotus (which has blueness as its quality) is an existing entity. Nor can non-existence possibly ever be the cause of any creation, precisely because of its being such ‘non-existence’, like, for instance, the total non-existence (Tuchchhatva) of the horns of a hare. Were entities to result from non-existence, all the resulting entities also would necessarily be characterized by non-existence. But it is not observed to be so, because all entities are perceived to possess their own individual specific qualities as existing entities. Nobody ever understands that water-troughs which are earthen, are entities which are the modifications of threads etc., while everybody cognizes the modifications of earth to be earthen. With respect to the argument advanced (by the Vaināshika), viz. that because it is not reasonably sustainable to understand an unchangeable entity to be the cause (of any effect) unless its own nature is destroyed, non-existence has to be understood to be the cause (of effects), (it must be said that) it is a wrong statement, because it is observed that gold etc. whose nature (as gold etc.) is constant and is recognized to be so, are the cause of results such as ornaments etc.. Even in the case of seeds etc. whose nature is seen to be destroyed, it is not the

antecedent destruction (of the seeds) that is understood to be the cause of their subsequent condition (as sprouts), because, it is understood that it is the *particles* (cells) of the seeds which constitute the seeds themselves, and which persist in the effect, and which do not get destroyed, that are the cause of the sprouts. Therefore as actual existence of an entity is never seen to result from the totally non-existing horns of a hare and as on the other hand the actual coming into existence (of ornaments) is observed to result from gold etc., the doctrine that entities result from non-existence is not reasonably sustainable. Besides, holding, to begin with (as a Vaināshika does), that mind and mental entities result from four kinds (of causes) and that, the elements, and things resulting from the elements, result from the Paramāṇus, the Vaināshika, by again imagining that entities result from non-existence, and by thus going back on his own previous assumption, only succeeds in merely perplexing the people in general.—26.

*Even men who are idle or indifferent i.e. apathetic would thus accomplish (what they desire).—27.*

If it be understood that entities result from non-existence, then idle men who do not care to exert would attain the fulfilment of their desire, because non-existence is easily available. An agriculturist would succeed in growing corn, even without engaging himself in agricultural pursuits, a potter would be able to produce earthen pots, even without the exertion of preparing the necessary clay, a weaver would be able to obtain cloth, even without engaging himself in the weaving of yarn, quite as easily as a man who weaves. No one would have to exert for the attainment of Heaven or Final Release. But this is neither proper nor does any one understand it to be so. Therefore also, the doctrine, that entities result from non-existence, is not reasonably sustainable.—27.

##### 5. ABHĀVĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 28-32.

*There could be no non-existence (of external entities) because (they) are actually perceived.—28.*

When, during what has gone before, faults with respect to the doctrine denying (the existence of) external entities, such as the unavailability of aggregates, have been set forth, the follower of Buddha who believes in the doctrine of Vijnāna i.e. mere internal cognitions or thought-forms (without there being any external i.e. objective entities corresponding to them) comes forward in opposition (to the Vedāntin). The theory of the doctrine of the reality of external entities was propounded (by Buddha), because he noticed the predilection of some of his pupils for believing in the objectivity i.e. reality of external entities (and so as to be in conformity with that view), but that never was his own view. To him, the doctrine of mere subjective cognition alone as the sole phase, was acceptable. According to that doctrine 'of the reality of mere subjective cognitions'—that all processes, whether they be with regard to the means of knowledge, or the object to be known, or with regard to the result of knowledge in the form of the awareness of the external object by the mind or intellect (Buddhi), are only internal, is what is reasonably sustainable, because even if external entities did actually exist, means-of-proof etc. do not come into operation, unless the mind or intellect is applied to or becomes aware of such external entities. (It may be asked by the Vedāntin)—How is it known that all these processes are only internal and that apart from mere subjective cognition, no external objective entity as such exists? (The follower of Buddha replies) Because it (i.e. the existence of external objective entities) is not possible. The external objective entity as it is understood to be, can either be atoms (Paramāṇus), or aggregates of atoms (Paramāṇus) such as (for instance) pillars etc.. The Paramāṇus, however, cannot be fixed accurately or spotted to be the objects of the cognition of a pillar etc. (because it is not reasonably sustainable that they can be perceived as Paramāṇus), nor are pillars etc. cognized as being the aggregates of Paramāṇus, because of the impossibility of the aggregates being explained as being either different from, or not different from, the Paramāṇus. 'Universals' (Jātis) etc., also should be refuted in a similar manner. Besides, cognitions as they arise have realization (of the object) as their common factor, and this particular selective appropriation with regard to each and

every different object of cognition, such as the cognition of a pillar, or of a wall, or a pot, or a piece of cloth, cannot be reasonably sustainable unless there is a special peculiarity (of form) of each of such cognitions, and hence cognitions have necessarily to be assumed to have the same form as the objects of such cognitions. And, when this is accepted, then, in as much as cognitions are thus coextensive in extent with the form of the objects of such cognitions (which are confined to such cognitions), the notion about the separate existence of a (corresponding) objective external entity is superfluous. Further as an external object and its cognition are perceived simultaneously, it means that there is no difference between an object and its cognition i.e. they both are one and the same. When one of the two is not cognized, necessarily the other also is not cognized, but supposing they (i.e. objects and their cognition) are by nature different, that would not be reasonably sustainable, because of the absence of any reason for the obstruction of the cognition of one of them, when the other of them is not cognized. Therefore also, there is non-existence of entities. This should be looked upon as in the case of dreams etc. . Just as in cognitions, in a dream, or in an illusion, or in a mirage, or in a Gandharva Nagara (a phantom city in the sky), there are perceptions in the forms of the objects of cognition, and cognition itself, without the existence of any corresponding external entities, similarly during wakefulness also, the perceptions of such objects as pillars etc., deserve to be similar (viz. that there could be no external entities existing in fact), because perceptions in both these cases have no difference (between them). How (it may be asked by a Vedāntin), in the absence of any external entities as such, is this variety of perceptions of external entities reasonably sustainable? (The follower of Buddha replies)—It is so because of the variety of impressions on the mind (Vāsanās). In this beginningless transmigratory existence, as cognitions and impressions on the mind succeed each other alternately as cause and effect, quite in the same manner as seeds and sprouts succeed each other alternately, and mutually constitute the causes and effects of each other, such variety in them is not contradictory. Besides it is understood from positive and negative instances (Anvaya and Vyatireka) that variety in cognitions is caused by impressions only,



inasmuch as in the matter of dreams, it is understood by both of us' (i.e. Buddhist and Vedāntin) that there is a variety of cognitions caused by impressions on the mind, even in the absence of the existence of external entities, while I (the Buddhist) do not understand that in the absence of mental impressions, there is a variety in cognition caused by actually existing external entities. Therefore, also (according to the follower of Buddha) external entities have no existence.

To this we (Vedāntins) reply—There could be no non-existence (of external entities) because external entities are actually perceived. It is not possible to understand that there could be non-existence of external entities. Why so ? Because (they are) actually perceived.

An external entity is invariably perceived in every cognition such as a pillar, a wall, a pot or a piece of cloth. It can never be that what is actually perceived is non-existent. For instance, if a man who is actually eating and experiencing the feeling of satisfaction derived by such eating, were to say—"I am not eating nor am I feeling any satisfaction", how can he be understood to be a person whose word should be (seriously) accepted ? Similarly how could a man's word be acceptable, if, while actually perceiving an external entity as a result of its contact with a sense-organ, he were to say, that he neither perceives such entity nor does it exist ? (If the opponent were to say however)—I do not say that I do not perceive any external entity but I say that I do not perceive any external entity, existing as apart from a mere subjective cognition of it. (We reply)—Of course you say that because there is no curb to your mouth, but then, it is not logical, because it is precisely by means of perception only, that the existence of an entity as apart from a mere cognition of it, has necessarily to be understood. No one understands perception itself to be the pillar or the wall, but all persons understand that they i.e. pillars etc. themselves are the objects of perception. It is in this manner that all people understand, and even those (such as the followers of Buddha) who desire to deny the existence of external entities also do, all the same, as surely speak about the external entity, thus—viz. that which is of the nature of an internal subjective cognition, appears as if it is external. Even they, who thus apprehend the perception

of an external entity as is well-known to all people generally, but who desire to deny that external entities exist, speak about it, *as if* it is external, or else, why should they say '*as if*' it is external? No one would say, that Viṣṇumitra appears *as if* he is the son of a barren woman (a total non-entity). Hence it would be reasonable for those who perceive an entity substantially as an entity, to say that it is perceived to be a substantial external entity, and not that it is perceived *as if* it is an external entity. But (says the follower of Buddha), as the existence of an external entity is not possible (as I have said above) I have perforce come to the conclusion that it is perceived *as if* it is an external entity. This conclusion (we reply) is not proper, because the possibility or the absence of possibility of the existence of an entity, depends upon the antecedent operation, or the absence of operation, of the means-of-proof (with regard to such entity) and not *vice versa*, viz. that the operation, or the absence of operation, of the means-of-proof depends upon the possibility or the absence of possibility (of the existence of such an entity). That which is actually perceived by the operation of one or other of the means-of-proof, is possible (of existence), and that which is not perceived by any of the means-of-proof whatsoever, is not possible (of existence). Hence, in this case, how can an entity which is actually perceived as substantially existing according to its own nature by all the various means-of-proof, be said to be either possible or not possible (of existence), by raising such alternatives as that such external objective entities are either different or not different (from Paramāṇus), when as a matter of fact they are actually perceived? It is not that because cognitions have the form of the objects of such cognitions, that destruction of such objects results, for cognition cannot have the form of external objects if such external objects themselves did not exist, and also because, such objects are as a matter of fact perceived to be external. Hence it is that, that an object and its perception are as a rule apprehended simultaneously, is to be understood to mean, that they have a relation of cause and effect between them, and not that they are one and the same, and have no distinction between them. Besides, when there are perceptions of a pot and a piece of cloth, there is a distinction between only the attributes

of the cognitions i.e. between the attributes of the pot and the piece of cloth, and not in the substantive viz. the cognition itself. For instance, when there is a white bull and a dark bull, the distinction is between the whiteness and blackness, the attributes of the bulls, and not in the generic form (Ākriti) of a bull i.e. bull-ness. It is by means of these two attributes (the whiteness and the blackness) that their distinction from the one (i.e. the generic bullness) results, and *vice versa*, for it is from the one (i.e. generic bullness) that its distinction from the two attributes (whiteness and blackness) results. Therefore, there is a distinction between an object and its cognition. The same should be understood in the case of the cognition of a pot and the remembrance of it, because here also the distinction is between the substantives, viz. cognition and remembrance, and not in the object i.e. the pot. As it is, in the case of the smell of milk and the taste of milk, the distinction is between the attributes, smell and taste, and not in the substantive i.e. the milk. Besides, as regards two cognitions, one of which is earlier and the other later and which are exhausted as a result of making themselves cognized (because they are momentary), it is not reasonably sustainable to understand that they have a relationship of the one being merely a cognition and the other being the subject of cognition (because it is the Self that is the knower, while the Buddhists do not accept the existence of the Self), and hence, the several declarations or dogmas (of Buddhist doctrine)—such as those about the distinctions between cognitions, about momentariness, about the distinction between individuals and classes, about an earlier cognition generating an impression (Vāsaka) which causes a subsequent cognition (Vāśya), about the distinctions in attributes, such as existing, non-existing and both existing and non-existing attributes (Sat, Asat and Sat-Asat Dharma) caused by the influence of Nescience, about the idea of existence and non-existence, and about bondage and Final Release, inherent in the Buddhist system—would have to be abandoned.

Besides, there is this other thing—you (the opponent) who claim to understand cognition as an internal subjective cognition merely, have to explain how and why you do not become conscious of the existence of an external entity such

as a pillar or a wall etc. If you (the opponent) say that a cognition is actually experienced, then it is equally reasonable to understand that an external entity is also similarly experienced.

If you (the opponent) say again that a cognition being like a lamp, of a self-illuminating nature, it is like a lamp, self-cognized, while an external entity is not so cognized, (then we reply) in saying so, you understand action as acting on itself—an idea which is against ordinary experience, like for instance, fire burning itself—, while you refuse to understand what is not contradictory and is well-known in the ordinary world, viz. that an external entity is cognized by means of a cognition which is different from the external entity itself, and in doing so you are indeed making an exhibition of your erudition. Besides it is not possible that cognition can be conscious of itself as apart from an (external) entity, precisely because a thing cannot act on itself. If you (the follower of Buddha) say that in case a cognition were to be apprehended by means of a thing apart from the cognition itself, that again will have to be apprehended by something else, and that again by still some other thing, and so a *regressus ad infinitum* would result, and besides, cognition, like a lamp, being self-illuminating, if it is imagined that for such cognition some other cognition is necessary, it would be a futile assumption, because, both the cognitions being similar, it would not be reasonably sustainable to hold that they have a relation between them, in which, one cognition is the illuminator and the other the object of such illumination, (we reply)—Both these assumptions of yours are not valid, because when a cognition is cognized, no further expectation arises about the immediate witness of such cognition (i.e. the Self), requiring in its own turn, some other witness to apprehend this first immediate witness, and hence it is not reasonably sustainable to entertain a doubt that a *regressus ad infinitum* would result. As the witness (i.e. the Self) and the cognition are of different nature, it is reasonably sustainable that there is a relation between them of one being the cognizer and the other being the object of cognition, because the existence of this witness (i.e. the Self) cannot be denied, inasmuch as the Self is self-proved. Moreover when you say that, like a lamp, cognition is self-illumina-

ing and does not need anything to illumine it, it would be tantamount to saying, that cognitions cognize themselves, and do not require any other means-of-proof to make themselves known, and it would be just as if you were to say, that there are a thousand burning lamps subsisting inside the big mass of a solid monolith.

(Now if you the Buddhist were to retort) that, cognitions being thus of the nature of perception (as you the Vedāntin suggest), you have practically accepted my (i.e. of the follower of Buddha's) view, (we reply)—No, because as it is seen that it is some person endowed with the faculty of vision, that is necessary to perceive the burning of the lamp, therefore, cognition also being, in common with a lamp, capable of being perceived, would require somebody other than itself to perceive it. Again, (if you the opponent were to suggest)—“You (the Vedāntin) who maintain that this witnessing Self is self-existing, practically in so many words accept my view, that cognition illumines itself, in a round-about way of reasoning”, (we reply)—No, because you (i.e. the follower of Buddha) hold that cognitions have particular attributes such as origination, destruction, and plurality, (while, we, the Vedāntins, recognize only the ‘Self’ which is eternal, unborn, indestructible). Hence, we have thus established, that cognitions, like a lamp, are cognized by some one different from such cognitions.—28.

*Because of the difference in their nature,  
(perceptions during wakeful condition)  
are not like those in a dream etc.—29.*

The argument advanced by him who discountenances the existence of external entities—viz. that, as in the case of perceptions in a dream, so in the case of perceptions during waking state, perceptions of pillars etc. may well occur even without actual corresponding external objective entities (existing), inasmuch as, as perceptions, they are similar—has now to be refuted. It is said with regard to this—Perceptions during waking state do not deserve to be like the perceptions in a dream etc. . Why (is it) so ? Because of the dissimilarity in their nature. Dream-state and waking-state are dissimilar. What dissimilarity is there ? We reply—that it consists in the subsequent contradiction, and the

absence of such subsequent contradiction respectively. Things perceived in a dream by a person are contradicted on his awakening (from a dream), (for he says)—‘Oh, I wrongly fancied I was in the company of a great person, I did not in fact meet him, my mind was overcome with sleep and this caused the illusion.’ There is a similar contradiction in the case of Māyā (illusion) etc. . But a thing perceived in a waking condition—a pillar for instance—is never contradicted under any circumstances. Besides, dream experience is of course a mere remembrance or memory (of past impressions) while what is seen during waking condition, is a perception or experience (brought about by the operation of the means-of-proof). The actual distinction between remembrance or memory (in a dream) and perception or experience (in a waking condition) which is of the nature of separation from or contact with a thing, is directly experienced by a person himself, when he says, for instance, ‘I remember my dear son, but I am not able to see him. But I do wish to see him.’ Under these circumstances, a person who himself actually experiences the difference between them, cannot say that waking perceptions are unreal, because of their actual perception by him, merely because they are perceptions similar to perceptions during dreams. It is not proper or logical for persons who claim to be intelligent, to deny the truth of their own experience. Besides, lest there may be the predicament of having to contradict their own experience, those who are unable to say, that waking perceptions are without any support, wish to say so, on the ground of their similarity to dream perceptions. That, which cannot possibly be the nature of a particular thing, can never be its nature merely because of its similarity with some other things. Fire (for instance) which is experienced to be hot, will never become a cold entity merely because of its similarity to water (merely because both are entities). The dissimilarity between the natures of cognitions in a dream condition and of those in a waking condition has already been indicated.—29.

*There could be no existence (of the impressions on the mind) because (according to you—the opponent—no external entities) are perceived.—30.*

The statement (of the follower of Buddha) that it is possible, that there may be variety in cognitions due to variety of impressions on the mind, even in the absence of the existence of external entities, has now to be refuted. It is said about it (by the Vedāntin)—As according to your doctrine, there is no perception of the existence of external objective entities, it is not reasonably sustainable that, there could be any impression on the mind. Diverse impressions on the mind, about entities, are caused by the perception of diverse (objective external) entities. If (as you maintain) the existence of objective external entities cannot be perceived, to what cause, then, can the variety of different impressions on the mind, be due to? If impressions on the mind are understood to exist as having no beginning in time, then on the ground of the maxim of the 'chain of blind men' (blind leading the blind), the result would be, the absence of any finality based on firm means-of-proof, which would only succeed in terminating all worldly transactions, and bring about an impossible position, but it would never succeed in proving your statement. This being so, the positive and negative instances enumerated by those (followers of Buddha) who refuse to concede the existence of actual objective entities, for the purpose of proving that the whole set of cognitions are caused by impressions and not by actual objective entities, should thus be understood to be refuted, because in the absence of the perception of objective external entities, the existence of the impressions (on the mind) cannot be reasonably sustainable. Besides, on the other hand, as it is understood that even in the absence of impressions on the mind, perception of objective external entities is possible, and as impressions (on the mind) are not understood to be possible in the absence of the existence of objective external entities, such positive and negative instances also necessarily establish the existence of external entities. Besides, as impressions on the mind indeed are special kinds of Samskāras, they cannot be imagined to be without a basis, because it is seen to be so in the ordinary world. In your (i.e. the opponent's) case, there is no basis of any sort for the impressions on the mind, because they are not perceived by any of the means-of-proof.—30.

*(Cognition pertaining to the consciousness of Ego i.e. Ahamkāra i.e. Ālaya-Vijnāna) also, being momentary, (it) cannot be the basis for the impressions on the mind.—31.*

The cognition pertaining to the consciousness of Ego i.e. Ahamkāra which indeed you (the follower of Buddha) imagine to be the basis for the impressions on the mind, also being understood to be but momentary and of a non-permanent nature, because you hold that entities have but a momentary existence, does not, like impellent cognition. (Pravrittivijnāna) of the reality of external entity (such as a pot or a piece of cloth), deserve to be the basis for the impressions on the mind. In the absence of the existence of any connecting principle whose nature persists (in every effect) in relation to all the three times (i.e. the past, present and future), or in the absence of any unchangeable entity (such as the Self) as the witness of all entities, no transactions, such as remembrance, recognition etc., which are dependent upon the impressions on the mind, and which depend upon environment, time and cause are possible. Were cognitions pertaining to Ego-consciousness, to be assumed (by you) to have a permanent nature, it would mean the abandonment of your own doctrine (of the momentariness of all entities). The faults attributed (by us), to the doctrine of the 'momentariness of external entities' (in the Buddhist sense), such as—"Uttarotpāde cha pūrva-nirodhāt" (Brah. Sū. Bhā. II. ii. 20), should be understood to apply equally to the doctrine of 'mere internal subjective cognitions' as the doctrine of 'the momentariness of entities', is common to both these tenets. In this way both these tenets (of the Buddhists), viz. the non-existence of external entities and mere internal cognitions, stand refuted. We do not propose even to extend the courtesy of taking any notice of the doctrine of Nihilism (Shūnyavāda) by way of refuting it, as it is entirely opposed to all means-of-proof, and as this course of worldly transactions which is established by all the means-of-proof cannot be rejected in the absence of any definite knowledge of any better principle, and as it is well-known that in the absence of any exception (to be found to be against a rule) the rule is taken as firmly established.—31.



*Considered in all possible ways (the Buddhist doctrine) is not reasonably sustainable.—32.*

Why need anything more be said ? The more is this doctrine of Buddha examined, in order to ascertain whether it is reasonably sustainable, the more it gets disintegrated, much as a well dug in sand does. We are unable to find in it even the least little reasonable sustainability of any kind. Hence also the doctrine of Sugata is not acceptable. Besides, Sugata by propounding the mutually contradictory doctrines of Bahyārtha-Vāda i.e. 'the reality of objective external entities' (in the Buddhistic sense), of the Vijnāna-Vāda i.e. 'reality of mere internal subjective cognitions, and of Shūnya-Vāda i.e. 'mere nothingness' (Nihilism), has merely succeeded in establishing, either his capacity for incoherent babbling, or his actual hatred of all beings (who are his adherents and who do not follow the Vedic Scriptures), fondly hoping that by the assimilation of the knowledge of such mutually contradictory theories, they may be perplexed. Therefore, the sense (of the Sūtrakāra) is, that those who desire real happiness through Final Release should leave Sugata's doctrine severely alone.—32.

6. *EKASMINNASAMBHAVĀDHIKARAṆAM.* Sū. 33-36.

*(Contradictory attributes cannot exist) in one and the same entity, because (it) is not possible, (and therefore, the Jain doctrine is not correct).—33.*

The doctrine of the followers of Buddha has been refuted. The doctrine of the clothesless Jains (Sans-collottes ?) is now being refuted. They acknowledge seven categories, viz. the Jīva-Self (Jīva), entities other than the Jīva-Self (Ajīva), the tendency of sense-organs towards sense-objects (Āsrava), the discipline of sense-organs (Samvara), the ordeals (Nirjara), Bondage (Bandha), Final Release (Moksha). They further reduce this number according to circumstances (Yathā-yogam) to two only viz. the Jīva-Self and entities other than the Jīva-Self, as they understand that the rest (the remaining five) are covered

by these two. They also talk about these very categories (in another way) as the five Astikāyās (i.e. entities) viz. Jivāstikāya i.e. the category of Jīva-Self, Pudgalāstikāya i.e. the category of a body (wherein there is a congregation and separation of Atoms), Dharmāstikāya i.e. the category of merit, Adharmāstikāya i.e. the category of demerit, and Ākāśhāstikāya i.e. the category of Ākāśha. They also again describe many other different sub-divisions of these categories, supposed to be comprised in their doctrine. They also refer to a mode of reasoning called 'Saptabhanginaya', such as, that, may be an entity exists, may be it does not exist, may be it does and does not exist, may be it is indescribable (Avaktavya), may be it exists and is indescribable, may be it does not exist and is indescribable, may be it does and does not exist and is indescribable. Further they employ this Saptabhangī method of reasoning to oneness (Ekatva) and eternity (Nityatva) etc. (and thus impugn the doctrine of Brahma).

With regard to this, we say :—This doctrine (of the Jains) is not logical, because, contradictory attributes cannot possibly exist (in one and the same entity). Contradictory attributes such as existing (Sat) and not existing (Asat) cannot at one and the same time belong to one and the same entity possessing an attribute (Dharma), even as coldness or hotness cannot possibly belong to the same entity simultaneously. These seven categories definitely ascertained (by Jains) as being so many and as having such and such form, may (according to the Jain theory) perhaps be so, or may not be so, and on the other hand, any resulting knowledge, of such an indefinite nature, which may be so, as described, or on the other hand may not be so, would be, like doubtful knowledge, certainly unauthoritative. (If the Jains were to say)—But the knowledge of an entity which is definitely ascertained to be of more kinds than one, would not deserve to be unauthoritative, like doubtful knowledge, we reply—No. For, in the case of a man, who in such an unfettered manner, definitely understands that entities are of more than one kind, the fact of such definitely ascertained knowledge of his, also, having the same common characteristic of its being 'an entity' quite as much as other entities, would necessarily induce the application of optional alternatives,

such as, that *such* an entity viz. the definitely ascertained knowledge of his, also, somehow exists or that it somehow does not exist, and thus, the indefiniteness of such knowledge would certainly be there all the same. Similarly, in the case of a person, who essays to arrive at such determination, as also in the case of the result of such determination, on the one hand, their existence somehow would result, and on the other hand also their non-existence somehow. How can then, the Tirthakara, authoritative as he is (considered by the Jains), be able to impart instruction, when the means-of-proof, the object to be known, the knower and knowledge, are all, thus, of an indefinite nature? Also how can those who follow his opinion act upon his instruction about a doctrine of such an indefinite nature? It is only when in the case of a thing, a definitely settled result is assured, that all people set about employing the means to achieve it unconfusedly, and not otherwise. Hence, any one who promulgates a Shāstra about a matter of such an indefinite nature or significance, would, like an inebriate or a mad-man, be a person, whose word cannot be accepted.

Similarly with respect to the five Astikāyās, if one were to employ the option, as to whether their number is five or is not so (i.e. is not five), then according to one alternative they may be five, and according to the other alternative, they may not be five, and thus it would mean, that they may be more or less than five. It is not possible that these categories could be indescribable, because if they are so indescribable, they cannot possibly be described. But to describe them, and also at the same time, to say that they are indescribable (and yet to describe them), would be contradictory. Again if they are described, it may be that they either are definitely ascertained to be so or that they are not so ascertained. Again, if a person were to babble, that the fruit of understanding them properly, viz. correct knowledge, may supervene, or again, that it may not so supervene, or conversely, that imperfect knowledge also may either result or may not result, then, he would indeed belong to the class of inebriates or mad-men, and certainly not to the class of persons whose word should be trusted. Again, if Heaven or Final Release were on the one hand understood to exist as a reality and on the other hand

understood not so to exist, and again if it were to be understood that they on the one hand are eternal, and on the other hand are non-eternal, then, any endeavour with regard to them (for their attainment) would not be reasonably sustainable. Also, there would be the predicament, that the Jīva-Self etc., which have been ascertained (by the Jains), on the strength of their system, to exist, and as not having a beginning in time, and also ascertained as having a particular nature, would with equal facility be understood as not having any such ascertained nature. And in this manner, as, in the case of the one and only one entity, such as the Jīva-Self etc., such mutually contradictory attributes of existence or non-existence at one and the same time are not possible, and as, if one such nature (of it) is present, the presence of the other nature is not possible, and, *vice versa*, when a particular nature is not present, its presence there is not possible, this doctrine of the Arhat (i.e. Jina, the propounder of Jain doctrine) is incongruous. This (refutation) should also be understood to refute the tenets about one and the same entity having contradictory attributes such as being one and many, eternal and non-eternal, separate and non-separate. As regards their tenet that aggregates of atoms, which are called Pudgalās, are formed, it has already been refuted in the earlier refutation of the doctrine of the Aṇu (of the Vaisheshikās) and so a separate refutation of the same again is not attempted (here).—33.

*Similarly (the Jain doctrine is liable to the fault of) the Self not being all-pervading.—34.*

Just as the fault, of the impossibility of an entity which has a particular attribute ever possessing another contrary attribute, has attached itself to the Syādvāda, similarly also the fault, that the Self, i.e. the Ātmā, would not be integral, would attach itself (to the Jain doctrine). In what manner will it so arise? The followers of Arhat hold that the Jīva-Self has the same dimensions as that of the body. Now, if it has the same dimensions as that of the body, then it would mean that it is neither co-extensive with the universe, nor integral, and is limited in size, and hence, like an

earthen pot etc., it will be non-eternal. And because bodies have not the same fixed dimensions, when a man whose Self has the same dimensions as his body, acquires the birth of an elephant, as a result of his actions (Karma), his Self will not be able to occupy the entire body of the elephant, and conversely, if he acquires the body of an ant, the Self could not possibly be wholly accommodated in an ant's body. Even in the single life-time of a person, the same fault would supervene during the stages of childhood, youth and old age. (The follower of Arhat says)—may be, the Jiva-Self is composed of infinite number of parts, and the same may contract in a small body and expand in a large one. (We ask him)—you have to answer whether, that those infinite number of parts of the Self occupy the same space, is not admitted or admitted. If it is not admitted, then these infinite number of parts would not be contained in a limited space, and if it is admitted, then it would be reasonably sustainable that they would be occupying the space of only a single part, and therefore their having a dimension greater than the dimension of one part not being reasonably sustainable, there would be the predicament of the Self having the dimension of an Anu only. Besides it is not even possible to conceive, that the parts of the Jiva-Self limited by the space of one body only, can ever be considered to be infinite.—34.

Now if it be said (by the followers of Arhat), that when the Self acquires a big body, some parts accede to the Self, and when it acquires a small body, some parts depart from the Self, alternately, we reply :—

*Even on the assumption of such alternatives, contradiction cannot be avoided, because the faults of modifications etc. (occurring), do supervene all the same.—35.*

Even on the assumption, that some parts accede to and some depart from the Self, alternately, it is not reasonably possible to propound, without a contradiction taking place, the Self's having the same dimensions as those of the body. Whence is it so ? Because faults, such as that modifications etc. (of the Self) occur, do arise. Even on the assumption

that some parts accede to and some depart from the Self, the liability of the Self that thus gets filled up or depleted constantly, to undergo modifications regularly by such accession and depletion, cannot be avoided, and if, the Self is understood to be so liable to modifications, it will necessarily be rendered non-eternal, say, like a piece of leather etc.. Under the circumstances, the doctrine of bondage and Final Release as understood (by the followers of Arhat), viz., that the Self, which is surrounded on all sides by the eightfold actions, and which happens to be engulfed in the ocean of transmigratory existence, floats upwards like a gourd, as a result of the severance of such bondage, would be contradicted.

Besides, as to those parts of the Self, which accede or depart, precisely because of their having this nature of coming into existence and being destroyed, they could not, just as the body etc. cannot be called the Self, be called the Self, and it will be, that, that particular part which continues to be there permanently, is the Self, and it would not be possible to point out that this particular part is the one which is there, so permanently. Besides, the thing is, that you have to explain, from what source these acceding parts come, and wherein those that depart are absorbed. They cannot possibly be said to proceed from the elements and be absorbed into them, because the Self (of which they are parts) is not an effect of elements, and by reason of the absence of any means-of-proof, it is not possible to indicate any general or particular reservoir (for all the parts as a whole or for a particular part) for such parts or for a particular part of the Jiva-Self. Besides the thing is that if it is really so the Self would be of an indefinite nature, as the dimensions of the acceding and departing parts would be indefinite. Hence, on account of the predicament of such faults etc. occurring, it is not possible to accept even this alternate accession and departure of the parts from the Self.

When it is proved by means of the previous Sūtra, that even though the Self has the same dimensions as the body (as assumed by the followers of Arhat), still the predicament of the fault of its not being eternal would occur, (even though it is understood to be reasonably probable, that the Self can acquire other larger or smaller bodies), because the Self would in that case be rendered non-integral i.e. not

whole or integral, the follower of Arhat may suggest as an alternative, that, may be, that even though the dimensions of the Self do not remain constant, the Self would still be eternal, on the strength of the maxim of the eternal nature of the continuous stream of water.

So the Sūtrakāra deliberately raises a doubt (in favour of the followers of Arhat) viz. that, just as the russet-robed one (Buddhist) holds, that even though cognitions are not constant, still their continuous stream may well be eternal, so might it equally well be, in the case of the clothesless Jains (Sans-collottes), and then answers this doubt by this Sūtra, thus :—If the stream is unreal (and not substantial) there would be the predicament of arriving at the theory of Nihilism, and even if it is real, there would be the predicament of the fault of the Self being liable to undergo modifications, etc., and thus again the doctrine (of the followers of Arhat) would not be reasonably sustainable.—35.

*And because, (according to the Jains) the dimension of the Jiva-Self in the condition of Final Release is not liable to change, the dimension of the Self in both the previous conditions also would be the same i.e. eternal (and common to all the three conditions), and therefore, there is no distinction.—36.*

The Jains hold that the dimension of the Jiva-Self in the final condition of Final Release is constant, and hence, there is the predicament, of its dimensions during the previous, i.e. initial and intermediate condition also, being constant, and therefore, its condition would be the same (during all the three conditions). Therefore, the Jiva-Self would have the constant dimension of one body only, and there would be no possibility of the acquisition of a greater or lesser body. Or else, because of the final dimensions of the Jiva-Self being thus constant it would have the same constant dimension in the earlier conditions, and hence it will have to be understood, to be uniformly either of an Anu or Great dimension, but never of the same dimension as that of the (changing) Body. Hence like the Saugata doctrine, the Ārhat doctrine also is incongruous and should therefore be neglected.—36.

## 7. PATYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 37-41.

*Because of the incongruity (of the view)  
the Lord's (being merely the efficient cause  
of the world, cannot hold good).—37.*

Now the doctrine (of the Māheshvarās) that the Lord is (the cause of the world) merely as a superintendent, is being refuted. How is it understood that the Sūtra means this? Because, elsewhere by Brahma-Sūtra I. iv. 23, 24, the Āchārya has already established that the Lord, by virtue of his being both the material and efficient cause, has both these natures, and now if this Sūtra were to be understood to refute the doctrine of the Lord being the cause, without any further qualification, then it would mean, that the Sūtrakāra has stultified himself by saying something contrary to what he has said before (as a result of the contradiction involved in the former and later statement).

Therefore, the doctrine that the Lord is not the material cause (Aprakṛiti), but only a superintendent, i.e. merely an efficient cause, is being refuted here with special effort, because it is opposed to the doctrine of the unity (Ekatva) of Brahma as propounded by the Vedānta. This extra-Vedic concept of the Lord is of various sorts. Some, who are the adherents of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga systems, hold that the Lord is merely a superintendent over the Pradhāna and the Purusha, and thus merely an efficient cause, and that the Pradhāna, the Purusha, and the Lord, are mutually different from each other. The Māheshvarās (i.e. the Shaivās, the Pāshupatās, the Kāruṇika-Siddhāntins and the Kāpālikās) on the other hand hold that the Lord i.e. the Pashupati (the Lord of the creatures) has prescribed five categories, viz. effect (Kārya), the cause (Kāraṇa), union or meditation (Yoga), injunction (Vidhi) and the end of misery (Dukkhānta), for the purpose of the liberation of creatures from their snares (of adjuncts), and (they) describe Pashupati i.e. the Lord of the creatures as being only the efficient cause (of the world). Similarly the Vaisheshikās etc., in some way or other, in accordance with the technique of their doctrine, speak of the Lord as being an efficient cause only.

So, this is how a reply is given to all that thus—Be-



cause of the incongruity involved (in the Lord's being the efficient cause only), the Lord's being merely an efficient cause of the world, viz. as being only a superintendent over the Pradhāna and the Purusha, is not reasonably sustainable. How so? Because of the incongruity. How is it incongruous? (We reply) Inasmuch as the Lord in creating this diversity amongst the creatures, viz., as between the low, intermediate and high grades of creatures, would be rendered quite as unlordlike as ourselves, by reason of his being contaminated with the fault of likes and dislikes. If it be said that no such fault would attach, because it all would depend upon the difference in the actions of these creatures, (we reply)—No, because supposing actions and the Lord have the relationship of, the former being those that are promoted (by the Lord) and the latter being the promoter (of such actions), there would be the predicament of the fault of 'reciprocal interdependence' (Itaretarāshrayatva) (i.e. a logical see-saw). If it be urged, that such fault would not supervene because of the beginninglessness (of transmigratory existence), (we reply)—No, because, inasmuch as the fault of reciprocal interdependence would be common, in being quite as applicable to the past as to the present, the maxim of the chain of the blind leading the blind would apply. Besides, it is a tenet of those who are experts in the Nyāya system that "Faults such as passion (Rāga) and aversions (Dvesha) have the characteristic of impelling (a person) to action (Pravartanālakṣhaṇāḥ Doshāḥ)". (Nyāya Sū. 1.1.18). It is observed, that no one is ever impelled to act, either in his own interest or in the interest of others, unless he is so impelled by such faults. Even he who acts in the interest of others, is impelled to act in that way, precisely because of his own interest. Hence, (if the Māheshvara view were to be accepted) as the Lord would have to be understood to have been impelled to action in his own interest, the predicament of his being rendered unlordlike would take place. Even if it be understood that the Lord is only a special type of Purusha, incongruity would attach to the doctrine all the same, because it is understood as a tenet that the Purusha is by nature apathetic or indifferent.—37.

(N. B.—The Vedāntin has charged the Naiyyāyikās

with fault by way of the necessary implication of their own Sūtra. The Vedāntin attributes the Lord's tendency towards creation to mere sport.)

*That there is a relation (between the Lord and the Pradhāna and the Purusha), is not reasonably sustainable.—38.*

Again (the fault of) incongruity (does occur). The Lord who is different from the Pradhāna and the Purusha, cannot be their superintendent in the absence of any relation subsisting between them and the Lord. In the first place, there could not be a relation by way of contact (Samyoga) between them, because the Pradhāna, the Purusha and the Lord are all without any parts and all-pervading. Nor can a relation of inherence (Samavāya) subsist, as it is not possible to say that the Lord is the abode and the other two have their abode in the Lord (like a piece of cloth and its threads). And as it is not yet established that the Lord is the cause of the other two which are his effects, it is not possible to imagine any other relation (between them) which can be understood from the effects, because even the existence of a relation of cause and effect (between them) has not yet been established. If it be asked (by the opponent)—How is it in the case of those who are the adherents of the doctrine of Brahma ?, (we reply) —There is no difficulty in our system. In our system, a relation of the nature of complete identity (Tādātmya) (between them i.e. the Lord and His illusion-causing power, Māyā) is reasonably sustainable. Besides, as the adherents of the doctrine of Brahma, explain the nature of the cause etc., on the authority of the Scriptures, there could be no rule, by which he would be obliged to understand all things, only, as he perceives them. There is a special obligation on the opponent of the Vedānta (the Sāṃkhya) to understand things as he perceives them, as he explains the nature of the cause etc., on the strength of an illustration (Drishtānta) i.e. a parallel instance. If he says, that the authority of the Āgama (as propounded by Kapila etc.) is equally available to him as the Āgama is promulgated by the Omniscient one, we reply—No, in his case there occurs the predicament of the fault of mutual interdependence,

inasmuch as the Omniscience of the Omniscient one can be established only as a result of the belief in the Āgama, and a belief in the Āgama can be established only as a result of the belief in the Omniscient one. Hence the hypothesis about the Lord is not reasonably sustainable, so far as the followers of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga systems are concerned. A similar fault of incongruity can, in so far as it is possible, be advanced against all the other extra-Vedic conceptions about the Lord.—38.

*(The tenet that) the Lord is the superintendent, is not reasonably sustainable.—39.*

This is again how the conception of the Tārkikās (Logicians) about the Lord is not reasonably sustainable. The Lord, even if he be as he is conceived to be by the Logicians, can work only by having the Pradhāna (as the material), even as a potter works on the earth (as the material), but this is not reasonably sustainable. It is not possible that the Lord can work by having the Pradhāna (as his material) as the Pradhāna (according to them) is devoid of any form and is not capable of being perceived, and because of its being quite dissimilar to earth etc.—39.

*If it be said, that as the sense-organs (are ruled by the Jīva-Self) so is the Pradhāna by the Lord, (we say)—no, the Lord (in that case) would be, liable to experience pleasure and pain (Bhoga).—40.*

(If it be said) May be, just as a man (i.e. the Jīva-Self) controls and uses the unperceivable and formless set of sense-organs such as the sense of sight etc., even so, may the Lord supervise over the Pradhāna—but even so, it is not reasonably sustainable. That such a set of sense-organs is ruled over (by a person) is understood from the fact, that a person experiences pleasure and pain through them, but here (in the case of the Pradhāna and the Lord) no such experience of pleasure and pain is actually observed, and if it be understood that the case is similar to the set of sense-organs, the Lord would also be liable to experience pleasure and pain, quite as much, as a man in

the condition of transmigratory existence, is subject to such experience of pleasure and pain. Or, alternatively, the two Sūtrās can be explained in another way:—By the previous Sūtra, viz. “This is why (the Lord’s being the superintendent) is not reasonably sustainable”, it is meant that, that the Lord is as he is conceived to be by the Tārkikās, is not reasonably sustainable. In the ordinary world, for instance, it is as one possessing the support of a body, that a king is observed to be the ruler of the nation, and not as one without any such physical basis, so, he who would infer the Lord on the strength of such parallel instance, would have to explain how the Lord comes to be possessed of a body as an abode of the sense-organs. But it is not possible to explain it that way, because a body can come into existence only after creation takes place, and prior to such creation, the existence of a body is not reasonably sustainable. And if the Lord has no such physical basis (such as a body) it is not reasonably sustainable that he could be the promoter (of the world), because that is how it is observed to be, in the ordinary world. As regards the present Sūtra (it is said)—Now, if on the analogy of what is observed in the ordinary world, it is imagined, that the Lord has, at his own will, equipped himself with a body to serve as an abode for the sense-organs, even this is not reasonably sustainable, because supposing the Lord does possess a body, then, as in the case of an ordinary person in the condition of transmigratory existence, there would be the predicament of the Lord being liable to experience pleasure and pain, quite as much as such a man is, and it would then mean that the Lord also would be rendered quite unlordlike.—40.

*Or it may mean that the Lord is liable to come to an end or that he is not Omniscient.*

—41.

This is again why the Lord’s being as he is conceived to be by the Tārkikās (Logicians), is not reasonably sustainable. They hold that the Lord is omniscient and infinite (imperishable) and also that the Pradhāna and the Selfs also are infinite (imperishable) and different from each other. Then (the question arises), as to whether, the

Lord has himself determined his own dimension (i.e. limit, *Iyattā*) and the dimensions of the *Pradhāna* and the *Selves* (to be of such and such definite extent), or whether, it has not been so determined. Considered either way a fault is inevitable. How so? In the case of the first alternative (viz. that the dimension has been determined by the Lord), the *Pradhāna*, the *Purusha* and the Lord would be rendered liable to come to an end, because it is observed to be so in the ordinary world. In the ordinary world, whatever has definite ascertained dimension i.e. limit—say, for instance, a piece of cloth etc.—is seen to be liable to come to an end. Similarly, therefore, this trio of the *Pradhāna*, the *Purusha* and the Lord having a definite ascertained dimension i.e. limit, they would be rendered as being liable to come to an end. Numerically also, as it happens, the *Pradhāna*, the *Purusha* and the Lord, being three in number, are definitely ascertained by number, and we may take it that the Lord has also definitely ascertained the dimension i.e. limit of the forms of the *Pradhāna* and the *Purushās*. Similarly, the great numbers of men also (may be taken to have been ascertained by the Lord). Then, if from amongst such numerically determined *Jīva-Selves*, who are involved in the transmigratory condition, some obtain their Final Release from the transmigratory existence (*Samsāra*), it would mean that their condition of being *Samsārins* (i.e. transmigratory beings), as also the transmigratory existence (*Samsāra*) itself, would have a certain end, and when gradually all the *Jīva-Selves* will have obtained their Final Release, there will be an end of the entire transmigratory existence (*Samsāra*) itself and of all the transmigratory beings (*Samsārins*). Besides, the *Pradhāna* which is the basis for the Lord, and which undergoes modifications for the sake of the *Purusha*, is but transmigratory existence only and when that too comes to an end, what else can possibly be said to subsist, which can serve as the basis for the Lord to act upon, and with respect to what can the Lord be considered to be the Lord, the Omniscient? Again, if the *Pradhāna*, the *Purusha* and the Lord have an inevitable end, then there will be the predicament of their necessarily having a beginning also, and if they have both a beginning and an end, then there would be the predicament thereby, of Nihilism (*Shūnyavāda*) resulting. Now, if to

avoid this contratemps, the second alternative is accepted, viz. that the Lord has not definitely ascertained either his own dimension, i.e. limit, or those of the Pradhāna and the Puruṣa, then the fault of having to abandon the doctrine of the omniscience of the Lord would crop up. Therefore also, the doctrine which the Tārikikās (Logicians) hold, viz. that the Lord is the efficient cause of the world, would be incongruous.—41.

8. UTPATTYASAMBHAVĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 42-45.

*(The Doctrine of the Bhāgavatās is not reasonably sustainable) because creation is not possible.—42.*

So far, the doctrine of those who do not hold the Lord as being the material cause, but hold him as being the Superintendent only and as being but merely the efficient cause (of the world), is refuted. Now the doctrine of the Bhāgavatās, i.e. of those who are in agreement with the view that the Lord is both the material as well as the efficient cause (of the world), is being refuted. But (says the opponent) that the Lord is of such and such a nature and that he is the material as well as the efficient cause, is exactly what has been established (by you the Vedāntin) before, on the authority of the Scriptures, and it has been settled (as a fact) that a Smṛiti which follows the Scriptures is authoritative. On what ground then is this doctrine being refuted? We say, even though this portion of the doctrine (of the Bhāgavatās) is common (to the Vedānta and the Bhāgavata doctrines) and is not discordant, there is still another portion of it which furnishes a ground for disagreement, and hence the refutation of that is now begun. The Bhāgavatās hold thus—The Bhagavān (the holy) Vāsudeva alone is the ultimate reality and is of the nature of unsullied knowledge. He has divided himself in four ways, and has set himself up in four forms (Vyūhās) of Vāsudeva, Samkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. 'Vāsudeva', verily, is said to be the Highest Self, 'Samkarṣaṇa', the Jīva-Self, 'Pradyumna', the mind and 'Aniruddha' the ego (Ahamkāra). Amongst all these, 'Vāsudeva' is the Highest Cause, and the rest, Samkarṣaṇa, etc., are his effects. And they hold that by propitiating such

Bhagavān i.e., the Highest Lord, for a hundred years, by approaching him in his temple (Abhigamana), by collecting materials of worship (Upādāna), by sacrifice (Ijyā), by constantly reciting his name (Svādhyāya), and by contemplation (Yoga), a (man) becomes free from his torments, and attains the Bhagavān (i.e. attains Final Release).

Now with regard to what is said, viz. that Nārayaṇa who is higher than the undeveloped (Avyakta i.e. Māyā) and is the Highest Self which divides itself and sets itself up in different forms, is not sought to be refuted (by us), because, it is understood from the Scriptures such as "He becomes onefold or threefold etc." (Chhān. 7.26.2) that the Highest Self transforms itself into manifold forms. Nor is the propitiation of the Bhagavān, by going to his temple and concentrating on Him to the exclusion of all else as is recommended, at all sought to be refuted (by us), because contemplation of the Lord etc. is well-known from the Scriptures. But with regard to what is said further, viz. that 'Samkarshaṇa' springs out of 'Vāsudeva', 'Pradyumna' out of 'Samkarshaṇa', and 'Aniruddha' out of 'Pradyumna', we say that the creation of 'Samkarshaṇa', i.e. the Jīva-Self, from the Highest Self called 'Vāsudeva', is not possible, because of the predicament of the fault of not being eternal etc.. If the Jīva-Self is subject to being created, faults such as that of its not being eternal etc. would occur, and hence the Jīva-Self would not attain unity with the Bhagavān, nor will Final Release be possible, because when an effect (such as Samkarshaṇa is, according to the Bhāgavatās) reaches back to its cause, the predicament would be, that the effect would get completely destroyed. The Āchārya will hereafter refute even the creation of the Jīva-Self, by the Sūtra—"The Self (is not created) because it is not so mentioned in the Scriptures, and according to which, it is eternal" (Bra. Sū. II. iii. 17). Therefore this tenet (i.e. the Bhāgavata doctrine) is incongruous.—42.

*(That it is) not (ever observed) that an implement (with which an agent works) is ever produced out of the agent.—43.*

This is again why the Bhāgavata doctrine is incongruous. Because, it is never observed in the ordinary world

that an implement such as a hatchet etc. is ever produced out of an agent such as Devadatta etc.. The Bhāgavatās describe that from the Jīva-Self called Samkarshaṇa, the mind that is called Pradyumna is produced, and from this effect Pradyumna, the Ego (Ahamkāra) that is called Aniruddha is produced. In the absence of any parallel instance (in illustration of it) we are not able to understand it to be so, nor is any Scriptural passage of such import available.—43.

*Even assuming they all possess (the attribute of) knowledge, it is not possible to refute (the objection of the Vedāntins raised above).—44.*

It may be said—These Samkarshaṇa etc. are not understood (by us the Bhāgavatās) to be Jīva-Selfs etc.. But (says the Vedāntin) then, how are they understood? They (says the opponent) are all understood to be the Lords possessing the attributes of the Lord, viz. knowledge, power to rule, strength, valour, and Teja, and that they are Vāsudevās all, requiring no other basis, and are pure. Therefore the fault alleged by you (the Vedāntin), viz. that the creation of them is not possible, does not arise.

To this we reply—We mean to say, that even if it be so, not only is there no refutation of the fault of the impossibility of their being created, but the fault does arise in another way also. How does it so arise? If you (the Bhāgavatās) mean that all these four Lords, 'Vāsudeva' and the rest, are all different and distinct from each other and that they all have equal attributes, and do not constitute the unity of Self, then (we say) that the conception of more than one Lord is superfluous, because, all that is expected to be accomplished, is already accomplished by one Lord only. Besides (in holding as you do), there is an abandonment of your own conclusion, because it is your tenet that Bhagavān Vāsudeva is the only ultimate reality.

If on the other hand you mean, that these four are the forms of only one and the same Bhagavān, and that they all have equal attributes, still the fault of the impossibility of their creation subsists all the same. In the absence of any distinguishing peculiarity (Atishaya) in the effect,



Samkarshaṇa cannot be understood to be created from Vāsudeva, Pradyumna from Samkarshaṇa and Aniruddha from Pradyumna. Because as between cause and effect, there always is some distinguishing peculiarity (Atishaya) in the effect, as there is, for instance, in the case of the earthen pot, the effect of earth. Without any distinguishing peculiarity (Atishaya), it is not possible to distinguish between the cause and the effect. The Pāṇcha-Rātrās (i.e. the Bhāgavatās) do not understand that there is any difference as such, due for instance to more or less knowledge or power, as between Vāsudeva and the rest. All these forms are understood by them to be without any difference and they do not understand that the forms of the Bhagavān are confined only to these four, because they further understand that this entire world, from Brahmā (i.e. Brahmadeva) down to a mere blade of grass is but the form of the Bhagavān only.—44.

*Also because of the contradictions.—45.*

In the doctrine (of the Bhāgavatās), many contradictions are to be met with, with reference to attributes and those in whom these attributes subsist. The attributes of knowledge, ruling power, strength, valour and Teja themselves, are also considered to be so many Selves, and also as so many Bhagavān Vāsudevās (in their doctrine). Besides they contradict the Scriptures also, because we observe that they cast a slur on the Scriptures when they say, that, failing to obtain the Highest Bliss from all the four Vedās, Shāṇḍilya studied this Shāstra etc. Hence it is established that this doctrine is incongruous.—45.

*Here ends Pāda II of Adhyāya II.*

## ADHYĀYA II—Pāda 3

### 1. VIYADADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 1-7.

*Ākāsha (Viyat) is not (a created entity) because there is no Scriptural statement (about it).—1.*

In the Vedānta we come across in various places different orders of creation, in the Scriptural statements. Some mention the creation of Ākāsha, while some do not. Some mention the creation of Vāyu, while some do not. The same (is the case) about the Jīva-Self and the Prāṇās. In the same manner contradictions with regard to the order (of creation) etc. are also to be observed. The irrelevance of other schools (such as Sāṃkhya etc.) has already been established, because of the contradictions involved (in their doctrines). Similarly the irrelevance of the Vedānta system also may be alleged on the same ground of contradictions and hence this further detailed amplification is begun, in order to make the meaning of the Scriptural statements about creation, clear, and the fruit (Phala) of making the meaning clear, is the removal of the doubts referred to (above). So to begin with, with reference to Ākāsha, it is first considered as to whether there is the creation of the Ākāsha or whether there is not.

With respect to that, the conclusion (of the opponents of Vedānta) is that the Ākāsha is not a created entity because there is no Scriptural statement (about it). In the Scriptural chapter about the creation, there is no statement about it. In the Chhāndogya (Upanishad), having referred to Brahma as expressed by the word 'Sat' (being) in the Scriptural passage—"Oh mild one, 'Sat' alone was in the beginning, the only one without a second" (Chhān. 6.2.1), that statement is followed by the statements—"It thought" and "It created Teja" (Chhān. 6.2.3), and, Teja the middle one of the five great elements is mentioned first and thus the creation of the 'Tejobannās' (i.e. Teja, Water and the Earth) is mentioned by the Scriptures. The Scriptures of course are our authority, by means of which the generation of knowledge (in us) of supersensuous entities takes place. There is no Scriptural statement

here, mentioning the creation of Ākāsha. Therefore, Ākāsha is not created.—1.

*But (asserts the Sūtrakāra) there is (such a statement in the Scriptures).—2.*

The word 'But' has the sense of approval of another view (by the Sūtrakāra). May be, the Chhândogya may not mention the creation of Ākāsha, but it is mentioned in another Scriptural passage. The Taittirīyakās, after introducing (the subject) thus—"Brahma is truth, knowledge and infinite", recite further, "From this Ātmā, verily, the Ākāsha came into existence" (Tait. 2.1). Hence there is a contradiction in the Scriptural passages, viz., that in some, creation starts with Teja, in others, with Ākāsha. Still it is but proper that these Scriptural passages should be reconciled. True, it is so proper, but it is not understood how (to do so). Whence is it so? Because, the relation of the creator, that is mentioned but once only by the Scriptures, in the passage "It created Teja" (Chhān. 6.2.3), simultaneously with two entities that are stated to be created, thus—"It created Teja, it created Ākāsha", is not reasonably sustainable. But (it is suggested by the Vedāntin) the relation of a creator who is mentioned but once only, with two entities that are to be created, is observed to exist, as for instance when it is said, "Having cooked the soup, (he) cooks the rice"; similarly, I will construe the Scriptural passage thus—'Having created Ākāsha, it created Teja'. This is not proper (says the opponent of Vedānta). From the Chhândogya it is understood that Teja was the first creation, and from the Taittirīyaka, that Ākāsha was the first creation. Now both Teja and Ākāsha can never at once be the *first* creation. By this, the contradiction, with reference to the words of other Scriptural passages also, is explained. In the Scriptural passage "From this Ātmā, verily the Ākāsha came into being", it is not reasonably sustainable to understand, that the ablation (Apādāna) or being born from (indicated by the ablative case-ending of Ātmā) and the 'creation', which are mentioned but only once by the Scriptures, can simultaneously connect with both the Ākāsha and the Teja, thus—from that, the Ākāsha came into being, from that, the Teja came into being. Besides

the creation of Teja is elsewhere stated differently, thus—“Agni (i.e. Teja, was created) from Vāyu” (Tait. 2.1). Now, when thus this contradiction is there, some other person says :—2.

*The Scriptural statement (about the creation of the Ākāsha) is in a secondary sense, because (the creation of Ākāsha) is not possible.—3.*

There could be no creation of Ākāsha (Viyat) just because there is no Scriptural statement (about it), and that other Scriptural passage which is cited as mentioning the creation of Ākāsha (Viyat), deserves to be (understood) only in a secondary or figurative sense. Why so ? Because (the creation of Ākāsha) is not possible. As long as those who follow the opinion of the Kaṇabhuk (lit. one who subsists on particles of food grains, i.e. Kaṇāda, the propounder of the Vaisheshika system) are alive, it is not possible to establish that the Ākāsha is a created entity. For, they deny that the Ākāsha was created, because of the impossibility (of the existence) of the materials (Dravyās) of any such cause. They hold that every thing that is created is the result only of the Samavāyi (inherent), the Asamavāyi (non-inherent), and the efficient (Nimitta) causes, and many such materials (Dravyās) of the same one kind of material (Dravya) become the material (i.e. inherent) cause (of any entity). In the case of the Ākāsha there are no such more than one homogeneous materials capable of starting the creation of Ākāsha available, which material (i.e. Samavāyi) cause being so present, by the close contact (Samyoga) of which materials, as the Asamavāyi (non-inherent) cause, Ākāsha can come into existence, and when these two causes (viz. the Samavāyi and the Asamavāyi) are thus absent (i.e. are not possible), that there could ever be any efficient cause (for Ākāsha) which can ever come into operation to help the first two causes, is far from being possible. With regard to entities such as Teja etc., which are liable to be created, it is possible that they possess some special condition prior to their creation and after it, such as, for instance, that before the creation of Teja, a phenomenon or effect such as ‘Light’ etc. did not exist and that such an

effect as light, does exist afterwards. In the case of Ākāsha, however, it is not possible to conceive of the existence of any such special condition of Ākāsha, either before the Ākāsha is created or after it comes to be created. Before the creation of Ākāsha, what possibly can be conceived of as existing, and at the same time, as not having any space, or not having a cavity or not having interstices in it? That Ākāsha is not liable to creation is proved, because of its being dissimilar (in its attributes) to earth etc., and also because it has the characteristic of being all-pervading. Therefore, just as in the ordinary world, a word is used in a secondary or figurative sense, as for instance when it is said "Make 'Ākāsha' (i.e. room)" or "'Ākāsha' (i.e. room) has become available" (where the word Ākāsha is used in the secondary sense of 'room'), or just as Ākāsha, one as it is, is figuratively indicated as being the Ākāsha of the pot, or the Ākāsha of the jar, or the Ākāsha of the house, or just as, even in the Vedās we find it expressed thus—"The forest creatures should be tethered (or killed?) in the Ākāsha-spaces", similarly the Scriptural passage about the creation of the Ākāsha, should also be construed in a secondary or figurative sense.—3.

*Also because of the word (Shabda i.e. the Scriptures).—4.*

Besides, the word (Shabda i.e. the Scriptures) itself proclaims that the Ākāsha is an entity which is not subject to creation, for it says—"That this Vāyu and the Antariksha (i.e. Ākāsha) are immortal" (Brih. 2.3.3). What is immortal can never be subject to creation. The Scriptural word also, when it compares Brahma with the Ākāsha, with reference to Brahma's attributes i.e. nature of immortality and its immanence (i.e. all-pervading nature) in the passage "Brahma is all-pervading and eternal like the Ākāsha", shows that Ākāsha also has these attributes. That an entity like this can be an object of creation is not reasonably sustainable. "The Self (Ātmā) should be understood to be eternal even as this Ākāsha is eternal" is an instance in point, as also the Scriptural passages—"Brahma has Ākāsha as its body" (Tait. 1.6.2), "Ākāsha is the Self" (Tait. 1.7.1) etc.. Were Ākāsha to be an object of

creation, it could not possibly be used as a qualifying adjective of Brahma, as 'blue' can be used as a qualifying adjective of a lotus. Therefore, it is understood that Brahma, in common with Ākāsha, is surely eternal.—4.

*It may well be, that like (the word)  
Brahma, even the one word (Sambhūta i.e.  
came into being) (is used both in its prin-  
cipal and secondary sense).—5.*

This Sūtra is by way of a reply (to the doubt raised by the Vedāntin about the word (Pada) 'Sambhūta'). It may be this way. How again (says the Vedāntin) can one and the same word 'Sambhūta' (i.e. originated, or came into being) in one and the same chapter (Adhikāra), viz. "From this Self, verily, the Ākāsha originated (came into being)" (Tait. 2.1), be possibly said be used in a secondary sense with regard to the Ākāsha, when it is used in the principal sense in the case of Teja etc. which come later on, and to which it is later on applied (i.e. after using it in the case of the Ākāsha)? It is replied to (by the opponent) thus:—It may well be that the word 'Sambhūta' can be used with reference to different subjects both in the principal and in the secondary sense, just as the word 'Brahma' (is so used). For instance, in the topic (Adhikāra) "Know Brahma by means of penance, penance is Brahma" (Tait. 3.2), the use of the word 'Brahma' is in the secondary sense with reference to the word 'food' etc., and in the principal sense with reference to the word 'bliss' (Ānanda), or just as in the case of the word 'penance' (Tapa) which constitutes the means of realizing Brahma, the word 'Brahma' is used in its secondary sense, and in the case of 'Brahma' which is the object to be known, it is used in the primary (i.e. real) sense. (Asks the Vedāntin)—How again, if (according to you) the Ākāsha is not subject to creation, can you justify the declaration—" (Brahma) is one and the only one without a second" (Chhān. 6.2.1)? Verily, with Nabha (i.e. Ākāsha) as a second entity, (not subject to creation as held by you) Brahma becomes 'Sadvitiya' (i.e. with a second), (i.e. like Brahma, another entity, Ākāsha, also is not subject to creation, so that it cannot be said that Brahma is the only one without a

second). And how then can it be, that, everything becomes known, when Brahma (alone) is known ?

To this the reply (of the opponent of the Vedānta) is:—The statement that Brahma is ‘one only’ can be reasonably sustainable, when it is considered with reference to its own effect (i.e. when, for instance, during Pralaya etc. no effects as such of Brahma exist, and it is not meant that nothing other than Brahma exists). Just as in the ordinary world, if some person, having observed clay, a staff, and a wheel at the house of a potter, on a previous day, and having observed earthen pots of various kinds spread about there on the next day, were to say, ‘There was only mere clay here on the previous day’, he, by such ascertainment or determination, only means that only the effects of clay (i.e. pots etc.) were not in existence on the previous day, and does not mean, that the staff, wheel etc. also, were not there (on the previous day), similarly, this Scriptural statement about Brahma being ‘one only without a second’ only means to exclude the existence of any created entity, other than Brahma only as a superintendent (Adhishṭhātri), i.e., that, even though it is seen that a potter is the superintending entity over the clay which is the material cause of the earthen pots, still there is no other creator other than ‘Brahma’ which is the material (as well as the efficient) cause of the world. It is not, that even though Brahma has the Nabha (i.e. Ākāsha) along with it, as a second entity, it is thereby rendered Sadvītiya (i.e. that it becomes associated with a second entity). It is only when entities have different attributes that they are said to be different. It is not that prior to creation, there is difference of attributes between Brahma and Nabha (i.e. Ākāsha), like milk and water mixed up with each other, because they both possess the same attributes of being all-pervading and incorporeal, in common. At the time of creation, however, Brahma alone endeavours to create the world while the other (i.e. Ākāsha) remains motionless, and it is because of that, that it is understood that Brahma and Ākāsha are different entities. Similarly, in the Scriptural passage “Brahma has the Ākāsha as its body” (Tait. 1.6.2), Brahma and Ākāsha are said to be non-different figuratively, and hence it is that it becomes established that by knowing Brahma, the knowledge of everything results. Besides,

every effect that comes into being, does so as being non-separate from Ākāsha in the space-time relation, and the Ākāsha also exists as non-separate with Brahma, in the same space-time relation, and hence, by knowing Brahma and its creation, Ākāsha also comes to be known just as well. Just as when a few drops of water are added to a pot full of milk, the drops of water are known, along with milk, and it is not that when the milk is known, the drops of water do still remain to be known, similarly, as the Ākāsha is non-separate from Brahma and its creation, in the space-time relation, by knowing Brahma, Ākāsha also becomes known. Therefore the Scriptural statement about the creation of Ākāsha is only in the secondary sense (which means, that Ākāsha like Brahma, is eternal and not a created entity).—5.

This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), the reply is :—

*The non-abandonment of the declaration can happen to be so (only if it is understood) that there is non-difference (between Brahma and its effects). (The same is understood) even from the Scriptural words.—6.*

It is understood from different Vedānta texts, that there are declarations of the following kinds—viz. “By which, that which is not heard, becomes heard, that which has not been deduced by reasoning, becomes so deduced, that which is not realized, becomes realized” (Chhān. 6.1.1); “Oh, verily, when the Self is seen, heard, cogitated upon and realized, all this becomes known” (Brih. 4.5.6) ; “By knowing what, Oh Bhagavan, does all this become known ?” (Mu. 1.1.3) ; “Outside of myself (Ātmā) there is no knowledge at all”. These declarations will not happen to have been abandoned, i.e. they will not happen to be obstructed, thus only, viz., provided all created entities in general are non-different from Brahma, which is (the entity) to be known. But, if it be understood that there is difference (between Brahma and the creation in general), then, the declaration that “By knowing the one, all else becomes known” will have been abandoned. It is only if it is under-



stood that all the entire set of entities in general owe their origin to Brahma, that their non-difference (from Brahma) becomes reasonably sustainable. It is only from the Scriptural words, that, in accordance with the maxim of non-difference between cause and effect, the declaration is understood to be established. Similarly, having made a declaration thus—"By which that which is not heard, becomes heard", it is by such parallel instances of clay etc. which purport to expound the non-difference between cause and effect, that the declaration is justified. It is precisely for establishing this, that subsequently, the Scriptural passages "Oh mild one, 'Sat' (being) alone was in the beginning, the one only, without a second" (Chhān. 6.2.1), "It thought", "It created Teja" (Chhān. 6.2.3), after demonstrating that the entire set of creation in general owes its origin to Brahma, further demonstrate their non-difference with it by beginning with the statement—"All this has that as its Self" (Chhān. 6.8.7), (and by repeating the same) right up to the end of the chapter (Prapāthaka). Therefore, if Ākāsha were not to be an effect of Brahma, it would not be known, even when Brahma becomes known, and thus the abandonment of the declaration would result. It is by no means proper to render the Scriptures unauthoritative, by such abandonment of the declaration. Again in every Vedānta statement, different Scriptural words by means of different parallel instances, proclaim the very same declaration, viz. "That which is all this, is the Self" (Brih. 2.4.6), "It is this immortal Brahma alone, that is seen right before (one)" (Mu. 2.2.11) etc.. Therefore, Ākāsha also, quite as much as Agni (i.e. Teja) etc., is created. The statement, that as there is no Scriptural statement, Viyat (i.e. Ākāsha) is not created, is not proper, because another Scriptural passage about the creation of Viyat (i.e. Ākāsha) has been cited, viz., "Verily from this Self, Ākāsha came into being" (Tait. 2.1). (The opponent says)—Oh, it is true of course that you have cited (such passage), but it is in conflict with another Scriptural passage—"It created Teja". (The Vedāntin replies)—No, because all the Scriptural passages are duly reconciled. (The opponent retorts)—We don't object to the reconciliation of such Scriptural passages as are not contradictory to each other, but we have here rightly spoken about the contradiction, viz., that it is im-

possible that the creator that has been mentioned only once by the Scriptural passage, can properly be connected with two entities-to-be-created, and that the two entities cannot, at one and the same time, be the 'first-to-be-created', or that any option about it can be available. (The Vedāntin says)—This is no fault, because in the Taittirīyaka, the creation of Teja is mentioned as the third (entity) to be created, thus—"Verily from this Self, the Ākāsha came into being, Vāyu from Ākāsha, and Agni (i.e. Teja) from Vāyu" (Tait. 2.1). It is impossible to construe this Scriptural statement in any other manner, while it is possible to construe the Chhāndogya statement thus—'After having created Ākāsha and Vāyu it created Teja'. This Scriptural statement, while being one which has the main purport of intimating the creation of Teja only, cannot possibly be able to bar or deny the creation of Ākāsha which is well-known from another Scriptural passage, because, one and the same sentence cannot possibly operate in two ways. The creator, however, one as he is, may well create more than one entity one after another. In this way, when the possibility (Kalpanā) of reconciliation (of different Scriptural passages) is there, a Scriptural statement should not be abandoned as having a contradictory meaning. It is not that we mean to connect the creator who is mentioned only once, with two entities to be created, because the other entity to be created is accommodated by following another Scriptural statement. Just as, for instance, the origination of all entities from Brahma, directly referred to in the Scriptures in the passage "All this verily is Brahma and one should calmly meditate on it as Tajjalān (i.e. in it all entities are born, in it they are absorbed and in it they have movement)" (Chhān. 3.14.1), does not prevent or obstruct the order of creation beginning with Teja, as referred to elsewhere, similarly the Scriptural statement about the origination of Teja from Brahma, cannot prevent the order of creation beginning with Nabha (i.e. Ākāsha) as mentioned in another Scriptural passage. But (it is objected by the opponent) the sentence "Tajjalān, one should calmly meditate on it" has the purpose of enjoining calmness, and not the purpose of dealing with creation, and so it does not deserve to prevent the order of creation established elsewhere. "It created Teja" is a sentence about

creation. Therefore, here, the order as stated by the Scriptures should be accepted. The reply is—No, the entity Viyat (i.e. Ākāsha) as established by another Scriptural passage, should not be rejected, by following that order of creation, in which Teja is mentioned first, because ‘order’ (Krama) is but only an attribute of entities. Besides, in the passage “It created Teja”, there is no word signifying an order, but the order is understood only from the meaning, and that order has to be rejected, because of the order established by another Scriptural passage—“Agni (Teja) was created from Vāyu”. Again in connection with Viyat (Ākāsha) and Teja, the taking of them either optionally or collectively, as being the first-creation, has been rejected, i.e. option (Vikalpa) has been rejected on the ground of impossibility, and the taking of them collectively (Samuchchaya) has been rejected on the ground of not having been accepted, respectively. Therefore, there is no conflict of the Scriptural statements (in Chhândogya and Taittirīyaka Upanishad). Besides, if in order to justify the declaration made in the Chhândogya, right in the beginning of the sentence “By which, that which is not heard, becomes heard”, the Viyat (i.e. Ākāsha), even though it is not mentioned, has necessarily to be enumerated in the entities created, on what ground (Kimanga) then, is the Viyat (i.e. Ākāsha), which is specifically mentioned in the Taittirīyaka (as a created entity), not to be included (amongst the created entities) ? Now with respect to the statement (by the opponent), viz., that in as much as the Ākāsha has the same space-time relation with all entities and Brahma and not a different one, it automatically becomes known along with Brahma and its effects (Kāryās) and the original declaration does not thus happen to be abandoned, and the Scriptural statement about Brahma “being the only one without a second” is not in the least disturbed i.e. contradicted and it is reasonably sustainable that, like milk and water, Brahma and Ākāsha are non-different,—it is said (by the Vedāntin), this knowledge of everything by the knowledge of one thing, should not be explained with the help of the maxim of milk and water, but it is thought, that it should, on the other hand, be explained rather, on the basis of the parallel instance of clay etc. which is stated later on, according to the maxim of the cause and effect (which means that by the knowledge of the nature

of the cause, the nature of the effect becomes known). The assumption of the knowledge of everything on the strength of the maxim of milk and water (as you the opponent say), would not be perfect or correct knowledge, because the knowledge of water acquired through the knowledge of the nature of milk would not mean the acquisition of perfect or correct knowledge (of water). It is not reasonably sustainable that the Scriptures—like ordinary men—ascertain a thing to be such and such, by illusorily deceptive or untrue statements. If the deliberate and emphatic statement of the Scriptures, viz. “Brahma is the only one without a second”, were to be explained on the basis of the maxim of milk and water, the Scriptural statement would be embarrassed. It would not be logical to understand, that the statements about “the knowledge of all as a result of the knowledge of the one” and that “Brahma is the only one without a second”, are with reference only to Brahma’s own creation (and thus to exclude the Ākāsha from its purview), because they would then apply equally in the case of the parallel instance of clay etc.. It would not have been stated by the Scriptures, as it is stated here, as something quite extra-ordinary, thus—“Oh Shvetaketo, my dear, since you are so conceited, thinking yourself as learned, and are so proud, did you also ask (your teacher) for that instruction, whereby that which is not heard, becomes heard etc.?” (Chhān. 6.1.2.3). Therefore, it should be understood, that this statement about the knowledge of every entity (by the knowledge of Brahma), is about every entity without exception, and it is stated in the Scriptures with reference to the fact that every entity is the creation of Brahma.—6.

With regard to the objection taken, thus:—as the creation of Ākāsha is not possible, the creation of it as spoken of by the Scriptures is in the secondary sense, we reply :—

*As is seen in the ordinary world, wherever modifications i.e. effects exist, there only, separateness is present.—7.*

The word ‘But’ in the Sūtra is meant to refute the doubt about the impossibility (of the creation of Ākāsha). A

doubt, viz., that the creation of Ākāsha is not possible, should really not be entertained, inasmuch as wherever a collection of effects (i.e. modifications) is observed—be it a pot or a small earthen pot or a water trough, or a bracelet, an armlet or an ear-drop or a needle, or an arrow or a sword, they are all understood to be distinct separate entities, while nothing that is not an effect, is in any way and anywhere observed to be distinct and separate. It is actually understood that the Ākāsha is distinct and separate from the earth etc., therefore, it also deserves to be an effect (i.e. a created entity). By all this, it is explained, that entities like the quarters, time, the mind, or the Paramāṇu etc. also, are effects or modifications.

(The opponent says)—Well, in that case as the Self (Ātmā) also is distinct and separate from the Ākāsha etc., it comes to this, that the Self, like a pot etc., is also an effect (or modification). (We reply)—No, because there is a Scriptural passage thus—“Ākāsha came into being from the Self” (Tait. 2.1). If, therefore, even the Self (Ātmā) were to be an effect, then, as the Scriptures do not speak anywhere about any other entity higher than the Self, in that case, the Self also being, like a pot etc., an effect (and thus not being the root-cause of all effects), the entire set of effects including the Ākāsha etc. would be devoid of the Self (Nirātmaka), and this would lead to the doctrine of the void (Nihilism). The Self (Ātmā) being precisely the Self (Ātmā) however, any notion about the possibility of its repudiation is not reasonably sustainable. So far as any person is concerned, the Self (Ātmā) cannot be adventitious (Āgantuka), because its existence is self-established (i.e. it proves itself). This self-establishment of the existence of the Self does not depend upon any means-of-proof, but, on the other hand, it is the Self (of every person) that utilizes such means-of-proof as direct perception etc., for the establishment of the existence of entities which are yet to be established. Nobody understands that entities such as the Ākāsha etc. are independent of any means-of-proof and that their existence is self-established. The Self, on the other hand, being the substratum or basis for the employment of the means-of-proof, its existence is supposed to be fully established, prior to such employment of the means-of-proof. Repudiation of

such an one, is not possible. It is an adventitious entity that can be repudiated, and never one's own nature, because he who would seek to be such a repudiator, would, being the Self (Ātmā) himself, be the Self's own nature. Fire (Agni) cannot possibly repudiate its own heat. Similarly even though in the case of an entity-to-be-known, the knowledge of it, as it is at present, or, as it existed in the immediate or distant past, or as it will exist in the near or distant future, is different at the present, past, or future time, (yet when somebody says)—'It is I, that know an entity that exists at present ; it is I, that knew the entity which existed in the immediate or distant past ; and it is I, that will know the entity which may exist in the near or distant future', the knower (i.e. I, the Self) is never different (but is constant all the time), because, he has a nature which is always constant. Similarly, even when the body is reduced to ashes, there is no destruction of the Self, because the Self has the nature of being always in the existence (i.e. of being eternal), and it is not possible to understand that it ever has any other nature. In this manner, it is precisely because the nature of the Self can never be repudiated, that it can never be an effect (i.e. an entity created), while the Ākāsha of course is such an effect. The objection raised (by the opponent of the Vedānta)—viz., that the Ākāsha is not created as there is no homogeneous and more than one material which could be the material cause of the Ākāsha—is now being answered. In the first place there is no such rule that only homogeneous—and never heterogeneous—materials start the production of effects. The threads and their contacts (the inherent and non-inherent cause of cloth) do not belong to the same category, because it is understood that the thread is a material and contact is a quality. Nor is there any such rule that efficient causes such as shuttles and looms must belong to the same category. If it be said (by the opponent), that when it is understood that causes must belong to the same category, only the inherent (Samavāyi) causes are meant, and not causes of other kinds (such as the non-inherent and efficient causes), even then, that is not an inexorable rule. It is observed that a rope is prepared from threads and Neelgai hair etc., which belong to different categories, and party-coloured blankets are woven

from threads and wool. Supposing it is assumed, that causes have a common category in the sense that they have existence and they are materials, such a rule (about homogeneous material of a Samavāyi cause) would be meaningless, because all entities, *qua* entities, have the same common category. Nor is there any such rule, that more than one cause alone start producing effects and not one cause only, because it is held (by the opponent of the Vedānta) that an Atom (Aṇu) or the mind (Mana) starts initial activity, and also because it is understood that a single Atom (Paramāṇu) as such, or a single mind (Mana) as such, starts the initial activity and it does not have to wait till each forms a group with other such homogeneous materials. If it be said that the rule (as the opponents of Vedānta suggest) about many similar causes, applies only in the case of the beginning of the production of a substance (Dravya), we reply—No, because we do accept the view of modifications (Pariṇāma-Vāda). Such a rule (as you suggest) may well be there, if it is understood (by you the opponent) that it is materials helped by contact (between such materials) that start the production of a different material. But it is understood (by us) that it is that very material, as and when it acquires another special condition, that is termed an effect (Kārya), and at times many such materials as the earth and seeds etc. together undergo modifications in the form of sprouts etc., and at other times, only a single material undergoes modification, as for instance when milk etc., turn into curds etc.. It is not that there is any such ukase of the Lord, that only one cause and one cause alone should produce an effect. Hence, it is firmly established on the authority of the Scriptures that the entire world sprang into existence from the one and only one Brahma in a regular order, beginning with the creation of the elements such as the Ākāsha, etc. and the same has already been stated in the Sūtra “(If it be said that the Vedānta view) is not (correct), because it is seen that (for producing an effect) there is preparation and assemblage (of means), (we reply)—No, because (Brahma) is like milk” (Bra. Sū. II.i.24). Again with regard to the statement (of the opponent), viz., that if it is supposed that the Ākāsha was created, it is not possible to conceive of any peculiarities of its pre-Ākāsha or post-Ākāsha con-

ditions, it is not logical. It seems to us, that, that peculiarity (viz. the sound-quality), by which we determine that the Ākāsha possesses a nature of its own, and which distinguishes it from the earth etc., at the present moment, *did not exist* in the pre-Ākāsha condition. And just as Brahma is not an entity possessing the same qualities of grossness etc., which belong to the nature of the earth (which is Brahma's effect), because of the Scriptural statement that Brahma is "neither gross nor atomic" (Brih. 3.8.8), similarly, it is not that it possesses the nature of the Ākāsha, because, it is understood from the Scriptures that it is not of the nature of the Ākāsha, inasmuch as it is sans-Ākāsha (Anākāsha). Again, with regard to the statement (of the opponent), that as the Ākāsha is dissimilar in qualities to earth etc., it is not subject to creation, (we say) that it is not proper, because it is reasonably sustainable, that in the face of the opposition of the Scriptures, any inference as to the impossibility of its being subject to creation, is fallacious. Besides, an inference about its being subject to creation, has already been indicated, and it is also possible to infer that the Ākāsha is, like a pot etc., perishable, as it is the substratum of perishable qualities. (If it is said) that in the case of the Jīva-Self, an inference of the above sort does not apply (because even though it is the substratum of perishable qualities such as intelligence, will, and endeavour, you, the Vedāntin, consider it to be eternal), we reply—No, because, so far as Upanishads are concerned, it is not accepted as established that the Jīva-Self is the substratum of perishable qualities, and any one who considers the Ākāsha to be a created entity (a Vedāntin for instance) does not consider it as established, that the Ākāsha has the qualities of being all-pervading etc.. With regard to the statement (of the opponent of Vedānta), that the Ākāsha is not subject to creation, on the authority of the Scriptural word, (we reply) that such a Scriptural statement about the Ākāsha being immortal (Amrita), should be considered in the same way as when the Scriptures say, that Gods are immortal (Gods are called immortal figuratively, because relatively to man, their span of life (like Methuselah) is very long), because, it has already been expounded that the Ākāsha has both an origin and an end. When again it is said, that "the Self is



all-pervading and eternal like the Ākāsha" the comparison has reference to the well-known greatness of the Ākāsha, for indicating that the Self's greatness is not surpassed by the greatness of any other entity, and not to indicate that the Self is similar to Ākāsha (and thus suggesting that both are eternal), just as, for instance, when it is said that the sun runs fast like an arrow, it is only to indicate the sun's great velocity, and not to indicate that its velocity is equal to the velocity of an arrow. By all this, the Scriptural statement about the Ākāsha being eternal, and the Self's comparison with it, is explained. Besides the Scriptural statement "The Self is greater than the Ākāsha etc." proves that the Ākāsha has lesser dimensions, and (the Scriptural statement) "There is no likeness of (or comparison for) the Self" (Shvet. 4.19) shows that Brahma is not comparable (with anything else). The Scriptural statement "Any entity other than this (Brahma) is perishable" (Brih. 3.4.2) shows, that entities other than Brahma, Ākāsha etc. for instance, are perishable. The argument, that like the use of the word 'Brahma' for penance, the Scriptural statement about the creation of the Ākāsha should be understood to be in a secondary sense, is refuted by the direct Scriptural statement about the creation of the Ākāsha and also by inference. Therefore, it is thus established that Viyat (i.e. the Ākāsha) is a creation of Brahma.—7.

## 2. MĀTARISHVĀDHĪKARĀṆAM. Sū. 8.

*By this (i.e. what has gone before) Air (Mātarishvā) (also) is explained.—8.*

This is an Atidesha (i.e. an extended application of the reasoning of the previous Sūtra). By this explanation about Viyat (i.e. the Ākāsha), air (Mātarishvā) also which has Viyat as its substratum, is explained. In the case of air also, similar opposite views may be *ceteris paribus* (other things being equal) arranged, thus. The view (of the opponent of Vedānta) would be, that as a Chhāndogya chapter of genesis makes no mention about the coming into being of Vāyu, it is not created. The opposite view would be—But there is mention of Vāyu, in the Taittirīyaka chap-

ter of genesis, thus—"Vāyu (comes into being) from Ākāsha" (Tait. 2.1). Hence as there is a conflict of the Scriptural passages, the opinion (of the opponent) is that, because of impossibility, the Scriptural passage about the creation of Vāyu is in a secondary sense. The impossibility is, because, in the Scriptural passage "This Vāyu is that divinity which never goes to rest (lit. never sets)" (Brih. 1.5.22), there is a denial that Vāyu ever goes to rest, and also because of the Scriptural mention of its immortality etc.. The conclusion (of the Vedāntin) is that air is created, because, it is only thus that the original declaration is not stultified, because it is understood that wherever there is modification, separateness is necessarily present. The denial about the air ever going to rest is with reference only to the subject of Aparā Vidyā (lower knowledge) and is merely relative, in the sense that air never goes to rest, as Agni etc. do. The Scriptural mention about immortality is something which has been already refuted (in the previous Sūtra). (The opponent says)—In the Scriptures, in one place, in the chapter about genesis, there is mention about the creation of Vāyu and Ākāsha, and in another place there is non-mention equally of both, so in the absence of any special feature, one Adhikaraṇa (topic) is good for both (Ākāsha and Vāyu), so why make this Atidesha? The reply is—This is true no doubt, but this Atidesha is made for the purpose of removing the doubt slow-witted persons may entertain, by the mere words (of the Scriptures), because, may be, some one may consider it to be eternal, inasmuch as the Scriptures in the Samvarga Vidyā etc. refer to Vāyu as being the holy one fit to be worshipped (Mahābhāgatva) and because of the denial (of the idea) that it is a divinity that goes to rest.—8.

### 3. ASAMBHAVĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 9.

*'Sat' (Ātmā) is not created, because, creation of it is not reasonably sustainable.—9.*

Having learnt from the Scriptures, how, even Vīyat (Ākāsha) and Vāyu (air) whose creation seemed to be impossible, are also liable to be created, somebody may have a notion that even Brahma also may be so liable to be

created from something or other. Similarly having also learnt from the Scriptures, that from modifications (i.e. effects) such as the Ākāsha, further modifications come into being, some one may perhaps consider that Ākāsha may have come into being from Brahma, which may itself also be a created entity. This Sūtra viz. "Because creation of it, is not reasonably sustainable" is for removing that doubt. Verily there should be no such doubt, that Brahma which is of the nature of 'Sat' (Ātmā), is created from some other entity. Why so? Because it is not reasonably sustainable. Brahma is purely 'Sat' (Ātmā). It is not possible that it (i.e. Brahma) may come into being from another such purely 'Sat' (Ātmā) entity, because in the absence of some speciality i.e. idiosyncrasy (Atishaya), a relationship such as that between a cause and its modification, is not reasonably sustainable. Nor can it (i.e. Brahma) come into being from any particularly special 'Sat' (Ātmā) inasmuch as it is contrary to what is actually observed, because the particular is derived from the general, (as for instance) a pot from clay etc., and never the general from the particular. Nor can Brahma come into being from 'nothingness' i.e. non-existence ('Asat'), because 'nothingness' i.e. non-existence is devoid of the Self (Nirātmaka). Besides the Scriptures themselves have taken exception (to such a thing) by the passage—"How can 'Sat' (Ātmā) come into existence from nothingness i.e. non-existence ('Asat') (Chhān. 8.7.1) ? Another passage from the Scriptures rules out any such creator of Brahma, thus—"He (the Ātmā) is the cause, the Lord of the Lord of the sense-organs (i.e. Jiva-Self), he has no creator and nobody is his Lord" (Shvet. 6.9). Again a possibility of the creation of Viyat and air is indicated (above), but there is no such indication of the possibility of the creation of Brahma itself mentioned anywhere, and that exactly is its distinction (from Ākāsha and Vāyu). Because it is observed that modifications result from modifications, it is no reason why Brahma also should deserve to come into being from a modification, because, unless a root-cause (Mūlaprakriti) is understood or accepted, the predicament of indefiniteness (Anavasthā) would result. Whatever is understood (by you) to be the root-cause, that exactly is our Brahma, and hence there is no contradiction.—9.

## 4. TEJODHIKARANAM. Sū. 10.

*Teja (came into being) from this (i.e. Vāyu), Scriptures also declare the same.*  
—10.

The Scriptures, in Chhāndogya, declare that Teja has the 'Sat' (Ātmā) i.e. Brahma as its root-cause, while Taittirīyaka declares that Vāyu is the root-cause, so, there being contradiction in the Scriptures with regard to the origin of Teja, the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that Teja has Brahma as its origin. Whence is it so? Because, beginning with "Sat (Ātmā) alone etc.", the instruction is that "It created Teja", and also because the declaration about the knowledge of everything (through the knowledge of 'Sat' (Ātmā) i.e. Brahma is possible, only if everything owes its creation to Brahma, and also because of the Scriptural passage "Tajjalān" (Chhān. 8.7.1) which is a passage showing the origin of all generally from Brahma, and also because, beginning with the Scriptural statement "From this the Prāṇa came into being", another Scriptural passage gives instruction, that every entity, without any exception, comes into being from Brahma. In the Taittirīyaka also, by the passage "He, having done penance, created all this, whatsoever it is" (Tait. 3.6.1), the Scriptures make a general (Avishesha) statement. Therefore the passage "From (i.e. after) Vāyu, the fire i.e. Agni (was created)" should be understood to signify an order (of creation), i.e., After Vāyu, fire i.e. Agni came into being (from Brahma).

With regard to this conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) it is said—That Teja came into being from this i.e. the Mātarishvā. Whence is it so? Because so it is said (by the Scriptures), thus—"From Vāyu, Agni (came into being)". If Teja were to be understood to have come into being directly from Brahma (i.e. without any other intermediate creation intervening between Teja and Brahma) and not from Vāyu, the Scriptural passage "From Vāyu, Agni (i.e. Teja, came into being)" would be contradicted. (The opponent says)—It has been said that it may signify an order (of creation). We reply—No, it appears, that in as much as, earlier in the passage "From this Ātmā ('Self')

verily the Ākāsha came into being" (Tait. 2.1.1.) the word 'Ātmanah' is indicated to be governed by the ablative case, i.e. having the sense of being the Apādāna i.e. ablation, indicating 'being born of' that, which is governed by the ablative case, (viz. Ātmanah, here), and because, this same 'coming into being' (i.e. Genesis) is the subject matter of this chapter, and also because, subsequently in the chapter of creation, the same ablative (indicating Apādāna) is to be observed in the passage "From earth, the herbs (came into being)" (Tait. 2.1.1), therefore, in the passage "From Vāyu, Agni (came into being)" also, it is the Apādāna—ablative only (indicating 'being born of' and not any order of creation). Besides, were we to understand the passage to mean 'subsequently (Ūrdhvam) to Vāyu, Agni came into being', we would necessarily have to read into the passage, the 'Upapadārtha-Yoga'\* while to understand the passage to involve the Kārakārthayoga†, thus—Agni came into being from Vāyu (as its source), is just apt (Klipta) and it is not necessary to imagine any such word as 'after' (Ūrdhvam) after Vāyu. Therefore, this Scriptural passage intimates that Teja has 'Vāyu' as its origin. But (says the opponent) the other Scriptural passage—"It created Teja"—also intimates that Teja has Brahma as its origin. No (we reply), because even if it were to be understood to mean, being born in a successive order (Pāramparyajatva i.e. that Teja was created from something created in between Brahma and itself viz. Vāyu), there would be no contradiction. Even if it be understood that after having created Ākāsha and Vāyu, Brahma having now reached the condition of Vāyu, created Teja, even then, the fact that Teja thus has Brahma as its origin, would not involve a contradiction, as for instance, when the Scriptures say—"Just as, *her* (cow's) warmed milk (Shritam), *her* curds (Dadhi) and *her* cheese (Āmikshā)" (in spite of the fact that cheese (i.e. Āmikshā) is made from curds, and curds from milk, and neither cheese nor curds are derived *directly* from the cow) there is no contradiction. Besides the Scriptures indicate how Brahma abides in its effects as the Self of these effects, thus—"That (Brahma) made itself manifest"

\* I.e. the employment of an additional word such as 'after' or 'subsequently' i.e. Ūrdhvam.

† Ablative indicating 'Source'.

(Tait. 2.7.1). Smṛiti also, similarly, beginning with the enumeration of "Intelligence, knowledge, and absence of infatuation" (Bh. G. 10.4) says thus—"It is from myself alone that all the various sorts of conditions of beings came into existence." (Bh. G. 10.5). Even though intelligence etc. are observed to come into being directly and immediately from their own causes, still all this aggregate of entities are, either directly i.e. immediately and indirectly i.e. meditately (Pranādyā), derived from the Lord. By all this (which has gone before) Scriptural passages which do not intimate any order of creation are properly explained, because, they are all reasonably sustainable, while, those that intimate a certain order of creation are not reasonably sustainable in any other way. The original declaration even, has reference only to the descent of all entities from 'Sat' (Ātmā) and it does not mean that they should all have descended directly and immediately from 'Sat' (Ātmā), and hence there is no contradiction (between the Scriptural passages).—10.

#### 5. ABADHIKARĀṆAM. Sū. 11.

*The waters (also).—11.*

The words "(came into being) from (Teja), for the Scriptures say so" are to be supplied from the previous Sūtra after "waters" (in the present Sūtra). The waters came into being from this, i.e. Teja. Whence is it so? When the Scriptural statements are thus—"It created the waters" (Chhān. 6.2.3), "From Agni, waters (came into being)" (Tait. 2.1), there could be no doubt (about the truth of the statements). Having explained the creation of Teja, (the Sūtrakara) when about to explain the creation of the earth says, by laying down this Sūtra, that waters come in between (Teja and the Earth) so that water (Āpa) may not be left out.—11.

#### 6. PRITHIVYADHIKĀRĀDHIKARĀṆAM. Sū. 12.

*(The word "Anna" means) the earth, because of the subject, form (i.e. Rūpa), and other Scriptural statements.—12.*

A Scriptural passage says thus—"The waters thought, may we be many, may we bring forth ; they created Anna" (Chhān. 6.2.4). Here there is a doubt as to whether by the word 'Anna' rice and barley etc., or articles of food such as cooked rice etc., are meant to be referred to, or the earth (is meant). The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that (by 'Anna') either rice and barley or cooked rice should be understood, because in the ordinary world, by the word 'Anna' that alone is understood, and the complementary passage also supports that meaning, thus:—"Therefore wherever it rains, rice and barley are produced in abundance" (Chhān. 6.2.4). When there is rain, only rice and barley, and not the earth, grow abundantly.

To this conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply—By the word 'Anna' the earth alone is meant to be spoken of as that which comes into being from waters. Whence is it so ? Because of, the subject (Adhikāra), the form (i.e. Rūpa), and other Scriptural passages also. For the sentences "It created Teja" and "It created waters" show that the subject here is about the great elements. Hence it is not justifiable to skip over the element 'earth' which comes next in the order, and to capriciously understand that rice etc. are meant (by the word 'Anna'). In the complementary passage also, the form i.e. Rūpa (as described) also appears to fit in with the earth thus—"That which is black (in form) is 'Anna' ". Articles of food such as cooked rice etc. are not as a rule of a black colour, nor are rice or barley. (The opponent says)—Oh, but neither is there a rule that earth also must be black. It is seen that there are fields white as milk or red like burning coal. (We reply)—This is no fault, because what is meant (by the black form of the earth) is with reference to the preponderance in the earth of the colour black, while neither white nor red (do so predominate). The Paurāṇikās also speak of the dark night as the shadow of the earth, viz. Sharvarī (i.e. night), and night of course is felt to be black, and hence it is appropriate (to say) that the form (Rūpa) of the earth is black. Another Scriptural passage also dealing with a similar subject says, that earth comes into being from waters, thus—"That which was like the skum (Shara) of the water, formed itself into a mass, and that became the earth" (Brih. 1.2.2). They also indicate that

barley etc. are produced from the earth, thus—"From the earth vegetation (Oshadhayah) came into being, and from that, the food". In this way the subject matter etc., which propounds the earth, being thus relevant i.e. present here, how can barley etc. be reasonably understood (by the word 'Anna')? The argument that it is well-known (that 'Anna' means food) is negatived by the very subject matter (Adhikāra) etc.. It should be noted, that the complementary passage also, showing that food etc. has the nature of earth, shows thereby, that the earth is the product of the waters. Thus, what is expressed by the word 'Anna' is but the earth. —12.

### 7. TADABHIDHYĀNĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 13.

*It is He (the Highest Self) that, precisely with profound premeditation, on each particular thing (creates all effects), because there is an indicatory mark about it (in the Scriptures).—13.*

A doubt having arisen—as to whether the elements such as Viyat (Ākāsha) etc. themselves alone create their own effects i.e. modifications, or whether it is the Highest Lord Himself abiding in the elements as their Self, that creates the various effects after profound thought—, the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that the elements themselves create their own effects. Whence is it so? Because the Scriptures declare their independence in that respect thus:—"Vāyu came into being from the Ākāsha, Agni from Vāyu" (Tait. 2.1.1). But (says the Vedāntin), that there could be independence of action in non-sentient (entities), is denied. (The opponent of the Vedānta says)—This is no fault, because the Scriptures themselves speak of the elements also as being sentient thus:—"That Teja thought", "That these waters thought" (Chhān. 6.2.4). This being the conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta), it is said—It is the Highest Lord alone which abides in these elements as their Self, that creates each and every effect after profound thought. Whence is it so? Because there is an indicatory mark about Him. Because, the Scriptures, by saying thus—"He who abides in the earth, and is within the earth, and whom



the earth knows not, and whose body is the earth, and who controls the earth from within" (Brih. 3.7.3), indicate, that the activity of the elements is to be seen only when they are presided over (by the Highest Self). Similarly, the Scriptures, beginning with "He thought, may I be many and create", show that the Highest Lord is the Self of us all, thus:—"He became 'Sat' and 'Tyat'" (i.e. entities which have form, and which have no form (i.e. Rūpa) respectively), "It made itself manifest as its own Self" (Tait. 2.6.1). The 'thinking' and 'hearing' by Teja and water etc. spoken of (by the Scriptures) should be looked upon as being due to the Highest Lord having entered into them (as their controller from within i.e. the Antaryāmi), because the Scriptures deny there being any other seer, thus—"Other than Him there is no seer" (Brih. 3.7.23); and also because, He, as the seer, is what is relevant to the context here and is intended to be spoken of, thus—"He thought may I be many and create".—13.

#### 8. VIPARYAYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 14.

*The order (in which dissolution takes place) is the reverse of this (i.e. the order in which creation takes place). It is also reasonably sustainable.*

The order in which creation takes place has been considered (already). Now, the order in which dissolution takes place is being considered. (The question being), whether there is no fixed order of dissolution, or whether it is the same as the order of creation, or the reverse of it. All the three conditions of these elements, viz. their creation, preservation and dissolution, are, according to Scriptures dependent upon Brahma, thus:—"From whom, all these elements i.e. beings come into being, by which, after they come into being they continue to live, and in which at dissolution they enter" (Tait. 3.1.1). So, in connection with this, the conclusion (arrived at by the opponent of Vedānta) is, that as no special peculiarity (about the dissolution) is stated, there is no definite rule about it, or else, as an order of creation is mentioned by the Scriptures, if one expects an order for dissolution also, such dissolution

also may take place in the same order (as of creation). This being the conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta) we reply—The order in which dissolution takes place, deserves to be in an order reverse to that, in which creation takes place. Even so, is it observed in the ordinary world, (for it is seen) that a person descends a staircase, in an order reverse to that in which he ascends it. Besides, it is also seen that the entities, such as a pot or a pitcher, which come into being from clay, at the time of dissolution, return to the condition of clay, and snow and hail, which come into being from water, return to the condition of water. Hence it is reasonably sustainable, that the earth which owes its origin to water, returns to the condition of water, after the period of its subsistence as earth comes to an end, and waters which come into being from the Teja, return to the condition of Teja. It should therefore be understood, that this entire creation, by reverting to the condition of a subtle and still more subtle cause successively, finally gets absorbed into the most subtle cause viz. Brahma. It is not logical (to suppose) that an effect by avoiding (to be absorbed into) its own cause, gets directly absorbed into the cause of its own cause. In various places in the Smṛiti etc. also, the order of dissolution is indicated to be an order which is in reverse of the order of creation, thus—“Oh divine sage, the earth, the basis of all this world is dissolved into waters, the waters into Jyoti (Teja) and the Jyoti into Vāyu (i.e. Ākāsha).” As it is only in the case of creation that the order of creation is mentioned in the Scriptures it does not deserve to hold good in the case of dissolution, and not being logical, dissolution does not expect it (i.e. order of creation) to apply in its own case. It is not logical that a cause should be dissolved while the effect (of such cause) yet subsists, because, it is not reasonably sustainable, that an effect should continue to subsist, after its cause is dissolved, while, that the cause should exist, even when its effect is dissolved, is logical, because it is observed to be so in the case of clay etc.—14.

9. ANTARĀVIJNĀNĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 15.

*If it be said that the creation and dissolu-*

*tion of intelligence (Vijnāna) and the mind (must be found a place) in between (Brahma and the elements) in the ordinary sequence, because there are indicatory marks (about their existence, and hence the order is interfered with), we say—No, because there is no difference.—15.*

It has been mentioned, that the coming into being and the dissolution of elements i.e. beings, take place in the direct order and in reverse order (literally, Anuloma and Pratiloma, i.e. along the lie of the hair and against the lie of the hair) respectively. It has also been mentioned, that creation proceeds from the Self and its dissolution also takes place in the same Self. (The opponent says)—It is also well-known from the Scriptures and the Smritis, that mind along with the organs-of-sense, and intelligence, exist sure enough, because there are indicatory marks about their existence, such as—"Know Intelligence to be the charioteer, and the Mind to be the reins; they say the sense-organs are the steeds" (Kāṭha. 3.3) etc. . Now, as all entities are understood to have come into being from Brahma their (i.e. of Intelligence etc.) coming into being and their dissolution must also necessarily be placed somewhere in between (other entities) in their order of creation and dissolution respectively. Besides in the Ātharvaṇa (Muṇḍaka Upanishad), in the chapter on genesis, the organs-of-sense are enumerated in the order of creation, somewhere between the elements and the Self, thus :—"From the Self, the Prāṇa, the mind, all the organs-of-sense, the Akāsha i.e. the Vāyu, the Teja, Water, and the Earth which is the support of all the entities, come into being" (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3). If it be said, therefore, that there would be the predicament of the order of creation and dissolution referred to earlier, being disturbed, we reply—No, because there is no disturbance or change in the order of creation and dissolution. If, therefore, the organs-of-sense are modifications of elements, their coming into being and their dissolution are included in the coming into being and dissolution of the elements and it is not necessary to look for a separate order (of creation and dissolution) in their case. And there positively is an indicatory mark about their being modifica-

tions of elements, thus—"O mild one, the structure of the mind, is that of the earth, of the Prāṇa, that of water, and of the speech, that of Teja" (Chhān. 6.5.4). The occasional separate reference to elements and organs-of-sense should be construed in accordance with the maxim of a Brāhmaṇa and a Parivrājaka (i.e. a Sanyāsin or a Peripatetic). If, on the other hand, supposing organs-of-sense are not the modifications of the elements, even then the order of creation of the elements is not disturbed by the organs-of-sense, because it may in that case be understood, that in the order of creation, the organs-of-sense came into being first and then the elements, or the elements came into being first and then the organs-of-sense. Because in the Ātharvaṇa merely a mention of the organs-of-sense and the elements in a particular order has been made, and not that of the order of their creation. In other places also the order of the creation of the elements and the organs-of-sense is mentioned separately, thus—"The Prajāpati (Sūtrātmā) verily was all this in the beginning. He thought about his own self. He created the Mana (i.e. the mind). There was then the mind only. It thought about its own self. It created the speech etc.". Therefore, no break in the order of creation is occasioned (by the mention of intelligence and the mind, in between the Self and the elements).—15.

#### 10. CHARĀCHARAVYAPĀSHRAYĀDHIKARAṆAM.

Sū. 16.

*The reference (to birth and death) is in the principal sense with reference to moveable and immovable entities. When the terms Birth and Death are used in connection with the Jīva-Self, they are in a secondary sense, because existence (of the Jīva-Self) is possible only when a body etc. exist.—16.*

May be, somebody may have a mistaken notion, that the Jīva-Self is subject to birth and final dissolution (i.e. death) because in the ordinary world, there are such references as, Devadatta is born, Devadatta is dead etc., and also because of the injunction for the performance of such ceremonies as Jātakarma and Antyeshṭi etc. (at birth and

death respectively), and that mistaken notion we will now remove. The Jīva-Self cannot be subject to birth and death, because, that it has a relation to the fruit mentioned by the Shāstrās, is reasonably sustainable, because were the Jīva-Self liable to be destroyed along with the body, then in that case injunctions and prohibitions with a view to the acquisition or avoidance of desirable and undesirable things respectively (by the Self) in another body, would be meaningless. It is also mentioned in the Scriptures—"It is this (i.e. this body), which is abandoned by the Jīva-Self, that really dies and not the Jīva-Self" (Chhān. 6.11.3). But, (says the opponent of the Vedānta), it is indicated that in the ordinary world the terms birth and death are used with reference to the Jīva-Self. (We reply)—It is no doubt true that you have indicated that it is so, but this reference to the birth and death of the Jīva-Self is in a secondary sense. (Says the opponent of Vedānta)—With reference to what entity then can this reference possibly be in the primary (i.e. real) sense, if this reference (in the case of the Jīva-Self) is in the secondary sense? (We reply)—The reference is in the primary i.e. true sense with respect to the entire set of moveable and immoveable entities. These terms 'Birth' and 'Death' have reference to the bodies of moveable and immoveable entities. These moveable and immoveable entities both come into being and die, hence, while the terms 'Birth' and 'Death' are used in the principal (i.e. real) sense with reference to these entities, they are used figuratively in the case of the Jīva-Selfs which abide in them, because these terms are used, only if such bodies exist. It is only when a body becomes manifest or disappears, that these terms 'Birth' and 'Death' are used, and not when it does not either manifest itself or disappear. No one has ever observed a Jīva-Self being born, or observed it to have died, elsewhere than when it is related to a body. The Scriptures show that the terms 'Birth' and 'Death' depend upon its (i.e. the Jīva-Self's) being in contact with or its separation from a body, in the Scriptural passage—"This person (Purusha i.e. Jīva-Self) is said to come into existence, when it has acquired a body, and this person (Purusha i.e. Jīva-Self) is said to die, when it goes out of the body" (Brih. 4.3.8). The injunction as to Jātakarma etc. also should be understood to be only

with reference to the manifestation of a body, because there is absence of (i.e. no possibility of) the manifestation of the Jīva-Self. The Sūtrakāra will explain in the next Sūtra, whether, like the Ākāśha etc., the Jīva-Self comes into being from the Highest Self or it does not do so. By this Sūtra it is merely mentioned that births or deaths in the gross sense (as they are applied popularly to the Jīva-Selfs) are really dependent upon the body, and they do not apply to the Jīva-Self.—16.

### 11. ATMĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 17.

*The Jīva-Self does not come into being, because there is no Scriptural statement about its coming into being, (like the Ākāśha). Besides, according to those i.e. the Scriptures the Self is eternal.—17.*

There indeed is such an entity as the Ātmā, called the Jīva, which presides over this cage of the body and organs-of-sense and which is connected with fruits of actions. There being a conflict in the Scriptural statements, as to whether it (i.e. the Jīva) comes into being from Brahma, like Vyoma (i.e. Ākāśha) etc., or whether, like Brahma, it is not subject to being born, there is a doubt. In some Scriptural passages the coming into being of the Jīva-Self from the Highest Brahma is mentioned by illustrations, such as those of the sparks of fire etc., and, from some other Scriptural passages it is understood, how the Highest Brahma without having undergone any modification enters into its own effects and is thereby known as being in the condition of the Jīva-Self, but where, its coming into being is not mentioned. With regard to this (Atra) the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that the Jīva-Self does come into being (as an effect of Brahma). Whence is it so? Because, (it is only thus that) the original declaration is not contradicted. The original declaration—viz. “When one is known, all else becomes known automatically”—is not contradicted, only if all this entire set of the creation of entities (including the Jīva-Self) owes its origin to Brahma. Were the Jīva-Self to be an entirely different entity altogether (and not an effect of Brahma), this declaration would be contradicted. It is not possible to

identify the unmodified Highest Self with the Jīva-Self, because of the difference in (their) characteristics i.e. natures. The Highest Self is of the nature of being free from all sin etc. whatsoever, while the Jīva-Self is quite the opposite of that. That the Jīva-Self is an effect (from its cause—Brahma), is established because of its being circumscribed or delimited. Inasmuch as, every entity, such as the Ākāśha etc., is an effect because it is so circumscribed or delimited, so all these effects, including the Ākāśha, are understood to be subject to being created. The Jīva-Self, also, therefore, inasmuch as it is the performer of meritorious and unmeritorious action, and is also subject to pleasure and pain, and has a separate existence in every individual body, deserves to be a created entity, at the time of the coming into being of this entire set of creation. Besides, the Scriptures also after first giving instruction about the creation of all this set of the objects of enjoyment and the organs-of-sense such as the Prāṇa (vital breath) etc., thus—"Just as from fire minute sparks i.e. scintillae fly about, even so from this Self all Prāṇās spread out" (Bṛih. 2.1.20), further give instruction about the separate creation of the experiencing Selves, thus—"All the Jīva-Selves without exception proceed (from the Highest Self)". Besides another Scriptural passage—"Just as from a well-kindled fire thousands of sparks i.e. scintillae similar in nature (Sarūpāḥ) (to the fire) fly around, even so, Oh mild one, all these different existences (i.e. Jīva-Selves) spread around from this Imperishable (i.e. Brahma), and are also ultimately absorbed into it" (Muṇḍ. 2.1.1)—speaks about the coming into being of all Jīva-Selves, and their ultimate dissolution into it. The word "similar in nature" (Sarūpāḥ) shows that the Jīva-Selves are similar in nature to the Highest Self, inasmuch as they possess sentiency. The non-mention (of a thing) in the Scriptures in one place, does not deserve to restrict that which is mentioned in another place, because something which is mentioned in some Scriptural passage in addition to what is stated in other Scriptural passages and which is not contradictory to anything (mentioned in these Scriptural passages), has necessarily to be understood as implied in all places. The Scriptural passage which mentions the entry (of the Highest Self) into its own effects, also, under

the circumstances, ought to be explained as meaning the modification of the Highest Self into its own effects as the Jīva-Self, like the Scriptural passage—"That made itself manifest as its own Self" (Tait. 2.6.1). Therefore, the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that the Jīva-Self does (of course) come into being (i.e. it is a created entity).

To this conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) the reply we give is:—The Self i.e. the Jīva-Self is not subject to being created. Whence is it so? Because there is no Scriptural passage (about its creation). In very many places (in the Scriptures) in the chapter on genesis there is no mention of it. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) it has been remarked (by me) that non-mention in a particular passage is unable to restrict a statement (to that effect) in other passages of Scriptures. (We reply)—Of course it is true that it is so said (by you), but what we say is, that its creation itself is not possible. Whence is it so? Because according to them (i.e. the Scriptural passages) the Self is eternal. And also because of the word 'Cha' (Also), and also because of the characteristics of being 'unborn' etc.. That the Self is eternal is understood from the Scriptures, and it is also understood that it is not subject to being born, and that it is not an effect or modification, and that it is the unmodified Brahma itself that subsists as the Jīva-Self and which has Brahma as its Self. That an entity of this nature i.e. form should be liable to being created, is not reasonably sustainable. (Says the opponent)—What are those Scriptural passages? We reply—"The Jīva-Self does not die" (Chhān. 6.11.3); "This great unborn Self which is undecaying, deathless, immortal, and fearless is itself Brahma" (Brih. 4.4.22); "This ancient one is unborn, eternal and everlasting" (Kāṭha. 2.18); "The wise one (i.e. the Self) is neither born nor does it die" (Kāṭha. 2.18); "Having brought it into being, it itself entered into it" (Tait. 2.6.1); "I will now enter into them myself as the Jīva-Self, and evolve names and forms" (Chhān. 6.3.2); "This Self permeated into it right down to the extremity of the fingernails" (Brih. 2.4.7); "That thou art" (Chhān. 6.8.7); "I am Brahma" (Brih. 1.4.10); "This Self is Brahma, the experiencer of everything" (Brih. 2.5.19). These and such other Scriptural passages, which speak about the Jīva-Self's being eternal, being there, they obstruct the possibi-



lity of the creation of the Jīva-Self. But (says the opponent of the Vedānta) it has already been said (by us) that because of its being separate i.e. circumscribed (Pravibhakta), it is a modification, and as such is subject to being created. To this, it is replied (by us)—It is by no means a separate i.e. a circumscribed entity by itself, because of the Scriptural statement—"There is only one God immanent in all beings, it is all-pervading and is the inner-Self of all things" (Shvet. 6.11). That it appears as if it is circumscribed etc., is because of the limiting adjuncts such as intelligence (Buddhi) etc., even as the Ākāsha (appears as if it is separate i.e. circumscribed) because of its connection with jars etc.. The Shāstra passage also which is similar, viz. "This Jīva-Self is Brahma, having the structure of intelligence (Vijnāna), the structure of the mind, the structure of Prāṇa, the structure of sight (Chakshu), and having the structure of the sense-organ of hearing (Shrotra)" (Brih. 4.4.5) etc., shows that the Jīva-Self though being of the nature of Brahma which is unmodifiable and one and one only, has the structure of manifoldness such as intelligence etc.. That it has the structure of that i.e. intelligence etc., means, that by reason of the non-manifestation of its own characteristic nature, which is different from intelligence etc., it merely appears to be tinged with the complexion of that particular nature of intelligence etc., and should be looked upon to be like a man whose mind is constantly centered upon women ('Strīmayo Jālmah', i.e. a voluptuary like a gay Lothario or a Don Juan for instance). Those rare instances in Scriptures, where its origination and dissolution is spoken of, should be construed as being the result of its contact with such limiting adjuncts (as Buddhi etc.), so that, it is said to be created when such adjuncts come into being and is said to be dissolved, when such adjuncts get dissolved. The Scriptures themselves declare similarly, thus—"Being knowledge incarnate and having risen from these beings or elements, it perishes when the beings or elements themselves perish. After it has departed, it has no further cognition" (Brih. 4.5.13). Similarly, that there is merely the dissolution of the adjuncts and not the destruction of the Self, is also declared by the Scriptures (when the Scriptures expound, in reply to a question which the Scriptures

raise first, by putting it in the mouth of Maitreya thus—“It is exactly here, Oh Bhagavan, that you have altogether bewildered me. I do not comprehend what you have said, viz. that after it has departed i.e. died (Pretya) it has no further cognition”) thus—“Oh Maitreya, I am indeed not wanting to say anything to bewilder you. The Self, Oh Maitreya, is imperishable and has the characteristic of being indestructible. What in fact takes place, is that it (i.e. the Self) is merely decontaminated i.e. separated from the sense-organs” (Brih. 4.5.14). It is only thus, that the original declaration is not contradicted, i.e., when it is understood, that it is the unmodified Brahma itself that exists as the Jiva-Self. Again, the difference in their individual characteristics is caused by the limiting adjuncts only. The Scriptural passage “After all this, do speak to me of that only by which Final Release may result”, by denying, that the Jiva-Self, whose structure is knowledge and which is the relevant topic here, has any characteristics of a transmigratory existence, further expounds, how the Jiva-Self is the Highest Self. Therefore (the conclusion is that) the Self is not subject either to being created or to being dissolved.—17.

## 12. JNĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 18.

*Hence it is, that (the Jiva-Self) is eternally all-knowing.—18.*

Now, on account of the conflict of opinion between the contesting parties, in as much as to whether, as held by the followers of Kaṇabhuk (i.e. the Vaisheshikās), the Jiva-Self, though *per se* non-sentient, is possessed of the nature of adventitious sentiency, or whether, as held by the Sāmkhyās, it possesses the nature of eternal sentiency, a doubt (has arisen). What then is the conclusion? The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that the attribute of the sentiency of the Jiva-Self is only adventitious as resulting from its conjunction with the mind, like the quality of redness etc. resulting from the conjunction of Agni (fire) and an earthen pot. Assuming that it has eternal sentiency, then, even those who are asleep or in a fainting fit or possessed (by a malignant spirit) would manifest sentiency, but after such people have come round,

on their being interrogated, such people reply that they were not conscious of anything, and they are again observed to possess sentiency. Hence (the conclusion is that) because of its being intermittently sentient, the Jīva-Self possesses merely adventitious sentiency. The reply to this conclusion is—The Jīva-Self is sentient and possesses eternal consciousness, precisely for this very reason, viz. that it is not subject to creation, and that it is but only the Highest Self i.e. Brahma, which, not being liable to any modification, subsists as the Jīva-Self, as a result of being affected by limiting adjuncts. The Scriptures speak of the Highest Self, as having the nature of sentiency i.e. consciousness, thus—“Brahma is knowledge and bliss” (Brih. 3.9.28); “Brahma is truth, knowledge and the infinite” (Tait. 2.1.1); “It is neither inside nor outside, but is wholly incarnate solidified knowledge” (Brih. 4.5.13) etc.. Now if the Jīva-Self is but this Highest Self only, then it is understood that the Jīva-Self also must possess the nature of eternal sentiency i.e. consciousness, even as heat and light are eternally the nature of Agni (fire). Commencing the chapter dealing with the Jīva-Self as one having knowledge as his structure (Vijnānamaya), there are such Scriptural passages as—“(During the condition of sleep) while being wide-awake himself, he (i.e. the Jīvātmā) looks upon the quiescent i.e. sleeping (sense-organs)” (Brih. 4.3.11); “That Purusha is Self-refulgent during this condition (of dreams). There is no cessation of the knowledge of the knower i.e. the Self” (Brih. 4.3.30). That the Jīva-Self does possess such nature, is further established, by means of the continuity of knowledge through the medium of all the sense-organs, thus—‘I know this, I know this’, on the authority of the Scriptural passage—“He who knows ‘I am smelling this’ is the Self” (Chhān. 8.12.4). (Assuming the opponent of the Vedānta to say)—if the nature of the Jīva-Self is that of eternal sentiency i.e. consciousness, that would render the sense-organs such as the sense-organ of smell (Ghrāṇa) etc. superfluous, we reply—No, because they (the sense-organs) have the function of the ascertainment of such special objects-of-sense as smell etc.. The Scriptures moreover specifically declare it to be so, thus—“The olfactory sense-organ is for the perception of smell” (Chhān. 8.12.4). The objection raised,

viz. that persons who are asleep do not perceive anything, is answered by the Scriptures themselves, which declare, with reference to the condition of sleep, thus:—"That it (i.e. the Jīva-Self) is not conscious of anything during the condition of sleep, means, that even while it is looking on it refuses to see (i.e. actually perceive). Because of its not being liable to perish, there is no cessation of the activity of perception on the part of the seer i.e. the Self, as there is nothing else, then, as apart and different from itself, which it can possibly see" (Brih. 4.3.23). What is meant is, that there is absence of the activity of its sentiency, because, there is no object (other than itself) that can be seen, and it is not that there is absence of sentiency itself. It is like the non-manifestation of the light pervading the Ākāsha by reason of the absence of any object to be illuminated and not because it does not possess its nature (of illuminating). The reasoning of the Vaisheshikās etc. being in conflict with the Scriptures, it is rendered fallacious. Hence we conclude that the Jīva-Self has the nature of eternal sentiency i.e. consciousness.—18.

### 13. UTKRĀNTIGATYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 19-32.

*Because (the Scriptures declare that the Jīva-Self) emerges (out of the body), goes about, and returns (to the body), therefore (the Jīva-Self is of the size of an Atom (Aṇu)).—19.*

Of what dimension the Jīva-Self is, is now considered, viz. whether it has the dimensions of an Atom (Aṇu), or whether it has a medium dimension, or whether it has a great i.e. infinite dimension. But (says the Vedāntin) it has been stated, that the Self is not subject to creation and has eternal sentiency i.e. consciousness and, hence, it follows that the Jīva-Self is in fact the Highest Self, and as the Highest Self is declared by the Scriptures to be infinite, whence could then there arise any anxiety about the consideration of its dimension? The reply (of the opponent of the Vedāntin) is—What you say is true of course, but the Scriptural statements, about the Jīva-Self's emerging (out of the body) and going about and returning, force us

to the conclusion, that the Jīva-Self has a limited dimension. Besides the Scriptures themselves occasionally speak about its atomic (Aṇu) dimension, and it is for clearing up all this, that this consideration of it is begun. The conclusion (of the opponent of the Vedānta) is, that because of the Scriptural statements about the Jīva-Self's emerging out of the body and going about and returning (to the body), it has a limited atomic (Aṇu) dimension. As regards its (of the Jīva-Self's) emerging out of the body, the Scriptural statement is—"When it (Jīva-Self) sallies forth (from the body) it does so along with all these (i.e. sense-organs such as speech etc.)" (Kaush. 3.3). As regards its going about—"Verily all those (i.e. Jīva-Selfs) who depart from this region, go to the region of the moon only" (Kaush. 1.2). And as regards its returning—"From that region it (Jīva-Self) returns to this world for doing Karma (action)" (Brih. 4.4.6). These Scriptural statements about the emerging, going about and returning of the Jīva-Self, force us to the conclusion that the Jīva-Self has but a limited dimension, because it cannot be imagined that an all-pervading entity can possibly have any movement (because being all-pervading it has no scope for movement). Now, when therefore it is taken as finally determined that it has a limited size, it is understood, that it can be only of the dimension of an atom (Aṇu), because during the examination of the Ārṇhata (i.e. Jain) doctrine, the doctrine that the Jīva-Self's dimension is that of a body, has already been refuted.—19.

*(The Jīva-Self is of the dimension of an Atom i.e. Aṇu) because the latter two actions (i.e. going about and returning to the body) have relation to the doer of such actions i.e. the Jīva-Self (according to the Scriptures).—20.*

May be, giving up (i.e. Utkrānti) of the mastership over the body by the Jīva-Self may be possible, even without any movement on the part of the Jīva-Self, in the same sense, in which a Lord's Lordship (over his township) is given up by the Lord,—merely by the Jīva-Self ceasing to have such mastership of the body, as a result of its actions

having been exhausted ; but the latter two actions, viz. going out (of the body) and returning (to the body), cannot at all be possible in the case of a Jīva-Self which is not capable of movement as they (i.e. these two actions) have a relation to the Self of the Jīva, because the root verb “to go” (and “to return”) implies an activity abiding in an agent (of such action). The going out of and returning to (the body) by the Jīva-Self, which is not of a medium dimension (because the Jīva-Self’s having a medium dimension has already been refuted) are possible, only if the Jīva-Self has an atomic (Āṇu) dimension (because if the Jīva-Self were to be all-pervading there could not be any scope for its movement). However, going out of and returning to (the body of) the Jīva-Self, being thus assumed to exist, the giving up (Utkrānti) can only be properly understood to mean, the moving out of the body (Āpasriṭi), because its going out and returning (to the body) are not possible unless it has first moved away from the body, inasmuch as, going out and returning, without moving away from the body, is not possible. Besides the Scriptures which have declared certain regions of the body, as the several exits (Āpādāna) from which the moving out of the Jīva-Self takes place, thus—“Either from the eye, or from the head, or from other parts of the body” (Brih. 4.4.2), “Taking these elements of light (Teja) etc. with itself, it, the Jīva-Self, enters the Hridaya” (Brih. 4.1); and the passage “And taking up the light elements, it returns to its place” (Brih. 4.3.11) shows that the Jīva-Self’s going about the returning is possible even when it is inside a body. Because of this fact also, it is established that the Jīva-Self has the dimensions of an atom (Āṇu).—20.

*If it be said (by the Vedāntins) that (the Jīva-Self is) not Āṇu because the Scriptural statement is about its not being so (Ātat-shruteh), (we, the opponents of Vedānta reply) no, the subject (there) is with reference to the other (i.e. the Highest Self).—21.*

If it be said by the Vedāntin—It may be like this, that the Jīva-Self is not Atomic (Āṇu). Why so ? Because

there is Scriptural statement about its not being so. The meaning is, that the Scriptural statements which refer to it as having a dimension different from that of an atom (Aṇu), thus—"Verily, that great unborn Self who, as amongst the Prāṇās (i.e. organs-of-sense) is one whose structure is knowledge" (Brih. 4.4.12), "(Who) like the Ākāsha is all-pervading and eternal", "Truth, knowledge and infinite is Brahma" (Tait. 2.1.1), would be contradicted if the Jīva-Self were to be of the dimension of an Atom (Aṇu). (The reply of the opponent of Vedānta is)—This is no fault. How so? Because the subject of this chapter is the other one (i.e. the Highest Self). For this Scriptural statement about a different dimension occurs in a chapter (Prakriyā) dealing with the Highest Self, because generally in the Vedānta the Highest Self alone is relevant as being the entity to be known. Also because, in the Scriptural statements such as "Spotless and beyond the Ākāsha" the chapter specially refers to the transcendental one (i.e. the Highest Self). But (says the Vedāntin) in the Scriptural statement "This one, who amongst the Prāṇās is one whose structure is knowledge" it is the Jīva-Self that is indicated as having a relation to greatness (of size). (The opponent of Vedānta replies)—That reference should be looked upon, just as the reference to Vāmadeva is looked upon, from the point of view of the Shāstra (*vide* Bra. Sū. I.i.30). Therefore by the Scriptural statement, which refers to a different dimension, having reference to the Highest Self, the Atomic dimension of the Jīva-Self is not thereby contradicted.—21.

*(The Jīva-Self is Atomic i.e. Aṇu in dimension) because there is a direct Scriptural statement about it and about its minute dimension.—22.*

This is again why the Jīva-Self is of the dimension of an Atom (Aṇu), viz. there is a direct Scriptural statement of a word suggestive of an Atomic (Aṇu) dimension of it, thus—"This Jīva-Self into which the Prāṇa (the vital breath) has entered in a five-fold manner, and which has the dimension of an Atom (Aṇu), has to be comprehended by the mind" (Muṇḍ. 3.1.9), and because of its connection

with the Prāṇa, it is understood that it is the Jīva-Self that is designated as Atomic (Aṇu). Similarly, the minute dimension stated in the Scriptures also indicates the atomic nature of the Jīva-Self, thus—"This Jīva-Self should be understood to be (of the dimension of) the hundredth part of the hundredth part of a young hair" (Shvet. 5.8); also "The inferior Avara Self (i.e. the Jīva-Self) is of the dimension of the point of a goad" (Shvet. 5.8) is another dimension (that is also mentioned).—22.

(Here somebody objects)—But assuming the Jīva-Self to be atomic in dimension, because of its being confined necessarily to only one portion (of the body), perception by it all over the body would be contradictory. However, it is seen, that those who have taken a plunge in the pool of the Jānhavī experience a feeling of coolness all over the body, and they experience heat all over the body during summer time. (To this the Sūtrakāra replies):—

*There is no contradiction, as in the case of sandalwood.*—23.

Just as a drop of yellow sandalwood paste, though it is in contact with only a portion of the body, creates a refreshingly pleasurable sensation over the whole body, even so, the Jīva-Self may well be able to have perception over the whole body, even though confined to only one portion of the body. The Jīva-Self being connected with the skin, that it has perception all over the body, is not contradictory, because the Jīva-Self's connection with the skin is all over the extent of the skin, and the skin envelops the whole body.—23.

*(If it be objected to by the Vedāntin that the cases are not parallel) because of the peculiar circumstance (in the illustration of sandalwood paste and the Self), (we reply)—No, because (there is peculiarity of circumstance also in the case of the Jīva-Self) as that (the Self has its abode) in the Hridaya.*—24.

Here it is urged (by the Vedāntin), that the statement



“There is no contradiction as in the case of sandalwood paste” is not logical, because the illustration and that of which it is the illustration are not equally balanced i.e. similar. It is only when it is established that the Jīva-Self is confined to one part of the body only, that the illustration of sandalwood paste would be proper. What is evident, however, is, that on the one hand the sandalwood paste has this peculiarity of circumstance, viz. that of existing only in one part of the body and also that it refreshes the entire body, while, on the other hand, the Jīva-Self evidently has perception all over the body and not that it is present in only one part of it. If it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta) that it may be so inferred, (the Vedāntin replies)—No, such inference is possible, because, the doubt as to whether the perception by the Jīva-Self all over the body is because it pervades the whole body like the skin-organ (of touch), or because of its being all-pervading like the Nabha (i.e. Ākāśha), or because, like a spot of sandalwood paste it is of the size of an Atom (Aṇu) occupying only a part of the body, is not removed (even if such an inference is allowable). To this, it is said (by the opponent of Vedānta)—This is no fault. How ? Because it is precisely so understood, viz. that like the spot of sandalwood paste, the Jīva-Self also exists only in a part of the body, and has a peculiarity of circumstance. If you ask ‘How ?’, it is said that in the Vedānta it is recited that the Jīva-Self abides in the Hridaya, thus—The instruction is:—“This Jīva-Self (abides) in the Hridaya” (Prashna 8.3.3) ; “It is in the Hridaya that this Jīva-Self (abides)” (Chhān. 8.3.3) ; “What is that Self ? It is he who is in the Hridaya, and who amongst the Prāṇās (sense-organs) has knowledge as his structure, a Puruṣha who is the flame of light in the Hridaya” (Brih. 4.3.7). Therefore, as both the illustration, and the entity that it illustrates, are without any dissimilarity, it is but proper that (the Sūtra is):—“There is no contradiction as in the case of sandalwood paste”.—24.

*Or because of the attribute (of sentiency, the Jīva-Self may pervade the whole body), as (we experience) in the ordinary world in the case of light (Ālokavat).—25.*

Because of the Jīva-Self's attribute of sentiency pervading the whole body, even though it has an atomic (Aṇu) dimension, its action of pervading the whole body is not contradicted. (It is) just as it is experienced in the ordinary world, viz. that the light of gems and lamps etc. which occupy only a part of the inner apartment of a house, fully pervades the whole inner apartment and does its work (of giving light) effectively over the whole inner apartment. Sandal-wood paste, consisting as it does of parts, may perhaps be capable of creating a refreshing and pleasurable sensation all over the body, by the diffusion of its parts, still, as the Jīva-Self is Atomic (Aṇu) in its dimension and has no parts, it may well be doubted whether it can move about over the whole body, and that is why it is stated—"Because of the attribute, as in the case of light".—25.

(Says the Vedāntin)—How again, can an attribute be present elsewhere than in the substance to which such attribute belongs ?

It is never observed that 'whiteness'—a quality of a piece of cloth—exists elsewhere than in the cloth itself. (If the opponent of Vedānta were to say), it may well be like the light of a lamp, (the Vedāntin replies)—No, because the light (of a lamp) also is understood to be a substance (Dravya). A lamp is but the Teja substance with its particles in a massed condition, and the same Teja particles when they are in a loose condition, are 'light'. To this (the opponent of Vedānta replies) :—

*(The quality of sentiency) may exist apart  
(from the Self), like 'smell'.—26.*

Just as even though 'smell' is but a quality, it exists apart from the substance to which such quality of smell belongs, because we find that we do perceive the smell of flowers even when the flowers are not in evidence before us, even so, though the Jīva-Self is of an Atomic (Aṇu) dimension, its attribute of sentiency may exist apart from it. Hence it cannot invariably be, as a rule, that, it is not reasonably sustainable, that an attribute (of the Jīva-Self) such as sentiency, cannot, as Rūpa (form) cannot, exist apart from that which is its substratum, because it is seen, that smell,

even though it is a quality, can exist separately from the substance to which it belongs. (If it be said by the Vedāntin) that smell can become separate from the substance to which it belongs, only along with the separation of (a part of) its substratum, (we reply)—No, because there will then be the predicament, of the substance, from which such separation of its quality along with (a part of) the substance takes place, itself getting dissipated. It is however experienced that it does exist without being so dissipated. Were it not to be so, it would lose its heaviness and other qualities which belong to it originally. (If it be said by the Vedāntin)—May be, the parts in which this smell abides, and which get separated, being very minute, the separation, even though it is there sure enough, is not detected, and the minute Paramāṇus of the substance which are scattered round about, cause the sensation of smell by entering the nostrils, (we reply)—No, because the Paramāṇus are supersensible, and in the case of Nāgakesara etc., a distinct heavy smell is experienced. Ordinarily people experience a smell only, and not the substance which possesses such smell. If it be said, that because the existence of Rūpa (form) as apart from the substance to which it belongs, is not actually experienced, it is not logical to think that a quality can exist as apart from the substance to which such quality belongs, (we reply)—No, because actual direct perception precludes an inference from coming into operation. Therefore those who care to expound (a thing) ought to accept it to be just as it is met with in the ordinary world. It is not possible to lay down a rule, that because the quality, of taste is experienced by the tongue, the quality of Rūpa (form) also can be experienced only by the tongue.—26.

*The Scriptures also declare similarly.—27.*

The Scriptures, after declaring that the Hridaya is the abode of the Jīva-Self, and that it has the dimensions of an Atom (Aṇu), also further declare by such passages as “Right down to the hair and the tips of the nails” (Chhān. 8.8.1) that the Jīva-Self pervades the whole body by means of its quality of sentiency.—27.

*Also because of the separate instruction  
(about Jīva-Self and its sentiency).—28. -*

It is understood from the Scriptural statement "Having mounted the body by means of sentiency (Prajñā)" (Kaush. 3.6), which mentions the Jīva-Self and its sentiency as being the agent and the instrument of action respectively, that the Jīva-Self pervades the body only by its quality of sentiency. Similarly, the Scriptural passage "Then (the sentient person) having absorbed into himself all the sentiency of the sense-organs" (Brih. 2.1.17), by giving instruction about sentiency being separate from the agent (i.e. the Jīva-Self), strengthens the same view. Therefore (according to the opponent of Vedānta) the Jīva-Self is of an Atomic (Aṇu) dimension.—28.

The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) being this (we reply) :—

*But, it is because (the Jīva-Self) has the quintessence of that (attribute of intelligence—Buddhi) i.e. 'Tadguṇasāratvāt', that there is a reference like that (Tadvyapadeshāh), (viz. of its being of an Atomic dimension) as in the case of the intelligent Self (Prājña i.e. the Highest Self).—29.*

The word 'But' refutes the view (of the opponent of Vedānta). It is not that the Jīva-Self is Atomic (Aṇu). It has already been stated, that the Jīva-Self is but the Highest Brahma, because there is no mention in the Scriptures about its creation and because the Scriptures have declared that Brahma itself entered (the created entities as the Jīva-Self), and also because of the instruction that there is complete identity (between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self). Now, if the Jīva-Self is but the Highest Brahma, then it deserves to be of the same dimension as that of the Highest Brahma, and as the Highest Brahma has been declared by the Scriptures to be all-pervading, therefore, the Jīva-Self also is all-pervading. It would be only thus, that all the Scriptural and Smṛiti declarations about the Jīva-Self being all-pervading, such as—"That great unborn Self, who, as the Jīva-Self, has amongst the Prāṇās the structure of knowledge (Vijnāna)" (Brih. 4.4.22), would be justified. It is not reasonably sustain-

able, that the Jīva-Self having the dimension of an Atom (Aṇu), can be conscious of pain which pervades the whole body. If it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta), that it may well be so conscious, because of its connection with the skin (Tvak—sense of touch), (we reply)—No, because (were it to be so), when one is pricked in the skin by a thorn, pain should be felt over the entire extent of the body, as the connection between the thorn and the skin, is all over the extent of the skin which envelops the whole body, but, a man who is pricked by a thorn (in the foot) is conscious of pain in the sole of the foot only. It is not reasonably sustainable that the attribute of an Atom (Aṇu) can extend beyond its substratum (i.e. the Aṇu) of which it is the attribute, because an attribute is coextensive with the substratum, of which it is the attribute. An attribute which does not subsist in its own substratum but subsists beyond it, would itself cease to be an attribute. It has already been explained also, that the refulgence of a lamp is another substance (and not an attribute). And, in as much as smell is understood to be an attribute, it deserves to travel only with its own substratum, inasmuch as otherwise there will be the predicament of its losing its very nature of being an attribute. Bhagavān Dvaipāyana has expressed a similar view, thus :—“Experiencing a smell about water, even if some people, who are not clever, understand it to belong to the water, one should know that it belongs only to the earth, and only happens to have resorted to water or air (along with the earth)”. Were sentiency, as the attribute of the Jīva-Self, to occupy the entire body, then the Jīva-Self cannot possibly have the dimension of an Atom (Aṇu). Sentiency is its essential nature, just as heat and light are the essential natures of fire (Agni). No such distinction between them, as, that one is an attribute, and the other is its substratum, can be here understood. Besides it has already been refuted that it (i.e. the Jīva-Self) can have the dimensions of a body. Therefore, as the only remaining alternative, the conclusion is that the Jīva-Self is all-pervading. How then is it (says the opponent of Vedānta) that there is a declaration that it (i.e. the Jīva-Self) has the dimension of an Atom (Aṇu)? The reply is—That declaration about its being of the dimension of an Aṇu, is because it has the quintessence

of the attribute of that (i.e. Buddhi, i.e. intelligence). The attributes, viz. desire, aversion, pleasure, pain etc., are the attributes of intelligence. The quintessence of the attributes of intelligence (Buddhi) constitutes the principal characteristic of the Jīva-Self during its condition of transmigratory existence as the Jīva-Self. (Here at this stage the Bhāshyakāra has dissolved the compound word 'Tadguṇasāratvam' which need not be translated.) There could be no transmigratory existence for the mere pure Self, without these attributes of intelligence (Buddhi). The condition of transmigratory existence appertaining to the Jīva-Self's appearing to be an agent and an experienter, has, the superimposition of the nature of the limiting adjuncts, such as the qualities of intelligence etc., (on the pure Self) as the cause, though the pure Self as such is in the real sense eternally free, and is not really an experienter or an agent, and is not in fact subject to any transmigratory existence. Therefore, the reference to its dimension (as its being Atomic i.e. Aṇu) is with reference to the extent of intelligence (Buddhi), because of the Jīva-Self's having the quintessence of the attribute of intelligence (Buddhi) (during the transmigratory condition). The reference to its passing out (from the body) etc. is because of the passing out (Utkrānti) etc. of the intelligence and not with reference to the passing out (Utkrānti) of its own Self. Further, having declared that the Jīva-Self has the dimension of an Atom (Aṇu) by the Scriptural statement—"The Jīva-Self is to be understood to be the hundredth part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair, and is meant to be infinite" (Shvet. 5.9), it is again declared, that it is infinite and all-pervading. This can be reasonably understandable, only if the Jīva-Self be understood, to be of the dimension of an Atom (Aṇu), in a figurative sense, and to have infinitude in the highest real sense. It can never be imagined, that both can be true in the principal sense. (Its) infinitude cannot possibly be understood to be in the figurative sense, because all the Upanishads purport to explain that the Jīva-Self is, in fact, the Brahma Self. Similarly when the Scriptures instruct that it is of the size of the point of a goad, by making use of another unit of measurement, thus—"The subordinate one (Avara) (i.e. the Jīva-Self) because of its attributes of

intelligence and body, is perceived also to be of the dimension of the point of a goad only" (Shvet. 6.8), they do so, merely because of its connection with the attribute of 'intelligence' and not because it is so in itself (i.e. not because it is so, *per se*). Again the Scriptural statement "This Self is Atomic (Aṇu) in dimension and should be realized by the mind" (Mund. 3.1.9) does not claim to instruct that the Jiva-Self has the dimension of an Atom (Aṇu), because what is relevant there, is that the Highest Self is unperceivable by the eye etc., and that it is understandable only through (its) knowledge and its grace being vouchsafed (to a man). Besides, it is not reasonably sustainable, that the Jiva-Self has the dimensions of an Atom (Aṇu) in the primary sense of the word Atom (Aṇu). Therefore, the statement about its being of the dimension of an Atom (Aṇu) should be construed as purporting to refer, to the abstruseness of the Highest Self, or to its being under the influence of a limiting adjunct. Similarly in the case of such Scriptural passages as "Riding astride the body by means of intelligence" (Kaush. 3.6) etc., which speak of difference (between the Jiva-Self and intelligence), it should be construed to mean that the Jiva-Self uses the body as its mount, by means of the intelligence which acts as an adjunct. Or else, it should be understood to be only a mention in a secondary sense, similar to the mention of the stony body of a pestle and mortar (Shilāputraka). It has been stated already that there is no such division understood here, as between an attribute and its substratum. The statement about Hridaya being the abode is also because the Hridaya is the abode of intelligence. Similarly the Scriptural passages "By the passing out of what, shall I also pass out, and by what being firmly settled, shall I also become firmly ensconced" (Prashna 6.3), "He created the Prāṇa" (Prashna 6.4) also indicate that the 'passing out' etc., also depend upon the limiting adjuncts. By reason of the absence of any such 'passing out' the absence of any 'straying about' and 'returning' also is understood. There could not possibly be any 'straying about' and 'returning' of one, that has not first emerged out of the body. Hence this reference to the Jiva-Self having the dimension of an Atom (Aṇu), is, like that in the case of the knowing Highest Self, because it has

the quintessence of the attribute of intelligence (Buddhi) as the limiting adjunct. Just as in the chapters which deal with the meditation on qualified Brahma, the Highest Self is referred to as being "Minuter than a grain of rice or barley" (Chhān. 3.1.14) by reason of its having the quintessence of that (i.e. Buddhi) as a limiting adjunct, or as "Having the structure of the mind, having Prāṇa as the body, and being one who is the quintessence of all odours" (Chhān. 1.14.2), or as "Being one who is the quintessence of all tastes, whose desires are true, and whose conceptions are all true" (Chhān. 3.14.2). (Here the opponent of Vedānta says)—If it is imagined that the transmigratory condition of the Jīva-Self is on account of its having the quintessence of the quality of intelligence, then it may well be, that intelligence and the Jīva-Self being different from each other, their contact will necessarily have to come to an end (some time) and when this intelligence thus gets disconnected from the Jīva-Self, the Jīva-Self being undiscernible when thus separated, there will result the predicament, of its not continuing in its transmigratory condition, or, of ceasing to exist altogether.—29.

The Sūtrakāra gives a reply (to the above):—

*There would be no such fault, because, it is seen (from the Scriptures) that such association (between the Jīva-Self and intelligence) continues as long as the Jīva-Self (continues to be in the transmigratory condition).—30.*

No such doubt, viz., that the fault indicated towards the end of the preceding Sūtra would result, should be entertained. Whence is it so? Because this association of intelligence (Buddhi) and the Jīva-Self continues, as long as the Jīva-Self continues to be in a transmigratory condition, and, as long as its transmigratory condition does not cease as a result of correct i.e. perfect knowledge. It is only as long as this association with this limiting adjunct of intelligence continues, that the Jīva-Self has the characteristic of being a Jīva-Self and has a transmigratory condition. In the truest sense, however, as apart from such



nature imagined through association with the limiting adjunct of intelligence, there is no such entity as the Jīva-Self. During the ascertainment of the proper meaning of the Vedās, no sentient Supreme Spirit (Dhātu) other than the Omniscient Lord which has the nature of being eternally free is to be met with, on considering hundreds of Scriptural passages, such as "There is no other seer, hearer, thinker and knower, other than this" (Brih. 3.7.23), "There is nothing else than this. That is the seer, hearer, thinker or knower" (Chhān. 6.8.7), "That thou art" (Chhān. 6.1.6), "I am Brahma" (Brih. 1.4.7) etc.. How, (again it is asked by the opponent of Vedānta), is it known that this association continues as long as the Jīva-Self continues? The reply is—Because it is so seen. The Shāstra also indicates similarly thus—"He who as amongst the Prāṇās, has 'knowledge' as his structure, he, the Puruṣha, who is the internal light in the Hrid, who assuming the likeness (of the intellect) moves about in both the worlds, and meditates as it were, and vibrates as it were" (Brih. 4.3.7). There the meaning of having knowledge as his structure, means having intelligence (Buddhi) as his structure, because elsewhere, in the passage "Having knowledge, mind, Prāṇa, the sense-organ of sight, and the sense-organ of hearing as his structure", having knowledge as its structure is stated along with the mind etc.. By the expression "Having the structure of intelligence", having the quintessence of the quality of that (i.e. intelligence), is meant, just as by 'Devadatta the libertine', one who mainly has a passion for women is meant. Moreover, the passage "Who (i.e. the Jīva-Self) being like (intelligence) moves about in both the worlds" shows, that even when the Jīva-Self goes to another world, it is not separated from intellect. (If we ask ourselves the question) whose likeness does it have when it moves?, (the explanation is)—from its proximity with intelligence, we understand that intelligence (Buddhi) is meant, and that same thing is indicated by, "Meditates as it were, vibrates as it were" (Brih. 4.3.7), which does not mean that it itself meditates or vibrates, but it meditates as it were and vibrates as it were, vicariously, through intelligence, as it (i.e. the intelligence) meditates and vibrates. Again, this contact between the Jīva-Self and intelligence is due to false-ignorance. False-

ignorance is not removed until true knowledge dawns, and as long as the knowledge, that the Self is Brahma, does not supervene, this association of the Jīva-Self with intelligence does not come to an end. The Scriptural passage also indicates the same thing, thus—"I have understood this great Puruṣha, who is endowed with the self-refulgent lustre of the Sun, and who is beyond the darkness of ignorance. It is only by knowing Him (i.e. the Highest Puruṣha) that a person transcends death. There is no other way to final emancipation" (Shvet. 3.8).—30.

But (says the opponent of Vedānta) with respect to the conditions of deep sleep and universal dissolution (Pralaya), it is not possible to understand that the Jīva-Self has any connection with intelligence (Buddhi) because the Scriptures say—"Oh mild one, he then becomes one with the Highest Self ('Sat') i.e. becomes merged into his own Self" (Chhān. 6.8.1). Besides it is also understood that there is a dissolution of the entire creation. How then, can it be, that there is connection of the Jīva-Self with intelligence as long as the Jīva-Self endures (in the transmigratory condition)? To this the reply is:—

*Because, like virility, though it (the connection between intelligence and the Jīva-Self) already exists (in a seed form) it merely becomes manifest (later on).—31.*

Just as in the ordinary world, virility etc. which do exist in a seed form during childhood and are not then recognizable as such, and are therefore considered to be non-existent, become manifest on the advent of adolescence i.e. puberty etc.—and it is not, as if they do not exist (in childhood) but spring up (later on), because, were it to be so, there would be the predicament of their manifesting themselves in the case of eunuchs also—, similarly, this embodied Jīva-Self's connection with intelligence, even though it does exist as a potential power, during deep sleep or universal dissolution, becomes manifest on (a person's) waking up, or at the time of creation (after every Pralaya). It is only in this way, that it is logical, because, nothing really can possibly spring into existence capriciously (i.e.

without a cause), as, otherwise, there would be the predicament of an effect coming into existence unwarrantably, without a cause. The Scriptures moreover indicate how the waking up (of a man) from deep sleep (in the same transmigratory condition as before) is caused by the existence of ignorance (Nescience) in its seed form, thus—“Having merged in the Highest Self (Sat) they fail to realize that they have so merged”, “All those who here (in this world) are (some particular entity), whether they be a tiger or a lion or a wolf etc., (that again they become)”. (Chhān. 6.9.3). Therefore, it is established that this connection of the intelligence with the Jīva-Self continues as long as the Jīva-Self continues as such (i.e. up to the time the Jīva-Self attains Final Release from limiting adjuncts). —31.

*Otherwise (i.e. if the existence of the internal sense organ i.e. Antahkarāṇa is not assumed) there will either be constant perception or constant non-perception (on the part of the Jīva-Self) or else one of the two (viz. Jīva-Self or the Antahkarāṇa) will have to be understood to be subject to a limitation (of its power).—32.*

This internal sense-organ which constitutes itself as the limiting adjunct of the Jīva-Self, is referred to in a different place, as mind or intelligence or knowledge or thought. Occasionally by the division of its modes, it is termed as ‘the mind’ when it functions as the doubter, and as ‘intelligence’ when it has the function of arriving at some specific determination. Now an internal-organ of this type must necessarily be understood to exist, because, if it is not so understood there would be the predicament of there being either constant perception or constant non-perception. When the embodied Jīva-Self, the organs of sense and objects of sense which constitute the means of perception, are together (in combination) there would be constant perception, and if, even when such causes exist together, their result is absent, then there would constantly be non-perception. But it is never observed to be so. Or perhaps, it will have to be understood that there is an

impediment to the power either of the Jīva-Self or of the organ-of-sense. An impediment to the power of the Jīva-Self is not possible, because it is not subject to any modification (of itself). Nor can it be so in the case of the organ-of-sense, because when an organ-of-sense has its power unimpeded during an earlier and a later moment, its power cannot be subject to any impediment, capriciously, (during the intervening moment). Therefore, that (entity) by whose awareness or want of awareness, perception or non-perception respectively result, is the mind. The Scriptures also declare similarly, thus—"I was absent-minded, that is why I did not see. I was absent-minded and hence I did not hear" (Brih. 1.5.3), "It is by the mind that one sees or hears" (Brih. 1.5.3). The Scriptures also indicate, that desires etc. are its (mind's) modes, thus—"Desire, volition, doubt, faith, disbelief, constancy, want of constancy, shame, reflection, fear—all this is but the mind only" (Brih. 1.5.3). Therefore, it is but appropriate that the reference to it (i.e. the Jīva-Self as having the dimension of an Atom i.e. an Aṇu) is because "it has the quintessence of that" (i.e. intelligence).—32.

#### 14. KARTRADHIKARĀṆAM. Sū. 33-40.

*This (Jīva-Self) is the Agent, because (it is only thus) that the Shāstra (i.e. the Scriptures) can have a purpose.—33.*

Along with the same topic, viz., that of the Jīva-Self having the quintessence of the quality of intelligence, another characteristic of the Jīva-Self also, is elaborated (by the Sūtrakāra). This Jīva-Self is in fact an agent. How so? Because it is only thus that the Shāstra (the Scriptures) can have a purpose. It is only in this way, that the Shāstra (the Scriptures) purporting to give injunction such as "He should sacrifice", "Give oblation (to the sacrificial fire)", "Give away (gifts)" can have a proper purpose. Otherwise, it would be purposeless. It is precisely because the Jīva-Self is an agent (a doer, i.e. Kartā), that an instruction as to a particular special duty is given (by the Shāstra i.e. the Scriptures). Supposing there were to be no such capacity as an agent (in the Jīva-

Self) it (i.e. instruction as to a particular special duty) would not be reasonably sustainable. Similarly it is only thus, that the Scriptural statement "He who has the nature of knowledge is the seer, hearer, meditator and knower, agent" (Prashna 5.9) can have a purpose.—33.

*Because there is instruction (in the Scriptures) about the wanderings of the Jiva-Self.—34. .*

This is again why the Jiva-Self is an Agent (i.e. a doer), because the Scriptures, in the chapter dealing with the Jiva-Self, give instruction that in the dream condition the Jiva-Self strolls about thus:—"He the immortal one, goes about at pleasure" (Brih. 4.3.12), "Moves about at pleasure in his own body" (Brih. 2.1.18).—34.

*Also because (the Jiva-Self) employs i.e. uses (the organs-of-sense i.e. instruments). —35.*

This is again why the Jiva-Self is an agent, because in the Scriptures in the chapter dealing with the Jiva-Self, there is mention about the Jiva-Self using the organs-of-sense i.e. instruments thus:—"The Purusha) having by means of his intelligence, taken to himself the power of perception, from the organs-of-sense" (Brih. 2.1.17), "Taking up his Prāṇās (i.e. sense-organs) with him" (Brih. 2.1.18).—35.

*(The Jiva-Self is an agent (Kartā), also because of the mention of the Jiva-Self as the agent, with respect to action. (Were the Jiva-Self) not designated (as the agent) of action (by the word /ijñāna) a designation of a converse nature (about it) would have been made by the Scriptures).—36.*

This again why the Jiva-Self is an agent (Kartā), because the Shāstra (the Scriptures) designates the Jiva-Self as the agent both in secular and Vedic actions, thus:—

“‘Vijnāna’ (Understanding i.e. the Self which has understanding) performs the sacrifice and actions also” (Tait. 2.5.1). But (says the opponent of Vedānta), by the word ‘Vijnāna’ it is intelligence that is understood. How ever then can the Jīva-Self be indicated, by it, to be the agent? We reply—No, this designation precisely is of the Jīva-Self and not of intelligence. Were it not to be the designation of the Jīva-Self, then there would have been a converse designation, thus—‘Vijnānena’ (*By means of understanding*), because it is seen in other places that when by the word ‘Vijnāna’ intelligence (Buddhi) is meant to be designated, the designation is by the use of the instrumental case (Tritiya i.e. Karaṇa-Vibhakti) thus—“Having by means of ‘Vijnāna’ i.e. intelligence (i.e. Buddhi) taken to himself ‘the power of knowing’ (of the sense-organs)” (Brih. 2.1.17). On the other hand, here, the designation being in the same case-ending as that of the agent (i.e. the Jīva-Self), thus—“Vijnānam (the Ātmā) performs the sacrifice” (Tait. 2.5.1), it suggests the agency of the Self which is different from intelligence (Buddhi), and so it is faultless.—36.

Here (the opponent of Vedānta says)—If the Jīva-Self, an entity distinctly different from intelligence (Buddhi) were to be the agent, then being independent, it would as a rule uniformly do only that which is dear and beneficial to itself, and not the other way (i.e. against its own interest), but it is observed to be doing even that which is contrary (i.e. against its own interest). It is not reasonably sustainable therefore that there should be any such non-uniform tendency in the Jīva-Self. The reply (of the Vedāntin) is:—

*As in the case of perception there is such non-uniformity (of tendency in the Jīva-Self).—37.*

Just as the Jīva-Self, independent though it is, so far as its power of perception is concerned, perceives both what is desirable and undesirable in a non-uniform manner, even so, it also may well do both what is desirable and what is undesirable in an equally non-uniform manner. If it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta) that even in the case

of perception there is no such independence (in the Jīva-Self) because of its dependence on the employment of the means of perception, we reply—No, because the acquisition of the means of perception has merely the purpose of presenting the objects of sense (to the Jīva-Self) and in as much as the Jīva-Self possesses intelligence, it has not to depend upon anything else, in the matter of perception. Besides even so far as purposive actions are concerned, there never is complete independence in the Jīva-Self, because it has to depend upon particular environment, time and causes. It is not, that an agent ceases to be an agent, merely because he depends upon such auxiliaries. A cook, even though, in the matter of cooking, he has to depend upon fuel and water, he nevertheless still has the culinary ability in him. The tendency of the Jīva-Self, therefore, towards doing both desirable and undesirable actions in the non-uniform manner, is not contradictory merely because of the variety of the auxiliaries of actions.—37.

*Because of the reversal of power.—38.*

This is again why the Jīva-Self, as distinct from Vijnāna (intelligence), deserves to be the agent. Were intelligence, as understood by the word 'Vijnāna' to be the agent, then thereby, there would be a reversal of power, viz., the power of being the organ-of-sense, which belongs to intelligence, would be lost, and would be substituted by the power of an agent. Now, assuming intelligence to possess the power of an agent, it will have to be understood, that 'intelligence' itself is the subject of the ego-consciousness. Because it is the general experience that the tendency (towards activity) is preceded by the consciousness of ego, thus—I go, I return, I eat, I drink etc. . When intelligence is thus understood to be equipped with the power of an agent, then another sense-organ able to accomplish all its ends, will have to be imagined to belong to it, because it is seen that notwithstanding the agent's ability (to act), he proceeds to act through some instrument (of action). Hence, the dispute (between the Vedāntin and his opponent) is merely about the nomenclature, while there is not the least difference (between them) with regard to the entity (indicated by any such nomenclature), because it is the

common ground (of both) that the agent is different from the instruments i.e. sense-organs of action.—38.

*(The Self of course is an agent) because otherwise meditation (on the Highest Self) would not be possible.—39.*

The instruction that Vedānta gives with regard to meditation, which has the realization of the Highest Self described in the Upanishads, as its fruit, thus—“(Oh Maitreyi), the Self should be seen, heard, cogitated upon and meditated upon. He should be sought, he should be desired to be known” (Brih. 2.4.5.), “Meditate on the Self as Om” (Mund. 2.2.6), would not be reasonably sustainable, if the Jīva-Self were not to be an agent. From this also it becomes established that the Jīva-Self is the agent (Kartā).—39.

#### 15. TAKSHĀDHĪKARĀṆAM. Sū. 40.

*Also, just as a carpenter (is seen to possess) a dual capacity (even so the embodied individual Jīva-Self also has a dual capacity).—40.*

It has so far been demonstrated on the strength of reasons, such as—(only if it is considered that way) that the Shāstra can be said to have a purpose etc.—, as to how the Jīva-Self is an agent, and it is now being further considered whether such agency of the agent (i.e. the Jīva-Self) is its innate nature or whether it is caused by the limiting adjuncts. Here, (the conclusion of the opponent of Vedānta is) that it is because of these reasons themselves—viz. such as that the Shāstra can have a purpose, only if it is considered that way—, and also because of the absence of any reason for there being any exception to it, that the Jīva-Self's being an agent is its innate nature. To this conclusion, we reply :—

That the Jīva-Self is an agent by reason of its innate nature, is not possible, because of the predicament of there being no Final Release. If, being an agent were to be the Jīva-Self's innate nature, there is no possibility of its ever being released from such activity as an agent, even as fire,



for instance, can never be rid of its heat. There could be no attainment of the highest aim of man (i.e. Final Release) for one, who is not free from such agency, since agency is of the nature of pain. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) the attainment of the highest aim of a man (i.e. Final Release) may be achieved, even while the power of action subsists, merely by the avoidance (of actions, by the agent), and such avoidance (of action by the agent), in its turn, can result from the avoidance of its cause, just as, even though fire has the power to burn, there is absence of such action of burning, when fire is separated from its fuel. (We reply) —No, because, it is not possible for such causes, which are connected (with the Jīva-Self) through a relation of having the nature of potential power, to be totally non-existent. But (says the opponent of Vedānta, again) Final Release may still be achieved by the Jīva-Self (as an entirely *new* acquisition) because such means of attaining Final Release are mentioned (by the Scriptures). (We reply) —No, because any thing that is dependent on such means (for its coming into existence) is necessarily non-eternal (and *ergo*—Final Release would be non-eternal). Besides it is declared (by the Scriptures) that Final Release is accomplished by expounding, that the Highest Self is eternally pure, enlightened, and free. Expounding in this manner cannot be possible, if the Jīva-Self's being an agent were to be natural to it. Therefore, such agency of the Jīva-Self is due to the superimposition on it of the characteristics of the limiting adjuncts, and is not natural (to it). The Scriptures also say so, thus—"It meditates as it were, it vibrates as it were" (Brih. 4.37), and by the passage "The wise call him, who is endowed with body, organs-of-sense and mind, as the experiencer" (Kāṭha. 3.4). The Scriptures also indicate that it is the Self itself, when it is affected with limiting adjuncts, that acquires the special nature of being the experiencer etc.. To those who can discriminate properly, there is no Jīva-Self as such as apart from the Highest Self, that is an agent or an experiencer, because the Scriptures have declared "There is no other seer than this (Highest Self)" (Brih. 4.3.23) etc.. (The opponent here says), If (as you the Vedāntin say) that there is no such other sentient Jīva-Self that is of a transmigratory nature and is an agent, and is separate from the aggregate

of intelligence etc., as apart from the Highest Self, then it would be that the Highest Self itself, would be one who has this transmigratory nature, and who is an agent and an experiencer. (We reply)—No, because this condition of being an agent and an experiencer is brought about by Nescience. The Shāstra (the Scriptures) also, after indicating that the Jīva-Self is an agent and an experiencer only during the condition of Nescience, thus—"Where there is duality as it were, there one sees the other" (Brih. 2.4.14), further on, rules out even the selfsame Jīva-Self's being an agent and an experiencer, when such Jīva-Self itself attains enlightenment, thus—"When all this becomes to him but the Self only, by what can one see, and what?" (Brih. 2.4.14). Similarly (the Scriptures) having referred to the exhausted condition of Jīva-Self, caused by the contamination of the limiting adjuncts during the condition of wakefulness and dreams, similar to that of a falcon flying about in the sky, further on, refer to the absence of such exhausted condition in the Jīva-Self when it is embraced by the Highest Self during the condition of deep sleep, beginning with "That really is its true form (Rūpa), wherein, it is one, whose desires are all fulfilled, whose only desire is merely to be itself (Ātmakāma) and who is sans-desire and is untouched by any pain (Shokāntara)" (Brih. 4.3.21), and the Scriptures then conclude thus—"This is its highest goal, this is its highest accomplishment, its highest world, and its highest bliss" (Brih. 4.3.32). The same thing is expressed by the Āchārya (by the above Sūtra)—"Also just as a carpenter etc.". The 'Cha' (Also) used in the Sūtra is used in the sense of 'Tu' (But). It should not be considered that the Jīva-Self's being an agent is natural to it, in the same manner in which heat is natural to fire. Just as in the ordinary world, a carpenter who has his tools, such as an axe etc., in his hand (for working with), is an agent and is in that way conscious of pain, but, when the self-same carpenter, having laid down his tools such as the axe etc. and having reached home, is at nobody's beck and call, relaxes and is off-duty, and thus feels happy, similarly, the Jīva-Self, while it is connected with the notion of duality caused by Nescience, is an agent, and is unhappy during the condition of wakefulness and dreams, but when for the purpose of overcoming its fatigue it enters

its own self i.e. the Highest Self and is relieved of the aggregate of actions and organs-of-sense during the condition of deep sleep, and is no more an agent, it becomes happy. Even so, in the condition of Final Release also, the Jīva-Self having the darkness of Nescience dispelled by the lamp of knowledge, and by emerging as the pure Highest Self, becomes happy. The illustration of the carpenter should be understood to apply to this extent only, viz. that the carpenter is an agent, only when he requires such definite particular tools as an axe etc. for such particular work of cutting etc., but is not an agent so far as his own body is concerned, even so, the Jīva-Self becomes an agent only as it requires organs-of-sense such as the mind etc. for all its activities, but is not an agent so far as it itself is concerned. It is not as if the Jīva-Self has limbs, like the carpenter, by which it either picks up the organs-of-sense or throws them away, just as the carpenter picks up his axe etc. by the hand or throws them away. With regard to the objection (raised by the opponent of Vedānta) that the Jīva-Self is an agent by its very nature, because thus only, can the Shāstra (the Scriptures) be said to have a purpose, (we reply)—No. So far as the Shāstra which deals with injunctions goes, it merely accepts the conventional agency of the Jīva-Self as ordinarily conceived, and gives instruction about a particular duty, but does not itself purport to establish any such agency of the Jīva-Self.

We have said already that the Jīva-Self's being an agent is not natural to it, because the Shāstra gives instruction about its true Self being Brahma. Therefore, the Shāstra of injunctions may well proceed by accepting the conventional agency of the Jīva-Self as caused by Nescience. The reference by the Shāstra (to the Jīva-Self) as "The agent, the knowing Self and Purusha" (Prashna 4.9) may well be of the nature of an Anuvāda\* and may merely refer in a conventional manner to the agency (of the Jīva-Self) as caused by Nescience. This much is sufficient also to refute (the objections of the opponent of Vedānta, about) the 'moving about (Vihāra)' and 'taking up' (Upādāna) (referred to in Sūtrās 34 and 35), because they also are of the nature of an Anuvāda. But (says the oppo-

\* Incidental remarks about a matter already established elsewhere.

nent of Vedānta), the instructions (of the Scriptures) about the 'moving about', thus—"In the condition of dreams while the organs-of-sense are dormant (the Jīva-Self) moves about in its own body at pleasure" (Brih. 2.1.18), indicate the agency to be of the pure Self, thus—"The Purusha having taken up intelligence through the intelligence (Vijnāna) of the organs-of-sense (i.e. Prāṇās)." The use of the instrumental (in Vijnānena) and objective case-endings in the case of the means such as the organs-of-sense (Buddhi etc.), intimates that the pure Self is an agent. To this, the reply is—It is not that even during the condition of dreams, there is any complete cessation of the use of the organs-of-sense of the Self, because the Scriptures, in the passage "It is along with intelligence that the Jīva-Self having entered the dream-state, goes beyond this world" (Brih. 4.3.7), also declare how the Jīva-Self even in that condition is still in association with intelligence. The Smṛiti also says thus—"When the organs-of-sense are dormant but the mind is not dormant (i.e. is still working) and is experiencing the objects-of-sense, know that to be the dream-state". The Scriptures declare that desires etc. are the modes of the mind and the same are witnessed during dream-state, therefore, (the Jīva-Self) moves about along with the mind during the dream-state. The wandering during that condition, also, is of the nature of mental impressions and not in the real sense. Thus the Scriptures also describe the activities of dream-state as qualified by an 'as it were', thus—"Enjoying the company of women, or laughing, or eating, as it were, or seeing frightful things, as it were" (Brih. 4.3.13). People in the ordinary world also speak about their dreams similarly—"I ascended the peak of the mountain, as it were, or, as it were, I saw the forest". Even with regard to the Scriptural statements about 'taking up', even though there is an indication that the organs-of-sense are governed by the instrumental and objective cases, it should still be understood that the agency of the Jīva-Self is only while it continues to be affected by the organs-of-sense, because it has already been indicated that the pure Self as such could never possibly be the agent. In the ordinary world also, expressions (of thoughts) take various forms, thus—the warriors fight, the king fights (vicariously) through his warriors. Besides in

the Scriptural mention of this 'taking up' (Upādāna) also, it is intended only to speak of the cessation of the activity of the organs-of-sense, and not of the independence of any thing, because, it is observed that during the condition of deep sleep there is a cessation of the activity of the organs-of-sense, even without any such deliberate intention. That reference which has been made earlier, viz. "Vijnānam (understanding i.e. Self) performs the sacrifice", causes one to arrive at the conclusion that intelligence alone is the agent because it is well-known that the word 'understanding' means intelligence, and also as it is mentioned immediately after 'the mind', because, the Scriptural passage "Faith is its Caput" (Tait. 2.4) recites faith etc. as the limbs of the Jīva-Self whose structure is knowledge, and faith etc. are well-known to be the attributes of intelligence, and also because the complementary passage is—"All Gods i.e. sense-organs worship intelligence as the Highest and as Brahma" (Tait. 2.5.1), and also because it is well-known that intelligence is the highest and first-born, and finally, also because, from another Scriptural passage "That which is called the sacrifice comes later and later in order, of speech and intelligence (Buddhi)", it is understood that a sacrifice is dependent upon speech and intelligence (Buddhi) for its accomplishment. Even if it be understood that the organs-of-sense are the agent, yet there is no substitution of the power of intelligence, i.e. intelligence would not lose its power as an organ-of-sense and acquire the power of an agent (i.e. Kārtā), because all causes (Kārakās) have necessarily to be the agents of their own respective functions. It is only with respect to perception that the organs-of-sense are sense-organs as such, but perception itself is by the Jīva-Self. With regard to that even, there could be no agency as such in the Jīva-Self, because, eternal perceptivity is its nature. Nor can such percipient (i.e. the Self) have such agency due to its ego-consciousness, because ego-consciousness itself is an object of perception (by the Self), and even though matters stand thus, there could be no predicament of having to imagine any extraneous organs-of-sense, because intelligence itself is understood to be such an organ-of-sense.

The objection, that meditation (Samādhi) would not be possible, should be understood to have already been re-

futed on the same ground, on which 'that it is only thus that the Shāstra can be understood to have a purpose' has been refuted, because it is by presupposing such conventional agency (in the Jīva-Self, as established by other authority) that an injunction about 'meditation' is given. Therefore, it is thus firmly established that the Jīva-Self is an agent, only in so far as it is such an agent as a result of the limiting adjuncts (and is not so in reality).—40.

16. PARAYATTADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 41-42.

*But, this agentship of the Jīva-Self is caused by the transcendent (Para) Highest Lord, because the Scriptures declare it (to be so).—41.*

It becomes necessary to consider, whether, with regard to this agentship of the Jīva-Self spoken of by the Scriptures and depending upon the limiting adjuncts during the condition of Nescience, the Jīva-Self is quite independent of the Lord or is dependent upon Him. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that the Jīva-Self is not dependent upon the Lord, so far as its agentship is concerned. Whence is it so? Because of the absence of any reason for such dependence (on the Lord). This Jīva-Self, subject as it itself is, to the faults of passion and aversion, and equipped as it is with all the other paraphernalia of means, may well be able to experience such agentship for itself. In what way then can the Lord help it (i.e. the Jīva-Self)? It is not generally known in this world, that in the matter of agricultural pursuits etc., in addition to a bullock, another entity such as the Lord also is needed. Were the Lord to create all these beings duly endowed with such essentially painful agentship, he would expose himself to the fault of pitilessness i.e. cruelty, and invidiousness also, in ordaining in them such agentship involving non-uniform results. But (says the Vedāntin) it has been said before (that such partiality and cruelty are not attributable to the Lord, because he depends upon the actions of the beings), viz., in Bra. Sū. Bhā. II. i. 34. No doubt, it has been so said and it would also be proper, provided (in the present case) such dependence (by the Lord upon actions of beings) were at all possible. Such

dependence by him would be possible provided the beings possessed merit and demerit, and they would have such merit and demerit provided they were to possess agentship in them. Now if such agentship were to be dependent upon the Lord (as you the Vedāntin suggest) on what (other things, inherent in his beings) would the Lord depend? Supposing it does happen to be so (i.e. such agentship is dependent upon the Lord), then the Jīva-Self would be liable to be visited with the consequences of actions which it has not committed (because assuming that the Lord has not to depend upon the meritorious and unmeritorious actions of beings, he would have to be supposed to render such fruits, even without action on the part of beings). Therefore, its agentship is its own and is natural to it.

The Sūtrakāra refutes this conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta) with the word "Tu" (But) and declares—"Is caused by the transcendent (Para) Highest Lord" (words in the above Sūtra). During the condition of Nescience, when the Jīva-Self is blinded by the darkness of ignorance, and is unable to distinguish itself to be different from the aggregate of sense-organs, this transmigratory existence, characterized by the Jīva-Self's being an agent and an experiencer, deserves to result as sanctioned by the Lord, i.e. the transcendent Highest Self, who resides in all beings, presides over all their actions, is the immediate witness (of everything), and quickens intelligence in everybody, and Final Release also deserves to be attained only by means of true knowledge generated (in the Jīva-Self) by His grace. Whence is it so? Because of the Scriptural statement to that effect. Though the Jīva-Self is contaminated with faults and is equipped with all the necessary paraphernalia of means, and though in the ordinary world it is not seen that the Lord is the means or cause of such activities as agricultural pursuits etc., yet it is conclusively understood from the Scriptures that the Lord is the motivating cause of all tendencies (of the Jīva-Self). Even so do the Scriptures declare in passages of the following type—"He makes those whom he wishes to lead to the abyss, do evil deeds" (Kaush. 3.8), and "He, who, himself dwelling in the Jīva-Self, controls it from within" (Shatapatha Brā. 14.6.7.30).—41.

But (still persists the opponent of Vedānta) if the Lord is the prime-mover of all actions, partiality or invidious distinctions and cruelty will necessarily attach (to the Lord), and besides, the Jiva-Self would still be visited with consequences of actions not committed by it. The reply is—No.

*But in order that the injunctions and prohibitions etc. (in the Scriptures) may not be rendered meaningless, (it is proved that the Lord) depends upon the efforts made (by the Jiva-Self).—42.*

The word “Tu” (But) has the purport of refuting the fault alleged. In causing the Jiva-Self to act, the Lord depends upon that effort in the nature of merit and demerit which is made by the Jiva-Self. Hence, those faults attributed (by the opponent of Vedānta) do not occur. Depending upon the disparity between meritorious and unmeritorious actions of the Jiva-Self, the Lord serving merely as the accidental cause, like the rain, distributes these unequal fruits of the meritorious and unmeritorious actions of the Jiva-Self, even as, in the ordinary world, rain is the common cause, by which large and small creepers etc., or rice and barley etc., grow up out of their own particular individual seeds. Just as, in the absence of rain or these particular seeds, the differences in their sap, flowers, and the green colour of the leaves (Palāsha—Chlorophyl) do not occur, even so it is just proper (to say) that depending upon the efforts made by the Jiva-Self, the Lord may give it auspicious or inauspicious fruits (of its actions).

But (says the opponent of Vedānta) it cannot be reasonably sustainable that the Lord depends upon the efforts made by the Jiva-Self, if the Jiva-Self’s very agentship is dependent upon somebody other than itself i.e. upon the transcendent (Highest Self). (The reply is)—This is no fault. Even though its agentship is dependent upon the Lord, it is the Jiva-Self, after all, that does, in fact, act. The Lord causes it to act in the present, depending upon what it did in the past, and He made it act in the past by depending upon what it did before even that past, and as



this transmigratory existence is beginningless, the argument is thus flawless. (The opponent of Vedānta says)—How again, is it understood that the Lord depends upon the effort made (by the Jīva-Self)? The reply is—(It is to be so presumed) as, otherwise, Scriptural injunctions and prohibitions would be rendered meaningless etc.. It is only if it is supposed to be so in this manner that injunctions and prohibitions of the nature of “One desirous of heaven should sacrifice”, “A Brāhmaṇa may not be killed” would have any meaning, otherwise they would be meaningless, and the Lord Himself would be made a substitute for the observance of these injunctions and prohibitions (in the sense, that their work would be done by the Lord himself), inasmuch as the Jīva-Self is entirely dependent upon the Lord (i.e. he would merely be an automaton i.e. a Robot) in the hands of another (i.e. the Lord). In the same manner the Lord may vouchsafe calamities as the fruit, to a man who does what is enjoined, and may render good to one who does what is tabooed, and thus the authority of the Scriptures would be undermined. The Sūtrakāra by the word ‘etc.’ in the Sūtra, indicates that were the Lord not to depend upon the efforts of men i.e. of the Jīva-Selfs in the ordinary world, the efforts would be rendered meaningless, as also environment, time and causes, and there would be the predicament of all those faults referred to above, occurring.—42.

17. AMSHĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 43-53.

*(The Jīva-Self) is a part (of Brahma) because of the representation (in the Scriptures) of its being different from the other, and that it is also non-different (from Brahma), because, some (i.e. Ārtharvaṇikās) speak of Brahma, in another way also, as being a fisherman and a knave or a gambler etc..—43.*

That, as between the Jīva-Self and the Lord there is a mutual relationship, as between one who is favoured and one who confers such favour, respectively, has already been spoken of. Now such mutual relationship is

observed in the ordinary world to exist only as between those who are bound up with each other, as for instance between the master and his servant or as between the fire and its scintillae. Hence, when as between the Jiva-Self and the Lord, a mutual relationship as between one who is favoured and one who confers such favour is understood to subsist, and when it is being considered as to whether such mutual relationship between them is a relationship as between the master and his servant, or as between the fire and its scintillae, the conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of the Vedānta) is, that either there is no rule as to that, or that the relationship between the Lord and the Jiva-Self is similar to that between the master and servant between whom, as is well-known, there is a relation of the nature of the ruler and the ruled.

To this conclusion, the reply is—It is a part (Amsha). The Jiva-Self deserves to be a part of the Lord even as the scintilla is a part of the fire. When it is said that it is a part, what is meant is that it is a part, *as it were*. It is impossible that it could be a part in the principal or literal sense of that which is partless (i.e. the Lord). If so (intervenes the opponent of Vedānta), inasmuch as the Lord has no parts, why cannot the Jiva-Self be the Lord himself? (The reply is)—Because it has been stated that they are different. If, in fact, there were to be no difference (between the Jiva-Self and the Lord), then declarations signifying difference between them, such as “He should be searched for, to know him should be desired” (Chhān. 8.7.1), “After knowing him one becomes a sage (Muni)” (Brih. 4.4.22), “Who residing within the Jiva-Self rules it from within” (Brih. 3.7.23) would not fit in properly. But (the opponent of Vedānta may say) this declaration of difference fits in very well, if it is understood that such difference is similar to the difference between the master and servant. The reply to this is—“Because some (Ātharvaṇikās) speak of Brahma in another way also” (in the Sūtra). It is not that merely by the declaration of difference (between the two), it is understood that the Jiva-Self is a part (of the Lord), but that there is a statement the other way which propounds non-difference (between them) also. The followers of one branch of the Atharva-Veda i.e. Ātharvaṇikās, recite in the ‘Brahma-

Sūkta', that Brahma is identical with fishermen, slaves and gamblers etc. also, thus—"Fishermen are Brahma, slaves are Brahma, and these gamblers also are Brahma. Dāshās are these fishermen, slaves are those who waste themselves in the service of their master, and the others, the gamblers, all these are Brahma", and thus the Scriptures by giving instances of these low creatures, show that all these Jīva-Selfs who have entered into this aggregate of bodies and sense-organs, brought about by names and forms, are but Brahma. Elsewhere also, in the chapter (Prakriyā) dealing with Brahma, the same sense is conveyed, thus—"Thou thyself art a woman, a man, a youth, a maiden. Thou thyself art a crabbed old man going about with a staff, and thou gettest born thus, in all ways and in all directions" (Shvet. 4.3); "Having created all forms, the wise one gives them names and sits calling them by their names" (Tait. Āra. 3.12.7). The same meaning is conveyed by another Scriptural passage, thus—"There is no seer, other than this" (Brih. 3.7.23). Sentieny is common, as between the Jīva-Self and the Lord, even as heat is common, both to the fire and its scintillae. That the Jīva-Self is thus a part (of the Lord) is understood by appreciating that there is both difference and non-difference (between them).—43.

Whence again is it understood that the Jīva-Self is a part ?

*Also because of the words of the Mantrās.*

—44.

The words of the Scriptural Mantrās also intimate this fact, thus—"So much is its greatness, and the Purusha is even greater than that; His (one) foot (i.e. part) comprises all the beings, and the remaining three feet are in heaven, (and are) immortal" (Chhān. 3.12.6). The Scriptures here indicate by the word 'beings' (Bhūtās), the entire set of immoveable and moveable things, the Jīva-Self being at their head. Also because it is said—"One who does not kill any being elsewhere than the Tīrthās (i.e. in observances according to the Shāstra, i.e. while performing sacrifices)". Part, foot, portion, are all synonymous terms. Therefore, it is understood that the Jīva-Self is a part (of the Lord).—44.

Whence again is it understood that the Jīva-Self is a part ?

*Besides, the Smṛiti also mentions similarly.*

—45.

In the 'Īshvaragītā' also, the Smṛiti mentions how the Jīva-Self is a part of the Lord, thus—"It is but my eternal (Sanātana) part, which, in the world, has become the Jīva-Self." With regard to what has been said (by the opponent of Vedānta) viz. that it is only as between the master and servant that the relationship of the one that rules and the one that is ruled, is seen to subsist, (what we say is)—be that as it may in the ordinary world, it is, however, here ascertained through the Shāstra, that there is a relationship of a part to the whole or a relationship in which there is one that rules and one that is ruled. There is nothing contradictory in saying that the Lord who has unexcelled limiting adjuncts (such as omniscience etc.) is the one that rules, and the Jīva-Self that has inferior limiting adjuncts (such as bodies etc.) is the one that is ruled.—45.

Here (the opponent of Vedānta) says—If it be understood that the Jīva-Self is a part of the Lord, then along with the sufferings of this transmigratory existence experienced by the Jīva-Self, the Lord also would suffer as well, even as in the ordinary world, by any localized pain either in Devadatta's hands or feet (which are parts of his body), Devadatta, whose body it is, would himself be the sufferer. Therefore, those who have reached Godhood would suffer the greatest pain, and under such circumstances (it would seem that) even the transmigratory existence (of the Jīva-Self) in the earlier stage would be preferable (to the later stage of the greatest pain after the attainment of Godhood), and thus, there would be the predicament of true knowledge being rendered purposeless. The reply to this is :—

*Similar to light etc., the Highest Self (does not experience pain) like (the Jīva-Self).*

—46.

We understand on the contrary, that the Highest Lord does not experience the pain inherent in transmigratory

existence, as does the Jīva-Self. The Jīva-Self having identified itself with the body, *as it were*, through the influence of Nescience, considers itself through ignorance, as the sufferer of pain caused to the body, but the Lord never identifies himself with a body, nor does he feel that he himself is suffering. Even in the case of the Jīva-Self, the experience of pain by it, is not in the real sense, but such experience is *as it were* caused by the confusion i.e. delusion due to its failure to discriminate between itself and the limiting adjuncts such as the body and the organs-of-sense, brought about by names and forms produced by Nescience. Just as the Jīva-Self experiences pain caused by burns or bruises of the body, through the confusion i.e. delusion of identifying itself with the body, similarly, through confusion i.e. delusion it experiences pain by identifying itself with the body of a son or a friend by entering into them, *as it were*, and by saying to itself 'I myself am the son, I myself am the friend, and by imagining the pain suffered by a son or a friend, as suffered by itself, through its love of such a son or such a friend. From this it is definitely ascertained that the experience of pain is caused by the confusion i.e. delusion due to false identification (Abhimāna). It is so understood from positive and negative instances also, when for instance, many persons having sons and friends and having such false attachment, happen to be sitting together along with some others (who have no such sons or friends), and when it is proclaimed (by somebody) that the son or friend has died, it is only those who have such attachment in the form of a son or a friend that are stricken with grief, and not those peripatetics (i.e. Parivrājakās or Sanyāsins) who are devoid of any such false attachments. Hence, it is observed, that even in the case of persons in the ordinary world, true knowledge has a definite use or meaning (Arthavattvam). How much more will such use or meaning then be, to one, who refuses to recognize any other object but the Highest Self, which is completely devoid of any notion of being any object as such, and whose nature is of eternal sentiency? Therefore there could never be the predicament of true knowledge being purposeless (as was suggested by the opponent of Vedānta). The words 'similar to light etc.' (in the Sūtra) furnish the statement of an illustration, viz., just

as when the solar or lunar light which occupies the Ākāsha, on being affected by such limiting adjuncts, as the little finger etc., assumes a straight or crooked aspect according as the little finger etc. are straight or crooked, but it really has no such aspect in itself, and it does not in fact become so in the real sense, or just as the Ākāsha is seen to be moving, when earthen pots etc. are moving, but it does not itself move in fact, or just as when a reflection of the sun in a water-trough appears to vibrate when the water-trough is shaken, but the sun whose reflection it is, does not vibrate in fact, even so, when the so-called Jīva-Self which is but only a portion *as it were* (of the Lord), and is brought into existence by Nescience and is then equipped with intellect, suffers from pain (or rather appears so to suffer), the Lord, whose part (*as it were*) the Jīva-Self is, is not in the least affected by any such pain. We have said already that even the supposed suffering of pain by the Jīva-Self, is caused by Nescience (and it is not real), and the Vedānta texts uniformly expound, how, when the Jīva-Self's notion of selfhood, which is brought into being by Nescience, is itself effaced, the Jīva-Self is nothing but the Highest Self or Brahma itself, by such Scriptural passages as "That thou art" etc.. Hence, there could be no predicament of the Highest Self or Brahma being affected by pain (supposed to be) suffered by the Jīva-Self.—46.

*Smṛiti also says (similarly).—47.*

Vyāsa and others also say in the Smṛiti, how the Highest Self is not affected by the pain suffered by the Jīva-Self, thus—"As between the two i.e. the Jīva-Self and the Highest-Self (Tatra), the Highest Self is declared by the Smṛiti, to be eternal, sans-attributes, and unaffected or untouched by fruits of actions, even as a lotus leaf is not touched by water, but the other one whose nature is action (i.e. the Jīva-Self) is the one who is affected by bondage and Final Release, and again comes into contact with the aggregate of the seventeen (i.e. the body which consists of the ten organs-of sense, five Prāṇās, the mind and intellect)". The word 'Cha' (in the Sūtra) means, that it should be understood to be implied, that the Scriptures also declare similarly, viz. "One of the two (i.e. the Jīva-Self) eats the

sweet fruit, and the other (i.e. the Highest Self) while it does not eat, merely looks on" (Shvet. 4.6), "Similarly, the one Self of all beings, who is beyond (the pale of the world), is not affected by worldly pain" (Kāṭha. 5.11).—47.

Here (the opponent of Vedānta says), if there is then, only one internal Self of all beings, how could there be the Vedic and worldly acquiescences (Anujñā) to perform acts, and inhibitions (Parihāra) i.e. injunctions and prohibitions? (The Vedāntin says)—But it has been stated that the Jīva-Self is but a part (*as it were*) of the Lord. And it is reasonably sustainable, that assuming this conventional difference, these acquiescences to perform (any act) and inhibitions, which depend on such difference, may very well be there, without causing any confusion. What is it, then, to which you object? (To this, the opponent of Vedānta says)—It can't be so, because those Scriptural passages which declare the non-difference of the Jīva-Self (with the Lord), also propound the Jīva-Self's not being a part, thus—"After creating that, it itself entered into it" (Tait. 2.6.1); "There is no other seer than this" (Brih. 3.7.23); "One who sees all things as different, goes from death to death" (Brih. 4.4.19); "That thou art" (Chhān. 6.8.7); "I am Brahma" (Brih. 1.4.10) etc.. But (says the Vedāntin) it has been said, that it is by realizing the difference and non-difference (between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self or Brahma), that 'that the Jīva-Self is a part (of Brahma)' is proved. (To this the opponent of Vedānta replies)—It would be like this, provided it were intended to propound both the difference and non-difference, but herein, it is the non-difference that is intended to be propounded, the attainment of the man's aim in life being dependent upon the realization that the Jīva-Self is but Brahma only. It is the natural conventional difference that is referred to, and it has been said that the Jīva-Self cannot possibly be a part in the real sense, of Brahma, which is devoid of any part, and it is only the Highest Self, the internal Self of all beings, that subsists in the form of the Jīva-Self, and therefore, it is necessary to explain, how acquiescences and inhibitions are reasonably sustainable.

We explain that as follows :—

*“Like Jyoti (i.e. Teja) etc., injunctions and prohibitions (become feasible) by the (Jiva-Self’s) contact with a body”.—48.*

Though the Self is but one only, injunctions and prohibitions of the following sort become feasible through its (i.e. the Self’s) contact with bodies, thus—injunction, for instance, that “the wife should be approached at the proper time”, or a prohibition that “the wife of a preceptor must never be approached”, or injunction that “an animal should be sacrificed as an offering to Agni and Soma”, or a prohibition that “no beings should be killed”, or even in the ordinary world, a permission that “a friend should be entertained”, or a prohibition that “an enemy should not be neglected” etc.. Contact with the bodies is ‘body-contact’. Now, what is this body-contact? It means the generation of a perverse notion (in the Self) that this aggregate of body etc., is the Self itself. It is observed to exist in all beings (and is expressed thus) :—I go, I come, I am blind, I am perplexed, I am not perplexed, etc.. Now, nothing else but true knowledge is able to remove this perverse notion, and this confusion i.e. delusion is constantly present in all beings, before true knowledge dawns, and even though the oneness of the Self is properly understood, such injunctions and prohibitions become plausible because of the notion of difference (between the Jiva-Self and Brahma) created by the Self’s contact with limiting adjuncts such as a body etc., brought about by Nescience. Then (says the opponent of Vedānta), the conclusion necessarily follows, that such injunctions or prohibitions are meaningless in the case of a person who has attained true knowledge. (We reply)—No. It is precisely because such person has accomplished his aim (Purushārtha) that he does not remain a fit subject for being enjoined (about such injunctions or prohibitions), for it is only he, who is fit to be so enjoined, that can be enjoined to discard or accept (this, that or any other thing). How can any one, who does not recognize anything (beyond the Ātmā) as being fit either for discarding or accepting, be possibly enjoined? The Self can never be enjoined upon receiving instruction about itself. (If the opponent of the Vedānta were to suggest)—It is precisely such person as realizes the body to be different from the Self, that



is fit to be enjoined, (we reply)—No, because it is only when the notion of being bound up with the body is present in the Self, that it becomes fit for instruction. Though it is true that it is only when a person recognizes the body to be different from the Self, that he is fit to be enjoined, it is only that person who does not realize that his Self is not bound up with the body—even as the Ākāsha is not bound up (with a jar)—that considers himself to be fit for being enjoined. Because no person who understands that he is not bound up with a body is seen to be fit for being enjoined. How can, then, a man who realizes the oneness of Self, be ever fit to be enjoined (about either injunctions or prohibitions)? It is not, that in the case of a man who has attained true knowledge and is not therefore a proper person to be enjoined, there would be the predicament of such person behaving as it pleases him, because in all cases it is the wrong notion (about the Self being bound up with the body) that promotes action, and those who have attained true knowledge never have any such notion. Therefore injunctions and prohibitions are possible only on account of the relationship (of the Self) with the body. This is just as it is in the case of Jyoti (Teja). Though Teja is the same as fire (Agni), fire from a crematorium only is never accepted while fire in other places is accepted. Similarly, though light of the sun is the same everywhere, it is only the light in an impure (Amedhya) place that is rejected, but not that in a pure (Shuchi) place. Similarly so far as earthly things go, things such as diamonds and beryls etc. are accepted but not the human cadaver etc., or just as the excreta of a cow are accepted because of their purity, but not that of any other species.—48.

*There could be no confusion (of actions or fruits), because the Jiva-Self is not in simultaneous connection (with all bodies).*

—49.

(Says the opponent of Vedānta)—Injunctions and prohibitions may well be possible, even though the Jiva-Self is but one only, because of its connection with every particular different body. Again if it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta) that, if it is understood that the Jiva-

Self is but one only, so far as its connection with the fruits of actions goes, it is bound to cause confusion, in as much as the Lord of all bodies (i.e. the Self) is but one Jīva only (even though the bodies are many), (we reply)—No, it could not be so, because of connection not being constant. There is no constant and comprehensive connection of the Jīva-Self who is an agent and an experiencer, with all bodies. It has been said already, that the Jīva-Self is subject to limiting adjuncts, and because of these limiting adjuncts not being comprehensive and constant (*Asantānāt*), there could be no simultaneous connection of the Jīva-Self with all bodies, and hence there could not be any confusion of actions or confusion of fruits of actions.—49.

*Also, (the Jīva-Self) is but merely a false appearance i.e. reflection (of the Highest Self).—50.*

It should be understood, that this Jīva-Self is but merely a false appearance i.e. reflection of the Highest Self, similar to the reflection of the sun in water. It is neither the Highest Self actually, nor is it quite a different entity altogether. Hence, just as when one reflection of the sun in one piece of water vibrates, another such reflection of the sun in another piece of water does not vibrate, similarly, when one Jīva-Self is in contact with the fruits of actions, another Jīva-Self is not in contact with *these* fruits of action, and thus there is no confusion of Jīva-Selfs and fruits of actions. And in as much as such false appearance is caused by Nescience, it is reasonably sustainable to hold, that the transmigratory existence also, is caused by Nescience, and when this Nescience is removed, the instruction, that the Self is Brahma in the real sense, is thus reasonably sustainable. In the case of those who hold the Jīva-Selfs to be many (i.e. the *Sāmkhyās*), however, in as much as the Jīva-Selfs are many and at the same time all-pervading, such confusion is unavoidable. How is it so? Because, the *Sāmkhyās* hold that the Jīva-Selfs are many, eternal, of the nature of sentiency, sans-attributes, and unexcelled (by any other thing), and the *Pradhāna* serves the common purpose of them all, and that through the *Pradhāna* they all attain enjoyment and Final Release. Accord-

ing to the Vaisheshikas, the Jīva-Selfs are many and all-pervading and they have a common material nature, similar to an earthen pot or a wall, and they are by themselves non-sentient, and the equally minute and non-sentient minds are their implements. From the mutual contact of the material of the Selfs and the mind, nine special attributes (Guṇās) such as desire etc. result, and each one of these qualities is connected with the Jīva-Selfs in a Samavāya relationship, without any confusion arising, and this exactly means transmigratory existence (Samsāra). Absolute non-existence resulting from the non-generation of these nine qualities of the Self is equivalent to Final Release. This is how the Vaisheshikās hold. This being so, in the case of the Sāmkhyās, all Jīva-Selfs being of the nature of sentiency, and proximity of the Pradhāna being common to them all, when one Jīva-Self comes into contact either with pleasure or with pain, the rest also must inevitably come into contact with such pleasure or pain. (If it be said)—The activity of the Pradhāna being for the attainment of the chief aim of a man i.e. Final Release, an adjustment (by which only a particular Self will be subject to such pleasure or pain) will somehow take place, as, otherwise, such activity of the Pradhāna would happen to be only for the purpose of establishing its own greatness, and thus Final Release would not be possible, (we reply)—This is not proper. It is not possible to understand any such adjustment as depending upon the attainment of the desired aim (i.e. Final Release). It must be shown that such an adjustment is somehow reasonably sustainable. In the absence of such reasonable sustainability, the wished-for Final Release cannot take place, while on the other hand, in the absence of proof of any cogent reason for such adjustment, confusion (of actions and their fruits) is bound to take place. In the case of the Vaisheshikās i.e. the Kaṇādās, when the mind connects with one Jīva-Self, as the proximity of the Pradhāna is common, connection with other Jīva-Selfs would also take place, and hence, the cause being common, the fruits also would be common, and thus when one Jīva-Self is connected with pleasure or pain, all Jīva-Selfs will also simultaneously connect with such pleasure or pain.—50.

The opponent of Vedānta argues—May be, an adjustment may take place on account of the ‘unseen principle’ (Adrishṭa). The reply of the Sūtrakāra is—No. Because,

*No such rule is possible, in the case of the ‘unseen principle’.*—51.

The Jīva-Selfs being many, and like the Ākāśha all-pervading, and also being in proximity with every body externally as well as internally, they acquire the unseen principle as a result of meritorious and unmeritorious actions of the mind, speech and body. The Sāmkhyās hold that it does not inhere in the Jīva-Selfs (because they are sans-attributes) but abides in the Pradhāna, which being common (to all the Jīva-Selfs), the unseen principle cannot possibly be the regulator of the enjoyment of pleasure or the suffering of pain. In the case of the Vaiśeṣhikās (Kaṇādās i.e. the Atomists) also, the unseen principle—in common with the case of the Sāmkhyās—is acquired through the connection of the mind with the body, and in the absence of any principle regulating the unseen principle of each Jīva-Self separately, the same fault (as in the case of the Sāmkhyās) would occur.—51.

(The opponent of Vedānta says)—Resolutions etc., such as ‘I want to win this fruit’, ‘I wish to avoid that fruit’, ‘I shall try for this’, ‘I shall do this’ etc., which are observed to motivate each Jīva-Self to action, may well regulate the relation of the mastery of that Self with reference to its own unseen principle. (We reply)—No.

*The same should be understood to be the case with such resolutions etc..*—52.

As these resolutions also, which are made in the proximity of all Jīva-Selfs by the conjunction of a Jīva-Self with the mind, are common to all Jīva-Selfs, they are not reasonably sustainable, because in the absence of any cause for such adjustments, the fault referred to above does attach to them, all the same.—52.

*If it be said (that an adjustment of pleasure and pain would take place) because of*

*(every Self) having its own separate part (Pradesha, in each individual body), (we reply) no, because of the inclusion (Antarbhāva, of all the Jīva-Selfs in all bodies).*

—53.

If the opponent of Vedānta were to say, that even though the Jīva-Self is all-pervading, its connection with the mind which has its seat in the body, will necessarily occur only with that particular restricted part of the Self which is circumscribed by that particular body, and hence an adjustment of the resolution, unseen principle, pleasure and pain, will be accomplished by such particular restricted part, even that is not reasonably sustainable. How is it so? On account of the 'inclusion'. As all the Selfs have the common nature of being all-pervading, they will all be included in all bodies. Besides, it is not possible for the Vaisheshikās to imagine any such part of the Jīva-Self, as being circumscribed by any particular body. And even if it is so imagined, as such an imaginary part of the Self, which is devoid of any separate parts, would exist but in imagination only, it will not be able to regulate an action in the highest real sense. It would not be possible to determine that a body created in the proximity of all the Jīva-Selfs, belongs to any one particular Jīva-Self and no other. And even if it be understood that these Jīva-Selfs have such particular parts, two Jīva-Selfs who have to experience similar pleasure or suffer similar pain may perhaps do so in one and the same body, inasmuch as the unseen principle of both may perhaps abide in one and the same part. Moreover, it is observed, that when Devadatta has physically left that particular place where he has actually experienced pleasure or pain, and such place is subsequently occupied physically by Yajnadatta, he also experiences similar pleasure or pain, as the other, and it would not be so, unless the unseen principle of both Devadatta and Yajnadatta were to occupy the same region. Besides, in the case of those who consider that the Selfs have parts, there would be the predicament of the absence of enjoyment of heaven etc. because such unseen principle would be produced in the body of a Brāhmaṇa etc., but the enjoyment of heaven etc. would belong to a

different region. Besides, in the absence of an illustration, the all-pervading nature of all these diverse Jīva-Selfs would not be reasonably sustainable. You (the opponent of Vedānta) had better say what these entities are which are at once many and yet occupy one common region. If you were to say that form (Rūpa) etc. are such entities, (we reply)—No, inasmuch as these forms (Rūpa) etc. are to that extent identical with the entities to which they belong, and the forms themselves, besides, have different essential characteristics. But there is no difference in the characteristics of these diverse Selfs. If the opponent of the Vedānta were to say, that difference in the characteristics (of the Self) may be reasonably sustainable on the strength of an inference about the ultimate special differences i.e. ultimate essential characteristics (Antyavishesha) (we reply)—No, because the conception of differences in the characteristics of the Selfs and the conception of the ultimate essential characteristics would be open to the fault of mutual interdependence (or a logical see-saw). The Vedāntins moreover do not concede that the Ākāsha etc. are all-pervading, because, they understand them to be created entities. Therefore, it is thus proved that the doctrine of the unity of the Self, alone, is flawless.—53.

*Here ends Pāda III of Adhyāya II.*

## ADHYAYA II—PĀDA 4

### 1. PRĀṆOTPATYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 1-4.

*In a similar way, the vital airs (i.e. Prāṇās are created).—1.*

By the third Pāda, the conflict of Scriptural passages with respect to the topic (about the creation) of the Ākāśha etc. has been cleared up. Now by this fourth (Pāda, the conflict) with respect to the topic (about the creation, number and real nature) of the vital airs (i.e. Prāṇās) is being cleared up. So far as that topic on the subject of Genesis is concerned, in the Scriptural passages such as "It created the Teja" (Chhān. 6.2.3), "From this 'Self' the Ākāśha came into being" (Tait. 2.1.1) etc., the creation of Prāṇās is not mentioned, while occasionally, the non-creation of the same is referred to, in as much as, in passages such as "In the beginning, this (i.e. the world) was non-existent" (Tait 2.7), "They asked, what was that, that was non-existent? Verily the 'Rishis' were then, in the beginning, non-existent. They asked, what are these Rishis? The Prāṇās verily are the Rishis", the Scriptures speak about the existence of the Prāṇās prior to Genesis. In some other places the Scriptures recite the creation of Prāṇās also thus—"Just as from a glowing fire minute scintillae fly around, similarly from the Self, the Prāṇās issue forth"; "From this (Ātmā) are born Prāṇās, the mind, and all sense-organs" (Muṇḍ 2.1.3); "From it the seven Prāṇās are born" (Muṇḍ. 2.1.8); "He created the Prāṇa and from Prāṇa, faith, space, air, Jyoti, waters, Earth, sense-organs, mind and food" (Prashna 6.4). The conclusion arrived at—from the conflict of Scriptural passages, and the lack of ascertainment of any reason for determination—is, that there is nothing that is reasonably sustainable, or rather, as the Scriptures have mentioned the existence of Prāṇās) prior to the Genesis, the conclusion arrived at is that the Scriptural passages which speak of the creation of Prāṇās are in a metaphorical i.e. in a secondary sense.

To this, the Sūtrakāra replies—"Also in a similar way, the vital airs (are created)". How, it is asked (by the oppo-

nent of Vedānta), in the absence of any relevant standard of comparison (Upamāna) here, is the word 'Tathā' (in a similar way) appropriate (Aksharānulomyam)? Towards the end of the last preceding Pāda, the finding of a fault in the opinion of those, who hold that there are many Jīva-Selfs and that they all are all-pervading, was the relevant point, which of course cannot be the standard of comparison here, because of the absence of similarity. It is only when there is similarity that anything can be said to be the standard of comparison. As for instance—As the lion is, so is Balavarmā. If it be said (by the Vedāntin), that it (i.e. the word 'Tathā') is meant for the purpose of explaining the similarity of Prāṇās with the 'unseen principle' (Adrishṭa), viz. that, as the 'unseen principle' is generated in the proximity of all the Jīva-Selfs, it is not possible to determine, as to what particular Jīva-Self's unseen principle it is, similarly, it is not possible to determine with respect to all the Ātmās generally, as to what particular Jīva-Self, the Prāṇās belong to; then (we the opponents of Vedānta reply)—that, as it has already been explained by saying that as there is no rule about a particular body belonging to a particular Self, it is as good as explained (that the same is the case about Prāṇās) and so this Sūtra would be merely a repetition. It is not possible to compare the Prāṇās with the Jīva-Self, inasmuch as it would contradict the conclusion to be arrived at here, because it has already been said that the Self is not created, while it is intended to state here that Prāṇās are (created). Therefore (says the opponent of Vedānta) it strikes us that this word 'Tathā' (in a similar way) is inappropriate here. (We the Vedāntins reply)—No, because even here a connection (of the Prāṇās) with a standard of comparison (Upamāna), in the Scriptural illustration used (in the Sūtra) is reasonably sustainable. Here, passages which speak of the creation of Prāṇās are the illustration used, such as—"From this Self all Prāṇās, all worlds, all Gods, all beings are created" (Brih. 2.1.20),—the meaning of which is, that just as the world etc. are created from the Highest Self, so are the Prāṇās. Similarly it should be understood, that in the passage "From him are produced the Prāṇās, mind, all the sense-organs, space (Ākāsha), air (Vāyu), light (Teja), water and earth which supports everything" (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3)



also, that the Prāṇās, like space, etc., are created (is mentioned). Or in the alternative, one could rely upon such remote connection with a standard of comparison (Upamāna), as is understood in the Pūrva-Mimāṃsā Sūtra (Jai. Sū. 3.4.32)—“Like the bad omen of throwing up i.e. vomiting of a Soma drink (during Paundarika-sacrifice)”, where it is construed to be connected with a very remote standard of comparison, thus—Just as in the preceding Pāda it is understood to have been mentioned that the Ākāsha etc. are the modifications (result as from causes) of the Highest Brahma, so it should be understood here also, viz. that the Prāṇās are the modifications of the Highest Brahma. It is asked (by the opponent of Vedānta) again, on what ground is the creation of Prāṇās based? (The reply is) that it is so mentioned in the Scriptures. (The opponent of Vedānta says)—But we have said that in some places the creation of Prāṇās is not mentioned. (The reply is)—The non-mention of a thing in one place cannot invalidate what is mentioned elsewhere (about that thing). Hence, it being common (both to Ākāsha and the Prāṇās) that the Scriptures speak of their being created, it is properly said, that like Ākāsha etc., the Prāṇās also are created.—1.

*(That Prāṇās are created is proved) because of a metaphorical sense not being possible.—2.*

The suggestion again—that the Scriptural passage about the creation of Prāṇās is in a metaphorical sense, because the Scriptures mention the existence of Prāṇās before the Genesis—is now refuted (by the Sūtrakāra) by the Sūtra thus—“(That Prāṇās are created is proved) because of a metaphorical sense not being possible”, because, otherwise, there would be the predicament of having to abandon the original declaration. Having made the original declaration (by implication), by the Scriptural passage “By knowing what, Oh Bhagavan, all this becomes known?” (Muṇḍ. 1.1.3),—viz. that by the knowledge of one, all becomes known, it is further declared in order to prove it, thus—“From it the Prāṇa is created” (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3). That original declaration, can only be held proved, provided it is

assumed that the whole world including Prāṇa etc., is a modification of Brahma, because of the fact, that a modification (i.e. an effect) thus can never exist as apart from its material cause (Upādāna-Kāraṇa). If the Scriptural passage about the creation of Prāṇās, were to be in a metaphorical sense, the original declaration will, in that case, have been abandoned (because if Brahma is not the material cause of Prāṇās, they will not be known, even if Brahma is known). Again, a concluding statement about the subject-matter of the original declaration is also made (by the Scriptures) thus—"The Purusha (i.e. Brahma) alone is all this 'Karma' (action), 'Tapa' (penance), and the transcendent and immortal Brahma" (Muṇḍ. 2.1.10); "This universe is but Brahma and it is the Highest and the Best" (Muṇḍ. 2.2.11). Similarly, the Scriptural passage "All this becomes known by seeing, hearing, cogitating upon, and by knowing, the Self" should be understood as making the same declaration. (The opponent of Vedānta says)—How then, is there the Scriptural statement about the existence of Prāṇās prior to the Genesis? (We reply)—It is not with reference to the root-cause (i.e. Brahma), because it is understood from the Scriptural passage "(It i.e. Brahma is) sans-Prāṇa, sans-mind, pure, and transcending the High imperishable" (Muṇḍ. 2.1.2) that the root-cause is devoid of any such special characteristics as Prāṇa etc.. This assumption about the existence of Prāṇās prior to the Genesis, should rather be understood to be with reference to the subsequent cause (Brahmadeva i.e. Hiranyagarbha, which itself is an *effect* of Brahma), as, viewed with reference to effects emanating from such subsequent cause (Brahmadeva) itself, because, it is understood as established from both the Scriptures and the Smritis, that the several conditions of things evolved and made manifest by names and forms have an inter-relation of cause and effect as between themselves (such as that between clay and a pot etc.).

In the topic about the Ākāsha (beginning of Pāda III above), the Sūtra (which has exactly the same words as in the present Sūtra) being a Sūtra which states the view of the opponent of Vedānta, it was explained as follows—that the Scriptural passage about the creation (of Ākāsha) is in the metaphorical sense, because of the impossibility (of the creation of Ākāsha). There the conclusion (that the Ākāsha

is a creation) was established on the ground, that to hold otherwise (as the opponent of Vedānta suggests) would involve the abandonment of the original declaration. Here the very same words are used, as a Sūtra establishing a conclusion (of the Vedāntin), and it is construed to mean—"Because of a metaphorical sense not being possible". Those who would understand the present Sūtra to have the same meaning as the previous Sūtra, would, in that case be ignoring the fact, that they would thus be overlooking the conclusion which would be arrived at necessarily, viz. that it would lead to the abandonment of the original declaration.—2.

*Also because it (i.e. the verb Jāyate) is used by the Scriptures earlier (with reference to Prāṇās).—3.*

This is again why the Scriptural mention with regard to the creation of Prāṇās, similar to that of the Ākāsha, is in the principal sense (and not in the figurative sense), viz., that the same word 'Jāyate' which means 'is born' and is used by the Scriptures earlier in the case of Prāṇās, happens to apply (later on) also to the Ākāsha etc. which come after Prāṇās. In the Scriptural passage "From this is born the Prāṇa" (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3) it has already been established that the creation of Ākāsha etc., is in the principal sense; therefore, in common with it, the word 'Jāyate' in the case of Prāṇās also deserves to be in the principal sense. It is not possible to interpret the same one word, which is pronounced only once, in one and the same chapter and sentence, and which applies to more than one (thing), as being in the principal sense in one case, and in a figurative sense in another, because, otherwise, there would be the predicament of a word having a disparity of form (of being both in the principal and the figurative sense). In the same way, in the Scriptural passage "He created the Prāṇa, and then faith from Prāṇa" (Prashna 6.4), the word 'created' used by the Scriptures in the case of Prāṇa applies afterwards to 'faith' etc., which also are subject to being born. The same reasoning applies, where a word implying 'being born' (Jāyate), which is used later on in the Scrip-

tures, relates to a thing mentioned earlier, as for instance, the word 'spread out' or 'come forth' (Vyuchcharanti) recited towards the end, in "all beings spread out", also relates to the foregoing Prāṇās etc.—3.

*Because the Scriptures mention that speech (and the Prāṇās and mind) are born from (the elements), therefore, it is established that Prāṇās are liable to be created.—4.*

Even though in the earlier chapter, dealing with "it created Teja" (Chhān. 6.2.3), the creation of Prāṇās is not mentioned, but only the creation of the three elements (Tejobanna, that is, the Teja, water and earth respectively) is mentioned, still as 'Speech', 'Prāṇa' and the 'Mind' have been stated to have been born from 'Teja', 'Water' and 'Earth' respectively, and as having Brahma as their cause, therefore, in common with them, it comes to be established that all the Prāṇās also, deserve to have their origin from Brahma. Similarly, that speech, Prāṇa, and the mind are preceded by Teja, Water and Earth respectively (as their cause), is spoken of in the same chapter, thus—"Oh mild one, mind has an earth-structure, Prāṇa a water-structure, and speech a Teja-structure" (Chhān. 6.5.4). Here, if the Scriptural statement that these mind etc. have the structure of earth etc., respectively, is in the principal sense, then, that they (i.e. speech, Prāṇās, and mind) are created from Brahma, of course follows. Supposing the Scriptural statement to be in a figurative sense, still, as the Scriptures speak of the evolution by names and forms as being effected by Brahma, and as (the Scriptures) in the introductory portion declare thus—"By which, what is not heard, becomes heard" (Chhān. 6.1.3), and as they in the concluding portion say—"In it, all this that is, has its Self" (Chhān. 6.8.7), and as it is well-known to be so from other Scriptural passages also, it is understood, that the statement, that these mind etc., have the structure of earth etc., is made only for the purpose of elaborating the fact of their being the effects of Brahma, and therefore also, it comes to be established that the Prāṇās are the modifications (i.e. effects) of Brahma.—4.

## 2. SAPTAGATYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 5-6.

*Prāṇās are seven, because, it is understood (from the Scriptures) and also because of their being detailed (as seven).—5.*

The conflict of the Scriptures with respect to the 'creation' of Prāṇās has been removed. Now it is proposed to remove the conflict with regard to their number. The Sūtrakāra will speak about the Chief Prāṇa later on. For the present he would determine, as to how many these Prāṇās are. The doubt (about their number) arises, because of the conflict of the Scriptures. In one place, they are said to be seven, thus—"From it the seven Prāṇās are born" (Muṇḍ. 2.1.18). In another, that, as having the attribute of sense-organs, they are eight, thus—"The sense-organs (are) eight and (there are) eight sense-objects" (Brih. 3.2.1); somewhere, (they are mentioned) as being nine, thus—"Seven Prāṇās verily are located in the head, and (there are) two lower ones" (Tait. Sam. 5.1.7.1). In some place (they are mentioned) to be ten, thus—"There are indeed nine Prāṇās in a person, and the navel is the tenth"; and in another place as being eleven, thus—"There are ten Prāṇās in a man, and the Self is the eleventh" (Brih. 3.9.4). They are again mentioned to be twelve in some place, thus—"All sensations of touch have their abode in the skin" (Brih. 2.4.11). In some place they are mentioned to be thirteen, thus—"The eye and that which can be seen" (Brih. 4.8) etc.. In this manner the Scriptures are in conflict, as to the exact number of Prāṇās. What then is your (i.e. of the opponent of Vedānta) conclusion? That the Prāṇās are seven only. Whence is it so? Because it is so understood from the Scriptures, thus—"From it the seven Prāṇās are born" (Muṇḍ. 2.1.8); and they are detailed as—"Seven verily are the Prāṇās in the head". But (says the Vedāntin) in the Scriptural passage "Seven and seven are these Prāṇās located in the cave (i.e. the human body)", this repetition (of the number seven 'Sapta') shows that they exceed the number seven. This is no fault, (replies the opponent of Vedānta). The repetition means that taking into consideration the differences in the Purushās they are seven in each person, and not that the Prāṇās themselves are understood to be different according to their

real nature, viz. seven of one nature, and seven of another. But (says the Vedāntin) they have also been described as being eight and so on in several places, how then, can they be seven only? (Says the opponent of Vedānta)—It is true of course that they have been so described, but it is precisely because such contradiction occurs that one definite number (of Prāṇās) has to be fixed, and the number seven has been chosen as being preferable as being the conception of a small number (Stokakalpanā), and it is understood, that the other numbers (exceeding seven) are referred to by Scriptures with reference only to the difference in the modes of the Prāṇās.—5.

To this the reply is :—

*But hands etc. are there spoken of as Prāṇās, (so it should) not (be considered) that way.—6.*

But other Prāṇās such as hands etc., over and above the seven Prāṇās are spoken of by the Scriptural passages such as—“The hands verily are the apprehenders (Grahās), and as they are appropriated for action by the sense-objects (Atigrahās), it is but by hands only that a man acts” (Brih. 3.2.8). It being established, that there is an excess over seven, the number seven can be explained as being included (in the greater number). Whenever there is a contradiction as to the number (of any thing) being more or less, the greater number has to be accepted, because the lesser number is always included in the greater number, but not *vice versa*, i.e. the greater number is not included in the lesser number. Hence it should not be maintained that Prāṇās are seven, only because it involves the preferable conception of a lesser number (Stoka-kalpanā), but by accepting the greater number, it should be maintained that there are eleven Prāṇās. The Scriptural passage which illustrates this, is—“There are ten Prāṇās in a person, with the Self (Ātmā) as the eleventh” (Brih. 3.9.4). By the word ‘Self’ here the internal sense-organ is understood, because of the chapter being about the sense-organs. But (says the opponent of Vedānta), illustrations are given about the Prāṇās being more than eleven viz. that they are twelve or thirteen. (We reply)—No doubt, such illustra-

tions are given, but beyond a set of eleven actions, there are no other actions which would justify the conception of any additional Prāṇās than eleven. There are five sense-organs of intellect, to serve the purpose of the five kinds of knowledges, having sound, touch, colour, taste and smell as their subjects, and there are five sorts of actions, viz. speaking, taking up, moving about, evacuation, and bliss (of the procreative act), with five sense-organs of action to serve their purpose, and then there is the mind, possessing many functions and serving all objects, which operates in all the three-fold division of time (i.e. past, present and future). This same mind is variously referred to as the mind, the intellect, the ego (Ahamkāra or Chitta), and there is a Scriptural passage having a similar purpose, which enumerates a series of different functions such as desire etc. and says—"All this is but the mind" (Brih. 1.5.3). Besides he who considers the Prāṇās to be seven belonging to the head would in fact mean that he considers them to be four only. Though they are four they are counted to be seven because of their different locations viz. the pairs of ears, eyes, nostrils, and only one of 'speech'. It cannot moreover be maintained that the other Prāṇās (over and above the seven) are but merely the different functions of the same seven Prāṇās, because the functions of hands etc. are entirely dissimilar (to the functions of these seven sense-organs). Similarly, when the Scriptures speak of ten Prāṇās, thus—"There verily are nine Prāṇās in a Puruṣha, with the navel as the tenth", they are said to be so, not on the ground of their different natures as sense-organs, but only with reference to the ten vents in the body. There is no such Prāṇa as the navel, known anywhere. The navel is said to be the tenth because it also is a separate location of the Chief Prāṇa. Sometimes the Prāṇa series is enumerated for the purpose of illustration. Thus, the Scriptural statement with regard to the Prāṇās being so different, it is necessary to consider with what view a particular statement is made. It has now been firmly established, that considered in relation to their respective functions, the conclusion that they are eleven is authoritative. The following is an alternative construction of the two Sūtrās (viz. Nos. 5 and 6). (The opponent of Vedānta says)—The Prāṇās are seven only, as it is understood from the Scriptures, that they

are seven only, thus—"As he (the Self) goes out (of the body), the Prāṇās follow him, and as the Prāṇa goes out, all the Prāṇās (i.e. sense-organs) follow him" (Brih. 4.4.2). But (says the Vedāntin) the word 'All' also is recited here, so how could it be that it is understood from the Scriptures that there are only seven (Prāṇās)? Because (says the opponent of Vedānta) they are so particularized here. Only seven Prāṇās beginning with the eye and ending with the skin (Tvak), are particularized as being relevant here, because the Scriptures enumerated them in a series thus :—"When that person in the eye turns back (from the body) he ceases to perceive form (Rūpa) etc." (Brih. 4.4.1); "They say he (the Jīva-Self) has become one (with the Highest Self) and does not see" (Brih. 4.4.2). The word "All" is always understood to mean, all that, which is relevant (to the context). Thus—When it is said that all Brāhmaṇās should be served dinner, it is only all those that have been invited that are meant and no others, so here also, only those seven Prāṇās which are relevant here, are understood by the word 'All' and no others. But (says the Vedāntin) here 'Understanding' (Vijnāna) is indicated as the eighth in the series, how then is it maintained that only seven are enumerated in the series? (The opponent of the Vedānta replies)—This is no fault, inasmuch as, even though there is a difference in their modes the 'Mind' and 'Understanding' are in their nature but one and the same, hence it is reasonably sustainable to hold, that they are seven. Therefore, the Prāṇās are seven only. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply—It is realized from Scriptural passages such as "The hand is an apprehender (Graha)" (Brih. 3.2.8) that hands etc., also, are sense-organs over and above the seven. By the term 'Graha' their nature of apprehending is understood, in as much as the Jīva-Self is held in bondage by this bond called 'Graha'. It is not that the Jīva-Self is held in bondage in one body, because the bondage is similar in other bodies, so that it is tantamount to saying that the bondage called 'Graha' is equally so in other bodies also. The Smṛiti also is similar, thus—"He comes into contact with the aggregate of the eight i.e. Prāṇa etc., which becomes his indicatory mark. His bondage consists in being apprehended by them, and his Final Release means his being relieved of them", which



shows, that before Final Release is obtained there is no freedom from the bondage called 'Graha'. Similarly in the Ātharvaṇa, while detailing the series of sense-objects and sense-organs such as "The eye and that which is seen, etc.", hands etc. are similarly mentioned as sense-organs, along with the objects of such sense-organs, thus—"Hands and what can be taken hold of, the Upastha (the organ of generation) and what can be enjoyed, the anus and that which is evacuated by it, and the feet and the going with them" (Prashna 4.8). Similarly, the Scriptures indicate the exodus of the eleven Prāṇās from the body, thus—"These ten are the Prāṇās in a person, with the 'Self' as the eleventh, and while they depart from this mortal body, they cause a person to roar" (Brih. 3.9.4). The word 'All', which goes with the word 'Prāṇa', and thus speaks of all the Prāṇās without exception, cannot possibly be restricted in its application to only the seven Prāṇās on the strength of the subject matter of the chapter, because the word of the Scriptures (Shruti), when in conflict with the chapter (Prakarāṇa), has (according to the Mimāṃsā rules of interpretation) greater authority. When it is said, that all Brāhmaṇās should be served with dinner, it is logical to say that it includes all the Brāhmaṇās on the earth, on the strength of the word 'All', but as it is not possible to serve dinner to all of them, its applicability is restricted to only those who are invited. But here, there is no reason why the sense of the word should be contracted (to mean only seven Prāṇās). So by the word 'All' all Prāṇās without exception are to be taken as meant, and thus it all is flawless, when it is understood, that the mention of a series of seven Prāṇās is only by way of illustration. Therefore, it is thus established, that considered from the point of view of the word (i.e. the Scriptures) and their functions, the Prāṇās are eleven. —6.

### 3. PRĀṆĀNUTVĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 7.

*The Prāṇās (i.e. sense-organs) are also of Aṇu (minute) dimension.—7.*

Now, the Sūtrakāra adds up another characteristic of the Prāṇās. Their being Aṇu in dimension means, that their

form (Rūpa) is not visible, and that they are not perceptible to touch and are minute, and not that they are like Atoms (Paramāṇus) because, (were they to be atomic), there would be the predicament of their function of pervading the entire body not being reasonably sustainable. They also are minute because, were they to be gross in dimension, they would be perceivable by those who happen to be near about a dying man, as they come out of the body, like a snake from its hole. They also are limited in size, because, were they to be all-pervading, that would contradict the Scriptural statements about their emerging from the body and their going away and returning to it. Nor could it be established in that case that the Jiva-Self possesses the essence of the quality of that (i.e. intelligence). (If the opponent of Vedānta were to say)—Even if they were to be all-pervading they may function in the region of the body just as well, (we reply)—No, because, it is reasonably sustainable, that every function is an organ-of-sense. Whatsoever is the means of perception, whether it be a function or any other thing, is according to us an organ-of-sense, hence the contention (between us) would merely be with regard to the nomenclature, and therefore any conception about their being all-pervading would be meaningless. Therefore we conclude that the Prāṇās are minute and limited in dimension.—7.

#### 4. PRĀṆASHRAISHTHYĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 8.

*And, the superior (Prāṇa) also, (is a created entity).—8.*

The Sūtrakāra purports to extend the application of (the proposition about) Prāṇās being modifications of Brahma (i.e. as an effect from a cause), to the Chief Prāṇa. (The opponent of Vedānta, says)—It has already been stated that all Prāṇās without an exception, are the modifications of Brahma, as for instance in the Scriptural passage—"From this is born the Prāṇa, the mind, and all the organs-of-sense also" (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3). Thus, the Scriptures speak separately of the creation of Prāṇa along with that of the mind and the organs-of-sense. Also because of the Scriptural statement—"He created the Prāṇa" (Prashna 6.4.). Why is then this extended application (Atidesha)

made? (We reply)—To remove a further doubt. In the Nāsadāsiya Sūkta (Rig-Veda Sam. 8.7.17), which has Brahma as its chief topic, there occurs the following Mantra—"There was not Death at that time (i.e. at the time of the Pralaya i.e. the great flood) nor manna i.e. ambrosia (Amrita, fit for the Gods), nor were there the Moon and the Sun, the symbols of the night and the day respectively. It, alone by itself, was spontaneously vibrating (i.e. breathing) without the air. Nothing else then was, nor anything transcending that, existed" (Rig-Veda Samhitā 8.7.17). Now, as from the word 'vibrating' (Ānīt) the function of breathing is understood, it may be suggested that before Genesis, Prāṇa was in existence, and one may think therefore that Prāṇa is not subject to creation, and it is just this notion which this extended application (Atidesha) is meant to remove. Even the word 'vibrating' (Ānīt) does not suggest the existence of Prāṇa before the Genesis, because it is qualified by the word 'without air' (Avātam) and also because of the Scriptural passage "Sans-Prāṇa, Sans-mind and Pure", by which it is indicated that the root-cause (i.e. Brahma) is devoid of any special feature or attribute such as the Prāṇās etc.. Therefore the word 'vibrating' i.e. breathing (Ānīt) is used here only with a view to indicate the existence of a cause (before the creation of the world). The word 'superior' is used by the Scriptures with reference to the Chief Prāṇa, thus—"The Prāṇa verily is the oldest and the most superior" (Chhān. 5.1.1). It is the oldest, because, it acquires its function simultaneously with the ejaculation of the semen (during the act of procreation), because were it not to be so, the semen ejaculated into the uterus would suppurate or would not achieve conception. The sense of hearing is not the oldest because it acquires its function after its special seat viz. the ear (Cochlea ?) is developed. The Prāṇa is superior, also because of its superior qualities as shown by the Scriptural passage—"Indeed we are unable to sustain ourselves without you etc." (Brih. 6.1.13).—8.

##### 5. VĀYUKRIYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 9-12.

*(The Chief Prāṇa) is neither air (Vāyu) nor a function (Kriyā), because the Scrip-*

*tures give instruction about it separately.*

—9.

Inquiry is now being made as to the nature of this Chief Prāṇa. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that on the authority of the Scriptures, the Prāṇa is air (Vāyu). The Scriptures say—"That which is Prāṇa is air and it is of five sorts—Prāṇa, Apāna, Vyāna, Udāna and Samāna." Or else according to the doctrine of another school (the Sāṃkhya school) it is but the combined function of all the organs of sense. The followers of that doctrine say—"The Prāṇa has this combined common function of all the organs-of-sense." To this we reply—Prāṇa is neither the air nor a function of a sense-organ. Whence is this so? Because there is separate instruction about Prāṇa. There is separate instruction about Prāṇa, from that of Vāyu, thus—"Prāṇa alone is the fourth part i.e. foot (Pāda) of Brahma (speech, eye and the ear being the other three, when mind is to be meditated upon as Brahma) and it shines and glows with Vāyu as its light" (Chhān. 3.18.4). Now, if Prāṇa were to be merely the Vāyu, it would not be stated separately from it. Similarly, there is separate instruction about the functions of the organs-of-sense, in as much as, after enumerating speech etc. in a series, a separate instruction about Prāṇa is given in various places. Also because the function of an organ-of-sense and that which has such function are identical i.e. without a difference. Now it would not have been mentioned separately like this from an organ-of-sense, if Prāṇa were to be only its function. Such separate instruction about Prāṇa from the organs-of-sense and the air, as is given in the following Scriptural passage "From it is born the Prāṇa, the mind, all the organs-of-sense, the ether i.e. space (Kham) and the air" (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), should also be taken into account. It is not possible that all the organs-of-sense can have one function collectively, for each has a function of its own, and an aggregate of the sense-organs collectively could have no active function. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) it may well be so on the strength of the maxim of 'Panjarachālana' (i.e. the moving of the net). Just as eleven birds in one and the same net, each having its own separate function, join together and move the net, similarly the eleven Prāṇās exist-

ing in one and the same body, and each having its own separate function, may join together, and may acquire a common function as that of the Chief Prāṇa, collectively. (We reply)—No. That the birds, each of whom has its own separate but similar function conducive to the movement of the net, may perhaps move a net, may be quite in order, because it is actually seen to be so, but here in this case (of the Prāṇās) it does not stand to reason, that the Prāṇās (i.e. organs-of-sense), each possessing a different function of its own such as hearing etc., can get together and collectively function as the Chief Prāṇa, because there is no authority for it, and because breathing is a function absolutely different and dissimilar to the function of hearing etc.. Again if the Chief Prāṇa were to be supposed to be the function of the sense-organs collectively, then the glorification of the Chief Prāṇa's superiority, and the conviction arrived at by speech etc. of their own subordinate position, with reference to the Chief Prāṇa, would not be possible. Therefore, the Chief Prāṇa is different both from the air (Vāyu) and action (Kriyā). (The opponent of Vedānta says): How then is there a Scriptural passage as follows—"That which is Prāṇa is but Vāyu"? (We reply)—It is this Self-same Vāyu—which after having attained the Adhyātma condition and having come into connection with the body and having divided itself five-fold, and then existing in such specialized condition, that is called the Chief Prāṇa. It is an entity neither different from Vāyu, nor is it Vāyu merely, and hence there is no conflict between the Scriptural passages showing difference and non-difference (and thus seemingly appearing to contradict each other).—9.

(The opponent of Vedānta here says)—It may well be then, that the Chief Prāṇa also attains freedom—like the Jīva-Self—in this body, in as much as it is superior (to the other Prāṇās i.e. organs-of-sense and the organs-of-sense are understood to stand in a subordinate position to it. Similarly the Scriptures speak of the various kinds of the exalted greatness of the Chief Prāṇa, thus—"When speech etc. are all dormant, the Chief Prāṇa alone is awake, it is not overcome by Death, it is the universal absorber, and absorbs the organs-of-sense such as speech etc., and it protects the

other organs-of-sense, even as a mother protects her sons." Therefore there is the predicament of the Chief Prāṇa—like the Jīva-Self—having independence. This view, the Sūtrakāra refutes as follows :—

*But like the sense-organ of sight (Chakshu) etc. (the Chief Prāṇa is subordinate to the Self) because instruction to that effect is given along with the sense-organ of sight etc. and for other reasons also.—10.*

The word 'but' refutes, the (alleged) independence of the Chief Prāṇa, like that of the Jīva-Self. Just as the sense-organs of sight etc., like the subjects of a king, are instrumental towards the activity of and enjoyment by the Jīva-Self, and are by no means independent, even so, the Chief Prāṇa though this Prāṇa is, it, like the minister of a king, is a subordinate instrument of all actions of the Jīva-Self, and is not independent. Whence is this so? Because instruction about it is given along with the sense-organs such as the sense-organ of sight etc., in the "Dialogue of the Prāṇās" etc.. It is appropriate that instruction about those who are similar in nature is given in a common way about all being taken collectively (by the Scriptures), like the Brihat and Rathāntara Sāma hymns for instance (which are always recited together). The word 'etc.' (in the Sūtra) indicates other reasons in refutation of the independence of the Chief Prāṇa, such as its being made up of component parts (of the five great elements) and its being non-sentient etc.—10.

(The opponent of Vedānta here says)—If it be understood that the Chief Prāṇa, like the sense-organ of sight etc., is a subordinate instrument of the Jīva-Self, then, just as 'form' or colour (Rūpa) is the object of the organ of the sense of sight, some such corresponding object-of-sense for the Chief Prāṇa is necessary. The sense-organ of sight etc. serve as subordinate instruments of the Jīva-Self, by their individual functions such as perceiving the form or colour (Rūpa) etc.. Moreover, a set of only eleven functions-of-sense, such as perceiving the form (Rūpa) etc., have been enumerated so far, for which eleven Prāṇās (i.e. organs-of-

sense) are assumed (to exist). Over and above these eleven functions, no twelfth function-of-sense as such, is known to exist, for which a twelfth Prāṇa has to be understood to exist).—To this, the Sūtrakāra gives a reply, thus :—

*(The Chief Prāṇa) not being an instrument  
(i.e. an organ-of-sense) there is no fault.  
The Scriptures also indicate similarly.—11.*

So far as this predicament of requiring an extra object-of-sense (for the Chief Prāṇa, as an instrument of sense) is concerned, it is no fault, because the Chief Prāṇa is not an instrument or an organ-of-sense. It is not at all understood, that like the sense-organ of sight etc., the Chief Prāṇa is an instrument or an organ-of-sense, by way of its delimiting and determining any object (by cognizing it). It is not as if, because of this, it (i.e. the Chief Prāṇa) has no function (Kārya) to accomplish. How is it so? Because the Scriptures, in the 'Dialogue of the Prāṇās' etc., indicate the special accomplishment of the Chief Prāṇa which is impossible (of existence) in the case of the other Prāṇās (i.e. organs-of-sense). The Scriptures, beginning with "Once the Prāṇās (i.e. organs of sense) quarrelled amongst themselves as to which one of them was the most superior", and then laying down thus—"He verily is the superior one, on whose quitting the body, it looks as if it is at its worst" (Chhān. 5.1.6, 7), and "thereafter demonstrating, that in spite of each one of the other Prāṇās (i.e. organs-of-sense), such as speech etc., going out of the body (one at a time), the body still continued to live even in the absence of that particular function of that particular Prāṇa (i.e. organ-of-sense), further demonstrate, how there occurred the predicament of the complete prostration of the body, and the weakening of the powers of speech etc. as a result of the Chief Prāṇa going out of the body, and they thus show, that the body and its organs-of-sense are sustained by the Chief Prāṇa alone. The Scriptures speak of this same thing, thus—"The superior Chief Prāṇa said to them, Oh, do not get perplexed, it is I that support and sustain this body (Bāṇa) by thus dividing myself five-fold." The Scriptures also indicate, how the body is protected by the Chief Prāṇa, when the sense-organ of sight etc. are dormant, thus—"protect-

ing this inferior nest, i.e. the body, by means of the Chief Prāṇa" (Brih. 4.3.12). And the Scriptural passage "As soon as the Chief Prāṇa goes out of any limb, it atrophies" (Brih. 1.3.19) and another Scriptural passage "By means of that Chief Prāṇa by which the Jīva-Self eats and drinks, the Jīva-Self protects the other Prāṇās (i.e. organs-of-sense)" show, that the nourishment of the body and organs-of-sense depends upon the Chief Prāṇa. Another passage indicates how the going away and staying on of the Jīva-Self, depend upon the Chief Prāṇa, thus—"By the going away of what, shall I (the Jīva-Self) go away, and by the staying on of what, shall I stay? He created the Prāṇa" (Prashna 6.3.4).—11.

*It is indicated (by the Scriptures) that, like the mind, (the Chief Prāṇa) has a five-fold accomplishment.—12.*

This is why there is a special accomplishment of the Chief Prāṇa, because it is indicated by the Scriptures, that it has a five-fold mode, viz. as that of "Prāṇa, Apāna, Vyāna, Udāna and Samāna" (Brih. 1.5.3). This distinction between the modes is with reference to its five-fold accomplishment. Prāṇa has the mode of going ahead, and has the accomplishment of exhalation etc.. The Apāna has the mode of going back in the reverse, and has the accomplishment of inhalation. Vyāna has its locus at the junction of Prāṇa and Apāna and is the cause of having the accomplishment of acts requiring strength of virility. Udāna has an upward mode, and is the cause of the accomplishment of going out (of the body). Samāna is the one that conveys the food juices evenly to all the parts of the body. It is in this manner that, like the mind, the Chief Prāṇa has a five-fold mode. The meaning is that just as the mind has a five-fold mode, so has the Chief Prāṇa also. The five modes of the sense-organs, such as the ear etc., as the cause, having sound etc., as their object, are well-known, but those other modes (of the mind) such as 'desire (Kāma) and 'resolution' (Samkalpa) etc., which also are enumerated, may not be accepted here, because there would then be an excess over the number five. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) as even here, there is yet another mode of the



mind which is independent of the ear etc., viz., having the (knowledge of) the past and the future as its object, this excess over the number is present here, just the same. (We reply)—Then in that case, following the maxim ‘An opinion of even an opponent which is not objected to, may, when necessary, be adopted’, the five-fold modes of the mind known in the science of Yoga, viz. ‘Right knowledge, error; imagination, slumber and memory’ (Pātanjala Yoga Sūtra 1.1.6), may be accepted here. Or, it should be understood that the mind is used as an illustration here, merely on account of its having manifold modes. It should be construed, that the Prāṇa also is a subordinate instrument of the Jīva-Self, because like the mind, it has a five-fold mode.—12.

#### 6. SHRESHṬHĀṆUTVĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 13.

*(The Chief Prāṇa) is also minute.—13.*

Like the other Prāṇās (i.e. the organs-of-sense) the Chief Prāṇa also should be understood to be minute, and here also ‘minuteness’ only means being invisible to the eye and being limited (in dimension) and not that it is like a Paramāṇu (Atom), in as much as, it pervades the entire body by means of its five-fold function. It is invisible to the organ of sight because it is not observable by a person who happens to be near about (a dying person) while it is going out of (the body), and is limited (in dimension) because of the Scriptural statements about its emerging from the body, going about, and returning to the body. But (says the opponent of Vedānta), that the Chief Prāṇa is all-pervading is also mentioned (by the Scriptures) thus—“It (i.e. the Chief Prāṇa) is like a grub, a mosquito, an elephant, the three worlds and all this (which we see about us i.e. the universe)” (Brih. 1.3.22) etc.. The reply is, that when it is said to be all-pervading it is meant only in its spiritual (i.e. Ādhidaivika) aspect, and with reference to its unitary and universal form, and as being the Self of all Prāṇās—like the Prāṇa of the Hiranyagarbha—, and not in its aspect in relation with the body (i.e. Ādhyātmika aspect). Besides, there is no fault of any kind, because it is indicated by the Scriptures which speak of its similarity

to a grub etc., as to how the Chief Prāṇa which abides in every creature is limited in its dimension.—13.

7. JYOTIRĀDYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 14-16.

*But, (the Prāṇās) have Jyoti (i.e. Teja—light) etc. as their presiding deities, because it is so declared (by the Scriptures).—14.*

It is now considered whether these Prāṇās which are the relevant subject here, are able to accomplish what they have to do, on their own (ability), or, only when presided over by deities. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that they accomplish what they have to do on their own (ability), equipped as they are with the power to accomplish what they have to do. Besides, if it were to be understood that their ability is due to their being presided over by deities, then there would be the predicament of these presiding deities having to be the experiencers, and the Jiva-Self would thus cease to be such an experiencer. Hence, (it must be understood that) their activity is as a result of their own greatness. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) being this, the reply to that is—"But (the Prāṇās) have deities such as the Jyoti etc. as their presiding deities." The word "But" (in the Sūtra) thus refutes the view of the opponent of Vedānta. It is understood that this set of the organs-of-sense (Prāṇās) such as speech etc., which are presided over by deities such as Jyoti etc. and which consider Agni (fire) as their own Self, start accomplishing their own particular activity. The Sūtrakāra also gives the reason for it, thus—"Because it is so declared (by the Scriptures)". The Scriptures declare thus—"Agni (Teja) transformed itself into speech and entered the mouth" (Ait. 2.4) etc.. This transformation of itself (i.e. of Agni) into speech, and its entering the mouth, is spoken of, after assuming its (i.e. of Speech) being presided over by a deity. If this relation to a deity is denied, no other specific relation of Agni with either speech or the mouth is observable. Similarly, the passage—"Vāyu transforming itself into Prāṇa entered the nose" (Ait. 2.4) should also be construed in the same manner. Elsewhere also, (the Scriptural passage) "Speech is the fourth foot or part (Pāda) of

Brahma (the eye, ear and mind, being the other three feet), it shines and gives out heat (i.e. accomplishes what it has to do) by means of Agni (Teja)" (Chhān. 3.18.3), which speaks of speech etc. being illumined (i.e. made manifest) by Agni etc., strengthens the same conclusion. The same meaning is indicated by the Scriptural passage which speaks of 'speech' etc. becoming Agni etc. thus—"Verily the Prāṇa helped 'speech' (which has precedence over all in the Udgītha ritual), to reach beyond death (which is of the nature of the sin of falsehood) and when thus freed from death, it (immediately) turned itself into a deity called Agni" (Brih. 1.3.12). Generally everywhere where there is an analogous enumeration of speech etc. and Agni etc. by a dichotomous division (i.e. binary classification, between that which is guided and that which guides) into Adhyātma and Adhidaivata aspects, it is made by assuming this relation. A Smṛiti passage also shows how speech etc. are presided over by Agni etc., thus—"Brāhmaṇās who have realized the truth say, that speech is Adhyātma, and that which is spoken viz. 'the word' is Adhibhūta i.e. a natural element, and in their case the fire is the Adhidaivata (i.e. the divine element)". The statement made by the opponent of Vedānta, viz. "Prāṇās act on their own, equipped with the ability to accomplish their effects", is not correct, because, carts etc. which possess the potentiality of movement, actually move only when bullocks etc. are harnessed to them. So when such a potentiality (of movement) is reasonably sustainable either way, it is determined on the authority of the Scriptures, that the Prāṇās are presided over by deities.—14.

The objection taken, viz., that there would be the predicament of the presiding deities being made the experiencers, and not the Jīva-Self, is refuted as follows:—

*The Prāṇās (have relation) with that to which they belong (i.e. the Jīva-Self), on the authority of the Scriptures.—15.*

Even though the deities preside over the Prāṇās, it is understood from the Scriptures, that the Prāṇās are connected with that to whom such Prāṇās belong i.e. the Captain of the body and the aggregate of the instruments of ac-

tion (i.e. the Jīva-Self). Even so says the Scriptural passage —“Now that Ākāsha wherein the sense-organ of sight has entered, there is the Seeing-Self (Chākshusha-Purusha). The sense-organ of sight is for the purpose of his seeing, and he who knows that he would smell this, is the Self, the nose is what one smells with” (Chhān. 8.12.4), and declares that the Prāṇās have a relation with the embodied Jīva-Self alone. Besides the various organs-of-sense have each a different deity presiding over it, and they cannot possibly be imagined to be the experiencers, for it is understood, that the embodied Jīva-Self alone is the experiencer in this body, as coordination i.e. unity of the Jīva-Self and the sense-organs (Pratisandhāna) is possible, (in its case, such as—‘I who am seeing this, am the same one, that is hearing —Ānandagiri’).—15.

*Also, on account of its (i.e. the embodied Jīva-Self's) eternal nature (i.e. Nityatva) (in the body).—16.*

It is this embodied Jīva-Self that is constantly in the body as the experiencer, because of the possibility of its being affected by merit (Punya) and demerit (Pāpa) and the experiencing of pleasure and pain, and, not the deities who—inasmuch as they reside in an exalted sphere in the glory of power—do not deserve to be the experiencers of pleasure and pain, in this insignificant body. There is besides a Scriptural passage to that effect, thus—“It is only merit that goes to them, sin verily does not contaminate the Gods” (Brih. 15.3). It is only with the embodied Jīva-Self that the Prāṇās have a permanent association, because it is seen that when the Jīva-Self leaves the body, the Prāṇās follow in its wake, as is seen in the Scriptural passage—“As he (i.e. the Jīva-Self) goes out, the Chief Prāṇa follows him, and as the Chief Prāṇa goes out, all the other Prāṇās (i.e. organs-of-sense) follow in its wake” (Brih. 4.4.2). Hence although the deities are the regulators of the organs-of-sense, still the Jīva-Self's condition of being the experiencer does not terminate thereby, for the deities are concerned with the organs-of-sense and not with the Jīva-Self i.e. the experiencer.—16.

## 8. INDRIYĀDHĪKARAṆAM. Sū. 17-19.

*These Prāṇās (other than the Chief Prāṇa) are the organs-of-sense, because it is so indicated by the Scriptures.—17.*

The one Chief Prāṇa and the other eleven Prāṇās (i.e. the organs-of-sense) have been enumerated. Now with regard to that, a doubt arises, as to whether these other Prāṇās are but the several different modes of the Chief Prāṇa, or whether they are essentially different entities. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that they are the several different modes of the Chief Prāṇa. Whence is it so? Because, the Scriptures having placed the Chief Prāṇa and the other Prāṇās in close proximity, have proclaimed them as having the Chief Prāṇa as their Self, thus —“(The Prāṇās said) Oh, well, may we all have his (i.e. the Chief Prāṇa's) form, and they all attained his form” (Bṛih. 1.5.21). Besides, the term ‘Prāṇa’ being common to all, it is understood that they are all one and the same, otherwise it would mean that one and the same word ‘Prāṇa’ would have more than one meaning, which would not be logical, or else, in one case it would have the primary meaning and in the other case it would have a secondary meaning. Therefore just as Prāṇa, Apāna etc. are the five modes of one and the same Prāṇa, so ‘speech’ etc. also are but such eleven modes of one and the same Prāṇa. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply—Speech etc. are entities essentially different, from Prāṇa (i.e. the Chief Prāṇa). Whence is it so? Because they are indicated separately. What is this difference in the indication about them? These Prāṇās (i.e. organs-of-sense) exclusive of the Chief Prāṇa, which are relevant to the topic, are spoken of as the eleven organs-of-sense because it is seen that they are referred to that way in the Scriptures. In Scriptural passages of the type of “From it the Prāṇa was born, as also the mind and all the organs-of-sense” (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), the Chief Prāṇa and the organs-of-sense are indicated separately. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) if it be so, then the mind, also, like the Chief Prāṇa, would be excluded, as not being an organ-of-sense, because the passage is seen to make a distinction in the indication, thus—“The mind and

all the organs-of-sense". (We reply)—This is true no doubt, but as the Smṛiti mentions eleven organs-of-sense, mind also, along with the organs of hearing etc., has to be included amongst the organs-of-sense, while it is not known, either in the Scriptures or the Smṛitis, that the Chief Prāṇa is an organ-of-sense. It is thus reasonably sustainable that this difference in the reference about them is due to an essential difference in the nature of the entities as such, otherwise, were all to be essentially one and the same entity it would be contradictory that one and the same Prāṇa, should, and, at the same time, should not, be referred to as an organ-of-sense. Therefore, the others (i.e. the organs-of-sense) are entities essentially different from the Chief Prāṇa.—17.

Whence is it again that the Prāṇās i.e. organs-of-sense are entities essentially different (from the Chief Prāṇa) ?

*Because in the Scriptures the Chief Prāṇa is indicated separately (from speech etc.).*  
—18.

Everywhere in the Scriptures the Chief Prāṇa is indicated separately from speech etc.. Beginning with—"They said to speech (Vāk)" (Bṛih. 1.3.2), and after having stated how speech etc. were destroyed by the demons by their sins, and having then concluded the chapter about 'Speech etc.', the Scriptures have thereafter separately enumerated the Chief Prāṇa, as the one who destroyed the demons, thus—"Then they spoke to this Prāṇa of the mouth (Āsanyam)". Other Scriptural passages also which speak of the difference, should be cited as illustrations, viz., "He (i.e. the Brahma-Deva) created the mind, speech and the Chief Prāṇa for himself (as the means of experience)" (Bṛih. 1.15.3). Therefore also, the Prāṇās (i.e. the organs-of-sense) are entities essentially different from the Chief Prāṇa.—18.

Whence again is it that they are different ?

*Because of dissimilarity in characteristics.*  
—19.

Because there is dissimilarity between the characteristics of the Chief Prāṇa and the others (i.e. the other Prāṇās i.e. organs-of-sense). It is the Chief Prāṇa alone, that is awake when speech etc. are asleep. He is the only one that is not appropriated by Death, while the others are. The sustainment or the fall of the body respectively, is due to its presence or its going out of the body respectively, and not of the organs-of-sense, and while the organs-of-sense are the cause of the perception of the objects-of-sense, not so the Chief Prāṇa, and thus there is a great deal of dissimilarity of this nature between the characteristics of the Chief Prāṇa and of the organs-of-sense. Therefore also it is established that they are essentially different entities. With regard to what is said (by the opponent of Vedānta), viz. that because of the Scriptural statement "That they all assumed his form" the Chief Prāṇa and the organs-of-sense are identical, (we say) that it is not logical. There also, dissimilarity (between them) is discernible, when what has gone before and what has followed (this statement) is considered. There also, having enumerated the organs-of-sense such as speech etc. by the Scriptural passage—"Speech (Vāk) maintained that it would keep on speaking" (Brih. 1.5.21) and thereafter having spoken of their being seized by Death in the form of exhaustion, thus—"Death by becoming exhaustion overcame them, therefore, speech does become exhausted" (Brih. 1.5.21), it enumerates separately by itself the Chief Prāṇa as the only one that is unconquered by Death, by the Scriptural passage "Death could not capture him, who is this central Prāṇa" (Brih. 1.5.21), and thus establishes its superiority by the Scriptural passage "(The sense-organs said) He verily is the best of us all" (Brih. 1.5.21). Hence in consonance with it, this assumption of the form (Rūpa) of the Chief Prāṇa by speech etc. should be understood to mean that speech etc. are solely dependent upon the Chief Prāṇa for the attainment of their functional ability without let or hindrance, and not that they are identical with it. Hence it is thus established that the word 'Prāṇa' is used for the organs-of-sense in a secondary sense. The Scriptures also indicate how the word 'Prāṇa', which indicates the Chief Prāṇa only, is used in a secondary sense in the case of the organs-of-sense, by the passage—"They all

assumed his form, therefore, it is that they are called by that name" (Brih. 1.5.21). Therefore organs-of-sense are essentially different from the Prāṇa i.e. the Chief Prāṇa. —19.

9. SAMJNĀMŪRTIKLIPTYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 20-22.

*But the apt arrangement of names and forms is the work of Him who makes the triple agglomeration (Trivritkaraṇa), according to the instruction given by the Scriptures.—20.*

In the chapter dealing with 'being' (Sat), after having spoken about the creation of Teja, Water and the Earth, the further instruction given is—"This deity thought, Oh well, after having entered these beings as the Jīva-Self, I shall evolve names and forms, I shall make each of these three (deities), partake of a part of the other two" (Chhān. 6.3.2). Here a doubt arises, as to whether this evolving of the names and forms is the handiwork of the Jīva-Self or of the Highest Lord. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that this evolving of the names and forms is the handiwork of the Jīva-Self. Whence is it so? Because of the qualification (with the words) "By this the Jīva-Self". Just as, in the ordinary world, when a sentence such as "I shall enter the enemy force by means of scouts, and estimate the strength of the enemy forces" is used, though in fact the estimate is made by the scout, it is attributed to and superimposed on the king himself, because he is the directive cause of it, and, also inasmuch as the 'first person' is used viz. "I shall estimate", even so, though the evolving of names and forms is accomplished by the Jīva-Self, it is attributed to and superimposed upon by the deity upon itself, because the deity is the directive cause of it, in as much as the 'first person' viz. "I shall evolve" is used. Moreover in the case of names such as a Dithatha, Daviththa, or in the case of forms, such as a jar or a trough, it is seen that it is the Jīva-Self to whom the agency belongs. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) being this, the Sūtrakāra replies—"But the apt arrangement of names and forms". The word 'But' refutes the opponent's view.



The evolving of names and forms by one who makes the triple agglomeration, indicates the Lord, because the Scriptures indicate that the agency which makes the triple agglomeration can indubitably belong to Him only. This evolving of names and forms such as the fire, the Sun, the Moon, and the lightning, or of Kusha-grass, Kāsha-grass, Palāsha tree or beasts or deer or man, is of various sorts, in so far as every species and every individual is considered in it, and it deserves to be the handiwork of the Lord alone, who is the creator of Teja, Water and the Earth. Whence is it so? Because of such instructions in the Scriptures. After the opening sentence "That this deity thought", and by the use of the first person singular, viz. "I shall evolve", the instruction given is that this evolving is the handiwork of the Highest Brahma alone. *But* (says the opponent of Vedānta) it has been concluded that this evolving is made by the Jīva-Self, because of the qualifications made viz. "With this living Self". (We reply)—It is not so. The words 'With this living Self' go with the words 'having entered', as they come after them and not with 'shall evolve'. Were they to go with 'I shall evolve', then the first person singular 'shall evolve', which would then go with the deity, will have to be considered as used in a figurative sense. The Jīva-Self, unaided by the Lord could not possibly have the power to evolve the various kinds of names and forms such as mountains, rivers, seas etc. and even if it has any such power with respect to any (of these), it (i.e. such power) is dependent on the Highest Lord Himself. It is not, however, that the Jīva-Self is an absolutely different entity from the Highest Lord—just as a scout is different from the king—on account of the qualification "By the Self", and also because this existence of the Jīva-Self as the Jīva-Self is dependent on the limiting adjuncts alone. Hence any such evolving accomplished by it, is tantamount to its having been evolved by the Highest Lord Himself. This is the conclusion derived from all the Upanishads, viz., that the evolving of names and forms is the Lord's handiwork, because of such passages as "The Ākāsha verily is the revealer of names and forms" (Chhān. 6.14.1). Therefore, this evolving of names and forms is the handiwork of the Highest Lord who makes the triple agglomeration. The Scriptures desire to say, that as this evolving of names and

forms is preceded by the triple agglomeration, every single evolution of a name and form can be said to have been spoken of as being brought about by the Parameshvara who is the maker of Teja, Water and Earth. This triple agglomeration is indicated by the Scriptures in the case of the fire, the Sun and the Moon and lightning, by the passage—"The red glow of Agni is the Teja form, the whiteness is the Āpa form and the darkness is the Anna form (i.e. earth) etc.". (Chhān. 6.4.1). In this way the form called Agni is evolved, and as an object is perceived only when its form is evolved, the name Agni is evolved. The same (argument) should be understood as applying to the Sun, the Moon and the Earth. By the mention of this illustration of Agni, a similar triple agglomeration of the three elements—the Earth, the Water and the Teja—may be taken to have been mentioned generally, because the introductory and the concluding portion (of the passage) is common to all of them. This is how this common introductory portion says—"Each of these three deities undergo triple agglomeration" (Chhān. 6.3.4), and this is how the common concluding portion—beginning with "That which became red as it were was the Teja form" etc., and ending with "whatever was not properly known before, was but the combination of these deities" (Chhān. 6.4.6, 7).—20.

This external triple agglomeration of the three deities being already there, now the Scriptures speak of another triple agglomeration in the Ādhyātmika aspect, thus—"These three deities when they arrive at a man's stage undergo triple agglomeration", and the Āchārya now proceeds to indicate it—on the authority of the Scriptures—with a view to remove the suspicion of any possible fault, as follows :—

*Bodily flesh is of the nature of earth according to Scriptures, and it is also of the nature of the others (i.e. Water and Teja).*  
—21.

According to the Scriptures, the Earth when it has undergone triple agglomeration, and is used by man (in the form of food), bodily flesh etc. result from it. The Scrip-

tures are to that effect, thus—"Food (i.e. Earth) when it is consumed is turned into three sorts—the solid element in it is turned into excreta, the middle one is turned into flesh and the subtle element becomes the mind" (Chhān. 6.5.1). The meaning is—what is consumed in the form of food such as rice, barley etc. is but the earth which has undergone triple agglomeration, the solid part of it is thrown out as the excreta, the middle one builds up the flesh of the body, and the subtle one becomes the mind. As indicated by the Scriptures, it should be understood, that of the other two i.e. Teja and Water, similar effects take place. Thus the urine, the blood and the Prāṇa are the products of Water, while the products of Teja are the bones, the nerves and the speech.—21.

(The opponent of Vedānta says here)—If every thing is either the material element or matter, according to the Scriptures, thus—"He made each undergo triple agglomeration", then what is the significance of such special designations as 'This is Teja', 'This is water', 'This is earth', and also of the statements, that 'Food eaten becomes the flesh', 'Water that is drunk becomes the blood', and 'Teja that is absorbed becomes bones' etc.? With regard to this it is said :—

*But such designations are due to their individual distinctive nature—due to their individual distinctive nature.—22.*

The word 'But' has the effect of refuting the alleged fault. Such distinctive designations are because of the special distinctions, which here means 'preponderance'. Though such triple agglomeration takes place (in the case of each) it is seen that there always is a preponderance of some one particular material element, thus—Agni has a preponderance of Teja, liquid has that of Āpa, and food has that of Earth. This triple agglomeration is for the purpose of rendering phenomenal existence possible, because were all these to be one and the same after such triple agglomeration—like the three strands of a rope for instance—such distinctive phenomenal existence of the three would not result. Therefore, notwithstanding this triple agglomeration,

it is because of this distinctive nature of each that special designations such as Teja etc. become reasonably sustainable. The repetition of the words 'distinctive nature' indicates the end of the Adhyāya.—22.

*Here ends Pāda IV of Adhyāya II, and Adhyāya II also.*

### III—SĀDHANĀDHYĀYA

#### ADHYĀYA III—PĀDA I

##### 1. TADANTARAPRATIPATTYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 1-7.

*During the attainment of another body (the Jīva-Self) sallies forth (from the body) enveloped (by the subtle elements, as indicated) by the question and its reply i.e. explanation.—1.*

In the second Adhyāya the conflict of Smṛiti and Nyāya (reasoning) with the doctrine of Brahma as propounded in the Vedānta, was refuted, and it was fully explained as to how it was needless to have any regard for the views of others, and the mutual conflict of Scriptural passages was also removed. It was also said therein, that certain entities which are different from the Jīva-Self, but which form its instruments (such as Prāṇa etc.), are born from Brahma. Now in this third Adhyāya, a set of topics such as, the manner of the Jīva-Self's progress during transmigratory existence as equipped with these instruments, its (i.e. the Jīva-Self's) other states, the nature of Brahma, the differences or non-differences between the Vidyās (Cognitions or Loreṣ or Upāsanās), and the question as to whether the various Guṇās i.e. the attributes (of Brahma) mentioned in the various Vidyās, are to be accepted cumulatively or separately as mentioned (in each Vidyā), the attainment of the aim of life as a result of correct i.e. perfect knowledge, the distinctions between the injunctions which are the means of the attainment of correct i.e. perfect knowledge (such as Sanyāsa etc.), and the absence of any regular rule with regard to the fruit of Final Release, will be expounded, and also any thing else which may become necessary, according as the occasion for it arises. So, in the first Pāda, with reference to the Vidyā of the five fires (i.e. Agnis), the difference in the ways of the progress (of a man) during transmigratory existence, would be explained, as that is the means for creating revulsion (to worldly things), because the Scriptures towards the end (of the Panchāgni Vidyā) declare—"Let (a man) therefore feel

S. B. 34

revulsion (for the sorrowful mundane existence, in which, as in a sea, the various creatures are constantly engulfed)". It is also understood, from the words of the chapter relating to transmigratory existence (of the Jīva-Self), beginning with "Thus these Prāṇās gather together round him" and ending with "It creates for itself another newer and a more benign form" (Brih. 4.4.1, 4), and from the possibility of (the Jīva-Self's) experiencing the fruit of meritorious and unmeritorious actions (by giving up one body and acquiring another), that the Jīva-Self, along with the Chief Prāṇa, sense-organs, and the mind, enveloped in Nescience, action (Karma), and the impression of the previous life, leaves the former body and attains a new one. Now, it is considered (here), whether the Jīva-Self goes away (from the body) enveloped in the subtle elements, which are the seeds of the body etc., or whether it goes away unenveloped. What then is the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta)? It is that it goes away unenveloped. Whence is it so? Because the Scriptures which declare that it takes up with itself the particles of energy (Teja) i.e. the organs-of-sense (Tejomātrās) do not say that it takes up with itself the subtle elements (Bhūta-Mātrās) also. The Scriptural passage "He who takes up to himself particles of energy (Teja)" (Brih. 4.4.1) intimates, by the words "Particles of energy (Teja)", the Self's taking up the organs-of-sense with it. In the concluding portion of the passage also, it speaks of the organs of sight etc., but there is no mention about the Self's taking up with it the subtle elements also. They are, besides, easily obtainable everywhere, i.e. they exist wherever a body has to be created, and hence the Jīva-Self's taking them up with itself would be purposeless. Therefore, the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) being, that the Jīva-Self goes out unenveloped, the Āchārya replies:— "During the attainment of another (body), (the Jīva-Self) goes enveloped etc.". It should be understood that during the attainment of another body (the Jīva-Self) moves out i.e. goes away enveloped by the subtle elements, the seeds of the body. Whence is it so? Because of the question and the reply i.e. explanation. The question is, thus — "Do you know how during the fifth oblation Āpa (water) attains the name of a man (Purushavachasah)?" (Chhān. 5.3.3). The explanation is in the form of a reply, thus—

Having indicated (the offering of) the five oblations in the form of faith, Soma, rain (Vrishti), food and semen respectively, in the five Agnis (fires), viz. the heavenly world, the cloud (Parjanya), the earth, the man and the woman respectively, (the Scriptures declare), "Thus during the fifth oblation, Āpa (water) attains the name of a man" (Chhān. 5.9.1). Therefore, it is understood, that it is as enveloped in water, that the Jīva-Self sallies forth (from the body). But (says the opponent of Vedānta), another Scriptural passage shows, that (the Jīva-Self), like the caterpillar, does not give up its hold on the previous body, as long it does not reach the other body, thus—"Just as the caterpillar on the grass" (Brih. 4.4.3). This (we reply) is not contradictory, in as much as, here, merely the lengthening out of the expectancy about the object to be reached, viz. the body to be brought about by previous action (Karma) of the Jīva-Self so enveloped in Āpa (water), is compared with the caterpillar. Therefore, this, according to the Scriptures, being the manner of the attainment of another body, all those other various conceptions generated by the mind of man, such as, that the all-pervading sense-organs and Jīva-Selfs, acquire their function on attaining another body, depending upon their actions (Karma) (the Sāmkhya view), or that the Jīva-Self alone by itself acquires its function there (i.e. in the new body) while the sense-organs, like the body, are born in those particular different environments of experience (the Buddha view), or that the mind alone proceeds to the new environment of experience (the Vaisheshika view), or that the Jīva-Self alone flies away from one body and reaches another, even as a parrot flies from one tree to another (the Jaina view), should all be ignored as being in conflict with the Scriptures.—1.

Says (the opponent of Vedānta), from the question and the reply i.e. the explanation cited, it comes to this, that on the strength of the word Āpa from the Scriptures, it is, as enveloped in Āpa only, that (the Jīva-Self) sallies forth (from the body). How is it, then, so comprehensively understood from that, that the Jīva-Self sallies forth as enveloped in all the subtle elements? Hence, the reply is :—

*Because (Āpa) has a triple composition (of elements). (Āpa is particularly mentioned) because of its preponderance.—2.*

(The Sūtrakāra) removes the doubt (alleged by the opponent of Vedānta) by the word 'because' (Tu). According to the Scriptures, Āpa consists of a triple agglomeration. When Āpa is understood to be the one that starts (the creation of a body) the other two elements also have necessarily to be understood (to have been involved with it). A body has a triple nature, because, all the three (elements), viz. Teja, water and earth, are perceived to have been involved in its making. It is triple (in its nature) also because it has three constituent humours, viz. the wind, bile and phlegm (Vāta, Pitta, Kapha). It is not possible to begin the creation of a body merely with Āpa, ignoring the other two elements. Therefore the Scriptural statement about the Āpa attaining the name of a man (Purushavachasah), is merely because of its preponderance (and it does not mean that the other two elements do not go into the making of it), nor is it, that the word Āpa employed in the question and the reply, is employed merely with respect to Āpa, alone by itself. Besides in all bodies a profusion of fluid matter such as the secretions and blood, etc., is observable. But (says the opponent of Vedānta), it is seen that solid matter preponderates in a body. (We reply)—It is no fault, because, may be, in comparison with the other elements, fluid matter preponderates. It is of course seen that even in the seed of the body characterized by semen and ovum also, fluid portion preponderates, while action (Karma) is but the efficient cause which starts the creation of another body. Also action (Karma) such as the Agnihotra etc. is dependent upon such fluid things, as Soma, ghee, milk etc.. The Āchārya will say hereafter how Āpa which invariably accompanies action (Karma) and is therein called "Faith", is offered as an oblation, in the Agni (fire) in the form of the heavenly world, and this also makes the preponderance of Āpa known, and it is understood, that such preponderance shows, that by the word Āpa, all the other seeds of the body such as the subtle elements have to be understood, and hence (the proposition of the Vedāntin) is flawless—2.



*Also because of the going away of the Prāṇās.—3.*

One Scriptural passage says, that during the acquisition of another body, the Prāṇās depart (from the previous body), thus—“When he (the Jīva-Self) goes out, the Chief Prāṇa goes out after him and when the Chief Prāṇa goes out, all the other Prāṇās (organs-of-sense) follow in the wake of the Chief Prāṇa” (Brih. 4.4.2). This going away of all the Prāṇās is not possible, unless they have some support, and hence it is understood that because of the going away of the Prāṇās, the Āpās which constitutes their support, also go away with the Prāṇās, along with the other elements. As observed in the case of living bodies, Prāṇās, unless they have a support, can neither depart nor abide anywhere.—3.

*If it be said (that the Prāṇās do not depart with the Jīva-Self) because of the Scriptural statement about their entering the Agni etc., (we reply)—No, because (that statement is) in a metaphorical sense.—4.*

If it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta)—It may as well be, that during the acquisition of another body, the Prāṇās, of course, do not accompany the Jīva-Self, because of the Scriptural statement about their entering into Agni etc., which indicates that at the time of death, Prāṇās such as speech etc. enter into deities such as Agni etc., thus—“Where the speech of this dead person gets absorbed into Agni and his vital breath into the air etc.” (Brih. 3.2.13), we reply—No, because (the statement) is metaphorical. The Scriptural statement about speech etc. entering into Agni etc., is in a secondary sense, because it is not observed in the case of the hairs of the body or the head, that they do go like that. The Scriptures there say thus—“The hairs of the body enter into herbs, the hairs of the head enter into trees” (Brih. 3.2.13). It is not possible that the hairs of the body and the head fly away (from the body) and approach the herbs and trees respectively. Nor could the Jīva-Self itself be imagined to be going away, if it is denied that its limiting adjunct, the Prāṇa, goes away with the

Jīva-Self (from the body). Nor is it reasonably sustainable, that there could be any experience (by the Jīva-Self) in a new body, in the absence of the Prāṇās. Besides the going away of the Prāṇās with the Jīva-Self is clearly stated elsewhere (in the Scriptures) (Bṛih. 4.4.2). Hence, it is only with reference to the fact that deities such as Agni etc. which preside over and support speech etc., withdraw their support at the time of death, that it is stated in a metaphorical way, that speech etc. enter into Agni etc.—4.

*If it be said that (it cannot be understood that water during the fifth oblation attains the condition of man) because Āpās are not mentioned in the case of the first (oblation), (we reply)—No, because it is reasonably sustainable that Āpās are meant.—5.*

(If the opponent of Vedānta says)—It may well be, that it is not definitely determined, that “during the fifth oblation Āpās attain the name of man” because, there is no Scriptural statement here, about Āpās, in the first (oblation). Here, the five Agnis such as the heavenly world etc. are mentioned by the Scriptures as the supporters of the five oblations (i.e. in them these oblations are offered). Having stated with regard to the first of them (i.e. the heavenly world) thus—“This world, verily, Oh Gautama, is the fire” (Chhān. 5.4.1), Faith (Shraddhā) has thereafter been indicated to be the oblation material, thus—“In this Agni, the Gods offer ‘faith’ as an oblation” (Chhān. 5.4.2). The Scriptures do not mention *water* there, as the material of oblation. Well may you imagine, that Āpās are the material of oblation in the case of the four Agnis which come after (the Agni as the heavenly world), because it is reasonably sustainable in their case, that Soma etc. which are used as the offerings (as oblations) have a preponderance of fluid matter, but it would be doing violence (to the text) to reject ‘Faith’ as mentioned by the Scriptures in the case of the first Agni, and to imagine Āpās (as meant by the term Faith) which are not mentioned at all by the Scriptures (as being the material of oblation to be offered in the heavenly world—Agni). ‘Faith’, as is well-known, is a particular conception or notion. Hence it is not logical

(to understand) that Āpās during the fifth oblation attain the condition of man. (We reply)—This is no fault because even there, in the case of the first Agni, by the word 'Faith' the self-same Āpās are meant. Whence is it so ? Because it is reasonably so sustainable, and it is reasonably sustainable to hold that this sentence becomes unambiguous, only if its beginning, the middle portion and its concluding portion are thus consistent with each other. Otherwise, when, the question asked is, thus—"The manner in which during the fifth oblation Āpās attain the condition of man", if something which is not Āpa, viz., 'Faith', is thus introduced as the material of oblation, then as the question would be of one sort, and the reply thus having no relation to the question, there would be no syntactical harmony (in the sentence). The Scriptures also indicate the same thing, viz. that 'Faith' is water (Āpa), when it concludes thus—"In this manner Āpās attain the name of man during the fifth oblation". Similarly it is noticed that the downpour of Soma as the result of 'Faith', as it grows gross and tangible, has a preponderance of Āpa, which is a logical reason for 'Faith' being 'Āpa', because, an effect is always similar to its cause. Besides, the term known as 'Shraddhā', being either an attribute of the mind or of the Jīva-Self, it is not possible to extract it out of that to which it belongs (i.e. the mind or the body of a man) and take it up (in the hand) for sacrificing, just as an animal's heart etc., can be extracted from an animal and taken up, and hence, the word 'Faith' does mean Āpās. It is reasonably sustainable to accept the word 'Faith' for Āpās, because of its use in a Scriptural passage, thus—"Faith indeed is Āpa." Āpās are the seed of the body and they attain minuteness or subtlety and similarity in form to faith, and hence they can be synonymous with the word 'Faith', just as a person possessing leonine prowess is referred to as the 'Leo'. Besides, Āpa can be properly referred to as 'Faith', as it is in close relation with action (Karma) backed by 'Faith', just as the word, 'a dais' (Mancha), can be used for men (who occupy the dais). Also, because of Āpa being the cause of Faith, it would be reasonably sustainable to use the word 'Faith', as in the Scriptural passage—"Āpās, indeed generate faith in him (viz. the sacrificing host i.e. the Yajamāna) for holy actions".—5.

*If it be said (that the Jīva-Self does not ascend enveloped in water), because there is no Scriptural mention (about it), (we reply)—No, because it is perceived to be so by reason of the fact that those who perform Isṭi (a sacrifice) etc. (attain the lunar world).—6.*

(If the opponent of Vedānta says), it may be (even as you the Vedāntin say), that because of the question and the reply, Āpās (i.e. water) in the order of Faith etc. respectively, may during the fifth oblation attain the form of man, but (I still maintain that) Jīva-Selfs do not go out (of the bodies) enveloped in water, because there is no Scriptural statement about it. There is no word in this Scriptural passage here, which refers to Jīva-Selfs, just as the word Āpās occurs therein, and hence it is not logical (to say) that the Jīva-Self goes out enveloped (in water). (We reply)—This is no fault. Why? Because a reference to those who perform Isṭis (Sacrifices) is understood (here). For the Scriptures, beginning with the passage “Those who in the city (which term is indicative of householders) practise meditation by performing Isṭa (i.e. Agnihotra etc.) and Poorta (i.e. digging of wells, ponds etc.), and Datta (giving monetary help to the deserving, out of the Veda), reach Dhūma (i.e. the deity abiding in smoke)” (Chhān. 5.10.3), afterwards declare, that those who perform such Isṭis (i.e. Agnihotra etc.) arrive at the moon by the Pitriyāna way (the way of the manes) indicated by the Smoke, thus—“From Ākāsha (space) to the moon, who is King Soma (the food of the Gods)” (Chhān. 5.10.4). Those self-same persons (i.e. those who perform Isṭi etc.) are understood here, also in a corresponding Scriptural passage—“In that Agni, the Gods sacrifice ‘Faith’ and from that oblation, King Soma is born” (Chhān. 5.4.2). In the case of those who perform such Isṭis (i.e. Sacrifices), that, curds, milk etc. (which they use) and which form the means of performing Agnihotra and Darshapūrṇamāsa sacrifices, are virtually Āpās, containing as they do a preponderance of liquid matter, is evident. Those Āpās when offered (as oblation in the Āhavanīya fire become subtle and assume the form of merit (Apūrva),

and take their resort with the performer of *Ishtis*. And when he dies the *Ritvija* (sacrificial priest) consigns his body according to a funeral ceremony to the cremation-fire, while reciting the Mantra—"May he (the *Yajamāna*) attain the heavenly world, *Swāhā*". Hence, what is meant by the statement "Those *Āpās* in the form of oblations, which invariably accompany these sacrificial acts based on 'Faith', and are of the form of merit (*Apūrva*), envelop those *Jīva-Selfs* who have performed the *Ishtis*, and carry them to that world, for affording them the fruit of these *Ishtis*" is, here in the present context, expressed by the verb 'to sacrifice' thus—"He sacrifices faith" (*Brih. 6.2.9*). Similarly in the *Agnihotra* chapter, by the complementary passage in the form of replies to six questions, viz. "This brace of oblations which are sacrificed, go up" (*Shata. Brā. 6.2.6*) etc., it is properly indicated, that these oblations of the *Agnihotra* attain the other world in order to start the function of affording the fruit (of actions). Hence it is just proper (to say) that the *Jīva-Selfs* enveloped in water in the form of oblations, move out (of the body) for experiencing the fruits of their actions (in another body).—6.

But (says the opponent of *Vedānta*), how is this, i.e. the going of these performers of *Ishtis* for the purpose of experiencing the fruit of their actions to other bodies, understood (to be so), when the Scriptures indicate, that those who have thus ascended to the moon by the path of the smoke, become food, thus—"This is King Soma, that is the food of the Gods, which the Gods eat" (*Chhān. 5.10.4*), and the other parallel passage of the Scriptures also indicates thus—"Having attained the moon, they become food, and the Gods there eat them up, just as here, the priests at a sacrifice drink King Soma, cup after cup, i.e. no sooner one cup is filled up, it is emptied" (*Brih. 6.2.16*)? There could be no experiencing of any fruit by those, who are gobbled up by the Gods, like tigers etc.. To this the reply is :

*Or else, the Jīva-Self's being called 'Food' (of the Gods) is in a metaphorical or secondary sense because of their not having realized the Self (Ātmā i.e. Brahma). The Scriptures also indicate the same.—7.*

The word 'or else' (Vā) has the purport of refuting the alleged fault. Their being 'the food' is not meant in the principal sense, but only in a metaphorical sense. Were their being 'food' to be in the principal sense, the Scriptural passage which confers competency (on a person), thus—"One who desires the heavenly world should sacrifice", would be contradicted. If those who perform *Ishta* were not to have experience (of the fruits of their actions) on the Lunar Sphere, why would they unnecessarily perform ritualistic action (such as *Ishti* etc.) involving a good deal of trouble? The word 'food' moreover, which is commonly used as the means of such experience (of fruits of actions), is observed to be used also for that which is not food, as for instance—that the subjects (*Vishās*) are food for Kings, animals are food for the subjects (*Vishās*). (Cf. Napoleon's—"Soldiers are fodder for the cannon.") Hence in their case, what is meant by 'eating', is the pleasurable association of the Gods with those who have performed *Ishtis* etc., who, like a man having pleasurable associations with his dear ones such as wife, son, friend or servant etc., have come to be in a subordinate position to the Gods (as compared with the Gods), and not the chewing and swallowing up of them like a *Modaka* (a sweet thing). The Scriptural passage "Verily the Gods neither eat nor drink but are satisfied merely by seeing this nectar (in the form of *Soma*) (as if they have actually eaten)" (*Chhān.* 3.6.1) denies any masticatory activity etc. on the part of the Gods. That those performers of *Ishta* etc. who have come to occupy a subordinate position to the Gods, also do have experience (of the fruits of actions) is reasonably sustainable, even as it is, in the case of King's servants who live on him. It is reasonably sustainable, that these performers of *Ishta* etc. are fit objects of enjoyment for the Gods, inasmuch as they have not yet realized the Self (*Ātmā* i.e. *Brahma*, and consequently are ignorant), for the Scriptural passage "Now, he who worships a deity, feeling that the deity is a different entity than himself, is ignorant like a beast and even so is he to the Gods" (*Brih.* 1.4.10) shows how those who have not yet realized the Self (*Ātmā* i.e. *Brahma*) serve as objects of enjoyment for the Gods. It is understood that even in this world he serves the Gods as a beast, by pleasing them by *Ishta* and similar actions, and

in the other world also he serves them similarly by depending on them for his maintenance and by experiencing the fruits (of his actions) as directed by them.

The following is another explanation of (the latter part of the Sūtra)—“Because of their not having realized the Self (Ātmā i.e. Brahma). The Scriptures also indicate the same.”

These (persons) who indulge in mere ritualistic actions such as Ishta etc., but do not endeavour to combine knowledge with such actions, are those who have not realized the Self (Ātmā i.e. Brahma). The Lore (Vidyā) of the five Agnis is here metaphorically treated as the Lore (Vidyā) of the Self (Ātmā i.e. Brahma) as is understood from the chapter (which deals with the knowledge of the Self). These performers of Ishta etc., being devoid of the knowledge of the five Agnis, are by way of a Guṇavāda (i.e. in a secondary sense) referred to as food (for the Gods) with a view thus to glorify the Lore (Vidyā) of the five Agnis, because as is understood from the gift of the passage, it is desired here, to enjoin the Lore (Vidyā) of the five Agnis. Another Scriptural passage similarly indicates the possibility of their having experience in the Soma (Lunar) World, thus—“Having enjoyed exalted status in the Soma (Lunar) World, he comes back (to this world)” (Prashna 5.4). Another Scriptural passage also, viz., “What constitutes a hundred joys of the fathers (manes) who have conquered the world of the manes (Pitriloka), is but only a single joy of these princes of Action (Karmadevās), who attain Godhood by their actions” (Brih. 4.3.33), indicates, how the performers of Ishta, sojourning which the Gods, obtain the experience of enjoyment. In this way, the statement about these performers of Ishta being the food (for the Gods) being in a metaphorical sense, it is understood that the Jīva-Selfs go up (to the moon for experience) and therefore it is quite properly said, that the Jīva-Self ascends enveloped (in Āpa).—7.

## 2. KRITĀTYAYĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 8-11.

*After actions are worked out i.e. exhausted  
(the Jīva-Selfs return to this world) with*

*an Anushaya (residue of actions) as is seen on the authority of the Scriptures, and the Smṛiti. They return in the reverse way (to that in which they ascended).—8.*

The descent (to this world) of those, who have performed *Ishta* etc., and have ascended to the sphere of the moon by the way of smoke etc., and have completely experienced the fruits of actions, is stated by the Scriptures, beginning with "Having stayed there (i.e. in the sphere of the moon) till their quantum of actions is exhausted (*yāvatsampātam*), they return by the same way by which they have ascended" (*Chhān.* 5.10.15), and upto "Those whose *Charaṇa* (conduct) has been good, attain a good birth such as that of a *Brāhmaṇa* etc. and those whose conduct has been reprehensible, attain the birth of a dog etc.". Now, it is considered here, whether the *Jīva-Selfs* who have experienced the fruit of all their actions, descend (to this world) with or without any *Anushaya*. The conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of *Vedānta*) is, (that they descend) without any such *Anushaya*. Whence is it so? Because of the special mention—"Till their quantum of actions (*Sampāta*) is exhausted". The word (*Sampāta*) here means the aggregate of actions, thus—"That by which (they) ascend to that world (i.e. the sphere of the moon) from this (world), for experiencing the fruit (of actions)". The words "Having stayed there till their quantum of actions is exhausted" show that the fruits of *all the actions* of a *Jīva-Self* are experienced, even there (in the world of the moon). And by another Scriptural passage also, viz. "When all that action (of theirs) is requited or exhausted (by the experience of fruit)" (*Bṛih.* 6.2.16), the same meaning is expressed. (Says the *Vedāntin*), I would say that it means thus—Whatever action is fit to be exhausted by experiencing its fruit there (i.e. in the world of the moon), that alone is exhausted there (and not that *all actions* are exhausted there). (The opponent of *Vedānta* replies)—It cannot be so imagined, because, another Scriptural passage refers to "Whatsoever (*Yat Kincha*) without any exception", thus—"Having in this world of the moon, exhausted the effect of all actions whatsoever which he has done in this world, he returns therefrom to this world for doing



action (Karma) again". (Brih. 4.4.6), which, as it, in general, refers to whatsoever action without exception, shows that all actions without exception are exhausted here (i.e. on the Lunar Sphere). Besides, death is the revealer of i.e. it makes manifest, all actions whose fruits have not yet begun to be experienced, because, it is not reasonably sustainable, that before death there could be any revelation of such actions as have been obstructed by other actions whose fruition has already begun. Besides, it (death) ought to be understood to be the revealer of all actions (without any exception), whose fruition has not till then begun, because, the cause (viz., death which reveals actions) being the same common cause, the result does not deserve to be different. It is not reasonably sustainable, that in the proximate presence of a lamp as a common cause, a jar alone is revealed (to sight), while a piece of cloth is not. Therefore the Jīva-Selfs descend without any Anushaya. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) being this, we reply:— When actions are exhausted, (the Jīva-Self does of course descend) with an Anushaya. When that particular set of actions, with which he (the Jīva-Self) has ascended to the Lunar Sphere for experiencing their fruits, is exhausted, the watery body which this Jīva-Self has acquired for itself on the Lunar Sphere, for the purpose of experiencing such fruits of actions, is dissolved by contact with the fire (in the form) of grief, caused by visualizing the exhaustion of all such experience of the fruits of this set of actions, even as hailstones are dissolved by contact with the rays of the sun, or the solidity of ghee is dissolved by contact with the flame of a 'sacrificial fire. Hence when actions such as Ishṭa etc. are exhausted by the experiencing of their fruit, the Jīva-Self descends to this earth along with an Anushaya. Whence is it so? Because of what is seen (Drisṭa i.e. the Scriptures) and the Smritis. For it is in this manner, that the descent of the Jīva-Self with its Anushaya, is indicated by the Scriptures, thus—"For, those who have done good deeds in this world necessarily attain a good birth such as that of a Brāhmaṇa or a Kshatriya or a Vaishya, and those whose actions have been disreputable, necessarily attain a disreputable birth such as that of a dog or a swine or a Chāṇḍāla (out-caste)" (Chhān. 5.10.7). It will later on be described (by the Āchārya) that the

word "Charaṇa" means Anushaya (the residue of unrequited actions). This division of the experience of pleasure and pain, in a high or low degree by every being, is evident amongst all beings from their very birth, and as it is not possible that it could be adventitious, it indicates the presence of an Anushaya, because it is generally understood from the Shāstra, that worldly prosperity and demerit are the result of good and bad actions respectively, as their cause. The Smṛiti also, by the passage "The (members of) various caste and order of life, having died after doing actions, and having experienced the fruits of their actions, are born again with this unrequited residue of their actions, and have a particular environment, caste, family, form, age-limit, knowledge, character, wealth, pleasure, intellect", shows how, the Jiva-Selfs descend with an Anushaya. Now, what indeed again is this Anushaya any way? Some say here—Anushaya is a sort of a residue of actions, left over from actions performed for the acquisition of heaven, and the fruits of which have been experienced, and is like (for instance) the residue of oil sticking to a pot. Just as when a pot of oil is emptied, it does not get emptied completely but some residue of oil does still remain sticking to the pot, even so is Anushaya. But (says the Vedāntin), because 'Adṛiṣṭa', the unseen principle (the quantum of merit and demerit), is always antagonistic to action, it is not logical (to say) that there could be any residue from actions whose fruits have been experienced. (Their reply is)—This is no fault. We do not understand that the fruits of actions in their entirety are experienced. But (says the Vedāntin) is not it, that the Jiva-Self is understood to have ascended the Lunar Sphere for experiencing the fruits of the entire set of actions without any exception? (Their reply is)—Well, but it is not possible to continue to stay on there when there is but only a small residue of actions. Just as, some servant having approached the King's household with all the implements of service (including the limbs of his body useful for work), but having lost most of his implements during his long sojourn there, has only the umbrella and the wooden shoes i.e. Pādukās (Cf. Dutch Sabots?) left with him, is not thereafter able to continue in the household of the King, similarly having merely the Anushaya left with him, the Jiva-Self is no longer able to stay on the

Lunar Sphere. (The Bhāshyakāra says)—This is by no means logical. It has already been said that it is not reasonably sustainable that there should be a residue of actions performed for the sake of obtaining the heavenly world whose fruits have been experienced, inasmuch as it (i.e. Adrishṭa) is antagonistic to actions. But (says that somebody referred to above) it has also been stated by us that the experience of the fruit of the entire set of actions which have the heavenly world as its fruit, could not be had. (We the Vedāntins reply)—It is not proper (to maintain), that actions performed with an aim to attain the heavenly world do not produce the whole fruit for a person while he is in the heavenly world, but produce a modicum of fruit even after he is displaced from such heavenly world. Such an assumption is not proper for those who accept the Scriptures as an authority. It of course is reasonably sustainable, that some oil should still keep sticking to a pot of oil (which has been emptied) because it evidently is so, or that a servant may happen to have only a small part of his service implements left with him, but here, any such residue of actions having the heavenly world as its fruit, is neither evident nor conceivable, inasmuch as it is contradictory to the Shāstra of the fruits of actions. It must necessarily be understood that there could be no such Anushaya i.e. residue of actions such as Ishṭa etc. whose fruit is the attainment of heaven, like ghee sticking to a pot. However, if Anushaya be at all assumed to be only a part of such good actions as Ishṭa etc. as a result of which the experience of heaven is obtained (by the Self), then it could only be a residue of a good type of actions and not otherwise, and if so, it would contradict the Scriptural statement which makes a division of Anushaya (into good and bad Anushaya) such as—“Those whose conduct is good and those whose conduct is disreputable” (Chhān. 5.10.7). Hence when that particular set of actions whose fruit is to be experienced in the next world is exhausted (by the enjoyment of its fruit), another set of actions whose fruit is to be experienced in this world, still remains, as Anushaya, and it is with this Anushaya that these Jīva-Selfs descend (from the Lunar Sphere) to this world. With regard to the objection raised (by the opponent of Vedānta), viz. that because of the reference to “What-so-ever” (Yat Kincha),

i.e. "without any exception", the Jiva-Selfs descend without any sort of such Anushaya, after having exhausted all the actions performed here (in this world) by experiencing the fruits thereof, (the Vedāntin's reply is)—It is not so, because the existence of Anushaya is definitely established (by us). It is thus understood, that it is after having begun experiencing the fruits, of all those actions performed in this world, whose fruit is to be experienced in the next world, and after exhausting these actions (that the Selfs descend). That other objection also—viz. that death reveals all such actions, the experiencing of the fruit of which is not till then begun without any exception, and that there could be no such division of actions, such as those whose fruition is begun in the next world and those whose fruition is begun in this world—is answered by the very same statement about the existence of Anushaya. It must besides be explained (by the opponent of Vedānta), on what ground it is understood (by him) that death reveals all those actions whose fruit has not yet begun. If it be said, that it is not reasonably sustainable, that the operation of such other action, which is obstructed by that action whose fruition has started, does not begin, and that such operation begins at the time of death when the latter action is exhausted, then it has to be explained, viz., Just as (as you the opponent of Vedānta say) it is not reasonably sustainable, that the operation of that action, which is obstructed by another action whose fruition has already begun before death, can possibly begin, similarly, even at the time of death, as the simultaneous commencement of the fruition of actions having fruits contrary in nature to each other is not possible, it is not reasonably sustainable, that, the operation of a comparatively weak action, which is obstructed by a powerful action, can ever begin. It is not possible to say that many actions whose fruits have to be experienced during another birth, and which are simultaneously revealed at the time of one and the same single death, can begin only on a new birth, merely because of the common circumstance of the absence of the beginning of fruition of these several actions, as it would contradict the fact, that each action has its own fruit. Nor can it be maintained that only some actions become manifest at death and some are annihilated, as it would contradict the rule, that

every action must necessarily have its fruit. It is not possible, that, in the absence of causes such as an expiatory ritual etc., annihilation of any action can take place. The Smṛiti also declares how actions obstructed by other actions having a contrary fruit, endure for a long time, thus—“Sometimes good actions merely stand by (without producing any fruit), as long as a person continues to be engulfed in transmigratory existence and is not released from misery”. If all these actions which have not started their fruition were to be made manifest at the time of one and the same single death, and were they to start but one fresh existence only, then, in that single fresh existence, be it that of a heavenly, hellish, or beastly kind, in the absence of any competency i.e. Adhikāra (in any being) for doing actions in such sort of single fresh existence only, no merit or demerit would result, and thus in the absence of any cause (for a new birth) no other fresh existence would come into being, and the statement of Smṛitis—that each single act of killing a Brāhmaṇa etc. is the cause of *several* births (required for expiating the sin)—would thus be contradicted. It is not possible to imagine that there could be any means other than the Shāstra, by which the nature, the fruit, and the means, of merit (Dharma) and demerit (Adharma), can be understood. It is not possible, that death could be the cause of the manifestation of the fruit of a ritualistic action such as the ‘Kārīri’ Isṭi, whose fruit (viz. rain) is observed here in this world, and hence the idea about death being the cause of the manifestation (of actions) also falls short of covering all possible cases. The illustration of the lamp also stands refuted, by indicating the relative strength or weakness of actions. This should be looked upon as being similar to the manifestation or non-manifestation of gross or minute form (Rūpa) of things. While the proximity of a lamp to things, is the same, it only reveals gross things, but not the minute ones, even so, when all the various actions, whose fruition has not yet commenced, have the same chance (of being made manifest), death reveals only the stronger action and not the one which is comparatively weaker. Therefore, the doctrine that all actions become manifest (at the time of death) is not proper, as it is contrary to the Scriptures, Smṛitis and also Nyāya (reasoning). Similarly the fear that there

would be the predicament of the want of Final Release if there is a residue of actions, is groundless, inasmuch as the Scriptures declare that *all* action is exhausted when real i.e. perfect knowledge supervenes. Therefore, it is clearly established that the Jīva-Selfs descend (to this world) along with an Anushaya and when they do so descend, they do so in a manner which is reverse to that by which they happen to have ascended (to the Lunar Sphere). "As they went" means as they ascended, and, "unlike that" means, in the reverse way, because Smoke and the Ākāsha included in the 'Pitriyāna' path (the path of the manes) are also mentioned in the path of descent, and also because of the expression "as they ascended"—which suggests the manner of descent to be in the reverse way. The reverse way also is understood, by the absence of any reference to night etc. and the additional reference to clouds etc.—8.

*If it be said (that a particular species of birth) is the result of Charaṇa (meritorious and unmeritorious actions, and no Anushaya need be assumed), (we say)—No, because (the Scriptural statement about Charaṇa) according to Kārshṇājini, is indicative of Anushaya by implication.—9.*

(If the objection of the opponent of Vedānta is)—It may be, that the Scriptural statement cited for the purpose of propounding the existence of Anushaya, viz., "For, those whose conduct has been good etc." (Chhān. 5.10), shows, that a particular species of birth is due to Charaṇa and not Anushaya, because, Charaṇa is different from Anushaya. Charaṇa, Āchāra and Shīla are synonymous, while by the word Anushaya, a residue of actions other than those whose fruit has already been experienced, is meant. Even the Scriptures indicate, how action and Charaṇa are different, thus—"Even as his actions are, and his conduct is, he becomes" (Bṛih. 4.9.5); also, "You should follow only such of our actions as are faultless and not the others, and, you should contemplate upon (and accept) only such conduct of ours as is good and no other" (Tait. 1.11.12). Therefore, as the Scriptural statement indicates that it is due to Charaṇa that a particular species of birth comes about, the

existence of Anushaya is not thereby established. (We reply)—This is no fault, because Āchārya Kārshṇājini is of opinion that the Scriptural statement (about Charaṇa) is in a secondary sense indicative only of Anushaya.—9.

*If it be said, that conduct (Charaṇa) would be rendered futile (if it be held that it does not cause a particular species of birth, we reply)—No, because actions depend upon that (i.e. Charaṇa).—10.*

If it be said—It may be like this : Why should the direct Scriptural meaning of the word 'Charaṇa' which is conduct (Shīla), be rejected and the word be understood in a secondary significance, to mean Anushaya? It may well be, that an auspicious or inauspicious species of birth respectively can be the fruit of the good or bad nature of conduct (Shīla) which is directly enjoined or prohibited respectively by the Shāstra. It is absolutely necessary that even conduct (Shīla) must be understood to have some fruit, as otherwise conduct would be without any purpose. (To this, Kārshṇājini replies)—This is no fault. How is it so? Because Charaṇa (meritorious or unmeritorious actions) is dependent upon that (i.e. Anushaya). Ritualistic action, such as Ishṭa etc., depends upon Charaṇa, because nobody whose conduct is not good is competent to perform such ritualistic action. On the authority of such Smritis as "The Scriptures do not sanctify i.e. purify a person who is devoid of good conduct", conduct cannot be without any purpose, even when it is supposed that conduct is subservient to man (and not to action). When the whole set of actions such as Ishṭa etc. starts fructifying, conduct which is so subservient to man may well start producing some supplementary speciality in the fruit of such actions. It is well-known in the Scriptures and Smritis that it is action that creates all objects. Hence, Kārshṇājini is of opinion, that it is action alone, i.e. Anushaya—which is the secondary significance of the word Charaṇa (conduct)—, that is the cause of a particular species of birth. When it is possible to understand actions to be the cause of a particular species of birth, it is improper to understand, that Shīla causes a particular species of birth. No one who is able to run on

his legs, would ever deserve to crawl i.e. creep on his knees.—10.

*Bādari (is of opinion, that Charaṇa) does mean good and evil actions.—11.*

Āchārya Bādari considers that by the word 'Charaṇa', both good or evil actions taken together, are (directly) meant, and that Charaṇa (Conduct), Anushṭhāna (Performance) and Karma (Actions) are all synonymous. It is also similarly observed, that the root 'Charati' is commonly used in the case of all actions generally with respect to him who performs meritorious religious rituals such as Ishṭa etc., and with respect to a man who performs meritorious actions, people say, that the high-souled man performs (Charati) Dharma (i.e. meritorious actions). And Āchāra also is but one kind of meritorious action. The distinction which is sometimes observed to be made between Karma and Charaṇa, is reasonably sustainable on the strength of the Nyāya maxim of "a Brāhmaṇa and a Parivrajaka (i.e. a Brāhmaṇa who has taken Sanyāsa)". Hence, the conclusion is that the men of good actions are those, whose acts are approved (by all generally) and men whose actions are filthy are men whose actions are censurable (by all generally).—11.

### 3. ANISHTĀDIKĀRYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 12-21.

*The Scriptures declare that even those who do not perform Ishṭa etc. also (ascend to the Lunar Sphere).—12.*

It has been stated, that those who perform Ishṭa etc., ascend to the moon. Now it is considered, whether those also who do not perform Ishṭa etc. ascend to the moon or whether they do not. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that it is not, that only those who perform Ishṭa etc. ascend to the moon. Whence is it so? Because the Scriptures speak of the moon as the destination, equally of even those who do not perform Ishṭa etc.. So say the Kaushitakins generally, thus—"Verily those who depart from this world, they all go to the moon". (Kaush.



1.2). Besides it cannot be imagined that those who are about to be born again, begin a new body without first having reached the moon, because the number of oblations is duly fixed according to (the Scriptural statement) "During the fifth oblation" (Chhān. 5.9.1), whence, all must needs ascend to the moon. If it be said (by the Vedāntin) that it is not proper that both those who perform the Ishṭa and the others (i.e. those who do not), alike have the same destination, (we the opponents of Vedānta reply)—No, because there is absence of experience (of the fruit of actions) on the Lunar Sphere for those others (who do not perform Ishṭa etc.).—12.

*But, the others (i.e. those who do not perform Ishṭa etc.) have also their ascent and descent, after having suffered in Samyamana (i.e. Death's abode), because, in the Scriptures, their course is seen to be in that way.—13.*

The word 'But' refutes the opponent's view. It is not, that all ascend to the moon. Whence is it so? The ascent to the moon is for the experience (of the fruits of action) and not without any purpose, nor is it merely for the purpose of descent either, because, a man goes up a tree for gathering flowers and fruits and not without any purpose, or merely for sustaining a fall (therefrom). It has been stated already that those who have not performed any Ishṭa etc. do not have any experience on the moon. Therefore, it is only those who have performed Ishṭa etc., that ascend to the moon and not the others. As far as those other people are concerned, they, having descended to Samyamana (the abode of Yama, the God of Death) and having suffered the torments befitting their evil deeds, again return to this world, and it is thus, that their descent and ascent take place. Whence is it so? Because, that they follow such a course is to be observed (from the Scriptures), for in a Scriptural passage similar in purport, and put in the mouth of Yama (Death), it is indicated, how those who depart (from this life) without having performed Ishṭa etc., find themselves in the clutches of Yama, thus: "The light of Sāmparāya (i.e. the means of

attaining the higher world) is not for him who is ignorant and is constantly erring and is infatuated by wealth, and who considers this (i.e. the present) world to be the only world, and that there is no beyond. Thus does he come into my clutches time and again" (Kāṭha. 2.6). There are several indicatory marks which show, how a man gets into the clutches of Yama (Death) such as—"(Let oblations be offered so as to please) Yama, to whom all men go" (Rig. Sam. X.14.1).—13.

*The Smritis also declare the same.*—14.

Learned men such as Manu, Vyāsa etc., in the legend of Nachiketā declare, how (those who do not perform Ishti etc.) suffer from the fruition of filthy actions in Samyama, which is under the control of Yama.—14.

*Besides (there are) seven (hells).*—15.

Besides, the Paurāṇikās also declare that there are seven hells such as the Raurava etc. which are the places for the experience of the fruits of evil deeds, and those who do not perform Ishta etc., reach those places. The meaning is—how ever can they ascend to the moon?—15.

But (says the opponent of Vedānta), it is contradictory to say that the experience of tortures by the sinful are controlled by Yama, as it has also been said that Chitragupta and various other dignitaries preside over Raurava etc.. (The reply is)—It is not so.

*There is no contradiction as there also, it is Yama's writ that runs.*—16.

There is no contradiction, because there also, he (i.e. Yama) is understood to be the chief dignitary. Smritis declare, that it is only as appointed by Yama, that Chitragupta and others are the dignitaries there.—16.

*Those who do not perform Ishta etc. do not ascend by the path either of knowledge or action, because the paths of knowledge and action are relevant to the context here.*  
—17.

In the Lore (Vidyā) of the Five Fires (Agnis), while replying to the question 'Do you know how this world (i.e. the moon) does not get filled up (to capacity)?', the Scriptures say—"In neither of these two ways (do they, who do not perform *Ishta* etc., go). They, as (being) insignificant creatures, are continually being reborn. Do thou be born, and do thou die—is this, their third condition. That is why this world (i.e. the moon) does not get filled up (to capacity)" (Chhān. 5.10.8). Here, (by the expression) by those two ways, are meant the paths of knowledge and action. Whence is it so? Because they are relevant (to the context) here. It is knowledge and action that are (referred to as) relevant for the purpose of the attainment of the Devayāna and the Pitriyāna paths. (In the Scriptural passage) "Therefore those who know it to be so (viz. that water (Āpa) in the fifth oblation attains the name of man)" it is described, that it is by this Lore (Vidyā) that the Devayāna path is to be attained. (The Scriptural passage) "*Ishta* and works of public utility and charity, mean action (Karma) and it is described that the Pitriyāna path is to be attained by that (i.e. Karma)" (Chhān. 5.10.1.3). It is in this context, that there occurs (the Scriptural passage)—"In neither of these ways etc.". What is meant to be said is, that for those who are not competent to attain the Devayāna path by the attainment of knowledge, and those who are not competent to attain the Pitriyāna path by means of action, there is the third path which is characterized by these insignificant creatures, which constantly recur (i.e. get born and die). It is because of this also that those who do not perform the *Ishta* etc., do not attain the moon. (Says the opponent of Vedānta)—May be, that even they ascend to the moon, and having descended therefrom become these insignificant creatures. (We reply)—That is not so, because (were it to be so) their ascent would be without any purpose. Again were all those who die to attain the lunar sphere after dying, (it would mean that) the reply would be that this world *would be* filled up by those who die, which would be contradictory to the question (viz., How is it that this world *does not* get filled up to capacity?). The reply should be given in a way which would show as to how this world *does not* get filled up. If it be said (by the opponent

of Vedānta) that it is so inferred, because it is understood that there is a descent, (we reply)—No, because there is no Scriptural statement (about it). It is true of course, that it is reasonably sustainable that this world is not filled up fully because of the descent, but the Scriptural passage “This is the third condition why this world (of the Moon) does not get filled up” (Chhān. 5.10.8) shows that it is logical that it does not get filled up fully precisely because of non-ascent. Besides as descent would be common also to those who have performed Ishta etc. there would be the predicament of this mention of the third path being rendered purposeless. The word ‘because’ (Tu) refutes the doubt about the ascent of all without any exception, caused by the words in the recension of another branch (viz. the Kaushītaki branch). Therefore it comes to this, that the word ‘all’ in the case of this other branch has reference to those who are competent (to ascend to the Moon) i.e. it means, that all those who are competent and who depart from this world, do verily go up to the Moon. —17.

With regard to the objection (of the opponent of Vedānta) that, all without exception deserve to ascend to the Moon for the acquisition of a body, as it is reasonably sustainable by reason of the fact that the total number of oblations is fixed (to be five), according to the Scriptural statement “During the fifth oblation etc.”,—the reply is :

*Not, in the case of the third path, because  
it is seen to be so.—18.*

With regard to the third path, the rule of five oblations for the attainment of a human body need not be accepted. Whence is it so ? Because it is seen to be so. For even so, in the manner described, the acquisition of the third path is seen to be, regardless of the rule of the five oblations, thus : “Do thou be born and do thou die, that is third path” (Chhān. 5.10.8). Besides (in the Scriptural statement) “During the fifth oblation Āpās attain the name of man”, the number of oblations is mentioned as being the cause of a *human* body and not as a cause of the body of an insect or a butterfly, because the word ‘Purusha’ is a

word for the human species. Besides, the instruction is, about Āpās attaining the name of man during the fifth oblation, and it is not that in the case of the other oblations, water attaining the name of man is denied, because, otherwise there would result a fault of a sentence being equivocal i.e. bearing two meanings. It may therefore be understood that in the case of those to whom the ascent and descent is possible a body may well be attained during the fifth oblation and in the case of others a body may well be begun as a result of water coming into contact i.e. combining with other elements, even in spite of the fixed number of oblations.—18.

*Besides (that it is so), so far as the ordinary world is (concerned), is well-known.*  
—19.

Besides with regard to the ordinary world, it is known how Droṇa and Dhṛiṣṭadyumna etc. and Sītā and Draupadī etc. were not born from the womb. In the case of Droṇa etc. there was no fifth oblation into a woman, and with regard to Dhṛiṣṭadyumna etc. there were no oblations with respect either to a man or a woman. Just as in their case the fixed number of oblations were disregarded, so may it well be in other cases also. The popular belief is that a female crane also conceives without being inseminated, (merely in the presence of clouds).—19.

*Also, because it is (so) seen.*—20.

Besides amongst the four kinds of beings, viz. the viviparous, the oviparous, those born out of sweat, and those born out of plants, because the latter two are seen to be generated without the sexual act, (the rule about) the fixed number of oblations is disregarded, and it may well be so in other cases also.—20.

But (says the opponent of Vedānta) (there is a Scriptural passage thus)—There are only three sources of these beings, viz. those which are born from eggs, those which are born from other living beings and those which spring out of plants. Thus the Scriptures here speak of three kinds

of beings. How then are four classes of beings understood ? To this, the reply is :

*The Sweat-born (Samshokaja i.e. born from sweat caused by the heat of the body) are covered by the third term.—21.*

(In the Scriptural passage) “Those born out of an egg, those born out of a living being, and those born from sprouts i.e. plants”, it should be understood that the third term includes even the sweat-born, because both equally are generated from earth and water, and there is no contradiction, because the view about distinction is confined to generation from an immovable (element) which is dissimilar to the generation from the movable entities.—21.

#### 4. SĀBHĀVYĀPATTYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 22.

*Because, (that, beings which descend from the moon) attain similarity (to Ākāsha etc.), is reasonably sustainable.—22.*

It has already been stated, that those who have performed Ishṭa etc., after ascending to the lunar sphere, and after staying there till their actions are worked out i.e. exhausted by the experiencing of the fruits thereof, descend with a residue of actions (Anushaya). Now the manner of their descent is being examined. With regard to that there is this Scriptural passage about the descent—“They again return to the same path by which they ascended, i.e. Ākāsha, from Ākāsha to Vāyu, from Vāyu he becomes smoke, and from smoke he becomes the (air) atmosphere, from the atmosphere he becomes the cloud and then comes down as rain” (Chhān. 5.10.5). Here a doubt arises. Whether they descend after being transformed into the actual form of Ākāsha etc. or whether, after becoming only similar to Ākāsha etc..

The conclusion (arrived at by the opponent of Vedānta) is that they are transformed into the actual form of Ākāsha etc., because so the Scriptures declare, as otherwise, a secondary significance would result, and when there is a conflict as between the literal meaning of the words of the Scriptures and their secondary significance, it

is logical to accept the literal meaning of the words of the Scriptures. The passage such as "having become Vāyu he becomes Smoke" could only be understood to be apt only if it be possible for such beings to be transformed into the actual form of these entities. Therefore, the conclusion is, that such beings are transformed into the actual form of Ākāsha etc.. We (the Vedāntins) reply—They only attain similarity to Ākāsha etc.. When the aqueous body attained for the purpose of experiencing the fruits of actions on the sphere of the moon, is being dissolved, after such experience has come to an end, it becomes subtle like Ākāsha, and thence it surrenders itself to Vāyu and thereafter comes into contact with smoke etc.. The same is here explained by—"Just as the ascent was made, they come to Ākāsha, and from Ākāsha, to Vāyu etc.." (Chhān. 5.10.5). Whence is it so? Because it is reasonably sustainable. And it is only thus that it becomes reasonably sustainable, because otherwise, that one entity is transformed into the actual form of another, cannot be reasonably sustainable in the principal sense. If it were to change actually into the very form of Ākāsha, its descent in the order of Vāyu etc. is not reasonably possible, because Ākāsha being all-pervading and the Jīva-Selfs being necessarily always in contact with it, it is not possible that that there can be any relation (as between the Jīva-Selfs and the Ākāsha) other than their changing into only a similarity with Ākāsha. It is of course logical to accept the secondary significance of a Scriptural statement when the literal interpretation of it is not possible. Hence, 'becoming similar to Ākāsha' is itself here spoken of metaphorically, as the entity itself becoming the Ākāsha etc.—22.

##### 5. NĀTICHIRĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 23.

*(These individual Jīva-Selfs who become similar to Ākāsha etc. during the descent) do not remain so, for long, because there is a special statement (about it).—23.*

Here, a doubt arises (as to the intervening period) between their becoming (similar to) Ākāsha, and their further going down to (the stage of) rice etc., viz. whether they remain for a long time in a condition similar to the

one they have acquired earlier, before they become similar to their later condition, or whether they stay for a short time only. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) being, that there is no rule (as to that) because of the absence of any Scriptural authority (stating any such rule), we reply—(That they remain in the condition similar to Ākāsha etc.) not for long. They remain only for a very short time in the condition similar to Ākāsha etc., and they reach this place (i.e. the earth) along with showers of rain. Whence is it so ? Because of a special statement, in which, the Scriptures instruct that it is so, with reference to their condition after reaching the condition of rice etc., thus—“From here, verily (their passage) is difficult and more difficult (Durnishprapataram\* i.e. increasingly difficult)” (Chhān. 5.10.6). The meaning is that moving away from the condition similar to rice etc., is rendered *more and more* difficult (which by implication means that the *earlier* movements are easier) and that indicates that during the earlier stages (of descent) the movement is easy. The special statement about the descent being pleasant and painful has reference to the shortness or length of the rate of descent, during that period, inasmuch as by reason of the non-development of a body (till then), there is no possibility of any experience (of the fruits of actions). Therefore (the conclusion is that) before attaining the condition of rice etc. the descent of the Jīva-Selfs (from the earlier condition) is quick i.e. after only a short time.—23.

#### 6. ANYADHISHṬHITĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 24-27.

*(These Jīva-Selfs during their descent come into contact with Vrihi plants etc.) which have been already occupied by other (Jīva-Selfs) as in previous cases, because there is a Scriptural reference to it.—24.*

In that same statement about the descent in the form of a shower of rain, it is said—“They here are born either as rice or barley, or as herbs or trees, or as sesamum or

\* One letter ‘Ta’ (त) out of the two ‘Ta’s in the word “Durnishprapataram” should be understood to have been dropped according to the Vedic practice.



pulse" (Chhān. 5.10.6). With regard to this a doubt arises, thus—Whether these Jīva-Selfs having such a residue of actions (Anushayins), at this juncture attain the species of immovable entities (Sthāvara) and experience pleasure or pain respectively of such immovable entities, or whether they merely come into contact with such immovable entities occupied by other Jīva-Selfs. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that these Jīva-Selfs who having such a residue of actions (i.e. being Anushayins) have attained the species of immovable entities, experience pleasure or pain peculiar to such species. Whence is it so? Because it is reasonably sustainable, that the root 'to be born' has its principal meaning, and also because it is well-known from the Scriptures and Smritis, that this species of immovable entities is the place where fruits of actions are experienced, and also because it is reasonably sustainable that religious actions involving the killing of animals such as sacrifices as Ishti etc. produce undesirable fruit. Therefore, that those having such a residue of actions (i.e. the Anushayins) are born as rice etc., is to be understood in the principal sense. It is similar to being born as a dog etc.. Just as the birth of the Jīva-Selfs having such residue of actions (i.e. Anushayins) in the species of a dog or a hog or a Chāṇḍāla (out-caste) is in the principal sense (of the terms) and they become subject to the pleasures and pains of that species, even so it is, in their birth as rice etc.. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply—These Jīva-Selfs having such residue of actions (i.e. Anushayins), merely come into contact with such rice etc., which are already occupied (by other Jīva-Selfs), and do not experience the pleasure and pain of such Jīva-Selfs as it is in the previous cases. Just as their being transformed into Vāyu and smoke means merely their having contact with them, similarly here, by their becoming rice etc., and belonging to the immovable species, merely their contact with them is meant. Whence is it so? Because the statement here, also, is similar to that. How is it similar? (It is similar) because it is so mentioned without its involving any action. Just as, there is no mention of any action, (in the text) beginning with (their becoming) Ākāsha, down to their coming down as showers of rain, similarly (there is no such mention) in

the case of their being born as rice etc.. Therefore, those beings having such a residue of actions (i.e. Anushayins) are not the experiencers of any pleasure or pain here. On the other hand, where their being such experiencers of pleasure or pain is meant, there is a reference to such action, such as—"those whose actions are good and those whose actions are filthy". Besides, if the birth of these beings having such a residue of actions (i.e. Anushayins) as rice etc., were to be in the principal sense, then whenever such rice is gathered, or pounded or cooked, or eaten, these Jiva-Selfs having such a residue of actions (i.e. Anushayins) who have occupied such rice etc. would abandon such rice, because, it is well-known that an individual Jiva-Self occupying a particular body, deserts such body when it is so harassed, and also because, were it to be so, the Scriptures would not refer to such individual Jiva-Selfs later on, as becoming inseminators (Retassighhāva). Hence these beings having such residue of actions (i.e. Anushayins) merely come into contact with rice etc. which have already been occupied by other Jiva-Selfs. By this (i.e. by this argument), that the verb-root 'to be born' is used in the principal sense, is refuted, as also (the argument) that such immovable entities are places for the experiencing (of fruits of actions). It is not, that we deny that immovable entities can be the proper places for experiencing (such fruits of actions). It may well be the place for such experience in the case of those creatures who by their unmeritorious actions have attained the species of immovable entities. We only wish to emphasize that those who descend from the moon with such residue of actions (Anushayins) do not attain the condition of immovable entities.—24.

*If it be said that (action such as a sacrifice etc.) is impure, (we reply)—No, because of the Scriptures.—25.*

Again, the objection raised (by the opponents of Vedānta) that as Sacrificial actions are impure, inasmuch as they involve the killing of animals, therefore they produce undesirable fruit, and hence, birth as rice etc., which these Jiva-Selfs having a residue of actions (Anushayins)

attain, must be understood to be in the principal sense, and the notion of its being of a secondary significance, is useless, is now being refuted. (We reply)—No, because the knowledge of meritorious or unmeritorious action is acquired from the Scriptures. It is the Scriptures (Shāstra) alone which are the means of determining that a particular action is meritorious or unmeritorious, inasmuch as they (i.e. merit or demerit) are supra-sensual and have unregulated environment, time and occasion as their cause. What is done as a meritorious action according to a particular environment, time and occasion, becomes unmeritorious under some other environment, time and occasion, and therefore, as apart from the Scriptures (Shāstra), nobody is able to attain the knowledge of meritorious or unmeritorious action. It is precisely on the authority of the Scriptures (Shāstra) that the Jyotishṭoma sacrifice involving the killing (of animals) is understood to be a meritorious action, so, how possibly can it be characterized as being unmeritorious? But (says the opponent of Vedānta) by declaring that “no creatures should ever be killed” the Scriptures (Shāstra) themselves instruct (us) that such killing of creatures is unmeritorious. (We reply)—Of course (it is so) but that is a general rule, while (the injunction) that ‘an animal be sacrificed to Agni and Soma’ is an exception (to that rule). A rule and its exception have their application in their own proper individual sphere. Therefore, Vedic sacrificial action is pure as it is performed by men of authority, and is considered uncensurable, and (a Jīva-Self’s) birth as an immovable thing is properly not its fruit, and (the Jīva-Self’s) birth as rice etc. does not deserve to be like the birth of a dog etc., because that has been spoken of (by the Scriptures) with respect to those whose conduct has been filthy, and there is no such special liability here (in the case of these Jīva-Selfs who become rice). Therefore, in the case of those who descend from the moon along with a residue of actions (Anushayins), their becoming rice etc. merely figuratively means their coming into contact with rice etc.—25.

*Thereafter, (these Jīva-Selfs) come into contact with those who are the inseminators.—26.*

This is again why the Jīva-Selfs becoming rice etc., means their merely coming into contact with them, viz., that after their becoming rice etc., the Scriptures mention about their becoming inseminators, thus—"Whosoever eats food and inseminates, that again, the Jīva-Self becomes" (Chhān. 5.10.6). This becoming an inseminator cannot possibly be in the principal sense. It is only long after a person is born and after he reaches adolescence that he becomes capable of inseminating. How can then the Jīva-Selfs with a residue of actions (i.e. Anushayins) who accompany the food eaten (by a person) be understood to become so in the principal sense? Therefore a Jīva-Self's becoming an inseminator should be understood to be merely its coming into contact with potential inseminators, and there is no contradiction because becoming rice etc. only means coming into contact with such rice etc.—26.

*From the womb, a body (is born).—27.*

Then, what the Scriptures (Shāstra) mean is that after coming into contact with an inseminator and after the womb is inseminated, the Jīva-Self with a residue of action (Anushaya) attains a body, in which it can experience the fruits (of residual actions), thus—"those whose actions are good" etc. (Chhān. 5.10.7). From this also, it is understood that, it is not, that, the Jīva-Selfs having a residue (i.e. Anushayins) when during their descent they become rice etc., acquire a body which experiences pleasure and pain. Therefore, it is thus established that what is termed as the birth of the Jīva-Selfs having a residue of action (Anushayins), as rice etc. merely means their contact (with them).—27.

*Here ends Pāda I of Adhyāya III.*

## ADHYĀYA III—PĀDA 2

### 1. SANDHYĀDHIKARANAM. Sū. 1-6.

*In the twilight (i.e. dream) condition, there is creation because the Scriptures also speak about it.—1.*

In the preceding Pāda the various ways of the progress of the Jiva-Self during its transmigratory condition have been elaborated upon, by the illustration of the Lore of the Five Agnis (Panchāgni-Vidyā). The Scriptures beginning with “When he sleeps” further on declare—“There are no chariots, no horses, no roads, (but) he creates such chariots, horses and roads” (Brih. 4.3.10) etc. With regard to this, a doubt (arises)—whether in the dream condition creation is as real, as it is in the waking condition, or whether it is merely an appearance i.e. it is illusory (Māyā-mayī). (The opponent of Vedānta says)—It is understood that in the dream condition creation is real. (Says he)—The word ‘Sandhya’ means the dream condition as the Scriptures use the term thus—“The twilight i.e. dream condition is the third condition” (Brih. 4.3.9). Or else it is the condition of being between the two worlds, i.e., it comes to mean the twilight i.e. dream condition as it exists where the two conditions of wakefulness and deep sleep meet, and in that twilight condition where wakefulness and deep sleep meet, creation deserves to be real. Whence is it so? Because the Scriptures which of course are authoritative, themselves declare—“And he creates chariots, horses, and roads” (Brih. 4.3.10). It is also understood to be so, as the concluding portion refers to him as the Kartā (Agent).—1.

*(The followers) of one branch also consider him (i.e. the Ātmā) to be the creator (of things desired in a dream, i.e. of Kāma), and also (Kāma means) sons etc.—2.*

Besides, the followers of one branch speak about the Jiva-Self in this twilight condition to be the creator of all objects of desire, thus—“This Purusha is the one, that keeps vigil while the sense-organs sleep, the creator of all objects of desire” (Kaṭha. 5.8). Here, inasmuch as they are

objects of desire, sons etc. are considered to be such objects of desire. But (says the Vedāntin) by the word Kāma, only special desires are spoken of. No (it is replied), because (the Scriptures) with reference to the passage "You may ask for a boon about being long-lived (lit., living for hundred years), and about sons and grandsons" (Kaṭha. 1.2.3) have time and again used the word 'Kāma' as meaning sons etc. which is relevant to the context, in the concluding portion, thus:—"I shall make you the experiencer of all desired objects" (Kaṭha. 1.2.3.). We infer from the chapter and the complementary portion, that the creator is the intelligential Highest Self (Prājña). This chapter deals with the intelligential Highest Self (Prājña), (as is seen from the Scriptural passage) "(This one) who is different (Anyatra) from meritorious action and unmeritorious action too" (Kaṭha. 2.14), and the complementary passage also refers to Him, thus—"That indeed is the bright one, that is Brahma, the one that is described as the immortal. All the worlds are contained in Him and none can go beyond Him" (Kaṭha. 5.8). Now, it is understood, that the world of the waking condition, created by this intelligential Highest Self, is of a real nature and so the other one created in the dream condition also deserves to be similar (i.e. real). The same reasoning, according to the Scriptures, applies to the waking and dream conditions, thus—"This is as good as his waking condition, say they, for what he sees during the waking condition, he sees in the condition of sleep also" (Brih. 4.3.14). Hence (the conclusion of the opponent of Vedānta) is that the creation in the dream condition is of course of the nature of reality.—2.

To this conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) the Sūtrakāra gives reply—

*But (creation in the dream condition) is mere appearance i.e. illusion, because of its nature of not being a complete manifestation (of the attributes of reality).—3.*

The word 'but' refutes the view of the opponent. It is not, as is said, that the creation in a dream, is creation in its real sense. The dream creation is but mere appearance i.e. illusion, and there is not even an iota (lit., whiff) of

reality (about it). Whence is it so? Because of its nature of not being a complete manifestation (of the attributes of a real entity). A dream is not of that nature in which the attributes of a real entity are fully manifested. What again is meant by this totality (of manifestation)? (It means) the existence of the requisite environment, time, and necessary materials (Sampatti) and the absence of subsequent obliteration. In the case of a dream, this requisite environment, time and necessary materials (Sampatti) and the non-liability of obliteration associated with real things, cannot be possible. There is not available for instance (in the case of a dream) a proper space necessary for a chariot. There cannot possibly be sufficient space for a chariot in the limited space of a body. But (it may be argued), may be, the dreamer may see objects which are outside the body, because he does perceive things occupying a different place. The Scriptures also indicate how a dream occurs outside the body (of the dreamer), thus—"The Immortal one, having moved out of the nest (of the body) goes about as he pleases" (Brih. 4.3.12), and these different perceptions, as this staying in or going out (of the body), would not be reasonably understandable in the case of a person dreaming if he were not to go out (of the body). (We reply)—No, it cannot be possible for a person in sleep to be able to go out to a place hundreds of Yojanās away, and to return from thence, in a trice. Occasionally a person speaks of his dream, in which he does not mention his returning (from a place to which he has gone in his dream), thus—"I was overcome by sleep today, and I slept here in the Kurus and went to the Pāṇchālās in my dream, and woke up there." If he were really to go out of his body, then he would wake up in Pāṇchālās as he is supposed to have gone there, but as a matter of fact he actually wakes up in the Kurus. His body along with which he dreams about having gone to another country, is seen by people near about, to be where he actually sleeps. Besides the other countries, which he is supposed to see in his dream, are not as a matter of fact as he sees them, and were he in fact to speed away (to these countries), he would see them as he would see them in his waking condition. Besides the Scriptures declare the dream to be *in* a body, beginning thus—"When he moves about in a dream",

and then declaring later—"He moves about in his own body at his pleasure" (Brih. 2.1.18). Hence, as it involves a contradiction with the Scriptures and reasoning, the Scriptural passage which refers to the going out of the nest (of the body) should be understood in its secondary sense, to mean that the Immortal one goes out, *as it were*, from the body. Any one who even while he is in his body, has no (present) use for it, may be said to be out of the body, *as it were*. The difference in the perception as between staying in and going out of the body, may, under the circumstances, be understood to be mere deception. There is also a confusion of time, in a dream. For instance, when he goes to sleep during the night, (in the dream) he considers it to be day time in Bhārata-Varsha (India). Similarly while a dream lasts only for a moment, he feels as if he has lived through a crowded period of many years. Besides, in a dream, there are not the means i.e. materials necessary for perceptive knowledge and action. As the organs-of-sense happen to have been withdrawn inwards (during sleep), a person dreaming has then no eyes etc. (properly functioning as in the waking state), by which he would, in fact, see any chariot etc.. Whence could he then have the power to manufacture a chariot in a moment and whence also for the matter of that can he have the timber etc. necessary for it? Besides the chariot etc. seen by him in his dream, are obliterated when (later on) he wakes up. Not only that, but even during the dream itself, its own creations are equally subject to obliteration, inasmuch as, the end of a dream, contradicts its beginning. What is understood to be a chariot, in a dream, is again in a moment seen as a man, and what is understood to be a man, is again seen as a tree. Besides the Scriptures (Shāstra) categorically declare the absence of any chariots etc. in a dream thus—" (In the dream condition) there are no chariots, no horses and no roads" (Brih. 4.3.10). Therefore the experience in a dream is merely an appearance i.e. it is illusory.—3.

*On the authority of Scriptures (a dream although an appearance i.e. an illusion, is yet) a portent too. Expert interpreters (of dreams) also say so.—4.*



(Says the opponent of Vedānta)—A dream, then, being an illusion, is it not, that there could not be even an iota of reality about it? (We reply)—It is not so. A dream is a portent of coming good or bad (events), for the Scriptures declare thus—"If (a person) while he is engaged in performing a religious ritual so that a desire of his may be fulfilled, beholds a woman in his dream, he may infer the augmentation (of his desire) from such vision of his dream" (Chhān. 5.2.9), and they also declare, how some dreams are indicative of death before long, thus—"When he sees a dark man with black teeth, he kills him" (Chhān. 5.2.9). Those who are experts in dream lore say thus—To dream about riding an elephant etc. is auspicious, while to dream about riding a donkey etc. is inauspicious. They also hold that some dreams caused by some incantations (Mantrās) or deities or some particular material, are indicative of just a suggestion of truthful meaning. (What is meant is) that even with regard to these matters, may the things suggested by the dream, be, for the matter of that, real enough, but those things seen in a dream which are said to be suggestive in this way, viz., the vision of a woman etc., are of course unreal, because they do become obliterated (after the dreamer wakes up). Therefore, that dreams are but a mere appearance i.e. an illusion, is reasonably sustainable. It being so, the words "The Scriptures also speak about it (Āha hi)" (in Sūtra 1 of Pāda ii of this Adhyāya) should therefore be explained as being used in a secondary sense. For instance, when it is said that the plough sustains the bullocks etc., it is so said, because it is the indirect means, and not because a plough actually sustains the bullocks, similarly the man sleeping being only the accidental cause (of a dream) it is said that he creates chariots etc., and that he is the creator (Kartā) of the chariots etc., and it is not that the person that is asleep does actually create the chariots etc.. It should rather be said, that, his being the creator, is so, in as much as he is the cause of the good or bad deeds, which in their turn are the cause of the experience by him of the pleasure or fear etc. brought about by the dream vision of the chariot etc.. It is because the self-luminous refulgence of the Self (Ātmā) is difficult of being properly recognized, that the Scriptures have made a reference to a dream, because dur-

ring the condition of wakefulness, as a result of the contact of the organs-of-sense with their objects, and the fact of being mixed up with the light of the Sun etc., the Self's being so self-luminous i.e. refulgent, is difficult of being recognized. Hence, if the statement about the creation of chariots etc. is construed to be as it is stated by the Scriptures (i.e. directly or literally) then the self-luminousness and refulgence of the Self would fail to be properly ascertained; therefore, the statement about the absence of chariots etc. should be construed as a direct Scriptural statement and the statement about the creation of the chariots etc. should be construed in a secondary sense. This would serve to explain the Scriptural mention about the creation ("the creator of all objects of desire," in *Kaṭha* 5.8, in *Sūtra* 2 of *Pāda* ii of *Adhyāya* III, as being in the secondary sense). Again, with regard to the statement (by the opponent of *Vedānta*) that it is the intelligential Highest Self that is spoken of as the creator (in the *Kaṭha Upanishad*), we say that, that also is not correct, because, in another Scriptural passage—"He having himself destroyed (his body in the waking state) and created (a body out of his impressions), he sleeps (and dreams) by (the help) of his own refulgence and light" (*Brih.* 4.3.9), the Scriptures speak of the activity being that of the *Jīva*-Self. Even here, by the passage "He who keeps vigil while the senses sleep", which is a reference to something which is well-known (*Anuvāda*), it is the *Jīva*-Self that is described to be the creator of desired objects. And it is precisely because of that, that the Scriptures, by the complementary passage "That verily is the bright one, that is *Brahma*", refute that the *Jīva*-Self is really the *Jīva*-Self, and instruct (us) that it is but *Brahma* only, as referred to in "That thou art" (*Chhān.* 6.9.4) etc., and not that, that this chapter deals with *Brahma* is contradicted, nor that we deny the activity of the intelligential Highest Self (*Prājña*), even in the dream state, because, that he is the Lord of all and that it is he (i.e. the intelligential Highest Self) who presides in all the different states, is reasonably sustainable. It is merely emphasized (by us) that the creations of the dream condition, are not real in the sense in which creations such as *Ākāsha* etc. are real. Moreover, even the creation of *Ākāsha* etc. also, is not a reality in the absolute ultimate

sense, as has been explained (in Bra. Sū. II. i. 14), and it has been elaborately established by us already that the whole phenomenal world is wholly illusory. Prior to the realization of Brahma, the entire phenomenal world, such as the Ākāsha etc., stands as it is, in a valid form and is said to be relatively true, but the creations in a dream are obliterated every day. The illusory character of dream creations, therefore, comes to be so stated separately in a special sense (of being totally illusory).—4.

*(Attributes which are (in fact) common to the Highest Self i.e. the Lord and the Jīva-Self, but are) obscured, become manifest in the Jīva-Self by meditation on the transcendental one (i.e. the Highest Self i.e. the Lord), for bondage (Bandha) and its opposite (i.e. Final Release) of the Jīva-Self are due to that Highest Self i.e. the Lord.—5.*

(Says the opponent of Vedānta)—It may even be like this, that the Jīva-Self is but only a part (Amsha) of the transcendental one (i.e. the Lord), even as a scintilla (is a part) of the fire. And this being so, just as 'to burn' or 'to give out light' are powers common both to the fire and its scintilla, even so the powers of 'knowledge' and of the 'rulership (of the world)' are common both to the Jīva-Self and the Highest Lord, and hence the Jīva-Self's dream-creation of chariots etc. may well be possible as a result of its Lordly power and knowledge, as being deliberately desired by it (Sāṅkṣipikī). To this we reply—Even though there is a relationship as that of a part to the whole, as between the Jīva-Self and the Lord, still, that the Jīva-Self and the Lord have attributes contrary to each other is directly evident. But (asks the opponent of Vedānta) is it, then, that the Jīva-Self and the Lord have no common attributes? (We reply)—No, it is not that it (Jīva-Self) has not such common attributes, but, even though it has such common attributes, they happen to be obscured as a result of being hidden from view (Tirodhānāt) by Nescience. Obscured though they thus are however, they become manifest only in a few rare cases such as that in

the case of a person, for instance, who keeps striving after and meditating upon the Lord, and who has acquired supernatural faculties, and whose darkness of ignorance is dispelled as a result of the grace of God (vouchsafed to him), even as a man whose power of vision is obscured by Timira (a disease of the eye—Diplopia) happens to have his vision restored to him as a result of the potency of the medicines, and it is not that they become manifest by themselves in the case of all persons. Whence is it so? Because it is “through Him” (Tatah) i.e. because of the Lord as a cause, that a Jiva-Self falls into bondage or acquires Final Release. The bondage is due to the ignorance of the knowledge of the nature of the Lord and Final Release occurs as a result of the acquisition of such knowledge (of the nature of the Lord). To the same effect is the Scriptural passage—“All bonds are sundered by knowing the Lord, and all sufferings having thereby come to an end, births and deaths cease. It is by meditation on Him, that, after death, the third stage, viz. the supreme Lordship of the universe, supervenes, and a man becomes absolutely detached i.e. isolated (Kevala) and one whose desire is only for the Self (Ātmā) only” (Shvet. 1.11).—5.

*Or, this obscurement (of the powers of Knowledge and Lordship of a Jiva-Self) also is, on account of its contact with the body.—6.*

Why again (says the opponent), even when the Jiva-Self is but a part of the transcendental Self, should it have its powers of Knowledge and Lordship obscured, when it is reasonable that such Knowledge and Lordship should not be so obscured, even as the power of a scintilla ‘to burn’ and ‘to give light’ is not obscured? We reply—(What you say) is true of course, but this obscurement of the powers of Knowledge and Lordship of the Jiva-Self results, on account of its contact with the body, i.e., with the body, organs-of-sense, mind, intelligence, objects-of-sense and sensations etc.. The simile for that is—Just as, though Agni has the power to burn and to give light, still such powers become obscured when the Agni remains concealed in the ‘Araṇi’ (sticks of Shamī tree which by their mutual friction pro-

duce fire) or when again it is covered over with ashes, similarly, the obscurement of the Knowledge and Lordship of the Jīva-Self is due to the confusion resulting from the failure of discrimination caused by its contact with limiting adjuncts such as names and forms which are brought about by Nescience. The word “or” (in the Sūtra) serves the purpose of the refutation of the doubt about the Jīva-Self and the Lord being entities separate from each other.

But (says the opponent of Vedānta), let the Jīva-Self then be for the matter of that an entity separate from the Lord, inasmuch as its Knowledge and Lordship is obscured, why is there any need of the assumption of its contact with the body? We reply—No, that the Jīva-Self can ever be an entity separate from the Lord, is not reasonably sustainable, because, beginning with the passage “This here deity thought” (Chhān. 6.3.2), the Scriptures later on refer to the Jīva-Self as the Ātmā in the passage “Having itself entered as this Jīva-Self (Ātmā)” (Chhān. 6.3.2), and by the passage “That is truth, that is Ātmā, Oh Shvetaketo, that thou art”, the Scriptures instruct that it has the Lord’s own nature (Īśhvarātmatva). Hence, non-different as the Jīva-Self is from the Lord, it comes to have its Knowledge and Lordship obscured by its contact with the body. Hence again, the creation of chariots etc. in a dream, by the Jīva-Self through his desire, does not fit in properly, because, if it could so create at its will, it would never care to experience any unpleasant unwanted dream, as nobody would ever wish for unpleasant or unwanted things. Again, with regard to what is said, viz. that the Scriptural passage about a dream being similar to the Jīva-Self’s waking state (Brih. 4.3.14), would establish the reality of dream creations, (we say) that, that statement (about a dream being just like its waking state), does not imply the reality of dream-creations, as it would contradict the Self’s self-fulgence and also because the Scriptures themselves have declared the absence of chariots in a dream. The meaning is, that, inasmuch as dreams are the product of the impressions received during the condition of wakefulness, that the statement that they appear like the waking state is so stated, only because they appear to be similar. It is, therefore, reasonably sustainable that dreams are but a mere appearance i.e. an illusion (Māyā).—6.

## 2. TADABHĀVĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 7-8.

*There is absence of that (i.e. a dream) in the Nāḍis and in the Self (Ātmā), according to the Scriptures.—7.*

The condition of dreams has (so far) been examined, and now the condition of deep sleep is being examined. With regard to that condition of deep sleep, there are the following Scriptural passages. In one place—"Now when this (i.e. the Jīva-Self) is completely and serenely asleep (i.e. wherein the organs-of-sense are completely out of action), it does not dream dreams, but happens to have entered the Nāḍis" (Chhān. 8.6.3). In another passage referring to Nāḍis themselves, the Scriptures say—"He moves along those (i.e. Nāḍis) and sleeps in the Purītat (the envelope of the Hridaya)" (Brih. 2.1.19). In another place again, referring to the Nāḍis, thus—"When in sleep, he happens to be in the Nāḍis, and does not dream any dreams whatsoever and becomes one with the Prāṇa (Brahma) itself" (Kaush. 4.19). Again elsewhere—"He sleeps in this Ākāsha within the Hridaya" (Brih. 2.1.17). Similarly in another place—"Then, at that time, he becomes one with the 'Sat' i.e. becomes one with its Self" (Chhān. 6.8.1). And also—"Embraced by the intelligential Self, he is not aware of anything external nor internal" (Brih. 4.3.21). Now (says the opponent of Vedānta), a doubt arises here, as to whether these Nāḍis etc. are the various different places for sleep, independent of each other, or whether by mutual interdependence they collectively form but only one place of sleep. What then is the conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta) ? It is that they all constitute different places of sleep. Whence is it so ? Because all these have one and the same use. Things which have the same use, such as rice and barley (in a sacrifice, for instance), are not seen to be dependent on each other, (and a sacrificer may optionally use either of them). Nāḍis etc. are seen to have one and the same purpose, as for instance, in the Scriptural passages "He happens to have entered into the Nāḍis" (Chhān. 8.6.3), "He sleeps in the Purītat" (Brih. 2.1.19), wherein there is the use of the same locative case in both. But (says the Vedāntin) it is not seen that there is such use of the locative in the case of the word 'Sat', in

"Then (he) becomes one with the 'Sat'" (Chhān. 6.8.1). (The opponent of Vedānta replies)—This is no fault, because even there (where the 'Sat' is governed by the instrumental case) it is understood that it is meant to have the same sense of the locative case. The complementary sentence there, purports to say that the Jīva-Self wishing to find a haven, approaches the 'Sat', thus—"Failing to obtain a haven (Āyatana) anywhere else (he, the Jīva-Self) takes shelter with the Prāṇa" (Chhān. 6.8.2), where by the word 'Prāṇa' the 'Sat' which is relevant here, is understood. The word Āyatana (haven of rest or sanctuary) has the sense of the locative case. In the complementary sentence also, it is seen that the locative is used thus—"Having become merged in the 'Sat', they are not aware that they have become merged in the 'Sat'" (Chhān. 6.9.2). In all these cases, the nature of deep sleep, which is characterized by the cessation of all special cognition, does not differ. Therefore, because they all have the same use, (the Jīva-Self) approaches optionally any one of these Nāḍis etc. as the place for the purpose of sleep. As against this conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) it is propounded as follows—"There is absence of that (i.e. experience of dreams) in the Nāḍis and in the Ātmā (Self)". The absence of 'that' means the absence of any dream-vision which is the relevant subject here, and which means deep sleep. By 'in the Nāḍis and the Self' is meant that the Jīva-Self approaches the Nāḍis etc. for the purpose of deep sleep, not optionally but as taken together collectively. Whence is it so? Because there is a Scriptural statement (to that effect). The Scriptures mention the Nāḍis etc. (i.e. the Nāḍis, the Purītat and Brahma) as the places of deep sleep, and that (statement) can be properly understood, only if they (i.e. the Nāḍis) are taken together collectively along with the other places (as the place of sleep). If it is understood that they each are to be taken optionally, then, (if only one of these three is accepted as the place of sleep) the others (i.e. the other two places) would then be ruled out, and in either supposition there would be contradiction of other Scriptural passages. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) it has already been said, that they all have the same use, and can be optionally understood (to be the places of sleep), like for instance, rice or barley. The reply is—No,

merely because it is indicated that they (i.e. the Nāḍīs etc.) have the same case-ending, it does not mean, that they all have the same use, and an option (as to their choice as a place of sleep) is available, for, in (sentences such as) “He sleeps in the palace”, “He sleeps in the bed” etc., even though it is seen, that, for things having different uses, but which are taken collectively, the same one case-ending is used, such as in “He sleeps *in* the palace” and “He sleeps *in* the bed”. Similarly, here also, with regard to the passage “He sleeps in the Nāḍīs, the Puritat and Brahma”, that they can be taken together collectively is reasonably sustainable. The Scriptural passage “When asleep he remains in them (i.e. the Nāḍīs), sees no dreams whatsoever, and becomes one with the Prāṇa (i.e. Brahma) itself” (Kaush. 4.19) being understood to be but one sentence only, the Scriptures indicate, that during such sleep the Nāḍīs and the Prāṇa (i.e. Brahma) are to be construed collectively. It has of course been already understood, in Sūtra I.i.28, viz. “Prāṇa (is Brahma) because it is so understood”, that, Prāṇa is Brahma. Where the Scriptures mention the Nāḍīs as the place of sleep, as it were independently, thus—“He then crawls into the Nāḍīs” (Chhān. 8.6.3), there even it is understood, from the fact that ‘Brahma’ which is mentioned elsewhere as well-established (as being the place of deep sleep) is not expressly ruled out, that the Jīva-Self ultimately reposes in Brahma itself, approaching it by way of the Nāḍīs. Even when it is so, the use of the locative case in the case of the word Nāḍī is not contradictory, because one who approaches ‘Brahma’ through the Nāḍīs, does of course go through the Nāḍīs, even as, whosoever enters the sea through the Ganges can also of course be said to be one who has entered the Ganges also. Besides, here, as it is intended to speak about the way to Brahma-Loka which is approached by way of rays and Nāḍīs, this description about the entering into the Nāḍīs is by way of the glorification of Nāḍīs. The Scriptures, after having said—“He enters the Nāḍīs” (Chhān. 8.6.3), purport to glorify the Nāḍīs by saying afterwards—“No sin whatsoever contaminates him” (Chhān. 8.6.3). The Scriptures also speak about the reason why no sin attaches, thus:— “Because then he becomes one with Teja” (Chhān. 8.6.3). The meaning is, that having his organs-of-sense enveloped by the



Teja of the Nāḍis, known as 'bile' (Pitta), he does not see the external objects of sense. Or else, by the word Teja, it is Brahma that is indicated, because in another Scriptural passage—"It is Brahma itself, Teja itself" (Brih. 4.4.7), the word Teja is used as meaning Brahma. The meaning is, that, as by way of the Nāḍis, he becomes one with Brahma, no sin, whatsoever, attaches to him. The attainment of Brahma is understood to be the reason of the absence of any attachment of sin, because of a Scriptural passage such as—"All sins are rolled back from here, as this Brahma-Loka is free from sin" (Chhān. 8.4.1). This being so, it is understood that the Nāḍis, which in common with Brahma which is well-known from passages elsewhere to be the place of (the Jīva-Self's) repose, are to be construed collectively with it. Similarly, inasmuch as the Purītat is mentioned in connection with the chapter dealing with Brahma, it also is, in a subordinate way to Brahma, understood to be the place of deep sleep, because when the Ākāsha of the Hridaya is referred to as the place of deep sleep, thus—"He sleeps in this Ākāsha which is inside the Hridaya" (Brih. 2.1.17), the Scriptures also mention, thus—"He sleeps in the Purītat" (Brih. 2.1.19). Purītat is spoken of as that which envelops the Hridaya, and one who sleeps in the Ākāsha of the Hridaya—which itself is inside the Purītat—, one can also be said to be sleeping in the Purītat, just as one who resides in a town surrounded by a wall is also said to reside inside the wall. It is already understood from the Sūtra "The small (Ākāsha, is Brahma) because of reasons which come after" (Bra. Sū. I. iii. 14) that the Ākāsha in the Hridaya is Brahma. Similarly, that the Nāḍis and the Purītat are understood to be taken collectively, is understood from "He having approached through them, sleeps in the Purītat" (Brih. 2.1.19)—as it is (construed to be) but one sentence. Now it is well-known that the 'Sat' and 'Prājña' (intelligential Highest Self) mean Brahma. Thus the Scriptural passages speak of only these three, viz. the Nāḍis, the Purītat and Brahma, as the places of deep sleep, wherein the Nāḍis and the Purītat are but merely the entrances (Dvāramātram), and Brahma alone is the place of deep sleep. Moreover, the Nāḍis or Purītat are only the abode of the limiting adjuncts of the Jīva-Self, because, its organs-of-sense abide there. When there

is absence of any relation with these limiting adjuncts, nothing can possibly ever be the abode of the Jīva-Self, because being an entity not different from Brahma it is then firmly ensconced in its own greatness. Its (i.e. the Jīva-Self's) having Brahma as its abode during deep sleep is not spoken of with a view to imply or convey the notion of any difference (between them), such as one of the two i.e. Brahma being the abode and the other i.e. the Jīva-Self being that which abides in such abode, but only in order to convey or imply their absolute identity, because, it is said—"Oh Mild one, it (i.e. the Jīva-Self) then becomes one with 'Sat', it is completely merged into itself" (Chhān. 6.8.1). By the word 'Sva' the Self is referred to, as meaning, that it has attained its own true form, by being in deep sleep. Besides, it is not, that the Jīva-Self is ever not-one-with-Brahma, because its own real nature is imperishable. It is with reference to the Self's having, as it were, acquired a foreign nature as a result of its contact with limiting adjuncts during the conditions of dreams and wakefulness, that it is said, that, when during deep sleep, these limiting adjuncts are relaxed, it acquires its own true nature. Hence it would not be logical (to say) that during the condition of sleep, it sometimes becomes one with Sat and sometimes not. Besides, even if it is understood that the Jīva-Self's place of repose is optional, still in all cases, deep sleep as characterized by the cessation of all special cognition, is always the same (i.e. it is not of different kinds). Therefore, it is logical that (the Jīva-Self) which has attained oneness with the 'Sat' does not cognize (anything), for, have not the Scriptures said—"Whereby and whom, should one, then, know?" (Brih. 2.4.14). In the case in which the Jīva-Self is understood to sleep in the Nāḍīs or the Purītat, it is not possible to know of any reason why it should not cognize, as it would then be a fit subject of duality (because of its difference with Brahmā), because of the Scriptural passage—"Where there is difference as it were, there one cognizes another" (Brih. 4.3.31). But (says the opponent of Vedānta) in the case of such difference (i.e. duality of the Jīva-Self and Brahma), may be, great distance etc., may very well be a reason for such absence of cognition. (We reply)—Oh, it could well be such a reason, provided the Jīva-Self were (understood by us) to be in itself

circumscribed or limited, even as Viṣṇumitra, who is on a journey and is not able to see his own house, is. It is not possible, that apart from limiting adjuncts, the Jīva-Self has any circumscribed limits as such. If it be said that the reason of this non-cognition by the Jīva-Self is that limiting adjuncts are at a great distance etc., even then it is logical that the Jīva-Self, relieved of its adjuncts, becomes one with 'Sat', and hence it is that it does not cognize. Now with regard to this, we do not suggest that the Nāḍis etc. equally with Brahma are the Self's place for repose. It is not that the knowledge that the Nāḍis or Puritat are the Self's places of repose, has any use in itself, because the Scriptures do not mention that there is any fruit attached to such knowledge, or that it is in any way subsidiary to anything (such as Karma) which has such fruit. We are only claiming to expound, that Brahma which is imperishable, is the Jīva-Self's place for repose and that knowledge of course has the fruit, viz. the realization that the Jīva-Self is in reality Brahma, and that it is free from the transactions of dreams or wakefulness. Therefore it is the 'Ātmā' i.e. the Highest Self that alone is the Jīva-Self's place of repose.—7.

*Hence, (the Jīva-Self's) awakening (is) from that (Highest Self).—8.*

It is precisely for the reason that the Ātmā (Highest Self) alone is the (Jīva-Self's) place of repose, that in the Scriptural chapter dealing with the subject of sleep, the instruction given is that the awakening of the Jīva-Self is always from this Ātmā (Highest Self). Thus, for instance, while replying to the question—"From where did this (Jīva-Self) return?" (Bṛih. 2.1.16), the Scriptures say thus:— "Just as from a fire minute scintillae fly around, even so, do the Prāṇās (come forth) from this Ātmā (Highest Self)" (Bṛih. 2.1.20). And also—"Having come from the 'Sat', they are not aware that they have come from the 'Sat'" (Chhān. 6.10.2). If these places of repose (viz. the Nāḍis, Puritat and Brahma) were to be understood to be optional, then the Scriptures would have instructed, that it (the Jīva-Self) sometimes wakes up from the Nāḍis, sometimes from the Puritat and sometimes from

the Ātmā (Highest Self). Therefore also, it is the Ātmā (Highest Self) that alone is the (Jīva-Self's) place of repose.—8.

3. KARMĀNUSMRITISHABDAVIDHYADHIKARAṆAM.  
Sū. 9.

*It is (understood, that it is but) the same (Jīva-Self) that wakes up, because of (the reasons of) Karma (religious action), remembrance (Anusmriti), Scriptural word (Shabda) and injunction (Vidhi).—9.*

It is now being considered, whether the Jīva-Self that wakes up again after attaining unity (with Brahma), is the same (Jīva-Self) that has attained unity with the 'Sat', or whether it is either the same or some other (Jīva-Self). With regard to that the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that there is no rule as such (with regard to it). Whence is it so? When a drop of water is thrown into a volume of water, it itself becomes (an undistinguishable part of) the volume of water, and it is hardly possible so to manage, that the very same drop of water can be taken out when it is so sought to be taken out. Similarly, in as much as when one (particular Jīva-Self) has gone to sleep and attained unity with the Highest Self and has thus attained serenity, that same Jīva-Self does not then deserve to wake up again. Thus the conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta) being, (that it must be said) that it is either the same Jīva-Self, or the Lord himself, or a different Jīva-Self that wakes up, it is said (by the Sūtrakāra)—It is the same Jīva-Self that has gone into deep sleep and attained blissful unity, that wakes up, and no other. Whence is it so? Because of (the reasons of) religious action, remembrance, Scriptural word, and injunction. (The Bhāshyakāra says)—I will now split up these reasons and illustrate. It must necessarily be the same (Jīva-Self) that wakes up, because it is seen that it resumes its unfinished work and does it. For it is seen that a person takes up the unfinished portion of the work which was being done by him the previous day, and finishes it the next day. No one would proceed to finish any work half

done by another, because it would be absurd to accept that (Atiprasaṅgāt). Therefore, it is understood that it is the one and the same entity that is the doer of one and the same work, done on the previous and the succeeding day. Hence, (the conclusion is) that the same Jīva-Self wakes up, because assuming some other Jīva-Self to wake up, it would not be reasonably sustainable to hold that the other Jīva-Self could possibly recall what is experienced earlier by the first Jīva-Self, thus—I saw this yesterday. It could not possibly be, that one can recall what another has seen. Assuming another Jīva-Self to have waked up, (in place of the other one that went to sleep), it cannot possibly be imagined that it can have any consciousness or recollection that it is the same Jīva-Self that had gone to sleep, thus—I who have now waked up am the same Jīva-Self that had gone to sleep. From the Scriptural words also it is understood that the same Jīva-Self (that went to sleep) wakes up again. Scriptural passages—such as “He reverts to the waking condition and to the same species, in the reverse way (to that by which he went)” (Bṛih. 4.3.16) ; “All creatures who day after day go to the Brahma-Loka but fail to attain it” (Chhān. 8.3.2) ; “Whatever they are here (i.e. in this world), whether they be a tiger or a lion, a wolf or a boar, a worm or a midge, a gnat or a mosquito, that again they become” (Chhān. 6.3.9)—which occur in a chapter dealing with the conditions of sleep or wakefulness, could not be properly reconciled on the hypothesis of another Jīva-Self waking up.

The same thing is understood from injunctions as to religious actions (Karma) or knowledge (Vidyā), because otherwise such injunctions as to religious action (Karma) or knowledge (Vidyā), would be meaningless. On the hypothesis, that it is some other Jīva-Self (and not the one that sleeps) that wakes up, it would come to mean that each and every one that goes to sleep attains Final Release. Now if it is so, you had better tell us what use that religious action (Karma), the fruit of which is to materialize at some future time, is, and of what possible use can knowledge (Vidyā) be. Besides, on the hypothesis that another Jīva-Self, that has so far been carrying on in another body, wakes up, there would be the predicament of the cessation of its phenomenal existence as that other Jīva-Self, in that

other body. It would again be futile to imagine, that one Jīva-Self that went to sleep in its own body, would wake up in another body. What would be the use in imagining that one who goes to sleep while it occupies one body, does not wake up in that very self-same body, but that another Jīva-Self that has gone to sleep while occupying another body, wakes up in the first body? If it is supposed, that one who has attained Final Release, wakes up, then it would mean, that Final Release is but only a temporary one. That a Jīva-Self whose Nescience i.e. ignorance has disappeared (i.e. one who has attained Final Release) should again wake up (in this phenomenal existence) is not reasonably sustainable. This argument will have also refuted (the notion) that may be the Lord may wake up, because, he is eternally free from Nescience. On the hypothesis that a Jīva-Self other than the one that goes to sleep wakes up, it would not be possible to prevent a Jīva-Self's acquiring the fruit of an act not done by it, as also to prevent an act done by it from being destroyed (without producing its fruit). Therefore, (it necessarily follows) that the same Jīva-Self wakes up, and none other. Now, the argument, viz. that just as it is not possible to take out the very same drop of water, that has been dropped into a big volume of water, even so, it is not possible, that the Jīva-Self which has attained unity with the 'Sat', can ever wake up, is being refuted. In the former case, it is perfectly logical, that, in the absence of any means to separate it (i.e. that one particular drop, from the general volume of water), that self-same drop of water cannot be taken out, but here (in the case of the Jīva-Self) the distinction (between the two cases) is that in the case of the Jīva-Self there are means for thus isolating such Jīva-Self, viz., its own actions (Karma) and Nescience (Avidyā). It is seen that though it is not possible for those belonging to our own species (i.e. the humans) to separate milk from water, from a mixture of milk and water, a hansa (a swan?) can do so. Besides, it is not as if an embodied Jīva-Self is an entity separate from the Highest Self, so that it can be separated from the 'Sat', like a drop from a volume of water. It has been stressed more than once that it is the 'Sat' itself, that, on account of its contact with limiting adjuncts, is spoken of as a Jīva-Self in a metaphorical

sense. This being so, while a Jiva-Self continues to be bound up with one particular set of adjuncts, it functions as one particular Jiva-Self, and when it comes to be bound up with another set of adjuncts, it functions as another Jiva-Self. The same set of adjuncts prevails during the conditions of sleep and wakefulness, in accordance with 'the maxim of the seed and the sprout' (i.e. as seed in the condition of sleep and like the sprout in the condition of wakefulness), and hence it is logical to say that it is the same Jiva-Self that wakes up (after going into deep sleep).—9.

4. MUGDHERDHASAMPATTYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 10.

*In the case of a person who is in a swoon, there is only half-attained unity (with deep sleep) on account of that being (the only) remaining (alternative).—10.*

People say of one who has swooned away, as having become unconscious. Examining the condition of such a person, it is said—There are only three well-known conditions of a Jiva-Self, viz. the conditions of wakefulness, of dreaming and of deep sleep. The fourth (condition) is (the Jiva-Self's) passing out of the body. No fifth condition as such, of a Jiva-Self, is known so far as the Scriptures and Smritis are concerned. A swoon, therefore, is necessarily one of those four conditions, is the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta). Our reply to that is—An unconscious person cannot be said to be in a wakeful condition, for such person does not perceive objects-of-sense with the organs-of-sense. (The opponent of Vedānta says) —May be, he may not be conscious in accordance with the 'maxim of the maker of an arrow' (Ishukāra-Nyāya). Just as a maker of arrows, even though he is awake, fails to see any other object-of-sense because his mind is engrossed with arrows, even so, a person who is in a swoon, though awake, does not perceive other objects-of-sense because of his mind being engrossed in the experiencing of pain caused by a blow with a club. (We reply)—No, because of the absence of consciousness. The maker of arrows whose mind is employed (in making arrows), says that he was

conscious upto that time only of an arrow, but a person who has swooned and has (subsequently) regained consciousness, says that he was till then drowned in total darkness and that he perceived nothing. In the case of a person who is awake, even though his mind is engrossed in one object, his body is held upright (i.e. properly balanced), while the body of a person that has swooned, drops down to the ground. Therefore such a person is neither awake nor does he experience any dream, because he is incapable of any cognition, nor is he, for the matter of that, even dead, because, his breathing and the warmth of his body, still persist. In the case of a person who is in a swoon, people who are in doubt as to whether he is dead or otherwise, feel the region of his heart to find out if there is any warmth, and feel the region of his nose to find out whether there is any breath. When they find that there is neither breathing nor warmth, they conclude that he is dead and carry him to a forest for cremation. And when they find that he has both breathing and warmth, they conclude that he is not dead, and treat him for bringing him back to consciousness. In as much as he regains consciousness, he no doubt is not dead, because nobody ever returns from Death's regions (cf., "a country from whose bourne no traveller returns"—Shakespeare). (The opponent of Vedānta says)—May he then be understood to be in deep sleep, because though he is not dead, he yet is unable to cognize anything. (We reply)—No, because there is dissimilarity (as between the two states). A person that has swooned sometimes suspends his breath for quite a long time, his body is in tremors, he has wide staring eyes and a ghastly face, while a person who is merely asleep has a face which is completely in repose, he breathes rhythmically, his eyes are closed, and his body is not in tremors. A person who is in deep sleep, is awakened by being moved by a hand, while one who has swooned away, cannot be awakened even by striking him with a club. There is difference also between the causes which induce sleep and unconsciousness. The cause of unconsciousness is the beating with a club, while sleep is induced by fatigue etc.. Besides, people never describe a person that has swooned away as one who is asleep. Therefore we understand that unconsciousness is a condition of semi-attained unity



(with deep sleep), since that is the only remaining alternative. He has (on the one hand) attained unity (with deep sleep) in as much as he does not cognize, and (on the other hand) because of other dissimilarities, he is not quite so in unity (with deep sleep). How again (says the opponent of Vedānta), can you describe the condition of a swoon as only semi-attained unity with deep sleep? Have not the Scriptures mentioned about one who is asleep, thus? —“Oh Mild one, he then is in unity with the ‘Sat’ ”, (Chhān. 6.8.1) ; “Wherein a thief ceases to be a thief” (Brih. 4.3.22) ; “Neither day nor night, nor old age, nor death, nor grief, nor good or evil deeds, transgress this bund (i.e. Paramātmā i.e. the Highest Self)” (Chhān. 8.4.1). The acquisition of good or evil deeds by a Jīva-Self is effected by the generation in him of the knowledge of a state of happiness or pain respectively. There is no perception of either pleasure or pain by a Jīva-Self during deep sleep, nor indeed is there any such perception by the Jīva-Self during the condition of a swoon. Therefore, there ought to be complete unity with the Highest Self in the case of a person in a swoon, on account of the cessation of limiting adjuncts, even as it is in the case of a person in deep sleep. The reply is—“We do not mean to say that in the case of a swoon the Jīva-Self is in a condition of semi-unity with Brahma, but we mean that the condition of a swoon is partly like deep sleep and partly like the other condition (i.e. of death). The similarity and dissimilarity of a swoon with sleep has been already indicated. It (a swoon) is the very door of Death. Whenever there is a residue (of the expiation i.e. working out) of Karma in a Jīva-Self, speech and mind return to it and whenever there is no such residue (of expiation i.e. working out) of Karma, Prāṇa (Vital Breath) and warmth depart from it. Therefore those who have realized Brahma consider it to be only a condition of semi-unity (with deep sleep). With regard to the objection (of the opponent of Vedānta) that no fifth condition as such is known, (we reply)—This is no fault. May be, it is not so known because it is rare, but it is well-known in ordinary experience and in the Ayur-Veda (the Veda of the Science of Medicine). That it is not reckoned as a separate fifth condition is because it is understood as being only semi-unity and all this is therefore flawless.—10.

## 5. UBHAYALINGĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 11-21.

*Even by reason of (difference in) place (Sthāna) (i.e. limiting adjuncts) the transcendent one (i.e. Brahma) cannot be of a two-fold nature (of being both qualified and unqualified Brahma) because everywhere it is taught to be without any attributes (Nirguṇa).—11.*

The nature of that Brahma which the Jīva-Self attains, on account of the cessation of all limiting adjuncts during deep sleep is now sought to be determined on the authority of the Scriptures. Scriptural passages relating to Brahma, have two sorts of indicatory marks. Thus, there are passages such as “(The Lord whose Self is the Ākāsha) whose handiwork the whole universe is, whose desires are all flawless and whose odours and tastes are all pleasant” (Chhān. 3.14.2) etc., which have an indicatory mark of qualified (Saguṇa) Brahma, and there are others such as “(Brahma is) neither gross nor subtle, nor short nor long etc.” (Brih. 3.8.8), which have an indicatory mark of unqualified (Nirguṇa) Brahma. Now when it is being considered, as to whether it should be understood that the Scriptural passages speak of Brahma (being) of both these sorts, or whether of only one of the two, and if only one of the two, whether of qualified (Saguṇa) or unqualified (Nirguṇa) Brahma, and when the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that in as much as Scriptural passages in support of both these indications are available, it should be understood to be of both sorts, (we reply)—That the transcendent Brahma considered by and in itself alone should possess both kinds of indicatory marks, is not reasonably sustainable. It is not possible to understand that, one and the same entity, in itself, is both endowed with specific attributes such as form (Rūpa) etc. and also as being the reverse of that (i.e. being without any attributes), because of the contradiction (involved). (The opponent of Vedānta suggests)—Well, let it then be understood to be (endowed with specific attributes) by reason of a particular local limiting adjunct (such as the earth etc.). (We reply)—Even that is not reasonably sustainable. It is not

possible that an entity being of one nature only should have a different characteristic merely because of its being affected by limiting adjuncts. A crystal which in itself is white, is not rendered as being coloured, by its being affected by a limiting adjunct such as red lac or resin (Ālak-taka), because the notion about its being coloured is only illusory. Besides limiting adjuncts are brought about by Nescience. Hence, when only one indicatory mark alone out of the two has to be accepted, Brahma should be understood to be devoid of any specific attributes and as not admitting of any such alternative, as being also the reverse of it, because in all Scriptural passages purporting to explain the nature of Brahma, such as "(Brahma is) neither gross nor subtle, without form, and undecaying" (Kāṭha. 3.15, Muktik. 2.72) etc., the only instruction given is, that Brahma is without any attributes i.e. it is free of any particular attributes.—11.

*If it be said that it is not so, (i.e. the transcendent Brahma is not without attributes), because there is difference (we reply)—No, because every such (assertion about difference) is denied.—12.*

(The opponent of Vedānta says—It may even be like this : That, which is said, viz. that Brahma does not admit of any alternative and that it has only a single indicatory mark, and that Brahma has no such double indicatory marks even when considered either by itself alone or as affected by a place i.e. a limiting adjunct (Sthānatah), is not reasonably sustainable. Whence is it so ? Because of difference. Every Brāhmic lore (Vidyā) teaches different forms of Brahma, such as, that Brahma has four feet, or that Brahma has sixteen parts, or that Brahma has the characteristic of being the 'Vāmanī' (i.e. being the carrier of or the conferor of fruits of meritorious actions on persons who perform such meritorious actions), or that the triple world forms its body, or as when Brahma is expressed by the name Vaishvānara. Therefore Brahma should be understood to have a qualified (Saguna) aspect also. But (says the Vedāntin) it has been stated that it is not possible that Brahma can have both these kinds of indi-

catory marks. If it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta)—Even that does not come in the way, because a difference in Brahma's form is brought about by limiting adjuncts. Otherwise a Shāstra which speaks of such differences (in the aspects of Brahma) would be without any object (to which such Shāstra applies). We reply—No, because every such statement of such a difference (in the aspect of Brahma) is denied as not being so (in fact) and the Shāstra has uniformly spoken of Brahma as being without any difference (in its aspects), and wherever such a difference is alleged, it has spoken about such difference as being the result of limiting adjuncts, thus—"This lustrous and immortal Purusha in relation with the body (Adhyātmam), is but the same as this Ātmā (i.e. the Highest Self)" (Brih. 2.5.1). Hence it is not possible to say that the Shāstra view is that Brahma has any such relation to different aspects, in as much as such difference in aspect is made merely for the purpose of meditation (Upāsana), and the purport of the Shāstra (i.e. the Scriptures) is that there is no such difference.—12.

*Moreover (followers of) one branch (of the Scriptures) declare likewise.—13.*

Moreover followers of one branch of the Scriptures declare the absence of any such difference, by censuring the recognition of differences (such as Brahma being of both kinds, qualified and unqualified) thus—"This can be grasped by the mind alone ; here, there are no differences. He who sees here, in this, as one having differences as it were, goes from death to death" (Kāṭha 4.11). Similarly also—"When all this, described as being threefold viz. as the thing experienced, the experiencer (i.e. the Jīva-Self) and as the one who rules and actuates (from within) as Antaryāmi, is understood as being but Brahma only" (Shvet. 1.12), and it is taught in this manner that this entire variety of worldly manifestations (Prapancha) characterized by things experienced, the experiencer, and the internal regulator, has Brahma alone as its only nature.—13.

(Says the opponent of Vedānta) when Scriptural passages about Brahma, which teach that it both has form

and is also formless, are actually there, how is it that it is understood that it is formless only and not that it is otherwise also ? The reply to this is—

*(Brahma) of course is devoid of any form, because, that is the main purport (of the Scriptures).—14.*

Brahma ought only to be understood to be without any form etc. and not as having a form. Whence is it so ? Because that is the main purport (of the Scriptures). That, those Scriptural passages such as “Neither gross nor fine, nor short nor long” (Brih. 3.8.8) ; “(It is) without any sound, touch, form, or decay” (Kaṭha. 3.15, Muktik. 2.72) ; “(This) Ākāsha verily is the revealer of names and forms. That, within which these are, is Brahma” (Chhān. 8.14.1) ; “That divine and incorporeal Purusha who is both outside and inside and is not subject to be born” (Muṇḍ. 2.1.2) ; “That which is this Brahma, which neither is a cause nor an effect, and is without anything inside or outside (of it). This Self which is Brahma, which perceives everything” (Brih. 2.5.19)—have the Brahma-Self, which is without any transmigratory nature i.e. without any extension (Nishprapancha), and nothing else, as their only purport, has already been established, in “It is Brahma, because (All Vedānta texts) have that connected sequence” (Bra. Sū. I. i. 4). Therefore, as expressed in such passages in the Scriptures, Brahma should be understood to be without any form. All other passages which refer to qualified Brahma as having a form, are not passages which display the chief purport. Their purport is to speak of an injunction to meditation, and when there is no conflict, they should be understood as they are stated in the Scriptures. When however there is a conflict, Scriptural passages which disclose the chief purport, have greater force than those which do not disclose such chief purport. This is the *ratio decidendi*, by means of which, even when Scriptural passages are of both sorts, it is the formless Brahma alone that is understood, and not the other (i.e. qualified Brahma).—14.

(The opponent of Vedānta here says)—But then, how are passages which speak of qualified Brahma to be con-

strued ? To this, the reply is—

*(It is) as it is in the case of light (viz. that Brahma as it were assumes various forms), in order (that passages referring to qualified Brahma) may not be rendered purposeless.—15.*

Just as the light of the Sun or the Moon, while it occupies the sky, comes into contact with limiting adjuncts such as the little finger etc., and according to as they (i.e. the little finger etc.) are straight or are bent, itself assumes a straight or bent form as it were, similarly, Brahma also, as it comes into contact with limiting adjuncts such as the earth etc., assumes the form of the limiting adjuncts as it were, and thus the Scriptural instruction about Brahma having a particular form for the purpose of meditation, is not contradictory. In this manner, passages dealing with Brahma as being of a particular form are not rendered purposeless. It would not be proper to understand that Vedic passages sometimes have a purpose and sometimes not, because they are all uniformly authoritative. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) if it is understood like this, then the previous declaration that even when affected by limiting adjuncts, Brahma is not of two kinds, is contradicted. No (we reply), because it is not reasonably sustainable, that any attribute brought about by the limiting adjuncts as its cause, can be the real attribute of an entity, because limiting adjuncts themselves are brought about by Nescience. That, it is only in the presence of Nescience (Avidyā) which is natural, that ordinary worldly phenomenal life, and conduct in accordance with the Scriptures, becomes possible, has been referred to by us in various places.—15.

*(The Scriptures) also, have declared (Brahma) to have that only (Tanmātram i.e. that it has that subtle and primary element, viz. sentiency only).—16.*

The Scriptures also have declared Brahma to be but the supreme spirit having sentiency only, and as being de-

void of any form (Rūpa), and as being without any other dissimilar distinguishing characteristic, thus — ‘(Oh Maitreyi), just as a solid block of salt has nothing else outside or inside it but is wholly a solid of saltness, even so, has this Self nothing outside or inside its self and is wholly a solid mass of sentiency’ (Brih. 4.5.13), which means that this Self has no form other than that of sentiency, either externally or internally. Sentiency alone is its own constant form. Just as a block of salt has constantly the salty taste inside or outside and no other, even so (is the case of the Self).—16.

*The Scriptures also indicate (so) and then again the Smritis also.—17.*

The Scriptures also indicate that Brahma has no other distinctive characteristic, by the denial of any other form (for it), thus—“Hence now the instruction is—(Whatever is said to be Brahma) is not so (i.e. Brahma)” (Brih. 2.3.6) ; “Other indeed it is than that which is known and not known” (Kena. 1.3) ; “Wherefrom, having failed to attain it, words along with the mind turn back” (Tait. 2.4.1). Scriptures also tell us, how, questioned by Bāshkali, Bādhva explained Brahma to him (i.e. Bāshkali) merely by his silence, thus—“He (i.e. Bāshkali) said, Oh Bādhva, teach me (what Brahma is), but he (Bādhva) remained silent and when he was thus questioned a second and a third time, replied—‘Indeed, have I told you (by my silence), but of course you do not understood. This Self (Ātmā) is one from which duality has been swept away (Upashānta).’” Similarly, it is by denying everything else (to be Brahma) that instruction is given in Smritis, such as—“I will explain to you that which is the object of knowledge, and having known which, immortality is attained. Brahma which is beginningless and transcendent and that, which is said to be neither Sat nor Asat” (Bh. G. 13.12). Smriti also says, how, Nārāyaṇa assuming the cosmic form of the universe, spoke to Nārada—“Oh Nārada, when you see me as one endowed with the attributes of all beings, it is only an illusion of my own creation, but you should not understand me to be really so”.—17.

*Hence is (Brahma's) comparison with a reflection of the sun (in water).—18.*

It is precisely because this Self is of the nature of sentiency and is devoid of any other distinguishing characteristic and is beyond (perception by) speech and mind, and also because instructions about it can only be imparted by the negation of every other entity, that, with reference to its unreal characteristic as caused by limiting adjuncts, a comparison—that it is like the reflection of the sun (in water)—is employed in the Shāstra dealing with Final Release (Moksha), thus—"Just as this lustrous sun (Viva-svān) even though one only, yet, having entered different waters, appears to be many, due to (being reflected in) the limiting adjunct viz. water, even so is this Self (Ātmā), which is not subject to birth, made to appear as if it is different because of the limiting adjuncts of many bodies. Similarly this Self (Ātmā) of all beings, one as it is, is, by residing in different beings, seen as if it is one and many, at one and the same time, like the reflections of the moon in water."—18.

Here, (the opponent of Vedānta) contends—

*As no other distinct positive material similar to water is to be seen (in which Brahma is seen to be reflected, like the sun or the moon in water), it is not like that (and there is no parallelism).—19.*

That Brahma is similar to the sun's reflection in water, is not reasonably sustainable, because nothing like water is to be seen here. A material entity such as water, is perceived to be distinctly separate and is at a distant place, from the sun etc., and there, the occurrence of a reflection of the sun etc. is feasible. The Self (Ātmā) however is not such a material entity, and being all-pervading and non-different from all, the limiting adjuncts cannot be separate from it, or at a place distant from it. Therefore the illustration is not apt.—19.

The reply to this is—



*Because the Highest Self i.e. Brahma is inside i.e. immanent (in the limiting adjuncts, such as a body etc.) it participates i.e. equally shares in the increase or decrease of the limiting adjuncts, and thus both (i.e. the illustration and that which is illustrated) being compatible, it is like this (i.e. the comparison is apt).—20.*

But this illustration is of course apt, in as much as (similarity to) a particular small extent meant to be spoken of (Vivakshitāmsha) is possible. It is not possible for anybody to demonstrate that an illustration and an entity illustrated are completely alike, apart from their being similar to some particular small extent, because were they to be completely alike, their relation, *inter se*, as an illustration and an entity illustrated, would itself be destroyed. Besides this reference to the illustration of a reflection of the Sun in the water, is not made (by the Sūtrākāra) out of his own imagination, but, already referred to by the Shāstra as it is, its propriety only is indicated here. Wherein, again (it is asked by the opponent of Vedānta), is the similarity here, which is intended to be stated? The reply is—Its participation or sharing in the increase or decrease (of the limiting adjuncts). The reflection of the Sun in the water increases as the water increases, diminishes as the water diminishes, moves when the water moves, becomes distorted when the water is disturbed, and thus it imitates the conditions of water, but it never is, that the Sun in fact becomes so. Similarly, though the Highest Self i.e. Brahma is not liable to undergo any modification and has a uniform nature in the ultimate sense, still, because it is involved in limiting adjuncts such as a body etc., it, as it were, undergoes increase or decrease which are the properties of the limiting adjuncts. Hence, inasmuch as the illustration and the entity illustrated are both compatible there is no contradiction.—20.

*(The illustration is apt) Because the Scriptures also indicate (similarly).—21.*

The Scriptures also indicate the entering of the Highest

Brahma into limiting adjuncts such as a body etc., thus—“He made the bodies of bipeds and quadrupeds, and then the Purusha himself became a bird (‘Pakshī’—the subtle body i.e. Linga Sharīra) and entered into the material bodies” (Brih. 2.5.18), and also—“Having entered (the material bodies) as the Jīva-Self” (Chhān. 6.3.2). Hence it is proper (to say)—Therefore is the comparison with the reflection of the Sun (in water) apt (Bra. Sū. III. ii. 18). Hence it is established that Brahma has only one indicatory mark (of being only unqualified) and it does not admit of any alternatives (of being both qualified and unqualified) and has not the indicatory marks of both kinds, nor an altogether contrary indicatory mark (of the qualified form). Some think that there are two topics (Adhikaraṇās) here. The first one being—whether Brahma is of one nature only and one in which all this variety of worldly manifestations (Prapancha) has ceased to be, or, whether it is of many natures corresponding to the variety of worldly manifestations. And the second one being—that it being firmly established that in Brahma this variety of worldly manifestations has no place and it is of one uniform nature, whether Brahma has the characteristic of ‘Sat’ (Being), or of Knowledge i.e. Sentiency (Bodha), or whether it has both these characteristics. With regard to this we say—Considered in every possible way, it is altogether useless to begin another Adhikaraṇa. If all this endeavour is for the purpose of refuting that the Highest Brahma has several indicatory marks, then, that having been refuted already by the earlier Adhikaraṇa—“Because everywhere etc.” (Bra. Sū. III. ii. 11-15), a subsequent Adhikaraṇa from the Sūtra “(It is) as it is in the case of light” (Bra. Sū. III. ii. 15-21) would be without any purpose. It is not possible to say that Brahma has only the characteristic of ‘Sat’ (Being) and not the characteristic of Knowledge i.e. Sentiency, as there would result the predicament of the Scriptural passage about its being a mass of Knowledge i.e. Sentiency (Vijnānaghana) being rendered purposeless. How can Brahma devoid of any Knowledge i.e. Sentiency be ever taught as being the Self of the sentient Jīva-Self? Nor can it be said that Brahma has the characteristic of Knowledge i.e. Sentiency only and not of ‘Sat’ (Being) as there would result the predicament of the Scriptural passage “It (i.e. Brahma) should be realiz-

ed as the one that exists" (Kāṭha. 2.6.13) being rendered purposeless. Besides how ever can mere Knowledge i.e. Sentiency be conceived as apart from existence? Nor is it possible to say that the latter Adhikaraṇa is meant to establish that Brahma has both the characteristics, as that would contradict what has been already determined earlier. In the case of one who understands Brahma to be Knowledge i.e. Sentiency only, to the exclusion of 'Being' (Sat), or to be 'Being' (Sat) only, to the exclusion of Knowledge i.e. Sentiency, there would result the predicament of having to understand Brahma as admitting of differences i.e. having a variety of worldly manifestations, which exactly was disproved by the earlier Adhikaraṇa. (If the opponent were to say) that there could not be such a fault because of Scriptural authority, (we reply)—No, because it would not be reasonably sustainable that one entity can ever have more than one nature. If it be said that 'Being' (Sat) is the same as Knowledge i.e. Sentiency (Bodha) and Knowledge i.e. Sentiency is the same as 'Being' (Sat) and that there could be no mutual exclusion of each from the other, then any *doubt*, as to whether Brahma has the characteristic of 'Being' (Sat) or Knowledge i.e. Sentiency (Bodha), or the characteristics of both Being (Sat) and Knowledge i.e. Sentiency (Bodha), would necessarily be without any foundation or support (i.e. it could not be possible for the opponent of Vedānta to imagine any objection and to establish any conclusion by refuting it, and thus no separate Adhikaraṇa would be necessary). We have on the other hand duly construed the Sūtrās as belonging to only one Adhikaraṇa. Besides, when there is a conflict with regard to Scriptural passages, just as when some speak of Brahma as having a form, and the others as Brahma being devoid of any form, and when once it is accepted that Brahma is devoid of any form, it would be absolutely necessary to explain the aim of the other Scriptural passages (claiming Brahma to have various forms). Therefore, it is in that sense, that the Sūtrās "(It is) as it is in the case of light" etc. (Bra. Sū. III. ii. 15-21) become more intelligible. Again, when it is said, that even those Scriptural passages which speak of Brahma as having various forms, do really have the aim of being ultimately understood as show-

ing that Brahma is devoid of any form, by way of destroying all the variety of worldly manifestations, and that they have no other separate aim, even that does not appear to be correct. How is it so? The variety of worldly manifestations referred to in the chapter dealing with the Vidyā of the Highest Brahma, thus—"This Highest Self (in the form of a Jīva-Self) has ten, hundred horses (i.e. sense-organs) attached to him, the same Highest Self is in the form of ten, a thousand, many and innumerable horses" (Brih. 2.5.19), is of course intended to be ultimately dissolved, because, the topic has been concluded thus—"This is Brahma, which is without cause, without effect, without anything inside or outside (of it)" (Brih. 2.5.19). But it is not logical to understand that the variety of worldly manifestations again, which is referred to in the chapter dealing with deep meditation, such as "He whose structure is the mind, whose body is Prāṇa and whose nature is refulgence" (Chhān. 3.14.2), is also intended to be dissolved, because these passages have a direct connection with the injunction for deep meditation (Upāsana) which is relevant there, such as—"He should make a resolution (Kratu)" (Chhān. 3.14.1). And when the Scriptures themselves intend that such kinds of attributes (of Brahma) are for the purpose of deep meditation, it cannot be maintained by way of an implication (Lakṣhaṇā) that they are meant for the purpose of their ultimate effacement. If all these (Texts) are to have the common purpose of the ultimate effacement (of the variety of worldly manifestations), the *ratio decidendi* indicated in Bra. Sū. III. ii. 14, viz.—"It is of course devoid of any form because that is the chief purport (of Scriptural passages)", would have no scope at all. It is also understood according to the Scriptural instruction, that these deep meditations on Brahma as having such forms have fruit, such as, that sometimes it is the destruction of sin, sometimes the attainment of power and sometimes Final Release by stages (Krama-Mukti), and hence it is logical (to understand) that the passages setting out deep meditations and passages purely dealing with Brahma as such, have different meanings and are not reconcilable. Besides (the Vedāntin says further) you (the opponent) have to state in what way you believe that they are reconcilable. If it be said (that

they are so reconcilable) because it is perceived that there is but the same one injunction in both these sorts of passages, as there is for instance in the passage about Prayāja (some minor Karma) and Darśhapūrṇamāsa, (we reply) —No, because in passages referring to Brahma, there is absence of any injunction. It has already been fully established in Sūtra I. i. 4 (“But it is, that Brahma is to be known from the Scriptures, because the Vedānta texts have that connected sequence”) how passages dealing with Brahma, only culminate in determining an already existing entity, and do not purport to give any injunction. Besides it must be stated (by you—the opponent) as to what kind of activity it is, to which this injunction applies. Whenever an injunction is given to a person, he is enjoined to do a particular thing such as—‘do this’. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) the dissolution of the duality of the variety of worldly manifestations (Dvaita-prapancha) may well be the kind of activity meant by that injunction, because as long as this duality of the variety of worldly manifestations is not dissolved, the knowledge of the truth of Brahma is not attained and hence the duality of the variety of worldly manifestations which is hostile to the knowledge of Brahma has to be first dissolved. Just as a man who is desirous of attaining heaven is advised to perform a sacrifice, similarly one who is desirous of Final Release is advised to dissolve the duality of the variety of worldly manifestations. Just as one desiring to ascertain the truth of the existence of a jar placed in the dark, first removes the darkness which is hostile to such ascertainment, similarly a person wishing to realize the truth about Brahma has first to dissolve this duality of the variety of worldly manifestations which is hostile (to such realization). This variety of worldly manifestations, now, has Brahma as its true nature, while Brahma is not of the nature of the variety of worldly manifestations, and it is by dissolving this variety of worldly manifestations of names and forms that the knowledge of the truth of Brahma is attained. With regard to all this we (the Vedāntins) ask—What exactly is this dissolution of the variety of worldly manifestations any way? Is this dissolution of the variety of worldly manifestations to be accomplished in the same manner in which the solidity of ghee is dissolved by contact with the heat of fire, or whe-

ther, just as, though the moon is but one only, the falsity of seeing more than one moon as a result of Diplopia, is removed (by treatment), this variety of worldly manifestations of names and forms, imposed on Brahma by Nescience, is to be dissolved by means of knowledge? Now, with regard to that, if it be maintained (by the opponent of Vedānta), that this actually existing variety of worldly manifestations of Adhyātmika nature such as a body etc., and the actually existing variety of external manifestations such as this world etc., have to be dissolved, then, as it would be impossible for a man as such, so to dissolve them, any such instruction to dissolve them would be with regard to something having the nature of an impossibility. And assuming that it is possible for a man to do so, and assuming also that the very first person who has attained Final Release must have already dissolved this earth etc., then this universe must indeed now be devoid of this world etc. (which it actually is not). If it be said that this variety of worldly manifestations superimposed on the one and only one Brahma through Nescience, is to be dissolved by means of knowledge, then it would merely suffice to make a person understand Brahma, by merely indicating it and denying the truth of the variety of worldly manifestations superimposed on it by Nescience, by means of such Scriptural passages as "Brahma is the only one without a second, that is the Truth, the Ātmā, that thou art" (Chhān. 6.8.7), and when that is made known, knowledge (Vidyā) would spring up of itself and counteract Nescience, and the variety of worldly manifestations of names and forms would melt away like the variety of worldly manifestations in a dream. But as long as Brahma is not made known (by the Scriptures), even if such exhortations are made a hundred times, thus—'Realize Brahma, dissolve this variety of worldly manifestations', neither is the knowledge of Brahma attained, nor does any dissolution of the variety of worldly manifestations ever take place. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) such injunction may well relate to the act of knowing the nature of Brahma or to the dissolution of the variety of worldly manifestations, when the Scriptures have once made Brahma known. (We reply)—No, it is merely by making a person realize (on the authority of the Scriptures) that Brahma is devoid of

any variety of worldly manifestations, that both these (i.e. the knowledge of Brahma and the dissolution of the variety of worldly manifestations) are simultaneously attained. It is merely by displaying the true nature of a rope, that both the knowledge of a rope *qua* a rope and the dissolution of the snake etc., superimposed on it by Nescience, is simultaneously accomplished. What is done once, is never done again. Now (we ask), does this Jīva-Self which is supposed to be the object of such an injunction, during the Jīva-Self's condition of phenomenal existence, belong to the phenomenal world, or is it Brahma itself? As regards the first alternative—by the expounding of the truth of Brahma as being an entity devoid of the variety of worldly manifestations, along with the dissolution of the world, the Jīva-Self itself also will have been dissolved, and then, to whom, can this injunction to dissolve the variety of worldly manifestations, be given, and who, by faithfully obeying such an injunction, could you possibly say, would have to attain Final Release? As regards the second alternative, when Brahma has been expounded thus—viz. that Brahma which cannot possibly be the object of an injunction, is itself the real nature of the Jīva-Self, and that the phenomenal condition of the Jīva-Self is caused by Nescience,—then, by reason of the absence of any entity to whom such an injunction can possibly be given, there would be the absence of any such injunction itself. So, words such as “Ātmā should be seen etc.” used in the chapter dealing with Brahma-Vidyā, also would not have the purport of an injunction to realize the truth, but would be for the purpose of bringing a person face to face with the Truth (Tattva) i.e. Brahma. Even in the ordinary world, directions such as ‘see this’, ‘listen to this’ are only meant to imply, that one should give one's attention (to what is being said), and there is no direct injunction that one should actually attain any knowledge. Even when a person is face to face with any object of knowledge, such knowledge may, or perhaps may not, supervene, and therefore, one who intends to impart such knowledge need only indicate the object of knowledge to him, and when once that is so indicated, knowledge supervenes in proportion to the nature of the object of knowledge (according to whether it is gross or subtle), and in proportion to the capacity

of the means of proof. Nor can it be, that a person so enjoined can possibly understand, that a thing known to be of one nature by some particular means of proof, is of another nature, by reason of any such injunction. If a person considering himself to be so enjoined, understands a thing in a different way (than what it actually is), then that would not, in fact, be knowledge as such but merely a mental act, and even if such different knowledge arises of itself, then it can only be of an illusory nature. Knowledge as such, on the other hand, is generated by the means of proof and is faithful to the object (of knowledge) as it is. It can never be produced by even a hundred injunctions, nor can it ever be prevented from arising even by a hundred prohibitions also. It does not depend upon a man, but depends merely on the existing thing itself. Hence also, there is absence of any injunction (as to the knowledge of Brahma). Moreover, were the aim of the Scriptures to be to culminate merely in injunctions only, then, what has so far been understood, viz. that the Jīva-Self is nothing else but Brahma, about which there could be no injunction, would be rendered unauthoritative. Now, if the Shāstra itself were to speak about Brahma as being one which cannot be an object of an injunction, and at the same time, were it to enjoin a person to understand it, then in that case, one and the same Brahma-Shāstra would have a double and a mutually contradictory significance. Now, supposing the Scriptures were to give injunctions only, it would not be possible for anybody to obviate such faults as would necessarily arise, viz., the abandonment of what the Scriptures have declared, and the acceptance of what they have not declared, and it would also mean, that Final Release also, like the fruit of actions, is the fruit of an unseen principle (Adrishṭa) and is non-permanent. Hence the passages dealing with Brahma, necessarily aim at the attainment of its knowledge, and do not aim at giving any injunction. Hence, it is not logical to reconcile them by saying that they are uniformly perceived to be giving injunctions only. Besides, assuming that Scriptural passages purport merely to give injunctions, that there is but one uniform injunction in the sentences teaching Brahma as being devoid of the variety of worldly manifestations, and teaching it as being of the nature of the variety of worldly



manifestations also, is not established. And when a difference in the injunctions is perceived on the authority of different Scriptural passages, it is not possible to accept that there is only one uniform injunction throughout. In the case of passages dealing with Prayāja and Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa it is logical to understand, considering the common factor (that one and the same person is competent to perform both), that there is but only one injunction. But there is no such common competency with regard to injunctions about qualified and unqualified Brahma. The attributes of refulgence etc. are not useful for attaining the dissolution of the variety of worldly manifestations, nor is the dissolution of the variety of worldly manifestations useful in any way to the attribute of refulgence, as they are mutually contradictory. It is not possible to accommodate both the dissolution of the variety of worldly manifestations and the necessity of accepting only a part of the variety of worldly manifestations as true, in one and the same person. Therefore, it is more logical to accept the distinction between instructions into those for qualified, and those for unqualified Brahma, as made by us, as being logically more plausible.—21.

6. PRAKRITAITĀVATTVĀDHIKARANAM. Sū. 22-30.

*(The Scriptural clause) 'Not so, Not so', denies that Brahma has such aspects (Etāvattva i.e. that it has aspects and is also aspectless), which is relevant here (Prakṛita), and then the Scriptures again say something more thereafter.—22.*

The Scriptures, after beginning thus—"Two verily are the aspects of Brahma, the corporeal (Mūrta) and the incorporeal (Amūrta) etc." (Brih. 2.3.1), and then dividing the five great primary elements into two groups (i.e. Earth, Water and Teja as one group and Vāyu and Ākāśha as the other respectively), and after indicating that which is the essence of the incorporeal aspect and is known by the name of Puruṣa (the Hiraṇyagarbha) as having the form like turmeric (i.e. Māhārajana) etc., go on further to say—"Now is there the instruction 'Not so, Not so' (Neti Neti), for there is nothing higher than this, that he is thus" (Brih.

2.3.6). With regard to that, we (the opponents of Vedānta) desire to know as to what object is this the denial of. There is nothing here which is seen to be stated specifically, thus —‘*This, is That*’—, which can be intended to be denied. The word ‘So’ (Iti), however, necessarily implies that there is something which is intended to be denied, because the use of the negative in the passage ‘Not so, Not so’ goes with the word ‘So’ (Iti). The word ‘So’ (Iti) which goes with what is in close proximity (with it) and has a function similar to the word ‘Thus’ (Evam), appears to have been used here, just as it is for instance used in the passage “Thus indeed, the teacher has said etc.” (which means that this is what the teacher has already said). According to the chapter, what are proximate here, are the two phenomenal aspects of Brahma (the corporeal and the incorporeal), and that very Brahma, of which these (i.e. the corporeal and incorporeal) are the two aspects.

Now, with regard to this (says the opponent) a doubt arises (in our minds) in this way—Whether this denial denies both, viz. these two aspects and that of which they are these two aspects (viz. Brahma), or whether it denies only one (of the two), and if the denial is of one only, then, whether it denies Brahma, and leaves over the two aspects (undenied), or whether, it denies the two aspects and leaves over Brahma (undenied). Here, we suspect, that both these (viz. the two aspects of Brahma, and Brahma itself) are equally relevant to the context, and both are denied. There are two denials here, because the words ‘Not so’ (Neti) are used twice. We feel that by the first, the phenomenal (i.e. the corporeal and the incorporeal) aspects of Brahma are denied, and by the other, Brahma, of which they are the two phenomenal aspects, is denied. Or rather, it is Brahma alone, of which they are the two phenomenal aspects, that is denied, because, in as much as, its existence is beyond comprehension by speech and mind, it (i.e. Brahma) is the one which deserves to be so denied, while the two phenomenal aspects (of Brahma) do not so deserve to be denied, in as much as they are perceivable by such means of proof as direct perception etc.. The repetition (of the words ‘Not so’) is with a view to inspire respectful confidence (in the statement denying Brahma). Our (i.e. the Vedāntin’s) reply to this conclusion

of the opponent of Vedānta is—So far as it goes it would not be reasonably sustainable, that both could be thus denied, because there would be the predicament of (such a conclusion leading to) the doctrine of the void (Shūnya-vāda i.e. Nihilism). It is with reference to some existent entity, that a non-existent entity is here denied, as for instance, when a snake etc. (for which a rope etc. is mistaken), is denied. And this is possible, only if some actually existent entity is left over undenied. Supposing both are denied, what *other* actually existent entity can possibly be left over (undenied)? And when no entity is left over (undenied), the moment one proceeds to deny any entity, in as much as, any such denial becomes impossible (as no existent entity, with reference to which such entity is sought to be denied as being non-existent, is left over undenied), the entity so sought to be denied (as non-existent) itself attains existence, and thus, the contemplated denial becomes reasonably unsustainable. Nor again is any such denial of Brahma reasonably sustainable, as it would contradict the introductory statement—"I shall speak to you of Brahma" (Brih. 2.1.1, Bālāki to Ajātashatru), and also because it would contradict the censure in the passage—"He who understands Brahma as non-existent, himself becomes non-existent" (Tait. 2.6.1), and it would also contradict the definite understanding—"It (i.e. Brahma) is, and it is as such, that it should be understood" (Kāṭha. 6.13). Also it would cause the predicament of the whole Vedānta being stultified. The statement (of the Scriptures) that Brahma is beyond comprehension by speech and mind, is not meant to imply its total non-existence. After expounding Brahma in the Vedānta with such great trouble, by means of such Scriptural passages as "One who knows Brahma attains that transcendent one" (Tait. 2.1.1), "Brahma is Truth, Knowledge, and Eternity" (Tait. 2.1.1), no one would seek to imply its non-existence, because, does not the maxim say thus—Better not touch mud at all, and give it a wide berth, than (do so), and then bother about washing it off? The Scriptural passage "From whence, without ever reaching it, speech along with the mind is thrown back" is but a technical manner of expounding it, and it means that, Brahma is beyond (comprehension by) speech and the mind, that it does not fall into the category

of any (external phenomenal) object, that it forms the Universal Self, and that it has the nature of being eternally pure, enlightened and free. Therefore, it should be understood that only the two phenomenal aspects of Brahma are here denied, and Brahma itself is left over (undenied). The same is expressed (in the Sūtra) thus—"denies that Brahma has such aspects (Etāvattva i.e. it has aspects and is also aspectless) which is relevant here". This Scriptural word has denied that particular form of Brahma which is characterized by the corporeal and incorporeal aspects of Brahma, and which thus is circumscribed by a particular limit i.e. extension and which is relevant to the present context. That is what is relevant and has been elaborated upon in the preceding chapter, in its relation to the Divinities (Adhidaivata) and the body (Adhyātma) as also that which has originated from it, and has the characteristic of impressions (Vāsanās), and which abides in that which is the cause of the incorporeal aspect and is known by the name of Purusha, which is the subtle Self (Lingātmā) and which is indicated by such illustrations as one having the yellow form i.e. the colour of turmeric etc., because the Purusha, the quintessence of the incorporeal aspect, cannot reasonably have any relation with an aspect perceivable by the eye. Thus it is understood that it is these phenomenal aspects of Brahma which are referred to by the word 'Iti' which indicates things proximate to it, and is led towards the negative which has the sense of denial. Brahma which has been indicated in the previous chapter, is indicated by the use of the genitive case-ending as the qualifying adjective of the two aspects of Brahma, and not in its principal sense. After these two forms of Brahma are dealt with elaborately, and when there is a desire to know the form of that, of which there are these two aspects, it is stated, "Now then there is the instruction, 'not so, not so'" (Brih. 2.3.6), and thus it is determined that in this way, by denying the truth of the imagined aspects of Brahma, the real nature of Brahma is intimated, and this aggregate of all effects which depends upon it, is denied to be true, by the words 'not so, not so'. It is logical also, that this is a repudiation of all effects as such, by the words 'not so, not so' as they are in the ultimate sense non-existent, because of the Scriptural passage, which characterizes them as but

a mere expression in speech, and that it is not a repudiation of Brahma, in as much as it is the root (Mūla) of all these imaginings (Kalpanās). No doubt should here be entertained, as to how the Shāstra, having itself first indicated these two aspects of Brahma, viz. the corporeal and the incorporeal, should subsequently repudiate them, because as the maxim says, it is better not to touch mud at all by giving it a wide berth, than (do so) and then bother about washing it off, because the Shāstra does not indicate the two aspects of Brahma as fit for being expounded, but only incidentally refers to them in as much as they are well-known in the world, as only fit to be repudiated because of their being superimposed on Brahma, and also for the purpose of expounding the true nature of Brahma, and thus, all that is flawless. These two denials according to the number, deny both the corporeal and incorporeal aspects of Brahma, or rather, the first repudiation refers to the group of elements, and the latter one, to the group of impressions. Or again the meaning is, that in as much as 'not so, not so' is tautologous, everything whatsoever that is thought of (as existent) does not exist in the real sense. Were the repudiation to be limited to a definite number of phenomenal entities, one would be curious to know, as to what *other* phenomenal entity, possibly, could be Brahma, if these phenomenal entities are not Brahma. The tautologous statement being there, and as all objects as such, are repudiated by it, it becomes established that Brahma is not of the nature of a phenomenal object, but that it is the Universal Self, and thus in this manner curiosity is satisfied. The conclusion therefore is, that the passage 'not so, not so' denies the truth of all phenomenal entities superimposed on Brahma, and Brahma alone is left over (unrepudiated). This is again why the conclusion could only be this, because after the denial (of the corporeal and incorporeal aspects and impressions) the text goes on further to say—"There is another which is beyond (all this)" (Brih. 2.3.6). Now if the denial were to be made to culminate merely in the non-existence of all entities, what *else* could the text possibly refer to, as being something which is beyond? In this connection the words are to be construed thus: After indicating Brahma by the words 'not so, not so' the text explains the instruction thus—What does this 'not so, not so'

mean ? The meaning is, that there is nothing besides this Brahma and hence it is described as 'not so, not so', and it does not mean that Brahma itself is non-existent, and this same is indicated to be the transcendent Brahma, which is not denied. When again the words are construed thus—"Beyond this declaration by 'not so, not so'", what is meant by that is that there is no further instruction about Brahma than the one expressed by the words 'not so, not so', which purport to deny all phenomenal existence. If it is so construed the further Sūtra words — "The Scriptures again say something more thereafter"—should be construed as referring to the name, "The Truth of the Truth (Satyasya Satyam)", "Praṇās verily are the truth and this (i.e. Brahma) is the truth of that (Truth)" (Brih. 2.1.20). This becomes intelligible only if the denial stops short of Brahma (i.e. it does not repudiate it), and does not culminate into a mere void or Nihility (Shūnya). Therefore we conclude that the denial stops short of Brahma and does not (by repudiating Brahma) culminate in a mere void or Nihility. —22.

*The Scriptures also declare that it (i.e. Brahma) is unmanifest i.e. unevolved.*—23.

(Asks the opponent of Vedānta)—Now, if this, the Highest transcendent Brahma, other than this whole set of manifold phenomenal manifestations (of it) which have already been repudiated, does exist, why is it then, that it is not perceived ? The reply is — Because it is unmanifest i.e. unevolved and unperceivable by the sense-organs, in as much as it is the immediate witness of all that which is visible i.e. knowable. The Scriptures also declare it thus—"It is not perceived by the eye, nor by speech, nor by the other Gods (i.e. sense-organs which make all objects manifest), nor through penance nor good actions" (Muṇḍ. 3.1.8), "This Self is expressed as not perceivable" (Brih. 3.9.26), "Which is invisible and unperceivable" (Muṇḍ. 1.6), "When this (i.e. this person) reaches the fearless condition of that invisible, incorporeal, unexpoundable, and the one that needs no support (i.e. Brahma)" (Tait. 2.7.1). The Smṛiti also says thus—"He is said to be unmanifest i.e. unevolved, unfathomable and unmodifiable" (Bh. G. 2.25).—23.

*Besides (it i.e. Brahma is realized by the Yogins etc.) during the condition of perfect meditation, because the Scriptures and the Smritis say so.—24.*

Moreover Yogins do perceive this Self (i.e. Brahma) which is devoid of all phenomenal manifestations and which is unmanifest. 'Samārādhana' means the performance of the act of devotion, meditation, and abstract contemplation. How again is it known that the Yogins realize it during such Samārādhana? On the authority of the Scriptures (Pratyaksha) and the Smritis (Anumāna). The Scriptures declare even so, thus—"The Self-born made the sense-organs extrovert i.e. only capable of perceiving outward entities (and not introvert i.e. receptive of the Self within) and hence a man perceives only external objects. May be, a wise man who has become introspective (by closing his eyes in contemplation) and desirous of immortality occasionally sees the innermost Universal Self" (Kāṭha. 2.1.1), "With his mind purified by being graced with knowledge, contemplating steadily on the partless Self (Ātmā) he sees him" (Muṇḍ. 3.1.8). Smṛiti also says thus—"Salutation to him (the Īshvara), who has the nature of Yoga, whom, those whose sleep (of the darkness of ignorance) has been dispelled (Vinidrāh), who have controlled their breathing, who have a contented mind, and who have their sense-organs well controlled, see, while meditating on his bright light", and also—"The Yogins see him, the Bhagavāna, who is the ancient Lord (of all)". —24.

But (says the opponent of Vedānta) if it is so understood, that there is a relationship as between one who meditates, and one who is the object of such meditation, then it would mean that the Highest Self and the other Self (i.e. the Jiva-Self) are different entities. We reply—No.

*Just as (in the case of) light etc., there is non-difference (between the Highest Self and the Jiva-Self). (The Ātmā in the form of) Light i.e. Brahma, is so (i.e. appears different) during activity (Karmanī). There is (no difference), on account of*

*repeated statements (to that effect, in the Scriptures).—25.*

Just as light, the Ākāsha and the Sun etc., appear as if they have special aspects, i.e. they seem different, because of the actions in the form of such limiting adjuncts as a finger, an earthen pot, or water respectively, but they do not lose their natural non-difference, even so, is this appearance of difference in the Selfs, the result of limiting adjuncts only, when in fact in themselves they are one and the same Highest Self. Similarly the Vedānta texts have oftener than once explained the non-difference between the Jīva-Self and the intelligential Highest Self i.e. Prājña.—25.

*Hence it is, that (the Jīva-Self becomes one) with the infinite (i.e. Highest Self). Moreover there is indicatory mark to that effect (in the Scriptures).—26.*

Hence it is, that, because of this non-difference (between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self) being natural, and the difference between them being merely due to Nescience, the Jīva-Self becomes one with the infinite, transcendent, intelligential, Highest Self, after destroying Nescience with knowledge. There is an indicatory mark to that effect (in the Scriptures), thus—"He who knows that transcendent Brahma, himself becomes Brahma" (Muṇḍ. 3.2.9) ; "Being Brahma in fact, it (i.e. the Jīva-Self) gets absorbed into itself" (Brih. 4.4.6) etc.—26.

*But because of the twofold reference (in the Scriptures) (the relation of the Highest Self with the Jīva-Self) is like (the relation of) a snake to its coils.—27.*

It is with the intention to purify his own view with reference to the relation between what is meditated upon (i.e. Brahma) and the one who so meditates (the Jīva-Self), that the Sūtrakāra, here, presents another aspect of the same (view). In some places, instruction is given (in the Scriptures) about the difference between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self, to be as that between the one that



meditates and one that is meditated upon, and as between the one that sees, and the one that is seen, thus—"Thereafter he (the Jīva-Self) sees Him (i.e. the Highest Brahma), while meditating upon Him (i.e. the Highest Brahma) as being one without any parts" (Mund. 3.1.8) ; in some places, as the one that approaches, and the one that is approached, thus — "He approaches the divine and transcendent Purusha who is even beyond the one that is beyond (Parātpara)" (Mund. 3.2.8), and in some places, as one who controls, and the one that is controlled thus—"who rules all things, by Himself being inside of them". In other places, even non-difference between them is indicated, thus — "That thou art" (Chhān. 6.8.7) ; "I am Brahma" (Brih. 1.4.10) ; "This your (i.e. the Jīva's) Self, which is inside everything" (Brih. 3.4.1) and "This is thy Self, the ruler from within, and the immortal" (Brih. 3.7.3).

Indications, thus, being of both kinds, if only the indication about the non-difference (between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self) alone is accepted (as being correct as a rule), the other indication (of difference between them) would be without any support. Therefore, inasmuch as indications are either way, the truth is that the relation (between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self) is similar to the relation as between a snake and its own coils. Just as, as a snake, there is no difference (between it and its coils), but taken separately, as a snake on the one hand, and its coils, hood, and its erect striking posture etc., on the other, there is difference.—27.

*Or else it is like the light and its source,  
inasmuch as both are Teja.—28.*

Or else this should be understood to be similar to light and its source. Just as Sun-light and its basis i.e. source viz. the Sun are not essentially different inasmuch as both have Teja in common, but are considered as different, even so, is the case here (i.e. as between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self).—28.

*Or rather (the relationship between the  
Jīva-Self and the Highest Self, is) as has  
been stated earlier (in Sūtra 25).—29.*

Or rather, this deserves to be even as was stated ear-

lier, viz. that there is no difference (between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self), just as it is in the case of light. For only if it is understood that the bondage (of the Jīva-Self) is the result of Nescience, that it becomes reasonably sustainable that Final Release results from knowledge. If, however, the Jīva-Self is understood to be in bondage in the real sense, and is according to the maxim of the snake and its coils, understood to be only a particular condition of the Highest Self, or, according to the maxim of light and its source, to be only a part of the Highest Self, then, inasmuch as it would not be possible to get rid of such bondage (in the real sense) there would result the predicament of the Moksha-Shāstra (the science of Final Release), being rendered unmeaning or worthless. Nor do the Scriptures declare this difference and non-difference (between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self) to be both equally true. They indicate 'non-difference' as a fact to be expounded, and merely refer to a 'difference' conventionally well-known already (as appertaining to the phenomenal condition), only with a desire to explain or establish 'non-difference'. Hence the conclusion is that there is no difference (between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self), just as it is in the case of light.—29.

*And (the conclusion is so) also because of the denial.—30.*

This is again why, this alone is the conclusion, because the Scriptures deny that there is any sentient entity as apart from the Highest Self, thus — "Apart from this (Highest Self) there is no other seer" (Brih. 3.7.23) etc.. It is understood, that, that alone is the conclusion, because, the Scriptural passages such as "Then the instruction is, 'not so', 'not so'" (Brih. 2.3.6), "That Brahma is without cause, and is not an effect, and has nothing inside or outside (of it)" (Brih. 2.5.19), have denied (the truth of) the existence of this variety of worldly manifestations and have left Brahma only, as the only remaining entity.—30.

#### 7. PARĀDHIKARĀṆAM. Sū. 31-37.

*Because of the reference (in the Scriptures) to a bund (Setu), a limited size (Unmāna),*

*a relation i.e. a connection (Sambandha), and a difference (Bheda), there is some entity even beyond this (viz. the transcendent Brahma).—31.*

There arises a doubt, because of the conflict of the Scriptural statements, as to whether, there is or is not any other real entity transcending even that Brahma, which, so far, was ascertained (by us) to be an entity that is free from the variety of worldly manifestations. Some Scriptural passages, at the first blush, appear as if they propound, that there is some entity transcending even Brahma, and the following attempt towards a refutation of the same is now begun.

(Says the opponent of Vedānta)—Some entity transcending even this Brahma, deserves to be the true entity. Whence is it so ? Because of the reference (in the Scriptures) to, a bund, a limited size, a relation, and a difference. The reference to a bund is, thus—"Now that which is this Self is a bund, the sustainer (of the world)" (Chhān. 8.4.1), and it describes Brahma which is called the Self, as being the bund. A bund is well-known in the ordinary world, to be a barrage of earth and wood for arresting the flow of water. Here, as the word 'bund' is used for the word 'Self' (Ātmā), it intimates to us, as the bund in the ordinary world does, the existence of some entity other than the Self which is the bund itself, and also on account of the use of the verb 'to cross over', in the Scriptural passage—"Having crossed over beyond this bund (i.e. the Self)" (Chhān. 8.4.2). Just as (a man) after crossing a bund in the ordinary world arrives at the sylvan terrain beyond, which by no means is a bund, even so, after crossing over the Self in the form of the bund (he) reaches some entity which is not the Self and is not a bund. The reference to a limited size occurs, thus—"That Brahma has four feet, eight hoofs, and sixteen parts". It is well-known in the ordinary world, that where there is something which has a definite measurable size, such as 'This, is so much, and is limited (in size) such as a small coin' for instance, there always exists something which is different from it (such as a rupee), similarly, it is understood, that as Brahma also has a limited measured size,

some entity other than that must necessarily exist. The reference to a 'relation' occurs, thus—"Oh mild one, he then becomes one with the 'Sat' (the Highest Self)" (Chhān. 6.1.1), "The Jiva-Self embraced by the intelligent Highest Self" (Brih. 4.3.21). It is seen, that it is only an entity of a particular definite measured size, that has any relation with a similar entity of a similar measured size, as is for instance, the relation of a man to a city. The Scriptures declare that the Jiva-Selfs, during deep sleep, become connected with Brahma. Hence, it is thus understood, that some other entity, which is beyond even the Highest Brahma and is not measurable, does exist.

A reference to a 'difference' also conveys the same meaning (to us). The Scriptures after referring to the Lord as being inside the Sun, thus—"Now this aureate Purusha that is to be seen in the Sun" (Chhān. 1.6.6), again refer separately and differently to the Lord as being inside the eye also, thus—"Now this Purusha that is seen in the eye" (Chhān. 1.7.5). Then the Scriptures extend the application, *mutatis mutandis*, of the form etc. of the Lord (in the Sun), to the Lord (in the eye), thus—"The form of this one is the same as the form of the other one, the joints of this one are the same as the joints of the other one, the name of this one is the same as the name of the other one" (Chhān. 1.7.5). The Scriptures moreover indicate how the Lordship of both is limited, thus: It speaks of the one, thus—"He becomes the Lord of those who are above this (Sun) and of the desires of the God also, which is its God-hood" (Chhān. 1.6.8), and of the other, thus—"He becomes the Lord of those who are below the Sun and of the desires of men also, which is its Godhood" (Chhān. 1.7.6), just as (if one were to say)—"This is the kingdom of the King of Magadha, and this, of the King of Videha'.—31.

The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) thus being, that on account of these references to a bund etc., there is some entity which is even beyond Brahma, we explain—

*But (Brahma is described as a bund)  
because of the similarity or likeness of  
both.—32.*

By the word 'but' the conclusion indicated to have been reached (by the opponent of Vedānta) is opposed (by the Sūtrakāra). Nothing whatsoever, other than Brahma (i.e. anything transcending Brahma), deserves to exist, because of the absence of any means-of-proof (about it). We do not come across any such means-of-proof about the existence of any entity (other than Brahma). It has already been established, that all entities whatsoever that are liable to be created, deserve to have their origin etc. from Brahma, and also, that an effect is non-different from its cause. Moreover, apart from Brahma, no other entity which is not-born (Aja) can possibly exist, inasmuch as it is definitely understood from the Scriptures thus—"Oh Mild one, that Sat (Being) only, without a second, existed in the beginning", and also because, the declaration (by the Scriptures), that by the knowledge of one (i.e. Brahma) all else becomes known, precludes any assumption of the existence of any entity other than Brahma.

But (says the opponent of Vedānta) has it not been said, already that the reference to a 'bund' etc. suggests (the existence of) a real entity as apart from the Brahma? We reply—No, so far as the reference to a 'bund' is concerned, it is not capable of propounding the existence of any entity as apart from Brahma, because it only says that Ātmā is a 'bund' and not that there is any entity beyond it.

To this (the opponent of Vedānta says)—Provided nothing transcending Brahma does exist, it is not possible to imagine that the Self (Ātmā) is a bund, therefore, some entity transcending even the transcendent Brahma, has necessarily to be imagined.

We reply—It is not logical. To assert or posit the existence of an entity which is not at all known as existing (i.e. is not properly established as existing) is but a mere dogmatic assertion. Besides, merely because the Self (Ātmā) is said to be a bund, if one were to assert or posit the existence of an entity transcending the Self (Ātmā), on the ground of the illustration of an entity popularly known (in this world) such as a bund, one would then even predicate the earthiness and woodenness of the Self (Ātmā), but it would by no means be logical, as it would contradict the Scriptural passage about its being not born

(Aja). It is just proper to say that the word 'bund' is used for the Self (Ātmā) because of the similarity or likeness (of the Ātmā and a bund). That the Self (Ātmā) sustains the world and its limits, is the similarity or likeness it has, to the popularly known bund. Hence, the Self (Ātmā) which is the relevant subject here, is glorified by being designated a 'bund' similar to the popularly known bund. The expression 'having crossed over beyond the bund' has the meaning of merely reaching it, as the root 'to cross over' cannot be understood to mean, crossing over and *reaching* some entity beyond. Just as when it is said (about a student) that he has crossed over beyond grammar, it only means that he has mastered it and not that he has reached anything beyond it.—32.

*It is for the sake of comprehension by intelligence (Buddhi) (that Brahma is imagined to have a measure of size), as in the case of a Pāda (i.e. foot or a token coin).—33.*

With regard to what is said (by the opponent of Vedānta), viz., because there is a reference to a limited size, there positively is an entity transcending (Brahma), we say—Even the reference to a limited size has not the object of making the existence of any entity other than Brahma understood (by it). What then, is it meant for? (We say)—(It is meant) for the sake of comprehension by intelligence (Buddhi) i.e. for meditation (Upāsana), that is all. How ever otherwise, can comprehension by intelligence, of Brahma as having four feet, eight hoofs and sixteen parts, be made steady in Brahma (during the meditation (on Brahma)? Therefore, it is by way of such a modification (of Brahma), that Brahma is merely imagined to have a limited size, because, as people are endowed variously with either dull, or moderate, or sharp intelligence, all are not able to concentrate their intelligence on Brahma, which is eternal and is not subject to modification. This is like the Pāda (i.e. foot or a token coin). Just as the mind and the Ākāsha which are mentioned in the Scriptures as the Adhyātmika (with reference to the relation of Brahma to Jīva-Self) and the Ādhidaivika (with reference to Deities)

symbols of Brahma and have been imagined to have four Pādās (Feet), viz. 'Speech' etc. in the case of the mind, and 'Agni' etc. in the case of the Ākāsha, for the purpose of meditation, even so, it is in this case. Or else, "as in the case of Pāda" should be understood thus—Just as a Karshāpaṇa (i.e. a silver coin such as a Rupee) is supposed to consist of sub-divisions of token coins, for the purpose of securing the ease of transactions, and the meaning is, that just as in the absence of any rule about a measure (Parimāṇa, controlling prices) men generally are not able always to effect transactions of either sale or purchase, with the whole coin, even so it is in this case.—33.

*(Scriptural statements about 'Relation i.e. connection and difference' are) because of a particular environment (Sthāna-Visheshā), just as (in the case of) light etc.—34.*

Here, in this Sūtra the refutation of both the references about a relation i.e. connection, as well as a difference, is stated. What is stated (by the opponent of Vedānta), viz., that on account of the statements about Relation i.e. connection with, and difference from (Brahma), there must be some entity even transcending Brahma, is not correct, because such references even with regard to only a single entity (such as Brahma) are reasonably sustainable, as depending upon a particular environment. In the case of the reference to Relation i.e. connection, the meaning is as follows: The destruction (Upashama) of a particular special cognition of difference arising from the contact of the Jiva-Self with special environments in the form of limiting adjuncts such as intelligence (Buddhi) etc., which results from the destruction of that particular limiting adjunct, and is spoken of with reference to that limiting adjunct, is what is metaphorically meant to be the Relation i.e. connection of the Jiva-Self to the Highest Self, and it is not with reference to any limitation of the nature of the Highest Self. Similarly, the reference to 'difference' is also a metaphorical statement about a difference in Brahma in connection with limiting adjuncts, and is not in connection with any difference in its nature as such, and

that is why the comparison, "it is like the light", is thus employed, viz. just as the solar and lunar light is really the same light (in essence), but it shows special attributes on account of its contact with limiting adjuncts, so the reference to 'Relation i.e. connection' is with regard to the cessation of limiting adjuncts, and the reference to 'difference' is due to the differences in the limiting adjuncts. Or again, it is like the references to 'Relation i.e. connection' and 'difference', in the case of light, in connection with such limiting adjuncts as a needle, a lasso (Pāsha) or the Ākāsha.—34.

*And (it is only thus) that it becomes reasonably sustainable.—35.*

And it is only thus and in no other way that a 'relation i.e. connection' becomes reasonably sustainable, because the Scriptures declare such a relation with its own nature, thus—"He becomes one with his own Self" (Chhān. 6.8.1), as the Self's own nature is imperishable. A relation, in accordance with the maxim of 'a citizen and a city', does not fit in properly. It is precisely because of this obfuscation of the real nature of an entity as caused by Nescience (which is effaced), that the Scriptural passage "He becomes one with his own Self" (Chhān. 6.8.1) becomes reasonably sustainable. Similarly, no other kind of 'difference' also is possible, on account of the conflict (which such other kind of difference would cause) with the notion of the only one Lord, as is well-known from the Scriptural passages. It is in the same manner also that the Scriptures explain the reference to a difference caused by environment, in the case of the one and only one Ākāsha, thus—"This Ākāsha here, which is outside the Purusha" (Chhān. 3.12.8) ; "This Ākāsha here, which is inside the Purusha" (Chhān. 3.12.8) ; "This Ākāsha here, which is inside the Hridaya" (Chhān. 3.12.9).—35.

*Similarly, on account of the denial of all other (entities).—36.*

Having thus refuted the reasons advanced by the opponent of Vedānta in support of his view, such as the refer-



ence to a bund etc., (the Sūtrakāra) now concludes his own view by (stating) another reason, thus—Similarly on account of the denial (by the Scriptures) of all other entities, it is understood that there does not exist any other entity transcending Brahma. So also, Scriptural passages—such as “He alone is below” (Chhān. 7.25.1), “I alone am below” (Chhān. 7.25.1), “Ātmā alone is below” (Chhān. 2.4.6), “All this is Brahma”, “The Ātmā is all this” (Chhān. 7.25.2), “There is no diversity or many-ness here” (Brih. 4.4.19), “Beyond whom nothing else is higher i.e. transcendent”, and “From whom nothing else is lower i.e. smaller” (Shvet. 3.9), “That this here, is Brahma, without cause, without effect, without anything inside or outside (of it)” (Brih. 2.5.19) etc.—which recur in the chapter dealing with the self-same Brahma, and which cannot possibly be construed as meaning anything else, preclude (the existence of) any entity other than Brahma. From the Scriptural passage about the Highest Self being inside everything, it is concluded that no other Self is inside the Highest Self (i.e. Brahma).—36.

*By this (i.e. by all that has gone before), it is established that Brahma is all-pervading. (It is also known) from the statement about (its) extent or expanse (Āyāma).—37.*

By this, i.e. by the refutation (of the argument) about the reference to a bund etc., and also by accepting, that (the existence of) everything else (than Brahma) is denied (by the Scriptures), it is also firmly established that the Highest Self is all-pervading, otherwise, it could not be so established. If the references to a bund etc. are accepted to be in their principal sense it would mean that the Highest Self is limited (in size), because a bund etc. are themselves so limited (in size). Similarly if it is not accepted that the existence of all other entities is denied (by the Scriptures), then inasmuch as such entities would mutually exclude each other, it would mean that the Highest Self also (being an entity) is limited (in size). It is understood from the word Āyāma (extent or expanse) etc., that it is all-pervading. The word Āyāma means expanse. That the

Highest Self is all-pervading, is also indicated by the following Scriptural and Smṛiti passages, viz. "As much (in size) this Ākāsha is, even so much (in size) is this Ākāsha in the Hṛidaya" (Chhān. 8.1.3), "Like the Ākāsha he is all-pervading and eternal", "He is greater than the heaven" (Chhān. 3.14.3), "Greater than the Ākāsha" (Shata. Brā. 10.6.3.2), "He is eternal, all-pervading, firm and immovable" (Bh. G. 11. 24).—37.

7. PHALĀDHIKARANAM. Sū. 38-41.

*Because, that fruits (of actions are vouchsafed) by Him (i.e. the Lord), is alone that is reasonably sustainable.*—38.

Another characteristic of the nature of this self-same Brahma, other than its distinctive aspects, by way of its being both the ruler, and the one that is ruled, which is discernible during its phenomenal existence, is now being described. The question to be considered is, whether, the well-known threefold fruits of actions, viz. the desirable, the undesirable and those which are partly desirable and partly undesirable, which all creatures are well-known to be subject to, during their transmigratory mundane existence, result directly from the actions themselves, or whether they are received from the Lord. It is propounded (by the Sūtrakāra) that these fruits deserve to be received from the Lord. Whence is it so? Because it is reasonably so sustainable. It is reasonably sustainable, that it is Hē, the entity presiding over everything, which brings about creation, preservation and absorption, and who is well aware of the specific environments and times, that suitably confers such fruits of actions on those who are responsible for such actions. It is not reasonably sustainable, that actions which come to an end every moment, yield their fruits at some future time, because no existence can ever spring from non-existence. It may well be (says the opponent of Vedānta), that an act during its own time and while it is coming to an end, creates a fruit proper to itself, and that the doer of such act experiences the fruit at some future time. That also is not feasible, inasmuch as it is not reasonably sustainable, that any fruit can ever be called a

fruit as such, before it is connected with the experiencer of such a fruit. It is precisely at that particular time, during which the fruit, be it pleasure or pain, is being experienced by any Jiva-Self, that, in the ordinary world, it is understood to be such a fruit. In the ordinary world men do not realize pleasure or pain as the fruit (of any action) as long as it is not connected with the Jiva-Self. If it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta)—Oh, all right, let no fruit accrue after the act (as you say), but may be, that fruit may accrue from the 'Apūrva' (merit) of actions which itself is the result of such actions,—even that is not reasonably sustainable because 'Apūrva' which by itself is non-sentient and inert like wood or earth, and which is not energized into activity by a sentient entity, cannot have any tendency towards activity. Besides there is no means-of-proof as to its existence. If it be said, that a presumption as to the existence of an 'Apūrva' is a *sine qua non* of such fruit, is precisely such means-of-proof, (we reply)—No, inasmuch as the existence of the Lord is firmly established, the presumption of the existence of such an 'Apūrva' as a *sine qua non*, goes by the board.—38.

*And also because of its being declared by the Scriptures.—39.*

It is not merely because it is reasonably sustainable, that we imagine the Lord to be the cause of the fruits (of actions), but because the Scriptures also declare the Lord to be the cause of such fruits. The Scriptural passage "He indeed is the great unborn Self (Ātmā), the one who vouchsafes food and wealth" (Brih. 4.4.24) also declares similarly.—39.

*It is on the same grounds however, that Āchārya Jaimini (considers) Dharma (conduct according to Scriptures), as the giver of fruits.—40.*

Āchārya Jaimini however considers Dharma to be the one that vouchsafes fruits, on the very same grounds (viz. Scriptural authority and possibility). This is what the Scriptures declare — "One who has a desire for heaven should

sacrifice". This is a Scriptural injunction, and as some object for the injunction is necessary to be understood, it must be understood that a sacrifice does result in the acquisition of heaven, because were it not to be so, no one would care to engage in a sacrifice, and thus any such instruction would be rendered meaningless. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) this view has already been rejected on the ground, that, as actions come to an end every moment, it is not reasonably sustainable that there could be any fruits (of actions). No (we the Mimāṃsakās reply) because according to us the Scriptures are authoritative. Once it is granted, that the Scriptures are authoritative, the relation between actions and their fruits, as declared by the Scriptures, should be understood to be so. Action which comes to an end without generating some 'Apūrva' cannot possibly grant its fruit at some future time. Hence it is inferred that some such condition (like an 'Apūrva') does of course exist, either as some subtle subsequent condition of action, or as some antecedent condition of the fruit. This is how the meaning becomes reasonably sustainable in the way referred to above, but it is not equally reasonably sustainable that the Lord vouchsafes the fruits (of actions). It is not reasonably sustainable that one uniform cause (such as the Lord) can have ununiform different results, and there would also be the predicament of the faults of partiality and cruelty being fastened on to the Lord, and all performance of actions would be rendered unfruitful. Therefore it is from Dharma alone that fruits (of actions) flow.

—40.

*But the sage Bādarāyaṇa however thinks that the one mentioned earlier (i.e. the Lord) is the cause of the fruits of actions, because He is referred to as the cause (of action i.e. Karma also).—41.*

Achārya Bādarāyaṇa however considers the Lord referred to earlier, as the cause of the fruits of actions. The word 'but' (in the Sūtra) has the effect of refuting the view that fruits result either from actions or from Apūrva. The conclusion is, that it is the Lord alone that vouchsafes fruits of actions, and whether He relies upon actions or

'Apūrva', for dealing out such fruits, may be as it may. Whence is it so? Because it is indicated that the Lord is the cause. It is as being the one that deals out the fruit, that the Scriptures refer to the Lord, thus—"He makes that man perform good actions whom he desires to raise up from this world, and makes that other man perpetrate evil actions whom he desires to dump down into the abyss" (Kaush. 3.8). The Smṛiti Bhagavad-Gīta, also (in 7.21) says the same thing: "Whatever form (of the deity) the devotee desires to worship through faith, on that very form, I render his faith firm. With such faith the devotee essays to propitiate Him, and thus, as ordained by me, he obtains his desires."

Besides all Vedānta texts declare, that all this creation is brought about by the Lord. That the Lord is the giver of the fruits of action, consists in the fact, that He creates all creatures according to their own actions. Faults, such as, that the creation of manifold different effects by one cause (viz. Brahma) etc. are not reasonably sustainable, do not apply to the Lord, inasmuch as the Lord has regard for the endeavours made (by each man).—41.

*Here ends Pāda II of Adhyāya III.*

### ADHYĀYA III—PADA 3

#### 1. SARVAVEDĀNTAPRATYAYĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 1-4.

*The injunctions etc. being common, the Vidyās\* (i.e. Lores, OR Upāsanās OR Cognitions) in all Vedānta texts are the same everywhere.—1.*

The true nature of Brahma, the object to be known, has so far been explained. Whether the Vidyās in all the Vedānta texts are different from each other or not, is now being considered. (The opponent of Vedānta says)—But surely, Brahma, the object to be known, has already been determined to be one that is free from all differences of cause or effect (Purvāparādibhedarahitam), and is uniform in essence, like a lump of salt, so, whence can there be any necessity to consider, as to whether the Vidyās are different or non-different from each other? It is not possible to say, that in the Vedānta it is intended to expound, that just as there is a variety of religious actions, there are varieties of Brahma, because there is but one and only one Brahma and it is of one uniform nature. That there could be a variety in the nature of Vidyās in the case of Brahma which is of one uniform nature, is not possible. If an entity is of one nature, and the knowledge of such entity is of a different nature, such knowledge can only be of an illusory nature. Now, again Brahma being but one and one only, if different Vijnānās (i.e. Vidyās or Upāsanās or Cognitions) of it are intended to be expounded by the Vedānta texts, then only one of them could be free from doubt, and the rest would necessarily be doubtful, and thus the predicament of a distrust of the Vedānta texts would result. Therefore it cannot be possible to entertain a doubt as to whether there are differences in the Vidyās relating to Brahma in the Vedānta texts, nor can it be maintained (even if it be so doubted) that because of the uniformity of injunctions, there is non-difference between them, because, the knowledge of Brahma is characterized by the absence of any such injunction about it (unlike the case of Dharma in

---

\* Vidyās are different methods of approaching the infinite Brahma.

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā). It has already been said by the Āchārya (i.e. the Sūtrakāra)—in the Sūtra “But that (Brahma is to be known from the Scriptures) is established, because (all Vedānta texts) have that connected sequence” (Bra. Sū. I. i. 4)—that the knowledge of Brahma supervenes, not through passages which purport to give injunctions (to act), but through passages about Brahma which culminate in the realization of Brahma as an entity. So how can any such discussion either about the difference or non-difference (between the Vidyās) be at all started ?

With regard to this, it is said—This consideration as to whether there is difference or non-difference as between the Vidyās is with reference to the qualified (Saguṇa) Brahma or the Prāṇa etc., and hence there is no fault. Here also—like ritualistic actions (Karma)—difference and non-difference as between meditations (Upāsānās) is possible, and, as in the case of actions, meditations also are spoken of as having visible and invisible fruits, and some are spoken of as having the fruit of Kramamukti (Final Release by stages) by way of the generation of correct i.e. perfect knowledge, and thus, in the case of meditations, a scope for discussion is possible, viz., as to whether the Vidyās as referred to in different Vedānta texts are or are not different from each other. Now, with regard to that, the possible arguments of the opponents of Vedānta in support of their view are stated, thus:—A designation (Nāma) for instance, is a well-known criterion for determining that there is difference, to wit, as in the case of the ‘Jyoti’ sacrifice etc. (in the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā). Here also in the various Vedānta texts, different designations for the Vidyās are mentioned, such as Taittirīyaka, Vājasaneyaka, Kauthumaka, Shāṭhyāyanaka etc. Similarly, a difference in the form (Rūpa) of Karma, is also calculated to propound a difference in actions (in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) as in “Āmikshā\* is for the Vishvedevās (i.e. all the Gods) and Vājina is for the horses”. Here, (in Vedānta) also a difference in form is to be seen, as for instance, the followers of one branch recite a sixth and an entirely dif-

---

\* When curds are mixed with hot milk, the milk coagulates and separates from the liquid portion. The coagulated portion is Āmikshā and the liquid is Vājina.

ferent Agni, in the case of the 'Vidyā of the Five Fires' (Panchāgni-Vidyā), while some others recite only five Agnis. Similarly, in the dialogue between the Prāṇās (viz. the Chief Vital Air and other sense-organs) etc., some mention a lesser number, such as, Vāk etc. (and four others only) while some mention a greater number (viz. five). Similarly, that a special attribute (Dharma) is suggestive of a difference in actions, is what is advanced as an argument for a doubt (by the opponent in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā), as for instance, in minor sacrifices (Ishtis) called 'Kārīrī'\* etc. So, here (in Vedānta) also there is a special attribute, viz. that only the followers of Atharva-Veda are required to perform the 'Shirovrata' (the ritual of bearing the Agni on the head). Similarly other criteria of 'difference' such as 'Punarukti' (repetition) etc., in so far as they become applicable, should be drawn upon in the case of the various Vedānta texts. Therefore (the conclusion of the opponent of Vedānta is)—The Vidyās in different Vedānta texts are different from each other. This conclusion, we answer as follows—The Vidyās (Cognitions, which are called by the same name) wherever they happen to be mentioned in the Vedānta texts, are the same everywhere, because the injunctions etc. (as to them) are common. By the word 'etc.', the application of all these arguments for establishing 'non-difference', referred to in the Sūtra, which states the conclusion, in the Shākhāntara Adhikaraṇa (of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā), is attracted i.e. they should be understood to apply here, viz., such as, connection, nature or form, injunction and special designation. Just as in one and the same Agnihotra, in spite of differences in the branches (of the Vedās) the injunction as to the performance of ritualistic action (Karma) by a man is the same—viz. "He should offer an oblation"—, similarly, the injunction, both in the case of the Vājasaneyins and Chhandogās—viz. "He who verily knows the oldest and the Highest" (Brih. 6.1.1) and (Chhān. 5.1.1)—is the same. Also the connection of the Vidyā (Cognition) with the fruit, is the same, in the case of both—viz. "He becomes the oldest and the Highest

\* In the Kārīrī Ishti only the followers of the Taittiriya branch of the Yajurveda, are required to dine off the bare ground and not off a plate, while, the followers of other branches are not.



amongst his own people" (Brih. 6.1.1). The nature or form of the Vidyā in both is the same, viz. the true nature of the Prāṇa, which is endowed with the special qualities of being the oldest and the Highest. Just as the materials and the deity (involved in the sacrifice) constitute the nature or form of a sacrifice, so the object to be known (i.e. Brahma) is the nature of the Vidyā, and the Vidyās are coloured by its nature (i.e. of the object to be known). The designation also (in both) is the same—viz. "the Vidyā of the Prāṇās". Therefore, the Vidyās (Cognitions in all the Vedānta texts are the same everywhere. The same construction should be put upon, in the case of the 'Vidyā of the Five Fires', the 'Vidyā of Vaishvānara' and the 'Shāṇḍilya Vidyā'. Such illusory reasons (as are stated by the opponent of Vedānta) for establishing that the Vidyās are different, such as, designation and form etc., have already been refuted in the First Kaṇḍa (i.e. Pūrva-Mimāṃsā), beginning with the Sūtra "There could be no difference based upon name, as the names belong to the Vedās", or, "the names do not apply to injunctions of acts" (according as the reading of the Sūtra is "Chodanābhīdhānatvāt" or "Achodanābhīdhānatvāt"—Pū. Mīm. II.4.10).—1.

The Sūtrakāra here anticipates another possible objection (of the opponent of Vedānta) also, and refutes it, as follows—

*If it be said, that the Vidyās are different from each other on account of differences (in subsidiary matters, we say)—No, there may be such differences (even in the case of one and the same Vidyā).—2.*

It may well be (says the opponent of Vedānta) that it is not reasonably sustainable, that the Vidyās in all the Vedānta texts are identical, inasmuch as there is difference in subsidiary matters (Guṇās). For instance, the Vājasaneyins, with reference to the 'Vidyā of the Five Fires' mention a sixth Agni, thus— "To him the material Agni itself, is the Agni" (Brih. 6.2.14) etc., while the Chhandogās do not mention it (i.e. such sixth Agni), but conclude their Vidyā of Five Fires by the number five only, thus—"So,

whosoever knows these five fires in this way" (Chhān. 5.10.10). Now, how can it be reasonably sustainable, that the Vidyā of those who include this subsidiary matter and those who do not, can be identical? It is not possible to understand that all the different subsidiary matters can be combined together, as it would contradict the number five. Similarly the Chhandogās (in addition to the Chief Prāṇa) mention four Prāṇās viz. Speech, the Eye, the Ear and the Mind and the Vājasaneyins mention a fifth also thus—"Semen is the creator (Prajāpati). He who knows it to be so gets an increase in progeny and animal stock" (Brih. 6.1.6). If it be also said, that on account of the difference caused by the inclusion and exclusion (of the subsidiary matters), there is a difference in the things to be known (viz. the Prāṇas) and because of the difference in the things to be known, there is a difference in Vidyā, just as a difference in the material and the deity (necessary in a sacrifice), causes a difference in the sacrifice, (we reply) —No, in as much as such differences in subsidiary matters, even when the Vidyā is one and the same (in all Vedānta texts) is reasonably sustainable. Even though the sixth material Agni cannot possibly be taken collectively (with the other five fires which are notional) there is no difference in the Vidyās (viz. the Panchāgni-Vidyās mentioned both in the Brihadāraṇyaka and the Chhāndogya), inasmuch as the other five Agnis, such as the heaven etc., are recognizable as the same in both. (For instance) there is no difference in the Atirātra sacrifice, even when the Shoḍashi cup is used or when it is not so used. Besides even the Chhandogās do mention a sixth Agni, thus—"Indeed when he has died and departed for the world indicated (by his actions) they take him to the Agni" (Chhān. 5.9.2). The Vājasaneyins however in order to dispel the idea of the sticks of fire-wood (Samidhs) and smoke which follow in the wake of the five notional i.e. imaginary fires, mention thus—"To him, the material Agni is the Agni and the material Samidh is the Samidh" (Brih. 6.2.14), which is but only a reference to something which is usual (Nityānuvāda, and which means that even in the Brihadāraṇyaka, the sixth fire is not mentioned for meditation). Even if (it be said) that this Vāda (i.e. reciting in this way) is for the purpose of meditation, still, this subsidiary matter can very

well be included even by the Chhandogās also, and no such doubt about any contravention of the number five should be entertained here, inasmuch as, this number five, is only intended to refer to imaginary i.e. notional Agnis (which are well-known to be five) and is but a reference to something which is usual (Nityānuvāda), and has nothing to do i.e. does not go with any injunction (to a meditation). In this manner, it is not contradictory to include the sixth additional Agni elsewhere (where it is not mentioned) in the "Dialogue of the Prāṇās". No such difference in the Vidyās or the object to be known, should be suspected, merely because of a difference due to a subsidiary matter being included or excluded or also because a particular small portion of the thing to be known is accepted in one Vidyā and is rejected in the other, because the maximum quantum of the thing-to-be-known (Vedyarāshi), is common i.e. the same in both. Therefore the Vidyās (everywhere) are identical.—2.

*(The rite of the holding of the fire on the head) relates to the study of Veda (amongst those who are followers of Atharvaveda), because (it is so mentioned) in the 'Samāchāra' and also because of the chapter. The rule is analogous to the libations.—3.*

The objection taken—viz., that inasmuch as in the case of the followers of Atharvaveda, 'the ritual of holding of the fire on the head' is a *sina qua non* for (learning) the Vidyā, and it is not so necessary in the case of others, therefore there is difference in the Vidyās—is now being answered. This is a feature of the study of Atharvaveda, and not of the Vidyā. How is it understood to be so? Because the Ātharvaṇikās mention that it is a feature of the study of Atharvaveda in the 'Samāchāra', a book which gives instruction about the Vratās (rituals) to be observed in the study of Veda, and which mentions this ritual as being related to the (Atharva-) Veda. It is also conclusively determined to be such a feature of the study of their own Upanishad only (and not of the Vidyā), on account of the word 'this' which refers to the qualification (for the study of the Muṇḍaka Upanishad), and the word 'study' also, in the passage—"No one who has not performed this ritual,

can study this (i.e. the Muṇḍaka Upanishad)" (Muṇḍ. 3.2.11). But (says the opponent of Vedānta), as the Muṇḍaka passage "This Brahma-Vidyā should be imparted only to those who have performed the ritual of 'the holding of the fire on the head' according to the instruction (Vidhivat)" (Muṇḍ. 3.2.10) speaks of its (i.e. of the ritual of Shīrovrata) relation to Brahma-Vidyā, this feature (of Shīrovrata) would get mixed up (with the other Brahma-Vidyās in the other Vedās) and apply to all Vidyās generally, because, Brahma-Vidyā is the same everywhere. We reply—No, because the word (this) (Ētām— एताम् ) in the passage refers only to that which is relevant to the context there (viz., to the Brahma-Vidyā mentioned in the Muṇḍakopanishad). As this relevancy of Brahma-Vidyā is with reference to this particular book (i.e. Muṇḍakopanishad), therefore this feature (of Shīrovrata) also relates particularly to that particular book only. That the rule is analogous to the libations (Sava), is an illustration indicated (in support of the argument). Just as, the seven libations—beginning with the libation to the Sun, and ending with the Shataudana libation—, having nothing to do with the three Agnis referred to in the other Vedās, but having a relation with only the one Agni referred to in the Atharva-Veda, are restricted to the followers of Atharva-Veda only, similarly this feature (of Shīrovrata) related as it is, to the study of the Atharva-Veda by the Ātharvaṇikās, is restricted to that study only. Therefore also, (the statement) that the Vidyās are identical (everywhere), is flawless.—3.

*(The Scriptures) also declare (similarly).*

—4.

The Scriptures also declare similarly that the Vidyās (Cognitions) are one and the same in all Vedānta texts, inasmuch as they all give instruction that the object to be known is one and the same, thus—"That abode (i.e. Brahma) about which all the Scriptures speak" (Kaṭha. 1.2.15); "So do the Bahvrchās (i.e. Hotris, the followers of Rig-Veda) consider it (i.e. Brahma) only, in the Mahatyuktha (Shāstra i.e. collection of glorificatory Sāma hymns), and the Adhvaryus (the officiating priests, who follow the Yajurveda) meditate on it (i.e. Brahma) in the

Sacrificial Agni, and the Chhândogās in Mahāvratā (a particular religious act for propitiating Indra)". Similarly, it is seen that the fear-inspiring nature of the Lord, spoken of in the Kāthopanishad thus—"The great fear, the uplifted thunder-bolt (Vajra)" (Kāṭha. 6.2), is referred to in the Taittiriyaka, for the purpose of censuring the viewing of difference (between the Jīva-Self and the Lord), thus—"Whenever he makes even the least little difference about it (Ātmā), then a great fear assails him. That indeed is where, the person, who does not accept the unity (of Jīva-Self and Brahma) but considers them to be different, becomes subject to fear" (Tait. 2.7.1). Similarly the Vaishvānara (the gastric fire) fancifully or notionally conceived to be of the size of a thumb, in the Vājasaneyaka (i.e. Brihadāraṇyaka), is accepted in the Chhândogya, as something which is already established, thus—"But, he who worships the Vaishvānara considered in this way to be of the size of a thumb, and as the Abhivimāna Self (Ātmā)" (Chhān. 5.18.1). In the same manner, inasmuch as, all Vedānta texts are understood to refer actually to the same matter, such as the Ukthās (Collections of Sāma hymns) etc., mentioned in one place, as being the same in all Vedānta texts, and are accepted in other places for the purpose of devout meditation, so, it is thus proved that the Upāsanaś (meditations) in all Vedānta texts are the same everywhere, on the authority of the maxim of "A thing that is often seen everywhere (Prāyadarshana)".—4.

## 2. UPASAMHĀRADHIKARANAM. Sū. 5.

*All the subsidiary matters have to be combined, because there is no difference in their application (Arthābheda) as between the Vidyās (Cognitions). This is just like the complementary matters of an injunction which is common.—5.*

This Sūtra states the fruit (Phala, of the discussion above). It having been established that the Vidyās (Cognitions) in all the Vedānta texts are the same everywhere, (it follows that) the subsidiary matters of a Vidyā in one place are to be combined with the subsidiary matters of the

same Vidyā in another place, because there is no difference in the fruit of the Vidyās (Cognitions) themselves. The use i.e. the benefit which the subsidiary matters relating to one Vidyā (Cognition) afford to that Vidyā is the same that they afford to another Vidyā, and, as the Vidyā is one and the same in both the places, there is a combination (of the subsidiary matters of both). It is like the complementary matters relating to an injunction (Vidhisheshavat). Just as, in as much as complementary matters of an injunction about the religious rites of Agnihotra etc. which are one and the same everywhere and not different, all such matters complementary to such an injunction have to be combined, even so it is, in the case of the present Vidyā. When the Vidyās are different from each other, then in as much as the matters of each Vidyā happen to be restricted to each Vidyā itself, and there is absence of any relation as between these Vidyās, such as that of one being the principal and the other being its modification (as there is between the Darsheshṭi and a Pashu-yāga), no combination of such complementary matters takes place. It is not so, however, when the Vidyās are one and the same. This Sūtra which states the fruit, will be further elaborated (by the Sūtrakāra), beginning with Sūtra 10 hereafter.—5.

### 3. ANYATHĀTVĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 6-8.

*If it be said (that the Udgītha Vidyās in Brihadāranyaka and Chhāndogya Upanishads) are different, because the words of the Scriptures are different, (we the opponents of Vedānta say)—No, because of non-difference (as between them).—6.*

In the Vājasaneyaka (i.e. Brihadāranyaka), beginning with “The deities said—Oh well, we will overcome the demons (interrupting us) in the sacrifice, by means of the Udgītha” (Brih. 1.3.1), and proceeding “They said to Vāk (speech), do thou sing for us” (Brih. 1.3.2), and after censuring Vāk (speech) and the other Prāṇās (i.e. sense-organs) as having been annihilated by the evil nature of the Demons, it is then recited, that they had recourse to the Chief Prāṇa, thus—“They said to the Prāṇa of the

mouth (Āsanya), do thou sing for us, and the Chief Prāṇa said, may it be so, and sang for them" (Brih. 1.3.7). Similarly, in the Chhândogya Upanishad also, beginning with "The deities approached the Udgîtha, (thinking) that they would defeat them (the demons) with it" (Chhân. 1.2.1), and having censured the other Prāṇās (senses) as having been annihilated by the evil nature of the demons, it is similarly recited, that they had recourse to the Chief Prāṇa, thus—"Then they meditated upon the Chief Prāṇa as the Udgîtha" (Chhân. 1.2.7). In both places, it is definitely understood by this glorification of the Chief Prāṇa, that there is an injunction about Prāṇa-Vidyā.

Now, a doubt arises here as to whether the Vidyās (Cognitions) in both the places are the same, or whether they are different. What then is the conclusion (of the opponent of the Vedānta) ? It is, that, on the same argument as before, the Cognitions are one and the same in both places. But (objects the Vedāntin) it is not logical (to say) that the Vidyās (Cognitions) are one and the same, because there is a difference in the introductory passage. The Vājasaneyins begin in one way and the Chhandogās in another. The Vājasaneyins mention the Chief Prāṇa as the singer of the Udgîtha, thus—"Do thou sing for us" (Brih. 1.3.2), while the Chhandogās treat the Chief Prāṇa itself as the Udgîtha, thus—"They meditated on this, the chief Prāṇa as the Udgîtha" (Chhân. 1.2.7). If, therefore, it be said (by the Vedāntin) as to how the Vidyās (Cognitions) could be one and the same, (we the opponents of Vedānta reply)—"This is no fault. That much peculiarity would not vitiate the unity of the Vidyās (Cognitions), because, it is understood that there is a great deal too much that is common (as between the Prāṇa-Vidyās of both the Vājasaneyaka and Chhândogya). For instance—Both begin with the fight between the deities and the demons, both speak about overcoming the demons and then both mention the Udgîtha, and follow it up by the invocation to Vāk (speech) etc., and then after censuring Vāk (speech) etc., both speak about having recourse to the Chief Prāṇa, and both speak about the annihilation of the demons through the strength of the Chief Prāṇa, in a manner similar to the illustration of a stone and a clod of earth, and thus, many such items are understood to be common to both. In the

Vājasaneyaka the Chief Prāṇa and the Udgītha are governed by the same case (Sāmānādhikaraṇya), thus—"He indeed is the Udgītha" (Brih. 1.3.23). Therefore, in the Chhāndogya also the Chief Prāṇa should be understood metaphorically to be the singer of the Udgītha and it should be understood that the Vidyās (Cognitions) are, thus, one and the same.—6.

*(Vidyās i.e. Cognitions) are not (the same in both the places) because the chapters are different. This is like (the meditation on) the greater than the great (Paro-varyān).—7.*

That the cognitions are one and the same, is not logical, while it is logical, that they are different. Why so? Because of the difference in the chapters (which speak of different subject matters). It is seen that there is here a difference in the introductory part of the chapters. In the Chhāndogya, for the matter of that, having in the introductory portion mentioned Omkāra, which is but a part of the Udgītha, as the proper object of meditation as the Udgītha, and having explained the special attribute (of Omkāra) as having the quintessence (of every other essence), thus—"Meditate on the word 'Om' as Udgītha" (Chhān. 1.1.1), and after having again referred to a part of the Udgītha in the form of Omkāra, thus—"Now, verily this is but a further explanation of the same word Om" (Chhān. 1.1.10), the Chhāndogya, by way of the legend of the Gods and the Demons, says further—" (The Gods) meditated on the Chief Prāṇa in the form of the Udgītha" (Chhān. 1.2.2). Now here, if by the word Udgītha, meditation on the whole Udgītha (and not on its part 'Om' only) is understood, and the Udgātri-Ritviṇa (the chanting priest) is understood to be the meditator, then the introductory passage (which speaks about the meditation on 'Om', a part of the Udgītha) would thus be contradicted, and the word would have to be understood as a Lakṣhaṇā i.e. in its secondary significance. Now, in one and the same sentence, the concluding portion ought to agree with the introductory portion. Therefore, here (in the Chhāndogya) the looking upon on Omkāra, a part of the Udgītha, as be-



ing of the form of the Chief Prāṇa, is the instruction given. In the Vājasaneyaka (i.e. Brih.) however, in the absence of any reason for understanding only a part of the Udgītha (i.e. Om) by the word 'Udgītha', meditation on the entire Udgītha is intimated. In the Scriptural passage "Do thou sing for us" (Brih. 1.3.2) also, the meditator the Udgātri-Ritvija is explained to be of the form of the Chief Prāṇa, which is another point of difference (in the Vidyās). That the Chief Prāṇa and the Udgītha which are mentioned as having the same case-ending, is for the purpose of expounding, that the Chief Prāṇa which is sought to be represented as the Udgātri-Ritvija, is the Self of all, and it is not able to show, that the Vidyās are identical. Besides, another disparity consists in this, viz. that by the word 'Udgītha' the whole Udgītha becomes the object of meditation. Nor can the capacity of the Chief Prāṇa as a singer be rejected on the ground of impossibility, inasmuch as, that it has the same capacity of being understood notionally as being the singer, as there is about the Udgītha, for the purpose of meditation, has been spoken of by the Scriptures. In as much as, that the Udgātri-Ritvija may very well sing by virtue of the strength of the Chief Prāṇa, is not impossible, because the Scriptures have therein stated so, in that very manner, thus—"He (the Udgātri) sang by means of the Speech and Prāṇa". Besides, when it is understood that a difference between things is meant to be spoken of, it is not proper to understand that the things are the same, merely because of the similarity of the language of the passages. For instance, in the case of the Abhyudaya passage (i.e. a passage relating to the rising of the moon in the Darsheshtī Sacrifice) and in the case of the Pashukāma passage (i.e. a passage relating to the desire of a Yajamāna to obtain stocks of cattle), there is the Scriptural passage—"Divide the rice (according to the size of the grains) in three ways. The middle one should be offered as Puroḍāsha on eight potsherds, to Agni the conferor (of gifts)", in which even though the reference is similar, still, because of the difference in the introductory passages, in the Abhyudaya passage it is understood that it (the Puroḍāsha) is not to be offered to the deity, and so far as the Pashukāma passage is concerned, it is understood to be by way of an injunction for a sacrifice. Similarly, here also

there is difference in the Vidyās (Cognitions) on account of a difference in the introductory passages. This is similar to (the meditation on) the greater than the great (the most excellent). Just as, even though there is similarity (of Vidyās in both) about the superimposition of the Highest Self (on the Udgītha), meditation on the Udgītha characterized by the special feature of being the 'most excellent', by such passages as "Ākāsha verily is greater than these (beings), Ākāsha is the last resort" (Chhān. 1.9.1), "He is the Udgītha, greater than the great, and eternal" (Chhān. 9.1.2), is different from the meditation on the Udgītha, characterized by the special feature of an 'aureate beard' (of the deity) in the Sun and in the eye. Thus, just as special features in different meditations, in even one and the same branch, cannot be combined, similarly they cannot be combined in the case of such meditations in different branches.—7.

*If it be said that the Vidyā is the same because the name (Udgītha-Vidyā) is the same, it has already been stated (that it cannot be so). Besides there can be one name (for different Vidyās). But (in the absence of a reason for understanding, that the Vidyās are different) when the name is the same, the Vidyās may be one and the same.—8.*

If it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta), that it is logical that the name being the same the Cognitions are one and the same, and that here the name 'Udgītha-Vidyā' occurs in both places, it is not reasonably sustainable. It has been stated in the preceding Sūtra, thus—"The Vidyās are not the same everywhere. It is like (the meditation on) the greater than the great" (Bra. Sū. III. iii. 7). That alone (viz. what we the Vedāntins say) is more logical and conforms to the letter of the Scriptures, and that the fact that the name is identical, is (a matter which is) outside the scope of the Scriptures, and the name is used in a secondary sense only, by ordinary men in ordinary parlance, in as much as the mere word 'Udgītha' is used. Besides, this identity of name viz. 'Udgītha-Vidyā' does also exist, even

in the case of meditations (on Brahma) as the 'most excellent', which are well-known to be different. It is similarly seen, that religious acts such as Agnihotra and Darshapurnamāsa mentioned in the book named Kāṭhaka (of the Kāṭhakās), are mentioned by the same name 'Kāṭhaka', even though they are well-known to be different, and even so can it be here also. Where there is no such reason for considering the Vidyās to be different, as for instance in the case of the Samvarga-Vidyā etc., identity of the Vidyās (Cognitions) may well occur, because of the identity of names.—8.

#### 4. VYĀPTYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 9.

*But, because (the word 'Om') is coextensive (with the Vedās), it is perfectly congruous.—9.*

Inasmuch as the Scriptures speak of the words 'Om' and Udgītha as having the same case-endings, in the passage "(He) should meditate on 'Om' (as if) it is 'Udgītha'" (Chhān. 1.1.1), and as the various views, viz. that the relation between the two is either of superimposition (Adhyāsa) or ablation (Apavāda), or unity (Ekatva), or of each of them qualifying the other (Visheshana), appear to suggest themselves as possible, a consideration arises as to which of these views is the logical one. Adhyāsa (superimposition) indeed is there, where, as between two entities, while the knowledge about one entity (out of the two), *qua* that entity, still subsists, the notion of its being another entity is superimposed upon it. The knowledge that the entity, on which the notion of the other entity is superimposed, is that self-same entity, continues to persist in spite of the fact, that the notion of another entity is superimposed on it. Just as for instance here, even when the notion of Brahma is superimposed on a name (such as 'Om'), the knowledge, that the name is a name, does still persist, and is not removed by the notion of Brahma. Or else, just as when an iconic representation (Pratimā) is superimposed with the notion of its being Vishnu (incarnate) etc.. Similarly here, (it could be understood) that either the notion of 'Udgītha' is superimposed on the word 'Om' or

the notion of the name 'Om' is superimposed on the word Udgītha. Ablation (Apavāda) occurs, where, with regard to an entity, a false notion (of its being some other entity) having already been definitely and successfully superimposed on it, a correct knowledge of it (that it is the self-same entity), which arises later on, negatives (i.e. ablates) the earlier false notion superimposed on it. Just as, for instance, a notion (entertained by a man) that the aggregate of the body and sense-organs is the Self, disappears (i.e. it is ablated) when the correct knowledge that 'the Self' is (in fact) 'the Self' (and the body and sense-organs are not the Self) supervenes at some subsequent later stage, by the Scriptural knowledge "That thou art" (Chhān. 6.8.7), or, as for instance, when the confused notion about 'a direction' (of the points of a compass), disappears after the correct knowledge about it (dawns on a person). Similarly, here also, the notion that the Udgītha' is 'Om' is repelled by the knowledge that it is (in fact) 'Om', and the notion that 'Om' is 'Udgītha' is repelled by the knowledge that it is (in fact) the 'Udgītha'. Unity (Ekatva) is, where the words 'Om' and 'Udgītha' do not happen to exceed in extent the meaning of each other, (i.e. that they are co-extensive in their denotation and connotation and mean the same thing). Just as for instance when it is said that a person is either 'a twice-born' or a Brāhmaṇa or a 'God on earth', (which means one and the same thing). The relation is that of a Visheshāṇa i.e. an adjective (to a substantive), when, an occasion to use the word 'Om' which coincides with the extent of all the Scriptures (because all Vedās begin with 'Om'), arises, it is made to culminate in meaning the particular operation, viz. 'singing' (Āudgātra = औद्गात्र)\* (i.e. what the Udgātri-Ritvija does), just as when some one says —'Bring the lotus which is blue' (where 'blue' qualifies 'the lotus'). Similarly here also, in the passage—" (He) should meditate on 'Om' which is of the form of the 'Udgītha' ". Thus, when this Sāmānādhikarāṇya passage (i.e. one in which there is a common case-ending) is considered, these various views appear to be possible, and in the absence of any definite determining factor, when the conclusion (of the opponent) is, that it is inconclusive, it is said (by the

\* Two readings are available here, viz. औद्गात्रविशेषस्य and उद्गीथविशेषस्य.

Sūtrakāra)—“But because (the word ‘Om’) is co-extensive (with the Vedās), it is perfectly congruous”. The word ‘also’ (Cha) which here stands in the place of the word ‘but’ (Tu), has the effect or result (Prayojana) of rejecting three views. That means that three views (out of the four mentioned above), in as much as they contain a flaw, are rejected, and only the view that ‘one word serves as an adjective qualifying the other’, being flawless, is accepted. With regard to the view of superimposition (Adhyāsa), the notion (of the entity) which is superimposed on another entity, will make the word which stands for the superimposed entity, understood in a secondary (Lakṣhaṇā) sense, and some fruit of it will have to be imagined. If it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta) that the Scriptural passage “(He) verily becomes the conferor of the thing desired” (Chhān. 1.1.7) etc. shows the necessary fruit, (we reply)—No, because that fruit is the result of something else. It is by no means the fruit of the superimposition of the Udgītha (on ‘Om’), but of the sentiment about ‘Om’ being the gratifier of the desire (which is entertained with respect to the word ‘Om’). In the case of ‘ablation’ (Apavāda) also there is a corresponding absence of any fruit (resulting from such ablation). If it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta) that the refutation of the false-ignorance, is such fruit, (we reply)—No, inasmuch as it is not understood to be helpful in any way towards a man’s chief aim. At no time does the knowledge of Omkāra *qua* Omkāra, or the knowledge of Udgītha *qua* Udgītha, ever disappear. Moreover this passage is not meant to expound the true nature of an entity, but it is intended to be by way of an injunction for meditation. Neither does the view about unity (Ekatva) fit in properly, as in that case, the uttering of two words ‘Om’ and Udgītha (which in the case of Ekatva (Unity) mean the same entity), would be superfluous, because only one word could very well express the desired meaning. It is not known that the word Udgītha is a word used for the word which is expressed by the letter ‘Om’ which is related to the subject of a Hotri (i.e. of the Rigveda) or an Adhvaryu (of the Yajurveda). Nor is the word ‘Om’ ever used metaphorically for the whole of the second part of the Sāma-Veda known as the ‘Udgītha’, so that the two words can be synonymous i.e. coextensive

in meaning. Therefore, the only remaining alternative, viz. the view that one of the two words ('Om' and 'Udgītha') acts as an adjective of the other and (qualifies its meaning) is accepted, because the word 'Om' is common to all the Vedās. In order that the letter 'Om' which is common to all the Vedās should not happen to be applicable here in that sense, it is here qualified by the word 'Udgītha', otherwise, how else indeed can the word 'Om' be understood to mean a part of Udgītha? (The opponent of Vedānta here retorts)—But even so far as this view is concerned also, secondary meaning would still be there (as the word 'Om' has to be understood to mean a part of Udgītha). (We reply)—What you say is correct of course, but even in the case of a secondary meaning, it may either be proximate or distant. In the case of a superimposition, the notion of one entity is superimposed on another and so the secondary meaning is 'distant', while in the case of a relationship in which one entity qualifies another, inasmuch as a word meaning the whole entity (Avayavi) is given the meaning of only a part of it (Avayava), the secondary meaning is 'proximate'. A word which expresses an aggregate of things is also seen to be used for a part of that aggregate, as for instance in the case of cloth or a city. Hence the meaning is that because the words 'Udgītha' and 'Om' are co-extensive, the word 'Udgītha' is here used as an adjective, qualifying the word 'Om', which, being thus perfectly congruous, is flawless.—9.

##### 5. SARVABHEDĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 10.

*As there is no difference (in the Prāṇa-Vidyās in different places) (the attributes in one Vidyā are) available elsewhere.—10.*

In the dialogue of the Prāṇās of the Vājis i.e. the Vājasaneyins, and the Chhandogās, it has been stated that the Prāṇa, which is endowed with the attribute of possessing a superior status etc., is the one to be meditated upon, and Vāk (Speech) etc. are also stated therein as being endowed with the attributes of 'richness of language' (Vasishṭhatva) etc., and the same qualities of theirs are referred back (by Vāk etc.) as really belonging to Prāṇa, thus—"What in

me consists as being endowed with the attribute of 'Vasishṭhatva', is indeed your (i.e. Prāṇa's) Vasishṭhatva"\* (Brih. 6.1.14). In the case of the dialogues of Prāṇa of the followers of some other branches such as Kaushitaki etc., in the passages such as "Now for the determination of the quality of being the Highest" and "These deities who discussed amongst themselves as to who amongst them was the best" (Kaush. 2.9), the superior status of Prāṇa has been stated, but not these attributes of Vasishṭhatva etc.. So, here the doubt is whether the qualities of Vasishṭhatva etc., which are mentioned as being present in one place, are to be understood to be present in other places also. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that they are not to be understood to be so present. Whence is it so? Because of the use of the term 'in this way' (Evam) in the Scriptures ("Who, in this way, knows the greatness of Prāṇa"). In different places, by the term 'in this way' in passages such as "Now, whosoever understands, in this way, by knowing that such superior status abides in the Prāṇa", the entity to be known is indicated. Moreover the term 'in this way' which goes with what is proximate (to it) is not able to intimate the set of attributes of this kind mentioned in other branches (i.e. in Vājasaneyi and Chhāndogya branches). Therefore, the qualities mentioned in each chapter fulfil their purpose there only, i.e. where they occur, and leave no further expectations (of their being applicable elsewhere). This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), the reply is—These attributes, viz. richness of language (Vasishṭhatva) etc., mentioned in some particular place only, are of course present in other places also (viz. Prāṇa-Vidyās in other places). Whence is it so? Because there is absence of any difference between them (i.e. between all Prāṇa-Vidyās). It is recognized, that because of the similarity of the dialogue, there is the same Prāṇa-Vidyā everywhere. And when there is thus no such difference between the Vidyās, how ever can the attributes mentioned in one place, fail to be present in other places as well? But (says the opponent of Vedānta) we have stated already that the term 'in this way', wherever it occurs, intimates separately in each place, each particular

\* Hume has translated this sentence as—"Verily wherein I am the most excellent therein you are the most excellent".

set of attributes (mentioned there). To which we reply— Even though the term ‘in this way’ in Kaushītaki Brāhmaṇa does not intimate the set of attributes occurring in the Vājasaneyi Brāhmaṇa, because of want of proximity, still, inasmuch as the Prāṇa-Vidyā is the same, the same set of attributes is of course intimated by the term ‘in this way’ in the Vājasaneyi Brāhmaṇa, and thus the set of attributes (Guṇās), even though restricted to the non-different Vidyā of some other branch, is not distinguishable from the set of qualities in one’s own branch. Neither is there, even if it be considered to be so, any abandonment of what the Scriptures have stated, nor the assumption of anything not so stated. The attributes mentioned in one branch are of course supposed to be stated in the other, inasmuch as there is absence of any difference in that to which these attributes appertain (viz. the Prāṇa-Vidyā). Devadatta, who is well-known in his own country, for the attributes of prowess etc., does not cease to have these attributes, merely because he goes to a foreign country and the people there do not have the advantage of having been made aware of these attributes (of his). Just as even there, when they get better acquainted, they do get to know these attributes of Devadatta, similarly, the attributes in one branch which are the object of meditation there, are present in a different branch also. Therefore, the conclusion is, that attributes which appertain to one and the same principal entity, even when they are mentioned in one place only, are to be understood as applicable to such principal entity, when it occurs elsewhere also.—10.

6. . ANANDĀDYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 11-13.

*Attributes (Guṇās) such as bliss etc., which appertain to the chief entity (i.e. Brahma, are to be combined).—11.*

The Scriptures in one place or the other in passages which aim at propounding the nature of Brahma, speak of Brahma here and there as possessing some out of such types of attributes, as of bliss, of being knowledge incarnate, of being all-pervading and of being the Self of all etc.. With regard to these, there is a doubt, as to whether, such attributes of Brahma as of bliss etc., wherever they are



spoken of by the Scriptures, are to be understood as being only as many as are mentioned in any such particular place, or whether, all of them collectively are to be understood to be available everywhere. Now, the conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta) being, that they should be understood separately to be only as many as are spoken of in any particular place, it is said (by the Vedāntin)—All the attributes of Brahma i.e. the Chief entity, such as bliss etc., should be understood to belong to it everywhere. Whence is it so? Precisely because of non-difference. Brahma, the entity to which these attributes belong, is one and the same Chief entity everywhere, and it does not differ. Therefore all the attributes of Brahma, are present everywhere collectively, on the strength of the illustration quoted in the previous Adhikaraṇa, viz. about the prowess etc. of Devadatta.—11.

But (says the opponent of Vedānta) if this is so, then all such attributes of Brahma, as its 'having Joy as its caput' etc., would also be available everywhere, for even so, the Scriptures in the Taittirīyaka Upanishad, after introducing the Self as being of the structure of Joy, mention thus—"Of him, satisfaction is the right wing (Paksha), extreme satisfaction is the left wing (Paksha), bliss is the Self, and Brahma is the tail, the support" (Tait. 2.5). The reply is :—

*The attributes such as 'having Joy as the caput' etc. are not available (everywhere). Augmentation and depletion pertain to only where there is 'Bheda' i.e. 'Dvaita' (a notion of difference).—12.*

Attributes such as 'It has Joy as its caput' etc., mentioned in the Taittirīyaka Upanishad, are not available everywhere, inasmuch as, Joy, satisfaction, extreme satisfaction, Bliss etc. are understood to derive augmentation or suffer depletion, relatively with each other, and with reference to the other experiencers. Augmentation and depletion become possible only in the presence of difference (i.e. a sense of duality, understood to exist as between the Highest Self and other Jīva-Selfs), while Brahma as such, is indeed without any duality, according to the Scriptural passages—"One only without a second" (Chhān. 6.2.1) etc.. Besides, in-

struction has already been given by us in Brahma-Sūtra I.i.12, that the attributes of 'having Joy as the caput' etc. are in fact not the attributes of the Chief entity, Brahma, but of the sheaths (i.e. Koshās in which it happens to be enveloped during phenomenal existence), and besides they are imagined to be so, merely to serve as the means of bringing the Highest Brahma to the mind (of the person who contemplates), and not with a view that they should actually be looked upon as appertaining to the object of meditation, and hence there is thus a greater reason why 'having Joy as the caput' etc. are not available everywhere. When the Āchārya (the Sūtrakāra) predicates characteristics such as 'Joy is the caput' to be the attributes of Brahma (when they are not so in fact) and says that they are not available everywhere, he is merely being logical, and the same rule of logic is to be applied to such other characteristics as are mentioned for the purpose of meditation, viz. 'Samyadvāma' (i.e. one having the attribute of being that to which all blessings go), and 'Satya-Kāma' (i.e. one having the attribute of having all true desires) etc.. When that which is to be meditated upon, viz. Brahma, is one only, and when the difference in the introductory passages argues a difference in the modes of meditation, the characteristics in each different place are not mutually available. Just as two maids simultaneously wait upon one and the same king, one with the royal umbrella, and the other with the fly-whisk, and just as in this case, though the person to be served is one only, there is difference in the mode of service and each such mode is confined to its own proper sphere, even so it is here also. It is in the case of qualified Brahma alone, when duality has practical application, that augmentation and depletion of the attributes becomes reasonably sustainable, and not in the case of unqualified Brahma. Hence attributes such as 'one whose desires are true' etc., which are mentioned by the Scriptures in one particular place, do not become available everywhere.—12.

*But the other (attributes) of Brahma are available everywhere, because the entity (Brahma) is the common purport everywhere.—13.*

Attributes such as 'Bliss' etc. spoken of by the Scriptures for the purpose of propounding the nature of Brahma are all available everywhere, in as much as Brahma, the entity of which they are the attributes, and the entity which is to be propounded, is one and the same, and that the attainment of the knowledge of it (i.e. Brahma) is their only fruit, is the difference between them and the other attributes.—13.

7. ADHYĀNĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 14-15.

*What is mentioned in the passage in Kāṭhopanishad (at 1.3.10) is for the purpose of meditation (on the Purusha) because of the absence of any fruit (in the case of others).—14.*

The Kāṭhaka, beginning with "Sense-objects transcend the sense-organs, the mind transcends the sense-objects, and intelligence transcends the mind" (Kāṭha. 1.3.10), says further—"There is nothing transcending the Purusha, that is the *terminus ad quem* (Kāshṭhā), the highest shelter or asylum (Parā Gatih)" (Kāṭha. 1.3.11). The doubt that arises here, is, whether it is only propounded here that the Purusha alone transcends everything else, or whether all these sense-objects etc., do each of them transcend the entity just preceding it in the series. We think (says the opponent of Vedānta) that it is being propounded here, that each succeeding entity in the series transcends the one preceding it. For the Scriptures declare it in that way, thus—"This transcends this", 'This transcends this'. But (says the Vedāntin), were these entities i.e. sense-objects etc. intended to be propounded as each one of them transcending the one preceding it, it would cause a split in the sentence. (The opponent of Vedānta replies)—This is no fault. It would be reasonably sustainable to understand that there are so many separate sentences. These so many separate sentences may be able to propound as to how so many entities such as sense-objects etc. are each endowed with the quality of transcending (that which is stated earlier) and hence it is propounded, the each one amongst these (several entities) transcends the one that precedes it. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) we say

—It is logical to understand that, that the Purusha alone transcends all these, is what is propounded and not that each one of these entities transcends the one that precedes it. Whence is it so ? Because there is absence of any fruit. It is neither seen nor is it stated by the Scriptures, that as amongst these other entities (excluding the Purusha), there is any fruit of the knowledge that each one of these transcends the one preceding it. It is only as regards the Purusha, understood as transcending the sense-organs etc., and as transcending this entire set of evils, that a fruit described as ‘the attainment of Moksha i.e. Final Release’ is discernible. So say the Scriptures also, thus—“Having reached Him a man is freed from the jaws of death” (Kaṭha. 3.15). Besides by the term *Terminus ad quem* which denies that there is anything beyond it, the Scriptures by evincing all due respect to the Purusha indicate that the statement about this stream of earlier and later entities in the series, is meant only for the purpose of comprehending Him (i.e. the Purusha), thus—“(This is) for the purpose of meditation”, which means for the purpose of the realization of the truth, by prior meditation. It is precisely for this realization that meditation is advised, and not for showing that meditation is the principal thing i.e. an end in itself. —14.

*Also, because of the word ‘Self’ (Ātmā),  
(that the series is mentioned for the sake  
of the Purusha).—15.*

This is again why this enumeration of the stream of the sense-organs etc., is for the purpose of the realization of the Purusha. Besides, in the Scriptural passage “This Self hidden in all beings, does not manifest itself. It is however perceived by those possessed of a subtle intellect, by their penetrating intelligence” (Kaṭha. 1.3.12), the Purusha that is relevant (to the topic) is described as being ‘the Self’ (Ātmā). Hence it is understood that it is meant to be stated, as to how the rest (i.e. sense-organs etc.) are not the ‘Self’. The Scriptures indicate how it (i.e. the Self) is difficult of comprehension and is capable of being understood only by those whose understanding is refined. It is for the realization of that ‘Self’ that the

passage "The wise man should suppress speech (and speech here is only illustrative and includes all sense-organs) by surrendering it into the mind etc." (Kaṭha. 3.13), have prescribed meditation (on the Self). This has already been explained in Bra. Sū. I. iv. 1—"That the one, which is inferred (i.e. Pradhāna), as said by some etc.". In this manner, it is seen how in various ways the main purport of the Scriptures is the Purusha and nothing else. Besides, having stated that "He arrives at his journey's end which is the Highest seat of Viṣṇu" (Kaṭha. 3.9), when further there is this curiosity as to what exactly is that Highest seat of Viṣṇu, which is at the end of the journey, it is finally understood, from this enumeration of sense-organs etc., that all this anxious effort is for the purpose of the realization of this Highest seat (of Viṣṇu).—15.

#### 8. ĀTMAGRIHĪTYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 16-17.

*The (Highest) Self is to be understood here also, as it is understood elsewhere, because of what follows.—16.*

It is stated in the Aitareyaka, thus:—"In the beginning indeed, this was but the Self alone. Nothing else was then vibrating (with life). He thought, may I create the worlds." (Ait. 1.1). "He created the worlds—the heaven (Ambha), the universe (Marīchi), the mortal world (Mara), the waters (Āpa i.e. Pātāla or the nether world)" (Ait. 1.2) etc.. Now with regard to this a doubt arises, as to whether, here, by the word 'Self' the 'Highest Self' is meant to be spoken of or some other entity. What then is your (i.e. of the opponent of Vedānta) conclusion? It is, that the 'Highest Lord' cannot be meant by the word 'the Self' here. Whence is it so? Because of what is seen to be the connected sequence of the sentences. But (says the Vedāntin) the connected sequence of the sentences appears very much to relate to the Highest Self, inasmuch as it is understood that before the genesis, the Self alone was, and because of the statement that the activity of creation (by the Self) was preceded by thought. (The opponent of Vedānta says)—No, because the statement is about the creation of the worlds. If it were to be accepted that the Highest Lord was the creator, then the creation

of the elements should have been stated to be the first creation but here the creation of the worlds is stated to be the first. The worlds are but the special combinations of the elements. The Scriptures speak of the heaven (Ambha) etc. as being the worlds, thus—"This, is Ambha which is beyond the heavenly world (Diva)" (Ait. 1.2). It is understood both from the Scriptures and the Smritis, that the creation of the worlds was accomplished by some other Lord (Brahmadeva), dependent upon i.e. under the supervision of the 'Highest Lord'. So says the Scriptural passage—"The Self in the form of the Purusha (i.e. Brahmadeva) being one only was alone in the beginning" (Brih. 1.4.1). Smṛiti also says thus—"He is the first embodied one and he is called the Purusha. He the Brahmā (Prajāpati) was the first creator of all beings, that came into existence." The Aitareya also in an earlier chapter speaks of this variety of creation as brought about by Prajāpati, thus—"Now about the creation of semen (Retā). Gods are but the (product of) the semen of Prajāpati." It is also seen that the word 'Self' is used for him (i.e. the Prajāpati) thus—"The Self alone, in the form of the Purusha, was, in the beginning" (Brih. 1.4.1). It is reasonably sustainable, to understand this—"being one only"—as being so, with reference to his own creation. The act of 'thinking' also is reasonably sustainable as being his, because of his being understood to be sentient. Besides, a great deal of special activity, such as—"He brought them a cow, he brought them a horse, he brought them a man, they said etc.", which is well-known in the case of particular phenomenal embodied individual Selves, can be understood here, and hence some such particular phenomenal Self such as Brahmadeva may very well be meant here. To this, we reply—"It is the Highest Self that is understood here, as is understood elsewhere also." Just as in the case of other Scriptural accounts of creation, such as "from the Self the Ākāsha came into being" (Tait. 2.1.1), we understand that the universal Self is meant by the term 'Self', or just as in the case of the ordinary use of the word 'Ātmā', it is the universal Self that is understood, so can it well be, here also. Where in cases in which along with "The Self alone was all this in the beginning" (Brih. 1.4.1) a qualification 'in the form of 'Purusha' etc. is stated by the Scriptures, the particular

Self may be understood. Here, however, we find that later on a particularized mention—such as “He thought he would create the worlds”, “He created these worlds”—is stated, which is favourable to the understanding of the Highest Self only. Therefore, it is but logical that it (i.e. the Highest Self) alone should be understood here.—16.

*If it be said (that the Highest Self is not to be understood), by reason of the sequence (of the passages, not indicating that way), we reply—It can very well be so, because it is ascertained (to be so).—17.*

What again is said (by the opponent of Vedānta), viz., that looking at the connected sequence of the sentences, the Highest Self is not to be understood, is now to be refuted. With regard to that it is said—It can well be so, because there is a determination to that effect. That the Highest Self should be understood to be meant, can be reasonably sustainable. Whence is it so? Because of such determination. It is only if the Highest Self is understood (here), that the determination, that the Self alone was the one that existed before the genesis, can be said to be plausible, otherwise it would be considered to be unplausible. I can very well construe, that the statement about the creation of the worlds comes but after the creation of the elements well-known to have been mentioned in other Scriptural passages. Just as, for instance, it was construed (by me) that the Scriptural statement “It created the Teja” comes after the creation of the Ākāsha and the Vāyu as mentioned in other Scriptural passages, even so can it be construed here. When the subject is common, any special particular about such subject, mentioned in one Scriptural passage, has to be combined with the same subject mentioned in the other Scriptural passages. Besides, even this special kind of activity, such as “He brought a cow (for the deity) etc.” (mentioned in connection with the Self here), has also to be understood in consonance with that particular entity ascertained as intended to be mentioned here, because it cannot be maintained that all this story is intended to be told here by the Scriptures, inasmuch as there is absence of any aim (of man being served) in un-

derstanding it that way. That, Brahma is the Self (of all), is what is intended to be spoken of here. For instance, after having taught about the creation of the worlds such as heaven etc., as also the creation of the guardians of the worlds such as 'Agni' etc., and thereafter, having also given instructions about the creation of the sense-organs, as well as the abode of such sense-organs viz. the body, the Scriptures, after mentioning how that same creator wondering to himself, thus—"How ever can this exist without me?" (Ait. 1.3.11), further say that he himself entered this body, thus—"He prised open the sutures (of the head) and entered the body through that opening" (Ait. 1.3.12). Again the Scriptures, after having mentioned, as to how (the creator) after having pondered over the activities of the sense-organs, thus—"If speech has spoken, if Prāṇa (Vital Breath) has breathed, (without my help)" (Ait. 1.3.11), and having asked himself, thus—"What then am I"? (Ait. 1.3.11), state as follows—"Then he saw himself as the Purusha, and as Brahma sprawling fully stretched and pervading all over" (Ait. 1.3.13), and thus finally arrive at the determination, that it is Brahma, the Self of all. Similarly afterwards, the Scriptures, after enumerating all the different entities, and also the elements, thus—"He is (the Lower) Brahma, He is Indra" (Ait. 3.1.3), go on further to determine that Brahma is the Self of all, thus—"All that, is led or guided by intelligence (i.e. Prajñā), all is firmly ensconced in intelligence, this world is led by intelligence, it is supported by intelligence, and that intelligence is Brahma" (Ait. 3.1.3). Therefore, that the Highest Self should be understood (to be meant here) is unexceptionable. Another construction (of Sūtrās 16 and 17) is as follows: The Scriptures in the Vājasaneyaka, beginning with the word 'the Self', thus—"What is this Self? He is the Purusha, that has knowledge as his structure, as amongst the Prāṇās; who is like a shining light inside the Hridaya" (Brih. 4.3.7), proceed to propound the same, to be free from all attachments, and to determine that it is the Brahma-Self. They also conclude thus—"He is that great unborn Self, Brahma, Sans-Senility i.e. unaging, Sans-Death, Sans-Destruction, Sans-Fear" (Brih. 4.4.25). The Chhândogya, on the other hand, begins without any reference to the word 'the Self', thus—"O Mild one, Sat (being)



alone was in the beginning, one without a second" (Chhān. 6.2.1), and in the concluding portion (Udarke) teaches its complete identity with the Self, thus—"That is the Self, that thou art (Oh Shvetaketu)" (Chhān. 6.8.7).

Now with regard to these statements, a doubt arises thus—Do these Scriptural statements mean one and the same thing or do they not? The conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta) is that they do not mean one and the same thing because the Scriptural statements are different. When there is a difference in the structure of the Scriptural statements, it is not logical to understand that they mean one and the same entity, because the understanding of the meaning depends upon the Scriptural statement. It is understood, that because the Vājasaneyaka begins with the word 'the Self' it teaches the essence of the Self itself (i.e. Brahma), while in the Chhāndogya which begins in a different way, the teaching is about a different entity. But (says the Vedāntin) we have said that in the case of the Chhandogās also, the conclusion is that the teaching is about the identity of the Self. (The opponent of Vedānta says)—It is true you have said so, but as the conclusion ought to correspond with the introductory statement, it only means, that there, merely the fanciful conception of its identity with the Self, is taught. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) the reply is:—Even in the case of the Chhandogās, in the passage "Oh Mild one, Sat (being) alone was in the beginning" (Chhān. 6.2.1), it is 'the Self' that should be understood, even as, in the case of the Vājasaneyins, in the passage "What is the Self" etc. (Brih. 4.3.7), it is the Self that is understood. Whence is it so? Because of what follows later on, viz. the teaching about its (i.e. Sat's) identity with the Self (Sūtra 17). If we the Vedāntins are asked, as to what the refutation of the statement of the opponent of Vedānta—viz. "Because of the connected sequence of the introductory passage and the absence of the mention of the word 'the Self' (in the Chhāndogya) 'the Self' cannot be understood there"—is, we say that 'the Self' may well be understood here, because there is such determination (later on). For instance, having stated, that by the knowledge of one, the knowledge of everything else supervenes, in the Scriptural passage "By (the knowledge of) which, that

which is not heard becomes heard ; that which is not understood becomes understood ; that which is not realized becomes realized" (Chhān. 6.1.1), the Scriptures in order to establish that, say (further)—"Sat (Being) alone";—which is possible, only if 'the Self' is understood to be meant. Otherwise the Chief Highest Self, not having been realized, the knowledge of everything cannot (be said to) supervene. Besides, the determination, that before creation, one (entity) alone (existed), the reference to the Jīva-Self by the word 'the Self', the statement that in the condition of deep sleep it i.e. the Jīva-Self attains its own nature (i.e. the nature of the Self), the frequently reiterated determination "That thou art" (Chhān. 6.8.7) preceded always by a question relating to it, can be possible, only if by all this, it is intended to be propounded that the Sat is identical with the Self ; and can never be possible, if only a fanciful conception of such an identity of the Sat with the Self, is meant here. It is not logical to maintain here, that the conclusion must necessarily always correspond with the introductory passage, because the introductory passage here does not refer either to the Self or not-Self, and such an ordinary introductory passage is not contradicted by a special particular mention in the complementary portion, because, it is an ordinary statement (such as that of the mere word 'Sat') that creates curiosity about a special particular (entity). The meaning of the word 'Sat' (Being) cannot, if properly considered, be other than the principal Self, because, that all the entities other than this Self are unreal, is reasonably sustainable, as has been shown already by words such as 'Ārambhaṇa' (making current) etc..

Similarly, a difference in Scriptural statements by itself does not necessarily mean a difference in their meaning. It is to be seen that in sentences such as (आहर पात्रम्) 'Bring the pot' and ( पात्र आहर ) 'the pot, bring (it)', even though the meaning is the same, there is difference in the construction of the sentences. Therefore, it is thus established that in sentences of this kind, even in spite of the difference in the manner of propounding, there is non-difference in the entity propounded.—17.

*On account of there being merely a reference to an act of Āchamana (in the form*

*of an injunction which is not possible here)  
as something which is 'Apūrva' (i.e. some-  
thing which is not stated anywhere before),  
merely a resolution to provide a garment  
for Prāṇa is enjoined.—18.*

Both the Chhandogās as well as the Vājasaneyins recite in their 'Dialogue of the Prāṇa' that the food of all creatures right down to the dog etc., is the food of the Prāṇa, and they also mention that Āpa (water) is its garment (i.e. of the Prāṇa). After that the Chhandogās recite thus—"Verily therefore both before and after partaking of food, they wrap water round the Prāṇa as a garment" (Chhān. 5.2.2). Vājasaneyins, on the other hand, recite thus—"Brāhmaṇās learned in Vedās perform Āchamana (sipping water from the palm of the hand, three times, repeating salutations to Keshava, Nārāyaṇa and Mādhava) while (commencing the) partaking of food and also after the partaking of it, and they consider that they are thus covering the nakedness of Prāṇa" (Brih. 6.1.14), "Therefore, one who knows it (to be so) should perform Āchamana both while (commencing the) partaking of food and also afterwards, and should consider that he is thus covering the nakedness of Prāṇa". And, as thus both the Āchamana and the imagining of the covering of the nakedness are understood (in that passage), it is being considered, whether both these are enjoined here, or only one of the two, viz. either an Āchamana, or the imagining of the covering of the Prāṇa's nakedness (with the Āchamana water). What then is your (i.e. of the opponent of Vedānta) conclusion? (It is) that both are enjoined. Whence is it so? Because both are understood (here). Because, as both have not ever been stated before, and as both are thus (of the nature of) quite a new departure (Apūrva), both deserve to have been so enjoined. Or rather (I should think), it is only the Āchamana that is enjoined, because the injunctive case determination is clearly (to be seen) in its case, thus—"Therefore, one who knows it to be so, should perform Āchamana both while commencing and after the partaking of food, and this reference to the covering of nakedness (of Prāṇa) is merely for its glorification (i.e. of the Āchamana)". This being the conclusion (of the

opponent of Vedānta), we reply—That an Āchamana is enjoined here, is not reasonably sustainable, because there is here only a reference to an act of Āchamana as is already known before (from the Smritis). This Āchamana which is already established by the Smritis, as an act to be performed for the purpose of purification, is but merely referred to here. But (says the opponent of Vedānta).—This Scriptural passage may well be the source of that Smṛiti? (We reply)—No, because the subject matter (of both) is different. This Smṛiti which deals with only a common matter, makes us understand, that an Āchamana which is connected with every man, is for the purpose of purification. The Scriptural passage occurring in the Prāṇa-Vidyā, even if it at all enjoins an Āchamana, may at best do so only in connection with that subject (i.e. Prāṇa-Vidyā). We cannot imagine, that Scriptural and Smṛiti passages referring to different subjects, have a relation *inter se* i.e. between themselves, as that of a source, with something which has that as its source, respectively. It is not possible to accept that a Scriptural passage which has a connection with the Prāṇa-Vidyā would enjoin an Āchamana, as something which is (of the nature of) quite a new departure (an Apūrva) because, an already known Āchamana connected with every man, is well recognizable here. Hence there is no injunction as to both (i.e. the Āchamana and the use of water as a garment of Prāṇa), because assuming both these as being enjoined, there would occur (the fault of) the splitting up of a sentence. Therefore after referring to the Āchamana which has to be performed while partaking of food and afterwards also, as understood already (from the Smritis), the Scriptures, by the passage “They consider that they have thus covered the nakedness of the Prāṇa” (Bṛih. 6.1.14), enjoin a new fanciful conception about covering the nakedness of the Prāṇa, by means of the Āchamana water, in connection with the Prāṇa-Vidyā, as quite (in the nature of) a new departure (Apūrva). It would not be logical to understand this statement about covering the nakedness of Prāṇa, as being in glorification of the Āchamana, inasmuch as, while an Āchamana is *not* enjoined here, it is clearly discernible, that an injunction as to the fanciful conception of covering the nakedness of Prāṇa, is so enjoined. This

being so, the Āchamana cannot be understood to be meant both for the purpose of purification, as well as for serving as a garment (for the Prāṇa), as both are distinctly separate actions.

It is thus flawless, because, an Āchamana indeed is but one act, understood as meant for the purification of a man, while to imagine that water used for it serves as a garment in which the Prāṇa is to be clothed, is indeed an altogether different act. Besides, it would not be possible to say, that by the passage "All that is food (for creatures) right down to a horse, a worm, and insects and butterflies, is your food" (Brih. 6.1.14) an injunction is given that food of all sorts should be eaten, inasmuch as there is no Scriptural passage (to that effect), and also as it is not possible. But of course there is an injunction to look upon everything as the food of the Prāṇa, and along with it, in the passage "Āpa (water) is the garment", while no injunction to perform an Āchamana is given, it stands to reason, that it is enjoined, that the well-known Āchamana water should be looked upon as clothing (for the Prāṇa). One cannot possibly both eat the cake and have it too, i.e. literally, only a half of a murder is not possible (that is one cannot hold that the former sentence does not give an injunction, but the latter does). Besides as the present tense (Vartamānāpadesha) is used here, viz. "They perform an Āchamana", this Scriptural passage is not capable of expressing an injunction. But (says the opponent of Vedānta), the Scriptural words "They consider (that they have thus covered the nakedness of Prāṇa)" also indicate that there is the same present tense. (We reply)—What you say is right of course, but when one (of these two acts) has necessarily to be an object of an injunction, and as the 'act of clothing' is referred to, it has been propounded (by us) that the imagining of water as the garment (of Prāṇa), which is never mentioned anywhere before (being an Apūrva i.e. in the nature of quite a new departure), is here enjoined, and not an Āchamana, as it is the same as has been spoken of before. With regard to the statement made (by the opponent of Vedānta), that there is a clear imperative form with respect to an Āchamana, (we say) that it has been answered (by the argument) that the Āchamana is something which has already been referred to before (by

the Smritis). Hence it is, that, inasmuch as an Āchamana is not an act specially enjoined, the Kāṇvās conclude their recital with "They consider that the nakedness of Prāṇa is thus covered (by the Āchamana water serving as a garment)" only, and do not recite in addition—"Therefore one who knows it to be so etc.". Therefore even in the recension of the Mādhyandinās also, it should be understood, that after merely making a reference to Āchamana, what is enjoined, is the fanciful conception, that such Āchamana water serves the purpose of a garment for the Prāṇa, which is the relevant topic here. Nor is it proper to understand, that in one place the Āchamana is enjoined, and in the other, the fanciful conception that it (the Āchamana water) serves as a garment is enjoined, inasmuch as the trend of the statement that water serves as a garment, is in the same form everywhere, and therefore, it is logical, that there is an injunction, only as to the fanciful conception of (the Āchamana water) being the garment, and not about performing an Āchamana.—18.

#### 10. SAMĀNADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 19.

*Because of non-difference (in the object of meditation) there is the same (identity of Vidyās) even in the same (branch).—19.*

It is understood, that in the Agnirahasya chapter (esoteric teaching about Agni) in the Vājasaneyi branch, there is a Vidyā known by the name of Shāṇḍilya-Vidyā, wherein, the Scriptures speak about some minor things (Guṇās) thus—"He should meditate on the Self whose structure is the mind, whose body is the Prāṇa and who is of the nature of lustre" etc.. In the same branch, in Brihadāranyaka again it is thus recited—"That Purusha whose structure is the mind and whose nature is lustre, and who is seen to be like a grain of rice or of barley in (the Ākāsha of) the Hridaya—He is the ruler of all, the Lord of all and he who rules over whatsoever is (in this universe)" (Brih. 5.6.1). Now there arises a doubt about this—as to whether there is the same identical Vidyā both in the Agnirahasya and the Brihadāranyaka, and also a combination of the minor things (Guṇās), or whether, there are two Vidyās and

there is no combination of their minor things. What then is your conclusion ? (It is) that these Vidyās are different and the minor things of each are detailed for each separately. Whence is it so ? Because (otherwise) there would be the predicament of (the fault of) 'repetition'. Having observed, in the case of the Vidyās in different branches, that the fault of repetition is refuted on the ground of difference between the persons who learn or know these Vidyās, it has been stated, after understanding that the Dialogues of Prāṇas are identical, that surplus minor things in the Vidyā in one place, are to be combined with the minor things mentioned in the same Vidyā in another place where they i.e. such surplus minor things are absent. But in the case of Vidyās of one and the same branch, inasmuch as this fault of repetition is not capable of being refuted, because there is no possibility of difference between persons who either know or learn these Vidyās (as they belong to one and the same branch), the Vidyās in separate places (in one and the same branch) do not deserve to be identical. Nor can any such division as, that, one recital has the meaning of prescribing a Vidyā, and the other recital has the meaning of prescribing the minor things, is possible, as in that case only the mutually exclusive minor things of the Vidyā would have been mentioned in each and not those which are common (to both), but (it is seen that) such common minor things—as for instance (the minor thing) 'of having the mind as the structure'—are recited in both. Therefore (we conclude) that there is no reciprocal combination of their minor things. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply—Just as there can be identity (of Vidyās) and the combination of minor things, as regards the Vidyās in different branches, even so does it deserve to be, in the case of the Vidyās in one and the same branch also, because of the object of meditation being the same, and we can recognize the same identical Brahma, characterized by the attribute of having mind as its structure etc., as being the object of meditation in both. Besides, the object of meditation is precisely the nature of a Vidyā. We cannot understand that the Vidyās are different when there is non-difference in their nature, nor can the minor things of each be restricted to each separately, when there is non-difference in the Vidyās. But

(says the opponent of Vedānta) I have propounded that the Vidyās are different, as otherwise there would be the predicament of (the fault of) repetition. (We reply)—No, because it can be shown that it is reasonably sustainable that the purpose of each is separate. It is reasonably sustainable that one Scriptural statement has the meaning of prescribing the Vidyā, and the other of prescribing the minor things, (because it can be maintained at one and the same time, that there is a unity of Vidyās and there is also the absence of the fault of repetition). But (says the opponent of Vedānta) assuming it to be so, that alone which is not recited in the Agnirahasya, viz., that he is the ruler (Īshānah) of everything, should have been recited in the Brihadāraṇyaka, and what actually has been recited in the Agnirahasya, viz., that he has the structure of the mind etc., should not have been recited in the Brihadāraṇyaka. (We reply)—This is no fault, because it is precisely on the strength of such a recital, that the Vidyā recited in one place is recognised as being the same Vidyā in the other place. Having established the identity of the remotely situated Shāṇḍilya-Vidyā with the Vidyā in the Brihadāraṇyaka by means of the statement of common minor things, the instruction about the quality of rulership of the Lord (Īshānatva) etc., is understood herein also (i.e. in the Agnirahasya also). Otherwise, how could it be stated that that minor thing is enjoined in that Vidyā. Besides, when a sentence has attained a purpose as a result of instruction unavailable (Aprāpta) therein, and the portion available (Prāpta) therein can be understood to be reasonably sustainable, even as a reference to something which is already known (Nityānuvāda), it cannot be possible to neglect such recognition, on the strength of such a Nityānuvāda. Therefore, it is reasonably sustainable that even in one and the same branch, there can be identity of Vidyās and the combination of such minor things.—19.

#### 11. SAMBANDHĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 20-21.

*In other cases also, it is the same (i.e. there is combination), because of the connection (of the minor things with one and the same Vidyā).—20.*



In the Brihadāraṇyaka, beginning with "Truth (Satya) is Brahma" (Brih. 5.5.1), and then stating further—"What that truth (i.e. Brahma) is, that he this Sun (Āditya) is, viz., this Purusha that is in this sphere (of the Sun), and, this Purusha that is in the eye" (Brih. 5.5.2), and thereafter having given instruction about the Ādhidaivika (i.e. presided over by deities) and Ādhyātmika (i.e. with reference to the relation between the supreme spirit and the Jīva-Self) special abodes of the very same 'Satya' (i.e. Brahma), and having furnished a fanciful body (for the Purusha) in the form of some mystic words (Vyāhritis, which are imagined to be the limbs of such a body), instruction is given about two esoteric names (for the Purusha). The mystic name of the Ādhidaivika Purusha is 'Aha', and of the Ādhyātmika Purusha is 'Aham'. Now, with regard to this, a doubt arises, thus—Are the two mystic names to be used indiscriminately in the case of both, or whether they are to be used separately, one for the Ādhidaivika Purusha and the other for the Ādhyātmika Purusha? (The view of the opponent of Vedānta) is stated by the present Sūtra itself. Just as in the case of the Shāṇḍilya-Vidyās which are recited separately in different places, a combination of the minor things (of the Vidyās in both the places) is spoken of, so should it similarly be, in the case of the present nature, because they (the minor things) relate to one and the same Vidyā. It is but the same 'Satya-Vidyā' that is studied here, in its Ādhidaivika and Ādhyātmika Purusha aspects, because of the non-difference in the introductory portion, and the mutually connected recitals about the Ādhidaivika and the Ādhyātmika Purushas. How ever can a minor thing obtaining in one (Vidyā) not be available in the very same Vidyā (even though it happens to be mentioned in another place)? A particular code of conduct enjoined (on a student) with reference to the preceptor, is equally observable, whether the preceptor happens to be in a town or in a forest. Therefore both these mystic names become available in both these Vidyās.—20.

The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) being this, its refutation is as follows:—

*Or rather, both (the mystic names) are not (available in both the places) because of a peculiarity.—21.*

Or, rather, both (the mystic names) are not available in both the places. Whence is it so? Because of the mention of the peculiarity of their having a relation with two different places of meditations (Upāsānās). The meaning is that, because they are each firmly attached to a particular place of meditation. In what way is this attachment to a particular place only? It is replied—The Scriptures by referring to the Ādhidaivika Purusha, thus—“This Purusha who is in this sphere (of the Sun)” (Brih. 5.3.3), mention his mystic name as ‘Ahah’, and by referring to the Ādhyātmika Purusha, thus—“This Purusha who is in the right eye” (Brih. 5.5.4), mention its mystic name as ‘Aham’. Now this pronoun ‘his’ (Tasya) governs what is proximate to it, therefore, (it must be understood that) these two mystic names are taught as being dependent, each upon a particular abode only (i.e. the sun and the eye respectively). So, how can they then be available in both the places? But (says the opponent of Vedānta) in as much as two abodes of one and the same ‘Satya’ (i.e. Brahma) are mentioned here, these Ādhidaivika and Ādhyātmika Purushas are of course identical. (We reply) —What you say is of course true, but in as much as the instruction given about the mystic names is with reference to particular conditions (of Brahma), it deserves to have these mystic names understood to be applicable in these respective particular conditions only. There is of course this illustration, viz., that in spite of the preceptor *qua* the preceptor being of the same constant nature, the manner in which he is to be served by his students while he happens to be seated, differs from the manner of serving him when he is standing, and *vice versa*. The illustration given by the opponent, however, is not a proper illustration, because the nature of the preceptor is constant, both when he is in the town and in the forest, and there is no particular difference caused in the service of the preceptor whether he be in the town or in the forest. Therefore (the conclusion is that) the mystic names are restricted, each to its own proper place.—21.

*The Scriptures also say so, by the indicatory mark viz. an extended application (Atidesha).—22.*

Besides there is an indicatory mark (for holding) that the attributes of such a nature i.e. which are connected with a particular condition, are restricted, each to its proper place, thus—"The form (of him) here, is the same as there, those which are hoofs (or joints) here, are the hoofs (or joints) there, the name here, the name there" (Chhān. 1.7.5). But (says the opponent of Vedānta) how does it become an indicatory mark? The reply is—Seeing that the attributes have become different because of the different places such as the Sun and the eye, and which therefore cannot be combined, the Scriptures have applied the attributes of the Purusha in the Sun, to the Purusha in the eye, by an extended application (Atidesha), thus—"Of him there, is the same form (as here)" (Chhān. 1.7.5). Therefore, the conclusion is that these mystic names are restricted, each to its proper place.—22.

## 12. SAMBHRITYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 23.

*Also (minor things such as) the wielding of exalted powers, and pervading the heaven, (about the Vibhūtis i.e. exhalted manifestations of Brahma) are not combined, because of the same reason.—23.*

In the Khila chapters (i.e. chapters which do not contain injunctions or prohibitions of any sort) of the followers of the Rāṇāyaniya branch (of the Sāma-Veda), exalted aspects of Brahma such as 'the wielding of superhuman powers' and 'pervading the heaven', are recited thus—"Brahma has assumed great exalted powers (such as for instance the power to create the Ākāsha etc.), and that in the beginning, the Highest Brahma stretched itself all over the heaven", and in their Upanishad also, Brahma-Vidyās such as the Shāṇḍidya-Vidyā, etc. are recited. So, when there is a doubt as to whether or not, in these Brahma-Vidyās, these exalted superhuman aspects of power are to be combined, and when the conclusion (of the opponent

of Vedānta) is that on account of their being related to Brahma, they are to be combined, the Āchārya replies—Superhuman exalted aspects such as ‘the wielding of exalted powers’ and ‘pervading of the heaven’, should not be combined with the Shāṇḍilya-Vidyā, precisely because of the same reason, viz. that they are related to a special abode. For even so, in the Shāṇḍilya-Vidyā, it is mentioned that Brahma has the Hridaya as its abode, thus—“This my Self is in the Hridaya” (Chhān. 3.14.3). Similarly also, in the Dahara-Vidyā, thus—“There is a small lotus-like palace, and in it there is the small Ākāsha” (Chhān. 8.1.1). In the Upakosala-Vidyā it is mentioned that the eye is the abode of Brahma, thus—“This Purusha that is seen to be in the eye” (Chhān. 4.15.1). It is thus understood, that there is in each of these Vidyās an Ādhyātmika abode (of Brahma), viz. a body. How can then the exalted aspects of Brahma of the Ādhidaivika nature be available in these Vidyās? But (says the opponent of Vedānta) even in them the Scriptures speak of Ādhidaivika exalted aspects of Brahma, thus—“Greater than the heaven, and greater than these worlds” (Chhān. 3.14.3), “He verily is Bhāmanī (the bringer of light) and shines in all the worlds” (Chhān. 4.15.4), “As is the extent of this Ākāsha, even so is the extent of this Ākāsha in the Hridaya, both the heaven and the earth are accommodated in it” (Chhān. 8.3.1)” etc.. There also are other Brahma-Vidyās not containing any special abodes, such as “(Brahma) having sixteen parts”. (We reply)—What you say is true of course, but there is a special peculiarity which furnishes the reason why minor things, such as ‘the wielding of superhuman exalted powers’, are not to be combined. It is logical, in the case of Vidyās in places separated from each other but recognized as identical, because of the mention of common minor things, that qualities mentioned in places separated from each other should be combined. But minor things such as ‘the welding of exalted powers’ and minor things such as ‘having mind as its structure’ etc., mentioned in Shāṇḍilya-Vidyā sentences, being mutually incompatible in their nature, are not capable of establishing identity of Vidyās occurring in places separated from them. It cannot be merely on account of such minor things being related to Brahma, that recognition of the identity of Vidyās with Vidyās in places

separated from them, can be established, because such recognition is possible, even where there actually is a difference in the Vidyās. It is a settled conclusion, that though Brahma is one only, it is meditated upon in many ways, because of difference in the exalted aspects of Brahma, like the difference observed in the case of 'greater than the great' etc. (in Sūtra 7, *supra*, even though the Udgītha everywhere is but one only). Therefore attributes such as 'powers of an exalted nature' cannot be combined with the Shāṇḍilya-Vidyā etc.—23.

### 13. PURUSHĀDYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 24.

*Because there is no Scriptural statement in the other Vidyās (such as in the Taittirīyaka Purusha-Vidyā) (of observances) as in the Purusha-Vidyā (of Chhāndogya) (there is no combination of the observances).—24.*

A Vidyā called Purusha-Vidyā is mentioned in the Rahasya-Brāhmaṇa (Chhāndogya) of the Tāṇḍis and Paingīs (who both are Sāma-Vedīs). There the Purusha (man) is notionally conceived to be (of the nature of) a sacrifice. Dividing a man's span of life (of 116 years) into three periods (of 24, 44 and 48), they are conceived to be the three Savanās\* (Ritualistic actions of purificatory bathing), hunger etc. are conceived to be the 'Dīksha' (initiation) etc.. Some other Dharmās (observances) such as the invocation of blessings and the incantation of Mantrās, are also understood to have been mentioned therein. The Taittirīyakās also imagine a Purusha-Sacrifice in one Anuvāka, thus—"Of the Sacrifice of him who knows it to be so, the Self is the Yajamāna (Sacrificing host), faith (Shraddhā) is his consort etc." (Tait. Āra. 10.64, Nārā. 30). Now with regard to this, there is a doubt, viz., whether the Dharmās of the Purusha-Sacrifice spoken of elsewhere, are or are not to be combined with the Dharmās

\* There are three Savanās (Karmās) in a sacrifice. In the morning Savana, Riks of Gāyatrī metre (of 24 letters), are recited. In the noon Savana, Riks of Trishṭup metre (of 44 letters) are recited, and in the evening Savana, Riks of Jagatī metre (of 48 letters) are recited.

of the Taittirīyakās. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) being, that as there is the common feature viz. the Purusha-Sacrifice (in both), there should be a combination of the Dharmās of the other Purusha-Sacrifice, with the Dharmās of the Taittirīyaka Purusha-Sacrifice, (we reply)—They should not be so combined. Why so? Because there is absence of recognition of the form (of the Purusha-Sacrifice of the Chhândogya), in the Taittirīyaka. The same is expressed by the Āchārya—"As is the Scriptural statement in Purusha-Vidyā (of the followers of one branch viz. the Tāṇḍīs and Paingīs), so it is not, in the case of others i.e. the Taittirīyakās". In their case (i.e. in the case of the Taittirīyakās) the fanciful conception of the sacrifice is different from that of the others (viz. the Tāṇḍīs and the Paingīs) by reason of the mention of a different series, thus—the wife (of the sacrificing host) (Shraddhā), the sacrificing host (Yajamāna), the Veda, the altar (Vedī), the bundle of sacrificial grass (Barhi), the sacrificial post (Yūpa), the ghee (Ājya), the animal to be sacrificed (Pashu), the officiating priest (Ritviḥ), etc., which is not mentioned in the Chhândogya. The fanciful conception of the Savana (ritualistic action of purificatory bathings) also, is different there, from that of the other (i.e. the Chhândogya), viz., "The morning, noon and evening (Karmās i.e. bathings)" (Nārā. 80). The little similarity in both—such as Death which is the 'Avabhritha' (the final bath at the conclusion of a sacrifice) being fancifully imagined as Death—being a very small one, it is discounted by the substantial volume of differences, and it is unable to establish such recognition. Besides in the Taittirīyaka, the Scriptures do not speak of the Purusha (the man) himself as the sacrifice (as in the Chhândogya). The genitive cases in "Of the Sacrifice of one, who knows" are not Samānādhikaraṇa (i.e. coordinate) genitives and do not mean 'the knower who himself is the sacrifice'. A Purusha (man) cannot possibly be the sacrifice in the principal sense of the term. They are Vyādhikaraṇa i.e. (non-coordinate) genitives, meaning thus—'Of the sacrifice performed by one, who knows thus'. A Purusha of course has a direct connection with a sacrifice, in the principal sense. As far as is feasible, the principal meaning should be understood and not the secondary meaning. The sentence

“The Self (the sentient Purusha) who is the sacrificing host”, which speaks of the host-ship of the Purusha itself, indicates his connection with the sacrifice, in a non-coordinating genitive significance.

Moreover, “(Of the sacrifice) of one who knows it to be so” being only a reference to a sacrifice, a thing already established, if any one would understand the Purusha (man) himself to be the sacrifice and the Self as the sacrificing host, there would be a split of the sentence (by his doing so i.e. one sentence would have a double meaning). Besides (the Scriptures) having first taught the Vidyā of the Self along with Sanyāsa (the renunciation of the world, the 4th Āshrama), when we see the mention of “Of him who knows it to be so” as a chapter following it in a regular sequence, we understand it to be merely a passage complementary of the earlier statement, and not as an independent Scriptural statement. Similarly, we understand that there is but only one fruit of both the Anuvākās, viz., “He acquires the greatness of Brahma” (Nārā. 80). In the case of the Scriptural statements about the Purusha-Vidyā of others (i.e. of the Chhandogās), there are no such passages complementary of any earlier passages. And they have as their fruit, an increase in the span of life, mentioned thus—“He who knows it to be so, lives for a hundred and sixteen years”. Therefore Dharmās such as these blessings and Mantrās etc., taught in other branches, are not available in the Taittirīyaka.—24.

#### 14. VEDHĀDYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 25.

*Because, Mantrās such as ‘wounding etc.’ have a different meaning (they have no connection with the Vidyās).—25.*

In the Scriptures, there is a mention of a Mantra (incantation) in the beginning of the Upanishads of the Ātharvanikās, as follows:—“Having wounded (the body of my enemy) all over, having wounded the Hridaya, and the blood-vessels, and the head, may he (my enemy) be also drawn and quartered in three ways”. In that of the Tāṇḍis (there is a Mantra) thus—“O Lord the Sun, may you bring forth a sacrifice” (i.e. cause me to make a sacrifice). In

that of the Shāṭyāyanins again, thus—“(Oh Indra), white is thy steed and verdent green and dark blue art thou”. And again in that of the Kāṭhās and the Taittirīyas, thus—“May the Sun be propitious to us, and also Varuṇa” (Tait. 1.1.1). But in the Upanishad of the Vājasaneyins a Pravargya-Brāhmaṇa (i.e. one in which Pravargya, a particular Karma in a sacrifice is considered) is recited, thus—“The Gods verily sat down to (perform) a Satra (a sacrifice)”. And in that of the Kaushītakins also, there is an Agnishtōma-Brāhmaṇa passage—“Brahma, indeed, is Agnishtōma, Brahma itself is that day (of the Sacrifice), they attain Brahma through Brahma, those who perform the sacrifice on that day attain immortality”. It is now being considered whether all such Mantrās as “wounding etc.” and actions such as Pravargya etc., are or are not to be combined with the Vidyās. How then does it strike us? (The opponent of Vedānta says)—(We think) that they should be combined with the Vidyās. Whence is it so? Because they are recited in proximity to the Upanishads which mainly deal with Vidyās. But (says the Vedāntin) we do not find any injunction as to their use in the Vidyās. (The opponent of Vedānta says)—It is right, but even though we do not find it to be so, we would infer to that effect, on the strength of their proximity (to the Vidyās). When proximity is thus suggestive of a purpose, it would not be logical to reject it capriciously. But (says the Vedāntin) we do not see that the Mantrās have any the least force with respect to the Vidyās. How ever can we understand, that actions such as Pravargya etc. employed only for some other purpose, have any application to Vidyās? (The opponent of Vedānta replies)—This is no fault, because, inasmuch as Hridaya etc. are mentioned therein, it is possible to imagine, that they do have some force in regard to the Vidyās. Hridaya etc. are often taught as serving as abodes etc. in meditations, and that way, it would be reasonably sustainable, that Mantrās such as ‘Having wounded the Hridaya’ may serve as matters subsidiary to meditations, for we do see such Mantrās used even in meditation, thus—“I will attain the earth by this, by this, by this” (Chhān. 3.15.3). Similarly actions such as ‘Pravargya’ etc., employed as they are elsewhere, can without impropriety, be employed in Vidyās, even as the ‘Brihaspati-Sava’ (a sacrifice to



be performed by one who wishes to be a teacher), though employed elsewhere, is employed in the Vājapeya sacrifice also. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply—There is no combination of these (Mantrās) in the Vidyās. Whence is it so? Because of ‘wounding etc.’ being different things. The things mentioned in the Mantrās “Having wounded the Hridaya” etc., viz., the wounding of Hridaya etc., are different and are entirely unconnected with the Vidyās as known in the Upanishads, and so they have no power to connect themselves with the Vidyās. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) we have already propounded that as the word ‘the Hridaya’ has been employed in meditation also, they do have, in that way, a connection with a meditation. (We reply)—No, we could, provided the word Hridaya alone were to be mentioned (in the Mantra), somehow construe that it would be so, but this Mantra does not mean a Hridaya only. The whole meaning of the Mantra, viz. “Having wounded the Hridaya, having wounded the blood-vessels”, does not have any connection with the Vidyās. Its meaning has a relation with the subject of magic spells (Abhichārika-vishayah), therefore, the Mantra “Having wounded (the body) all over etc.” has a connection with some act relating to some sort of magical spells for malevolent purposes. Similarly the Mantra “O Lord the Sun, may you bring forth a sacrifice” has a connection with some sacrificial act, because of the indicatory mark, viz. the bringing forth of a sacrifice. What particular connection it has, has to be determined by some other means-of-proof. Similarly, in the case of other Mantrās also, even though they happen to be recited in the Rahasya portion, they have to be construed as having a relation with, and being employed for, some other purpose, on the strength of some indicatory mark, or some other authority or some other means-of-proof, and cannot be understood as being complementary to a Vidyā, merely on the ground of proximity. It has already been stated in the first Tantra (i.e. Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) that mere proximity (Sannidhi) is a weaker means-of-proof as compared with a Scriptural passage, by the Sūtra—“When there is a conflict (between the Scriptures) as between the Scriptural word, the indicatory mark, the sentence, the chapter, the place and the name, every succeeding member (in this series of

Pramāṇās) is weaker than the one which comes earlier" (Jai. Sū. 3.3.13). Similarly, that, actions such as 'Pravargya' etc. which are employed elsewhere, can be complementary to Vidyās, is not reasonably sustainable. There is nothing in common between these (actions) and the Vidyās. So far as the Brihaspati-Sava is concerned, it is clearly enjoined in addition to Vājapeya sacrifice, thus—"Having performed the Vājapeya Sacrifice, he should perform the Brihaspati-sava". Besides, this single Pravargya, enjoined but once only, and employed in one place, on a stronger means-of-proof (Pramāṇa) does not deserve to be employed elsewhere also, on the strength of a weaker means-of-proof. It would be so possible, only if no special distinction as between means-of-proof can be observed, but it is not possible not to understand the particular distinction between a strong and a weak means-of-proof, because, that one (of the two) is stronger or weaker than the other, is itself the special distinction between them. Therefore, Mantrās or actions of these sorts should never be understood to be complementary to a Vidyā, merely because they are recited in proximity (to the Vidyā). One should satisfy oneself, that they are recited in proximity with each other, because, that both should be employed while in a forest, is an observance (Dharma) common to them both.—25.

#### 15. HĀNYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 26

*But, where the 'discarding' (of good and evil deeds is mentioned) 'receiving' of them by others has to be understood), because 'receiving' is complementary to the Scriptural word (discarding), as (for instance) in the case of Kushās, metres, glorification and the chanting (of Mantrās). That has been stated (by Jaimini in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā).—26.*

There is a Scriptural passage of the Tāṇḍins, thus—"Having shaken off demerit even as a horse shakes off his hair, being freed (from ignorance) even as the moon escapes from the mouth of Rāhu, and having shaken off the body, I, i.e. the Self, that have fulfilled everything that

has to be done (Kritātmā), attain the eternal (Akrita) Brahma-world" (Chhān. 8.13.1). Similarly in the Scriptural passage of the Ātharvaṇikās—"Similarly the knowing one, freed from (the limiting adjuncts of) names and forms, attains the transcendent and heavenly Purusha" (Muṇḍ. 3.2.8). Similarly the Shātyāyanins recite—"His sons receive his property, his friends his good deeds, and his foes his evil deeds". Similarly the Kaushitakins—"He shakes off his good and evil deeds, his beloved caste-people receive his good deeds, and those who are disliked by him, receive his evil deeds" (Kaush. 1.4).

Thus, in one place the Scriptures speak about the discarding of good and evil deeds, in some other place they speak of the 'receiving' of them in parts by people who are dear to him and by those who are not so dear, while in still some other Scriptural passage, they speak of both the discarding and the receiving, and thus, when both these (i.e. discarding and receiving) are spoken of, there is nothing further to be said about it. Where again only the receiving is spoken of but not the discarding, such 'discarding' of course is necessarily implied, inasmuch as when one's good and evil deeds are received by another, their discarding (by that one) is of course necessary (by implication). Where, however, the Scriptures speak of 'discarding' only and not of 'receiving', and when it is considered as to whether (in such a case) the 'receiving' necessarily takes place or not, (the opponent of Vedānta) concludes—'receiving' does not take place, as it is not stated by the Scriptures, and also because, when the Scriptures declare so in another branch, it has reference to another Vidyā (of qualified Brahma viz. of Saṁyā-Brahma-Vidyā). Besides, the 'discarding' of good and evil deeds is made by one person himself, while the 'receiving' is done by another, and when a connection between such 'discarding' (by one) and 'receiving' (by another) is not necessarily inevitable, why should 'discarding' necessarily imply the 'receiving' also? Therefore, 'receiving' does not take place wherever 'discarding' only is present.

That being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), it is recited "even when discarding (alone is mentioned, receiving has to be understood)". Even when the Scriptures speak only of 'discarding', 'receiving' also deserves to be

implied, because, it is complementary to 'discarding', and in the Kaushitaki-Rahasya, the word 'receiving' is understood to be complementary to the word 'discarding'. Therefore, in other places also, even when the Scriptures speak merely of 'discarding', the word 'receiving' necessarily follows (after it). With regard to the argument (of the opponent of Vedānta) that inasmuch as the Scriptures are silent about it, and as that (i.e. receiving) is observed in some other Vidyās, and (as between discarding and receiving) there is no necessarily inevitable relation, it is not necessarily implied: it is replied—This sort of restricting a thing only to the place wherein it is detailed (i.e. that it thus has its Vyavasthā) would be justified, where, anything which has to be done (i.e. some action), is mentioned in one place (in the Scriptures) and it is sought to be carried over (i.e. made applicable) in some other place, but here, neither the 'discarding' nor the 'receiving' is mentioned as something to be performed (as an act), but they are mentioned only in glorification of the Vidyā. Such indeed (it is meant) is the blessedness of Vidyā, that it is through its power, that such wise-man's good or evil deeds, which constitute the cause of his transmigratory existence (as a man, living in this world), are shaken off and they then enter into his friends and foes respectively. The recital being thus, for glorification, and as 'receiving' takes place only after 'discarding', it is considered that wherever there is a mention of 'discarding' only in the Scriptures, 'receiving' inevitably follows in its wake, and thus the best glorification of Vidyā is secured. It is well-known that depending on one explanatory passage (Arthavāda) another explanatory passage is brought into operation, as for instance in the case of the passage—"Beginning with this (world), the Sun (Āditya-Loka) is the twenty-first" (Chhān. 2.10.5) etc.. How ever can we speak of the Sun (Aditya-Loka) as being the twenty-first here, except only by the application of another explanatory passage as follows—"There are twelve months, five seasons, three worlds, and the Sun which is the twenty-first" (Chhān. 2.10.5) ? Similarly, in the passage, viz. "The two 'Trishtubha' metres are for the purpose of equipment with the sense-organs", the necessity of another explanatory passage, viz. "Trishtubha verily is the sense-organ", is evident. The question about 'receiving'

being thus merely for the glorification of Vidyā, the doubt as to how the good and bad deeds of one (man) can possibly be received by another, may not be needlessly emphasized and elaborated upon. The reference (by the Sūtrakāra) to the word 'word' (Shabda) in the Sūtra "The 'receiving' is complementary to the Scriptural word (discarding)", suggests that the word 'receiving' which necessarily follows the word 'discarding' should be understood to be just for the glorification (of the Vidyā). Had the Sūtrakāra intended to state that there should be a combination of subsidiary matters, he would have merely spoken of 'a thing to be received' as a thing to be taken for granted after 'the thing to be discarded' is discarded. This Sūtra is meant for demonstrating the combination of glorifications only incidentally to his desire to consider the combination of attributes. The sentence "Like Kushās (small wooden sticks for counting the number of hymns sung by the Udgātri), metres, glorification, and chanting (of the words in the hymns)" is by way of employing a simile. When in the Mantra of the Bhāllavīs, viz. "Oh Kushās, you are fashioned from trees, do you protect me", the Scriptures (only in a general way) mention that Kushās are fashioned out of trees, and as there is a special mention by the Shāṭyayanins, that they are made of an Udumbara tree, we know that they are so made from Udumbara wood. Or when, in the absence of any special rule, the predicament is as to which metres as between God's metres and Asurā's metres\* are recited first and which (are recited) afterwards, it is understood from the Scriptural statement of the Paingīs, viz. "God's metres come first", that God's metres have such precedence. Again when in the absence of any special direction in the case of some (followers of some branch) the question arises as to when the Shoḍashi-stotra (Panegyric on the Shoḍashi cup used in sacrifices for drinking Soma) should be sung, it is from the Scriptural statement in the Rig-Veda, viz. "About the time of Sun-rise", that the particular time (for such singing) is determined. Or just as when some (Scriptural statements) speak of the chanting (of hymns) in a general way, thus—"the Ritvijās sing", while the Bhāllavins recite a special particular (viz. that

\* Metres of Asurās alone consist of nine words to a quarter i.e. Pāda of the metre and all other metres are God's metres.

the Adhvaryus do not sing), it is that (i.e. the special recital of the Bhāllavins) that determines, as to who amongst the sacrificial priests are to sing and who are not. The meaning is, that just as in the case of Kushās etc., they have a connection with a special particular in another Scriptural statement, similarly 'discarding' also has a connection with 'receiving', and if one were not to accept the special rule in a particular Scriptural statement, as being applicable in the case of another Scriptural statement, an 'option' would occur everywhere. But wherever it is possible (to determine a thing positively), it is not logical to have recourse to an 'option'. All this has already been explained in the Dvādashalakṣaṇī (of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā 10.8.15), thus—"Api tu Vākyasheshatvāditaraparyudāsah syat pratishedhe vikalpah syāt". Or else, these Scriptural statements about this 'shaking off (by a person who has attained knowledge)' by this Sūtra, should be construed in the following way. (The question is) whether this statement about 'shaking off' purports to speak about the 'shaking off' i.e. discarding of the good or evil (deeds), or whether it purports to speak of some other thing. With regard to this, it can be stated (as on behalf of the opponent of Vedānta) thus—'Discarding' cannot mean 'Shaking off', because according to Smṛiti, the root 'Dhu' ( धु ) means 'fluttering', as is seen from the use of the verb, in the case of the movement of the tips of a flag in the wind, in the passage "The tips of the flag are fluttering". Thereafter, having stated (the further argument of the opponent of Vedānta), viz. that the shaking off of the good and evil deeds is caused by the obstruction to their fruition for some time, it should be refuted (by the Vedāntin) as follows: The word fluttering should be understood to be synonymous with the word 'discarding', because the word 'receiving' is complementary to it. The 'receiving', of good or evil deeds which belong to one but are not discarded by him, by another, is not possible. And even if the 'receiving' of the good or evil deeds of one by another is not properly possible, yet because it has been so stated (by the Scriptures) and also with a view to the following of that meaning, it is possible to determine, that discarding indeed is but 'fluttering' only. Now the Scriptural statement about 'receiving' in proximity to 'shaking off' occurs in a particular place only (viz. the Kaushītaki

Upanishad), still—as in the case of Kushās, metres, glorification, and chanting—its application is induced in the other cases, on account of the Scriptural statement about ‘shaking off’, and it furnishes itself as a criterion for determining (the meaning). Because, the fluttering of good or evil deeds in the principal sense of the term—like the fluttering of the tips of a flag—is not possible, inasmuch as it is not a material substance (Dravya). The horse, while he throws off the dust as he shakes his hair, drops his hair also (along with the dust) and the Scriptural Brāhmaṇa passage is—“Having shaken off demerit, even as a horse shakes off his hair”. As verbs often have many meanings, no contradiction with the Smṛiti (Smarañavirodhah) is involved. The passage “This has been stated” (in the Sūtra) has already been explained.—26.

16. SĀMPARĀYĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 27-28.

*It is just (about the time of attaining the future life i.e. just about the time of death) at the time of going out of the body (that a man discards his good or bad deeds) because there is nothing (for him) either to attain or to overcome (on the way). Others (i.e. other texts) also (say) the same.—27.*

The Kaushītakins, in the Paryanka-Vidyā (the Lore of the Couch), speak about the separation between a man and his good or evil deeds, when he is midway to Brahma seated on the couch, beginning with “Having arrived at the Devayāna path he reaches the Agni-world” (Kaush. 1.3), and then declaring—“He reaches the river Virajā which he crosses by only his mind, shakes off his good and evil deeds” (Kaush. 1.4). Now when the question is, whether as stated in the Scriptures this separation (between himself and his deeds) should, as stated by the Scriptures, be understood as taking place during the journey, or at the time of going away from the body, and the conclusion of the opponent of Vedānta being, that as the Scriptures are authoritative, it is necessary to understand it as taking place according to the Scriptural statement, (the Sūtrakāra)

says—"At the time of going out of the body (i.e. while dying)". It is understood that it is while attaining the future life, i.e. while departing from or leaving the body, that, as a result of the power of knowledge, this discarding of good or evil deeds takes place. He states the cause as well, viz. that because there is nothing to be attained or overcome (by such person, on the way). The wise man who has started upon giving up his body i.e. who is dying and attaining Brahma as a result of his knowledge, has nothing to gain either from his good or evil deeds, in between, so that it should have to be imagined that they (i.e. good or bad deeds) subsist undestroyed for some moments (after death supervenes). Besides, inasmuch as good or evil deeds have a fruit which is antagonistic to (the fruit of) Vidyā, and their destruction takes place through the power of Vidyā, it deserves to occur just when the Vidyā is about to fructify. Therefore, (it must be understood) that even though this destruction of good or evil deeds occurs earlier, it is only stated (here) later on. Even so, do the followers of other branches, such as the Tāṇḍins and Shāṭyāyanins, speak about this discarding of good or evil deeds during an earlier stage, thus—"Having shaken off demerit even as a horse shakes off his hair" (Chhān. 8.13.1) and "His sons receive his property, his friends his good deeds, his foes his evil deeds".—27.

*(As the cause of the destruction of good and evil deeds, is the attempt which a person makes by properly controlled effort, according to rules) and as such an attempt according to his own desire is not possible, (while on the way, therefore, that such destruction takes place just about the time of death, is reasonably sustainable), because considered either way, there is no contradiction.—28.*

If it be understood in the case of one who has gone out of the body and has started on the Devayāna path, that the destruction of the good and evil deeds takes place midway, then the making of a wilful effort, of the nature of self-restraint, regulated conduct and the pursuit of knowledge by a man, not being reasonably sustainable while on



the way, after the body has fallen (i.e. after the Self has gone out of it), such destruction of the good and evil deeds, of which such wilful effort is the cause, midway, would not be reasonably sustainable. Now, as a man's making such wilful effort is possible only earlier, while he is living and while he is in the stage of an aspirant, and as this discarding of the good and evil deeds, depends upon such previous wilful effort, it should be understood that such discarding of good and evil deeds due to such wilful effort is necessarily before death. It is only thus that the relation of the cause (i.e. wilful effort) and its effect (i.e. destruction), and the reconciliation of the Scriptural passages of the Tāṇḍins and the Shātyāyanins, become reasonably sustainable.—28.

17. GATERARTHAVATTVĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 29-30.

*Transition or evolving (Gati) must be understood to have a meaning in two ways (i.e. it must be interpreted in two ways), otherwise a contradiction (would take place).—29.*

The Scriptures, in some places (where they refer to the Vidyā of qualified Brahma) mention the Devayāna path, in proximity to the discarding of merit and demerit, and do not do so in others (where the Vidyās of unqualified Brahma are mentioned). So a doubt here arises as to whether, the Devayāna path becomes available regularly after the discarding of merit and demerit, or whether it becomes available in parts (Vibhāgena) i.e. becomes available in some cases and does not become available in other cases. The conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta) being, that just as the Scriptures speak of 'receiving' as following regularly after 'discarding' (of the good and evil deeds), even so, the Devayāna Path also, deserves to be available (after such discarding), regularly, (we reply)—the availability of the use of the Devayāna Path deserves to be considered in two ways, i.e. in some cases it is available, and in some other cases it is not, and it does not follow regularly, because, if it were to be accepted as being regularly available, a contradiction would take place. In Scriptural statements, such as "Having dis-

carded merit and demerit, (the Self) uncontaminated by any impurity, attains likeness i.e. unity with the transcendent (Brahma)" (Muṇḍ. 3.1.3), any transition or evolution which requires one to arrive at one place from another (i.e. implies movement), would be contradictory. How can any one who is uncontaminated by any impurity (Niranjanah), and who does not go anywhere (Agantā), be understood to go from one place to another? The likeness i.e. highest unity with the transcendent (Brahma) is what is to be attained, and it does not depend upon starting (from one place) and reaching any other place, and therefore, we are of opinion, that under such circumstances a journey (along the Devayāna Path) is meaningfully.

*This availability (of the twofold division into justification for or against a journey along the Devayāna Path) is reasonably sustainable, because things which constitute the cause of such journey along such a path, are discernible. It is similar to what is experienced in the ordinary world.—30.*

This possibility either way, viz. that this journey along the Devayāna Path has meaning i.e. justification in one way and not so in another, is reasonably sustainable, because, things which constitute the cause of such a journey, are to be seen. That such a journey has meaning i.e. justification, is discernible in the case of meditations on qualified Brahma as in the Paryanka-Vidyā, wherein 'ascending the couch, having conversation with Brahma which is seated on the couch, and the experiencing of particular special smells etc., which depend upon (the Jiva-Self) arriving at a different place' are mentioned in the Scriptures. Experience of any such nature, however, is absent in the case of perfect knowledge. In the case of those, who have understood that there is perfect unity of the Jiva-Self (with Brahma) and who have had all their desires already fulfilled, and the seeds of whose sufferings have all been completely burnt out here in this world, and who do not have to expect anything else but the destruction of the whole quantum of actions, the experiencing of the fruits of which has already started, such journey or movement (along

the Devayāna Path) is meaningless. A division in this manner (into the justification or otherwise for a journey) is just similar to what is seen in the ordinary world. Just as in the ordinary world, a road which takes you from one place to another, is necessary for reaching another city, but it is not necessary in the case of the attainment of good health, even so it is, in this case. We will again propound the subject of the division (of the justification or otherwise for a journey along the Devayāna Path) with greater clarity in the fourth Adhyāya.—30.

18. ANIYAMĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 31.

*There is absence of any rule (restricting the journey along the Devayāna Path, only to those Vidyās in which it is mentioned), and it is available in all Vidyās (about qualified Brahma). No contradiction is involved according to the Scriptures and Smritis.—31.*

That a journey along the Devayāna Path is appropriate in Vidyās dealing with qualified Brahma but not in Vidyās dealing with the unqualified Highest Self, has been stated already. But even in the case of Vidyās dealing with qualified Brahma, the Scriptures refer to such journey (along the Devayāna Path) in some Vidyās only, such as the Paryanka-Vidyā, the Upakosala-Vidyā, the Panchāgni-Vidyā and the Dahara-Vidyā, but not in others, such as the Madhu-Vidyā, the Shāṇḍilya-Vidyā, the Shoḍashakala-Vidyā and the Vaishvānara-Vidyā. Now, with regard to this, a doubt arises, whether this journey (along the Devayāna Path) is restricted to only those Vidyās in which it is mentioned by the Scriptures, or whether, it relates to all the Vidyās of such kind, irrespective of any such restrictive rule. What then is the conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta) ? It is, that such journey (along the Devayāna Path) as a rule occurs only where it is mentioned, because, the chapter (dealing with that subject) regulates it. If such journey (along the Devayāna Path) mentioned by the Scriptures in one Vidyā were to be extended to any other Vidyā, the authoritativeness of the Scriptures would

thus be stultified, because, in that case, there would be the predicament, that everything would mean everything else (sarvasya sarvārthatvāt). Besides, the journey along “the light (Jyoti) etc.” of the Devayāna Path, which is mentioned by the Scriptures in the Upakosala-Vidyā is also mentioned in the Panchāgni-Vidyā, and such repetition (of the mention of a journey along the Devayāna Path in the Panchāgni-Vidyā) would be meaningless if such journey were to be applicable to all Vidyās. Therefore, such journey is restricted (to those Vidyās only where it is specifically mentioned). This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), the Sūtrakāra says :—The journey (along the Devayāna Path) is not so restricted. This journey deserves to be applicable to all Vidyās dealing with qualified Brahma, which have the attainment of the world of Brahma (Brahma-Loka) as their fruit. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) it has been stated (by me), that if it were to be understood, that there is no such restrictive rule, it would contradict the chapter (dealing with these Vidyās). (We reply)—The meaning is, that there is no such contradiction, because of the word and the inference, i.e. the Scriptures and the Smritis. The Scriptures do declare as much. It is understood from the Scriptural passage “Those who know it to be so” (Chhān. 5.10.1), which leads those who study the Panchāgni-Vidyā to the Devayāna Path, and also leads those who study other Vidyās (in which such Devayāna Path is not mentioned) such as “Those who meditate (on Brahma) with faith and austerities” (Kāṭha. 5.10.1), to a path similar to the path of those who study the Panchāgni-Vidyā. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) how is it known that those who study such other Vidyās also journey along the Devayāna Path? Inasmuch as faith and austerity alone are mentioned here, it must be understood that it is **only** those who meditate on Brahma with faith and austerity who have this path laid down for them. (We reply)—This is no fault. Those who meditate on Brahma with faith and austerity alone, do not obtain this journey along the Devayāna Path, without the help of knowledge, because another Scriptural passage says—“It is through knowledge, that they ascend to that (place) from where all desires have turned back, the Dakṣiṇās (those skilled in Vedic rituals only) do not go that way, nor even those who practise

austerities but who are ignorant. Meditation on Brahma with faith and austerities here, means the other Vidyās (wherein such journey is not mentioned). The Vājasaneyins moreover recite in the Panchāgni-Vidyā Chapter, thus—“Those who know it to be so and those who meditate on Brahma i.e. Satya (the Truth) with faith” (Brih. 6.2.15), which should be explained, as meaning those, who full of faith meditate on Satya i.e. Brahma, because the word Satya is often used as meaning Brahma. As, by “Those who know it to be so”, only those who know the Panchāgni-Vidyā are understood, therefore, it is logical that by “Those who in the forest etc.” those who know the other Vidyās should be understood. Now, the Scriptural passage “Now, those who do not know these two Paths (i.e. Devayāna and Pitriyāna) become worms, butterflies and snakes etc.” (Brih. 6.2.16), which intimates (to us) the miserable fall of those who miss these two Paths, informs (us) thereby, that those (who study the Vidyās in which this Devayāna Path is either mentioned or not mentioned) have to take a journey along these Devayāna or Pitriyāna Paths, and Vidyā being common here, it is understood that those who possess the knowledge of other Vidyās (which are silent as to the Devayāna Path) also attain the Devayāna Path.

The Smṛiti also says—“The bright and the dark journeys are the eternal paths of this world. Going by one (i.e. the Devayāna) one does not return and going by the other (i.e. the Pitriyāna) one returns again to this world” (Bh. G. 8.26). The argument that the mention of the Devayāna Path once in the Upakosala-Vidyā and again in the Panchāgni-Vidyā (is repetition), (is answered by saying that) in both the places it is so mentioned for the purpose of meditation only. Therefore, there is no such rule (restricting the journey along Devayāna Path to only those Vidyās in which it is specifically mentioned).—31.

#### 19. YĀVADADHIKĀRĀDHIKARĀṆAM. Sū. 32.

*Those who have a certain duty of office to perform, continue (in their physical body) as long as duty of the office lasts.—32.*

It is now being considered, whether, in the case of a person who has realized Brahma, another physical body is

or is not created for him, after his original body has fallen. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) a doubt, as to whether, after true i.e. perfect knowledge, the means of Final Release (Moksha), is attained, such Final Release takes place or not, is not reasonably sustainable. When the means of cooking have become available, a doubt as to whether cooked rice can or cannot be got ready, cannot be possible, nor whether the diner would or would not be satisfied. But (we reply), such an inquiry is of course reasonably sustainable, because it is seen from History and from the Puraṇās, that even from amongst these who have realized Brahma, some acquire other bodies. For instance, the Smṛiti says that Apāntaratama, a Vedic scholar and an ancient sage, was, as directed by Viṣṇu, reborn as Kṛiṣṇa-Dvaipāyana, at the junction of the Dvāpāra and Kali Yugās. Similarly, Vasishṭha the mind-born son of Brahmā as he was, having lost his original body through the curse of Nimi, was reborn of Maitrāvaruṇa at the behest of Brahmā. Scriptures similarly speak of the rebirth of Bhrigu and others, also the mind-born sons of Brahmā, during the sacrifice of Varuṇa. Sanatkumāra also, another mind-born son of Brahmā, was reborn as Skanda, because of the boon he had himself conferred on Rudra. Similarly the Smṛitis speak of many such acquisitions of other bodies for some reason or other, in the case of Daksha and Nārada etc. . And the Scriptures also in Māntrās and Arthavādās, speak of such things. Some amongst them are said to acquire another body after their original body has fallen, while some, even when their original body still continues, are said to assume several bodies simultaneously, through their own lordly powers of Yoga. Smṛitis speak of their being adepts in the full meaning of the Scriptures. Seeing therefore, that in as much as they (i.e. these sages etc.) acquire other bodies, a conclusion is inevitably arrived at that the knowledge of Brahma is on the one hand the cause of Final Release, and that on the other hand it is not so. The Sūtrakāra therefore says—No, because these Apāntaratama and others who happen to be appointed to their particular offices, which constitute the cause of the preservation of the world through the promulgation of the Vedās, continue to be in their own bodies as long as such special office of theirs lasts. Just as the Bhagavān Śun, having exercised the powers of his office,

over the world for a thousand Yugās, at the end, experiences complete isolation (Kaivalya) i.e. Final Release which is free from the diurnal rising and setting, as stated by the Scriptures, thus—"Having risen upwards from there (in the form of Brahma), he neither rises nor sets, but continues to be all alone by himself in himself" (Chhān. 3.11.1), or just as, some people of the present time who have realized Brahma, experience Final Release, after the enjoyment of the fruits of their actions which have started fruition is exhausted, because the Scriptures have declared—"He is delayed only until he is relieved of his body and then he attains Final Release" (Chhān. 6.14.2). That, Apāntaratama etc., Lords though they are and appointed though they are to their offices by the Highest Lord, and even though they possess correct i.e. perfect knowledge which is the means of Final Release, have to continue in their bodies as long as their duty lasts, because their actions have not yet been exhausted, and that they obtain Final Release when such actions get exhausted, is not contradictory. They (these Lords), while they are ridding themselves of the quantum of their actions which has once started fructifying, and migrating from one body to another, as from one house to another, with perfect liberty, and creating new bodies with the material of the body and sense-organs at their command, occupy such bodies, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of discharging the duties of their office, albeit with the consciousness (of their having the nature of Brahma) unobliterated. It cannot be said that they remember only their births (and not their individuality), because it is well-known from the Smritis that they are known to be the self-same persons. Smṛiti also states, how Sulabhā, a great scholar of Brahma, (Brahmavādinī), desirous of having disputations with Janaka, leaving her own body, entered the body of Janaka, and after having had a discussion with him, again returned to her own body. If, after actions which have once started (bearing fruit) have been used up, other actions were to spring up and cause the starting up of another body, then other actions whose seeds have not yet been burnt out may as well spring up too, and in such a case, may be, a doubt may legitimately arise, as to whether Brahma-Vidyā sometimes is, and at other times is not, the cause of Moksha, but

such a doubt is not logical, because it is well-known from the Scriptures and the Smritis, that perfect knowledge (Jñāna) has the effect of burning up the seeds of actions. The Scriptures for instance say—"The knots of the Hridaya (in the form of impressions) are cut asunder and all doubts are resolved and all his actions are exhausted, when the one that is both the cause and the effect viz. Parāvara (i.e. Brahma) is realized" (Muṇḍ 2.2.8) ; "When memory (that I myself am Brahma) returns, all knots are resolved" (Chhān. 7.26.2) etc.. The Smṛiti also says—"Oh Arjuna, just as a well-lighted fire consumes all fuel and reduces it to ashes, even so does the fire of perfect knowledge reduce all actions to ashes" (Bh. G. 4.37). Just as seeds which have once been consumed by fire do not ever again sprout up, even so the Self does not again suffer the afflictions which have once been consumed by perfect knowledge. It is not reasonably sustainable, that when once the afflictions caused by Nescience are consumed, the quantum of actions which is the seed of afflictions, should get burnt out only in one part, while another part of it should sprout up. It is never seen, that a seed of rice which is burnt up by fire, ever sprouts up in one part of it. The quantum of actions which has started fructifying, is ultimately dissipated, even as an arrow that is once shot, comes to rest after its force (momentum) is expended, because, as stated by the Scriptures—"He is delayed only so long etc." (Chhān. 6.14.2), a man has to wait only till his body falls. Hence those who have been appointed to such offices continue to exist as long as their duty of office lasts. Moreover, it cannot be said that the fruit of perfect knowledge is not uniform everywhere, because the Scriptures declare that all without exception, attain Moksha on the realization of knowledge, thus—"Those from amongst the Gods that realized the Truth, themselves became the Truth, and the same was the case with the sages and men" (Bṛih. 1.4.10). May be, there are some great sages who have succumbed to the temptation of worldly powers etc. resulting from other knowledges, and it is reasonably sustainable, that subsequently, on realizing that their power has been exhausted, they become dejected, and steadfastly pinning their faith on the knowledge of the Highest Self, thus attain Final Release (Kaivalya), because the Smṛiti says thus—When the great deluge comes on and



the Para i.e. Brahmā gets destroyed, all these, their minds chastened, enter into the Highest Brahma. The fruit of perfect knowledge being patent, any doubt about missing the fruit of such perfect knowledge cannot be reasonably sustainable. The fruits of actions, however, viz. the heaven etc., not being based on experience, a doubt, as to whether they are or are not possible, would be justified, but the fruit of perfect knowledge is based on experience, because the Scriptures declare "That Brahma, which is immediate and is directly experienced" (Brih. 3.4.1), and give instruction about it, as being an entity firmly established, thus—"That thou art" (Chhān. 6.8.7). It is not possible to construe that the passage "That thou art" means, that one would become so *after* death. For another Scriptural passage—"The Sage Vāmadeva visualizing himself as Brahma, understood that he himself was Manu and the Sun" (Brih. 1.4.10)—shows that the fruit of perfect knowledge, viz. the union with the Universal Self, springs up the very moment true knowledge supervenes. Therefore, the attainment of Moksha is the invariable and uniform fruit, which, a person who has attained perfect knowledge, without exception, obtains.—32.

## 20. AKSHARADHYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 33.

*Conceptions about the Imperishable one ('Akshara' i.e. Brahma) (which are expressed in the form of negations) are to be included (everywhere) because of similarity (of the definition) and also because the object representing these negative conceptions (i.e. the Akshara-Brahma) is the same. It is like the Aupasada (Upasada-Ishti). That has been stated (by Jaimini, in Pūrva-Mīmansā).—33.*

In the Vājasaneyaka it is stated thus—"This verily, Oh Gārgi, is the Imperishable one (i.e. Brahma) of which the Brāhmaṇās (those who have realized Brahma) speak, and which is neither gross, nor atomic, nor short, nor long, nor red, nor oily etc." (Brih. 3.8.8). Then in the Ātharvaṇa it is stated—"Now about the highest i.e. Parā (Vidyā) by

which this Imperishable one is understood, and which is that which cannot be seen or comprehended and is without any origin (i.e. cause) or attribute" (Muṇḍ. 1.1.5). Similarly, elsewhere in some places also, this Imperishable Highest Brahma is spoken of by the Scriptures by way of negating some special characteristic (about it). Therein in some places, Brahma in the form of the Imperishable, is described by way of the denial of some particular characteristics, other than those mentioned in some of the other various places. With regard to all these knowledges, by way of the denials of some one or other particular characteristic in some one place or other, when there is a doubt as to whether all such negative conceptions are restricted to the various places where they are mentioned or should be understood as obtaining everywhere, and the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that they should be restricted, each to the particular place where it is mentioned, we say—All special negative conceptions about the Imperishable one (Brahma) should all be understood as obtaining everywhere, because the Imperishable (Brahma) is common to all and the definitions are similar. The manner of expounding Brahma which is of a nature involving denial of every special conception, is common everywhere. The same identical Brahma is understood to be propounded everywhere, so why should such negative conceptions (about Brahma) referred to in one place, not be available in other places? It has been so explained in the Sūtra "Bliss etc. belong to the principal one (i.e. Brahma)" (Bra. Sū. III. iii. 11). The distinction between the two is that, special characteristics of a positive injunctive nature were considered there (i.e. in Bra. Sū. III. iii. 11), while negative conceptions are considered here. This distinction between these two kinds of considerations (Chintābhedah) is with a view to secure a detailed elaborate treatment (of Brahma). That, it is like the Aupasada i.e. the Upasada sacrifice (Ishti), is the illustration in point. Just as in the Ahīna Sacrifice of Jamadagni (a sacrifice which lasts for more than one day), wherein an Upasada Puroḍāsha (offering) is enjoined, the incantations (Mantrās) along with which these Puroḍāshās are offered, viz., "Oh Agni, may thou protect the sacrifice etc." (Tāṇ. Brāh. 21.10.11), are connected with the Adhvaryu (sacrificial

priest representing the Yajurveda), even though the incantations have their origin in the Sāma-Veda of the Udgātri (i.e. the chanting priest), because it is the Adhvaryu who is supposed to offer such Puroḍāsha, and also because subsidiary matters go with the principal matter, similarly, the meaning is, that here also, inasmuch as, all these special negative conceptions about the Imperishable one (i.e. Brahma), wherever they may occur, go with the Imperishable one (i.e. Brahma), and because they all relate to it. This has been stated in the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, thus—"Guṇa-mukhyavyatikrame tadarthatvānmukhyena Vedasamyogah" (Jai. Sū. 3.3.9).—33.

## 21. IYADADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 34.

*Because mention is made (by the Scriptures) that it (i.e. the nature of the Vidyā) has this particular limit (the same one Vidyā is mentioned).—34.*

In the chapter dealing with the Adhyātma aspect (i.e. the relation of the Jīva-Self to the Highest Self) the Ātharvanikas and the Shvetāshvatarās recite the Mantrās—"Two birds, close companions and friends, attach themselves to a common tree. One of them eats the sweet pippala fruit, while the other does not partake of it, but merely keeps looking on" (Muṇḍ. 3.1.1). Similarly, the Kaṭhās recite—"Drinking the fruit of one's own good actions in this world, the two (i.e. the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self) having entered the cave which is at the highest peak (viz. intelligence i.e. Buddhi, the highest in a body), and who are, as stated by those who have realized Brahma, to be like sunshine and shadow (i.e. opposed to each other in attributes), and similarly by the Panchāgnīs (i.e. householders who have kept the five fires), i.e. Trīṇāchiketās (i.e. who have kindled the three Nachiketa fires" (Kaṭha. 1.3.1). The doubt that arises here is, whether these two (Mantrās) form identical or separate Vidyās. What then is your conclusion? (The opponent of Vedānta says)—It is that they form separate Vidyās. Whence is it so? Because a distinction (between them) is discernible. In the Mantrās "Two birds etc.", one is seen to be the experiencer

and the other to be the abstainer, while in the other Mantra "Drinking the fruit etc.", both are seen to be equally the experiencers, and the nature of that which is to be known being thus different (in each), the Vidyās are separate. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), it is replied, that there is identity of the Vidyās. Whence is it so? Because in both these Mantrās the nature of that which is to be known, is mentioned as being non-different, circumscribed by a limit, and endowed with duality. But (says the opponent of Vedānta), the difference in their nature has been indicated (by me). (We reply)—No, both these Mantrās propound the one Lord (Parameshvara) only, having the Jiva-Self as its second (Jiva-dvitiya), and not different entities. In the Mantra "Two birds etc.", by "the other one does not partake of it but merely keeps looking on", the Highest Self (Paramātmā) which is beyond any sensation of hunger etc., is referred to. In the complementary passage also the same (Paramātmā) appears to be referred to, thus—"When he sees the other one, the Lord, approached in different ways (i.e. by the paths of Karma and Yoga), and knows (all this world) as his greatness" (Shvet. 4.7). In the Mantra "Drinking etc.", when it is the Jiva-Self that is meant to be the one that drinks, the Highest Self, also, inasmuch as it is always in association with it, and even though it is beyond any sensation of hunger etc., is metaphorically referred to also as drinking with it, on the analogy of the 'maxim of the Umbrella'. Of course this is a chapter dealing with the Highest Self, inasmuch as it begins with the verse "Other than the doing of meritorious actions i.e. Dharma and unmeritorious actions i.e. Adharma" (Kaṭha. 1.2.14), and the complementary passage here, also refers to the same subject, thus—"Who is the bund (of security) for those who engage themselves in sacrifices, the imperishable Brahma, and one that is the transcendent" (Kaṭha. 3.2.). The same has been dealt with in detail in "The two Selves that have entered the cave" (Bra. Sū. I.ii.11). Therefore, there is no difference in the Vidyās, and there is thus an identity of Vidyās (in both). Besides when these three Mantrās of the Scriptures are carefully interpreted, it is understood, that they all contain the Vidyā of the Highest Self, and the reference to the Jiva-Self is in fact made, not with a desire to speak

about it as a different entity as such, but with a view to speak of its being identical with the Highest Self. It has already been mentioned (by us) that there is no scope for any consideration as to whether there is any difference or otherwise, so far as the Vidyā of the Highest Self is concerned. The present Sūtra (Yoga) is merely by way of a detailed elaborate treatment (of the subject). Therefore also, the extra characteristics (in one place) are to be combined (in all places).—34.

## 22. ANTARĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 35-36.

*As the same Universal Highest Self is taught to be the innermost of all, as in the case of the aggregate of elements (Bhūta-grāmaṇat), even so, as that very same one's own Self is the entity to be known (in the Ushasta and Kahola Brāhmaṇās, the Vidyās are identical).—35.*

With respect to the questions of Ushasta and Kahola, the Vājasaneyins mention the same question, twice consecutively, thus—“(Tell me about) that which immediately and directly is Brahma, and which is the innermost Self of all” (Brih. 3.4.1 and 3.5.1). With regard to that, the doubt is whether the Vidyās in the same sentence used twice here are but one and the same Vidyā or whether they are two separate Vidyās. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that they are two separate Vidyās, on the strength of the same sentence which is repeated twice. Otherwise, assuming that nothing more nor less is meant (in the two sentences), a mention of it twice would be meaningless. So, just as on account of repetition, religious actions are construed to be separate (according to Pūrva-Mimāṃsā), even so, inasmuch as there is repetition here, the Vidyās are separate. That being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), the reply is—As the same universal Highest Self (Svātmā) is stated to be inside all, in a general and common way, there is unity of Vidyās. The question asked and the reply given, refer in a common way to one and the same one's own Self which is said to be inside all. *Two Selves* cannot possibly be the innermost

Selves, in one and the same body. Therefore, the statement about being the innermost of all, can be proper or cogent in the case of only one 'Self', and another 'Self' cannot possibly be an entity innermost of all, even as it is in the case of the aggregate of elements. Just as in the case of a body (which is) an aggregate of five elements, Āpa (water) is inside the Prithivī (earth), and Teja is inside the Āpa, in a relative sense, but this being inside relatively, cannot be 'inside all' in the principal sense, even so it is in this case. Or else it may be understood, that the words "like the aggregate of elements" are mentioned (in the Sūtra) as an illustration from another Scriptural passage. The meaning is, that just as in the Mantra "There is one and only one God, hidden in the aggregate of elements, he is all-pervading, and is the Self of all" (Shvet. 6.11), only one Universal Highest Self is spoken of as being inside the aggregate of elements, even so it is, in the case of these Brāhmaṇa passages. Therefore, as the entity to be known is but one only, the Vidyās are identical.—35.

*If it be said (that unless the Vidyās are understood to be separate), the two identical but separate statements are not reasonably sustainable, (we reply)—No, because it is only like (the repetition in) another Scriptural instruction.—36.*

The objection taken (by the opponent of Vedānta), viz., that unless the Vidyās are understood to be separate, the two identical but separate Scriptural statements are not reasonably sustainable, has to be refuted. With regard to that, we reply—This is no fault, because it becomes reasonably sustainable, as it is in the case of (similar repetitions in) another Scriptural instruction (about the same one thing). Just as in the sixth chapter of the Upanishad of the Tāṇḍins (i.e. Chhāndogya), even though the Scriptural instruction "That is the Self, that thou art, Oh Shvetaketo" (Chhān. 6.8.7) is repeated nine times, the Vidyā does not thereby become separate, even so, will it be, in this case also. (The opponent of Vedānta says)—How is it that the Vidyās do not become separate, even though Scriptural instruction is given nine times? (We

reply)—Because we understand from the introductory and the concluding portions, that they mean the same one entity, inasmuch as the Scriptures refer to the same one entity again and again, as the entity to be propounded, in the passage “May the Bhagavān be pleased to teach me (the same Brahma) once again” (Chhān. 6.5.4), and because, it is in this way that by the removal of every fresh doubt, Scriptural instruction given more than once is made reasonably sustainable. Similarly, here also, inasmuch as there is no difference in the nature of the question, and the concluding portion, “Every thing else than this is perishable” (Brih. 3.4.2, 3.5.1), also is identical, it appears that the introductory and the concluding portions refer to the same one entity. Kahola who uses the word ‘eva’ in the second question, thus—“That *very* (entity) again which immediately and directly is Brahma” (Brih. 3.5.1), shows that the same entity referred to (by Ushasta) in the previous question, viz. “that which immediately and directly is Brahma”, is brought forward in the later question (of Kahola). In the former Brāhmaṇa passage, the existence of the Self as apart from the body and the sense-organs is stated, while in the latter, the same Self is referred to as the one which is beyond the attributes of transmigratory condition such as hunger etc. (see Sū. 34). In this way, it becomes reasonably sustainable that the same entity is meant. Therefore, the Vidyā is the same (in both these Brāhmaṇās).—36.

### 23. VYATIHĀRĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 37.

*There is reciprocal interchange of (meditations). The Scriptural recensions (of both) also state distinctly to that effect. It is as in the case of other (attributes).—37.*

The Scriptural statement of the Aitareyās, with reference to the Purusha in the Sun, is like this—“That which I am, He is, and what He is, I am”, while the Jābālās mention this way—“Oh great divinity, thou indeed art myself and I verily am thou”. Now the question here is, whether reciprocal interchange of meditations of both these kinds are to be made here, or meditation of only one kind is to

be made. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that meditation of only one kind is to be made. Beyond meditating upon the oneness of the Jīva-Self and the Lord, nothing else is to be meditated upon here. Now, if it be specially meditated upon, that the transmigratory Jīva-Self is the Lord, and the Lord is the transmigratory Jīva-Self, then, in meditating that the transmigratory Jīva-Self is the Lord, the status of the transmigratory Jīva-Self would of course be enhanced, but on the other hand, in meditating that the Lord is the transmigratory Jīva-Self, the status of the Lord would be lowered. Therefore, meditation ought to be only of one nature (i.e. one-sided) only and (it should be understood) that the Scriptural statement in a reciprocal manner both ways is for the purpose of strengthening the unity of both. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), the reply is—The statement about the reciprocal interchange of meditation, is merely for meditation. Just as in the case of the other attributes, i.e. just as other attributes such as ‘being the Self of all’ etc. are mentioned by the Scriptures for meditation, even so, here, the Scriptures have stated in both ways, viz. “Thou art myself and I am thou”, and such statement would have meaning only if the meditations are meant to be reciprocally interchanged, as otherwise this special mention of meditation both ways would be meaningless, because meditation in one way only would suffice. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) I have stated that if it were to be imagined that the Scriptural statement speaks of reciprocal interchange, then, as in that case the transmigratory Jīva-Self will have to be considered to be the deity and the deity to be the transmigratory Jīva-Self, and thus there would be a lowering of the status (of the Lord). We reply—This is no fault, because in this way, it is precisely the unity (of the transmigratory Jīva-Self and the deity) that would thus happen to be meditated upon. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) in that case the predicament of the very same strengthening of the unity (already referred to by me) would occur. (We reply)—We are not in this way seeking to avoid the strengthening of the unity, but we wish to propound only this much, by depending upon the authoritativeness of Scriptural statements, that, meditations of both these kinds should be made by reciprocal interchange and



not of one kind only. No doubt, it would virtually (Phalatah) result in strengthening the unity. It is just this way. Though the instruction, about the Lord's having the attribute 'of possessing desires that are always true', is for the purpose of meditation only, still it also does establish the existence of the Lord as endowed with such an attribute. Therefore, this reciprocal interchange (of meditation) should be made, and such meditation deserves to be combined in the case of other similar Vidyās.—37.

#### 24. SATYĀDYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 38.

*(In both the places viz. in the 4th and the 5th Kaṇḍikās of the 5th Adhyāya of Brihadāraṇyaka) the same (Satya-Vidyā is mentioned) and, therefore, (attributes such as) Satya etc. (ought to be combined).—38.*

In the Vājasaneyaka after enjoining the Satya-Vidyā comprising of the meditation on the name 'Satya' with its component letters sa ( ष ), ta ( त ), ya ( य ), the first and the third representing Truth, and the middle one representing 'untruth' held fast between them) by the Scriptural passage—"He who knows that all-pervading, worship-worthy (Yaksha), first-born Satya i.e. Brahmā (the Hiranyagarbha)" (Brih. 5.4.1), it is later on mentioned thus—"That which is that Satya, is the Āditya, he, who is the Purusha in the sphere (of the Sun), and he, who is also the Purusha in the right eye" (Brih. 5.5.2). Now with respect to this, a doubt arises, as to whether these are two different Satya-Vidyās or whether they both are but one and the same Vidyā. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that they are two Vidyās, because they have been connected with separate fruits or results, viz. with "He conquers these worlds" (Brih. 5.4.1) in the former sentence, and with "He destroys and casts off all sin" (Brih. 5.5.3, 4) in the latter one, while the bringing forward of the relevant Satya (in the former sentence), into the latter one, is, because, the object of meditation (viz. Hiranyagarbha) is one and the same (in both the Vidyās). The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) being to this effect, we reply—There is but one Satya-Vidyā (in both the places). Whence is it so? Because, in the passage

"What that is, is *that* Satya" (Brih. 5.5.2), what was relevant in the former is brought forward into the latter. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) it has been said (by me) already that even when the Vidyās are separate, this bringing forward of the thing relevant in the former, into the latter one, is reasonably sustainable. (We reply)—It is not so. Of course, it may well be so, where, because of some other patent reason a difference in the Vidyās is perceived. But here in this case, where both these (views) are possible, precisely because of the bringing forward of the former "What that is, is *that* Satya" later on, by the passage "What that is, is *that* Satya", it is determined that there is unity of Vidyās here, because the same Satya connected with the earlier Vidyā is brought forward in the later Vidyā. With respect to the argument (of the opponent of Vedānta) that as a separate fruit is stated by the Scriptures, the Vidyās are separate, we reply—that the Scriptural statement about the other fruit or result, being only in glorification of the instruction about another subsidiary matter, viz., that its esoteric names are 'Ahaḥ' and 'Aham', there is no fault. Besides, if the fruits or results have to be imagined from the Arthavāda passages only, and, if there is unity of Vidyās, the several fruits or results stated by the Scriptures to be the fruits or results of the several parts (Avayavās) of such Vidyā, have to be combined into one fruit or result of the whole Vidyā (i.e. the Avayavi), and therefore, inasmuch as one Satya-Vidyā alone is mentioned here by the Scriptures as being endowed with particular different special features, all attributes, such as Satya etc., have to be combined in the single act (of meditation).

Some others, however, holding that this Vājasaneyaka passage, which relates to the subject of the Purusha in the eye and the Sun, is the same that is mentioned in the Chhāndogya passages, "Now, this aureate Purusha that is seen to be in the Sun" and "and now this Purusha that is seen in the eye", and holding that this Vidyā relating to the Purusha in the Sun and in the eye (in the two places) is but one and the same Vidyā in both the places, consider, that the attributes occurring in the Vājasaneyaka Vidyā viz. "Satya etc." are to be combined with these mentioned in the Vidyā of the Chhāndogās. But it does not

appear to be proper to think so, because the Vidyā in the Chhāndogya appears to relate to the Jyotishṭoma ritual belonging to the Udgītha (the religious ritual of the singing by the Udgātri, a Sāma-Veda priest, in the Jyotishṭoma). Because indicatory marks relating to a religious Karma are present there, in the beginning, the middle and the end, as for instance, "This (Earth) indeed is Rik and the Agni is the Sāma" in the beginning, "A Rik and the Sāma are the singers and therefore, it is the Udgītha" (Chhān. 1.6.8) in the middle, and "He who, knowing thus, sings the Sāma" (Chhān. 1.7.9), in the concluding portion, while there is no such indicatory mark relating to Karma, in the Vājasaneyaka. Hence, inasmuch as there is difference in the Vidyās, due to the difference in the introductory portion (Prakrama), that the attributes (of these Vidyās) are restricted to only where they are mentioned, is logical.—38.

25. KĀMĀDYADHIKĀRĀDHIKARĀṆAM. Sū. 39.

*(Attributes such as) (true) desires etc.  
(in one place, are to be combined) else-  
where and vice versa, because of (the  
similarity of) the abode etc..—39.*

The Chhāndogās beginning thus—"Now the lotus-like small palace that is in this body (i.e. Brahma-pura, lit., the city of Brahma) and the small Ākāsha that is within it" (Chhān. 8.1.1), recite—"This Self which is without sin, and is unaging and undying and is sans-grief, sans-hunger, and sans-thirst, and is the one, whose desires are true, and whose resolutions are true" (Chhān. 8.1.5). Similarly the Vājasaneyins recite—"Verily that great Self, that is unborn and is one that alone amongst the Prāṇās (i.e. sense-organs) has the structure of knowledge (Vijnānamaya). (Who is) the ruler of all, and sleeps in the Ākāsha of the Hridaya" (Brih. 4.4.22). Now, the doubt here being, as to whether there is unity of Vidyās here, and a mutual combination of attributes, (the conclusion of the opponent of Vedānta is) that there is unity of Vidyā. With regard to that it is said—"(*attributes such as) desires etc.*". The meaning is—"true desires etc.", just as Devadatta is called Datta,

and Satyabhāmā is called Bhāmā (for short). Such set of attributes of the Ākāsha of the Hridaya, as having true desires (Satyakāmatva) etc., observed (by us) in the Chhândogya, combine with "This great unborn Self" in the Vājasaneyaka, and the "rulership over all etc." observed in the Vājasaneyaka, also combine with "This Self that is without Sin etc." in the Chhândogya. Whence is it so? Because, "the abode etc." is common to both. The same common abode, viz. the Hridaya, the same Lord who is the common subject to be known, and the same common characteristic of being a 'bund' (Setu) calculated to protect the worlds from promiscuity, and so many other such common characteristics are observed. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) as between them, we observe particular differences also. For instance in the Chhândogya, the attributes belong to the Ākāsha of the Hridaya, while in the Vājasaneyaka they belong to Brahma which is the support of that Ākāsha. We reply—No, because in Brahma-Sūtra I. iii. 14, it has been established that the word Ākāsha in the Chhândogya means Brahma. This however is the particular difference here. In the Chhândogya the Vidyā of qualified Brahma is taught, because the passage "Now, those who having realized the Self and its true desires, here during life, depart from this body" speaks of the Self, as also of the desires, as the things to be known. In the Vājasaneyaka, however, the instruction is about the unqualified transcendent Brahma, as is evident from the co-ordination of the question and the reply, "Now after this, tell me about (that which leads to) Final Release" (Brih. 4.3.14) and "This Purusha is unattached" (Brih. 4.3.15) respectively. In the Vājasaneyaka the set of attributes such as being the ruler etc., is stated for the purpose of the glorification of the Self, and, afterwards by the concluding portion "That Ātmā which is (negatively) described as 'not so', 'not so'" etc., it is the unqualified Brahma that is spoken of. As however the qualified Brahma is (essentially) the same as the unqualified Brahma, it should be understood that the combining of the attributes as stated in the Sūtra, is merely for the purpose of illustrating the exalted stature of Brahma and not for the purpose of contemplation.—39.

## 26. ĀDARĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 40-41.

*Because of the deference (shown by the Scriptures) the Agnihotra (to the Prāṇa) is not to be dropped.—40.*

In the Chhândogya Upanishad, referring to Vaishvânara-Vidyā the Scriptures declare thus—"That the food (Bhakta) that comes in first is for the Sacrifice. The oblation that he offers first, he should offer, saying 'To the Prāṇa, Svāhā' " (Chhān. 5.19.1). Five such oblations to the Prāṇa are enjoined therein, and the word Agnihotra is afterwards applied to them, thus—"One who knows it to be so and performs the Agnihotra" (Chhān. 5.24.2) and "Just as hungry children sit round their mother, even so, all creatures sit round the Agnihotra" (Chhān. 5.24.5). With regard to that the following consideration arises, viz., whether, when no dinner is taken, this Agnihotra is to be dropped, or whether it is not to be so dropped. Because the Scriptures speak about the connection (of the Agnihotra) with the food that comes in—"as that food etc. that comes in first", and as such coming in of the food is for the purpose of dining, (it would appear that) when such a meal is missed, the Agnihotra to the Prāṇa also is dropped. This being the conclusion arrived at, (the opponent of Vedānta) says, that it, rather, is not so dropped. Why? Because of the deference (shown by the Scriptures). For, even so, is the Scriptural statement of the Jābālās in the Vaishvânara-Vidyā thus—"He (the performer of Agnihotra) should dine (i.e. give five oblations to the Prāṇa), before his guest (dines)". The Scriptural passage "It verily is, as if a man without himself offering an oblation (in an Agnihotra), performs the Agnihotra for another", which, after having censured that dining by the guest first, purports to give precedence to the dining by the host (Svāmi i.e. Yajamāna) and thus shows deference to the Agnihotra of the Prāṇa. And they consider, that when the Scriptures do not countenance such conceding of precedence to the guest in the matter of dining, much less then would they tolerate the dropping out of the Agnihotra altogether. But (says the Vedāntin) it has been shown, that, as it has a connection with the food that comes in first for the dinner, when the dinner is not taken, the Agnihotra also is not

performed. (The opponent of Vedānta) says—No, because that passage purports to prescribe a particular kind of material for the Agnihotra. As, in the case of the ordinary Agnihotra, materials such as milk etc. are prescribed, and inasmuch as the word Agnihotra occurs here also, therefore, on the analogy of the ‘Ayana’ (a Sacrifice which lasts for a year) of the Kaṇḍapāyins (i.e. those, who in a sacrifice drink Soma from a pot called Kuṇḍa), when such duty is to be performed, the Scriptural passage “That food which comes in first etc.” is meant to enjoin a particular kind of subsidiary matter relating to a particular kind of food. Therefore the conclusion arrived at (by me) is that even though a subsidiary matter (as for instance food for a dinner) is absent, the principal matter (viz. the Agnihotra) is not dropped. Even though dinner is not taken, Prāṇa-Agnihotra should be performed just the same, with some material which is not incompatible, such as water, or any other material, on the analogy of the ‘maxim of furnishing a substitute (Pratinidhinyāya).—40.

The Sūtrakāra replies—

*When dinner is ready, (Prāṇa-Agnihotra should be performed with that i.e. with the food available) because the Scriptures have mentioned to that effect.—41.*

When dinner is ready, Prāṇa-Agnihotra should be performed with that i.e. with that very same food which becomes available first. Whence is it so? Because the Scriptures have said so, thus—“That food which comes in first is fit for the purpose of offering as an oblation (Homīya) in a sacrifice” (Chhān. 5.19.1). By referring to food which has become available first (i.e. which is ready at hand) as a thing already established, the Scriptures prescribe that the oblations to the Prāṇa should be accomplished with material which is meant for another purpose (viz. a dinner). How can these oblations which by themselves do not possess a characteristic of enjoining anything, be themselves able to suggest the substitution of any other material (to be used as oblations), when such a dinner itself is dropped? Besides, no features of an ordinary Agnihotra are available here. In the Ayana of Kaṇḍapāyins the

word Agnihotra, occurring in the injunctive clause "He performs Agnihotra for a month", may well be construed as enjoining an ordinary Agnihotra, and hence it would be logical that subsidiary features of such an ordinary Agnihotra, may well become available in that case, whereas, in the present case (of a Prāṇa-Agnihotra) the word Agnihotra which occurs in an Arthavāda passage, does not deserve to enjoin a similar ordinary Agnihotra, because if it were to be understood that features of such an Agnihotra do become available here, such other subsidiary features as the kindling of a fire etc., also, may become equally available here, which of course is not possible. The kindling of a fire is for the purpose of its acting as the base for the sacrificial oblations. This (i.e. Prāṇa-Agnihotra) Sacrifice is not meant to be made into a fire, as in that case there would be the predicament of the destruction of the oblations which are meant to be eaten (by the sacrificer), and also because of their relation to the material made ready for a dinner, this offering of the oblation (in the Prāṇa-Agnihotra) is necessarily to be offered in the mouth (Āsyē). The Jābāla Scriptural statement "He should dine before the guest (dines)" shows the accomplishment of the offering of oblations as being made in the mouth only. That is why here also, the Scriptures indicate that the subsidiary parts of the Agnihotra are to be fancifully imagined, thus—"That the chest is the Vēdī (altar), the hairs are the Sacrificial grass, the Hridaya is the Gārhapatya fire, the mind is the Anvāhāryapachana fire, and the mouth is the Āhavanīya fire" (Chhān. 5.18.2). The Scriptural statement about the Vēdī (altar) here, should be understood to mean the 'Sthāṇḍila' (i.e. a piece of ground, levelled as a square, and prepared for a sacrifice, because, in an Agnihotra in the principal sense, there is no Vēdī), and the subsidiary matters of an Agnihotra are only to be fancifully imagined. And as this Prāṇa-Agnihotra is connected with a dinner which is taken at a particular stated time (i.e. noon and evening) it has no connection with the time of an ordinary Agnihotra (i.e. early morning and night). The other features of an ordinary Agnihotra such as the saying of prayers ('Upasthāna') etc. also would be contradicted here in some way or other. Therefore, these five oblations connected

with Mantrās, materials, and Deities, are to be offered when a dinner is ready. The statement showing deference, is for prescribing precedence to the host for dinner, (before the guest). This Scriptural passage cannot bear the burden of any more meaning ("Nahyasti vachansyātibhārah"). It is not possible to indicate by that sentence, that the Prāṇa-Agnihotra has to be invariably performed (whether there be any dinner or otherwise). Therefore, (it is concluded that) when a dinner is missed the Prāṇa-Agnihotra is also dropped.—41.

27. TANNIRDHĀRAṆĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 42.

*As regards the relation of specific determinations (Nirdhāraṇā) about meditations i.e. Upāsanās (with religious actions), there is no rule, because, it is so seen (from the Scriptures). Besides there is a separate fruit (for these meditations) viz. the non-obstruction (of the fruit of the sacrificial act).—42.*

(In the Scriptures) there are some Cognitions i.e. Vidyās connected with matters subsidiary to religious acts (such as sacrifices), as for instance—"He should meditate on the imperishable (Om) which is the Udgītha" (Chhān. I.i.1). We will now consider whether they (i.e. such meditations) are connected with such religious acts (i.e. sacrifices) permanently, just as for instance, the Palāsha wood ladle (used for offering ghee in sacrificial fire) is, to a sacrificial act, or whether they are not so permanently connected, just as the milkpail (Godohana, used optionally in a sacrifice for carrying water, according to whether the sacrificer's aim is or is not the acquisition of cattle), for instance, is not. What then, is the conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta)? It is, that they are permanently connected. Whence is it so? Because they are accepted to be so i.e. included in Scriptural statements about the ritualistic forms of sacrifices (Prayogavachana). Even though these (meditations) are not mentioned by starting a specific chapter about them, yet, inasmuch as, they are connected with sacrifices through the Udgītha etc., they do connect themselves with the statements about other ritualistic forms (of sacrifices) as subsidiary matters, quite



in the same way, as other subsidiary matters (such as the Palāsha-wood ladle etc.) are connected. So far as the fruits of such meditations, mentioned by the Scriptures in passages in their own context, viz. "He verily becomes the conferor of all desires" (Chhān. 1.1.7) etc., are concerned, inasmuch as, that statement is merely an Arthavāda passage, because of its being mentioned in the form of the present tense (and not in an injunctive form), similar to the Scriptural statement—"One who hears no evil", and because of their not having the object of mentioning a fruit principally, therefore, just as passages, such as "He whose sacrificial ladle is of Palāsha wood does not hear of any evil", which are not mentioned in any chapter, become permanently connected with a sacrificial act, by way of the sacrificial ladle, as if they are recited in such a chapter, even so, these meditations on the Udgītha etc. also, are permanently connected (with a sacrificial act). This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply—"As regards the relation of these specific determinations about meditations such as on Udgītha etc. (with religious actions) there is no rule". These particular specific determinations about the nature of matters subsidiary to religious actions, such as Udgītha etc.—viz. 'that the Udgītha is the best of all essences', 'a fulfiller of desires', 'a conferor of desires', 'he is the Sun etc.'—cannot possibly belong to sacrificial actions permanently. Whence is it so? Because it is seen to be so (from the Scriptures). Because the Scriptures indicate, that they are not so connected permanently, thus—"By means of that (the imperishable 'Om'), both those who know it to be so, and those who do not, perform actions" (Chhān. 1.1.10), which shows, that it is permissible, even to those who are ignorant, to perform such religious actions as sacrifices. The Prastotri and others (priests at a sacrifice) even when they are devoid of any knowledge of the deities of the Prastāva etc. are observed to undertake the performance of sacrifices, as is seen in the Scriptural passages—"Oh Prastotri, if without knowing the deity appropriate to a Prastāva\*, you perform the

\* When at a sacrifice, a Sāma Rik has to be sung, the first portion of the Rik is Prastāva, which is recited by the Prastotri, the middle portion beginning with 'Om' is the Udgītha, which is sung by the Udgātri, and the final portion is Pratihāra, which is recited by the Pratihatri.

Prastāva, or chant Sāma Riks or recite the Pratihāra etc.” (Chhān. 1.1.9, 10, 11)”. Besides, it is observed that such Cognitions i.e. Vidyās which are subsidiary to religious acts, have a fruit of their own, different from the fruit of these religious acts, such as, the non-obstruction of the resulting of fruits of actions, i.e. its abundance, i.e. some special excellence, thus—“By means of that (imperishable ‘Om’) both those who know it to be so, and those who do not, perform actions. Actions performed by those who know (Vidyayā) and actions performed by those who are ignorant (Avidyayā) are however different from each other and whatever he does equipped with knowledge, faith and esoteric meditation, has greater power” (Chhān. 1.1.10). Now because in the sentence “Actions performed by those who have knowledge and by those who are ignorant, are but different from each other (Nānā tu)”, the actions of those who know and those who know not, are made out to be separate from each other, and also because of the use of the “Tarap” termination (of the comparative degree of comparison) in the word ‘of greater power’ (Virya-vattara), it is understood that the actions, even of those who are ignorant, do of course have some power after all. And this becomes reasonably sustainable, only if the Cognitions i.e. Vidyās are not permanently connected with religious actions. If it be supposed, that the connection of a Vidyā with religious actions is permanent, then how can it be understood that action performed without knowledge is powerful (at least to some extent) ? It stands well established that it is only when all the subsidiary matters are combined with an action, that such action can (possibly) be powerful. Moreover in the case of meditations in which the idea of different worlds is superimposed on the Sāmās (Lokasāmādishu), each separate meditation has its own separate and different fruit, as for instance—“To Him the worlds above and below become competent (to afford experience)” (Chhān. 2.2.3) etc., and it is not logical, to understand this Scriptural statement about the fruit, as being merely an Arthavāda passage (i.e. merely glorificatory), because in that case, it would inevitably have to be understood to be a Guṇa-Vāda (i.e. a passage stating a secondary matter only), but as the Scriptures speak about a fruit, it is reasonably sustainable that they are to be

understood in the principal sense (Mukhyavāda). In the case of specific particular actions such as Prayāja etc. (i.e. actions subsidiary to a sacrifice), they being necessary for a sacrifice which expects all subsidiary actions to be duly performed for its own proper fulfilment (Itikartavyatā-kāṅkshasya), it is logical that the Scriptural statement about their fruit is but an Arthavāda (i.e. it is merely in glorification of the Prayāja). The same is true of such statements as the one about the sacrificial ladle being made of Palāsha wood etc., which are mentioned without beginning any special chapter about them. It is not possible to imagine that things, such as the ladle being of Palāsha wood, which in themselves do not possess the nature of actions, (and which are only casually stated without beginning any special chapter about them), can have any relation to any fruit, unless they depend upon something else. So far however as (the use of) the milk-pail (Godohana) etc. is concerned, inasmuch as they have the advantage of depending upon the carrying of water which is necessary (for a sacrifice), a statement as to its fruit is reasonably sustainable. Similarly, in the case of the fact of its being made out of Bilva-wood, being connected with a sacrificial post (Yūpa), a statement as to its fruit also is reasonably sustainable. But here, there is no such other thing present, on which the fact (viz., being made of Palāsha wood) can depend. If, that sentence having stated the thing desired to be stated, viz., the fact of being made of Palāsha wood, as being dependent on a sacrificial ladle, it were to be also supposed that the sentence equally desires to express an injunction about a fruit also, then there would be (the fault of) the splitting up of a sentence. Now, meditations connected with Udgītha etc., being of the nature of action, any particular injunction with regard to that, being reasonably sustainable, a statement as to the fruit thereof is not contradictory. Therefore, it should be understood, that, just as the milk-pail (Godohana) etc., connected though they are with a sacrifice, yet, inasmuch as they have a separate fruit of their own, their connection with a sacrifice is not permanent, similarly, it is the same in the case of meditations connected with the Udgītha. That is precisely why the author of the Kalpa-Sūtrās has not included these meditations in the category of actions.—42.

## 28. PRADĀNĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 43.

*This is similar to the Pradāna (i.e. offering of the Puroḍāshās). This has been mentioned (by Jaimini in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā).—43.*

In the Vājasaneyaka passage “Speech (Vāk) vowed that it would continue speaking” (Brih. 1.5.21), it has been definitely ascertained that so far as Ādhyātmika entities such as speech etc. are concerned, Prāṇa is the most eminent, and so far as the Ādhidaivika entities such as Agni etc. are concerned, Vāyu is the most eminent. Similarly in the Chhāndogya passage, “Vāyu verily is the general absorber” (Chhān. 4.3.1), it has been definitely ascertained that as regards the Ādhidaivika entities, Vāyu is the general absorber of all entities, and in the passage “Prāṇa verily is the general absorber” (Chhān. 4.3.2), it has been definitely ascertained that as regards the Ādhyātmika entities, Prāṇa is the general absorber of speech etc. Now, a doubt here arises as to whether these Vāyu and Prāṇa are to be understood to be separate entities, or whether they are to be understood to be one and the same entity. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that, because they do not differ in their essential nature, they are not different. There being no difference in their essential nature, it is not logical to meditate upon them separately. Besides the Scriptures also indicate, how the Ādhyātmika and Ādhidaivika entities are non-different in their essential nature, in the passage, thus —“Agni became speech and entered the mouth” (Ait. 2.4), and afterwards they indicate by the passage “All these are all alike and eternal” (Brih. 1.5.13), that the exalted Ādhidaivika entity (Vāyu) is but the Self of the Ādhyātmika entity viz. Prāṇa. Similarly, in other places also it has been indicated generally that there is no difference in the essential nature of the Ādhyātmika and Ādhidaivika entities, while in one place the Scriptures specifically indicate how the Vāyu and the Prāṇa are one and the same, by the passage, “That which is Prāṇa is but Vāyu”. Similarly in the Vājasaneyaka Brāhmaṇa cited in illustration, in the concluding verse, viz. “From where the sun rises” (Brih. 1.5.23), the Scriptures conclude, with a reference

to the same Prāṇa, in the passage "That it rises from the Prāṇa and also sets in it" (Brih. 1.5.23), and thus indicate how it is one and the same. The Scriptures further confirm the same by concluding (the Brāhmaṇa) with that one Prāṇa-Vrata (an observance), by the passage—"Therefore, he should observe only one Vrata (observance), he should exercise the Prāṇa and the Apāna" (Brih. 1.5.23). Similarly in the Chhândogya also it is conveyed by the passage "Prajāpati, the protector of the world and the sole God (running like the thread, as the Self, through all entities) i.e. as the Sūtrātmā of the great-souled four (the deities Agni, Sun, Moon, and Water on the one hand, and speech, eye, ear and mind, on the other)", how the same entity (Vāyu) is the absorber of all, and it does not state that there is one absorber of the one quartette and another absorber of the other. Therefore, the meditations on Vāyu and Prāṇa should be understood to be non-separate.

This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply—"That Vāyu and Prāṇa should be meditated upon as separate (entities)". Whence is it so? Because of the instruction in the Scriptures that they are separate (entities). This instruction about the separate division of the Adhyātma and the Adhidaiva, is for the purpose of meditation and it would be meaningless, if the meditations were to be non-separate. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) it has been said, that, because of non-difference in their essential natures, there is no separate meditation. (We reply)—This is no fault, because even though there is no such essential difference, still it is reasonably sustainable to understand, that the meditations are 'separate, because of the separate instructions to that effect, due to the different conditions (of Prāṇa and Vāyu). Even though the suggestion in the concluding verse is reasonably sustainable as purporting to state, that there is non-difference in the essential nature (of Prāṇa and Vāyu), still, it has no power to nullify the distinction between them as separate objects of meditation as stated earlier, and also, because of their being treated as 'the standard of comparison' (Upamāna) and 'the thing compared' (Upameya), in the Scriptural passage—"Just as this Prāṇa is the middle one as amongst the Prāṇas even so is Vāyu amongst the deities" (Brih. 1.5.22). By this the Prāṇa-Vrata also should be

understood as explained. The words 'that one only' (eva cha), in the Scriptural passage "The Vrata (observance) is but that one only" (Brih. 1.5.23), is for the purpose of conveying, that by rejecting the Vāk-Vrata etc., the Prāṇa-Vrata should be understood to be the only Vrata to be performed, because, the Scriptures have declared that the Vrata of speech etc. has been shattered, by the passage "Death in the form of fatigue has overcome them" (Brih. 1.5.21), and the Scriptures do not mean that the Vāyu-Vrata should be rejected, because, by beginning with the passage "Now the consideration of the Vratās" (Brih. 1.5.21), they have ultimately determined, that both Vāyu and Prāṇa equally, are entities whose Vratās have not been shattered. Again after declaring that "Only one Vrata should be observed" (Brih. 1.5.23), and then declaring its fruit to be "reaching union with Vāyu", by the passage "By that he obtains a body like that of the Deity (Sāyujya) and the same world as that of the Deity (Salokatā)" (Brih. 1.5.23), the Scriptures indicate that the Vāyu-Vrata is not given up. Now, by the word 'Deity' here, Vāyu ought to be understood, because the person meditating has the aim of reaching the condition of the limitless nature of the indeterminate Self (Brahma) and also because it is observed earlier that "This Deity, Vāyu, is a Deity that never sets (i.e. it is indestructible)" (Brih. 1.5.22). Similarly, the Scriptures indicate by showing the difference (between Vāyu and Prāṇa) in the passage "Vāyu as amongst the Deities and Prāṇa as amongst the sense-organs, are verily the two general absorbers" (Chhān. 4.3.4), and conclude by showing difference between them thus—"They (i.e. Vāyu along with Agni, Sun, Moon, and Water) are one quintette, and these (i.e. Prāṇa along with speech, eye, ear and mind) are the other quintette, which together make the Krita\*". Therefore, the meditations are also separate, as in the case of 'Pradāna' (the offering of the Puroḍāshās). Just as in the Triple-Puroḍāsha-Ishti referred to in the Scriptural passage "A Puroḍāsha on eleven potsherds to King Indra" (where the opponent in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā maintains that the Hotri priest offers all the Puroḍāshās simultaneously, so

---

The four sides of the dice are marked with 4, 3, 2 and 1 pips, respectively, which represent the Krita, Tretā, Dvāpāra and Kali, the four Yugas respectively and the pips when added, make ten, which collectively are called the 'Krita'.

that they may not be rendered infructuous, because if only one out of the three Puroḍāshās is offered to one Deity, the remaining two Puroḍāshas become as if they are the leavings of the first), and when the doubt is, as to whether they should be offered simultaneously or not, the conclusion (arrived at there) is, that because of difference in the attributes of the Deities, viz. the different aspects of Indra, and because of the fact that the attributes of rulership (Rājatva) etc. are different, an exchange of the Mantrās such as the Ājyā and the Anuvākya in each successive offering, is enjoined, and also because the Deities are separate, therefore, according to the Scriptural enumeration (Nyāsa) the offerings also are separate and distinct, similarly, even in spite of the non-difference in the essential nature of Vāyu and Prāṇa, as the Deity meditated upon is different, the meditations also are different. In this way, even though the entity to be meditated upon is the same, inasmuch as each particular portion of it (Amsa) to be meditated upon, is different, the meditations also are separate. The same has been mentioned (in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) in the Samkarsha Kāṇḍa, thus—"The Deities are separate because they are recognized as being separate (Nānā vā Devatā prithakjñānāt)". There, however, the sacrifices become different because the Deities and the materials of sacrifice are separate, while here, there is no such difference in the Vidyās, because of the introductory and the concluding portions, and it is understood, that only one Vidyā is enjoined both in the Adhyātma and Adhidaiva teachings. Even though the Vidyā is one, because of the difference in the Adhyātma and Adhidaiva entities, the activity i.e. Karma is different, just as the same Agnihotra, by reason of the difference in the time (of its performance), viz. in the morning and in the evening, is each individually a different act of Agnihotra. It is by bearing this in mind, that the Sūtrakāra has stated in the Sūtra that it is like the offering i.e. Pradāna (in the Puroḍāsha Ishti).—43.

29. LINGABHŪYASTVĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 44-52.

*Because of a profusion of indicatory marks  
(these conceptual i.e. notional Agnis which  
represent the various modes of the mind, are*

*Vidyās and are not related to actions). Also that i.e. an indicatory mark has greater force (than the Prakaraṇa i.e. chapter) is explained in the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā).—44.*

In the Agnirahasya of the Vājasaneyins, in the Brāhmaṇa passage “Indeed in the beginning this ‘Sat’ (being) was not existing”, with reference to the mind it is recited—“It saw the thirty-six thousand Agnis belonging to its own Self, which were of the structure of the mind and were built up by it” etc.. Similarly, the Scriptures speak of different conceptual Agnis built up respectively by speech, Prāṇa, eye, ear, action and fire. The doubt that arises with regard to them, is whether these Agnis, i.e. the Agnis built up by the mind etc., are related to action (Kriyā) and are subservient to it, or whether they are independent and are merely of the nature of a Vidyā. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) being, that they are related to action, because of the chapter (Prakaraṇa), it is stated (in the above Sūtra) that because of the profusion of indicatory marks, it is understood, that they are independent. Many an indicatory mark is to be seen here in this Brāhmaṇa passage, which strengthens the conclusion, that they are merely of the nature of a Vidyā, viz., such indicatory marks, as for instance, “These Agnis are the handiwork of what-ever these beings conceive mentally” and “All these beings, even while they sleep, do constantly keep building up these Agnis for him who knows this to be so”. That indicatory mark is, of course, greater in force than the chapter (Prakaraṇa). The same has been stated in the previous Kāṇḍa i.e. the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā (Jaimini Sūtra 3.3.13)—“Shruti - linga - vākya - prakaraṇa - sthāna - samākhyānām samavāye pāraḍaurbalyamarthaviprakarshāt”.—44.

*Because of the chapter i.e. Prakaraṇa, (these conceptual Agnis) are but only a variation in form of the preceding one (i.e. fire built up in a brick Kuṇḍa). They may well be action (Karma), as in the case of the conceptual cup (Mānasa).—45.*

(Says the opponent of Vedānta)—That these Agnis are independent and are not complementary to any other thing



(like an action), is not logical. The chapter (Prakarāṇa) being one that relates to the actually kindled material Agni referred to earlier, the present instruction is merely about a special alternative form of that actual Agni, and it is not an independent Agni. But (says the Vedāntin) an indicatory mark has greater force than a chapter (Prakarāṇa). (The opponent of Vedānta says—That it is so is of course true, but an indicatory mark of this present kind cannot have greater force than the chapter (Prakarāṇa). Inasmuch as it is in the nature of a glorification of the conceptual Agni (because it occurs in an obviously Arthavāda passage), it is indicatory of some other matter. Any thing which is indicatory of some other matter, is, when such other matter is not available, reasonably sustainable even as a Guṇa-Vāda, and as such it is unable to affect the subject matter of a chapter (Prakarāṇa). Therefore, even though these Agnis are conceptual, they are subservient to action, even as in the case of the conceptual cup, i.e. a Mānasa. Just as in the case of the tenth day of the Dasharātra sacrifice which is known by the name Avivākya, the sea, which is fancifully conceived to be Soma, is taken up by means of the Earth conceived as a cup, for (being offered to) the deity Prajāpati, and the taking up of the cup, standing it up in its proper place, and the offering of Soma as an oblation to the sacrificial fire (Homa), the taking up of the remaining Soma, and the mutual invitation by the sacrificial priests to each other (to partake of the Soma), and the drinking of it, are all mentioned to be merely conceptual. The meaning is, that just as this Mānasa is a conceptual cup, and becomes subservient to action (because the chapter relates to action), even so does this particular conceptual Agni also (relate to action).—45.

*Also because of the extended application  
by analogy (Atidesha).—46.*

The extended application by analogy (of the actually kindled fire) to these conceptual Agnis, further strengthens (the conclusion), that these Agnis are subservient to action (Karma), thus—“These thirty-six thousand Agnis are so many Suns”. Each one of them is quite as much as the previously mentioned (actually kindled) Agni. Now

an extended application by analogy is possible, only when there is commonness (between them). (The Scriptures) by extending the application by analogy (Atidesha) of this Agni built up in bricks for religious actions, to the conceptual Agnis, indicate, that these conceptual Agnis also are subservient to action (Karma).—46.

*But (says the Vedāntin), (these conceptual Agnis) are but a Vidyā only (and they are not subservient to action) because of such determination (by the Scriptures).—47.*

The word 'but' refutes the view (of the opponent of Vedānta). These Agnis built up by the mind etc. are of the nature of a Vidyā and are independent and are not subservient to action. The Scriptures have determined it to be so, thus—"These Agnis are such, as are built up by Vidyā alone, (and are not actual), and, they are built up by Vidyā for one who knows this to be so".—47.

*Also because it is seen (from the Scriptures).—48.*

Moreover, an indicatory mark showing the independent nature of these (conceptual) Agnis is to be seen. It has been shown earlier, thus—"Because of the profuse indicatory marks (in Bra. Sū. III. iii. 44)".—48.

But (says the opponent of Vedānta) even an indicatory mark, without more, i.e. without any other thing being available, is unable to establish any thing, and therefore, ignoring such indicatory mark, it was determined on the strength of the chapter (Prakaraṇa) that the Agnis were subservient to action. This is answered as follows :

*The conclusion (that these conceptual Agnis are independent and not subservient to action) is not affected, because of the Scriptures etc. being more authoritative (than the Prakaraṇa).—49.*

The view that these conceptual Agnis are independent, should not be allowed to be affected, by concluding that by

reason of the authority of the Chapter, they are subservient to action. It has already been established by the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā Sūtra about the Scriptures and indicatory marks (Pū.-Mī. III. 3.14) that the Scriptures (Śruti) and indicatory marks (Linga) and a sentence (Vākya) are of greater force than the Chapter (Prakaraṇa). In the present case they are seen to establish the view that these conceptual Agnis are independent. How is it so? Because, in the first place the Scriptures declare, thus—"It is Vidyā only that kindles these Agnis". Similarly the indicatory mark also is, that "All creatures at all times, and even while they are asleep, keep on kindling these conceptual Agnis". There also is a passage—"In the case of those who know it to be so, it is by Vidyā only that they are so kindled". The Scriptural passage determining that the Agnis are kindled by Vidyā only, would be contradicted, if it were to be understood that these Agnis are subservient to action. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) this determinate conclusion may merely purport to imply the absence of any extraneous means (of kindling these Agnis). (We reply)—No, because in that case the Final determination would be superfluous, inasmuch as, were it to have such a purport, that (i.e. the determination that no extraneous means are required) will have been accomplished merely by describing their nature of being built up by Vidyā only. That such Agnis are kindled without any extraneous means is their very nature, and even though they are so kindled without any extraneous means, such determination may well be understood to have the purpose of removing a possible doubt, that like the conceptual cup (Mānasa), they also may be subservient to action. Similarly, the continuousness observed in the Scriptural passage "In the case of one who knows it to be so, all beings at all times keep on kindling up such conceptual Agnis, be he sleeping or be he awake", is possible only on the supposition that such Agnis are independent (and not subservient to action). Just as in the conceptual Agnihotra of the nature of speech or of the Prāṇa, the Scriptures, after mentioning "He makes an oblation of Prāṇa into Speech, and of Speech into the Prāṇa" (Kaush. 2.5), mention further, thus—"Be he awake or be he asleep, he keeps on offering such countless and immortal oblations continu-

ously" (Kaush. 2.5), even so it is (here). Now assuming these Agnis as being subservient to action, inasmuch as such action is of but a small duration, it cannot be properly imagined that such conceptual Agnis are constantly employed (in action). It would also not be logical to say, that this (indicatory mark) is merely of the nature of an Arthavāda. Wherever there is a distinct imperative and injunctive indicatory mark etc. it would be logical to understand that the mere mention of anything (without any injunction) is of the nature of an Arthavāda. But, here inasmuch as a clear injunction is not available it is necessary to imagine an injunction about acquiring knowledge, merely from the mention of an Arthavāda passage. It is possible to imagine the passage as it occurs, and as the continuous (kindling of Agni) is to be seen here, it has to be imagined only in that manner. From that, the independence of these (Agnis) is established by means of their own power. The passage "Whatsoever these beings mentally imagine, that is the handiwork of these Agnis" is also thus explained. Similarly the sentence which speaks of a relation of (these Agnis) to a particular (knowing) individual, by the words "In the case of one who knows it to be so", militates against the possibility of any connection (of these Agnis) with a sacrifice (Kratu). Therefore, the conclusion is, that the view that these Agnis are independent (and not subservient to action) is the stronger one, and preferable (to the view that they are subservient to action).—49.

*On account of the relationship (Anubandha) etc. (the conceptual Agnis are independent) like other Vidyās which are (considered to be) separate. It is seen (that other similar matters are so taken away from a chapter). It has also been mentioned (by Jaimini in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā).*  
—50.

This is again why, notwithstanding the chapter (Prakaraṇa), conceptual Agnis such as these built up by the mind, should be understood to be independent, inasmuch as the Scriptures bind up the modes of the mind etc., with the subordinate parts of (a sacrificial) action thus—These

(Agnis) are to be established mentally, built up mentally, the sacrificial cups (Mānasa) are to be taken up mentally, the Udgātris (Priests who sing) have to sing their glory mentally, the Hotris (Priests who sacrifice) etc. have to recite them mentally, what-so-ever action (Karma) is sacrificial action and is performed in a sacrifice (for the sake of a Purusha) is all to be done mentally in respect of these mental i.e. conceptual and mentally built up Agnis. This relationship has conceptual exaltation (Sampat) only, as its fruit. The subordinate parts of action being actual, they ought not to be desired to be obtained by conceptual exaltation (Sampadā). No doubt should be entertained, that like meditations such as the Udgītha, the meditations on them (i.e. these Agnis) are subservient to action, as being related to the subordinate parts of actions, because, the Scriptural passages about them are dissimilar in their nature. The Scriptures do not mention here that any particular subordinate part of action should be selected, and any particular stated thing—such as, *this*—should be superimposed on it. They merely select the thirty-six thousand modes of the mind, and imagine them to be the Agnis, and imagine the sacrificial cups etc., as is imagined in a Purusha sacrifice (i.e. where the notion of a sacrifice is superimposed on a man) etc.. It should be understood that this number of the Agnis being seen to correspond to the days of a man's life-span, they are superimposed on the modes of the mind which are connected with the days in a man's life. It is thus, that by reason of such a relation, the Agnis so built up mentally etc. are independent (and are not subservient to action). The word 'etc.' should, so far as is possible, be understood to include an extended application (Atidesha) etc. also. Similarly, by the Scriptural passage "Each of these (conceptual Agnis) is quite as much (powerful) as this earlier one (i.e. the actual material Agni used in actual Karma)", the Scriptures, by such extended application of the greatness of the actual Agnis to such conceptual Agnis, thereby indicate their contempt for mere ritualistic action as such. Even if these conceptual Agnis be supposed to have such connection with actual action, it would not be possible to maintain that the former (i.e. conceptual Agnis) can be used optionally in place of the latter (i.e. the actually built up Agnis). The

former i.e. the conceptual Agnis cannot possibly be able to render any service in actual action, in a way in which such service is rendered by such properly built up material Agni such as the Āhavanīya etc.. The argument (of the opponent of Vedānta), that the extended application (Atidesha) strengthens the conclusion, that such conceptual Agnis are subservient to action, inasmuch as such extended application becomes possible only when there is something common (between two things), is, so far as our view is concerned, answered by the statement, that such extended application is equally possible here, inasmuch as both (the actual and the conceptual Agnis) have the nature of being an Agni, common to both of them, because even such conceptual Agnis, albeit conceptual, are Agnis after all. Besides, authorities such as the Scriptures etc., have also been adduced. In this way, on account of such reasons as 'relation' etc., these conceptual Agnis are independent, even as other Vidyās which are separate are independent. For instance, Vidyās such as the Shāṇḍilya-Vidyā and others have each their own particular relation and are independent (of action). It is also seen from the Scriptures that the 'Aveshṭi' (an Isṭi i.e. a minor sacrificial action) which originally is recited in the chapter about the Rājasūya Sacrifice, is taken away from that chapter (and used elsewhere) because it has relation with the three Varṇās (castes), while the Rājasūya Sacrifice being a King's sacrifice is confined to the Kshatriya caste (Varṇa) alone. This has already been mentioned in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, Jaimini Sūtra 11.4.7 to 11.—50.

*Not even on the ground of similarity of features (with the 'Mānasa' Cup, can these conceptual Agnis be subservient to action) because it is perceived (that they are useful to a man i.e. Purusha). This is as it is in the case of 'death'. Nor does the heavenly world attain the condition of Agni.—51.*

Now the claim (of the opponent of Vedānta)—that it is just as it is in the case of the Mānasa Cup (i.e. the conceptual Agnis are subservient to action)—is here refuted. It is not conceivable even on the ground of having similarity of features with the Mānasa Cup, that these conceptual Agnis are subservient to action, because, on account of

such reasons as Scriptural declarations, it is understood that they are useful only to the aim of man (Purushārtha). It could not be, that it is never possible, that an entity cannot have anything in common with any other entity (because even the most dissimilar entities have at least 'the attribute of being an entity', common to them), and the innate dissimilarity (between two entities) can never be thus obliterated simply on that account. This is similar to the case of 'death'. Even though the word 'death' is used equally in the case of Agni and the Purusha in the sphere of the Sun, as for instance in the Scriptural passages—"He that is in this sphere (of the Sun) is but this Death (Yama) only" and "Agni, indeed, is Death (Yama)" (Brih. 3.2.10), there is no predicament of complete similarity as between these two and Death (Yama), or, just as in the Scriptural passage "Oh Gautama, this (heavenly) world, indeed, is Agni, and the Sun is its fuel (Samid)", even though there are such common features as 'fuel etc.', the heavenly world never really is transformed into the condition of the material Agni, even so, it is here.—51.

*By the subsequent (Brāhmaṇa passage as well as the preceding one) also, (it is understood) that the Scriptures purport to enjoin (the Vidyā), and the relation (of the actual Agni with the Vidyā) is due to the profusion (of the subordinate parts of Agni).*  
—52.

Even in the subsequent proximate Brāhmaṇa—"This world, indeed, is the built up Agni", it is observed that the aim of the Scriptures is the enjoining of the Vidyā, and it does not aim at the giving of any injunction with regard to any purely subsidiary part of action. Even there the same is implied from the Scriptures which censure 'mere action' and glorify the Vidyā, in the Shloka—"It is by Vidyā that they ascend to that stage from where all desires are rolled back. Performers of mere ritualistic action (Dakṣiṇāh) do not go there nor do the ignorant ascetics." Similarly, even in the preceding Brāhmaṇa, viz. "This sphere that fiercely shines", it is the Vidyā that appears to be the chief thing and not mere action, as the Brāhmaṇa concludes by

stating the fruit of the Vidyā only, thus—"He becomes immortal, Death becomes his own self", and in common with it, the same is the case here. In this Vidyā very many subordinate parts of the actual Agni are to be imagined and for that reason the Vidyā is made to connect with the sacrifice, and not because it is subservient to action. Therefore, the conclusion thus established is that these conceptual Agnis are of the nature of a mere Vidyā.—52.

### 30. AIKĀTMYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 53-54.

*Some (deny the existence) of the Jīva-Self  
i.e. the Ātmā, (as apart from the body)  
because (as they say), it exists only when  
a body exists.—53.*

Now here the existence of the Jīva-Self i.e. the Ātmā as apart from the body is being justified, in order to establish its competency for suffering bondage or attaining Final Release. Were the Jīva-Self as apart from the body, not in fact to exist, injunctions (for actions) having the fruit of the acquisition of the heavenly world could not be reasonably sustainable, and (under such circumstances) how can anybody possibly be taught the Brahma-hood of the Jīva-Self? But (says the opponent of Vedānta), in the first Pāda of the Chief Shāstra (Pū.-Mī. 1.15) mention has been made of the existence of the Jīva-Self as apart from the body, as (an entity) capable of i.e. fit for experiencing the fruit as stated by the Shāstra. (We reply) —No doubt it is so stated there by its commentator (Shabaraswāmi) but there is no Sūtra there (by Jaimini), relating specifically to the existence of the Jīva-Self. Here, however, the compiler of the Sūtrās (Bādarāyaṇa) has himself established its existence by first raising a doubt as to its existence. It is from here that Āchārya Shabaraswāmi has borrowed it, and referred to it in the Pramāṇa-Lakṣhaṇa (Chapter in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsa dealing with the characteristics of the means-of-proof such as the Scriptures and the Smritis). It is to this again that Bhagavān Upa-varsha has referred, when the necessity of discussing the existence of the Jīva-Self arose in the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsa, by saying that he would speak about it in the Shārīraka. Now



here, when the meditations (Upāsanās) having injunctions as their authority are being considered, the existence of the Jīva-Self is being discussed as being complementary to the entire Shāstra. In the former topic of discussion (Adhikaraṇa) it has been described, as to how the conceptual Agnis are for the chief aim of the Purusha, by determining, that some matters can be taken apart from the chapter (Prakaraṇa), and it is now, when it has become necessary to explain, as to what that Purusha is, for whom these conceptual Agnis are meant, that the existence of the Jīva-Self as apart from the body is spoken of. This is the first Sūtra that has the purpose of stating the objection (of the opponent of Vedānta), for, it is by the refutation of such a preliminary objection, that a firm conviction as to the statement intended to be made (by the Vedāntin), is generated, in accordance with the maxim of 'making an iron pile firm by digging it (deep into the earth)'. As regards this (Topic), some, to wit, the Lokāyatikās (Materialists), who consider the body itself to be the Jīva-Self, and that any Jīva-Self as such as apart from the body does not exist, and who also hold, that sentiency (Chaitanya) which is not perceived to exist in this external world etc., taken both singly or collectively (Samastavyasteshu), may yet possibly exist when the elements transform themselves into the form of a body, and say, that sentiency like some intoxicating power, results from those elements, and that a Purusha is merely a body possessed of such sentiency, and that there is no Jīva-Self as such as apart from the body, capable of proceeding to the heavenly world or capable of obtaining Final Release, and by whom sentiency is generated in the body. They understand that the body itself is the sentient Jīva-Self, and give a reason for it (as is stated in the Sūtra above), viz., that the Jīva-Self exists only when a body exists. That which exists only when something exists, and does not exist when such other thing does not exist, is understood to be the attribute of such other thing, just as heat and light are the attributes of fire. Prāṇa, movement, sentiency, memory etc. understood to be the attributes of the Jīva-Self by the advocates of the Ātmā, but which are perceivable only in a body and not as the attributes of anything as apart from the body, thus deserve to be merely the attri-

butes of the body, as long as the existence of an entity endowed with such attributes such as the Jīva-Self is not established. Therefore the Jīva-Self is not something which is different from the body.—53.

This being the conclusion (of the materialist), we reply :—

*But it is not (so). (The Jīva-Self) is something apart (from a body), because (the attributes of the Jīva-Self) do not exist even when it (i.e. the body) exists. It is, as it is in the case of perception.—54.*

It is not (as asserted by the opponent of Vedānta) that there is no Jīva-Self as such as apart from the body. It does deserve to exist separately from the body, because, the attributes (of the Jīva-Self) do not exist, even when the body exists. If it be held (as is held by the opponent of Vedānta) that the attributes of the Ātmā are but merely the attributes of the body (because they exist when the body exists), then why could it not be held by him (equally justifiably) that these attributes *are not* the attributes of the body, because they *are not* seen to exist, even when a body still exists? Besides, the attributes (of the Ātmā) are dissimilar to the attributes of the body. Form (Rūpa) etc., which are the attributes of a body, continue to exist as long as a body exists, but vital breath and movement etc. are absent in the Death-condition, even though (in that death-condition) the body does still exist. Besides as long as the **body** exists, the attributes of the body are perceivable by others also, but not so the attributes of the Ātmā, such as sentiency, memory etc.. Besides as long as the body exists, it is possible to ascertain the existence of these attributes (of the Ātmā) conclusively, as long as life exists, but it is not possible to ascertain their non-existence conclusively, after the body has ceased to exist, because may be (for aught we know) the attributes may well continue to exist in the Ātmā, even when perchance the body has fallen, the Ātmā having transmigrated into another body. The view of the opponent (of Vedānta) thus stands refuted merely by the raising of a doubt (about its validity, because in the absence of definite proof, his view, at best is but a

mere hypothesis). The opponent (of Vedānta) may well be counter-questioned as to what he considers to be the nature of this 'sentiency' which he prefers wishfully to hold as originating from the elements. The materialist does not recognize any entity (Tattva) as such, other than this quartette of elements (Earth, Water, Teja, and Vāyu). Now if it be said (by the opponent) that the perception of the elements and their products, itself is 'sentiency', then inasmuch as they (i.e. the elements) are but the objects of such sentiency, sentiency cannot possibly be *their* attribute, because action by an entity on itself, is contradictory, as for instance, fire which is hot, cannot burn itself, nor can an actor (acrobat), be he ever so well trained, be able to ride on his own shoulder. If sentiency be the attribute of elements and their products, they cannot be made the objects of such sentiency, nor can form (Rūpa) etc., make form etc. themselves or the form of any external and internal (bodily) elements and their products, their objects. Hence, inasmuch as we do in fact understand the existence of the perception of elements and their products, we must necessarily understand the separateness of such perception from such elements and their products. Now the Ātmā as we understand it, is of the nature of being perceivable, and hence of course, this Ātmā is an entity apart from the body. Now this perception being of a uniform nature, the Ātmā is eternal, because even under circumstances of a different condition (such as a dream-condition) it recognizes itself as the perceiver, thus—'It is I that saw this', and besides it is only thus that Smritis etc. become reasonably sustainable. The argument advanced (by the opponent of Vedānta) that because the attributes (of the Ātmā) exist only when a body exists and therefore 'Perception' is the attribute of the body, is refuted in the manner described (above).

Besides, because, perception (of objects) takes place only when auxiliary implements such as a lamp etc. are available, and as it does not take place in the absence of such auxiliary implements, it cannot, merely on that ground, become the property of a lamp etc.. In the same manner, because, perception takes place when a body exists and does not take place when a body does not exist, it does not thereby deserve to be the property of the body. Because, it is reasonably sustainable that like the lamp etc., a body is

merely useful as an auxiliary implement. Nor is it that a body is invariably necessary in the matter of perception, because when during dream-condition the body has absolutely no movement, a variety of perceptions is observable. Therefore, (the view) that the Self as apart from a body, does exist, is clearly flawless.—54.

31. *ANGĀVABADDHĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 55-56.*

*But (injunctions about meditations) connected with subordinate parts (of sacrificial acts such as the Udgītha Karma) are not (restricted) to the particular branches (of the Vedās, in which they occur, but because the meditations are identical), they are available in each Veda.—55.*

This incidental digression (about the Jiva-Self) is now finished and we will now revert to the discussion relevant (to the Pāda). The doubt that arises here is, as to whether, injunctions to meditations connected with Vidyās such as the Udgītha etc., prescribed in the different branches of each Veda, such as “One should meditate on ‘Om’ which is the Udgītha” (Chhān. 1.1.1), “One should meditate on the Sāma of five kinds, as so many different worlds” (Chhān. 2.2.1), “Verily, what people speak about as Uktha (viz. Shastra i.e. a collection of Mantrās sung by the Ritvijās during a sacrifice) is but this earth” (Ait. Ār. 2.1.2), “This built up fire indeed is the world (Loka)” (Shata. Brā. 10.5.4.1), are applicable only to the Udgītha of the particular branch in which they are mentioned, or whether they are applicable in all the various branches. This doubt has been so stated on the assumption, that inasmuch as the accents (Svarās) in each branch are different, the Udgīthās in each branch also are different. What then is the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta)? It is, that these injunctions to meditation relate to the Udgītha of each individual branch separately. Whence is it so? Because of proximity (Sannidhāna). Because, when it is only generally prescribed that the Udgītha should be meditated upon, there naturally is a desire to know as to what particular Udgītha is meant, and such desire etc. is subsequently satisfied by the proximate special direction in each indi-

vidual branch, and also because there is no reason for transgressing that (special direction) and accepting the special direction in another branch. Therefore, the meditation on the Udgītha in each branch is confined to that branch alone. This being the conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta), the Sūtrakāra replies—"But (injunctions about meditations) connected with the subordinate parts etc.". The word 'but' in the Sūtra refutes the view (of the opponent of Vedānta). These (meditations) are not confined, each to its own individual branch only, but are available in all branches. Whence is it so? Because of the absence of any special distinction in the Scriptural statements about the Udgītha. If it be supposed that the meditation mentioned in each branch is confined to that branch alone, and the general Scriptural statement "Let one meditate on the Udgītha", which does not purport to express any particularization, is made to indicate any such particularization on the ground of proximity, the Scriptural statement would thus be contradicted. This would not be logical, because a 'Scriptural statement' has greater force than mere 'proximity (Sannidhāna)'. Besides, it is not that a Vidyā can have a general application would not be reasonably sustainable. Hence, notwithstanding differences in accents, inasmuch as the Udgītha is one and the same everywhere, the injunctions must be understood to be applicable to all the branches generally.—55.

*Or rather, as in the case of Mantrās etc..  
there is no contradiction here.—56.*

Or rather, no such contradiction should be doubted here, viz. as to how an injunction about the Udgītha Vidyā prescribed in one branch can at all be available for the Udgītha Vidyā etc. of another branch, because, it is reasonably sustainable, that, as in the case of Mantrās etc. there can be no contradiction here. For it is seen that Mantrās, actions and subsidiary parts (Guṇās) which occur in one branch, are made applicable in another branch also. (For instance) even in the case of the followers of that particular branch, in which the Mantra recited in another branch during the taking up of the stone (for pounding rice etc.)—viz. "Thou art the Kuṭaru"—is not mentioned, its application in their branch is observed, thus—"He takes up the

stone (accompanying such act by reciting) 'Thou art the Kukkuṭa or thou art the Kuṭaru'. Similarly in the case of those (for instance the Maitrāyaṇis) in whose case Prayājās (Sacrificing of Samids) are not prescribed, an injunction with regard to this subsidiary item of such a Prayāja is given, thus—"Verily the seasons are the Prayājās and they should be offered in one and the same place". (Here the word 'seasons' which indicates the *number* of the Prayājās and 'the offering of them in one and the same place' are subsidiary actions i.e. Karmāṅgās.) Similarly also in the case of those, in whose branch, a Mantra giving instruction about the kind of animal to be sacrificed, such as "A he-goat should be sacrificed to Agni and Soma", is not mentioned, a Mantra indicative of that (recited by the Adhvaryu) is observed thus—" (Oh Hotri), recite the Anuvākya for the offering of the fat of the pericardium of a he-goat". Similarly, it is observed that the Mantra "Oh Agni, promote the Hotra and the Sacrifice", which occurs in one Veda, is accepted in another Veda. Similarly, also the hymn (Sūkta) "He (Indra), as soon as he was born, became capable of being thoughtful", recited in the Veda of the Bahvrchās (i.e. followers of Rigveda), is observed by the followers of Yajurveda by the Mantra "For the Adhvaryu, the Sajaniya hymn (in which the words 'Sajanāsa Indrah' occur, is to be recited)". Therefore, just as the subordinate parts of a sacrificial act on which the Vidyās depend, are observed to be accepted everywhere, even so, the Vidyās which depend upon such subordinate parts, are accepted everywhere, and hence there is no contradiction (involved).—56.

32. BHŪMAJYAYASTVĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 57.

*There is top-ranking eminence (Jyāyastva) of Bhūmā (i.e. Cosmic Self) (as the object of meditation), as it is, in the case of a Kratu (Sacrifice), for the Scriptures also indicate so.—57.*

In the legend beginning with "Oh Prāchinashāla Aupamanyava" (Chhān. 5.11.1), the Scriptures speak of meditation on the Vaishvānara (the Cosmic Self) in its individual (Vyasta) and collective (Samasta) aspect. Medi-

tation on the individual aspect of it is as follows:—"Oh Aupamanyava (asked Ashvapati Kaikeya), 'On whom dost thou meditate as the Self?' He replied, 'Oh respected King, it is on the heaven (that I meditate)'. Ashvapati said, 'Verily that Self on which you meditate and which is called the Sutejā (the brightly shining Self) is the Vaishvānara Self.'" (Chhān. 5.12.1). Similarly, meditation on the collective aspect is as follows—"Of this Vaishvānara Self, the caput is Sutejā, the eye is Vishvarūpa, the Prāṇa is the Prithagvartmā Self, the torso is Bahula, Rayi (wealth) is the bladder, the feet are this Earth" (Chhān. 5.18.2). Now, with regard to this, the doubt arises, as to whether the meditation (on Vaishvānara) shall be both ways i.e. individually and collectively, or collectively only. What then is the conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta)? It is that meditation should be separate on every separate part, because in the case of every part (Avayava) viz. "Sutejā" etc. the predicate 'thou meditatest' is used by the Scriptures, and also because the Scriptures speak of different fruits of such meditations, thus—"In your family a progressively intensive pressing out of the Soma juice (for Soma-Yāga) is seen" (which means that your family is extremely religious) (Chhān. 5.12.1). With regard to that, it is said (by the Vedāntin)—It appears that this sentence purports to speak of the top-ranking eminence of the Cosmic Self, Vaishvānara, the aggregate of all limbs (such as the caput, the eye etc.), and not of the meditation on every individual part of it also. It is, as it is, in the case of a sacrifice (Kratu). It is just as it is, in a sacrifice such as the Darshapūrṇamāsa, etc., viz. that the collective performance of the principal part along with the subsidiary part is intended to be spoken of, and not of the individual parts such as the Prayājās etc. separately, nor of the principal part along with only one such subsidiary part. (Here the opponent of Vedānta says)—Whence is it so understood? (We reply)—because, the Cosmic Self (Bhūmā) alone is of top-ranking eminence. Even so it is understood that the Bhūmā i.e. Cosmic Self is of top-ranking eminence, because it is understood that the Scriptural statements have been reconciled as having that one uniform meaning. By viewing the earlier and the later portion, it is understood that this sentence, one as it is, is with respect to the

Vaishvānara Vidyā. Because it is so said (by the Scriptures). The Scriptures, beginning with (the statement) 'the six sages', beginning with 'Prāchinashāla', etc., and including Uddālaka at the end, being unable to attain a firm understanding faith (Parinishṭhā) in the Vaishvānara Vidyā, state that they approached Ashvapati Kaikeya, and later on, state, that the sages spoke of the heaven etc. individually, as being the object of meditation of each sage respectively, and still later on, speak of heaven etc. as being only the caput etc. of Vaishvānara, thus—" (He said)—this is merely the caput of the Self" (Chhān. 5.12.2). They also censure meditation on individual parts (by putting in the mouth of Ashvapati-Kaikeya), thus—"Had you not approached me (for instruction), your head would have dropped off". Again, rejecting meditation on each individual part, and approving of the meditation on the collective aspect, the Scriptures indicate how the fruit is dependent only upon the Cosmic Self (Bhūmā), thus—"Who eats food (by residing) in all the worlds, in all beings, and in all the Selves" (Chhān. 5.18.1). Individual fruits with respect to Sutejā etc. individually mentioned by the Scriptures, should be understood as meaning that the fruits of the meditations on individual parts should be pooled together as the one single fruit of the meditation on the principal entity (i.e. Bhūmā, the Cosmic Self). Similarly, the Scriptural statement with regard to each individual part, by the use of the predicate 'thou meditate' is also for the purpose of referring to the opinion of each individual sage only, and not for the purpose of enjoining meditation on each individual part.

Therefore, (the conclusion is, that) the view about the combined meditation on the Bhūmā, the Cosmic Self, is the better one. Some are of opinion that by using the word 'better' and establishing, that the view about the meditation in the aggregate form is the better one, the Sūtrakāra looks upon with some approval at least on the view about the meditation on individual parts also. But, this is not logical, because when it is understood that reconciliation of different Scriptural statements is possible, it is not logical to think that one sentence has two different meanings, and also because, (if so understood) the censure expressed by the sentence "your head would have dropped off" would be



contradicted. Besides when meditation on the aggregate aspect is clearly to be understood from the concluding portion, it is not justifiable (for the opponent of Vedānta) to speak about the meditation on the aggregate aspect as being conspicuous by its absence, in the Scriptural statement, while stating his (i.e. the opponent's) own view. Even the statement in the Sūtra about 'the top-ranking eminence' (Jyāyastva) in the Sūtra is also reasonably sustainable as meaning 'authoritative'.—57.

### 33. SHABDADIBHEDĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 58.

*(The Vidyās mentioned by the Scriptures in different places) are separate, because the words etc. are different.—58.*

It has been said in the foregoing Adhikaraṇa that notwithstanding that the Scriptures speak of different fruits of Sutejā etc., collective meditation (on the Cosmic Self) is better and greater. This may create a notion that it is also taught that other meditations (Upāsanās) mentioned in different Scriptural statements are also to be combined together. Besides, it cannot be possible to understand the Vidyās to be separate, when there is no difference in the object of such Vidyās. The object to be known constitutes the nature of Vidyās, even as the materials to be used as offerings, and the deities (of a sacrifice), constitute the nature of a sacrifice. Now it is understood here, that even though there are separate Scriptural statements, the entity to be known (by the Vidyā) is but one and the same, viz. the Lord, as in "He has the mind as his structure and the Prāṇa as his body" (Chhān. 3.14.2), "Ka is Brahma, Kha is Brahma" (Chhān. 4.10.5), "He whose wishes are true and whose purposes are true" (Chhān. 8.1.15) etc.. Similarly also in "Prāṇa alone is, Prāṇa verily is the absorber" (Chhān. 4.3.3), "Prāṇa verily is the seniormost and the best" (Chhān. 7.15.1) etc.. Because the entity to be known is one and the same, therefore, the Vidyās are identical. In this view, the separateness of Scriptural statements is not purposeless, inasmuch as each Scriptural statement refers to different attributes (i.e. Guṇās) (of the same entity), therefore, in order that the Vidyā may be complete in itself, the various different natures belonging to one and the same

object of knowledge, should, even though prescribed separately in our and the opponent's branches of Scriptural statements, be combined together. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), it is stated—the Vidyās are separate etc.. Even though there is no difference in the object to be known, Vidyās of this kind deserve to be separate. Whence is it so? Because the words etc. are different. There is such difference in the words, as for instance—"He knows", "He should meditate", "He should resolve" etc. (Chhān. 3.14.1). Earlier (in the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) difference in words is understood to be a reason for considering ritualistic acts as separate (Pū.-Mī. 2.2.1). By the expression "etc." (in the Sūtra) it is implied that the attributes (i.e. Guṇās of the Vidyās) should, as far as it would be possible, be understood as furnishing reasons for considering the Vidyās as separate. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) the words "He knows" etc., signify a difference in words only, and not a difference in their meaning also, as is indicated by the words "He sacrifices" etc., because all these words have no difference as between themselves, and uniformly mean the same thing viz. the activity or mode of the mind, and there is no possibility of their having any other meaning. How can then a difference in words cause a difference in Vidyās? (We reply)—This is no fault. Because, even though as meaning an activity or mode of the mind there is no difference (between them), still, when a difference in the object of knowledge, resulting from a difference in connection, is present, separateness of the Vidyās (from each other) becomes reasonably sustainable. Even though the object of meditation, viz. the Lord, is one and the same (in all the Vidyās), the Scriptures mention in each chapter, mutually exclusive and different attributes i.e. Guṇās (of the Lord). Similarly, even though the Prāṇa as the object of meditation is without any difference, and is but one and the same everywhere, still, as on account of the difference in connection, one attribute is to be meditated upon in one meditation, and another, in another, and as there is thus a difference in the object of knowledge, it is understood that the Vidyās are separate. It is not possible to maintain here, that one enjoins a Vidyā and the other enjoins the attributes i.e. Guṇās only, because of the absence of any cause for such determination. And

as in each chapter there are many attributes i.e. Guṇās. that it should enjoin attributes i.e. Guṇās relating to a Vidyā which has already been established elsewhere, is not reasonably sustainable. As far as the (opponent's) view is concerned, attributes such as 'His having true desires etc.', being common to all, do not deserve to be mentioned more than once. Besides as each chapter separately mentions, how one who desires a particular thing should meditate on this, and how one who desires some other thing should meditate on some other thing, and as it is understood therefrom that they (the Upāsanās) do not need to borrow anything from each other, these chapters are not reconcilable. Nor, as in the case of the Vaishvānara Vidyā, is there any other injunction for knowing these meditations as combined into one composite meditation, on the strength of which, these separate meditations on parts, occurring in each chapter, should attain reconciliation. Besides, if it were to be understood unrestrictedly (Nirankushatvena) on the ground of the object of knowledge of all Vidyās being one and the same, that there is unity of Vidyās, an impossible combination of all attributes (Guṇās) wherever they may occur, will have to be understood. Therefore, it is very properly said (by the Sūtrakāra) that the meditations are separate by reason of the words being different. It should be understood, that it is subject to this, i.e. by assuming this Adhikaraṇa as established, that the opening Sūtra of this Pāda is stated in the form in which it is stated.—58.

#### 34. VIKALPĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 59.

*Option (about the Vidyās is available) because the fruit (of all) is not special in each Vidyā (i.e. it is the same in the case of all Vidyās).—59.*

It being (thus) established that the Vidyās are separate, it is now being considered whether one can collectively perform all these, or optionally any one of them, as one pleases, or whether one can as a rule, exercise an option with regard to them. So far as this is concerned the separateness of these Vidyās having been established, there

is no reason for a rule that they should all be collectively performed (by one man). But (says the opponent of Vedānta), separate as such sacrifices as the Agnihotra and the Darshapūrṇamāsa etc. are, it is seen that there is a rule that they are all to be collectively performed (by one man). (We reply)—This is no fault, because (in their case), a Scriptural statement about their regular performance, is the reason (for their collective performance by one man), while there is no such Scriptural statement with regard to these (Vidyās), and therefore there is neither a rule requiring their regular performance collectively (by one man), nor a rule necessarily prescribing an option as to their performance. Competency of a man for (the performance of) one Vidyā does not prevent his competency as to the performance of another Vidyā. Therefore according to the only remaining alternative the performance of all collectively (by one man) or any one of the Vidyās as desired, optionally, enures. But as the fruit of all these (Vidyās) is the same, it is logical that there should be an option with regard to them. For Scriptural statements, such as “He has mind as his structure and Prāṇa as his body” (Chhān. 3.14.2), “Ka is Brahma, Kha is Brahma” (Chhān. 4.10.5), “He whose wishes are true and whose resolutions are true” (Chhān. 8.1.5), are all uniformly observed to have the attainment of the Lord as their fruit. (The opponent of Vedānta replies)—This is no fault, because it is observed that religious actions, the means of the attainment of heaven etc., which have a common fruit, are performed as one desires. Hence the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) being that the Vidyās may be performed just as one pleases, it is replied (by the Vedāntin) that they deserve to have an option and not that they must all be combined. Whence is it so? Because the fruit (of all) is the same, viz., the actual realization of the object of meditation. When the object of meditation, such as the Lord, is actually realized by one Vidyā, the other is rendered purposeless. Besides (such a view) involves the non-possibility (of such realization). The view that all Vidyās may be collectively performed (by one man) for actual realization, would cause distraction of the mind. The Scriptures indicate that the fruit of a Vidyā is secured by the actual realization (of the Lord), thus—“He who has

realized (the object of meditation) and who has no doubt left (realizes Brahma)" (Brih. 3.14.4), "Having attained Godhood, he becomes absorbed in the Godhead" (Brih. 4.1.2) etc.. Similarly, the Smṛiti passage "who is always imbued with that faith" (Bh. G. 8.6) etc.. Therefore, one should choose one out of the several Vidyās which have all one common fruit and perform it with undivided attention, till such fruit is obtained by the actual realization of the object of meditation, (is the conclusion).—59.

### 35. KĀMYĀDHIKARĀṆAM. Sū. 60.

*Vidyās for the attainment of desires (Kāmyāḥ), may, as desired, be collectively performed (by one man) or not, because there is absence of any reason, as was available (in the previous Sūtra).—60.*

This Sūtra mentions an illustration of a Vidyā which is the converse of those whose fruit is one and the same (as stated in the previous Sūtra). In these Vidyās which are performed with a view to particular desires, as for instance, thus—"He who knows this Vāyu as being the offspring of the direction, does not have to bemoan the loss of a son" (Chhān. 3.15.2), "He who meditates on the names (such as Rigveda etc.) as Brahma, is able to roam about at will, quite up to that extent as the extent upto which the Names i.e. the Vedās go" etc. (Chhān. 7.1.5), —and which like sacrificial action, encompass their fruit by means of the unseen principle (Adṛishṭa), there is no expectancy of direct realization (of Brahma). And they can either be all combined or not, as desired because any such reason, as that the fruit is one and the same, is absent.—60.

### 36. YATHĀSHRAYĀBHĀVĀDHIKARĀṆAM. Sū. 61-66.

*Vidyās connected with parts of sacrificial action are on a par with that which is the support on which they rest.—61.*

When a doubt, exists, as to whether, Vidyās which depend upon subsidiary parts of sacrificial action, such as

the Udgītha, and which are mentioned in the three Vedās, should all be necessarily performed collectively, or just according to one's wish, the Sūtrakāra says that they are on a par with that which is their support (Āshraya) and on which they depend. Just as Scriptural hymns or Riks (Stotrās), on which these Vidyās depend, are all taken collectively (for the purpose of a sacrifice) even so should the Vidyās depending on them (be collectively performed) because all the Vidyās depend upon their support.—61.

*Also because of the instructions (about the Vidyās).—62.*

Just as Scriptural hymns or Riks etc. which are the support of the Vidyās, are taught in the Vedās, even so, is the instruction with regard to the Vidyās which depend on them. The meaning is, that there is no difference as such, made by the Scriptural instructions, between the several subsidiary parts of action (Karma) and the Vidyās (Upāsānās).—62.

*On account of (the indicatory mark viz.) the rectification (of flaws).—63.*

The Scriptural statement "It is from the seat of the priest who presides at the Sacrifices (Hotri) (i.e. by virtue of the work done by him), that any defect (i.e. mistakes in accents etc.) in the singing (of Sāma by the Udgātri) is automatically cured" (Chhān. 1.5.5) intimates, how, by virtue of the knowledge, that the Prāṇava (i.e. the syllable 'Om') and the Udgītha are one and the same, the defect caused by a mistake of the Udgātri (the Sāma-chanting priest) in chanting, is automatically cured by the work of the Hotri, and this indicatory mark suggests that inasmuch as a Vidyā mentioned in one Veda has a common relation with another mentioned in another Veda the meditations (i.e. the Pratyayās) occurring in all the Vedās have to be combined.—63.

*And also because of the Scriptural statement about the attributes (of the Vidyās) being common (the Vidyās are taken collectively).—64.*

The Scriptures mention how the Omkāra, which is an attribute (Guṇa) i.e. the support of the Vidyā, is common to all the three Vedās, thus—"It is by that (i.e. the Syllable 'Om') that the Vidyās of the three kinds (characterized by Rigveda etc. and by the religious sacrificial acts enjoined by them) begin, thus—He the Adhvaryu gives order after saying 'Om', by saying 'Om' the Hotri priest recites, and by saying 'Om' the Udgātri priest sings" (Chhān. 1.1.9). Hence it is, that the support viz. 'Om' constitutes an indicatory mark about the Vidyās being common to all the three Vedās (and they have to be taken collectively). Or the Sūtra is explained as follows:—Were the Udgītha etc. which constitute the nature of the sacrificial acts not to be common to all sacrificial acts, the Vidyās which depend on them, also would not be common. But Scriptural passages intimate, by means of the terms used in the performance of acts which cover all subsidiary parts, that the Udgītha etc. are common to all sacrificial acts, and hence, that, inasmuch as the support is common, the Vidyās also are taken collectively (is our conclusion).—64.

*Or rather not (i.e. meditations do not go with the sacrificial acts on which they depend) because of the non-existence of any Scriptural passage (to that effect).—65.*

The words "or rather not" refute the view (of the opponent of Vedānta). Meditations which are dependent (on subsidiary sacrificial actions) do not go together with the subsidiary parts on which they depend. Whence is it so? Because of the non-existence of any Scriptural passage (to that effect). Just as the subsidiary sacrificial acts prescribed in the trio of Vedās and the Scriptural hymns etc. are seen to go together, as for instance in—"Having taken the pot in the hand or having taken up the Sacrificial ladle, he recites the hymn i.e. Stotra, and after reciting it, says—Oh Prastotri, do thou sing the Sāma, Oh Hotri, sacrifice this", similarly there is no such Scriptural passage about the going together of the meditations. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) the text prescribing the performance may as well establish their going together. We reply—No, because the meditations subserve the purpose of a man, while the text about the performance, may, if at all, estab-

lish the going together of the Udgītha etc., which subserve the purpose of a sacrifice. It has already been mentioned by us, that meditations such as Udgītha etc., even though they depend upon a sacrifice, may, like the milk-pail, subserve the purpose of a man, as in Br. Sū. III. iii. 42. This precisely is the special difference depending upon instruction, as between subsidiary acts of a sacrifice and the meditations which depend upon such acts, viz., that while one subserves the purpose of a sacrifice, the other subserves the purpose of a man. The two indicatory marks (referred to in Sūtras 63 and 64 above) cannot be a reason for the going together of the meditations, because they cannot be construed as having any Scriptural statement, or a logical reason, as the basis for it. Now, it cannot be supposed that because all the dependent things are included in any performance (of a sacrificial act), they also include all the meditations which depend on them, because meditations are not employed for that purpose. Meditations even though they depend upon some support, may at the most, not exist when their supports do not exist, but it is not that they deserve to go together with that which forms their support. The reason is, that the Scriptures have not mentioned anything to that effect. Therefore, meditations should be performed, just as one pleases.—65.

*And also because it is so indicated by the Scriptures.—66.*

The Scriptures mention, how meditations do not go together (with sacrificial subordinate acts) thus—"Verily the Brahmā priest (the master of ceremonies) who knows it to be so, protects the sacrifice, the host (in a sacrifice), and all the Rītvijās" (Chhān. 4.7.10). 'Now if all meditations were intended to be combined, then in that case as every body (amongst the priests) would be understood to be knowing every such meditation, the Scriptures could not have stated that the Brahmā priest who knows it to be so, is the protector of all the rest. Therefore, (the conclusion is that) meditations should be combined together or an option about them should be understood, just as one would wish.—66.

*Here ends Pāda III of Adhyāya III.*



1. PURUSHĀRTHĀDHIKARĀṆAM. Sū. 1-17.

*Bādarāyaṇa (is of opinion) that according to (the authority of) the Scriptures, the chief aim of man (i.e. Final Release, is attained) through this (i.e. the knowledge of the Self).—1.*

The Sūtrakāra, now starting on the inquiry as to whether the Upanishadic knowledge of the 'Self' is connected with religious action (Karma), through a person competent to perform such religious action, or whether it constitutes an altogether independent means of the attainment of the chief aim of man, begins (this Sūtra) by stating the conclusion itself, thus—The chief aim of man is (attained) through this (i.e. the knowledge of the Self). Achārya Bādarāyaṇa considers that it is through this altogether independent knowledge of the 'Self' prescribed in the Vedānta (texts) that the chief aim of man is attained. How is it so understood? The Sūtrakāra replies by beginning thus—It is so understood on the authority of the Scriptural statements of such kind as "One who knows the Self transcends grief" (Chhān. 7.1.3), "He who knows that transcendent Brahma, himself becomes Brahma" (Muṇḍ 3.2.9), "One who knows the Brahma-Self attains transcendent Brahma" (Tait. 2.1.1), "It is the one (who is blessed) with a teacher that knows (Brahma); He needs but wait only till he is relieved (of the body) and (when he is so relieved) he directly attains (Brahma)" (Chhān. 6.14.2). Again beginning thus—"This Self which is free from sin", the Scriptures further declare—"He who has searched for and understood that Self obtains all the worlds and all desires" (Chhān. 8.7.1). Similarly, Scriptural statements beginning with "It is the Self, Oh, Maitreyi, that should be seen" (Brih. 4.5.6). The Scriptures by the passage "Such indeed, Oh Maitreyi, is the measure of immortality" (Brih. 4.5.15) declare, how the knowledge (of the Self) alone is the means of attaining the chief aim of man.—1.

Here some opponent says—

*Jaimini is of opinion that the Scriptural statement about the chief aim of man, is, as in other cases, of the nature of an Arthavāda only, because (the Jīva-Self) is in a subservient relation (to religious actions).  
—2.*

Jaimini considers that in as much as the Jīva-Self, by way of being an agent (Kartā), is in a subservient relation to religious action, the knowledge of the Self also, like such things as the action of the sprinkling of rice with water (Vrihiprokṣhaṇā) etc., has through such things necessarily a connection with religious action, and the Scriptural statement about the fruit of such knowledge of the Self, also is an Arthavāda, even as, such other Scriptural statements, about the fruit of the materials (used in a Sacrifice) and about acts such as the refinement (Samskāra) of the materials, as, "He whose sacrificial ladle is of Palāsha wood, does not hear any evil (about himself)", "When he anoints his eye, he thereby avoids the evil eye of his enemy (lit., a Nephew)" and "The Prayāja and Anuyāja oblations offered by him serve as an armour for the Sacrifice as also for the sacrificer, so that his enemies may be confounded", are but an Arthavāda only (i.e. they are in glorification of the material, deity and action respectively). (But, says the Vedāntin)—How can this knowledge of the Self, which is taught (in the Scriptures) without starting any specific chapter about it, be said to enter into any connection with a sacrificial act, in the absence of any such reason or other as a specific chapter about it? If it be said (by you, the opponent of Vedānta), that it is understood from a Scriptural passage (such as) "He who knows Brahma, transcends grief", that such knowledge (of the Self) is connected with a sacrificial act through the agent (i.e. the sacrificer), we reply—No, because, it is not reasonably sustainable that the knowledge (of the Self) can be understood to be so connected with a sacrificial act through the agent by means of the Scriptural passage, because such knowledge (of the Self i.e. Brahma) cannot be employed in a sacrificial act. Now, instruction about such things, given without beginning any special chapter mentioning such things, may be

imagined to have such a connection with religious actions, on the authority of a Scriptural passage, by way of such things having an invariable connection with religious action (such as a 'Parnamayī Juhu' i.e. a sacrificial ladle of Palāsha wood has, with a sacrifice), but an agent is a variable intermediary, being common both to worldly as well as religious acts, and therefore it is not established that such knowledge (of the Self) has any such connection with a sacrificial act. (This argument of the Vedāntin, the opponent of Vedānta counters thus)—No, because the knowledge, that the Self is an entity different from the body, is not useful anywhere, except in a religious act. The knowledge that the Self is different from the body, cannot be of any use in a worldly act, because, in all such cases it is reasonably sustainable, that motivation towards any such worldly action depends upon a fruit that is patent. In the case of Scriptural religious actions, however, which bear fruit at some later time, i.e. after death (lit., after the body falls), that there can possibly be any activity in the absence of the knowledge that the Self is different from the body, is not reasonably sustainable, and thus the knowledge that the 'Self' is different from the body, has application precisely in such a case. But (says the Vedāntin) inasmuch as, such adjectives of quality, as, that the 'Self' is free from sin, are employed (in the case of the Self), the doctrine of Upanishadic knowledge, that the Self is not of a transmigratory nature, cannot be subservient to any tendency (for any action). (The opponent of Vedānta says)—No, the Scriptural instruction viz. that the Ātmā should be seen, is precisely with respect to that very transmigratory Self, as is suggested by the terms 'dear' etc., while the adjective of quality that it is free from sin may well be in glorification of the Jīva-Self. But (says the Vedāntin) that the Upanishads profess to teach that this superior (Adhikam) and non-transmigratory Brahma is indeed the cause of the world, and that that alone constitutes the real nature of the transmigratory Jīva-Self, has been established (by us) in several different places. Of course it is so established, but it is with a view to strengthen the same conclusion, in a way similar to the digging in of a pile (into the earth) to make it more firm, that objections to that are first raised, for the consideration of

it by way of the fruit of such knowledge of the Self (viz. whether it is the means of the attainment of the chief aim of man viz. Final Release i.e. Moksha, or whether it is only like the fruit of Sacrifices), and they are then refuted.—2.

*Because such conduct of life (of persons who have acquired knowledge of Brahma, but who still perform religious acts) is discernible.—3.*

Passages such as “Janaka, the Videha King, performed a sacrifice characterized by munificent presents (to officiating priests)” and “Oh venerable Sirs, I am about to perform a sacrifice”, referring to statements about those who have realized Brahma, even when they purport to speak of something else (viz. the propounding of Brahma-Vidyā), are still indicative of being supplementary to action. Similarly, seeing that the Scriptures indicate that Uddālaka and others imparted instruction to their sons etc., it is understood that they are connected with the particular order of the life of a householder. Now, if it be (understood) that the chief aim of man is achieved only through the knowledge (of the Self), why would such persons perform actions (sacrifices etc.), involving such strenuous work? Because, is there not the maxim (Nyāya)—why would a person go to a mountain (for honey), if honey be available near at hand (Arke)?—3.

*Because, there is a Scriptural statement to the effect (that by the mere knowledge of the Self the chief aim is not attained).—4.*

The Scriptural passage “That which he does with knowledge, faith, and meditation becomes more powerful” (Chhān. 1.1.10), which directly declares that knowledge is subservient to religious action, shows that mere knowledge (Vidyā) alone is not the means of attaining the chief aim of man.—4.

*Also because (of the Scriptural statement that) they (i.e. knowledge and religious action) go together (after him who goes to the*

*other world) and cooperate in starting the manifestation of their fruits (which shows that knowledge i.e. Vidyā alone is not the cause of the attainment of the chief aim of man).—5.*

The Scriptural passage—"Knowledge and religious actions together go along with the Jiva-Self (when it departs from the body)" (Brih. 4.4.2), which declares that both knowledge (Vidyā) and religious actions together cooperate in starting the manifestation of their fruit, shows that mere knowledge is not the cause of the chief aim of man.—5.

*Also because the Scriptures prescribe (religious action) to those who understand the meaning of the Vedās, (Knowledge i.e. Vidyā is not an independent cause of the attainment of the chief aim of man).—6.*

Scriptural passages such as "He who after studying the Vedās at the preceptor's house, during the time spared after performing all his duties towards his preceptor as prescribed (by the Smritis), and after returning from his preceptor's place (after completing his studies), studies the Scriptural texts in his own family, in a pure place" (Chhān. 8.15.1), show, that he who has understood the meaning of the Vedās, is competent to perform religious actions. Hence also, knowledge (of Brahma) itself independently does not constitute a means of attaining the fruit (of Final Release). But (says the Vedāntin), here, by the words 'after studying the Scriptures', the Scriptures merely speak about the reading or reciting of the Vedās, and not the understanding of their meaning. (We reply)—This is no fault, because (according to Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) as the study of the Vedās has a patent use, it is well established that such study of the Vedās extends upto the complete understanding (comprehension) of their meaning.—6.

*Also because of (the mention of) definite rules (Vidyā is subservient to religious action).—7.*

“One should desire to live for a hundred years doing religious acts. It is in this way alone that action would not affect you (who have this form of man) and in no other way than this” (Īsha. 2). “What is known as Agnihotra is a sacrificial act which has to be performed upto old age or death and a man is relieved of it only by old age or death.” Definite rules such as these show that knowledge is complementary to action (because, there would not be any such rules, if a person were to be able to get rid of Karma on attaining knowledge).—7.

This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) the Sūtrakāra refutes it (as follows) :—

*But, because the Scriptural instruction is about one, (who is) even greater (than the Jīva-Self), it shows that Bādarāyaṇa's view is proper i.e. correct. The Scriptures also declare so.—8.*

The view (of the opponent of Vedānta) is refuted by the word but (Tu). The claim (made by the opponent of Vedānta) viz., that because knowledge (of the Self i.e. Brahma) is subservient (to religious action), it is but an Arthavāda (Bra. Sū. III. iv. 2), is not reasonably sustainable. Whence is it so? Because the Scriptures teach about one who is even greater (than the Jīva-Self). If the Vedānta texts were to give instruction, only about the transmigratory Jīva-Self as being embodied and as one that is an agent and an experiencer, also as being different from the body, then, in the manner described, the Scriptural statements about the fruit (i.e. the chief aim of man viz. Final Release) would be of the nature of an Arthavāda. The Vedānta texts however teach about one who is even greater than the Jīva-Self, viz., the non-transmigratory Highest Lord, (who is) free from the nature of being either an agent or a transmigratory being and is characterized by the nature of being free from all sin, as an entity fit to be known. The Sūtrakāra will hereafter (in Bra. Sū. III. iv. 16) say that the knowledge of that (Brahma) not only does not stimulate any action, but on the contrary, uproots all actions as such. Thus the view of Bhagavān Bādarāyaṇa,

viz., that through the knowledge of Brahma, a man's chief aim of life (i.e. Final Release) is attained (stated in Brahma-Sūtra III. iv. 1), still holds good and valid, and is not disturbed by any fallacious views, such as, that knowledge is subservient or complementary to religious action. Even so do the Scriptural statements indicate the Lord, the Highest Self, to be greater than the Jīva-Self, thus—"One who is omniscient and knows all" (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9), "It is through the terror of it that the wind blows etc." (Tait. 2.5.1), "A great terror, a raised thunderbolt" (Kāṭha. 2.6.2), "It is at the command of this Imperishable one, Oh Gārgi etc." (Bṛih. 3.8.9), "It thought, may I be many, may I bring forth. It created Teja" (Chhān. 6.2.3), etc.. Now, the reference to that transmigratory Jīva-Self suggested by the word 'dear' (Priya) etc. which is brought forward (by the opponent) as the one to be known, by beginning with passages, such as "It is for the pleasure of the Self that everything becomes dear. The Self, Oh Maitreyi, should be seen" (Bṛih. 2.4.5), "He who breathes by means of the Prāṇa (the Vital breath) is exactly your own Self, which is inside everything" (Bṛih. 3.4.1), "This person that is seen in the eye" (Chhān. 8.7.4), and which are afterwards followed up thus—"I shall again explain Him to you" (Chhān. 8.9.3) etc., and when, by reason of the complementary passages, such as "That which is the Rīg-veda etc. is but the divine afflatus of this great being" (Bṛih. 2.4.10), "He who transcends hunger and thirst, sorrow and confusion, old age and death" (Bṛih. 3.5.1); "Having attained the transcendent light, manifests itself in its own form, He is the Puruṣa (*par excellence*)" (Chhān. 8.12.3), a desire to speak about something even greater than the Jīva-Self is clearly discernible there, it is understood that all that is with a view to speak of and emphasize the absolute non-difference (between the Jīva-Self and Brahma), and hence there is no contradiction. The Highest Lord is but the real nature of the embodied Jīva-Self, while the Highest Self's condition as the embodied Jīva-Self is merely caused by limiting adjuncts, on the authority of Scriptural statements such as "That thou art" (Chhān. 6.8.7), "There is no seer other than this" (Bṛih. 3.8.11). We have already described all this at great length in appropriate places before.—8.

*But Scriptural declarations (about the conduct of those who have attained the knowledge of Brahma) equally (support the opposite view).—9.*

With respect to the view (of the opponent of Vedānta), that because, (in the case of those who have attained the knowledge of Brahma) conduct of life as declared by the Scriptures is seen i.e. they are seen to perform religious acts, therefore, knowledge is subservient to religious action, (we reply), that Scriptural declarations about such conduct of life, are equally in support of the view that knowledge is not subservient to religious action. To that very effect is the Scriptural declaration—"The sage Kāvasheya (the son of Kavashā) who had understood that (i.e. Brahma), said, why need I study the Vedās and why need I perform sacrifices? The ancient sages who had understood that (i.e. Brahma) never performed the Agnihotra". "Knowing this Self (i.e. Brahma) the Brāhmaṇās, having discarded their innate desire for progeny (sons), wealth and the (acquisition of the) worlds, thereafter lead a life of mendicancy" (Brih. 3.5.1). It is to be seen (from the Scriptures) that Yājñavalkya and others who had realized Brahma did not bank on religious actions (such as sacrifices etc.), thus—"He (Yājñavalkya) having said (to his wife Maitreyi), 'my dear, verily that much (i.e. the knowledge that the Ātmā is the only one reality), is the means of immortality' renounced the world (and became a Sannyāsin)". Besides, the indicatory mark (about knowledge being subservient to religious actions) as seen (by the opponent of Vedānta) in the passage "Oh, venerable sirs, I am about to perform a sacrifice", occurs in the Vaishvānara Vidyā. Now, it is possible that in the case of a Vidyā dealing with qualified Brahma i.e. Brahma under the influence of limiting adjuncts, knowledge and religious actions may well go together. But (claims the Vedāntin), even there knowledge is not subservient to action (as such people may engage in action for Lokasangraha, i.e. for inducing people towards religious action), because there is no chapter (in the Scriptures) etc. about it.—9.

With regard to the objection (of the opponent of



Vedānta on the ground) that “There is a Scriptural statement about it” (Bra. Sū. III. iv. 4), we reply :—

*(The Scriptural statement) is not, of universal application.—10.*

The Scriptural statement “That which he does with knowledge etc.” (Chhān. 1.1.10) is not applicable to all Vidyās, because it has connection with that particular Vidyā which is relevant (to the context where it occurs) viz. the Udgītha Vidyā—“You should contemplate on the letter (Om) which is the Udgītha” (Chhān. 1.1.1).—10.

*There is a splitting up (as between knowledge and religious actions) as between a hundred (things, divided between two persons).—11.*

The argument (of the opponent of Vedānta in III. iv. 5 above), viz., that the Scriptural statement “Knowledge and religious action together go along with the Jīva-Self (when it departs from the body at the time of death)” (Brih. 4.4.2) is an indicatory mark about Vidyā not being independent, is answered thus—It should be understood that there is a splitting up here, thus, viz. Vidyā accompanies one Purusha (at the death of a person who has attained knowledge) and religious action accompanies another Purusha (an ignorant person who dies). It is, as it is in the case of a hundred (things). Just as, when it is said that that a hundred (things) should be given to these (two persons), they (things) are divided fifty-fifty, and a moiety is given to one and the other moiety is given to another. Besides this statement about ‘going along with’ has no reference to one who is desirous of liberation (from worldly bondage), because the concluding Scriptural statement—“This much about a person who has desires (Kāmaya-mānah)” (Brih. 4.4.6)—has reference to the transmigratory Jīva-Self. And the distinctly separate statement—“Now about (one) who has no desires (Akāmaya-mānah)” (Brih. 4.4.6)—is separately stated with reference to one who is desirous of Final Release. Now the Vidyā contemplated in the case of one who is in the transmigratory con-

dition is understood to be what is Scripturally enjoined and prohibited (i.e. Karma—and not the knowledge of the Self i.e. Ātmā-Vidyā) as there is absence of any special reason (why a particular Vidyā should be understood). 'Action' (referred to here) also means that which is enjoined and that which is prohibited, and only refers to 'action' which is already established elsewhere. This being so, the Scriptural statement about knowledge and action together going along (with the Jīva-Self, after death) may also be understood as not contemplating any such division between knowledge and action.—11.

With regard to the argument, that Scriptures prescribe religious action to such only as understand the meaning of the Vedās (in Bra. Sū. III. iv. 6), the reply given is thus :—

*It is only to him who has merely recited the Scriptures i.e. 'Adhyayanamātravatah'\* (that engaging in religious action is prescribed).—12.*

Because, in the Scriptural statement "Having studied the Vedās at the preceptor's house" (Chhān. 8.15.1), it is merely the reciting (of the Vedās) that is referred to, we conclude that it is only with respect to those who have but only recited the Scriptures (without understanding their meaning) that there is an injunction about religious action. But (says the opponent of Vedānta)—If it is so, then incompetency for the performance of religious action would result for the want of the knowledge of the Scriptures. (We reply)—This is no fault, because we do not deny that the knowledge of religious action resulting from the reciting (of the Vedās) is attained by one who has recited the Vedās and that he attains competency for performing religious actions, but we wish to propound only this much, that, as the Upanishadic knowledge of the Self, is understood to have a fruit of its own independently, it cannot become the cause for the conferment of com-

\* Vaidikās hold that Adhyayana means the reciting of the words of the Vedās, while the Mīmāṃsakās hold that it also means the understanding of the meaning of the Vedās. (Vide Apte's Dic. under *Adhyayana*.)

petency for religious actions. Just as the knowledge of one sacrifice is not necessary for performing another sacrifice, even so should this be looked upon.—12.

With regard to what is said (by the opponent of Vedānta)—viz., Also because definite rules (are prescribed) (Bra. Sū. III. iv. 7)—we reply :—

*No, because there is no (mention of) special qualification.*—13.

There is nothing specifically mentioned in the Scriptural statement “Performing religious actions here (in this world) one should desire to live to be a hundred” (Īsha. 2) to understand any such rule that such a person should be possessed of knowledge. The rule is enjoined (by the Scriptures) without any special qualification attaching.—13.

*Or else the consent (accorded for the performance of religious action) is for the purpose of glorification (of Vidyā).*—14.

The Scriptural passage “Performing religious actions here (in this world) etc.” (Īsha. 2) can have another interpretation as follows :— Even though on the strength of the chapter (Prakaraṇa) it is only one who possesses knowledge, that has any connection with the word ‘doing’, still it should be understood that this permission to perform religious action is for the glorification of the knowledge (of the Self). The Sūtrakāra will later on say—“Religious action does not affect you, who have the nature of a man” (Īsha. 2). By this is meant—Even if a person who has knowledge (of the Self) performs religious actions right throughout his life, such action does not affect him, because of the potency of knowledge, and in this manner, knowledge (of the Self) is thus glorified.—14.

*Also, some others by their wilful unrestrained conduct of life (show their contempt for religious actions).*—15.

Besides, some men having actually experienced the fruit of the knowledge (of Brahma), and solely depending upon the fruit of such knowledge actually experienced by them, say that they have no use for any such other means of attaining other fruits, such as progeny etc.. There is a Scriptural statement in the Vājasaneyi branch, about wilful conduct of life, thus—"Realizing this (Brahma) the sages of old did not have any desire for progeny. Said they—what use have we, who have this Self (Ātmā) and this Loka as the fruit (for ourselves), for progeny?" (Brih. 4.4.22). We have said more than once, how the fruit of the knowledge (of the Self) is based on simultaneous actual experience, and is not, like the fruit of religious actions, something which results at some future time. Hence also, it is, that knowledge of the Self (Vidyā) is not subservient to action, nor is it possible to accept the Scriptural statement about the fruit of the knowledge (of the Self), as not being so, (i.e. as being an Arthavāda only).—15.

*Moreover (the Scriptures state that there is) destruction (of the means which confer competency for religious action).—16.*

Moreover the Scriptures mention that there is destruction (Upamarda), of the inherent nature (Svarūpa) of this entire apparent worldly manifestation (Prapancha) which is brought about by Nescience, which is characterized by actions (such as sacrifices), materials (of such sacrifices), and fruits of sacrifices, and which are the means by which competency for religious actions is conferred through (the acquisition of) the power of Vidyā, thus—"But when to him (the knower of Brahma) every thing has become but the Self only, then what should one see, and by what, and what should one smell, and by what?" (Brih. 2.4.14) etc.. Now, in the case (of the opinion) of him who would insist on maintaining that the knowledge of the Self resulting from Vedānta must necessarily precede the attainment of competency for religious actions, that very competency for religious actions itself would undergo complete destruction. Therefore, also, knowledge (of the Self) is independent (and is not subservient to religious actions).—16.

*Knowledge (i.e. Vidyā of the Self, is prescribed) for those who have entered the order (Āshrama) of those who observe continence (i.e. Sannyāsins). (This order of life) is referred to in the Scriptures.*  
—17.

The Scriptures mention knowledge (i.e. Vidyā of the Self) in connection with the order of those who observe continence (i.e. the Sannyāsins). That, in that order (of Sannyāsins), knowledge (i.e. Vidyā of the Self) can be subservient to religious actions is not reasonably sustainable, in as much as religious action is contra-indicated i.e. totally absent in that order. The Sannyāsins do not perform such Scriptural religious actions as the Agnihotra etc.. (If the opponent of Vedānta also says that) the order of the Sannyāsins is not referred to in the Scriptures, (we reply) that, that argument also is not so, (i.e. cannot be available to the opponent), because such order is mentioned in the Scriptures, thus—“(There are) three branches of Dharma” (Chhān. 2.23.1); “Those who meditate with faith and austerity in the forest” (Chhān. 5.10.1); “Those who practise faith and penance in the forest” (Muṇḍ. 1.2.11); “Aspiring for that very world (Loka), Sannyāsins become such Sannyāsins” (Brih. 4.4.22); “One may become a Sannyāsin (i.e. renounce the world) even from the order of Brahmacharya (the celibate life of a student) directly (i.e. skipping the two intermediate orders of the householders (Grihasthāshrama) and of those who sojourn in the forest (Vānaprasthāshrama) )” (Jābāla. 4). Besides, the Scriptures as well as the Smritis countenance, that both those who have entered and those who have not entered the order of householders, and those who have paid and those who have not paid the three debts (due to the Gods, the Rishis and the manes), can equally join the order of those who observe continence. Therefore also knowledge (i.e. Vidyā of the Self) is independent (and not subservient to religious action).—17.

## 2. PARĀMARSHĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 18-20.

*Jaimini thinks that there is only just a reference (to orders of life i.e. Sannyāsa*

*etc.) here, which is no injunction. The Scriptures also censure (these orders of life).—18.*

Āchārya Jaimini considers, that the Scriptural statement “(There are) three branches of Dharma” (Chhān. 2.23.1) which has been cited (by the Vedāntin) to establish the existence of the order of Sannyāsins, is not able to establish it, because, he considers that here there is only a reference to other orders of life (Āshramās) but no injunction (about them). Here, there is no word signifying any injunction, such as a verb in an imperative tense etc., and it is perceived that each of these (Scriptural statements) has a different meaning. So far as the Scriptural statements viz. “(There are) three branches of Dharma : sacrifice, study of the Scriptures, and charity, form the first (branch), penance is the second (branch), and a student-bachelor, residing at the house of the preceptor, where (i.e. in the preceptor’s house), the student-bachelor wears himself out, is the third (branch); and that all these obtain the world of the righteous”, are concerned, the Scriptures after first making a reference to this, and mentioning that the fruit of these orders is but only a limited fruit, thereafter glorify the condition of complete ensconcement-in-Brahma (Brahmasamsthātā) as having the limitless fruit, thus—“One who is firmly ensconced-in-Brahma attains immortality” (Chhān. 2.23.1). But (argues the Vedāntin), even such mere reference, does of course establish (the existence of) these orders. (The Mīmāṃsaka replies)—No doubt it does so establish, but this knowledge is derived from the Smritis and customary conduct, and not directly from the Scriptures. Hence when they are in conflict with the Scriptures, they would either become unfit for acceptance, or as pertaining to those that are not competent (to perform religious actions). But (says the Vedāntin) the order of householdership is referred to along with the order of the Sannyāsins, thus—viz., that sacrifice, study of the Scriptures and charity is the first branch etc.. (The Mīmāṃsaka says)—That is true of course, but as only the householder is enjoined to perform Agnihotra etc., his existence is well established by (other) Scriptural statements. Hence, this reference in this passage is in glorifica-

tion only, and not by way of any injunction. Besides a direct Scriptural statement censures these other orders, thus—"He who abandons Sacrificial fire (i.e. gives up householdership and takes up other orders of life) becomes, as it were, a murderer of the Gods"; "After having brought money (the fee), dear to the preceptor, you should not snap up the thread of progeny" (Tait. 1.11.1); "A sonless person does not attain (any) world, (and) even the beasts are aware of it". Similarly the Scriptural statements—"Those who meditate with faith and penance, in the forest" (Chhān. 5.10.1); and "Those who reside in the forest practising penance and faith" (Muṇḍ. 1.2.11)—are but instructions about the Devayāna Path (because the Scriptures, in the next sentence after this, speak about those persons going to the Archi i.e. the Devayāna Path) and not an instruction about any other order of life. In such statements as—"Penance is the second" etc., it is doubtful if a mention of some other order of life is intended. Similarly the Scriptural passage, "It is with a desire to attain that very world (Loka), that those who accept Sannyāsa, do so", is not an injunction to take to Sannyāsa, but is merely in glorification of the Ātma-Loka. But (says the Vedāntin), in the Jābāla Scriptural statement "One may accept Sannyāsa even directly from student-bachelorship", there is a clear injunction about Sannyāsa. (The Mīmāṃsaka replies)—It is no doubt true, but it should be understood that this present discussion is carried on without reference to that Scriptural statement.—18.

*Bādarāyaṇa (is of opinion that) the other orders of life (Āshramās) also must be duly observed, because of similar indications in Scriptural statements.—19.*

Āchārya Bādarāyaṇa considers that the other orders of life also are to be observed, because there are Scriptural statements (about them) in the Vedās. Bādarāyaṇa who considers, that like the order of householdership, even the other orders of life also, ought to be observed, even though one may not wish to do so, thereby refutes the view (of Jaimini), viz. that inasmuch as Agnihotra etc. (which pertain to the order of householdership), have to be com-

pulsorily performed, and as the other orders of life are inconsistent to it, they are to be observed by those who are not competent (to perform Agnihotra etc.). Whence is it so? Because of similar indications in Scriptural statements. "(There are) three branches of Dharma" (Chhān. 2.23.1), is a Scriptural statement which refers to the other orders of life, quite as much as it refers to the order of householdership. It should be understood, that just as the order of householdership prescribed by other Scriptural statements is referred to here, even so are the other orders of life also, just as 'Nivīta' (wearing the sacred thread hanging from the neck only) and Prāchināvīta (wearing the sacred thread hanging from the right shoulder and going under the left hand) which are referred to in a different injunctive Shāstra, are understood to be referred to in a passage which enjoins 'Upavīta' (wearing the sacred thread hanging from the left shoulder and going under the right hand). Therefore, the order of householdership and the other orders of life are equally necessarily to be observed. Similarly, in the Scriptural passage, "Wishing for this very Ātma-Loka, it is, that the Sannyāsins become Sannyāsins" (Brih. 4.4.22), the order of Sannyāsa is referred to, along with the studying of the Vedās. And again in the Scriptural passage "Those who meditate with faith and with penance in the forest" (Chhān. 5.10.1), the Vānaprastha order of life is referred to, along with Panchāgni-Vidyā (the Vidyā of Five Fires). Now, as regards the objection (by the opponent of Vedānta) that in the Scriptural passage, "Penance is the second (order of the life)" (Chhān. 2.23.1) etc., the mention of the other orders of life is ambiguous, (we reply)—This is no fault, because there is a means of proof (Pramāṇa) for the determination of that is clearly present. In the passage "(There are) three branches of Dharma" (Chhān. 2.23.1), it is declared that there is a trio of Dharma-branches. Many religious observances such as sacrifices etc. having different origins cannot be included in this trio (of Dharma-branches) unless they are connected with some order of life out of the trio. Now, by the order of householdership which has sacrifice etc. as an indicatory mark, one branch of Dharma is thus indicated. The term 'student-bachelor' is a clear indication of an order of life. So by the term 'Penance', then, what branch



of Dharma, other than the order of life in which penance (i.e. Sannyāsa) is the principal item, can be understood? By the indicatory mark in the passage, "Those who in the forest" (Chhān. 5.10.1), and by the terms 'faith' and 'penance', an order of life is clearly understood. Therefore, even if there be only a reference (to other orders of life), it is established that they have necessarily to be practised.—19.

*Or else (this passage may be understood to be) an injunction (for other orders of life) as in the case of the holding (of the samidhās i.e. fire-sticks).—20.*

Or else (this passage may be understood to be) an injunction for the other orders of life, and not merely a reference to them. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) if it is understood to be a passage indicating an injunction, it would contradict the realization of the unanimity of view which is understood here, inasmuch as, the three branches of Dharma have the world of the righteous as their fruit, and the state of having a steadfast ideal of being ensconced-in-Brahma has immortality as its fruit. (We reply)—It is of course true, but the realization of the unanimity of view which is there, should be abandoned and it should be understood that there is an injunction here, because of there being a mention of an extraordinary thing unheard of before (Apūrva), and also because no other injunction is seen to be mentioned (in the Scriptures), and in as much as other orders of life are to be clearly understood here, it is not reasonably sustainable, that a unanimity of view should be understood, by considering the passage to be a Guṇa-vāda (a kind of Artha-vāda). This is like the holding (of the fire-sticks i.e. Samidhās). Just as, in the Scriptural passage "He should approach, holding the fire-sticks below (the Havih i.e. an oblation), the fire-sticks are held above when the oblation is meant for the Gods", even when a unanimity (Ekavākyatā) about holding the fire-sticks under (the oblation) exists, it is understood that there is an injunction here for holding the fire-sticks above (the oblation) when it is meant for the Gods, because of its being an extraordinary thing. The same is stated (by Jaimini)

in the Shesha-Lakṣhaṇa (the third chapter of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) thus—"But holding the fire-sticks above the oblation is an injunction because of the extraordinary nature (of the statement)". Similarly, here, the Scriptural statement which only refers to an order of life, is understood to be an injunction. Even though this is but a reference only to other orders of life, still on the strength of the glorification, the statement "Having a steadfast ideal of being ensconced-in-Brahma" should necessarily be understood to be something which is enjoined. Now, it has to be considered, whether this (being firmly ensconced-in-Brahma) is meant for any order of life out of these four orders of life (as desired), or for the order of the Sannyāsin (Parivrājaka) only. If it be supposed, that when all the orders of life down to that of the student-bachelorship are referred to, the Parivrājaka also is necessarily supposed to be so referred to along with the rest, then the fact is that all the four orders of life are equally commonly referred to, and as the person who has the steadfast ideal of being firmly ensconced-in-Brahma cannot possibly not belong to some such order of life, a person having such a steadfast ideal of being firmly ensconced-in-Brahma will necessarily have to belong to some one of these four orders of life. And if it be supposed that the Parivrājaka is not understood to be referred to along with the other orders of life, then the Parivrājaka thus would be the only one who remains to be so referred to, and it would mean that he would necessarily be the one who has the steadfast ideal of being firmly ensconced-in-Brahma. Here, some (are of opinion) that a Parivrājaka also is referred to by the word 'Penance' which (term) indicates a Vaikhāṇasa (one of the four kinds of the Vānaprastha order of life), but that is not logical. As far as it is possible, the Parivrājaka does not deserve to be understood by the word 'Penance' which particularly signifies the Vānaprastha. It is logical to understand, that just as here the 'householder' and the 'student-bachelor' have been definitely referred to by their own special attributes, even so the mendicants (Bhikṣus) and the 'Vaikhāṇasās' (hermits) also are similarly referred to by their special attributes. The word 'Penance' is a special attribute of Vānaprasthās, because of their chief characteristic of mortification of the body, for

which the word 'Penance' is used by custom. The attribute of the mendicant (Sannyāsin) characterized by the control of the sense-organs, is certainly not understood by the word 'Penance'. It is not logical (to suppose) that the orders of life which are known to be four, can be referred to by only three terms. Besides there is an indication of distinction here, thus—These three attain the world of the righteous, and the other one (i.e. the Parivrājaka Sannyāsin) attains immortality. This indication of distinction is possible, only if there is a distinction (between the Vaikhānasa and the Bhikshu). It can never be, that while both Devadatta and Yajnadatta are dull of intellect, one of the two is highly intellectual, but it can very well be, that while both Devadatta and Yajnadatta are dull of intellect, Vishnumitra is highly intellectual. Therefore these first three orders of life are of those who attain the world of the righteous, and the Parivrājaka, the only one left over, is the one who attains immortality. (The opponent of Vedānta says), how can the expression "A person having a steadfast ideal of being firmly ensconced-in-Brahma", which in its current etymological derivation is applicable to all (orders of life, as they can equally have that ideal), be restricted only to the Parivrājaka? If it be allowed its customary meaning, viz. immortality, then, being attainable by merely (belonging to) an order of life, there would be the predicament of knowledge being rendered purposeless. (We reply)—Being ensconced-in-Brahma means merging in Brahma, and being ensconced in it, is spoken of as having a firm stability in it, and being of the nature of having no other extraneous operational activity. That is not possible in the case of the other three orders of life, because failure to perform the religious duties prescribed for one's own order of life is understood to result in sin, according to the Scriptural statements. In the case of a Parivrājaka, however, inasmuch as he happens to have renounced all religious actions, sin as caused by the failure to perform religious actions, is not possible (in his case), while the duty of being peaceful and of exercising control over the sense-organs (far from being opposed to the condition of being firmly ensconced-in-Brahma) is, on the other hand, rather helpful to it. The state of being firmly ensconced-in-Brahma, as supported by his duty of main-

taining the condition of being peaceful and in the proper control of his senses, is the only duty prescribed in his order of life, while sacrifices etc. are of the others, and their failure in these actions amounts to sin. Of similar import are Scriptural statements such as "Renunciation is Brahma, Brahma is the Highest, the Highest is Brahma, these penances etc. are lower (in value) and renunciation excels them" (Nārā. 78), "Yatis (anchorites) who have determined well the meaning of the knowledge of Vedānta, and who by renunciation have become pure, (and obtained Final Release)" (Muṇḍ. 3.2.6; Nārā. 12.3.1; Kaivalya. 3). The Smṛiti also, by saying thus—"Having minds fixed in it and serving it with all their heart" (Bh. G. 5.17) etc., indicates how a person having the ideal of being firmly ensconced-in-Brahma has no religious duty to perform. Therefore, (in the case of a Parivrājaka), such fault, as, that he would attain immortality merely by belonging to that order of life, and that knowledge would be rendered purposeless, cannot occur. Therefore, even though, here in this passage, there is a reference to other orders of life, that order of life, viz., of being a Parivrājaka and having the characteristic of having the ideal of being firmly ensconced-in-Brahma, is available all the same. The Āchārya has discussed this subject without reference to the Jābāla Scriptural statement which gives injunctions about the other orders of life. Of course there is a direct Scriptural statement enjoining the other orders of life, thus—"Completing student-bachelorship, he should become a householder, and after that he should become a hermit, and after that a Parivrājaka, or if he so chooses, he may become a Parivrājaka directly after finishing student-bachelorship, or after householdership, or after being a hermit" (Jābāla. 4). It cannot be argued, that this Scriptural statement relates to one who is not competent (to perform religious action), because of the absence of any special Scriptural statement therein, and because there is a separate statement with regard to those who are incompetent (to perform religious actions), thus—"Whether he be one, who has undertaken a vow or one who has not, whether he be an acolyte (a Snātaka) or a householder, or whether he has given up keeping a sacrificial fire or whether he is not competent to keep such fire" (Jābāla 4). Besides, a Parivrājaka's

order of life, being helpful to the attainment of the ripe knowledge of Brahma, it cannot be said to be available for those who are incompetent to perform religious actions. The same is indicated in the Scriptural statement—"The mendicant with colourless (i.e. white) vestures, clean shaven, without a wife, clear, not disloyal and living on alms, is fit to attain Brahmahood" (Jābāla 5). Therefore, it is proved that there is such an order of life as that of those who observe continence (i.e. Sannyāsins) and as knowledge (of Brahma) is spoken of in their connection, it i.e. knowledge (Vidyā) is independent (and not subservient to religious action).—20.

### 3. STUTIMATRĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 21-22.

*If it be said (that Scriptural statements such as those about Udgītha etc.) are merely in glorification, because of their being accepted (as subordinate parts of sacrificial acts, we say), — No, because of (the statements) being extraordinary.—21.*

When, with regard to Scriptural passages such as "This Udgītha is the quintessence of essences, is the highest, is fit for the topmost rank, and is the eighth (essence)" (Chhān. 1.1.3), "This (world) itself is the Rik, this Agni is the Sāma" (Chhān. 1.6), "This brick-built fire is indeed this world" (Chhān. 1.6.1), "That the Earth is the Uktha (collection of hymns)", a doubt arises as to whether they are in glorification of the Udgītha, or are by way of an injunction to meditation, and if it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta) that it is logical that they are for the purpose of the glorification of the Udgītha, inasmuch as they are accepted by the Scriptures to be with reference to the Udgītha etc., which are the subordinate parts of religious acts (such as Sacrifices), similar to such Scriptural statements as—"This Earth is the sacrificial ladle, the Sun is the tortoise (the form of the fire altar), the heavenly world is the Āhavanīya (fire)" etc., which are, for the purpose of glorification of the ladle (Juhu) etc., the Sūtrakāra replies—No. It is not logical that the purpose of these Scriptural passages

should be mere glorification; because of their being of an extraordinary nature (Apūrvatvāt). It is only if these Scriptural passages (are understood to) mean an injunction, that they can properly be said to be of an extraordinary nature, and if the passages are considered to be merely in glorification, then they would be meaningless, because a glorificatory passage comes into use as such, only when it can be construed to be a passage complementary to a passage which prescribes an injunction, as stated in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā (1.2.7), thus—"Being in syntactical relation of unity with an injunction, they are for the glorification of an injunction (Vidhinā tu ekavākyatvāt stutyarthena vidhinām syuh)". But these glorificatory passages mentioned in a place different from that in which the Udgītha is mentioned, would be meaningless, inasmuch as they fail to be passages complementary to Udgītha passages. As regards the Scriptural passage "This (earth) is the Rik etc.", as it is mentioned in proximity to an injunctive passage, it is different from the present passage. Therefore (the conclusion is that) Scriptural passages of this type are meant by way of an injunction.—21.

*Also, because of words having an injunctive meaning (Bhāvashabdāt).—22.*

The Scriptures recite words indicating clear injunctions in passages such as "He should meditate on the Udgītha" (Chhān. 1.1.1), "He should meditate on Sāma" (Chhān. 2.2.1), "He should know himself to be the Uktha", which, were they to be considered to be meant merely in glorification, would be purposeless. Similarly even those who are learned in Nyāya, consider, that expressions such as "should do", "should be done", "must be done", "may become", and the fifth "they will become", occurring in all the Vedic texts, are definitely indicative of an injunction and they consider 'Ling' (technical expression in Paṇini's grammar) etc. to mean an injunction. Besides in every chapter fruits are mentioned by the Scriptures, such as "He verily becomes the fulfiller of desires" (Chhān. 1.1.7), "He (the meditator on Udgītha) is able to obtain his desires by singing Sāma hymns" (Chhān. 1.7.9), "The worlds (in their ascending and descending order) serve

him" (Chhān. 2.2.3). Therefore also, Scriptural passages such as Udgītha etc. purport to enjoin meditation.—22.

4. PĀRIPLAVĀDHIKARĀṆAM. Sū. 23-24.

*If it be said (that the legends mentioned in the Upanishads) are for the purpose of Pāriplava, (we say)—No, because of specification i.e. because only particular specific legends (are so intended).—23.*

In the case of certain legends mentioned in the Vedānta, as for instance—"Now, Yājñavalkya had two wives, Maitreyī and Kātyāyanī" (Brih. 4.5.1), "Pratardana, the son of Divodāsa arrived at the favourite abode of Indra" (Kaush. 3.8), "There once lived a king named Jānashruti the great-grandson (of Janashruta), who donated (wealth) with faith (Shraddhādeyah), and who was a generous giver (Bahudāyī), and kept an open house (Bahupākyah—lit., who got a large quantity of food cooked for guests)", the doubt arises, whether their purpose is Pāriplava (recitation of certain legends before a king engaged in a Horse-sacrifice) or for the purpose of making the Vidyās, in proximity with which such legends are mentioned, understood. (The conclusion of the opponent of Vedānta is) that these Scriptural legends are for the purpose of Pāriplava, inasmuch as, they are legends quite as much as legends which are ordinarily recited, and because there is a Scriptural injunction that such legends should be so recited as Pāriplava. Hence, if it be said, that the principal aim of Vedānta texts would not be 'knowledge' (Vidyā), because, like Mantrās they are complementary portions (of sacrificial acts), (we reply)—It is not so, because there is specification. It is in connection with the passage—"Pāriplava should be recited", that, only certain specific legends such as "The king Manu, the son of Vivasvat" etc. are mentioned there. If by the Scriptural statement all legends (in the Upanishads) in general were to be understood (as meant for Pāriplava) because of these particular legends being similar to legends generally, their special specification by the Scriptures would be meaningless. Hence these Scriptural legends are not for the purpose of Pāriplava.—23.

*And, thus, because of being connected with syntactical unity (the legends are meant for the proximate Vidyās).—24.*

It is logical, that inasmuch as these legends are not meant for the purpose of Pāriplava, they should be understood as being useful for the propounding of the Vidyās proximate to them, because there is a connection of syntactical unity (between them and the Vidyās). For it is seen that there is such unity with the proximate Vidyās, in that they are useful for creating a taste (for the Vidyās), and for their easy comprehension. Besides in the Maitreyi Brāhmaṇa, for instance, it is seen, that there is such syntactical unity with the Vidyā which begins with the Scriptural passage—"Oh Maitreyi, the Self indeed should be seen" (Brih. 4.5.6). In the legend of Pratardana also (such syntactical unity is to be seen) with the Vidyā passage beginning with "I am Prāṇa the intellegential Self", and in the legend of Jānashruti with the Vidyā passage—"Vāyu indeed is the absorber" (Chhān. 4.3.1). It is just as it is in the case of the legends mentioned in Scriptural texts with reference to religious actions, such as "He gouged out his own pericardium" etc., which have the purpose of the glorification of the proximate injunction (according to Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā). Therefore the legends are not meant for Pāriplava.—24.

##### 5. AGNINDHANĀDYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 25.

*Hence, because of this also, it is, that there is no need of 'lighting a fire' etc. (for Vidyās).—25.*

The words 'because of this' (Ata eva) are used here, because it is possible to connect them with the distant Sūtra "The chief aim of man (i.e. Final Release is attained) through this" (Bra. Sū. III. iv. 1). It is because a Vidyā is the means of (the attainment of) the chief aim (of man), that religious duties connected with the various orders of life, such as 'lighting up of a fire', are not required by the Vidyā (of the knowledge of the Self) for generating for itself such knowledge of the Self. The Sūtra-



kāra thus sums up the 'fruit' of the first Adhikaraṇa, with the intention of saying something in addition.—25.

6. SARVAPEKSHĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 26-27.

*Because of the Scriptural mention of sacrifices etc. (as the means of the knowledge of the Self) performance of all religious actions is necessary. It is, as it is in the case of a horse.—26.*

It is now being considered, whether knowledge (Vidyā of the Self) does not at all need the performance of religious actions, or whether there is some such need after all. With regard to it, the conclusion already arrived at (by the preceding Sūtra) being, that knowledge of the Self has absolutely no need at all of religious actions pertaining to the different orders of life, such as the 'lighting up of a fire', for its own generation, it is said, that there is such need of all such religious actions pertaining to all the orders of life (Āshramās). Therefore the Sūtrakāra says:—Knowledge (of the Self) does of course need all the religious actions pertaining to the various orders of life, and it is not that it does not need them at all. But (says the opponent of Vedānta), the statement that religious actions pertaining to the orders of life, are, at one and the same time, both needed and not so needed, is contradictory. (We reply)—No, knowledge (of the Self) when once it is generated, needs nothing whatsoever, for the attainment of its fruit (i.e. Final Release), but so far as its *own* generation is concerned, it does so need (the performance of religious actions). Whence is it so? Because of the Scriptural statement about sacrifices etc.. For so goes the Scriptural statement—"The Brāhmaṇās desire to realize the Self by means of the recitation of the Scriptures (Vedānuvachana), sacrifices, charities, and fasting or living only on what they casually get as food (Anāshakena)" (Brih. 4.4.22), and it indicates, that sacrifices etc. are the means of the attainment of the knowledge (of the Self). Now the determination that these (sacrifices etc.) are such means, results from their connection with the desire to know. As, in the Scriptural statement "That which is called a sacrifice is but a

life of batchelorship" (Chhān. 8.5.1), the life of batchelorship which is the means of knowledge (Vidyā) is mentioned along with sacrifices, therefore, that sacrifices etc. also are such means, is suggested thereby. The Scriptural statements, such as "I shall now briefly tell you about that ultimate goal, about which all the Vedās speak, which is proclaimed by all penances, and with a desire for which a batchelor's life is led (by men)" (Kāṭha. 1.2.15), suggest, that religious actions which pertain to the orders of life, are the means of the attainment of knowledge (Vidyā of the Self). So says the Smṛiti also, thus—"Religious actions cook up or digest uncleanness, and knowledge (of the Self) is the Highest goal". Knowledge supervenes from actions, after such actions have purified uncleanness etc.. The statement, "It is, as it is, in the case of a horse" is just an apt illustration. Just as, a horse, considering his dignity, is not employed for the dragging of a plough, but is used for a chariot, even so religious actions are not needed by the knowledge (of the Self) for the attainment of its own result (viz. Final Release), but they are needed by the knowledge (of the Self) for its own generation.—26.

*Even though it be so, (a person desirous of Final Release) must be equipped with calmness and control over the sense-organs, and because, as subsidiary parts of knowledge they are helpful to it, there is an injunction about them, and they have therefore to be necessarily observed.—27.*

Even if one (i.e. some opponent of Vedānta) were to think, that it is not logical to consider sacrifices etc. to be the means of attaining knowledge (of the Self), because of the absence of an injunction about them, and because the Scriptural statement of the type of "They desire to know (Brahma) by means of sacrifice" is of the nature of an Anuvāda (i.e. mere reference to something known already), and is of the nature of being a eulogy of knowledge, and is not of the nature of an injunction for sacrifice, and that in as much as the knowledge (of the Self) is so blessed, people desire to acquire it by means of sacrifices etc., we reply—A person desirous of the knowledge (of

the Self) must be one who is equipped with calmness and control over his sense-organs, because, they are said to be the means of knowledge, according to the Scriptural statement "Therefore, one who knows it to be so, sees the Self, in the Self itself, by becoming calm, subdued, satisfied, patient and collected" (Brih. 4.4.23), and also because, what is so enjoined (by the Scriptures) has necessarily to be followed. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) even here, it is seen that in the Scriptural passage "A man by becoming equipped with calmness and control over the sense-organs, sees" (Brih. 4.4.23), the present tense is used, and there is no injunction as such. Not so, we reply, because it is understood that there is an injunction, as, by the word 'therefore' a eulogy of what is relevant here is understood. Besides in the Scriptural text of the Mādhyandinās, a clear injunction is indicated by the expression "He should see". Therefore even though sacrifices etc. may not be needed, calmness etc. are. Besides even sacrifices etc. are needed, because of the Scriptural statement itself about such sacrifices. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) it has already been stated that in the passage "Desire to know by sacrifices" no injunction is discernible. (We reply)—It is true that it is so said, but as its connection with the desire to know is of an extraordinary nature (Apūrva), an injunction has to be understood. It is not as if this connection between sacrifices etc. and 'the desire to know' is something which has been established already, so that it could be said to be merely an Anuvāda i.e. that it is merely repeated here. Scriptural passages such as "Therefore, Pūshā (i.e. the Sun) who is sans-teeth receives a well-mascerated (portion of the oblation)", even though (they are) not of the nature of a Scriptural injunction, still, on account of being considered to be injunctional because of an extraordinary feature about them, a discussion about them is started in the first Tantra (i.e. Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā III. 3.34) thus—"It is understood that in the case of Vikritis (Ishtis based on the Darshapūrṇamāsa Ishti) the oblation to Pūshā is well-mascerated". Even so it has been stated in Sūtra 20 of the present Pāda. It has been explained in the Smritis such as Bhagvadgītā that sacrifices performed without keeping an eye on the fruit, become the means of the attainment of the knowledge (of the Self) for him who

desires Final Release. Therefore religious actions such as sacrifices etc., as also calmness and the control over sense-organs as prescribed for the different orders of life, are all to be considered as necessary for the generation of knowledge. Even then, it should be well understood with due discrimination, that as between them (i.e. Sacrifices etc. and calmness and control over sense-organs), in the expression "One who knows it to be so", because of their connection with knowledge, calmness and control over the sense-organs are the proximate i.e. inward means of the knowledge (of the Self), while sacrifices etc., because of their being connected with the desire of a man who knows thus, are the external means.—27.

7. SARVĀNNĀNUMATYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 28-31.

*There is liberty to eat food of all sorts only when otherwise there is possibility of death, because the Scriptures have said so.—28.*

In the dialogue of the Prāṇās of the Chhandogās' branch of the Scriptures, there is a passage, thus—"Nothing is not food to a person, who knows it to be so (i.e. that he—the Prāṇa of all beings—is the eater of all kinds of food)" (Chhān. 5.2.1). Similarly, there is a passage of the Vājasaneyins, thus—"In his case he eats nothing that is not eatable, nothing that is not eatable is accepted by him" (Brih. 6.1.14). What is meant is, that in his case every thing is food fit to be eaten. When therefore the doubt is, whether this liberty about all sorts of food, is enjoined as being a subordinate part, i.e. a means of Vidyā, like calmness etc., or whether it is mentioned by way of eulogy, the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that it is an injunction. For in this manner, this teaching promotes a special tendency (and thus being an extraordinary thing (Apūrva) must be understood to be an injunction). Therefore, being in proximity to a Vidyā it is a subordinate part of the Vidyā, and being such a subordinate part, the abrogation of the general rule is indicated by it. But (says the Vedāntin) —If it is understood to be so, the Shāstra dealing with what should and should not be eaten, is contradicted. (The oppo-

nent of Vedānta) replies—This is no fault, because, there being a relation as between a general rule and a special exception here, such contradiction of the Shāstra is reasonably sustainable. Just as the general rule against the killing of any living being is contradicted by an injunction for the sacrificial slaughter of an animal, or just as in the case of the Vāmadevyā-Vidyā, the Scriptural passage “No woman who makes an approach, should be jilted, because that is a special observance (Vrata)” (Chhān. 2.13.2), which while speaking specially about not avoiding any such woman, contradicts the general Shāstra which deals with the division of women, into those who should be accepted for cohabitation and those who should not be so accepted, even so, by this passage, which permits food of all kinds in connection with the Prāṇa-Vidyā, the Shāstra dealing with the division between food that can be eaten and food that cannot be eaten, may well be contradicted. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we say—Such permission to eat all sorts of food is not enjoined by this. No word enjoining anything is to be seen here, because, in the passage “Nothing is not food to a person who knows it to be so” there is a present tense form (Vartamānāpadesha). When the realization of an injunction is absent, it is not possible to wishfully construe an injunction (in the passage) having the nature of promoting a special tendency (allowing any kind of food). Besides, it is after mentioning that the limit of the food of Prāṇa extends in range right down to the limit of a dog etc., that, it is said—“To him who knows it to be so, there is nothing that is not food.” It is also not possible for a human body to consume food right down to the limit of a dog etc., while it is quite possible to consider all this as the food of the Prāṇa. Therefore, this is but an Arthavāda only, having the purpose of a eulogy of the food of the Prāṇa, and not an injunction permitting all sorts of foods. That is indicated by the Sūtra—“There is liberty to eat food of all sorts when there is a possibility of a danger to life (lit., possibility of Prāṇās departing)”. This means, that it is only when life is endangered, or in cases of such an extreme calamity, that all food is permitted to be eaten, because it is so seen from the Scriptures. Even so, the Scriptures speak of a tendency on the part of the sage Chākṛāyaṇa, while he was in a condi-

tion of extreme calamity, to eat food which is forbidden, in the Brāhmaṇa passage—"When the province of Kuru was devastated by a hail-storm (or by an invasion by red locusts)" (Chhān. 1.10.1) etc.. The sage Chākrāyaṇa while he was in such an extremity partook of Kulmāshās half eaten by an elephant-driver, but refused water (offered by him) as having the fault of being a sort of his leavings. And he stated the reason to be as follows—"Verily I could not have lived if I had not eaten these (Kulmāshās). I can get water to drink anywhere I may desire" (Chhān. 1.10.4). The Scriptures also state, that again the next day, he partook of the same stale leavings of himself and another (his wife). That the Scriptures, by mentioning this eating of the already twice tasted stale food, purpose to indicate its meaning, that in such a predicament as a danger to life, it is permissible to eat food which is forbidden, in order to sustain oneself, while under comfortable and safe conditions, even those who possess knowledge, should not do so, is understood from Chākrāyaṇa's rejection of the water. Therefore, the Scriptural passage "In the case of one who knows it to be so" (Chhān. 5.2.1) etc. is an Arthavāda passage.—28.

*Also because in this way (the Shāstra)  
is not contradicted (the present sentence  
is an Arthavāda passage).—29.*

It is only when it is (understood to be) so, that the Shāstra which purports to discriminate between that which can be eaten and that which cannot be eaten, by such a passage as "When the food is pure, then the mind becomes pure", that the Shāstra will not happen to be contradicted.—29.

*Besides, Smṛiti also says so.—30.*

Moreover the Smṛitis also, both with regard to those who know and those who do not know, say without any distinction as to when all sorts of food may be eaten, thus—"That a person, who when his life is in danger partakes of food obtained by him from wheresoever, is not contaminated by sin, even as a lotus leaf is not contaminated by water". In the same way, by passages such as "A Brāh-

maṇa must not drink liquor", "Hot liquor should be poured down the throat of a Brāhmaṇa who drinks spirits", "Those who drink liquor become worms, because of drinking what is forbidden" \*, the Smṛiti speaks of what, not being food, should be avoided.—30.

*Thus also the Scriptural statement prohibiting unrestricted conduct (would be justified).—31.*

There is a Scriptural passage in Kāṭhaka Samhitā which denounces food that cannot be eaten, and which aims at persuading a man against indulging in unrestricted conduct thus—"Therefore, a Brāhmaṇa should not drink spirituous liquors etc.". This passage becomes all the more reasonably sustainable, when the passage "Nothing is not food to one who knows it to be so" is understood to be an Arthavāda. Therefore, passages such as these are Arthavādās and not injunction.—31.

#### 8. ĀSHRAMAKARMĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 32-35.

*Religious duties pertaining to the orders of life, inasmuch as they are prescribed (by the Scriptures) are to be performed, (even by those who do not desire Final Release).—32.*

It has been determined in Bra. Sū. III. iv. 26 (performance of all religious duties is needed), that religious duties which pertain to the orders of life, are the means of attaining knowledge (of the Self). Now it is being considered whether they are to be performed by one who is merely attached to his own order of life without caring for attaining knowledge, and who does not desire Final Release, or that he need not perform them. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta is)—inasmuch as, by the Scriptural passage "That which the Brāhmaṇās desire to know by the reciting of the Vedās" (Bṛih. 4.4.22), such religious duties of the orders of life are prescribed as being the means of (attaining) knowledge, (it follows) that they

\* There is another rendering of this passage, thus:— "Worms that drink wine are generated in the mouth of one who drinks wine."

are not to be performed by those who desire to attain a different fruit, but do not desire to acquire knowledge (of the Self). And that if they have to be performed by such a person also, then they could not be the means of attaining such knowledge, because of the contradiction (involved) as between a connection with religious actions (Karma) which is at once both permanent and non-permanent. To that, the reply given is—These permanent religious duties have necessarily to be performed even by one who is merely attached to an order of life and does not desire to attain Final Release, because, they are enjoined by such Scriptural passages as—“He must perform the Agnihotra as long as he continues to live”. Indeed it is not (even if it is understood to be so) that the Scriptural passage would thereby have to bear the burden of a meaning which it cannot well bear.—32.

With regard to the objection (of the opponent of Vedānta) that, if so, religious duties would not be the means of (acquiring) knowledge, the reply is :—

*And also because of their being (mentioned as being) co-operators (in the attainment of knowledge).—33.*

These (religious duties) would be co-operators in the attainment of knowledge, because they are prescribed to be so by the Scriptures, thus—“That, the Brāhmaṇās desire to know, by the reciting of Vedās etc.”. That has been explained by Sūtra 26 above, viz. “There is need of all religious actions, because of the Scriptural statement about sacrifices etc.. It is, as it is, in the case of a horse.” Now, it should not be considered, that the Scriptural statement about the duties pertaining to the orders of life being co-operators, is with regard to the fruit of knowledge (i.e. Final Release), just as the Prayājās (are with regard to the fruit of Darshapūrṇamāsa), because knowledge (of the Self) cannot be the subject of an injunction, and also because the fruit of the knowledge of the Self (i.e. Final Release) is not something which has to be brought about by any means. Such means as Darshapūrṇamāsa etc. which are characterized by injunction, may require other co-



operating means (as a help), inasmuch as they aim at such fruit as the heaven, but knowledge does not (require any such co-operative means). The same has been said in the Sūtra "Hence there is no need of the lighting of Agni" (Bra. Sū. III. iv. 25). Therefore, the statement about religious duties being co-operators is only with reference to their being the means of the bringing about of knowledge. In this case, no doubt should be entertained about any contradiction as between permanent and non-permanent connection with religious actions (Karma), because there may well be differences in connection even when there is no difference in religious actions. The connection implied by the statement about (Agnihotra) having to be performed as long as life lasts is a permanent connection, and knowledge (of the Self) is not its fruit. The other connection implied in the passage "That, the Brāhmaṇās desire to know by reciting the Vedās" is a non-permanent one, the fruit of which is the knowledge (of the Self). Just as in the case of a Khadira sacrificial post (fashioned out of Khadira wood), it is connected with a sacrifice in a permanent connection, while with reference to a particular purpose of a man (such as, the attainment of strength i.e. Virya, which may or may not be desired by a man) its connection is non-permanent, even so it is here.—33.

*Considered both ways, these very same (religious duties are meant to be performed), because of the indicatory marks being both ways.—34.*

Considered in every way, whether the view be about religious duties as pertaining to the orders of life, or the view be of their being co-operators in (the acquisition) of knowledge (of the Self), these very same religious duties such as Agnihotra etc., have to be performed. But (says the opponent of Vedānta), by determining 'that these same' (religious duties have to be performed), what does the Āchārya seek to refute? We reply, that he seeks to refute the doubt about these religious duties being different (from those mentioned in the Karma-Kāṇḍa). No such difference in the religious duties is meant here, as is meant in the case of the minor Sacrifice (Ayana) of the Kaṇḍa-

pāyins, by (the injunction) "He performs Agnihotra for a month", where, a religious duty different from that in the case of the ordinary Agnihotra, is meant to be mentioned. Whence is it so? Because of the indicatory marks of both kinds, i.e. the indicatory marks both in the Scriptures and the Smritis. As for the Scriptural indicatory mark, the passage "That, the Brāhmaṇās desire to know, by the reciting of the Vedās" (Brih. 4.4.22), which enjoins (a person in) sacrifices etc., that is something which is already established, and is something, the nature of which is already known to be the means, with reference to this "desire to know", and it does not evolve, as the expression "he sacrifices" etc. does, a new and extraordinary form of these (sacrifices). The Smriti indicatory mark "Whosoever performs religious duties without any desire for their fruit" (Bh. G. 6.1) shows that the same religious duty, as is already known to be such a duty, has to be performed for the generation of the knowledge (of the Self). Similarly, the purificatory rites referred to in the Smriti passage "One who has gone through the forty-eight purificatory rites", being well-known in connection with Vedic religious actions, are the same as are meant by the Smritis, in connection with the generation of the knowledge (of the Self) in a person, who has gone through such rites. Therefore, this determination of non-difference (as between religious duties) is quite proper.—34.

*The Scriptures also indicate (that persons who perform religious duties) are not overcome by torments (such as passions etc.).—35.*

Another indicatory mark, which goes to strengthen the conclusion about religious duties being the co-operators (in the acquisition of the knowledge of the Self), and which shows, how a person who is equipped with such means as Brahmacharya etc. is not overcome by such torments as passions etc., is stated by the Scriptures, thus—"This Self (i.e. the knowledge of the Self) which a person acquires by means of Brahmacharya etc., is not destroyed" (Chhān. 8.5.3). Hence, it is definitely concluded that religious duties such as sacrifices etc., besides pertaining to an order of

life, are also co-operators (in the acquisition of the knowledge of the Self).—35.

9. VIDHURĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 36-39.

*Those who are in between (i.e. are neither here nor there) (are also competent to acquire knowledge), because it is seen to be so (from the Scriptures).—36.*

When the doubt is, as to whether, widowers etc. and those who are not able to take up any one of these orders of life, because they do not possess the means such as wealth or materials etc., are competent to acquire knowledge (of the Self), or whether, they are not, the conclusion (of the opponent of the Vedānta) is that they are not so competent, because it is definitely ascertained that religious duties pertaining to an order of life (Āshrama) are the means of (acquiring) knowledge (of the Self) and also because they are not possible (in their case). To that the Sūtrakāra replies—One who is in between, and is living out of the orders of life, is also competent to acquire knowledge (of the Self). Whence is it so? Because it is so seen from the Scriptures. It is seen from the Scriptures that individuals such as Raikva, Vāchaknavī (Gārgī) etc. who were similarly circumstanced had acquired the knowledge (of the Self). (Chhān. 4.1 and Brih. 3.6.8).—36.

*Smṛiti also has stated similarly.—37.*

That, Samvarta (a Smṛitikāra) and others who did not care to perform the religious duties of an order of life, and went about in the nude, became great Yogins in spite of that, is testified by History.—37.

But (says the opponent of Vedānta) the instances stated from the Scriptures and the Smṛitis are but mere indicatory marks, but what is the conclusion arrived at (from them)? The Sūtrakāra states the conclusion, thus—

*(Widowers etc. also) because of their special acts are vouchsafed this favour.—38.*

It is possible that in the case of widowers etc. this favour viz. the knowledge (of the Self) is vouchsafed to

them as the result of some special acts of theirs, such as Japa (Prayer), fasts, worship of deities etc. which are not opposed to their condition (i.e. not belonging to any order of life as widowers etc.) and which any man merely as a man can perform. For so says the Smṛiti—"There is no doubt that a Brāhmaṇa by mere prayers becomes equipped (with the knowledge of the Self), whether he performs anything else or does not, and he is called a learned Brāhmaṇa (Maitra)" (Manu. Sam. II. 87), and it indicates, that though the performance of the duties of an order of life is not possible (in such a man's case), still he is competent to engage himself in prayer. Such favour is certainly possible, as a result of the performance of the religious duties pertaining to an order of life during a former life, for the Smṛiti by the passage "And being thus equipped (with knowledge) after successive births, he attains the highest goal" (Br. G. 6.45), indicates, that particular special impressions (Samskāras) stored up during previous births do vouchsafe the knowledge (of the Self). Knowledge of the Self has its own directly visible fruit and by the mere absence of any obstruction, it confers competency on an aspirant, for listening etc. (to a discourse on the Self etc.). Therefore such competency even in a widower etc. is not contradictory.—38.

*But the other (means, of the knowledge of the Self) is better, because of the indicative marks.—39.*

To belong to some one or other order of life is a better means of the knowledge of the Self, than the condition of being neither here nor there (i.e. lit., being suspended in mid-air), because it is seen to be so from the Scriptures and Smṛitis. The Scriptural indicative mark is—"By it (i.e. by the Devayāna Path) goes the bright one the knower of Brahma, and the doer of meritorious acts" (Bṛih. 4.4.9). A twice-born should not remain unattached to some one or other order of life, even for a day. If he does so remain for a year, he should perform the 'Krichchhra' \* purification.

\* An observance of 12 days, having one meal only for 3 days, only night meal for 3 days, for 3 days to dine only if some body offers food without asking for it, and a fast for 3 days.

tory rite, is another indicatory mark.

10. *TADBHŪTĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 40.*

*For one who has become that (i.e. become a Sannyāsin) there is no becoming-not-that (Atadbhāva), because of the rule (against becoming-not-that) and the absence (of statements) about that. Even Jaimini (is of the same opinion).—40.*

It has been established that there is an order of life of Sannyāsins. There is a doubt as to whether, having once entered that order of life, there can be defection from it or not. (The conclusion of the opponent of Vedānta) is that there may be such defection, either by reason of a desire to perform the duties of a former order of life properly, or through passion etc., because of the absence of any special reason against such defection. To this conclusion the reply is:— For one who has become so, i.e. for one who has become a Sannyāsin and a celibate, there never is any becoming-not-that i.e. there can be no defection from that. Whence is it so? Because of a rule, and the absence of any such defection. For instance, a rule in Scriptural passages such as “One who continues to wear himself out at the house of his preceptor”, “The dictum of the Shāstra (Padam) is that he should go to a forest, and the esoteric meaning (Upanishad) of it is that he should never turn back”, “After being permitted by the Āchārya, he should, as enjoined (by the Scriptures), live in one of the four orders of life, until he is relieved of his body (i.e. till he dies)”, indicates, that there can be no such defection. While there are Scriptural statements of the nature of an ascending order, such as “Having finished his Brahmacharyaship, he should become a householder” (Jābāla. 4), “He may become a Sannyāsin straight away from Brahmacharyaship”, there are no statements of the nature of any such descending order, nor are there any instances of respectable people ever having behaved in such manner. That, there may well be such a descent (from a higher order of life) with a view to perform the duties of a former order of life properly, is not so, because the Smṛiti says—“The performance of the

duties of one's own order of life, be they ever so badly performed, is preferable to the better performance of the duties of any other order of life" (Bh. G. 3.35), and also because it is conformable to logic. The duty to which one is enjoined, is alone one's duty and not any other which one is able to discharge better, because the nature of duty has a Scriptural injunction as its characteristic. There could be no defection through passion etc., for a Shāstra which lays down rules, is mightier than that. By the word 'even' in "even Jaimini", it is meant to be taught (by the Sūtrakāra), with a view to strengthen his own opinion, viz. that there is a concensus of opinion between Jaimini (a Mīmāṃsaka) and Bādarāyaṇa (an Advaitin) in that matter.—40.

11. ADHIKĀRĀDHIKARĀṆAM. Sū. 41-42.

*Also expiatory rite referred to in Adhikāra-Lakṣhaṇa (Pū.-Mī. VI) is not available (to a Brahmachāri of the Naishṭhika order) because of the inference that his fall from such order of life, is irrevocable and because such Naishṭhika Brahmachāri has no connection with that expiatory rite.—41.*

(The question crops up) whether, if a Naishṭhika Brahmachāri (i.e. one who holds bachelorhood for life, as the steadfast ideal) has committed an act of incontinence i.e. unchastity through mistake, the expiatory rite "A Brahmachāri who has committed an act of incontinence should sacrifice a donkey to the deity Nairriti" is available to him, or whether it is not. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that it is not available to him. Even though in the Adhikāra-Lakṣhaṇa an expiatory rite has been mentioned (Jaimini Sū. 6.8.21), still a Naishṭhika Brahmachāri does not deserve to avail himself of it. What is the reason? Because, the Smṛiti says, that his fall, once he falls, is irrevocable, thus—"For one who having once for all accepted Naishṭhika Brahmacharya, falls from it, I see no expiatory rite by which such moral-suicide (the slayer of his own Ātmā) can purify himself, because it is not reasonably sustainable, that a person who is once decapitated can even again become whole and entire". In the case of an Upakurvāṇa Brahmachāri (i.e. a student Brahma-

chāri who later intends to be a householder), such expiatory rite is available because the Smṛiti does not refer to a similar irrevocability from a fall of such Upakurvāṇa Brahmachāri.—41.

*Some, however, consider (the lapse of even a Naishṭhika Brahmachāri also) as a minor sin, (and consider that an expiatory rite) is available to him. This is similar to the eating (of forbidden food). The same has been mentioned (by Jaimini).—42.*

But some Āchāryas consider it (i.e. such a lapse) to be but a minor sin (Upapātaka). The lapse of a Naishṭhika Brahmachāri, elsewhere than with the wife of a teacher, does not amount to a grave sin, because it is not mentioned amongst the grave sins, such as that (of spoiling) the bed of a teacher, and therefore they consider an expiatory rite as much available to a Naishṭhika Brahmachāri as to an Upakurvāṇa, because celibacy is common both to the Naishṭhika Brahmachāri and the Upakurvāṇa and the lapse of both is also similar. This is like the eating (of food that is taboo). It is similar to a breach of the observance by a Brahmachāri by his drinking liquor and eating meat, and his purifying himself by (the performance of) an expiatory rite. In the case of those who hold that no expiatory rite is available (to a Naishṭhika Brahmachāri), there is no original Scriptural authority (in favour of their view), while those who hold that such expiatory rite is available to them, have the general authority, viz. “a Brahmachāri who commits the sin of incontinence etc.”, (in their favour). Therefore, it is sounder logic to hold that such an expiatory rite is available to them. The same has been stated in the Pramāṇa Lakṣhaṇa (in Pū.-Mī. I. 3. 89), which means that when an option between two contradictory things is observed, that which has Scriptural authority should be accepted. Therefore, the Smṛiti passage which denies such expiatory rite (to a Naishṭhika Brahmachāri) should be explained as being conducive to the stimulation of the greatest effort by a Naishṭhika Brahmachāri in keeping his vow (of celibacy). Similarly, in the case of mendicants and Vaikhānasās also, the same expiatory rites should

be held available, such as—"A Vānaprastha committing a breach of the observance of his order, should perform a 'Krichchhra' for twelve days, and help grow a coupe of grass." A mendicant (Bhikshu) also should do the same as a Vānaprastha, barring the cultivating of Soma, in addition to the duties of his own Shāstrās.—42.

### 12. BAHIRADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 43.

*But, all the same (those Sannyāsins and celibates who have broken the vow) are to be kept out (i.e. excommunicated) both because of the Scriptures and the accepted rules of conduct.—43.*

Whatever the nature of the lapse of the Sannyāsins from their order of life may be, viz. whether it be a minor or a grave sin, in both cases they ought to be excommunicated by respectable persons, because of the Smṛiti passages involving great censure (of such lapse), such as:—"For him, who after entering the order of Naishṭhika Brahmachāri, lapses from it, I do not know of any expiatory rite, which could purify this moral-suicide", and "Whoever touches a Brāhmaṇa who, having entered on an order of life, has lapsed from it, or who has been excommunicated, or one who is hanged, or bitten by worms, should perform the Chāndrāyaṇa expiatory rite". Also because that is the recognized etiquette of a respectable person. Respectable persons do not perform a sacrifice with, or study with, or enter into matrimonial relations etc. with, them.—43.

### 13. SVĀMYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 44-46.

*That the performer (of meditations, which form subsidiary parts of religious actions such as Sacrifices) is the Yajamāna (the sacrificing host) only, because the Scriptures speak of a fruit, (is the opinion) of Ātreya.—44.*

With regard to meditations which form subsidiary parts (of sacrifices etc.), a doubt crops up, as to whether



they are acts to be performed by the Yajamāna or the Ritvija (sacrificial priest). What then is the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) ? It is that they are the job of the Yajamāna. Whence is it so ? By reason of the fruit, as mentioned by the Scriptures. The fruit as mentioned by the Scriptures is—"There is rain for him, and he causes rain (for others) who mediates on rain as the five-fold Sāma" (Chhān. 23.2). And it is logical to understand that this fruit goes to the Yajamāna, because, competency to perform the whole sacrifice including the subordinate parts (of it) is conferred on him, and it is he alone, on whom such competency is conferred, that is entitled to it (i.e. the fruit). That this fruit (of the meditation) is obtained by the Yajamāna is known from such Scriptural statements, as—"It rains for him who meditates etc.". But (says the Vedāntin) it is seen (from the Scriptures) that the Ritvija also obtains the fruit, thus—"Whatever he (the Ritvija) desires for himself or for the Yajamāna, he obtains, by singing (Sāma) for it" (Brih. 1.3.28). (The opponent of Vedānta says)—No, because the present Scriptural statement is by way of an exception. Therefore Āchārya Ātreya considers, that it is on the Yajamāna, that the performance of these meditations from which fruit results, rests.—44.

*Auḍulomi (is of opinion) that it is the Ritvijā's job, because he is retained for it (for special fee).—45.*

It is not, that these meditations are acts to be performed by the Yajamāna. Āchārya Auḍulomi considers that they are the Ritvijā's job. What is the reason (for such a view) ? Because the Yajamāna specially retains the Ritvija for the whole religious performance including the subsidiary parts and meditations such as the Udgitha, because it is the duty of him on whom competency is conferred. Therefore, on the analogy of the rule with respect to the Godohana (milk-pail), they are to be performed by the Ritvija. For even so do the Scriptures indicate, viz. that it is the Ritvija who is the performer of the Vidyā, thus:—"Baka Dālbhya knew it (i.e. the Udgitha). He became the singer for the Naimisheyās, (the Yajamānās of the sacrifice)" (Chhān. 1.2.13). As regards the argument, that the

Scriptures declare that the fruit goes to the agent, i.e. the Ritviṇa, the reply is—This is no fault. Because, barring an exceptional statement, the connection of the Ritviṇas with the fruit cannot be reasonably sustainable, because whatsoever he does is for another (i.e. the Yajamāna).—45.

*Also because of the Scriptural statement.*—46.

There are the following Scriptural statements—“He said, whatever blessings the Ritviṇa invokes in a sacrifice, he invokes for the Yajamāna”, “Therefore the Udgātri who knows it to be so, should ask—For what object of your desire shall I sing?” (Chhān. 1.7.8.9). These passages indicate, that the fruit of the Vidyā (Vijnāna) of which the Ritviṇa is the agent, goes to the Yajamāna. Therefore, it is thus established that the performance of the meditations which form the subordinate parts (of a sacrifice) is the Ritviṇa’s job.—46.

#### 14. SAHAKĀRYĀNTARAVIDHYADHIKARAṆAM.

Sū. 47-49.

*In the alternative, there is an injunction about a third co-operating item (over and above Bālya and Pāṇḍitya), for one who is like that (i.e. one who possesses ordinary knowledge, and in whom the notion of duality still persists). This is like injunctions etc.*—47.

The Brihadāraṇyaka passage says as follows—“Therefore a Brāhmaṇa (a knower of Brahma) after having acquired scholarship, should try to live by means of (that strength which comes from) knowledge, and after having known all about this strength and scholarship (such a one) then (becomes) a Muni (ascetic), and after having known all about non-ascetic and ascetic condition (Amauna and Mauna), he becomes a Brāhmaṇa (knower of Brahma)” (Brih. 3.5.1). A doubt which arises here is whether there is or there is not an injunction given here, about the state of Muni-hood. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that there is no such injunction. The injunction (in the

passage) comes to an end with the words— “He should live by means of strength”. In the passage “Now after that a Muni”, no verb in an imperative sense indicating any such injunction, is to be seen. Therefore, it is logical to understand the passage as an Anuvāda (a mere reference to something already established before). (If it be asked), whence is such a conclusion arrived at, (the reply is) the word ‘ascetic’ and ‘scholar’ signify knowledge, and the sentence “having attained scholarship” necessarily leads to the condition of an ascetic. Besides, the sentence “Having acquired knowledge of non-asceticism and asceticism, he becomes a Brāhmaṇa” does not purport to give any injunction to attain knowledge of Brahma, because that is already implied (by the term Brāhmaṇa). Therefore, just as “Then (he becomes) a knower of Brahma” is merely by way of eulogy, even so the passage “Then (he becomes) an ascetic” also deserves to be similar (in nature), because the reference in both the cases is similar. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) we reply :—

There is an injunction with regard to some other thing which is an auxiliary (in the acquisition of knowledge). We should consider it as an injunction about the ascetic condition, which is an auxiliary to knowledge, in the same way in which ‘strength (which comes) from knowledge’ and ‘scholarship’ are understood to be injunctions, because of their being Apūrva i.e. an extraordinary thing unheard of before. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) it has been mentioned (by us) that the condition of an ascetic is already understood from the condition of scholarship. (We reply)—This is no fault because the word ‘ascetic’ (Muni) implies a preponderance of knowledge, and it is etymologically derivable from ‘Manana’ (Cogitation) as “A Muni through Manana (Cogitation)”, and also because it is seen to have been used in “I am the Vyāsa amongst the Munīs” (Bh. G. 10.37). But (says the opponent of Vedānta), in the Scriptural passage “Householdership, studentship at a teacher’s place, Muniship and Vānaprasthaship”, the word ‘Muni’ is used as a synonym for the highest order of life (i.e. of a Sannyāsin). (We reply)—No, because it is seen to have a different meaning also, as in the passage “Vālmiki the best amongst Munīs” (even though Vālmiki was not a Sannyāsin). Because there, the state of a Muni is mention-

ed in proximity to the other orders of life, the highest order of life is to be understood by the word 'Muni' as being the only thing which has remained to be mentioned, and because the highest order of life (i.e. that of a Sannyāsin) is mainly distinguished by pre-eminence of knowledge as the principal feature there. Therefore, the state of a Muni as characterized by a preponderance of knowledge is enjoined here, as the third thing, with reference to (the other two states of) 'strength (which comes from) knowledge' and 'scholarship'. With regard to the objection that the injunctional part (of the sentence) ends with the condition of strength (which comes from knowledge), it has to be understood, from the fact that the state of a Muni is an extraordinary thing (unheard of before), that an injunction is meant, viz. that he should be a Muni. Besides as the condition of a Muni is indicated to be something that has to be acquired (by a man), it has to be understood that like 'strength (which comes) from knowledge' and 'scholarship', it is something which is fit to be enjoined. By the words "for one who is like that", one who has knowledge and is therefore a Sannyāsin, is to be understood. How is it known that it is an indication of one who has knowledge or of one who is a Sannyāsin? Because, from the sentence "Having thus known the Self, and having given up all desire about sons etc. they adopt a mendicant's career", it is understood that the subject of the chapter relates to that. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) if a person is possessed of knowledge, its preponderance (in him) necessarily follows, and if so, of what use then is any such injunction? The Sūtra says—"In the alternative", and that means, that when, because of the predominance of seeing things as different (through Nescience), knowledge is not fully acquired, then in that case an injunction to this effect is to be understood—"In the case of an injunction etc.". Just as in the case of an injunction such as "One who desires for the heavenly worlds should perform Darśhapūrṇamāsa" injunction is also impliedly given with regard to such subsidiary parts as the lighting up of a sacrificial fire etc. as an auxiliary, even so, what is meant is that though the sentence about Vidyā (knowledge) is not mainly of an injunctional nature, an injunction is enjoined (there).—47.

When the order of life of the Sannyāsin, characterized by 'strength (which comes) from knowledge', and as having the authority of the Scriptures, is there, why do the Scriptures then in the Chhāndogya conclude by mentioning the order of the life of a householder, thus—"After having finished his studies (at the house of the preceptor) and then by becoming a householder" (Chhān. 8.15.1) ? (The opponent of Vedānta thinks)—By concluding that way, the Scriptures thus show respect to that order of life (and show indirectly that the order of life of the Sannyāsin is not of much importance). The Sūtrakāra replies—

*But it is because (a householder) has to perform religious duties fully i.e. comprehensively, that the Scriptures conclude with the order of life of a householder.—48.*

The word 'but' in the Sūtra indicates that there is something which is special (about the order of life of a householder), viz., that the householder has to perform all religious duties fully i.e. comprehensively, is particularized here. Because the Scriptures have enjoined on him many religious duties of a very exacting nature as pertaining to his order of life, such as sacrifices etc., as also, as far as possible, religious duties of other orders of life also, such as Ahimsā (abstention from killing or giving pain in thought, deed and action) and control (over the sense-organs), therefore, there is nothing contradictory in the Chhāndogya Upanishad concluding with the householder's order of life.—48.

*Also, because, like the Muni's (i.e. ascetic's) order of life, the Scriptures also give instructions about others (i.e. other orders of life) also.—49.*

Just as the order of life of an ascetic, and that of the householder, have the authority of the Scriptures, even so, residence at the house of a preceptor (i.e. the order of Brahmacharya), and the order of a Vānaprastha also (have similar Scriptural authority). For a Scriptural statement (to that effect) has already been cited before, thus—"Penance with austerity is the second, and a Brahma-

chāri residing at the house of a preceptor is the third" (Chhān. 2.23.1). Therefore, inasmuch as all the four orders of life have been mentioned (by the Scriptures), there is an option either of belonging to any of them singly or to all of them successively (as one pleases). The word "others (i.e. other orders of life)" (used in the Sūtra, even though only two orders of life are mentioned there), should be understood to have been so used with reference to the various minor sub-divisions of the same two orders of life, or with reference to the mutual distinction as between the many who practise (these orders of life).—49.

15. ANĀVISHKARĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 50.

*(The Ascetic should conduct himself without making himself manifest, because it is only when construed thus, (that the passage can have a proper sequence).—50.*

The Scriptures declare that one should behave with strength (which comes) from knowledge (Bālya), thus—"The knower of Brahma, after attaining scholarship should conduct himself with the strength (which comes) from knowledge" (Brih. 3.5.1). Now, the word Bālya being there, as formed by applying the Taddhita suffix to the word 'Bāla', and as meaning the condition of a child, or childish actions, and it being impossible to attain the childlike condition as characterized by a particular age, at will, a doubt (arises), as to whether, it means the juvenile propensity to perform the excretory functions of urinating and defoecating, wherever a child pleases, or whether it means the condition of internal purity and innocence, and the undeveloped condition of organs (which have not yet started to function), or whether merely a childlike freedom from hypocrisy and arrogance etc. is meant. What then is the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta)? It is, that it is logical to understand by 'Bālya' the behaviour characterized by eating and speaking as one pleases and exercising the excretory functions of urination and defoecation anywhere—which is its better known meaning. But (says the Vedāntin) it would not be logical, to accept unrestricted behaviour as the meaning of the word, as it would cause one to be liable to the fault of losing one's caste (i.e. be-

coming a Patita) etc.. (The opponent of Vedānta says)—No, because just as on the strength of the Scriptural statement about the killing of animals (in a sacrifice, no sin attaches), even so, the liability of sin attaching to such person is obviated. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) the reply of the Vedāntin is:—No, because it is possible to construe the Scriptural statement in another way. When it is possible to accept another meaning of the word 'Bālya' which would not be contradictory, it would not be logical to accept a meaning which would contradict another Scriptural injunction, because, an injunction with regard to a subordinate matter is given, only with a view to support the principal injunction. So far as the Yatis (ascetics) are concerned, attainment of knowledge is meant to be their principal pursuit, which pursuit is not possible, in case, all the ways of a child are accepted in toto (as the pattern of behaviour, by the Yatis). Therefore only the special inward condition of a child, such as the absence of a functional ability in a child, is to be understood by the word 'Bālya' here. That is why the Sūtrakāra states (in the Sūtra)—“Not making himself manifest” etc., i.e. without proclaiming himself by parading his knowledge, studies and religiosity (before others), and he should be free from hypocrisy and arrogance, just as a child that has not yet acquired his functional activity, has no desire to manifest itself to others. It is only thus, that the construction of the sentence, in such a way as to supplement the principal meaning, becomes reasonably sustainable. The same has been stated by Smritikārās, thus—“He is a Brāhmaṇa, whom nobody knows either as noble-born or low-born, nor ignorant or learned, nor of good conduct or of bad conduct. The one who knows, should perform his religious duty unostentatiously, and should go about incognito. He should go about in the world as if he is unobservant, ignorant and dumb”. Also, without exhibiting any outward indicatory mark (of his real nature) and in an unostentatious manner, etc.—50..

#### 16. AIHIKĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 51.

*In the absence of any impediment (to the means of attaining knowledge such as*

*'hearing, cogitating' etc., it may be generated) even during this birth, because it is so seen (from the Scriptures).—51.*

Beginning with the Sūtra "There is need of all, such as sacrifices etc.. It is, as it is, in the case of a horse" (Br. Sū. III. iv. 26), the higher and lower means of knowledge have so far been determined. Now it is being considered, whether knowledge, the fruit of such means, when it comes, does so during this very birth or it may do so even during the next birth. What then is your (i.e. of the opponent of Vedānta) conclusion? It is, that it comes during this very birth. What is the reason? Knowledge is preceded by the previous 'hearing etc.' (of the Scriptures). Nobody is induced to 'hear etc.' with an aim that knowledge should come during the next birth, but is always induced to do so with the aim that it should come here and now in this birth. Sacrifices etc. also generate knowledge by way of 'hearing etc.', because knowledge is generated through the means of right knowledge. Therefore, it is only during this birth that knowledge comes. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply —

Knowledge is generated during this very birth, provided there is no impediment to the means of attaining knowledge. By this is meant, that when the means of knowledge, while they are operating, have no impediment, caused by some other action ripe for fruition, knowledge is generated even here in this world, but when such an impediment is caused to them, then (knowledge is generated) in the next birth. Such ripening of actions (for fruition) takes place when the environment and causes present themselves. It is not possible to regulate that the same time, environment and causes which cause one action to ripen, would also cause another action to ripen, because actions can have fruits contradictory to each other. The Shāstra merely concludes by saying, that a particular action will have a particular fruit, but does not mention any specific time, environment or cause (for it). As a result of the peculiar strength of the means, some supersensuous power manifests itself in the case of some actions, while in the case of some other actions it stands arrested. Inasmuch as intentions are uncontrolled, it cannot be that a man cannot have



any such general intention as that knowledge may be generated in him either in this life or in the next, just as it pleases. Similarly even though knowledge is generated by 'hearing etc.', it is so generated only when the impediment to it is removed. The Scriptures also indicate the inscrutability of the Self (Ātmā), thus—"He, who is not obtainable by many, even for hearing, He, who is not known even by many who hear about Him, wonderful is the one, who speaks about Him, skilful is he, who finds Him, and wonderful is he, who instructed by skilful teachers, knows Him" (Kāṭha. 2.7). The Scriptures, which declare that Vāmadeva attained Brahmahood even while he was in the embryonic stage, show that, through means accumulated in the previous life, knowledge is attained during the next birth. Smṛiti also says, how, Bhagavān Vāsudeva questioned by Arjuna, thus—"Oh Kṛishṇa, to what end does that one go, who has not attained perfection?" (Bh. G. 6. 37), replied—"Oh son, nobody who has performed meritorious actions ever goes to a bad end" (Bh. G. 6. 40), and further, having spoken about the attainment of the world of the blessed by such a man, he says that such man is reborn in a good family, and then goes on further to say that "There (i.e. in the next birth) he comes into contact with the knowledge gained during the previous body" (Bh. G. 6. 43), and ultimately concludes by indicating, thus—"Having attained perfection through many such births, he at last attains the Highest goal" (Bh. G. 6. 45). Hence it is thus established that knowledge is generated in this birth or in the next, depending upon the measure in which impediment is removed.—51.

#### 17. MUKTIPHALĀDHIKARĀṆAM. Sū. 52.

*With regard to the fruit of Final Release, there is no rule (as there is, in the case of knowledge), because the condition of Final Release has been definitely ascertained (by the Scriptures).—52.*

The Sūtrakāra, after raising a doubt, viz. that, as in the case of an aspirant for Final Release who depends upon knowledge as the means (of attaining it), it is seen that

there is a rule as to a peculiarity in respect of knowledge, and that it fructifies in the present or in the next birth, depending upon the relative strength of the means, even so, there may well be a rule about such peculiarity in the nature of the fruit of Final Release, resulting from higher or lower means, says, that there is no such rule with regard to this fruit viz. Final Release. There should, in fact, never be a doubt with regard to the existence of any such rule about any special kind of Final Release. Whence is it so ? Because, that condition (of Final Release) has been definitely ascertained. All Vedānta texts understand this condition of Final Release to be of one uniform nature. Brahma itself is this condition of Final Release, and there is no possibility of Brahma ever being of many sorts, because according to the Scriptural statements, it is understood to have only one kind of indicatory mark, as is to be seen in Scriptural passages such as—"It is neither gross nor subtle" (Brih. 3.8.8); "That Self (which can be described as being), not so, not so" (Brih. 3.9.26); "Where one sees nothing else" (Chhān. 7.24.1); "That immortal Brahma is right in front" (Mund. 2.2.11); "This every thing is that Self" (Brih. 2.4.6); "This great unborn Self, sans-decay, sans-death, sans-destruction and sans-fear, is indeed Brahma" (Brih. 4.4.25); "When every conceivable thing is but this Self, then who can see whom and by what?" (Brih. 4.5.15) etc.. Besides, the means of knowledge, on account of their varying strength, may well create some such peculiarity in their own fruit i.e. 'knowledge'. but never in the case of the fruit of knowledge i.e. Final Release. We have often said, that it is not something, which has to be attained, because of its nature of always being ready and in existence and being something which is realized through knowledge. For the matter of that, even in the case of knowledge, that there is no such difference in it, as (for instance) its being good or bad, is reasonably sustainable, because were 'knowledge' to be inferior it would not be knowledge at all, inasmuch as knowledge always is the most superior thing. Therefore, there may, at the most, if at all, be a difference in the length of time after which it is generated viz. immediately or after a long time. But no such difference is possible in the matter of Final Release. Besides in as much as there is absence of

any such difference even in the case of knowledge, there is a similar absence of any rule, as to its fruit also, as there is in the case of fruits of religious actions. There is no difference in the case of knowledge which is the means of Final Release, as there is in the case of religious actions. In the case of Vidyās (Lores or Cognitions or Meditations) dealing with Qualified Brahma, as for instance—"It has mind as its structure, it has Prāṇa as its body" (Chhān. 3.14.2) etc., as the possibility of a difference due to an increase or decrease of Guṇās is reasonably sustainable, a rule as to the difference in the fruit is also reasonably sustainable, as it is, in the case of fruits of actions. The following is the Scriptural indicatory mark about it—"According as they try to propitiate Him, they become". It is not so, however, in the case of Vidyās about Unqualified Brahma. Similar also is the Smṛiti statement—"There is nothing such as a higher goal (in the case of a Vidyā of Unqualified Brahma). It is only when it is a Vidyā of Qualified Brahma, that differences are spoken of". The repetition of the passage "That condition has been ascertained by the Scriptures" in the Sūtra, indicates the end of the Adhyāya.—52.

*Here ends Pāda IV of Adhyāya III, and Adhyāya III also.*

## ADHYĀYA IV—PHALĀDHYĀYA

### PĀDA 1

#### 1. ĀVRITTYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 1-2.

*Repetition (of the mental act of acquiring knowledge i.e. Jñānakriyā is necessary), because, (the Scriptures have) more than once given such instruction.—1.*

In the third Adhyāya consideration was mostly given to the higher (Parā) and lower (Aparā) Vidyās, with reference to the means (of acquiring them). Now, here in the fourth (Adhyāya) consideration will be given to the fruit (Phala, of the Vidyās). May be, as occasion may arise, some other things also will be considered. To begin with, however, in (i.e. by means of) the next few Adhikaraṇās we would continue the consideration of those means (of acquiring knowledge) which still have remained (to be fully considered). A doubt arises with regard to the following Scriptural statements—"Oh Maitreyi, verily the Self should be seen, heard, cogitated upon and constantly meditated upon" (Brih. 4.5.6), "Let the mentally well-poised intelligent man (Dhīra) attain knowledge by knowing Him (the Ātmā)" (Brih. 4.4.21), "That is to be sought for, that is to be desired to be understood" (Chhān. 8.7.1)—viz., as to whether there should be only a single mental act or whether there should be a repetition (of such a mental act). What then is the conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta) ? It is, that, like 'Prayāja' (some particular act performed only once during the sacrifice) there should be only one such mental act, because in that way the purpose of the Shāstra will have been adequately served, and any such repetition (of it) which is not enjoined by the Scriptures, would be tantamount to going counter to the Shāstra. But (says the Vedāntin) several instructions of the Scriptures have been mentioned in illustrations such as—"('That the Self) should be seen, heard, cogitated upon and meditated upon". (The opponent of Vedānta says)—Even so, such repetition may be made as instructed by the Scriptures, by hearing once, thinking once, cogitating upon once, and meditating upon once, but not more than that,

and of course, where instruction (to do a thing) is given by the Scriptures only once, as in "Let him understand or let him meditate upon", there should be no such repetition. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply :—

This act (of acquiring knowledge) ought to be repeated. Whence is it so ? Because of several instructions. Such instruction (about repetition) more than once as "(That the Self) should be seen, heard, cogitated upon and meditated upon", suggests the repetition of the act of acquiring knowledge. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) we have explained that as instructed by the Scriptures, we should repeat the mental act once, but never more than that. (We reply)—No, because they (i.e. such mental acts) are meant ultimately to culminate in the intuitive realization (of Brahma). It is only when they so culminate in such intuitive realization (of Brahma) by such repeated hearing etc. that they have their tangible fruit, just as the threshing of rice (which has its husk on it) has its culmination in the dehushing of such rice grains. Besides 'cogitation and meditation' are said to imply action in which this aspect of repetition (Āvrittiguṇa) is implicit. For instance in ordinary life when we say (that a man worships his preceptor or his king, we understand that it means that he serves his preceptor or his king with continued unswerving loyalty (Tātparyeṇa). Similarly it is only when a Proshitanāthā wife (a grass widow i.e. a wife whose husband has gone away on business) constantly remembers her absent husband and is eager to meet him, that we speak of her (i.e. such traveller's wife) that she has no other thought but that of thinking constantly and wistfully remembering her absent husband. It is seen that the terms 'he should know', 'he should meditate' are used in Vedānta texts without any distinction i.e. as synonymous. In some places a Scriptural statement begins with the term 'let him know', and concludes with 'let him meditate upon', as for instance in—"He who *knows* in the same manner in which he (Raikva) knows it (earns the same fruit which Raikva earned). It is of him that I have spoken (to you)" (Chhān. 4.1.4) and "Oh Bhagavān, teach me about the deity on which you *meditate*" (Chhān. 5.2.2). Elsewhere, the Scriptures begin with 'meditating' and conclude with 'knowing' as for in-

stance in—“*Meditate* on the mind as Brahma” (Chhān. 3.18.1) and “He who *knows* it to be so, shines and radiates with the heat of his fame, success, and strength, obtained through the knowledge of Brahma” (Chhān. 3.18.3). Thus, it is established, that repetition is necessary even when instruction is given only once, while several instructions of course suggest repetition (of such mental acts).—1.

*Also, because of the indicatory mark (the necessity of repetition is understood).—2.*

A Scriptural indicatory mark also, makes the repetition of the mental act of acquiring knowledge, understood. Thus, with reference to the Udgītha Vidyā, after having censured meditation on “Āditya as the Udgītha” (Chhān. 1.5.1), as involving the fault of having the fruit of being blessed with a single son only, and enjoining the Vidyā of of the rays, thus—“Do thou meditate on the rays” (Chhān. 1.5.2), for the sake of obtaining many sons, the Scriptures indicate the enjoining of the repetition of the mental act of meditation as something already well established. Therefore in common with it, such repetition of the mental acts of acquiring knowledge is established in the case of all mental acts. The opponent of Vedānta here says—“May, such repetition of the mental act, well be, in the case of those mental acts of meditation whose fruit is capable of being achieved, because of the possibility of a superiority of fruit being achieved thereby, but what good can there be of such repetition of a mental act with respect to the Highest Brahma, which culminates in (the realization of) the transcendent Brahma, which has the nature of being eternally pure, enlightened and free, and which is the Self of all? If it be said (by the Vedāntin), that the realization of Brahma as the Self of all can take place by only one such act of hearing, is not reasonably sustainable, and hence I hold that repetition of it is understandable, (we, the opponents of Vedānta, reply)—No, because it is not reasonably sustainable (that such realization would necessarily take place) even by such repetition. If the passage “That thou art” (Chhān. 6.8.7) heard only once does not create such realization, what hope is there that even a repetition of such a passage would create such realization? If it be said (by the Vedāntin) that a passage merely

by itself may not be able to cause this entity to be realized and hence a passage which depends on reasoning to help it, may cause the realization of Brahma as the Self (of all), we, (the opponents of Vedānta) reply, even then such repetition is purposeless, because even mere reasoning, operating but once only, may cause its own object to be realized. It may even be like this (says the Vedāntin), viz. that reason and the (Scriptural) passage, together, may effect only a general, and not a special, kind of knowledge (of an entity). For instance, from a sentence such as 'I have pain in my chest', and the symptom of the tremor of limbs, a man may merely understand the existence of such pain (in the man who says so, only in a general way) but he cannot experience such pain, in that special manner in which the sufferer of such pain himself actually experiences it. If it be said (by the Vedāntin) that it is such special realization which removes ignorance (i.e. Nescience), and hence it is, that repetition is necessary for that purpose, (the opponent of Vedānta says)—No. Even if such repetition is made more than once, there is no possibility of such special realization. If such special realization does not result by the application of the Shāstra and reasoning, once, it cannot be so realized, even if they are employed even a hundred times. Therefore, whether a special or a general realization is sought to be propounded by means of the Shāstra and by reasoning, in either case, inasmuch as they would accomplish their work by one such operation of themselves (i.e. of the Shāstra and reasoning) repetition would have no use. Besides it is not possible to determine that the Shāstra and reasoning employed but once only, can never as a rule produce such experience, because of the varying intelligences of those who have to experience such a realization. There may well be such use for repetition, where, in the ordinary world, in the case of a thing consisting of many parts, and possessing general and special characteristics, one part of such a thing may be understood by one such act of careful intentness of attention, and another part by another such act of careful intentness of attention, as for instance, in the case of the understanding of a lengthy chapter of the same lesson, but no such repetition is needed for the generation of the right knowledge of Brahma, which is devoid of any such ordinary or special

characteristics of any kind, and which has sentiency alone as its Self.

To this conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), it is said, that repetition may well be purposeless in the case of one, who, when the passage "That thou art" is addressed to him only once, is able to realize that Brahma is the Self (of all), but to one who is not so able to realize, repetition is useful. For instance, in the Chhândogya, when instructed (by the preceptor), thus—"Oh Shvetaketu, that thou art" (Chhân. 6.8.7), and on his being asked again and again thus—"The Bhagavân should again explain it to me" (Chhân. 6.8.7), the preceptor after having removed every such cause of doubt one by one, again and again instructs Shvetaketu thus—"Oh Shvetaketu, that thou art". That is why we have given this Scriptural illustration, thus—"Ātmā verily should be heard, cogitated upon, and meditated upon" (Brih. 4.5.6). But (says the opponent of Vedānta), if the passage "That thou art", heard but once only, is unable to make one realize that which it means, then it certainly would not be able to do so even when it is repeated. (We reply)—This is no fault, for, indeed, when a thing (such as repetition) is seen to be useful how can it be said that it is not reasonably sustainable? It is indeed seen, that those who are able to understand the meaning of a sentence but vaguely by hearing it once only, are able to understand its meaning correctly, by a progressive removal of misconceptions (as to its meaning), by repetition. Besides, the sentence "That thou art" speaks of the entity denoted by the word 'thou' as being identical with the entity denoted by the word 'That'. And it is by the word 'That' (Tat), that Brahma, the 'Sat', and the seer, is said to be the cause of the origin of this world, as is well-known from the Scriptural passages such as—"Brahma is truth and knowledge, and is eternal" (Tait. 2.1.1), "Brahma which is knowledge and bliss" (Brih. 3.9.28), "Unseen but seeing, unknown but knowing etc." (Brih. 3.8.11), "Not subject to birth, not subject to old age, not subject to death, neither gross nor subtle, nor short nor long" (Brih. 3.8.8) etc.. There, by the words 'not subject to birth etc.', birth and such other phases of existence are denied, by the words 'neither gross etc.', such properties of matter as grossness etc. are denied, and by the words 'knowledge etc.' Brahma's being the light of sentiency is spoken



of. The entity 'That' (Tat) called Brahma, which is devoid of all the attributes of a transitory mundane existence, and which is capable of being realized, is well-known to those who are well-versed in Vedānta. Similarly, they also know that the entity indicated by the word 'Thou' (Tvam) is the Universal Highest Self (Pratyagātmā), the hearer, and the one which beginning with the body is understood to be the innermost Self of all and is ultimately determined to be of the nature of sentiency (Chaitanya-Svarūpa). Now, in the case of those whose comprehension of the meaning of these two terms is obstructed, i.e. coloured by ignorance, doubt, and confusion, the sentence "That thou art" is unable to generate appropriate knowledge of what these words mean, because, the knowledge of the meaning of all the words (of a sentence), is a pre-requisite for the knowledge of the meaning of such a sentence, and hence in their case, the repetition of the study of Scriptural passages and reasoning, which results in the proper discrimination of the words, is necessary. Even though, the Self which is to be realized, does not consist of any parts as such, still the nature of consisting of such parts as are characterized by a body, the sense-organs, mind, intelligence, objects of sense, and the property of reacting to pleasure and pain, is superimposed on it, and in such a case, inasmuch as one mental act of intentness of attention removes the misconception about one such part, and another such mental act of intentness of attention removes the misconception about another such part, and so on, it is but proper that in such a case, realization comes about by progressive stages, but even that is but only a penultimate condition of the actual realization of the Self. But such clever minds, as are not subject to any such impediments of the nature of ignorance, doubt, and confusion, as to the meaning of words, are able to understand the meaning of the passage "That thou art" even though it is mentioned but once only, and hence in their case it is but proper, that repetition has no purpose, and the realization of the Self, effected once for all, removes all ignorance, and no such order of progressive realization need be understood (to be necessary). But if it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta)—Forsooth, it would be proper if anybody were to realize the Self in this way, but (on the other hand) that the Self is subject to pain, is very forcibly

experienced (by men), and no one ever experiences the complete absence of pain etc., (we reply)—No, because it is reasonably sustainable, that just as the conception by the Self, that it possesses a body of its own, is false, even so the conception of it being subject to pain etc. also, is due to a similar false conception, for it is seen that when a body is actually cut or burnt, an erroneous conception such as ‘I am being cut and I am being burnt’ does in fact take place. Similarly when entities, more external to the Self. (than the body), such as a son or a friend, are being afflicted with pain, a similar false superimposition, viz. that it is ‘I’, i.e., the Self, that is being afflicted with pain, is to be seen. Even so there may be an erroneous misconception of pain etc., similar to the misconception of possessing a body. Because pain etc., like the body etc., are experienced as being distinctly separate from sentiency, as they are not experienced during deep sleep. The Scriptures on the other hand declare that sentiency is experienced even during deep sleep, thus—“Verily while that which he does not see (with his eyes) he verily does see, though he does not see” (Brih. 4.3.23). Therefore, the realization of the Self, is the realization that ‘I am the Self’, characterized only by sentiency and freedom from all pain as such. For him, who actually experiences the Self in this manner, there is nothing left to be done. The same is expressed in the Scriptural passage “What use is progeny to us, to whom the Self only is but the (heavenly) world?” (Brih. 4.4.22), which indicates that for a man who knows the Self, nothing is left to be done. So says the Smṛiti also, thus—“One who is delighted in the Self, is satiated with the Self and is content in the same, has nothing left for him to do” (Bh. G. 3.17). In the case of those to whom such realization does not come readily, repetition is understood to be necessary for such realization. Even in the case of a man who has understood the meaning of the passage ‘That thou art’, the Scriptures do not seek to distract such a person away from the meaning of the passage, and induce him towards practising repetition. No one gets one’s daughter married (with a mental reservation) for the purpose of doing violence to the bridegroom (at some future time). Even in the case of a man who considers himself to be enjoined by the Scriptures to such repetition, a conception contrary to that of the con-

ception of Brahma, such as that 'I am the doer, I have got to do this', is invariably generated. He who is intellectually dull and, therefore, misses the meaning of the sentence because its meaning does not flash on him, deserves to be firmly grounded into the meaning of the sentence, by such means as repetition etc.. Therefore, it is thus established that even in matters relating to the realization of Brahma, repetition of the instruction which is the means to such realization of knowledge, is necessary.—2.

## 2. *ĀTMATVOPASANADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 3.*

*(The Scriptures understand) that Ishvara i.e. Brahma is the Jīva-Self (Ātmā) and they (i.e. Scriptures) also cause it to be so understood.—3.*

The Sūtrakāra is now considering whether the Highest Self whose special attributes are described by the Shāstra, should be understood to be the 'I' or it should be understood as being some thing other than 'I'. (The opponent of Vedānta says)—When the Scriptures mention the word 'Self' in connection with the innermost Universal Self, whence can such a doubt arise? It is said (by the Sūtrakāra)—Were there to be a possibility of non-difference between the Jīva-Self and the Lord, then alone, it is thought, that the word 'Jīva-Self' could be understood in its principal sense, otherwise it will have to be understood in its secondary sense. What then is the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta)? It is that it can't be understood to be the 'I'. It is not possible to understand Him, who possesses the nature of being free from sinfulness i.e. the Highest Lord, as one having a contrary nature (i.e. that of the embodied Jīva-Self), nor can he, that has such contrary nature, be considered to be one who possesses the nature of being free from sinfulness (i.e. that of the Highest Lord). The Highest Lord has the nature of being free from sinfulness and the embodied Jīva-Self has a nature contrary to that. Now, if the Highest Lord were to be considered to be a transmigratory Jīva-Self, there would be the predicament of the non-existence of the Highest Lord himself thus resulting, and thereby the Shāstra would become meaningless. Again, if the transmigratory Jīva-Self were to be the

Lord (i.e. Ishwara) there would be the absence of a person competent (to study the Vedānta Shāstra) and thus the Shāstra would equally again be rendered meaningless, and besides there would be a contradiction of such means-of-proof as direct perception etc. (as it is known by everybody that the Jīva-Self is not the Lord). If it be said (by the Vedāntin), that different as they are, complete identity between them ought to be understood on the authority of the Shāstra, in the same way in which a symbol and Viṣṇu etc. are looked upon as being identical, (we the opponents of Vedānta say), well may it be so if you so prefer it, but do not seek to land us into an admission, that the Lord is the Self of the transmigratory being i.e. the Jīva-Self in the principal sense of the term. To this, we reply—The Highest Lord should of course be understood to be the Ātmā (Jīva-Self), for even so do the Jābālās, in the chapter dealing with the Highest Lord, understood the Lord to be the Ātmā (Jīva-Self) thus—“Thou art indeed I, Oh blessed deity, and I indeed, am Thou”. Similarly Scriptural passages such as “I am Brahma” also should be looked upon as considering (the Highest Lord) as the Self. Vedānta texts such as “This your Self which is inside all” (Brih. 3.4.1), “This your Self which is the ruler within and is immortal” (Brih. 3.7.3), “That is the truth, that is the Self, that thou art” (Chhān. 6.8.7), make us understand the Lord to be the Ātmā (i.e. the Jīva-Self). What is mentioned (by the opponent of Vedānta), viz., that it can be understood by these sentences, on the strength of a similar reasoning about a symbol being Viṣṇu, that the symbol (Pratīka) should be understood to be Brahma, is not logical, because there would thus be the predicament of these passages having to be understood in a secondary sense. Besides (it would not be proper), because here the syntactical form of the sentences of the Scriptures is dissimilar. Where, the Scriptures mean, that a symbol should be superimposed with the notion of a particular thing, there is only a unilateral statement, as for instance in the passages—“The mind is Brahma” (Chhān. 3.18.1), “The Āditya is Brahma” (Chhān. U. 3.19.1). Here however the Scriptures declare thus—“Thou art I, and I am Thou”, and hence, as here, the form of the Scriptural statement is different from the Scriptural statement about the symbol,

it is understood that there is non-difference (between the embodied Jiva-Self and Brahma). Besides, the Scriptures have censured the looking upon of entities as being different. For instance, Scriptural passages, such as "The man who meditates upon a deity as an entity different from himself, really does not understand (the Truth)" (Brih. 1.4.10), "One who here perceives entities as being different from each other, only goes from death to death" (Brih. 4.4.19), "Everything forsakes him who considers all entities as being different from the Self" (Brih. 4.5.7), have censured the understanding of such difference (in entities). As regards the statement (by the opponent of Vedānta), that it is not possible for entities having opposite natures to be the Self of each other (i.e. to be mutually identical), (we reply)—This is no fault, because it is reasonably sustainable, that the notion of their possessing natures opposed to each other, is illusory. As regards the statement that there would be the predicament of the non-existence of the Lord, (we reply)—that also is not so, because of the authority of the Shāstra, and also because we do not understand (as you the opponent of Vedānta do) that the Lord himself has the nature of the transmigratory Jiva-Self. We understand that the Scriptures do not propound that the Lord is the transmigratory Jiva-Self, but on the other hand we do understand that the Scriptures aim at propounding, by denying the transmigratory nature of the Jiva-Self itself, that it is the Lord. This being so, it is determined, that the non-dual Lord has the nature of being free from all sinfulness, and that the (supposed) contrary nature of the Jiva-Self, is illusory. With regard to the statement (by the opponent of Vedānta) that there would be the absence of any person competent (to study the Vedānta Shāstra) and that such means-of-proof as direct perception would be contradicted, (we reply) that, that also is not so, because it is understood by us, that prior to the realization of knowledge, the Jiva-Self by all means, does indeed have such transmigratory nature, and it is during such condition that the operation of such means-of-proof, as direct perception etc. takes place. While the Scriptures indicate by the passage "When all this becomes to him, the Self as such, by what will he see and see what"? (Brih. 2.4.14) that after the realization (of the Self) there is absence of such means-of-

proof as direct perception etc.. If it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta) that in the absence of the means-of-proof such as direct perception, there would be the predicament of even the Scriptures themselves ceasing to be the Scriptures (because they are the strongest means-of-proof), (we reply)—Not exactly, because, we on the other hand, do welcome such a predicament (i.e. it is for us a consummation devoutly to be wished). Besides, the Scriptures beginning with “In this condition (of realization), a father ceases to be a father” (Brih. 4.3.22), go on to say in the end, that “The Vedās cease to be the Vedās” (Brih. 4.3.22), and thus after the realization (of Brahma) we do welcome, even the Vedās ceasing to be the Vedās. If the opponent were to say—“Who in that case, is the one, that is in ignorance i.e. in need of such realization?”, we reply—It is you yourself, who are asking this question. If the opponent were to say—“Oh, but the Scriptures declare that I myself am the Lord”, (we retort)—If you have realized it to be so (i.e. that you are the Lord) then (in that case) there is none that happens to be without any such realization. Again the fault attributed, viz. that inasmuch as the Self along with Avidyā (i.e. Nescience) necessarily make a pair, it makes for duality, and hence ‘Advaita’ (non-duality or monism) is not reasonably sustainable, is also refuted by what has just gone before. Therefore, one should focus the mind on the Lord as being the Ātmā (the Self).—3.

### 3. PRATIKĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 4.

*The Symbol cannot be (understood to be the Self). He (i.e. the person meditating) does not (look upon it as the Self).—4.*

Now a doubt arises, with regard to meditations on symbols in such (Scriptural passages) as “One should meditate on the mind as Brahma, the Adhyātma (aspect), and ‘the Ākāsha is Brahma’ the Ādhidaivata (aspect)” (Chhān. 3.18.1), “The instruction is that Āditya is Brahma” (Chhān. 3.19.1), “He who meditates on Nāma (i.e. the Vedās) as Brahma” (Chhān. 7.1.5), as to whether the symbols should themselves be understood to be the Self (Ātmā) or not. What then is the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta)? It is, that it is logical that they also should

themselves be understood to be the Self (Ātmā). Whence is it so? Because in the Scriptures, Brahma is well-known as being the Self (Ātmā), and inasmuch as these symbols, as the effects or modifications (Vikāra) of Brahma, are also of the nature of Brahma, it is reasonably sustainable that they also are of the nature of the Self. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply—One should not fasten the notion of the Self on symbols. The person meditating does not understand these different symbols to be the Self. The argument that symbols being the effects of Brahma, are themselves of the nature of Brahma, and hence they are of the nature of the Self also, is not correct because (in that case) there would then be the predicament of the non-existence of the symbol itself thus resulting. It is only after the nature of the diverse effects such as Nāma etc. *qua* effects is destroyed, that it is possible to accept them as being of the nature of Brahma. When this nature of the effects i.e. Nāma etc. is destroyed, how could they then have the nature of a symbol or how could they then be accepted as being of the nature of the Self? Because Brahma has the nature of the Self, it cannot be supposed, that in the instruction about the contemplation on Brahma, there is an instruction about the contemplation on the Self, because in the instruction about the contemplation on Brahma, the agentship (of the person meditating) is not dispensed with. The doing away of all the attributes of transmigratory nature such as agentship etc., is a *sine qua non* for the instruction that Brahma is the Self, while an injunction to meditate is given without doing away with such attributes as agents etc. (implicit in transmigratory existence). Hence, inasmuch as, both the persons meditating, and the symbol (the object of meditation) are similar (because neither are Brahma), that the symbol can be looked upon as the 'Self' is not reasonably sustainable. A Ruchaka (a kind of golden utensil) and a Svastika (another kind of golden utensil) are not the self of each other (i.e. they are not identical). They are identical only as gold. We have said already, that if symbols are considered to be of the nature of Brahma, there would then be the predicament of the non-existence of the symbol resulting. Therefore, the symbol is not looked upon as being the Self.—4.

## 4. BRAHMADRISHTYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 5.

(The Āditya i.e. the Sun etc.) are to be looked upon as Brahma, because, that way there is exaltation (Utkarsha) (of them).—5.

As regards the instances given (above), this other doubt arises, viz., as to whether, therein, Āditya etc. are to be looked upon as Brahma, or Brahma is to be looked upon as Āditya etc.. Whence is there any such doubt? Because we do not know of any reason for both these having the same case-ending (Sāmānādhikaraṇya). Here, it is seen that the word Brahma has the same case-ending as the words 'Āditya etc.' in the passages "Āditya (is) Brahma", "Prāṇa (is) Brahma", "Lightning (is) Brahma". Here, the fact of their having the same case-ending is not clearly understood to be proper, because the words 'Brahma' and 'Āditya' etc. have different meanings. A sentence such as 'The bull (is) a horse' cannot be an instance of a proper co-ordination merely because of the fact that both have the same case-ending. But (it is argued by the opponent of Vedānta), as there is a relationship of cause and effect between Brahma and Āditya, just as there is for instance, between clay and a trough, there would be such coordination between them, by reason of their having the same case-ending. No, we reply. By such coordination resulting from their having the same case-ending, the effect *qua* an effect would be destroyed, and it has already been stated by us, that there would then be the predicament of the non-existence of the symbol itself resulting, and this passage would then be a passage relating to the Highest Self, and thus the competency (of a man) to meditate would be affected, and a particular mention here of only a few limited entities (such as Āditya, Prāṇa and lightning, when all entities are equally the effects of Brahma), would be useless. Therefore when there is a superimposition of one entity on another, as in the passage "The Brāhmaṇa (is) the Vaishvānara Agni", and there is a doubt as to what is to be superimposed on what, and the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that in the absence of any Shāstra laying down the *raison d'être* of such a rule, there could



be no rule as to that, or preferably, the conclusion is, that Brahma should be looked upon as being the Āditya etc., because it is only by looking upon Brahma as the Āditya etc. in this way that there would be a meditation on Brahma, and the Shāstra also lays down that it is only the meditation on Brahma that has a fruit, and that hence the Āditya should not be looked upon as Brahma. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply—Āditya etc. should be looked upon as Brahma. Whence is it so? Because of the exaltation (Utkarsha). It is in this way that Āditya etc. would really be looked upon as exalted, because the notion of their being exalted (viz., that they are Brahma) is superimposed on them. The same thing is held good in ordinary life, which expects that the idea of exaltation should always be properly superimposed on an inferior entity, as for instance when a king's charioteer is looked upon as the king. The same rule ought also to be followed here, because to reverse the process would cause the predicament of a fault (Pratyavāya) being committed. If a king is looked upon as a charioteer, and is thus lowered in estimation, it would not be proper. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) such a doubt about the predicament of a fault thus resulting should not be entertained, because of the authority of the Scriptures, and it would not be logical to regulate the outlook of Shāstra by the canons of the ordinary world. To this our reply is—This would be so, provided the meaning of the Shāstra happens to be properly determined, but when the meaning of the Shāstra is doubtful, the application of the canons of ordinary life for clearing the ambiguity would not be wrong. So, it is but proper, that when the meaning of the Shāstra is duly ascertained to be in favour of the superimposition of the notion of an exalted status (on an inferior entity), any one who superimposes a low status (on a superior entity) would be going into an error. Besides, as the words 'Āditya' etc. come first (in the passage), in the absence of any reason to the contrary, they ought to be understood in their primary sense. When therefore, that these words should be understood in their primary sense is thus fixed in our mind first, and the word 'Brahma' which comes to our mind later cannot be properly coordinated with the earlier words

'Āditya' etc. in a Sāmānādhikaraṇya sense, if it is understood in its primary sense, the only remaining alternative available, is, that it (i.e. the passage) enjoins the looking upon the first entity as Brahma. Besides as the word 'as' (Iti) is used in conjunction with the word 'Brahma' the same meaning is logical. For the Scriptures everywhere mention the word 'Brahma' in conjunction with the word 'Iti', as for instance in "That it is as Brahma, is the instruction; That it is as Brahma, is how it should be meditated upon", "That it is as Brahma, is how he meditates on it", while they mention only the mere words 'Āditya' etc.. Hence as in the sentence 'He perceives the mother-of-pearl as silver' while the word 'mother-of-pearl' means the mother-of-pearl, the word 'silver' means only the perception of silver (in the mother-of-pearl). A man merely perceives it as silver, when actually no silver is there. In the same way it is understood here also, that he should look upon 'Āditya' etc. as Brahma. The complementary passages "He who knows this to be so, meditates on the Āditya as Brahma" (Chhān. 3.19.4), "Who meditates on 'Speech' as Brahma" (Chhān. 7.22), "Who meditates on a mental resolution (Samkalpa) as Brahma" (Chhān. 7.4.3) also, by using the words Āditya etc. in the accusative case, indicate that the Āditya etc. are the objects of the act of meditation, by superimposing the idea of Brahma on them. With regard to the statement (by the opponent of Vedānta) that it is Brahma that should be meditated upon for the purpose of the fruit (viz. Final Release), we say that it is not proper, because as demonstrated above, it is the Āditya etc. that have to be meditated upon (as Brahma). As regards the fruit of such meditation (viz. Final Release), Brahma itself, which presides over every thing, will of course vouchsafe the fruit of the meditation on Āditya etc., as in the case of the service (Upasanā) of a guest (Atithi). This has been already described in the Sūtra—"The fruit (comes) from Him (the Lord) for it is reasonably sustainable" (Bra. Sū. III. ii. 38). When it is said that Brahma is the object of meditation, it is in the sense of the superimposition of the idea of Brahma on symbols, just as there is the superimposition of Viṣṇu etc. on images etc.—5.

## 5. ADITYĀDIMATYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 6.

*Notions of Āditya etc. (are to be superimposed) on the subordinate parts (i.e. Angās of sacrificial acts), because it is reasonably sustainable.—6.*

As regards meditations which relate to the subordinate parts (i.e. Angās of sacrificial acts) such as “He (the Sun) who shines, should be meditated upon as Udgītha” (Chhān. 1.3.1), “The worlds should be meditated upon as five-fold Sāma” (Chhān. 2.2.1), “‘Speech’ (Vāk) should be meditated upon as the seven-fold Sāma” (Chhān. 2.8.1), “This (very Earth) (is) the Rik and the Agni (is) the Sāma” (Chhān. 1.6.1), a doubt arises, as to whether it is enjoined, that the Āditya etc. should be looked upon as the Udgītha or that the Udgītha etc. should be looked upon as the Āditya etc.. With regard to that, the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that there is no rule as to that, on account of the absence of any reason for any such rule. Here, it is not understood that there is any special exaltation of anything in particular, as there is in the case of Brahma. It is possible to understand that Brahma is more exalted than the Āditya etc., by reason of its being the cause of the world and because of its being endowed with the nature of being free from sin, but there happens to be no reason to understand any reason for understanding that there is any special exaltation in the case of the Āditya and the Udgītha, inasmuch as, the nature of being but effects only, is common to them both. Or rather, (we think, that) the notions of Udgītha etc. should as a rule be superimposed on the Āditya etc.. Whence is it so? Because Udgītha etc. are of the nature of sacrificial acts, and because it is well-known that it is through such acts that fruits are obtained. Āditya etc. when meditated upon with the notions of their being the Udgītha etc. may themselves acquire the nature of religious acts and may thus become the cause of the acquisition of fruits. For the Scriptures, by the passages “This (very Earth) (is) the Rik, this Agni (is) the Sāma” (Chhān. 1.6.1), and by (the complementary passage) “That this Sāma is superimposed on this Rik” (Chhān. 1.6.1), indicate the Earth by the word Rik, and Agni by the word

Sāma, which is possible only when it is desired to look upon the Earth and the Agni as the Rik and Sāma respectively and not when it is desired to look upon the Rik and Sāma as the Earth and Agni. It is when the charioteer is looked upon as the king, that the word 'King' happens to be used metaphorically for the charioteer, but the word 'charioteer' is never so used metaphorically for the king. Besides, by the use of the locative case (Adhikaraṇa) in connection with the word 'worlds', in the passage "The worlds should be meditated upon by looking upon them as the five-fold Sāma", it is understood, that it is the Sāma that is to be superimposed on the worlds. In the Scriptural passage "This Gāyatra (Sāma) (in which the five-fold Sāma is considered to be the five Prāṇās i.e. the sense-organs) is woven into the Prāṇās" (Chhān. 2.11.1) also, it is indicated similarly. In the Scriptural passage "That Āditya is Brahma, is the instruction" (Chhān. 3.19.1), Brahma, which is referred to after Āditya, is to be superimposed on Āditya etc. which are referred to first. In the Scriptural passage "The Earth is the Hinkāra" (Chhān. 2.2.1) again, the Earth etc. are referred to first, and the Hinkāra etc. are referred to afterwards. Hence the notion of the subordinate parts (of a sacrificial act) are to be superimposed on Āditya etc. which are not such subordinate parts (of action i.e. Karma).

This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) we reply—It is the notions of Āditya etc., that should of course be superimposed on such subordinate parts (of sacrificial acts) as the Udgītha etc.. Whence is it so? Because, it is reasonably so sustainable. It is reasonably sustainable, that it is only when the Udgītha etc. undergo refinement by the superimposition of the notions of Āditya on them, that on account of the contact with the Apūrva (lit., the remote consequence of an act, *here*, the merit of such religious acts) the religious acts attain greater augmentation. The Scriptural passage "Whatever (religious act) he performs with knowledge, faith, and meditation (on the deities), that alone becomes more potent" (Chhān. 1.1.10) indicates that knowledge (Vidyā) is the cause which makes a religious act more potent. But (says the opponent of Vedānta), this may be so, in the case of actions which are made more potent by such meditations, but what is the

position (Katham) with regard to actions which have their own independent fruit, as is seen for instance, in the Scriptural passage "He who, knowing this, meditates on these worlds by looking upon them as the five-fold Sāma" (Chhān. 2.2.3) ? (We reply)—Even in that case, because it is only those who are competent that can engage themselves in such meditation, it is logical to hold, that the fruit is obtained as a result of the relation of the aforesaid Apūrva to the meditation, as it is for instance, in the case of the rule about the Godohana (Milk-pail). Besides, inasmuch as Āditya etc. have themselves the nature of (vouchsafing) a fruit, it is reasonably sustainable to understand that they are more exalted than the Udgītha etc. which are of the nature of a religious act. Moreover the Scriptures teach us that the fruit of religious acts is of the nature of the attainment of Āditya etc.. Besides, the Scriptures by mentioning in the beginning that the Udgītha is something that should be meditated upon by the passage "The letter 'Om' is the Udgītha and it should be meditated upon. The following is the further explanation of Udgītha" (Chhān. 1.1.1), later on enjoin this notion of looking upon them as Āditya. The statement (by the opponent of Vedānta) that the Āditya etc. meditated upon as the Udgītha etc. would themselves acquire the nature of a religious act and yield a fruit, is not proper, because meditation itself being a religious act, it would be reasonably sustainable that meditation itself would yield a fruit, and also because Udgītha etc. even though looked upon as Āditya etc. would not thereby lose their nature of being religious acts. The use of the words 'Rik and Sāma' for the Earth and the Agni respectively, in the Scriptural passage "That Sāma is superimposed on the Rik" (Chhān. 1.6.1), is by way of an indirect application (Lakṣhaṇā). Indirect application (Lakṣhaṇā) is promoted by its possible proximate or even distant relation as the case may be, to the primary meaning (of the word). Hence even though it is desired here that the Rik and Sāma are to be looked upon as the Earth and Agni, still, inasmuch as such well-known entities as Rik and Sāma have been separately mentioned, and again inasmuch as the entities, Earth and Agni are proximate to them, therefore, the Rik and Sāma thus being related to Earth and Agni, it is definitely ascertained,

that the words Rik and Sāma are used synonymously for the Earth and Agni respectively. Again, it is not possible to prevent the word 'charioteer' from proceeding to denote a king, for some reason or other (as for instance when the king chooses to take up the reins in his own hand, and do the work of a charioteer). The Scriptural passage "This (Earth) itself, is the Rik (Iyam eva Rik)" (Chhān. 1.6.1), because of the order in which the words (earth and Rik) are mentioned, makes it understood that it is the Rik that is of the nature of the Earth. If the Scriptures had meant it to be understood that the earth was of the nature of the Rik, the order of the words would have been—This (i.e. the Earth) is but the Rik only (Iyam Rik Eva). Besides the Scriptural passage "He who knowing thus, sings Sāma" (Chhān. 1.7.7) concludes that the meditation is upon the subordinate part (i.e. Anga of a religious act) and not upon the earth. Similarly, in the Scriptural passage "The worlds may be meditated upon as the five-fold Sāma", even though the word 'world' is governed by the locative case (Lokeshu), it is the worlds that are to be superimposed on the five-fold Sāma, because it is understood from the word Sāma which is governed by the accusative case, that it is the Sāma that is the object of meditation. When the worlds are superimposed on Sāma, it is that Sāma which is meditated upon as the worlds, or otherwise it would be the worlds that would happen to be meditated upon as Sāma. This discussion should be understood as explaining the Scriptural passage "This Gāyatra (Sāma) is woven into the Prāṇās" (Chhān. 2.11.1), where also the Scriptures use the accusative case equally for both (the words), as in the passage "Now verily this seven-fold Sāma should be meditated upon as Āditya" (Chhān. 2.9.1). As the introductory portion shows the Sāma as the entity to be meditated upon, thus—"Verily meditation on the whole Sāma is good" (Chhān. 2.1.1), "Now about the five-fold" (Chhān. 2.7.2), "And now about the seven-fold" (Chhān. 2.8.1), it is the Āditya etc. that are to be superimposed on it (i.e. the Sāma). It is precisely because it is understood that it is the Sāma that is to be the object of meditation, that even when the Scriptural indication is the opposite way, such as "The Earth is the Hinkāra" (Chhān. 2.2.1), it is Hinkāra etc. that are to be looked upon as the Earth etc.. Therefore

it is thus proved that the notions of Āditya etc., which do not rest on any subordinate part (of a religious act) are to be superimposed on the Udgitha etc. which are such subordinate parts of religious acts.—6.

6. ĀSINĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 7-10.

*(The person meditating must be) in a sitting posture, because (it is only that way that meditation) is possible.—7.*

There could be no question of the consideration about posture etc. in the case of meditations relating to the subordinate parts of religious actions, inasmuch as they are regulated by the religious actions themselves, nor can there be any such question in the case of the correct i.e. perfect intuitive knowledge (of an entity such as Brahma), as the knowledge of such an entity depends upon such intuitive knowledge of the entity itself. But with regard to other meditations, the Sūtrakāra now proceeds to consider, whether they should as a rule be performed in a sitting posture or whether a man should set about to perform them, regardless of any such rule, whether he be standing, sitting, or lying down, just as he pleases. With regard to this, the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that inasmuch as meditation is a mental act, there could be no rule with regard to the bodily posture. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) the Sūtrakāra replies—A person should meditate in a sitting posture only. Whence is it so? Because it is possible (only in that posture). Meditation indeed is the setting up of a continuous stream of homogeneous mental apprehensions, which is not possible when a person is either walking or running, as motion etc. of any kind are prone to distract the mind. In the case of a man standing also, inasmuch as the mind is preoccupied in maintaining the body in an erect posture, it is not capable of realizing a supersensuous entity. A man in a recumbent posture is prone to be suddenly overpowered by sleep. But, in the case of a man in a sitting posture, many such faults are easily avoidable and meditation by him is thus possible.—7.

*Also because (of meditation being) of the nature of steadfast concentration of thought.—8.*

Besides, to concentrate on a thought steadfastly is but the setting up of a continuous stream of homogeneous mental apprehensions. The term 'steadfast concentration of thought' is seen to be used in a secondary sense, when bodily movements are perfectly relaxed, the vision is fixed (as in a brown-study), and the mind is absorbed in a single object, as for instance, when we speak of a crane watching intently (for a fish) or of a grass widow (a Proshita-bandhu i.e. a woman whose husband is absent on a journey) watching intently with steadfast devotion (her traveller-husband's return). This can be accomplished with ease in a sitting posture. Therefore, also, meditation is an act to be performed in a sitting posture.—8.

*It is with reference to the steadfastness (of the earth even while rotating, that the Scriptures have used that term in steadfast concentration in the case of the earth).—9.*

In the Scriptural passage "The Earth is, as it were, in (a condition of) steady concentration (of thought)" (Chhān. 7.6.1), the statement about such concentration of thought is used in reference to the Earth's (apparent) want of movement. That is a Scriptural indicatory mark for holding, that meditation is an act to be performed in a sitting posture.—9.

*The Smritis also say similarly.—10.*

The learned Smritikārās also speak of the sitting posture (Āsana) as a subordinate part of meditation, thus—"Having taken up a firm sitting posture for oneself in a hallowed place etc." (Bh. G. 6.11). Hence also, the Yoga-Shāstra gives instructions about such special postures as Padmaka (the lotus posture—i.e. sitting, right foreleg on left thigh and left foreleg on right thigh).—10.



## 7. EKĀGRATĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 11.

*Because, no particular (rules are mentioned, meditation should be performed) wherever concentration of mind (can be attained).—11.*

As regards the direction, environment or time (in which meditation should be performed), a doubt (arises), as to whether there is or is not any rule (governing it). The Sūtrakāra answers the opponent of Vedānta, who considers, that there may be some sort of rule as to that, inasmuch as it is observed that usually in the case of Vedic actions there is a rule as to the direction etc., that a rule as to direction etc. in connection with the aim (of such meditation) does exist by implication, thus:—As there is no special Scriptural mention about any rule about meditation, as there is in Sacrifices etc., as regards the eastern direction, or forenoon, or a site sloping towards the east, one should perform meditation wherever and in whichever direction, and whenever, concentration of mind can be secured with ease, because such concentration of mind is possible anywhere. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) some do mention such special rules as for instance—"One should meditate in a level place which is clean and is free from pebbles, fire, sand etc. and also free from noise and ponds etc. and in a place which is agreeable to the mind, but not in a place where there are mosquitoes etc. which are troublesome to the eye, i.e. in a cave etc. where the air is still and calm" (Shvet. 2.10). The reply given is—No doubt there is such a kind of rule but such a rule being there, the Āchārya as a friend hints that there is no special rule about the special things mentioned in that rule. The expression 'agreeable to the mind' indicates this very thing, viz. that meditation should be performed, in such places wherever there is concentration of mind.—11.

## 8. ĀPRĀYAṆĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 12.

*There should be repetition of meditations, right up to the time of death, because it is observed to be so, even at that moment.—12.*

In the first Adhikaraṇa it was concluded that there should be repetition of all meditations. So far as that is concerned, as such meditations for the purpose of correct i.e. perfect knowledge, should, as in the case of the pounding (of rice etc.), ultimately culminate in the achievement of the objective viz. correct i.e. perfect knowledge, the extent of their repetition has of course been understood already. When the effect of meditation viz. correct i.e. perfect knowledge, is achieved, it is not possible to enjoin any further effort (of meditation) because, as Brahma is the Self of all and is not something which can be enjoined (on a man), it cannot be the province of a Shāstra. With respect to meditations which have the fruit of the nature of secular prosperity, however, there is scope for consideration as to whether one should stop after repeating such meditations for some time, or whether they should be repeated as long as one continues to live. What then is the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) ? It is, that meditation having been performed for some time, should be given up, because the Scriptural requirement of 'meditation' in which such repetition is implicit, is thereby achieved. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) we reply :—

Meditation should be repeated right up to the time of death, because the acquisition of the invisible fruit of meditation is dependent upon the final act of the acquisition of knowledge (Antyapratyaya). Religious acts which begin to produce the fruit to be enjoyed during the next birth, require (Ākshipanti) the knowledge of the nature of i.e. the conception of, such fruit, at the time of death, according to Scriptural passages such as "He becomes endowed with special consciousness of desires, he follows the subtle body (Linga-Sharīra) which has such special consciousness of desires" (Brih. 4.4.20), "He approaches the Prāṇa with whatsoever he has in his mind. This Prāṇa conjointly with Teja, takes him along with the Self, to the desired world" (Prashna. 3.10). (This is so), also because of the illustration of the caterpillar on the grass. But so far as these meditations are concerned, what knowledge of desires other than that which accrues at the time of death, apart from the repetition of such meditations, can such meditations expect ? Therefore, there ought to be a re-

petition of the meditations, which are of the nature or the conception of the knowledge of the desire of the fruit to be obtained at the time of death. For even so does the Scriptural passage "With whatever special desire he departs from this world" indicate the repetition of the act of meditation, even at the time of death. The Smṛiti also says—"With whatever desire in mind he departs from the body at the end, to that object of desire, Oh son of Kuntī, obsessed as he is with that desire, he goes" (Bh. G. 8.6), "With a steadfast mind, at the time of departure (from the body)" (Bh. G. 8.10). The Scriptures also declare, that even at the time of death, there is something still remaining to be done, thus—"He should at the time of death, call to his mind the three things" (The three Mantrās addressed to the Sun, the Adhidaivika aspect of Prāṇa thus—"There is no destruction of you, you are constant, you are the subtle element of Prāṇa") (Chhān. 3.17.6).—12.

### 9. TADADHIGAMADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 13.

*On its (Brahma's) realization, the possible future sins and the past ones, do not come into contact and are destroyed respectively, because it is so declared (by the Scriptures).—13.*

The supplemental portion which remained (to be discussed) in the third Adhyāya is now finished. Now, the Sūtrakāra starts on the consideration of the fruit of the knowledge of Brahma. The doubt is, as to whether, when realization of Brahma has taken place, sinful acts whose fruit is contrary to it (i.e. the fruit of the knowledge of Brahma) are destroyed or not. What then is the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta)? It is, that inasmuch as actions do have the result of producing their fruit, their destruction, prior to their producing such fruit, is not possible, because it is understood from the Scriptures, that actions do possess an inherent power of producing their fruit, and hence if sinful acts were to be so destroyed before their fruit is duly suffered, the Scriptures would thus happen to be ignored. The Scriptures also declare—Actions are never destroyed. But (says the Vedāntin) if it

be so, then it would come to this, that the instruction of the Scriptures with respect to expiatory rites would be rendered meaningless. This is no fault (the opponent of Vedānta replies), because it is reasonably sustainable that expiatory rites are understood to depend upon particular occasions, as for instance, like the *Ishti* which is to be performed, when a house is destroyed by fire. Besides as expiatory rites have been enjoined in connection with a man's contact with sin, they may well have the purpose of neutralizing such sinful acts, but there is no such injunction (about expiatory rites) with respect to the *Vidyā* of the knowledge of Brahma (viz. that it should be attained for the purpose of neutralizing sinful acts). But (says the Vedāntin), if it is not understood that the sinful acts of a man who has attained the knowledge of Brahma are so destroyed, then inasmuch as the fruit of such actions has necessarily to be suffered, no Final Release would ever take place. (The opponent of Vedānta replies)—No, because, like fruits of actions, Final Release also may come about, depending upon a particular environment, time and special cause. Therefore, there never is any destruction of the sinful acts, on the attainment of the knowledge of Brahma. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply :—

On its (i.e. Brahma's) realization, the destruction and non-contact respectively of prior and subsequent sinful acts, come about, i.e. the prior sinful acts are destroyed and possible sinful acts in future do not come into contact with a person. Whence is it so ? Because of the declaration to that effect (by the Scriptures). For the Scriptures, in the chapter dealing with Brahma-*Vidyā*, indicate that a learned man does not come into contact, with future sins, (even though such contact is possible in the case of future sinful acts), thus—"Just as water does not stick to a lotus-leaf, even so, sinful acts do not contaminate a man, who knows this in this way" (Chhān. 4.14.3). The Scriptures similarly indicate the destruction of sinful acts committed already, thus—"Just as a fluff of cotton-wool sticking to an arrow is consumed when the arrow is put in the fire, even so are all his prior sins destroyed" (Chhān. 5.24.3). The following again, is yet one more Scriptural declaration about the destruction of actions—"The knot of the *Hridaya* is cut

under and all doubts are resolved and all actions destroyed on the realization of Him who is at once both the High (Para) and low (Avara)" (Muṇḍ. 2.2.8). With regard to the statement (by the opponent of Vedānta) that the assumption of the destruction of acts before their fruits are experienced, would mean that the Shāstra is ignored or vitiated, we reply that this is no fault. We do not mean to deny the power of actions to generate their fruit, but we only wish to say, that such power which of course is always inherent in actions, is merely arrested by some such other cause as correct or perfect knowledge etc.. The Shāstra is concerned merely in maintaining that such power does exist, but not in maintaining either its liability to be obstructed, or not to be obstructed, in any way. The Smṛiti statement, viz., that action is never destroyed is a statement only of the nature of a general rule, that inasmuch as action has the result of producing a fruit, it is never destroyed unless its fruit is first experienced. On the authority of such Scriptural statements as "He escapes from all sins", "He who performs the Ashvamedha sacrifice escapes from the sin of the killing of a Brāhmaṇa, and also every one who knows it to be so", the destruction of actions by expiatory rites is of course to be desired. The statement (by the opponent of Vedānta) that expiatory rites may well be for special occasions as and when they arise, (we reply)—It is not so, because as they are enjoined whenever there is a contact with sin, and as their fruit, viz. the destruction of such sins by them, is possible, the idea of their having some other fruit is not reasonably sustainable. With regard, again, to the statement (by the opponent of Vedānta) that there is no injunction as regards the acquisition of the knowledge (of Brahma) with the intention of the destruction of sin, as there is in the case of an expiatory rite, we reply—There of course is such an injunction in the case of Vidyās (Cognitions) with respect to qualified Brahma, because in the complementary passage with regard to them, the attainment of lordly power by, and the removal of sin of, him, who has attained such knowledge, is referred to, and as there is no reason for the Scriptures not desiring to state so, it is therefore definitely ascertained that the acquisition of lordly power, as preceded by the destruction i.e. incineration (Pradāha) of sin, is their fruit. As regards

Vidyās (Cognitions) with respect to unqualified Brahma, even though there is no similar injunction, the destruction i.e. incineration of all actions is established as a necessary result of the knowledge that the Self is not an agent. The term 'non-contact' indicates, that, with regard to actions (which may occur) at some future time, any one who has realized Brahma does not ever actually become an agent of any action. With respect to actions in the past, though a person through false-ignorance understood himself to be such an agent as it were, still by reason of the removal of such false-ignorance through the power of the knowledge (of Brahma) even these past actions are dissolved, and that is why the Sūtrakāra has referred to their destruction. The person who has realized Brahma understands, that he himself is Brahma, which has the nature of never being an agent or an experiencer during all the three divisions of time (viz. the past, present or future), contrary to the pre-conceived (wrong) notion of being such an agent or experiencer, and a person who has realized Brahma knows that he never was such agent or experiencer before, nor is he so at present, nor will he ever be so at some future time. Final Release is reasonably sustainable only in this way. Otherwise as there would never be any destruction of actions which have their origin in beginningless time, there would be no Final Release. Final Release does not, like fruits of actions, deserve to be dependent on environment, time and special causes, because (if it were to be so), there would be the predicament of its being transitory i.e. non-eternal, and also because it is not reasonably sustainable that the fruit of knowledge is not directly perceptible. Therefore, it is firmly established that on the realization of Brahma, sinful actions are liquidated.—13.

#### 10. ITARĀSAMSHLESHĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 14.

*But there is a similar non-contact even of the other i.e. meritorious acts, in the same way (as in the case of sinful acts), and (Final Release takes place), as soon as the body falls (i.e. death takes place).—14.*

In the former topic (Adhikaraṇa), non-contact and

destruction of (future and past) sins which are natural and which are the cause of bondage, were as indicated by the Scriptures (Shāstra), explained as being caused by the knowledge (of Brahma). Now, a doubt having been raised, that meritorious acts being acts in accordance with the Shāstra, they could not be antagonistic to knowledge based on the Shāstra, in order to remove such doubt, an extended application (Atidesha) of the argument in the previous Adhikaraṇa is made here (in the Sūtra), viz. that in the case of a man who has attained knowledge, there is a similar non-contact and destruction of acts of the other kind i.e. meritorious acts, as in the case of sinful acts. Whence is it so? Because of the possibility of a predicament of such acts being an impediment to the fruit of knowledge (i.e. Final Release) occurring, as they also, are the cause of their own fruit. In Scriptural passages such as "He verily transcends both (i.e. meritorious as well as sinful acts)" (Brih. 4.4.22), there is a mention that like sinful acts meritorious acts also are annihilated, as is indicated by (the use of) the word 'destruction', because the destruction of actions, as a result of the knowledge that the Self is never an agent (i.e. the doer of such acts), is common, both to meritorious as well as sinful acts, and as in the Scriptural passage "His (i.e. of the man who has realized Brahma) actions are annihilated" (Muṇḍ. 2.2.8), no distinction is made (between meritorious and sinful acts). Besides where only the word 'sin' is seen (to be used in the Scriptures) it should be understood that it covers 'merit' also, because, as compared with the fruit of perfect knowledge (i.e. Final Release) the fruit of a meritorious act (which is only secular prosperity) is inferior. Besides the word 'sin' is used in the Scriptures also to indicate merit, because, in the Scriptural passage "Neither day nor night transcend this bond" (Chhān. 8.4.1), good deeds are enumerated along with the bad deeds, and in the passage "All sins turn back from here", for 'merit' which also is relevant here, the word 'sin' is used in a common way. The word 'as soon as' (Tu) in the Sūtra 'as soon as the body falls' is used for the purpose of indicating proper ascertainment. It being thus established, that there is non-contact and liquidation of good and bad deeds which are the cause of bondage, as a result of the power of the

knowledge i.e. Vidyā (of Brahma), the Sūtrakāra makes us understand that in the case of a man who has attained knowledge (of Brahma), Final Release is bound to take place the moment the body falls (i.e. death supervenes).—14.

11. ANĀRABDHĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 15.

*But it is only the past actions which have not started their effects i.e. fructification (that are annihilated by the acquisition of the knowledge of Brahma), because (the Scriptures have declared death to be) the point of time, (for Final Release).—15.*

From the foregoing Adhikaraṇās, the annihilation of meritorious and unmeritorious actions as brought about by the knowledge of Brahma, has been ascertained. It is now being considered whether, this (annihilation) takes place indiscriminately in the case of both, viz. actions which have started to fructify and those which have not yet started to do so, or particularly in the case of those only, which have not yet started to fructify. With regard to that, as, by the passage "Verily he transcends both these" (Brih. 4.4.2), the Scriptures do not specify anything in particular, (the conclusion is that) there is annihilation of all acts generally. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply—(the annihilation is) of only those acts which have not yet begun to fructify. It is the collective meritorious and unmeritorious actions of the previous birth, and those also of the present birth done prior to the generation of knowledge of Brahma and which have not yet started to fructify, that are annihilated by such acquisition of the knowledge of Brahma, but not those which have already started to fructify and which are only semi-enjoyed, and which have constituted the cause of the generation of the present body (i.e. Janma) which is the repository of the knowledge of Brahma. Whence is it so? Because the Scriptures have prescribed the fall of the body as the point of time at which Final Release takes place, by the passage "He is delayed in the acquisition of Final Release, only so long as he is not relieved of the body" (Chhān. 6.14.2), as



otherwise, in the absence of any *raison d'être* for a man's existence after all actions are annihilated as a result of the acquisition of the knowledge of Brahma, he would secure Final Release immediately after such acquisition of knowledge, and (if such were to be the case) the Scriptures would not have spoken about a man's having to await the fall of the body (for Final Release). But (says the opponent of Vedānta) when this knowledge, viz. that the Ātmā is not in fact an agent, annihilates actions as a result of its own natural power (*Vastubalena*), how can it be (maintained) that it annihilates some actions only and neglects to annihilate some others? When the contact between the seed and the fire is common (to all seeds), it is not possible to accept that the power of some particular seeds (to germinate) is annihilated and the power of some others is not (so annihilated). We reply—It is not reasonably sustainable, that there can be any generation of the knowledge of Brahma without the acceptance of a reservoir of actions (which is the cause of the generation of a body), in which actions have started their effects i.e. fructification, and when once that is accepted, and when, as in the case of a potter's wheel which has been set in motion, there is no possibility of any hindrance to the momentum which is generated, it is inevitable that such knowledge has to await the dissipation of that momentum. The knowledge that the Self (Ātmā) is not an agent also annihilates actions by removing false-ignorance, but even though it is so removed it does still persist for a while, as a result of past impressions, just as, for instance, the notion about there being two moons also persists for some time. Besides, it should not be discussed here (i.e. it is not debatable here) as to whether a man who has realized Brahma does continue to possess a body for some time after such realization, or whether he does not, because how can one man ever dispute another man's experience of both the realization of Brahma and of his yet continuing to possess a body, as such experience of the other man, can belong to such other man alone? The Scriptures and the Smritis by way of indicating the characteristics of a man firmly ensconced in the knowledge of Brahma, have explained the same thing. Therefore the final conclusion is, that through the power of knowledge there is annihilation only of the meritorious and

unmeritorious actions which have not yet started their effects i.e. fructification.—15.

12. AGNIHOTRĀDYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 16-17.

*Agnihotra etc. also (Tu), lead to the same result (viz. the generation of the effect of knowledge), because it is seen to be so (from the Scriptures).—16.*

Extended application (Atidesha) of the reasoning about sinful acts, was made in the case of the non-contact and destruction of meritorious actions also. The Sūtrakāra now raises a doubt as to whether this holds good in the case of all meritorious acts, and says—"Agnihotra etc. also". The word 'also (Tu)' removes the doubt. Whatever is routine (Nitya) Vedic religious action, such as Agnihotra etc. for instance, makes for precisely the same result. The meaning is that the result of such action is the same as the result of knowledge. Whence is it so? On account of the Scriptural indication, viz. "The Brāhmaṇās endeavour to know the Self by means of the reciting of the Vedās, and by means of sacrifice, and charity" (Brih. 4.4.22). But (says the opponent of Vedānta) inasmuch as the results of knowledge and actions are dissimilar, it is not reasonably sustainable that they can have the same result. We reply—This is no fault, because even though curds and poison have the effect of (causing) fever and death respectively, still, when they are used conjointly with brown sugar, and incantations (Mantrās) respectively, they are observed to produce satisfaction, and physical well-being i.e. nourishment, respectively. Even so, religious actions when they are connected with knowledge, produce the result of Final Release. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) Final Release is not something which can be effected i.e. produced, and so how can it be said to be the result of action? We reply—This is no fault, because actions help to produce that effect indirectly from a distance. Action being something which promotes knowledge, it is metaphorically said to be the means of Final Release, through the medium of knowledge. Hence it is, that the statement about the result being the same, is with reference only to action already per-

formed (before the generation of knowledge). In the case of a man who has realized Brahma, it is not possible that there can be any performance of Agnihotra etc. after such realization, because the realization of Brahma as the Self (of a man), which cannot be something to which a man can be enjoined, cannot properly be the subject of a Shāstra. In the case of meditations connected with qualified Brahma, inasmuch as in that case, a man does not cease to be an agent, the performance of Agnihotra etc. even afterwards (i.e. after attaining knowledge of qualified Brahma) is of course possible. And when such action is performed in a disinterested manner (without any motive), then in the absence of its having any relation to any other result, it is reasonably sustainable, that it has appropriateness for such a relation to meditation (Vidyā).—16.

Now, with respect to what action (Karma), then, is this Scriptural statement, about the non-contact and destruction (of actions) ? and with respect to what action (Karma), then, is this statement, about the appropriation (of merits and demerits), by the followers of one branch (of the Vedās), thus—"His sons inherit his property, his friends inherit his meritorious actions, and his enemies inherit his unmeritorious actions" ?

The Sūtrakāra gives a reply :—

*There are good acts, other than those (i.e. Agnihotra etc.). (This statement about the appropriation is about them.) Both (Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa) (agree about that).—17.*

There are good acts, other than these compulsory routine acts, such as Agnihotra etc., which are undertaken with a desire for a particular fruit, and it is about the appropriation of these that the followers of one branch have spoken thus—"His friends inherit the good deeds etc.". It is with regard to these, that there is this statement about this non-contact and destruction, as in the case of sinful acts. Both the Āchāryās Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa agree in holding that such kind of acts, performed for some desired end, are not helpful towards (the acquisition of) knowledge.—17.

## 13. VIDYĀJNĀNASĀDHANĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 18.

*(The Scriptural passage) "Also whatever (he does) equipped with Vidyā (knowledge of Brahma)" also (intimates similarly).—18.*

It is understood from the preceding Adhikaraṇa, that a compulsory routine act (Nitya-Karma) such as Agnihotra etc., which, if performed (by a man) with a desire for the fruit of Final Release, and which by way of being the cause of the destruction of the sinful acts committed (by him), becomes the means of the purification of the mind, thus becomes the means of producing in cooperation with Vidyā the same result as that produced by the knowledge of Brahma, which has Final Release as its fruit. Now religious acts such as Agnihotra etc. are acts which are either connected with Vidyā which is dependent upon the subsidiary part of religious acts, or are mere unconnected acts as such. By reason of Scriptural statements such as "He who sacrifices, knowing thus", "He who offers oblation, knowing thus", "He who recites, knowing thus", "He who sings, knowing thus", "Therefore one should appoint him only, who knows thus, as the Brahmā-priest, and not one who does not know it to be like this" (Chhān. 4.17.10), "Both equally, i.e. he who knows this to be so, and he who does not, perform acts (by means of the letter 'Om')" (Chhān. 1.1.10), it is understood that religious acts are of both kinds, viz. either those connected with Vidyā or not so connected. With regard to that it is being considered, whether, it is only acts such as Agnihotra etc. connected with Vidyā, which, by way of being the means of knowledge, come to have the same result as the result of knowledge, and not the mere Agnihotra which is not so connected (with Vidyā), or whether both these kinds of acts whether connected or not so connected with Vidyā, equally without any distinction come to have the same result. Whence is the doubt? Because the Scriptural passage "(They) endeavour to know this Self by sacrifice", speaks of sacrifice etc. generally, as being subsidiary to the knowledge of the Self, while Agnihotra etc. connected with Vidyās are understood to have a sort of special significance. What then is the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta)? It is, that

it is only Agnihotra etc. which are connected with Vidyās, which become complementary to the knowledge of the Self, and not those which are not so connected, because that which is equipped with Vidyā is understood to have a special significance over that which is not so connected. Also because of such Scriptural passages as “One who knows this to be so, conquers death, the very day on which he offers an oblation”, and because of the Smṛiti passages “Equipped with which knowledge, Oh Pārtha, wilt thou get rid of the bondage of acts ?” (Bh. G. 2.39), “Oh Dhananjaya, (mere) action is vastly inferior to action equipped with the possession of knowledge” (Bh. G. 2.49). This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), it is expounded (by the Sūtrakāra), thus—Also whatever (he does) equipped with Vidyā—(in the above Sūtra). It is true that an act such as Agnihotra etc. when it is connected with Vidyā is superior to a mere act of Agnihotra which is not so connected (with Vidyā), just as a Brāhmaṇa who is equipped with Vidyā, is superior to one who is not so equipped. Still, it is not, that an act of Agnihotra, not so connected with Vidyā, is not at all necessary. Whence is it so ? Because, the Scriptural passage “They endeavour to know this Self by means of a sacrifice” speaks of Agnihotra generally as being the means of the knowledge of Brahma. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) inasmuch as Agnihotra etc. which is connected with Vidyā is understood (from the Scriptures) to be superior to one which is not so connected, it is logical, that Agnihotra which is not so connected with Vidyā, is not considered necessary, as the means of the knowledge of the Self. (We reply)—No, it is not so. Rather, it is logical to imagine that as an Agnihotra which is connected with Vidyā has very great power because of such Vidyā, it only happens to be a superior means as regards the knowledge of the Self, while it is not so in the case of a mere Agnihotra which is not so connected with Vidyā. It is not proper to understand, that, Agnihotra etc., which is mentioned by the Scriptures to be but a subordinate part of the knowledge of Brahma, in a general way only, thus—“Endeavour to know by means of a sacrifice”, is not such a subordinate part of the knowledge of Brahma. For the Scriptures which declare, thus—“Whatever he does with Vidyā, faith and esoteric meditation, be-

comes more potent" (Chhān. 1.1.10), and speak of a certain sort of superiority of an Agnihotra which is connected with Vidyā, towards its own effect, by thus speaking about its being *more* potent, also indicate thereby, that the same Agnihotra, when it is not so connected with Vidyā, has at least *some* potency as regards its fruit any way. Now what constitutes the potency of an act, is its ability to produce its own fruit. It is thus established, that the compulsory routine Agnihotra, whether connected with Vidyā or not so connected, and performed by an aspirant for Final Release, with the desire for such Final Release as its fruit, prior to the generation of the knowledge (of Brahma), whether during the present or previous birth, and which in proportion to its power, becomes the cause of the realization of Brahma, by way of causing the annihilation of the aggregate of sins which constitute an impediment to such realization (of Brahma), and which is helpful to such internal causes as, hearing, contemplating, faith and steadfast devotion, thus becomes a collaborator of Brahma-Vidyā in the production of the same result, viz. Final Release.—18.

#### 14. ITARAKSHAPANĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 19.

*By destroying other acts (i.e. these meritorious and unmeritorious acts which have started to fructify) by experiencing their fruit, however, he attains identification with the Supreme Spirit i.e. Kaivalya.—19.*

Mention has already been made (by the Sūtrakāra) of the destruction of the meritorious and sinful acts which have not yet started to fructify, through the power of knowledge. Having also annihilated the other meritorious and sinful acts which have already started fructifying, by the experiencing of their fruit, identification with the Supreme Spirit is attained, on the authority of the Scriptural passages "He is delayed only so long as he is not relieved of the body and then he becomes one with Brahma" (Chhān. 6.14.2), and "Himself being Brahma, he merges into Brahma" etc.. But (says the opponent of Vedānta)—Even though correct i.e. perfect knowledge is there, just as, according to the maxim (Nyāya) of 'the vision of double

moons', a man still continues to see entities as different, prior to the fall of the body, he may well continue to do so i.e. see entities as different even after that. (We reply)—No, because of the absence of any cause for it. In the former case, the necessity of the destruction of the residue of actions of which the first has yet to be experienced, is the cause of the persistence of such notion of duality, while no such cause exists in the present case. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) another fresh aggregate of actions may start a fresh experience of the fruit of actions? (We reply)—No, because the seeds (of such actions) happen to have been burnt out. Any new action, which has to depend upon false-ignorance, may if at all, begin a fresh experience after the fall of the body, but such false-ignorance is completely destroyed by correct i.e. perfect knowledge, and hence, the proposition, that on the dissipation of the effects of actions which have started to fructify, a wise man experiences complete identity with the supreme spirit (Kaivalya), holds perfectly good.—19.

*Here ends Pāda I of Adhyāya IV.*

## ADHYĀYA IV—PĀDA 2

### 1. VĀGADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 1-2.

*Vāk i.e. Speech (merges) into the Mind (Mana), because it is so seen and also because of the Scriptural statement.—1.*

Now, (the Sūtrakāra) wishing to lead a man to the path of the Gods (Devayāna) for the attainment by him of the fruit of the lower kind of Vidyā, to begin with, speaks about the order of the passage (of the Self, out of the body), according to the Shāstra. He will later on say how the passage (of the Self, out of the body) is common, both in the case of those who are equipped with knowledge and those who are ignorant of it. There is the following Scriptural statement with regard to the subject of death—"Oh gentle one, when a man is dying, Speech (Vāk) merges into the Mana, the Mana into Prāṇa, the Prāṇa into Teja, and Teja into the Highest deity" (Chhān. 6.8.6.). Here, the doubt is, whether the Scriptural passage speaks of the merger of speech (Vāk) itself along with its mode or function, into the mind (Mana), or whether it speaks of the merger of only the mode or function (of speech). With regard to that the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), is, that it is speech (Vāk) itself, that merges into the mind. It would be only thus that the proper meaning of the Scriptural passage will be brought out, otherwise a Lakṣhaṇā (implication) would result. Whenever there is a doubt as between a Scriptural passage and a Lakṣhaṇā, logically the Scriptural passage is acceptable and not a Lakṣhaṇā. Hence, the merger into the mind, is of speech (Vāk) itself. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply—It is the mode or the function of speech (Vāk) that merges into the mind. (Asks the opponent of Vedānta)—How do you interpret that it is only the function of speech (Vāk) that merges, when the Scriptural passage recites that speech (Vāk) merges into the mind (Mana)? (We reply)—What you say is right, but the Sūtrakāra will mention hereafter (in Sūtra 16 of this Pāda) thus: "There is nonseparateness (Avibhāga), i.e. complete merger, because of the Scriptural statement". Therefore, it is under-



stood that what is intended to be spoken of here, is merely about the cessation of the mode or function of speech (Vāk). Assuming, the Sūtrakāra intended to speak about the merger of the entity (Tattva) itself (i.e. speech), then, as nonseparateness i.e. complete merger would be common (between all entities) everywhere, why would he, only at a later stage, speak of nonseparateness or complete merger of it (into a person who has attained knowledge, in Sūtra 16) ? Therefore the cessation of the mode or function alone is intended to be spoken of here, the meaning being, that the mode or function of speech is arrested first, while the mode or function of the mind still continues to function. Whence is it so ? Because it is so seen. It is actually seen that the function of speech is arrested first, even when the function of the mind still exists. Nobody is able to observe the merger of speech itself along with its function, in the mind. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) it has been said, that on the authority of the Scriptures, it is logical that there is a merger of speech itself, into the mind. We reply —No, because speech has not the mind as its cause. It is logical (to hold) that, from whatever cause any entity is created, into that, it merges, as for instance, an earthenware trough, into (its cause) the earth. There is no means-of-proof i.e. authority (for saying) that speech results from the mind. The generation and the cessation of a function, however, are seen to depend even upon what is not their cause. For instance, the function of fire which is of the nature of Teja, is generated from fuel which is of the nature of the earth, while it (i.e. fire) is extinguished in water. Supposing this view is correct (says the opponent of Vedānta), how is there a Scriptural statement, that “Speech merges into the Mind”? The Sūtrakāra replies—On the authority of the Scriptures themselves. The meaning is that the Scriptural statement is reconcilable in favour of this view, by metaphorically treating the function of an entity and the entity itself as being non-different.—1.

*Hence it is that all (sense-organs) follow  
the lead (of the mind).—2.*

In the Scriptural passage “Therefore when (after leaving the body) the Jiva-Self, whose lustre i.e. bodily

heat (Teja) has cooled off, (goes) to a rebirth (through death which is then imminent) along with the sense-organs that have become one with the mind" (Prashna. 3.9), the Scriptures have mentioned the absorption of all sense-organs generally, into the mind. Here it is to be seen from this Scriptural passage, that, for this very reason, viz., that just as speech by way of its mode or function becomes one with the mind, even so, the mode or functions of the eye etc. also merge into the mind which along with its mode or function is still in existence, and, as it is possible to construe the word 'sense-organ' occurring in the Scriptures as meaning its function, and as the complete absorption of the sense-organ as such (Tattva) is not possible, the Scriptures mean to say that it is only through the merger of their modes or functions that the sense-organs are understood to become one with the mind. Now, when the absorption of all the sense-organs generally (by way of their mode or function) into the mind, is being intended to be spoken of by the Scriptures, the special mention of speech (Vāk), the organ of speech (in the Sūtra) is in accordance with the particular instance from the Chhândogya Upanishad—"Speech becomes one with the Mind".—2.

## 2. MANODHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 3.

*It is understood from the following (sentence) that, Mind (merges) into Prāṇa (by way of its function or mode).—3.*

By the Scriptural passage "Speech merges into the Mind" (Chhān. 6.8.6), it is meant to be spoken here, that it is the mode or function (of speech) that merges, is understood. As regards the next sentence—"Mind merges into Prāṇa". (Chhān. 6.8.6)—, when it is considered, as to whether it is intended to be told, that here also, there is merging of the mode or function only, or whether there is merging of that to which the mode or function belongs (i.e. the entity, the sense-organ mind) along with its mode or function, the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that it is the merging of the mind along with its mode or function, that is meant to be spoken of here. Because the Scriptures favour the view, and it is reasonably sustainable, that the mind has

Prāṇa as its material cause. For the Scriptural passage "Oh gentle one, mind has the structure of the earth, and the Prāṇa has the structure of water" (Chhān. 6.5.4) declares, that the earth is the cause of the mind, and water is the cause of the Prāṇa, and that "the Āpās (i.e. waters) created the earth" (Chhān. 6.2.4). Hence when the mind therefore merges into Prāṇa, it is in fact the earth that merges in water, for mind in fact is the earth and the Prāṇa is water, because, there is non-difference between the cause and the effect. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply—It should be understood from the next sentence, that it is by way of its mode or function only, that the mind, after having absorbed into itself the modes or functions of the external organs-of-sense merges into Prāṇa, because it is seen, that in the case of a man in deep sleep or a man dying, there is a cessation of the function of the mind, while the respiratory function of the Prāṇa still continues. Again the merger of the mind (itself i.e. in its own nature) into Prāṇa is not possible, because mind has not Prāṇa as its material cause (Atatprakritivāt). But (says the opponent of Vedānta), it *has* been shown that the mind has Prāṇa as its material cause. (We reply) —This is not quite right. Mind does not deserve to merge into Prāṇa, by maintaining by way of such ratiocination (viz. that mind is earth, Prāṇa is water, and the earth originates from water) that mind has Prāṇa as its material cause. Even accepting this view, mind will be absorbed into the earth, and the earth into water, and Prāṇa also into water. Besides, even in this view there is no authority for the statement that mind has its origin in water which has modified itself into Prāṇa. Therefore, mind itself (with its own nature) is not absorbed into Prāṇa. It has been shown (already) that even the Scriptural statement as it is, holds good, even if only the mode or function (of the mind) is understood to be absorbed, by metaphorically holding a mode or function (of an entity) and the entity to which such function belongs, as being non-different.—3.

### 3. ADHYAKSHĀDHĪKARĀṆAM. Sū. 4-6.

*The Prāṇa (vital breath) merges into the presiding entity (Adhyaksha i.e. the Jīva-*

*Self) because of its reaching the Jīva-Self,  
the presiding entity (Adhyaksha).—4.*

It has thus been established, that there is merger of merely the mode or function of an entity and not of the entity itself into another entity, from which the former entity has not had its origin. Now, with regard to the Scriptural statement, "Prāṇa (merges) into Teja", it is being considered whether, as stated by the Scriptures, this merging of the mode or function of Prāṇa, is into the Teja only, or it is into the Jīva-Self, the entity presiding over the bodily cage. With regard to that, the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that, as the Scriptures are above being doubted (Anatishankyatvāt), the merging of Prāṇa must be into Teja, because the assumption of anything that is not stated by the Scriptures is not logical. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), the Sūtrakāra explains—The Prāṇa merges into the presiding entity (the Jīva-Self). The Prāṇa which is relevant (to the present discussion) subsists in the Jīva-Self i.e. the Cognitional Self, which is the presiding entity, having Nescience (Avidyā), action (Karma), and consciousness of the former birth (Pūrva-prajñā) as its limiting adjuncts. The meaning is that the function of Prāṇa has mainly that Jīva-Self as its basis (of operation). Whence is it so? Because it is understood, that they (i.e. the Prāṇās i.e. sense-organs which have merged in the Prāṇa, the vital breath) reach the Self. The Scriptural passage "Just in this way do all the Prāṇās gather round the Self at the time of death, when man reaches the final gasping stage" (Brih. 4.3.38), says so, commonly, of all Prāṇās in general, and a Scriptural passage elsewhere indicates, how all the Prāṇās approach the presiding entity, and the Scriptures indicate in particular by the passage "When the Self goes out of the body, all the Prāṇās (i.e. sense-organs) follow the Self", as to how the Prāṇa of the five-fold modes or functions (i.e. of Prāṇa, Apāna, Vyāna, Udāna, Samāna) follows the presiding entity (i.e. the Jīva-Self), and the Scriptural statement "When Prāṇa sets forth out of the body, all the Prāṇās, (i.e. sense-organs) follow that Prāṇa (i.e. vital breath)" (Brih. 4.4.2), indicates how the other Prāṇās follow in the wake of the Prāṇa of the five-fold modes or functions. And

the Scriptural statement "He becomes equipped with special cognition (by way of being equipped with the sense-organs) demonstrates how the presiding entity becomes possessed of internal consciousness (Antarvijnānatva), and makes it understood that the Prāṇa (i.e. vital breath) in whom the aggregate of all the other sense-organs has merged, subsists in it (i.e. in the presiding entity i.e. the Jīva-Self). But (says the opponent of Vedānta), the Scriptural passage declares that Prāṇa merges into Teja. How then do you go further and accept in addition that the Prāṇa merges into the presiding entity? (We reply)—This is no fault, because, with regard to this business of the exodus from the body (Utkrānti), as the presiding entity (the Jīva-Self) is the main entity that is concerned in it, any special circumstances mentioned in other Scriptural passages, ought to be given due regard to.—4.

The doubt here is as to how the Scriptural statement "The Prāṇa merges into Teja" is to be explained. The Sūtrakāra replies :—

*(The presiding entity along with Prāṇa)  
resides in the (subtle) elements, because  
the Scriptures declare to that effect.—5.*

It should be understood that the presiding entity which is in conjunction with Prāṇa, resides in the subtle elements, which are the associates of Teja and which are the seeds of the body, because of the Scriptural statement—"Prāṇa (merges) into Teja". But (says the opponent of Vedānta) this Scriptural statement indicates the residing of Prāṇa in the Teja, and it does not say that the presiding entity having Prāṇa in conjunction resides in the Teja? (We reply)—This is no fault. Because, by the preceding Sūtra, which says—"Prāṇa (merges) into the presiding entity", (it should be understood that) the presiding entity has been enumerated by the Scriptures as coming in between the Prāṇa and the Teja. It is possible to say of a man, who, after going to Mathurā from Srughna proceeds from Mathurā to Pāṭaliputra, that he goes from Srughna to Pāṭaliputra. Therefore, by the Scriptural passage "Prāṇa (merges) into Teja", it is precisely the residing of the pre-

siding entity in conjunction with Prāṇa, in the subtle elements which are the associates of Teja, that is meant.—5.

But (says the opponent of Vedānta) how could it be said that the presiding entity resides in the elements which are the associates of Teja, when the Scriptures speak only of one element viz. the Teja, thus—"Prāṇa (merges) into Teja"? The Sūtrakāra replies :—

*But the Jīva-Self does not reside in one (element i.e. Teja) only, because (the Scriptures and Smritis) both indicate this.—6.*

The Jīva-Self, at the time of entering into another body, does not happen to reside in Teja only, because the gross physical body, which is the effect (of the subtle body), is seen to be composed of many (elements). The same meaning is conveyed by the passage in the form of a question and answer, thus—" (Do you know) how Āpah (during the fifth oblation) attain the name of a Purusha (man) ?" (Chhān. 5.3.3). This has been explained thus—"Because (Āpa) has a triple composition (of elements), (but Āpa is particularly mentioned) because of its preponderance" (Bra. Sū. III. i. 2). Both the Scriptures and Smritis indicate the same thing. The Scriptures say thus—" (This Self) has the structure of Earth, Water, Vāyu, Ākāsha and Teja" (Brih. 4.4.5). The Smṛiti says thus—Along with the subtle and indestructible minute parts of the five (lit., half of ten) elements, all this world is born, as of yore. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) beginning with the Scriptural passage "Where, at that time, does the Purusha happen to be?", the subsequent Scriptural passage "What these two (viz. Yājñavalkya and Ārtabhāga) spoke about was but Karma (action), what they praised (as being the material cause of the world) was but Karma (action)" (Brih. 3.2.13), explains, how, when all the sense-organs such as speech etc. become merged, at the time of the Self's going away to another body, it is but Karma on which the Self depends. The Sūtrakāra says with regard to this—There, what is intended to be spoken of as (the Self's) dependence on Karma (action), is the bringing about of the bondage (of the Self) by the tendency of sense-

organs and sense-objects termed as Graha and Atigraha respectively, which is promoted by Karma (action). Here, on the other hand, what is spoken of as the dependence (of the Self) on the elements, is because of the desire to speak of the generation of another body, out of the elements, as its material cause. Besides by the use of the word "praise" (Prashamsā), what is indicated is, that action is of the chiefest importance, and not, that the dependence (of the Self) on another entity, is excluded. Therefore, there is no contradiction (in those two passages).—6.

#### 4. ĀSRUTYUPAKRAMĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 7.

*(This going out of the body) is common (to both the learned and the ignorant), upto the beginning of the Path. (This) immortality is of those who have not completely destroyed their afflictions (such as Avidyā etc.).—7.*

With regard to those who entertain a doubt, as to whether this going out (of the body) is common both to the learned and the ignorant, or whether, there is any distinctive peculiarity about it, (and that it applies only to the ignorant), the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that there is such distinctive peculiarity (i.e. it is applicable to only one of the two). It relates to the Jīva-Self which depends on the subtle elements. It is for rebirth that these subtle elements are resorted to (by the Jīva-Self). Rebirth is not possible in the case of the learned, because it is a firmly established conclusion that no rebirth is possible for a learned man and that he attains immortality. Therefore, this manner of going out (of the body) is only for the ignorant. But (says the Vedāntin)—As this going out is mentioned (in the Scriptures) in the chapter dealing with the knowledge of the Self i.e. Ātma-Vidyā (in Chhāndogya 6.8), this going out may be only in the case of the learned. (The opponent of Vedānta replies)—No, like sleep etc. it is only referred to as a thing already established (by other means-of-proof) elsewhere before. Similarly, just as elsewhere in Scriptural passages, such as "When a man indeed desires to sleep, or desires to eat or desires to drink"

(Chhān. 6.8.1.3.5), sleep etc., which are common to all beings generally, are referred to even in the chapter dealing with the knowledge of the Self, as being best calculated to explain the thing desired to be explained, and the Scriptures there, do not particularly purport to enjoin them on the learned, even so, this going out of the body which applies in the case of the people in general is here spoken of in a general way only, with a view to propound, thus—“That Highest Deity in which the Teja of the man about to die, merges, is the Ātmā (i.e. the Highest Self), and, that Self thou art”. This manner of going out is denied in the case of the learned man, on the authority of the Scriptural passage “His Prāṇās do not depart” (Brih. 4.4.6). Therefore, this (going out of the body) is applicable only in the case of the ignorant. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply—This going out of the body, beginning with the Scriptural statement, that “Speech (merges) into the Mind” etc., deserves to be common to both the learned as well as the ignorant up to the beginning of the Path, because nothing special in particular is mentioned by the Scriptures about it. The ignorant person (by which, his Self is meant) after resorting to the subtle elements which form the seeds of the body, and being impelled by (his) Karma, goes out for experiencing the acquisition of a body, and the learned man on the other hand resorts to the Nāḍī which is the way to Moksha (i.e. Final Release) and which is illuminated by knowledge. The same is expressed (in the Sūtra), by “Upto the beginning of the path”. But (says the opponent of Vedānta), it is immortality which a learned man aims to attain and that does not depend upon (a man’s going) from one place to another, (i.e. it does not involve any movement), so how can there ever be any such resort to subtle elements or any such going up to the Path (in his case)? To that (we reply)—This is for those who have not had their afflictions (i.e. Avidyā) destroyed (Anuposhya). Where a man desires to obtain only a relative immortality on the strength of the Vidyā of qualified Brahma, without having got rid of afflictions such as Nescience etc., there, in their case, the beginning of the Path and a resort to subtle elements is possible, because, it is not reasonably sustainable, that any movement (towards Final Release) could be possible in the



case of Prāṇās which have not resorted to any such subtle elements. Therefore, there is no fault (of any kind here). —7.

5. SAMSĀRAVYAPADESHĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū, 8-11.

*That (i.e. Teja) subsists upto the time of complete merging (Pralaya), because there is reference to transmigratory existence till that time (in the Scriptures).—8.*

That the Scriptural passage “The Teja (merges) into the transcendent deity (i.e. Brahma)” means that the Teja of the person dying, which is the subject matter of the context here, along with the presiding entity, Prāṇa, the set of sense-organs, and other elements, merges completely into the transcendent deity, has been stated on the authority of the Scriptural chapter. Of what nature, however, can this merger (i.e. Sampatti into Brahma) be, is being considered now. With regard to this the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that this merging of the Teja (i.e. of its own nature) is a total merging (into the transcendent deity), because, that it has that (i.e. the transcendent deity) as its own cause, is reasonably sustainable. It has been established, that the Highest deity (Brahma) is the material cause (Prakṛiti i.e. Upādāna cause) of the entire set of entities liable to be created, and hence this attainment (by an entity) of this condition of non-separation (with its material cause), is therefore absolute and complete. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply :—

These subtle elements, Teja etc., which form the substratum of all sense-organs, such as the sense-organ of hearing etc., subsist upto the time of merging i.e. upto the time of this Final Release from transmigratory existence resulting from correct i.e. perfect knowledge, because, the following Scriptural passage, viz. “Some enter into the species (Yoni) of beings which have a body, for the purpose of acquiring such a body, and others acquire existence as inanimate things, according to what their actions are, and what they know” (Kāṭha. 5.7), indicates such transmigratory existence (in the case of the ignorant), because

otherwise, every one would attain absolute Brahma by the mere extinction of all limiting adjuncts, just at the moment of death. In that case both the Shāstra which gives injunctions, as also the Shāstra of correct i.e. perfect knowledge, would be rendered meaningless. Bondage, of which false-ignorance is the cause, does not deserve to be dissolved, except through correct i.e. perfect knowledge. Therefore, even though it (i.e. Brahma) is the cause (of all the subtle elements) this merging into Sat (i.e. supreme being) is—as in the case of deep sleep and the great absorption (Pralaya)—only in such a way that they (i.e. the Jiva-Self, Prāṇa, the set of sense-organs and the subtle elements) still continue to exist in a seed form.—8.

*(This Teja) is subtle in its nature and in its size, because it is seen to be so.—9.*

This Teja (of a person) which, along with the other subtle elements, is resorted to by the Jiva-Self as it goes out of the body, deserves to be subtle by itself (in its own nature and size). Its subtle nature is also understood from the Scriptural declaration about its passage through the Nāḍis etc., and its rarefied fineness (Tanutva) makes its movement reasonably sustainable, and its freedom from obstruction is made reasonably sustainable by reason of its pristine purity, and hence it is, precisely, that it is not perceived by persons round about (a person dying) as it goes out of the body.—9.

*Hence it is that (the subtle body is not destroyed) on the destruction of the gross body.—10.*

Hence it is that when the gross body is destroyed during cremation etc., this subtle body is not so destroyed.—10.

*This warmth is of this (i.e. the subtle body), because, that it is so, is reasonably sustainable.—11.*

It is precisely the warmth of this subtle body, which is experienced (by people) on touching the body, for when the body is in the defunct condition, even when the body still subsists and the attributes of the body, such as form etc., are

still present, no warmth is perceivable, while it is so perceivable only when the body is in a living condition, and hence it is that it is reasonably sustainable that this warmth has its resort elsewhere than in this well-known body as such. Of a similar import is the Scriptural passage "He is warm while he is living and cold when he is dead".—11.

6. PRATISHEDHĀDHĪKARĀṆAM. Sū. 12-14.

*If it be said that because of the denial (by the Scriptures), (the Prāṇās i.e. sense-organs of him who has realized Brahma) do not go out of the body, (we, the Vedāntins say)—No, because the denial is meant to imply that they i.e. the Prāṇās do not leave the Jīva-Self.—12.*

(The Vedāntin says)—By the qualification made by the Scriptural passage "Immortality without having destroyed the afflictions (such as Avidyā)" it is understood that in the case of absolute immortality there is absence of any movement and going out (of the Jīva-Self), still (the Sūtrakāra) by raising a doubt that this 'going out' may still be there on account of some reason or other, ultimately denies it all the same by the Scriptural passage "Now about one who does not desire (Akāmayamānah), who therefore is without desire (Akāma), who is free from (any) desire (Nishkāma), when (his) desires have all been fulfilled (Āptakāma), he whose desire is all contained in the Self (Ātmakāma), and who being Brahma himself, merges into Brahma" (Brih. 4.4.6). Hence, this denial, thus, having reference to the subject of the knowledge of the Highest Brahma, when it is said (by the Vedāntin) that in the case of those who have realized Brahma, his Prāṇās do not go out of the body, (the opponent of Vedānta says)—No, this denial about the going out of the Prāṇās has reference to the going out of the Prāṇās from the embodied Jīva-Self and not from the body. How is it understood (asks the Vedāntin)? Because in the Scriptural passage of the followers of another branch (of the Vedās), thus—"Prāṇās do not go away from him (Tasmāt)", the ablative case

(Tasmāt i.e. *from him*) is used, (and not the genitive, Tasya i.e. *of him*). The genitive case which refers only to a general relation is thus restricted in its ordinary application in a general way, and is made to govern a special relation by the ablative case used in the other branch of the Scriptures. The words “from him” are made to govern the Jīva-Self, which alone is competent as regards secular prosperity and Highest Bliss and which is the chief subject (of the chapter) and not the body. Therefore, the meaning is that the Prāṇās do not go away from the Jīva-Self as it leaves the body, but continue to be with it.—12.

Thus, the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) being, that the going away of the Jīva-Self from the body is along with the Prāṇās (i.e. sense-organs), the Sūtrakāra refutes it, thus :—

*(It is not as you say) because, in the case of the followers of one branch, there is a clear denial of the going out of the body (by the Jīva-Self).—13.*

The statement (by the opponent of Vedānta), that there is such going out of the body of the Prāṇās (i.e. sense-organs), even in the case of one who knows the transcendent Brahma, because, the denial of such going out, thus—“from him the Prāṇās do not go out”, is with reference to the going out (Apādāna) of the Prāṇās from the embodied Jīva-Self, is not correct, because in the case of some reciters of the Scriptures, that the denial of such going out (Apādāna), is with reference to a body from which such going out takes place, is definitely observed. Even so, in the question (posed) by Ārtabhāga, viz., “Whether, when such person dies, the Prāṇās go away from him, or they do not ?” (Brih. 3.2.11), the view being taken, that there is no such going out, thus—“No, said Yājñavalkya” (Brih. 3.2.11), and when a doubt (under such circumstances) is (expressed), that inasmuch as the Prāṇās (of such a man) do not depart, he does not therefore in fact die, the Scriptures, having declared the dissolution of the Prāṇās by stating, “The Prāṇās get absorbed even here, (i.e. in the body)”, in order to establish that statement, mention the bloating and swelling of him (i.e. Jīva-Self) who is the relevant subject

here, and who is thus referred to as 'He' in the Scriptural statement—"He becomes bloated, he swells and lies down dead, thus bloated" (Brih. 3.2.11). Now this can only happen to the body and never to the Jīva-Self. And in common with that, (in the Scriptural statement) "From him the Prāṇās do not depart but are dissolved even there (in the body)", the denial is, thus, of the going out from the body, from which such going out takes place, the body and the Jīva-Self being metaphorically considered to be one and the same and non-different. Even though the Jīva-Self is to be explained as being the chief entity, in the case of those, in whose branch the Scriptures recite the ablative case, even in that case it should be explained that the denial is of the going out of the body, because of such metaphorical treatment of non-difference between the body and the Jīva-Self. In the case of those in whose Scriptural recital, the genitive case is used, the denial about the going out, which has reference to a man who has attained knowledge (of Brahma), is the denial of the going out from the body, inasmuch as the Scriptures here purport to deny the going out which is well-known, and as it is the going out from the body and not the going out from the Jīva-Self, that is well-known, the denial, therefore, is of the going out from the body. Besides having described this going out, and reverting into transmigratory existence, of those who are ignorant (of Brahma), in detail, by the Scriptural passage "That (this Jīva-Self) goes out by way of the eye or the head or by way of some other region of the body, and as it goes out, the Prāṇa follows in its wake, and as the Prāṇa goes out all the other Prāṇās (i.e. subtle sense-organs) follow suit" (Brih. 4.4.2), and having thus concluded this statement about those who are ignorant (of Brahma) by the passage "This is about one who still has desires (Iti nu Kāmayamānāh)" (Brih. 4.4.6) etc., and having thereafter indicated those who have realized Brahma, by the passage "Now about those who have no desires (Atha Akāmayamānāh)" (Brih. 4.4.6), if the Scriptures were to make one understand this going out, to be of one who has realized Brahma, then such indication by the Scriptures would necessarily be meaningless. Therefore, in order that such indication may have meaning, this movement and going away from the body arrived at in the case of those who

are ignorant (of Brahma), should be explained as having been denied (by the Scriptures) in the case of those who have realized Brahma. In the case of one, who has realized Brahma, and to whom his Self is but the all-pervading Brahma itself, and whose desires and actions have come to an end, any such movement or going out (of the body) would not be reasonably sustainable, because of the absence of any proper cause for it. Besides Scriptural passages such as "Here (in this very body) he attains Brahmahood" also indicate the absence of any such movement or going out (on the part of one who has realized Brahma).—13.

*Smṛiti also (has said similarly).—14.*

Besides, the Mahābhārata also has mentioned that there is absence of any movement or going out (of the body), (in the case of one who has realized Brahma), thus—"In their search of the path of a man to whom all beings have but become his Self and who has understood all beings correctly by intuition (as being of the nature of the Ātmā) and who has no path (such as the Devayāna or Pitriyāna) to traverse, even the Gods get perplexed". But (says the opponent of Vedānta), the Smṛiti does speak of such *movement* even in the case of one who has realized himself to be the all-pervading Brahma, thus—"Shuka the son of Vyāsa, who with a desire for Final Release set forth towards the sphere of the Sun, when called by his father following him, responded with the words—"Yes, father?"". (We reply)—No, it should be understood here, that he (i.e. Shuka) after first having reached a particular region physically by means of the powers of Yoga, thereafter discarded his body, because, the Smṛiti has stated that he was seen by all beings and all those beings could not have actually seen him going, were he to go in a disembodied condition. The legend is then wound up with the remark—"Shuka, traversing the stellar region at a speed faster than that of the wind, and having thus displayed his prowess, entered into all beings". Therefore, in the case of one who has realized Brahma, there is absence of any movement and going out (of the body). We shall explain the subject of those Scriptural passages which speak of movement, later (in Bra. Sū. IV. iii. 7).—14.

## 7. VĀGĀDILAYĀDHĪKARAṆAM. Sū. 15.

*Those Prāṇās (i.e. sense-organs) get absorbed in the transcendent Brahma, because, the Scriptures have said so.—15.*

Now, the sense-organs of the person who has realized Brahma, which are described by the term “Prāṇa”, and the subtle elements, get absorbed into the Highest Self. Whence is it so ? Because the Scriptures say so, thus—“Even so, in the case of a man who is a seer his sixteen component parts (Kalās) dependent on the Purusha, as they approach and reach the Purusha merge into Him” (Prashna 6.5). But (says the opponent of Vedānta) another Scriptural passage with respect to a person who has realized Brahma, has spoken about the merger of these component parts, elsewhere than into the Highest Brahma, thus—“Gone are the fifteen parts into the earth etc. which are their cause i.e. substratum (Pratishṭha)” (Muṇḍ. 3.2.7). (We reply)—No, that passage is only with reference to the point of view of the phenomenal mundane existence, i.e. that such parts as are the effects of the earth etc., merge into the earth etc. which is their material cause, while the former passage is with respect to a person who has realized Brahma, viz. that this entire set of the component parts of a person who has realized Brahma, attains the Brahmic condition (i.e. merges into Brahma). Therefore it is all flawless.—15.

## 8. AVIBHĀGĀDHĪKARAṆAM. Sū. 16.

*(This absorption of the component parts into the Highest Brahma is a total merger, so that there is non-separateness (Avibhāga) (between them and Brahma) on the strength of Scriptural declarations.—16.*

Now, is this absorption of the component parts (Kalā-pralaya), in the case of those who have realized Brahma, incomplete (Sāvashesha) as in the case of the others (i.e. the ignorant) or is it absolute and total (Niravashesha) ? With regard to that (the conclusion of the opponent of Vedānta being) that inasmuch as the merger is general i.e. common in its nature, a residue of the potential powers

(Shaktyavashesha) continues to subsist, (the Sūtrakāra) says—The merger is necessarily total i.e. a condition of non-separateness is attained. Whence is it so? Because of the Scriptural statement. Because the Scriptures, after mentioning the merger of the component parts, declare—“Their names and forms (which constitute their power) are obliterated and it is said that he is the Purusha alone and he thus becomes one who is without any component parts, and immortal” (Prashna. 6.5.). The component parts being but the product of Nescience, that any such merger, having knowledge as its cause, could be incomplete (i.e. retaining a residue), is not reasonably sustainable, and hence there is non-separateness i.e. the merger is necessarily total.—16.

#### 9. TADOKODHIKARĀṆAM. Sū. 17.

*(Even though in the case of both i.e. in the case of the ignorant and in the case of one who has realized qualified Brahma), the apex of the nest of the Self (i.e. Hṛidaya) becomes (equally) floodlit and thereby the way-out of the Ātmā also is (equally) floodlit, still, as a result of the power of Vidyā, and on account of meditation on the subordinate part of Vidyā being prescribed (by the Scriptures), (it is understood that the Self of one who has realized unqualified Brahma issues forth from the head). Therefore, it is established that blessed by the Grace of Him who belongs to the Hridaya (i.e. Brahma), the Self of him who has realized qualified Brahma issues forth by way of the hundred and first Nāḍī of the head (viz. Sushumnā).—17.*

The incidental discussion with regard to the Vidyā of the transcendent one (i.e. Nirguṇa i.e. unqualified Brahma) is now finished. The Sūtrakāra now reverts to the discussion about the lower kind of Vidyā. It has been stated that the going out, of one who has realized qualified Brahma and of one who is ignorant, is similar (in the case of both),



upto the beginning of the path. And the Sūtrakāra now indicates the entering on that path. The nest or abode of the cognitional Jiva-Self which is desirous of going out, and which has absorbed into itself the powers (Tejomātrās) of this group of (sense-organs such as) speech etc., is the Hridaya, on the authority of the Scriptural passage—"Receiving into itself the powers of the sense-organs, it proceeds towards the Hridaya". And the Scriptures speak about the going out (of the Self) to be from the abode of the sight etc., after the apex of the Hridaya is flood-lit, thus—"The apex of the Hridaya of the man becomes flood-lit and his Self goes out by means of this light either by way of the eye or the head or by way of any other region of the body" (Brih. 4.4.2). Now when the question is whether this going out is the same in the case of both, viz. the one who has realized qualified Brahma and the one who is ignorant, the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), being, that it is the same, because the Scriptural statement (about it) is the same, the Sūtrakāra says—Even though the flood-lit condition of the apex of the Hridaya and the flood-lighting of the way-out is common both to the ignorant and to one who has realized qualified Brahma, the Self of him who has realized qualified Brahma, alone, goes out by way of the head, and of the others by other regions (of the body). Whence is it so? Because of the power of the Vidyā. If, even the Self of one who has realized qualified Brahma, were, like the Self of the ignorant, to go out by any part i.e. by way of some one part of the body or another, (and not by way of the head), then he would not attain the best world (Loka) and such Vidyā would then be rendered useless. By reason of the circumstance, that meditation on the path subordinate to those Vidyās is prescribed, it is meant, that inasmuch as in these several different Vidyās, the path subordinate to those Vidyās and connected with the Nāḍī of the head, have been prescribed, it is logical to understand that the Self of him who meditates on that path should tend to go out by that way viz. by that Nāḍī (of the head). Therefore, the wise one, to whom the grace of Brahma, which has the Hridaya as its abode, has been vouchsafed, and on whom he has meditated well and has thus attained its (Brahma's) condition, goes out by way of the hundred and first Nāḍī which is the one over and above

the other hundred Nāḍis, and the others (i.e. the ignorant) go out by way of the other hundred Nāḍis. For even so, the Scriptures declare with reference to the Vidyā of the Hridaya thus—"There are a hundred and one Nāḍis of the Hridaya, one of which courses up into the head. One who goes up by way of that, attains immortality. All other Nāḍis are for the ordinary going out" (Chhān. 8.6.6).—17.

#### 10. RASHMYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 18.

*(Both i.e. the Self of the ignorant as well as the Self of one who has realized Brahma, ascend by) following the way of the ray (of the Sun).—18.*

Mention is made by the Scriptures, of the Vidyā of the Hridaya (also called Dahara-Vidyā), beginning with "That small lotus-like mansion which is (situated) in Brahma-pura (the city of Brahma, i.e. the body)" (Chhān. 8.8.1). In the chapter (Prakriyā) about the Vidyā, the Scriptures, after first mentioning the relation between the Nāḍi and the ray (of the Sun) in detail, thus—"Now these Nāḍis of the Hridaya", further mention, thus—"Now then, when this i.e. the Self issues forth from the body, it ascends, by following the way of the ray (of the Sun) only" (Chhān. 8.6.5). And again, thus—"And ascending thus by following the ray, the Self attains immortality" (Chhān. 8.6.6). Therefore, it is understood that issuing forth by way of the hundred and first Nāḍi, the Self goes out following the way of the ray (of the Sun). And when the doubt arises, as to whether the person dying (i.e. his Self) ascends by following the ray (of the Sun) irrespective of whether such person dies during the day or the night, it is declared (by the Sūtrakāra) that inasmuch as the Scriptural statement is general, the Self (whether death occurs by day or by night) without any distinction, ascends by following the way of the ray (of the Sun).—18.

*(If it be said that the Self of those who die) during the night, does not go by following the way of the ray (of the Sun), we reply No, because the connection of the Nāḍi*

*with the ray (of the Sun) subsists as long as the body (subsists). The Scriptures also indicate that.—19.*

If the opponent were to say that inasmuch as the connection between the Nāḍī and the ray (of the Sun) exists during the day, the ascent of the Self of one who dies during the day, by following the way of the ray (of the Sun), may be possible, but it could not be so, in the case of one who dies during the night, because (then) the connection between the Nāḍī and the ray (of the Sun) is destroyed, (we reply)—No, because the connection between the Nāḍī and the ray subsists as long as the body subsists. The connection between the Shirā (i.e. Nāḍī) and the ray subsists as long as the body subsists. The same is indicated by the Scriptures, thus—"The rays spread out from the Sun and enter the Nāḍīs and again spreading out from the Nāḍīs they enter the Sun" (Chhān. 8.6.2). During summer the existence of the rays is perceived even during nights, because, heat etc., the effects of the rays, are perceived. Just as during the cloudy days of the winter (Shishir) season the rays are few, they are not perceivable, even so they are not perceivable during the nights of other seasons or on cloudy days. The Scriptural statement "The sun makes a day (of it) even during the night" indicates the same thing. Were a person dying during the night, to ascend without following the way of the ray (of the Sun), the Scriptural statement about its i.e. the Self's following by way of the ray (of the Sun) would be contradicted, nor has it been particularly taught (by the Scriptures) that he who dies during the day, ascends, by following the way of the ray, while he who dies during the night (also ascends) in spite of the absence of rays. Now, if a person who has realized Brahma, were not to ascend, merely because of the offence of dying during the night, (then in that case) the fruit of the Vidyā would thus be uncertain (i.e. it would be available in some cases and not in others) and inasmuch as there is no rule about the time of death, no one would be attracted towards the Vidyā. (The opponent of Vedānta says)—May be, that one who dies during the night may await the advent of the day; but (we reply)—even if he were to

await the advent of the day, may be, on account of the contact with the fire (during cremation) the body may not be in a condition fit for such contact with the ray (of the Sun). Besides the Scriptures indicate, how, there is no such awaiting (the advent of the day), thus—"As soon as his mind is thrown off (at the time of death) he reaches the Sun" (Chhān. 8.6.5). Therefore, this ascent of the Self, by following the way of the ray (of the Sun) is uniform both during the day as well as during the night.)—19.

11. DAKSHINĀYANĀDHIKARĀṆAM. Sū. 20-21.

*And hence also (the Self of a man follows the way of the ray of the Sun) even during Dakṣiṇāyana (Southern journey of the Sun).—20.*

And it is precisely because this awaiting (the advent of the Sun) by the Self, is not reasonably sustainable, and also because of the fruit of the Vidyā being uncertain (in such case), and also because of there being no regulation of the time of death (of a person), that, when a man who has realized Brahma dies even during the Southern journey (of the Sun) he does by all means obtain the fruit of the Vidyā. This Sūtra removes the doubt that the Scriptures mean that one should await the Northern journey (of the Sun), as death during the Northern journey (of the Sun) is commendable, because, Bhīṣmā's awaiting the advent of the Northern journey (of the Sun) is also observed, and because of the Scriptural statement—"From the bright half of the month (they go) to the six months of the Sun's Northern journey" (Chhān. 4.15.5). This well-known thing (about the propriety of death during the Northern journey of the Sun) is with reference to those who are ignorant (of Brahma). Bhīṣmā's patient waiting, was for the purpose of observing appropriate conduct, and for demonstrating the gift obtained by him as a favour from his father, of being able to time his death at will (Svachchhandamrityutā). The meaning of the Scriptural statement (referred to above) would be stated later on by the Sūtra "They (i.e. fire etc.) are the guides

(of the person dying) because there is indicatory mark of that" (Bra. Sū. IV. iii. 4).—20.

The opponent of Vedānta says:—The Smṛiti, beginning thus—"Oh the best amongst the Bharatās, I shall now tell you the time, dying at which time, the Yogins return and do not return respectively (to this mundane phenomenal existence)" (Bh. G. 8.23), has, specially with reference to time, determined the day etc. as the particular time, when those who die at that time do not return (to this mundane existence). How is it then said that those who die during the night or during Dakṣiṇāyana, also do not return? To this it is said:—

*The Smṛitis prescribe a particular time etc. with regard to Yogins only. Sāṃkhya and Yoga are mentioned in the Smṛitis.—21.*

This fixing of the proper time for dying etc. such as dying during day etc. in order that there should be no return (to transmigratory existence) are prescribed for the Yogins. Sāṃkhya and Yoga are mentioned in the Smṛitis and not in the Scriptures. Hence, as the subjects are different, and have a special kind of authority (in their own systems), the time (of death) fixed in those Smṛitis has no application in a Scriptural Vidyā. But (says the opponent of Vedānta), the Path of the Gods and the Path of the Manes (Devayāna and Pitriyāna) such as—"Fire, light, the bright half of a month, and the six months of the Northern journey of the Sun" and "Smoke, night, the dark half of the month, and the six months of the Southern journey of the Sun", known from the Scriptures, are known from the Smṛitis also. The reply is: It is by assuming a doubt about a contradiction supposed to occur by the mention of time by the Smṛiti, thus—"I shall speak of the time", that the refutation stated above is made. But no such contradiction would occur, if, even in the case of Smṛitis, deities such as fire etc. are understood to be the guides (of the person dying).—21.

*Here ends Pāda II of Adhyāya IV.*

## ADHYĀYA IV—PĀDA 3

### 1. ARCHIRĀDYADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 1.

*(One desirous of Final Release) goes along the path of light (Archi) etc. because that path is well-known.—1.*

That the going out (of the Jīva-Self, out of the body) upto the beginning of the path is common (to the ignorant as well as to one who has acquired the knowledge of Brahma) has been stated, so far. Other Scriptural passages have mentioned the path in various ways. One (path) is with reference to the connection between the Nāḍī and the ray (of the Sun), thus—"Now he ascends by means of the rays" (Chhān. 8.6.5). Another with reference to Archi (light) etc., is thus—"They reach the Archi (light) and thence the day" (Brih. 6.2.15). Another one thus—"Having reached the Devayāna path, he thence reaches the world of Agni" (Kaush. 1.3). Still another one, thus—"Verily, when the Puruṣa departs from this world, he reaches Vāyu" (Brih. 5.10.1). Yet still another one, thus—"Divested of all contamination with sin, they proceed through the Sun-gate" (Muṇḍ. 1.2.11). Now, with regard to these, a doubt arises, as to whether these paths are all mutually different, or whether they all together form but one and the same path, particularized by different stages (for resting on the way). The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that these paths are all different from each other because the chapters (relating to these paths) are different and they are subordinate parts of different types of meditations. Besides, the final determination (Avadhāraṇa)—"Now just by these rays only" (Chhān. 8.6.5)—would be contradicted, if the paths of light (Archi) etc. have also to be considered necessary, and the Scriptural statement about 'speed', viz., "As soon as his mind is thrown off (at the time of death), he reaches the Sun" (Chhān. 8.6.5), also would be similarly contradicted. Therefore, the paths are of course mutually different. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply—"Along the path of Archi (light) etc.". We understand that all those who desire to attain Brahma, go only

along the path of Archi (light) etc.. Whence is it so ? Because of its being so well-known. This path is well-known to all who have acquired knowledge (of Brahma). Even so in the Vidyā (Lore) of the Five Fires the Scriptures speak of the path of the Archi (light) even for those who study other Vidyās, thus—"Those also who meditate on the Truth by faith, in the forest" (Brih. 6.2.15). (Says the opponent of Vedānta)—It may well be this way. In the case of those Vidyās, wherein no path is mentioned, the path of the Archi (light) may be accepted, but where another path is specifically mentioned, why should there be the acceptance of the path of Archi (light) ? To this, it is replied—This would be so, if these several paths were to be essentially different from each other. We maintain, however, that the Path is but the one and only one path leading up towards Brahma-Loka, which is marked by different characteristics of stages in different places, and as everywhere the same one path is clearly understood, that these different characteristics of stages only serve to indicate the relation of adjectives to the substantive (viz. the path of Archi), is reasonably sustainable. Even though the chapters are different, inasmuch as the Vidyā is identical, the paths having different characteristics of stages are to be combined into one single path, just as different attributes (Guṇās) are to be combined (in the case of different Vidyās i.e. Cognitions). Now, even though the Vidyās are different, inasmuch as the path (in each) is distinctly recognizable as being one and the same, and as the destination (in all cases) also is identical, there is no difference in the paths. For, in the Scriptural statements—"They have their sojourn in the Brahma-Loka for a period coextensive with the life-span of Brahmā" (Brih. 6.2.15), and "He has his sojourn there (i.e. in Brahma-Loka) for eternal years" (Brih. 5.10.1), "He wins the same victory and attains the same comprehensive greatness, characteristic of Brahmā" (Kaush. 1.4), "That those who through their vow of celibacy (meditate on Brahma) and attain the Brahma-Loka" (Chhān. 8.4.3), the same one uniform nature of the result, viz. the acquisition of Brahma-Loka, is indicated everywhere. With regard to the argument (of the opponent of Vedānta) that the specific determination "By these very (rays) etc." would not be available, if the

path of Archi (light) etc. were to be accepted (as the path in all cases), (our reply is)—This is no fault, because this (statement) also has the purport of including the ray as one of the stages (to which the Self goes in its journey). The same one word “only” cannot at once establish the rays as a stage, as well as reject the path of Archi (light) etc.. So it should be understood that it makes only the (Self’s) relation to the rays understood. The statement about ‘speed’ is not obstructed in its application, even in the case of the path of Archi (light) etc. also, as it merely indicates comparative swiftness, so far as having to reach another place is concerned, just as in (the sentence)—“I would be returning here in a moment”. Besides, the Scriptural statement “By neither of those two paths” (Chhān. 5.10.8), which speaks of the miserable third path of those who have missed the other two paths (i.e. Devayāna and Pitriyāna), also establishes the Devayāna path having Archi (light) etc. as its various stages as the only other path, as distinguished from the path of the manes (Pitriyāna). Only, there are many stages in the path of the Archi (light) etc., and few in the other paths and it is logical to understand the fewer stages as included in the greater number (of stages), and that also is why the Sūtrākāra has stated the Sūtra as above.—1.

## 2. VĀYVADHIKARĀṆAM. Sū. 2.

*(That the Self in its journey goes) from the Samvatsara to Vāyu (is understood) from the non-specific and specific (statements).—2.*

The Āchārya now, in the capacity of a friend, determines (for the pupil) the specific order of the arrangement of the particular stages in the path, which mutually have a relation of adjectives to the substantive (viz. the path of Archi). As regards the followers of the Kaushitaki branch of the Scriptures, the Devayāna path is recited by them, thus—“He having reached the Devayāna path, thereafter (by that path) reaches the world of Agni, and then the world of Vāyu, thereafter the world of Varuṇa, and from there the worlds of Indra, Prajāpati and



Brahmā" (Kaush. 1.3). Now, the words 'Archi' (in Brih. 6.2.15) and Agni-Loka (above) both express the same meaning as both of them mean the flaming fire (Jvalana) and hence it is unnecessary to look for any specific order of arrangement, in their case. Scriptures however have not mentioned the exact position of Vāyu in the path of Archi etc. and hence it has of course to be determined. We say that, in the Scriptural statement "They reach the Archi, from there the day, thereafter the bright half of the month, and from there the six months during which the Sun journeys towards the North, from thence to the Samvatsara and from the Samvatsara to the Āditya" (Chhān. 5.10.1, 2), it has to be understood, that they accommodate Vāyu after the Samvatsara and before the Āditya. Whence is it so? Because of the non-specification and the specification. For, Vāyu, which is mentioned non-specifically (i.e. without reference to its particular position in the order) in the Scriptural passage "He (reaches) the world of Vāyu" (Kaush. 1.3), is seen to be specifically so mentioned in another Scriptural passage—"Verily when a person departs from this world, he reaches the world of Vāyu, where Vāyu affords him an exit, like the hole in a wheel, by which he ascends and reaches the Āditya" (Brih. 5.10.1). Now, as the coming of Vāyu earlier in the order than the Āditya, is a specific statement, Vāyu's position has to be fixed in-between the Samvatsara and the Āditya. Why (again says the opponent of Vedānta), should not the position of Vāyu be fixed after Archi, because of the specific mention about Vāyu coming later on than Agni? We reply, that here there is no specific mention at all. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) there is the Scriptural statement—"Having arrived at the Devayāna path, he then reaches the world of Agni, the world of Vāyu, the world of Varuṇa" (Kaush. 1.3). We reply—Here the statements are merely made, one after another, but there is no word indicative of any specific order (as between them). Only an indication is made here of the objects reached, viz. that the Jīva-Self reaches these particular objects, but in the other passages a specific order is understood, viz. that the Self, ascending by way of the chariot wheel, arrives at the Āditya. Therefore, it is but very properly stated (by the Sūtrakāra) in the Sūtra—"From the non-specific and speci-

fic (statements)". As regards the Vājasaneyins, they recite thus—"From the months (the Self) reaches the world of the Gods and from there the world of Āditya" (Brih. 6.2.15). There, so as to secure Āditya being reached after (Vāyu) it should be understood that the Self reaches Vāyu from the world of the Gods. The Sūtrakāra has stated "From the Samvatsara (he) reaches the Āditya" with reference to the Chhāndogya statement. As between the Chhāndogya and the Vājasaneyaka, the world of the Gods is not mentioned in one statement and the Samvatsara is not mentioned in the other. Both, however, being equally authoritative, both the world of the Gods and the Samvatsara have to be included in both. Besides, it should be properly discriminated here that the Samvatsara being (as an extension of the month) connected with the month, it comes first and the world of the Gods comes afterwards.  
—2.

### 3. TADĪDADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 3.

*(In the order of the stages of the path)  
next after Lightning comes Varuṇa because  
of the relation (between them.)—3.*

There is the Scriptural passage—"From the Sun (the Self goes) to the Moon and from the Moon to the Lightning" (Chhān. 4.15.5). Now after the Lightning, Varuṇa ought to be connected, because of the (Kaushitaki) Scriptural statement—"He reaches the world of Varuṇa", Lightning and Varuṇa of course have a mutual relation. Whenever large lightnings dance about within the bowels of the clouds, with sharp cracking noise, rain pours down. A Brāhmaṇa passage also says—"There is Lightning, it is making noise, and then, may be, it will rain" (Chhān. 7.11.1). It is well-known from the Scriptures and Smritis, that Varuṇa is the Lord of Waters. After Varuṇa, Indra and Prajāpati should be successively placed in the order, both because (in Kaushitaki) the Scriptures recite that way and there is no other position (where they could possibly be placed). They should be relegated towards the end, after Varuṇa etc., inasmuch as, they are casually mentioned, and have no recognized position in the path, which begins with Archi and ends with Lightning.—3.

## 4. ĀTIVĀHIKĀDHĪKARAṆAM. Sū. 4-6.

*(These stages of the path are) guides (Ātivāhikās), because there is an indicative mark (about it being so).—4.*

With regard to the path of Archi etc., there is a doubt as to whether these entities are the signs of the path, or places where the Self experiences the fruits (of action), or whether they are conductors of those who travel (by this path). The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that Archi etc. are the signs i.e. land-marks on the road, because the trend of the Scriptural instruction is of that nature. Just as in the ordinary world, when a man starts to go to a village or a town, he is given instructions, thus—"Go thou from here to that hill, thence to that Udumbara tree, thence further on to the river, and from there thou shalt reach the village or town (as the case may be)", even so, it is stated here by the Scriptures, thus—"From the Archi to the day, from the day to the bright half of a month, etc.". Or else, may be, they are the places for experiencing (the fruits of actions) inasmuch as the Scriptures have connected Agni etc. with the word 'Loka' (world), as for instance, "He reaches the world (Loka) of Agni" (Kaush. 1.3), and the word 'Loka' is used for a place of enjoyment, as for instance, "The world of men, the world of the manes and the world of the Gods" (Brih. 1.5.16). Even so, says the Brāhmaṇa—"They become attached to the worlds characterized by days and nights" (Shata. Brā. 10.2.6.8). Hence these stages could not possibly be the guides, precisely because they are non-sentient and their being guides is not reasonably sustainable. In the ordinary world, it is the actually living intelligent men that are appointed by the King, to guide the people travelling along a difficult path. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply—They of course deserve to be the guides. Whence is it so? Because, the Scriptural passage "From the moon to the lightning. There, a Purusha, who is non-human (Amānusha), leads them (the Selfs) up to Brahma" (Chhān. 4.15.5) indicates that, that these are guides is spoken of as an established thing. (If the opponent of Vedānta says)—But, the use of that statement is exhausted

in that particular subject it speaks about (and does not also mean that there is any man as a guide upto the stage of Lightning) : (we reply)—No, because the special qualification 'who is non-human' has the purpose of excluding an earlier already established idea about these guides being men. It is only, if it is understood, that Archi etc. are men that serve as guides, that this use of the expression 'who is non-human' would be justified in its purpose of excluding, in the case of that particular guide, the previously established fact that the guides are human beings.—4.

But (says the opponent of Vedānta) mere indicatory mark, in the absence of any logical reason to support it, is not indicative (of such sentient guides). We reply :—

*Because, by reason of both the path and the Selfs who travel by that path being without any knowledge, it is established (that the Deities Archi etc. are guides).—5.*

As regards those (Selfs) who traverse the path of Light, in as much as they are not independent, because, all their sense-organs happen to be bunched up together by their having been separated from their body, and in as much as Light (Archi) etc. also are equally incapable of any independent activity, because of their being non-sentient, it is understood that these sentient Deities who preside over Light etc., are appointed (to act as guides) on this special journey. In the ordinary world also (it is seen that) people who are either drunk or have fainted, and whose sense-organs happen to be similarly bunched up together (and have become incapable of action), are led along their path by others. Again as Light etc. are not permanently available, that they can be characteristic of the path, i.e. that they can be land-marks of the path, is not reasonably sustainable, nor can one, who has departed (this life) during the night, ever reach the day, while it has already been stated, that he cannot possibly await (the advent of) the day. But if it is understood that these Archi etc. have Deities etc. as their Selfs, then such Deities having eternal existence, this fault does not occur (in their case). It is reasonably sustainable that they (the Deities) are referred to here as Light etc., because they are suppos-

ed to identify themselves with Archi etc.. The statement "From the Light to the day" (Chhān. 4.15.5; 5.10.1) is not inconsistent even in the case of their being such guides, because it is possible, that by means of the instrumentality of the Light, the Self reaches the day and by means of the instrumentality of the day, it reaches the bright half of the month. It is seen that such instruction is seen to be given to the guides well-known in this ordinary world also, thus—Do thou go from this place to Jayavarmā, thence to Jayasinha and from thence to Krishṇagupta. Besides, in the introductory portion, merely a general relation is stated, in the passage "They arrive at the Light" (Brih. 6.2.15), but no special relation (of any kind). But in the concluding passage a special relation as that between a guide and a person guided is mentioned, thus—"He conducts them to Brahma", and from that it is definitely concluded that the same special relation exists in the introductory portion also. In as much as the sense-organs of those who traverse this path are all bunched up together, there is no possibility of any such experiencing (of the fruits of actions). Now, even with respect to those who traverse this path but do not experience the fruits of actions, it is possible to use the word Loka (world), because these Lokās (i.e. worlds met with in the path) can well be the places for the experiencing (of the fruit of actions) by those who are residents of these worlds. So, it should be construed like this—One who reaches the Agni-Loka (i.e. where Agni is the Lord) is conducted by Agni and one who reaches the place where Vāyu is the Lord, is conducted by Vāyu.—5.

(The opponent of Vedānta raises a doubt.) If the view that these (stages of the path) are but such living sentient guides, how can that properly apply in the case of Varuṇa etc. inasmuch as, in the arrangement (of the order of the stages) Varuṇa etc. are placed after Lightning, while, from the stage of Lightning right up to Brahma-Loka, the Scriptures speak about the conductorship of the Puruṣha who does not belong to the human species (i.e. who is a non-human) ? Hence, to this, the Sūtrakāra replies, thus—

*From there, the Selfs are escorted by the Puruṣha in the Lightning, because the Scriptures have said so.—6.*

It should be understood that having reached (the stage of) Lightning, (the Selfs) are escorted by a non-human Purusha upto the world of Brahma. Because, the Scriptures make you understand that way, thus—"From that stage of Lightning, a non-human Purusha comes along and leads the Selfs to the world of Brahma". As regards (deities such as) Varuṇa and others, it should be understood that they favour him, either by not obstructing him or by actually helping him on in some way. Therefore, it is but properly stated (by the Sūtrakāra) that these Light etc., who have the deities as their Selfs, are the guides (of the Jīva-Selfs on their way).—6.

#### 5. KĀRYĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 7-14.

*Bādari is of opinion that the Brahma (referred to above) is the qualified Brahma, an effect (Kārya) (of the unqualified transcendent Brahma), because an approach (Gati) towards such qualified Brahma is reasonably sustainable.—7.*

With regard to the Scriptural passage "He leads them up to Brahma" (Chhān. 4.15.5), it is now considered, as to whether he leads the Selfs to the lower Brahma (i.e. qualified Brahma), an effect of the unqualified transcendent Brahma, or whether he leads the Selfs to the principal transcendent unqualified Brahma which does not undergo any modification. Whence is there any such doubt? Because of the employment of the word Brahma and the mention of the act of going (implying movement). With regard to that, Āchārya Bādari is of opinion, that the non-human Purusha leads the Selfs only to the qualified Brahma, an effect (of the unqualified transcendent Brahma). Whence is it so? Because, an approach (i.e. movement) as such, towards such qualified Brahma is reasonably sustainable. It is only towards qualified Brahma, an effect (of the unqualified Brahma), that any such approach (involving motion) is possible, because it has a definite local habitation (Loka in Brahma-Loka), while it cannot be imagined, that there can be any approach towards the transcendent unqualified Brahma, or that it can

ever be an object of any such approach, or that any such approach (involving movement) towards it, is possible, because the transcendent unqualified Brahma is omnipresent and is the universal Self of all those who are supposed so to approach.—7.

*Also, because of the specification.—8.*

In another Scriptural passage—"He leads them up to the worlds of Brahma, and having attained excellence, they sojourn there for a period coextensive with the life-span of Brahmā" (Brih. 6.2.15), because of the specification, it is understood that this movement of approach (by the Selfs) is only towards Brahma-the-effect (Kārya-Brahma). Any such specification by the plural number (viz. worlds) is not possible in the case of the Highest (unqualified) Brahma, while it is possible in the case of Brahma-the-effect, because, that it can have differences of conditions, is reasonably sustainable. Besides, the use of the word Lokās (worlds) by the Scriptures in its direct sense is appropriate in the case of such places as are comprised in the effects (of Brahma) and which have a specific design, and wherein fruits of actions are experienced. In other cases its use is in the metaphorical sense, as for instance, in the Scriptural passage (in which Yājñavalkya says to Janaka)—"Oh king, Brahma alone is this world" (Brih. 4.4.23). Besides, the Scriptural statement about one entity being a support (Ādhāra), and another entity as something which rests on such support (Ādheya), cannot be appropriate in the case of the Highest (transcendent) Brahma. Therefore, this movement of approach is of course towards Brahma-the-effect.—8.

But (says the opponent of Vedānta) the use of the word Brahma is not reasonably sustainable even in the case of Brahma-the-effect (Kārya-Brahma), because it has been established in the Samanvaya Adhyāya (i.e. Bra. Sū. Adhyāya I), that Brahma is the cause of the creation etc. of this entire world. With regard to that, it is said :—

*The reference to it i.e. Brahma-the-effect (Kārya-Brahma), as Brahma, however (Tu), is because of the nearness.—9.*

The word 'however' (Tu) has the purpose of refuting the above objection. The use of the word Brahma for the lower qualified Brahma is not contradictory, by reason of its nearness to the Highest (transcendent) Brahma, because it is firmly established, that, in fact it is but the Highest Brahma itself, which, when it is in contact with pure limiting adjuncts such as intellect etc.), is described as having the qualities of an effect, such as having the mind as its structure etc., for the purpose of meditation, and is described as the Lower qualified Brahma.—9.

But (says the opponent of Vedānta) the conclusion that it is the qualified Brahma, i.e. Brahma-the-effect, to which the Selfs reach, does not fit in properly with the Scriptural declaration about the non-return (to this transmigratory existence). It is not accepted (by Scriptures), that there can ever be any eternal existence (to the Jīva-Self) elsewhere than in the Highest transcendent Brahma. (If it be said) that it is indicated by the Scriptures that those who go along the Devayāna path do not again return (to this transmigratory existence), thus—"Those who traverse this path do not ever return to this recurring human existence" (Chhān. 4.15.6), and that they do not return again because it is also said—"One who ascends by that path attains immortality" (Chhān. 8.6.6; Kaṭha. 6.16), we reply :—

*When there is a dissolution of the worlds of Brahma-the-effect, (the Selfs) along with the presiding deity, attain the Highest Brahma, because the Scriptures have so declared.—10.*

When the dissolution of the worlds of Brahma-the-effect, is imminent, the Selfs, in whom correct i.e. perfect knowledge is generated there, attain the highest place of Viṣṇu, which is pure, and is even higher than this world of Brahma-the-effect (Kārya-Brahma), along with its presiding entity, the Hiraṇyagarbha. This should be understood to be so from the Scriptural statements about Final Release by stages (Krama-mukti), and non-return (to this transmigratory existence) etc.. It has been expounded (already) that the attainment of the Highest Brahma, as



preceded by a movement of approach (Gatipūrvikā) towards it, is properly not possible.—10.

*On account of the Smṛiti, also.*—11.

The Smṛiti also is in agreement with this view, thus—  
“When the final dissolution (of this world) along with Hiranyagarbha, is imminent, all these (Jīva-Selfs), purified in mind, attain the Highest Brahma, along with Brahmā, the Hiranyagarbha.” Therefore, the conclusion is that the Scriptural statement about the movement of approach, is with respect to the Brahmā, i.e. Brahma-the-effect.—11.

But (says the opponent of Vedānta), by raising what *prima facie* doubt, is this conclusion, viz. “Bādari is of opinion that the Brahma referred to, is Brahma-the-effect” (Bra. Sū. IV.iii.7) arrived at? The Sūtrakāra now sets forth the same i.e. the *prima facie* doubt by the following Sūtra :

*Jaimini is of opinion that he (the Puruṣa) leads them to the Highest Brahma, because, that is the principal meaning (of the word, Brahma).*—12.

Achārya Jaimini is of opinion, that the Scriptural passage “He leads them on to Brahma” (Chhān. 4.15.6) means that he leads them to the Highest transcendent Brahma. Whence is it so? Because, the principal meaning of the word ‘Brahma’ is the Highest transcendent Brahma, and Brahma-the-effect is its secondary meaning, and as between the principal and the secondary meanings the principal meaning is to be preferred.—12.

*Also, because of the Scriptures.*—13.

The Scriptural passage “One ascending by that path, attains immortality” (Chhān. 8.6.6 and Kaṭha. 6.16), indicates that this immortality (referred to therein) is preceded by a movement of approach (to it). Immortality is reasonably sustainable in the case of the Highest transcendent Brahma, and not in the case of Brahma-the-effect, inasmuch as every effect, as such, is liable to destruction, because of the Scriptures, which declare—“Where one sees

things different (from each other) that is insignificant and mortal" (Chhān. 7.24.1). It is with respect to the Highest (Brahma) that in the Kaṭha-Valli, such movement of approach is mentioned. No other Vidyā is introduced there, because by the Scriptural passage "Different from meritorious action (Dharma), different from unmeritorious action (Adharma) etc." (Kaṭha. 2.14), it is the Highest transcendent Brahma that is introduced there.—13.

*This determinate belief (Abhisandhi) about the attainment (of Brahma), is not with respect to Brahma-the-effect (i.e. qualified Brahma).—14.*

Besides, this determinate belief about the attainment (of Brahma), thus—"May I reach the assembly hall of the mansion of Prajāpati" (Chhān. 8.14.1), is not with respect to Brahma-the-effect (Kārya-Brahma), because, in the (preceding) Scriptural passage—"That which makes names and form manifest, and in whom they abide, that is Brahma" (Chhān. 8.14.1), the Highest Brahma, which is dissimilar to Brahma-the-effect, is understood to be the relevant subject matter. Similarly, in the Scriptural passage—"I shall be the Self (Yasha) of the Brāhmaṇās (and of the Kshatriyās and Vaishyās)" (Chhān. 8.14.1), it is understood to be the Self of all, inasmuch as in the Scriptural passage "That, whose name is the great Self (Yasha), has no equal" (Shvet. 4.19), that Highest Brahma alone is known to bear the name 'Yasha' (the Self). Because of this attainment of the mansion which is preceded by a movement of approach towards it and which is mentioned in the Vidyā of the Hridaya (Daharāvidyā) thus—"That city of Brahma, called Aparājitā, having a golden canopy built by the Lord, Brahma (to which, the one who knows the Daharāvidyā, goes)" (Chhān. 8.5.3), and also, because the root-verb 'Pad' also means movement, it is concluded, that there is an expectation of some path (along which such movement can take place). Therefore, the Scriptural statements about 'movement' are with respect to the Highest Brahma, is the other view (Pakshāntaram, i.e. the opponent's view i.e. Pūrva-Paksha). These are the two views which have been detailed by the Āchārya in the form

of Sūtrās. One view (in Sūtrās 7 to 11) shows movement to be reasonably sustainable, and the other view (in Sūtrās 12 to 14), shows that it is the principal meaning (of the word Brahma) that is feasible. Now, here, the view that 'movement is reasonably sustainable', is capable of rendering the view that 'the principal meaning (of Brahma) is feasible' fallacious, but not *vice versa*. The first view therefore is explained as being the final conclusion (Siddhānta) and the latter one as being the Pūrva-Paksha (i.e. the view of the opponent of Vedānta). When it is not so possible (to understand the word Brahma to be used in the principal sense here) we know of no one, who can dictate to us that it should be so understood. Besides, even in the chapter relating to the Vidyā of the Highest Brahma, it is reasonably sustainable to understand that, the reference to the movement implied in another Vidyā, such as—"Very many other Nādis are for the purpose of the going up (of the Jīva-Selfs)" (Chhān. 8.6.6), is for the glorification of the Vidyā of the Highest Brahma. By separating the passage "May I reach the hall of the mansion of Prajāpati" (Chhān. 8.14.1) (from the passage preceding it), it would even not be contradictory (to understand) that this determinate belief (in reaching) is with reference to Brahma-the-effect. Just as the qualified Brahma is spoken of as one to whom all actions and all desires belong, it is also possible to describe it, as being the Self of all. Therefore, the Scriptural statements about 'movement' are with reference to Aparā-Vidyā i.e. the Vidyā of qualified Brahma (Kārya-Brahma i.e. Brahma-the-effect).

Some others again adhering to the usual arrangement, viz., that the earlier Sūtrās here (7 to 11) represent the Pūrva-Paksha view (i.e. the view of the opponent of Vedānta) and the later Sūtrās here (12-13) represent the final conclusion (i.e. the Siddhānta view), maintain that the Scriptural statements about 'movement' are with reference to the Highest Brahma. That however is not proper, because, that Brahma could ever be the object of any such 'movement' is not reasonably sustainable. It can never be reasonably sustainable, that the Highest Brahma, which is ascertained to be all-pervading and which is immanent in all and is the Self of all, as particularized in the Scriptural passages "All-pervading and eternal, like the Ākāsha", and

"That which is Brahma, directly and immediately" (Brih. 3.4.1), "That Self which is inside all" (Brih. 3.4.1), "All this, verily, is the Self" (Chhān. 7.25.2), "Brahma verily, is all this and is the best" (Muṇḍ. 2.2.11), is something, towards which this movement of approach is possible. What has already been reached cannot again be sought to be reached. As is well-known in the ordinary world, it is one thing that goes towards some other thing, (i.e. there always are two different things involved in such a case). But (says the opponent of Vedānta)—It is seen in the ordinary world that something which has already been arrived at, can still be something towards which movement is possible, having regard to its relation with specific different environment, as for instance, one who already is on this earth *can* be described as going to this very same earth by way of going from one part of it to another. Similarly, a child being itself (i.e. without being different), can be seen to be progressing towards its own old age, which of course pertains to its own Self, but is characterized by a different period of time. Even so, inasmuch as, Brahma equipped as it is with all kinds of power, may still be something which can somehow admit of being approached. (We reply)—No, because in the case of Brahma all special characteristics are denied. It is not possible to imagine any special relation (to subsist) as between the Highest Self and any such special circumstance as a particular environment or time etc., because of such Scriptural passages as "(Brahma is) without parts, and without activity and it is tranquil, faultless and untainted" (Shvet. 6.19), "Neither gross nor subtle, nor short nor long" (Brih. 3.8.8), "He who is without and within, and is not liable to be born" (Muṇḍ. 2.1.2), "The great unborn Self, ageless, deathless, immortal, fearless, Brahma" (Brih. 4.4.25), "He that can only be described (negatively) as 'not so, not so'" (Brih. 3.9.26), and also as well by Smritis and reasoning, so that, on the ground of any such relation to particular environment in space or condition, it (the Highest Self) could be said to be something towards which movement is possible. As regards the earth and a person's age, because of their having a relation to special conditions of environment of space and time respectively, the possibility of their being approached by movement towards them as being related to some specific conditions of environment

and time, is reasonably sustainable. If it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta), that because of the Scriptural declarations, about Brahma being the material cause of the creation, preservation and dissolution of the world, it (the Highest Brahma) possesses manifold powers, (we reply)—No, because those other Scriptural statements which purport to deny any special attributes to Brahma, cannot have any other interpretation. If it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta) that the Scriptural statements about creation etc. also, cannot have any other interpretation, (we reply)—No, because they have the purpose of propounding the oneness (i.e. unity) of Brahma. The Shāstra, which by means of the simile about clay etc. purports to propound the oneness of Brahma as the only existing reality, and the unreality of everything that is an effect (as from a cause), does not deserve to have the aim of propounding creation etc.. (The opponent of Vedānta says)—But, why again (should it be), that the Scriptural statements about creation etc. should be in a subordinate position to those which aim at denying differences in Brahma, and why should not the latter be in a subordinate position to the former? It is replied—Because Scriptural statements which deny any special differences (in Brahma) have the purport of not leaving any further unsatisfied curiosity (Nirākāṅkshatvāt). On the realization of the Self as being the only one, eternal and pure entity, no further curiosity ever again arises, because of the generation of a complete conviction (in a person), that the final aim of man is thus achieved, by reason of such Scriptural passages as—“How can there be any confusion or sorrow, in the case of a person, who realizes the unity (of Brahma)” (Isha. 7), “Oh Janaka, thou hast attained fearlessness” (Br.h. 4.2.4), “One who knows (the bliss of Brahma) is unafraid, and is not tormented (by the doubt) as to whether he has performed a good action or whether he has performed a sinful action” (Tait. 2.9.1). Similarly, because it is also observed that those who have realized Brahma experience contentment (of mind), and because the Scriptures have also censured the notion of considering the unreal effect, as being real, thus—“He who sees things as different goes from death to death”. Hence it is not possible to consider the Scriptural statements which deny differences, to be in a subordinate position to the other

Scriptural statements. Scriptural statements about creation etc. (of the world) have no such power to propound a meaning which results in allaying any further curiosity, while it is directly understood that they have a different meaning. Even so, after stating the following passage, viz., "Oh mild one, know that this sprout which has thus sprung up, cannot be without its root" (Chhān. 6.8.3), the Scriptures later on indicate, how the 'Sat' (being) is the one and the only one root of this world, which deserves to be known, thus—"That from which these beings are created, that by which they are preserved and that in which they are ultimately absorbed, that you should desire to know. That is Brahma" (Tait. 3.1.1). In this way, inasmuch as the Scriptural statements about creation etc. have the purpose of making the oneness (unity) of the Self understood, Brahma cannot possibly have a relation with many powers. Hence, that Brahma is something which can be approached, is not reasonably sustainable. The Scriptural passages—"His Prāṇās do not depart (from the body)", "Being himself but Brahma, he merges into Brahma" (Brih. 4.4.6) repudiate the notion of any movement towards the Highest Brahma. That has been explained in the Sūtra—"For (the denial of the departure) is clearly made (in the texts) of some (schools)" (Bra. Sū. IV. ii. 13). As regards the assumption of a movement (towards Brahma), the Jīva-Self which is supposed to be the one that so approaches, can either be a part of, or an effect of, that which is to be so approached, viz. Brahma, or it may be something absolutely different from it, because if (they were to be) totally identical, movement (of the Jīva-Self) would not be reasonably sustainable. (Says the opponent of Vedānta)—Supposing it is so, so what? The reply is—If, it (i.e. the Jīva-Self) is a part (of Brahma) then inasmuch as a part is always in contact with the whole, of which it is such a part, that a part such as Jīva-Self can approach Brahma cannot be reasonably sustainable. Besides inasmuch as Brahma is well-known as being devoid of any parts, the assumption that anything (such as the Jīva-Self) can be a part of it, is not reasonably sustainable. As regards the view that it (the Jīva-Self) is an effect of Brahma, also, it would be equally so, because an effect is always in contact with or present in the cause. An earthen pot cannot subsist (as such pot) if it were to divest

itself (of the nature) of its having the clay as its Self, and were it to give up (the nature of having such clay as its Self), there would be the predicament of its ceasing to exist altogether. As regards both the views about the Jiva-Self being either a part of or an effect of Brahma, Brahma, of which the Jiva-Self is supposed to be such a part or effect, being itself unchanging, its entering into a condition of transmigratory existence is not feasible. If a Jiva-Self is different from Brahma, it would deserve to be, either an atom (Aṇu) or all-pervading, or of a dimension in-between these two. If all-pervading, any movement on its part would not be reasonably sustainable and if of an intermediate dimension, there would be the predicament of its being non-eternal, and if it has the dimension of an atom, perception (Vedanā) over the whole body would not be reasonably sustainable. Besides, the view about its being either an atom or of an intermediate dimension, has been fully refuted earlier (in Bra. Sū. II. iii. 29). If the Jiva-Self is supposed to be different from the transcendent Self, there would be the predicament of the Shāstra "That thou art" (Chhān. 6.8.7) being contradicted. The same fault would be common to both the views about its being a part or an effect (of Brahma). If it be said, that inasmuch as such a part or an effect (of Brahma) being non-different from Brahma of which it is such a part or an effect, there would be no such fault, (we reply)—No, because, in that case, their being the same one entity in the principal sense of the term, is not reasonably sustainable. In the case of all these views, there is the predicament of there being no Final Release (for the Jiva-Self) because of the non-effacement of the notion of its being the Self in a transmigratory condition, and if there is such effacement, there would be the predicament of its own innate nature perishing, because it is not understood (by those who hold such a view) that Brahma is the Jiva-Self's Self. With regard to what is maintained by some people foolishly, viz., that, inasmuch as, permanently obligatory actions and actions performed on special occasions are performed (by people) so that no sin (on their part) should result, and actions meant to be performed with some special desire, or actions which are prohibited, are avoided in order that they may neither attain heaven nor hell respectively, and actions whose results are

to be experienced in the present existing body, are duly exhausted by the experiencing of their fruits, therefore, (in the case of persons so circumstanced), in the absence of there being any cause for their attaining another body after the present body has fallen, they may well attain complete identification with the Supreme Spirit (Kaivalya) having the characteristic of their Selfs abiding in their own innate nature, even without their having acquired the knowledge that Brahma is their Self, (we reply)—This is not correct (Asat), because of the absence of any means-of-proof (for such a view). No Shāstra has ever propounded, that a person desirous of Final Release should behave in this particular way. It has been inferred by such people as a result of their own wishful thinking, that inasmuch as transmigratory existence results from actions, it would not so result, in the absence of such a cause. Besides, as it is extremely difficult to understand that there is in fact an absence of any such cause, it is not possible even to infer so. It is possible that each living being has amassed a store of actions having desirable and undesirable fruits, in its previous birth (Jātyantara), and because of the impossibility of experiencing the fruits of actions having such dissimilar fruits simultaneously, some of them which get an opportunity, cause one birth, while some others stand by, and await favourable environment, time and cause, and as there is no possibility of these remaining actions being exhausted, it is not possible to determine, even in the case of a person behaving in the manner described (above), that when his present body falls, there positively is an absence of any cause for the attainment of a new body. The existence of such residuary actions, is proved by Scriptural and Smṛiti passages, such as—"Those whose conduct here has been good etc." (Chhān. 5.10.7) and "Thereafter, by means of the residuary actions". (Says the opponent of Vedānta)—It may be that permanently obligatory actions and those which have to be performed because of some special cause, may exhaust such residuary actions. (We reply)—No, because of the absence of any incompatibility between them. It is only in the presence of such incompatibility, that there is reciprocity of destroying and being destroyed between them (i.e. one action can exhaust or neutralize another action, and the other action can get itself exhausted or neutralized



by the first). Good actions thus stored up in a former birth are however not antagonistic to the permanently obligatory actions or actions performed because of some special cause, because 'purity of such actions' is a factor common to both (these sets of actions). Sinful actions, inasmuch as they are of an impure nature, when they thus are incompatible may well exhaust actions, but even so, they won't be able to bring about the absence of a cause for the attainment of another body, because, that subsisting good actions do furnish such a cause, is reasonably sustainable. Also because it is not possible to determine, that the destruction of *all* bad actions without leaving any residue (un-destroyed) has taken place. There is no means-of-proof to determine that the performance of permanently obligatory actions, and actions which have to be performed because of some special cause, would merely prevent the accruing of sin, and would not generate some other ancillary fruit, because along with it (i.e. the prevention of the accrual of sin) such other fruit may possibly result side by side. For the Āpastamba Smṛiti says—When a mango tree is planted for its fruit only, its shade and fragrance also become available along with the fruit, similarly, when religious duties are performed, other benefits also can accrue side by side. It is not possible for any body, who has not attained true i.e. perfect knowledge, to be able to assert confidently, that during his whole life between his birth and death, he would avoid performing acts performed with a desire (Kāmya-Karma) and avoid the performance of acts prohibited (Pratishiddha), because it is observed that even the most clever (persons) are guilty of performing some such venial acts. May be, all this can be justifiably doubted, still it certainly is difficult to be sure that no cause (for rebirth) exists. Without realizing the unity of the Jīva-Self and the Highest Brahma, which can only be realized by true knowledge, it is not possible to expect, that the Jīva-Self, whose nature is to be an agent and an experiencer, can wish for complete identification with the Supreme Spirit, because it is impossible (for one) to overcome one's own nature as (for instance) it is impossible for Agni to overcome its own nature of heat.

(The opponent of Vedānta says)—It may perhaps be like this. The actual effect of a Jīva-Self being in fact an

agent and an experiencer (i.e. its being in a transmigratory condition) is something which is detrimental to it, but not its potential power of being such an agent or an experiencer, and hence, when the operation of such potential power is avoided by avoiding action, then, even if such potential power exists, Final Release may be reasonably sustainable. (We reply)—That cannot be so, because when such potentiality subsists, it is extremely difficult to avoid such potentiality producing its effect. (The opponent of Vedānta says again)—It may be this way: mere potential power, independently of other causes, does not begin to produce its effect, and so, even if such potential power subsists, being isolated, it would not offend in any way. (We reply)—Even that could not be so, because causes also are in relationship with the Jīva-Self by way of this permanent relation with such potential power. Hence when the Jīva-Self's nature of being an agent and an experiencer subsists, and the identity of the Jīva-Self and Brahma which is to be understood through Vidyā, is not so understood, there is not even the least little hope of Final Release. The Scriptures which declare—"There is no other path (to salvation)" (Shvet. 3.8), thus rule out any other path to Final Release than that of perfect knowledge. (If the opponent of Vedānta says) that, supposing the Jīva-Self to be non-different from the Highest Self, there would be the predicament of the cessation of all phenomenal activity i.e. practical existence, because there would be no scope for the operation of such means-of-proof as direct perception etc., (we reply)—No, because prior to the realization of Brahma, like the transactions in a dream prior to awakening, the continuance (i.e. the operation of the means-of-proof) would be reasonably sustainable. The Shāstra also, by the passage "For when there is duality as it were then one sees another" (Brih. 2.4.14; 4.5.15) etc., having spoken about the operation of such means-of-proof as direct perception etc. in the case of those who have not realized the truth (i.e. Brahma), again indicates the absence of it (i.e. the operation of such means-of-proof), in the case of those who have realized such truth (i.e. Brahma), by the passage "When every thing has, to him, become but the Self only, by what can he see and whom?" (Brih. 2.4.14; 4.5.15). Thus in the case of one who has realized the transcendent Brahma, inasmuch

as the notion that Brahma is something which has to be approached is obliterated, it is not possible in any way to propound any movement (of approach towards Brahma). (The opponent of Vedānta says)—With respect to whom, then, are the Scriptural declarations about such a movement? It is replied—They may well be, with regard to the Vidyā of qualified Brahma, for even so, is such movement occasionally mentioned, in the Panchāgni-Vidyā (the Vidyā of the Five Fires), and the Paryanka-Vidyā (Vidyā of the Couch of Brahma), and the Vaishvānara-Vidyā (Vidyā of the Vaishvānara Fire). Wherever such movement is spoken of even with respect to Brahma, as in the Scriptural passages “Prāṇa is Brahma, Joy is Brahma, Ākāsha is Brahma” (Chhān. 4.10.5), “Now this lotus-like hall of the mansion in the city of Brahma (i.e. the body) which is there” (Chhān. 8.1.1), even there, because of the attribute of being Vāmanī (carrier of blessings) and of having true desires, as it is only the qualified Brahma (Saguṇa Brahma) that has to be meditated upon, movement (of approach towards such qualified Brahma) is possible. The Scriptures, however, do not ever mention any such movement with respect to the transcendent Brahma, as they have specifically denied it by the passage “His Prāṇās do not depart” (Brih. 4.4.6). Even though, in the Scriptural passage “One who has realized Brahma, attains the Highest” (Tait. 2.1.1), the root “to attain” implies a movement, it should be understood, that, as described above, inasmuch as there is no possibility of reaching some other region, it should be looked upon as meaning, that the attainment (by the Jīva-Self) of its own nature, by way of the dissolution of the names and forms superimposed by Nescience, is spoken of, as in the Scriptural passage “Being but Brahma, he merges into Brahma” (Brih. 4.4.7) etc.. Even if it is supposed that such movement is mentioned in connection with the transcendent Brahma, it ought to be understood as mentioned either for creating a taste, or for meditation. Now, in the case of one who has realized Brahma no such taste is possibly created by mentioning any such movement, because it happens to have been already brought about by the peace (of mind) which is vouchsafed to him by the knowledge (of Brahma), of which he is immediately and not distantly conscious in himself. Nor is it reasonably sustainable, that there can be

any necessity of thinking about any such movement (on the part of the Jiva-Self) with respect to knowledge, which is not something capable of being acquired (as a fruit of some action) and which speaks of the Final Release which is always ready at hand. Therefore this 'movement' is only with respect to qualified Brahma (i.e. Saṁgha Brahma). Under these circumstances, because of the inability to grasp the distinction between the Highest Brahma and the qualified Lower Brahma, Scriptural statements about movement with respect to qualified Brahma, are superimposed on the transcendent Brahma. (Here, the opponent of Vedānta says)—What? Are there then two kinds of Brahma, the Highest or unqualified Brahma and the Lower or qualified Brahma? (We reply)—Well, of course there are these two kinds of Brahma, because there is this Scriptural passage, "Oh Satyakāma, what this syllable 'Om' is, is the Highest and the Lower Brahma" (Prashna. 5.2). What again is the Highest Brahma and what the lower Brahma (asks the opponent of Vedānta)? The reply is—Wherever there is instruction about Brahma by means of such words as "not gross etc.", by denying the distinctions of names and forms brought about by Nescience, that is the Highest transcendent Brahma. Where, as in the Scriptural passage "Which has the structure of the mind, which has Prāṇa as the body, and which has the form (Rūpa) of brightness" (Chhān. 3.14.2), instruction is given about Brahma as having the distinction of names and forms for the purpose of meditation, that is the Lower i.e. qualified Brahma. But (says the opponent of Vedānta), in this way, the Scriptural declarations about non-duality would be contradicted. (We reply)—No, because, it is refuted by the fact that it is affected by the limiting adjuncts such as names and forms which are brought about by Nescience. Of the meditation on the Lower Brahma, there is the fruit, as mentioned in the Scriptural passage "If he is desirous of the world of the manes" (Chhān. 8.2.1), which is characterized by Lordship over the earth, and which is available in this transmigratory existence, because of the ignorance (of one who knows qualified Brahma only) not having been yet removed. As such fruit is confined to a particular environment, a movement for the attainment of it, is not contradictory. Even though the Self is all-pervading, that,

like the movement of Ākāśha when a pot moves, it is well-known that the Jīva-Self is said to depart along with the movement of the limiting adjuncts of intelligence etc., has been stated by us in the Sūtra)—“On account of its having for its essence the qualities of that” (Bra. Sū. II. iii. 29). Therefore it should be seen that the view of Bādari in Sūtra IV. iii. 7, is the final conclusion (Siddhānta view), and the view of Jaimini in Sūtra IV. iii. 12 is merely an indication of the Pūrva-Paksha view, for the purpose of the development of the intelligence (of the pupil).—14.

6. APRATĪKĀLAMBANĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 15-16.

*Bādarāyaṇa (is of opinion) that he (the non-human being) conducts these who do not take their resort upon the symbol (of Brahma). No fault arises either way, because, only he who wishes for it (reaches Brahma).—15.*

It is firmly established so far, that (the Jīva-Self's) movement is with respect to Brahma-the-effect (i.e. Saṁgha Brahma), and not with respect to the Highest Brahma. It is now doubted whether, the non-human being, leads all those who depend upon Brahma-the-effect, without any exception, to the world of Brahma, or some of them only. What then is the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) ? It is, that all those who have acquired the knowledge (of Brahma) move towards Brahma-the-effect, which is different from the Highest Brahma, because in Bra. Sū. III. iii. 31, such movement (towards qualified Brahma) has been stated in the case of all other Vidyās generally. This being the condition (of the opponent of Vedānta) the Sūtrakāra replies :— “Those who do not take their resort upon a symbol”. Bādarāyaṇa Āchārya is of opinion that the non-human being leads all those who take their resort upon Brahma-the-effect, except those who depend on a symbol, to the world of Brahma. No fault arises even if it is understood that there are both these ways. It is reasonably sustainable to say that the argument about there being no rule, holds good in all meditations, except those on symbols. It should be understood that the sentence

'a man who entertains a desire for Brahma' furnishes the reason which justifies there being those two ways. It is but proper (to say) that he who entertains a desire for Brahma reaches Brahmic Lordship, because of the Scriptural statement—"In whatever way he meditates, even so he becomes". In the case of a symbol, no desire for Brahma is entertained, because in such meditations, the symbol is *the* principal thing. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) the Scriptures declare that even those who do not entertain a desire for Brahma do also go towards Brahma, as in the passage in the Vidyā of the Five Fires, viz. "He leads them on to Brahma" (Chhān. 4.15.5). (The reply is)—It may be, no such discussion is justified where it is so specifically mentioned, but where there is no mention of any such specific exception, it is possible to determine, according to the ordinary rule about those who entertain a desire for Brahma, that it is only those who entertain a desire for Brahma that reach it and no others.—15.

*(The Scriptures) indicate that there is something special (about the fruit).—16.*

With respect to meditations on symbols (of Brahma) such as Nāma (name) etc., the Scriptures indicate a specially greater and greater fruit of each succeeding meditation than the one in the case of an earlier meditation, by such passages as "He (who meditates on a Nāma as a symbol of Brahma) is free to go about at his pleasure, as far as the Nāma is capable of going" (Chhān. 7.1.5), "Speech (Vāk), indeed is greater than a Nāma" (Chhān. 7.2.1), "He is free to go about as far as speech (Vāk) can go" (Chhān. 7.2.2), "Mind, indeed is greater than speech" (Chhān. 7.3.1) etc.. This specially greater and greater nature of the fruit is reasonably sustainable, because meditations depend upon the technique of the symbols. If they were to depend upon Brahma, in as much as Brahma is but one and one only, how could there be any speciality (of greater and greater) fruit? Therefore, it is, that meditations which depend upon symbols (of Brahma) have not the same fruit as the other meditations.—16.

*Here ends Pāda III of Adhyāya IV.*

## ADHYĀYA IV—PĀDA 4

### 1. SAMPADYĀVIRBHĀVĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 1-3.

*(When the Jīva-Self) has attained (unity with Brahma), there is manifestation of it (in its own form as Ātmā), because of the word 'Sva' (one's own).—1.*

The Scriptures declare—"It is thus that the serene Jīva-Self (Samprasāda), having thus risen from this body and having attained unity with the Highest light (Jyoti) manifests itself in its own nature" (Chhān. 8.12.3). With regard to this a doubt arises, as to whether it manifests itself in some particular adventitious (Āgantuka) form, as it does in a place where fruits of actions are experienced, such as the world of the Gods etc., or whether it manifests itself only in its own form as the Self. What then is the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) ? It is, that, may be, such manifestation is in an adventitious form, as in the other places, inasmuch as, Final Release also is known to be a sort of a fruit, and also because the word 'to become manifest' is an alternative (synonym) for the word 'to be born'. Were such manifestation to be but in its own form, then it would manifest itself equally so in its earlier conditions also, because the form of an entity never perishes, and therefore this manifestation (of the Jīva-Self) must be in some particular adventitious manner. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply :— It manifests itself in the pure form of its own Self, and not in some other adventitious form. Whence is it so ? Because of the word 'Sva' (one's own) in the Scriptural statement—"It manifests itself in its own Ātmic form", otherwise, the special qualifying adjective 'Sva' (one's own) would not be appropriate. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) the word 'Sva' may merely convey the meaning of the form of the Self. (We reply)—No, because it is not necessary to say so in so many words, inasmuch as it is reasonably sustainable that whatever particular form any thing manifests itself in, it, all the same, is its own form and therefore (in that case) the qualifying word 'Sva' would be meaningless, but if the word is construed to

mean the Self (Ātmā), the qualifying word has a meaning, in as much as the Jīva-Self manifests itself purely as its own Ātmic Self and not in some other adventitious form.—1.

But (says the opponent of Vedānta) this non-liability of the form of a thing to perish both in the former and present condition being common, what is the difference (between the Jīva-Self's earlier condition and its later condition) contemplated here ? The Sūtrakāra replies :—

*(The Jīva-Self now) attains Final Release, because the Scriptures have made a declaration (to that effect).—2.*

That (Jīva-Self) which is here spoken of, as manifesting itself (in its own Ātmic form), is one, that now is released from all bondage, and which subsists as its own pure Self, the special distinction being, that before, its Ātmic Self was obscured by the three conditions, referred to in the Scriptural passage—"He happens to become blind, he weeps as it were, and is, as it were, destroyed" (Chhān. 8.9.10, 11, in which Indra points out these defects in the Self as taught him by Prajāpati). (The opponent of Vedānta asks)—How again is it known, that it has now attained Final Release ? (We reply)—Because the Scriptures have so declared. Because, the Scriptures having declared that the Self which is free from the defect of these three conditions, is the one that has to be explained (to the pupil), by the passage "I shall explain this same (Self) to you again" (Chhān. 8.9.3; 8.10.4; 8.11.3), and having stated further on, that "Neither pleasure nor pain touch that Self which indeed has become disembodied" (Chhān. 8.12.1), they ultimately conclude thus—"It manifests itself in its own Ātmic form, that is the Highest Puruṣa" (Chhān. 8.12.3). Similarly, in the introductory portion of the legend (of Indra and Prajāpati) also, the declaration is with respect to the Self which has attained Final Release, thus—"That Self which is free from sin" (Chhān. 8.7.1) etc.. Besides, Final Release which is known to be the fruit, is dependent upon merely the cessation from bondage and not on the accrual of some extraordinary new condition altogether. As regards the argument (of the opponent of



Vedānta) that 'to be manifest' is synonymous with 'to be born', that also, is with reference to the earlier condition (of the Jīva-Self), even as a person, who, after being cured of his malady, emerges from it (i.e. out of the illness), is a person who now is free from such malady. Therefore there is no fault.—2.

*Because of the chapter, (by the word Jyoti) the Self is understood here.—3.*

(The opponent of Vedānta says) how is it said here (i.e. in Sūtra 2 above), 'that (the Jīva-Self) attains Final Release', even though, by the passage "Having attained the Highest Light" (Chhān. 8.12.3), the Scriptures mention the Jīva-Self to have become that, which is perceived to be an effect (from the cause, Brahma), and inasmuch as the word Light (Jyoti) is by established usage positively understood to mean the physical light (the element created by Brahma) ? Now, one who has not transcended the condition of being an effect, can never deserve to have attained Final Release, inasmuch as, an effect is well-known to be perishable. (We reply)—This is no fault, inasmuch as, the chapter makes it understood that by the word 'Light' (Jyoti), the Self (Ātmā) alone is meant, and when, in the Scriptural passage "This Self which is free from sin, and is ageless and deathless" (Chhān. 8.7.1), the supreme transcendent Self is the relevant entity, it is not possible to understand the word Jyoti capriciously, as the physical light, as there would be the predicament of the abandonment of what is relevant (viz. the transcendent Self), and the acceptance of that which is irrelevant (viz. Teja, an effect). Besides, the word 'Light' (Jyoti) is observed to be used for the Self, as in the Scriptural passage "That, the Gods (meditate upon) as the Light of Lights" (Brih. 4.4.16). This has also been fully elaborated (in Brahma-Sūtra I. iii. 40). —3.

## 2. AVIBHĀGENA DRISHTĀTVĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 4.

*(The Jīva-Self in the condition of Final Release) subsists in a condition of non-separateness (from Brahma), because it is so seen (from the Scriptures).—4.*

When the doubt is, as to whether, the Jīva-Self which attains the highest light, and manifests itself in its own Ātmic form, is separate from the Supreme Self or subsists in a condition of non-separateness from it, and when the opponent of Vedānta, because of the Scriptural passage "He moves about in that condition" (Chhān. 8.12.3), which indicates something in which something else subsists, and something which so subsists in such something, and "Having attained the light" (Chhān. 8.12.3), which indicates an agent (Kartri) and an object (Karma) (of such agent's activity), is of opinion that it continues to subsist separate (from Brahma), (the Sūtrakāra) explains it (to the opponent of Vedānta) and declares that the Jīva-Self which has attained Final Release, subsists in a condition of non-separateness from the Supreme Self. Whence is it so? Because, it is so seen (from the Scriptures). For, the Scriptural passages "I am Brahma" (Brih. 1.4.10), "Where (he) sees nothing as separate" (Chhān. 7.24.1), "There is nothing which makes itself a second to it, so that it may see something as separate" (Brih. 4.4.33) indicate the Supreme Self to be non-separate (from the Jīva-Self). Now following the reasoning (Nyāya) "Whatever his desire is etc." (Bra. Sū. IV. iii. 15), it is logical that, the fruit is, as is the knowledge. Also, Scriptural passages such as "Oh Gautama, just as pure water thrown into pure water, becomes one and the same and all-alike, even so, the Self of a sage who knows, becomes" (Kaṭha. 2.4.15), which purport to expound the nature of the Jīva-Self which has attained Final Release, indicate the non-separateness (of the Jīva-Self and the Supreme Self). Similarly, also the illustrations of the river and the sea etc.. As to the reference to separateness, even when non-separateness is there, it can be described to be so in a figurative sense, as indicated in such Scriptural passages as "Oh Bhagawān, in what does it abide? It abides in its own glory" (Chhān. 7.24.1). It is so seen also in "In love with itself", "Sporting with one's own Self" (Chhān. 7.25.2).—4.

### 3. BRĀHMĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 5-7.

*Jaimini (is of opinion) that, because of the statement (Upanyāsa) (in the Scriptures)*

*etc., (the Jiva-Self) manifests itself in the Brāhmīc form.—5.*

It is now settled that the Jiva-Self, according to the Scriptural statement "In its own Ātmic nature" (Chhān. 8.3.4), manifests itself only in the form of the Supreme Self and not in any other adventitious lower (Apara) form. Now, when the desire is to know the particular speciality of the form, it is stated (by the Sūtrakāra) that Āchārya Jaimini is of opinion that it manifests itself in its own Brāhmīc form (comprising of the whole gamut of attributes) beginning with the nature of being free from all sin, and ending with the attribute of having true desires, as also (the attributes) of omniscience and lordship over all. Whence is it so? Because, it is so understood from the statements (Upanyāsa) etc. in the Scriptures. For the statements, beginning with "He who is free from all sin" (Chhān. 8.7.1), and ending with "Having desires which are true and having true resolutions" (Chhān. 8.7.1), inform us that the Self has the nature of its own Self. Again the passage "He moves about there, eating, sporting, and being completely engrossed in enjoying" (Chhān. 8.12.3), intimates its attribute of lordly power, as also the passage "He has complete liberty of movement in all the worlds" (Chhān. 7.25.2). And, it is only in this manner, that the references about it, as being omniscient and the Lord of all, become reasonably sustainable.—5.

*Audulomi (is of opinion) that (the Jiva-Self manifests itself) only as pure sentiency, as that is its Self.—6.*

Even though attributes such as those of being free from sin etc. are indicated (by the Scriptures) as being of separate forms, still they have their origin merely in the imaginary conceptions that arise (in the mind) by words, because, that they merely indicate the absence of sin etc., is understood (from the words), while, inasmuch as, 'sentiency' alone is the nature of this Self, it is but logical that the manifestation (of the Jiva-Self) should be, merely in its own nature of sentiency. For even so it is, that the Scriptural statements "Thus, oh (Maitreyi), this Self which has

no inside or outside but which is wholly a solid mass of sentiency" (Brih. 4.5.13) happen to be in consonance with the Scriptures. Even though such attributes as "Having desires which are true etc." are spoken of as being the attributes of an entity (dissolving the compound word 'Satya-kāma' as 'he whose desires are true'), yet, inasmuch as they are dependent upon contact with limiting adjuncts they cannot possibly be, like Sentiency, the Self's own nature, because in the case of Brahma, there is a denial of its having more than one i.e. several aspects. In the case of Brahma, this i.e. its having more than one aspect is denied in Bra. Sū. III. ii. 11. Hence, the mention about it of eating etc. is meant merely to convey the absence of any misery, for the purpose of glorification, as it is, in the attribute of 'loving its own Self' (Ātmaratiḥ) etc.. It is not possible to describe Brahma (alone by itself) as having the attributes of love, sport and love-play, in the principal meaning of the terms, as they presuppose the existence of two entities. Therefore, Āchārya Auḍulomi is of opinion that the Jīva-Self manifests itself in a way in which all phenomenal duality is effaced from it, and that it is serene, and as one having a nature of serene sentiency, which is not possible of being indicated (by any term).—6.

*Bādarāyaṇa (is of opinion) that even if it be so (i.e. even though the Jīva-Self attains Brāhmīc form of sentiency only), because of the Scriptural statement (Upaṇyāsa) (it is understood) that the Jīva-Self still retains its previous attributes also and there is thus no contradiction.—7.*

Even if it is understood that the Jīva-Self has this transcendental attribute of pure sentiency only, still, inasmuch as, considering the phenomenal point of view, it is not denied that the Jīva-Self still retains its previous attribute of possessing Lordly powers also, as understood from the Scriptures, Āchārya Bādarāyaṇa is of opinion that there is no contradiction.—7.

#### 4. SAMKALPĀDHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 8-9.

*But, a person who has attained Final Release, (attains his desires) merely by his*

*volition, because the Scriptures have stated so.—8.*

The Scriptures have stated in the Vidyā of the Hridaya, thus—"If he is desirous of the world of the manes, then by his mere volition alone, his manes appear before him" (Chhān. 8.2.1) etc.. With regard to that the doubt is, whether mere volition itself is the only cause by which the manes etc. so appear (before him) or whether it has any other means combined with it. (The opponent of Vedānta says) even though the Scriptures mention mere volition alone (as the cause), still, as is observed in the ordinary world, it is logical, that there is need of other means also. Just as in the ordinary world, a man, like myself (for instance), meets his father etc. by a volition coupled with other means, such as approaching his father, even so, it may similarly be in the case of a person who has attained Final Release. It is only in this way that, nothing contrary to what is usually observed, will have been imagined. The expression 'merely by his volition' is used by taking it for granted, that as in the case of a king, the other equipment of means, by which the desired object is attained, is easy to obtain. Because, were the manes to appear (before the person who has attained Final Release) as a result of mere volition alone, because of their being of as unstable a nature as the display of mere volition, they would not be capable of affording much enjoyment. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) we reply :

The manes would of course appear (before the person who has attained Final Release) merely as a result of his volition alone. Whence is it so ? Because of the Scriptural statement about it. The Scriptural passage "His manes appear merely through his volition alone" (Chhān. 8.2.1) etc. would be contradicted, if it is understood that other means also are necessary (for that purpose). If the other means also happen to be available by volition, may it well be so, but such means can never be understood to have been brought about by a separate effort of volition, as, otherwise before such other means become available, there would be the predicament of mere volition alone being rendered unfruitful. It is not possible to apply (the test of) what is ordinarily seen in the world, to things which can only be

understood from the Scriptures. Inasmuch as the volition of a person who has attained Final Release, is different by nature, to the volition of the people in the ordinary world, it is through mere volition alone, that their (i.e. of manes etc.) being steady by nature till the attainment of the result desired, is understandable.—8.

*It is just because of this (i.e. that a person has attained Final Release) that he has no other Lord (to lord it over him).—9.*

It is precisely because of this, i.e. because the volitions of a person who has attained Final Release are not unfruitful, that he has no other Lord to lord it over him. The meaning is, that there is no one else who is his Lord. Even an ordinary man, when he forms any resolution, does not, if he can help it, care to be dominated by another. The Scriptural passage “Now, those who depart (from this world), after having realized the Self, and having desires which are true i.e. sure of fulfilment, can move about the worlds with perfect freedom” (Chhān. 8.1.6) also indicates the same thing.—9.

##### 5. ABHĀVĀDHIKARĀṆAM. Sū. 10-14.

*Bādari (is of opinion) that there is absence (of a body and sense-organs of a Jīva-Self, which has attained Final Release), the Scriptures also have declared similarly.—10.*

Because of the Scriptural statement “By mere volition alone his manes appear (before him)” (Chhān. 8.2.1) etc., the existence of the mind at least, as a means of volition, is proved. It is now being considered whether a person who has attained Final Release and has acquired lordly power, possesses a body and sense-organs. With regard to that Āchārya Bādari is of opinion, that in the case of a man who has attained such advancement, there is absence of a body and sense-organs. Whence is it so? Because of the Scriptural statement—“By visualising the desires of this world of Brahma with the mind alone, he becomes engrossed (in them)” (Chhān. 8.12.5). Were he to be so engrossed while

possessing a body and sense-organs also, in addition to a mind, there could not have been the specific particular mention (in the Scriptures) of the mind *alone*. Therefore, during the condition of Final Release there is absence of a body and sense-organs.—10.

*Jaimini (is of opinion) that body and sense-organs do exist for him, because the Scriptures speak of an option (about them).—11.*

Āchārya Jaimini is of opinion that a person who has attained Final Release does possess a body together with the sense-organs quite as surely as the mind, inasmuch as by the Scriptural passage “He becomes onefold, he becomes three-fold etc.” (Chhān. 7.26.2) the option of being manifold is mentioned, and in the absence of different bodies, such manifoldness cannot be feasible. Even though, this option of becoming manifold is mentioned in the Vidyā of the Bhūmā (the great one) referring to the unqualified Brahma, still this lordly power which exists in the condition of qualified Brahma, is referred to for the purpose of the glorification of the Vidyā of the Bhūmā, and hence, there, it must be understood as being the fruit of the Vidyā of qualified Brahma.—11.

It is said (here, by the Sūtrakāra) :

*Bādarāyaṇa is of opinion that (the finally released Jīva-Self) has both the characteristics. It is like (for instance) the “Dvādashāha” (Twelve-day Sacrifice).—12.*

Āchārya Bādarāyaṇa again considers this two-fold condition to be proper, because, it is seen that there are indicative marks of both the kinds, viz., that he becomes embodied or disembodied, just as he desires to have such a body or desires to be without such a body, because his determinate desires are true and because of the variety of his volition. This is like the Twelve-day Sacrifice (Dvādashāha) which is both a ‘Satra’ and an ‘Ahina’, because the indicative marks are of both the kinds (viz. the verbs ‘Upayanti’ (used in a Satra) and ‘Yajayet’ (used in an

Ahina) are used, which indicate it to be both a Satra and an Ahina). It is so in this case also.—12.

*In the absence of a body, it becomes reasonably sustainable, as (it is) in a dream-condition.*—13.

When there is absence of a body and sense-organs, then as in a dream-condition a body and sense-organs do not exist, and objects of desire, such as the manes etc., are only of the nature of a mere perception (and hence merely unsubstantial), even so, during the condition of Final Release also, it is reasonably sustainable, only in that way.—13.

*When the finally released Jīva-Self, is in an embodied condition, it is, as it is, in a waking condition.*—14.

When a body does exist, as for instance in the waking condition, a father or such other entities are actually in existence (and are not mere perceptions only) even so it is during the condition of Final Release, when a body still exists.—14.

#### 6. PRADĪPADHIKARAṆAM. Sū. 15-16.

*The entering (Āvesha) (of the Jīva-Self that has attained Final Release, into several bodies) is like a lamp, because the Scriptures indicate it to be so.*—15.

In Brahma-Sūtra IV. iv. 11—"Jaimini (is of opinion) that body and sense-organs do exist, because the Scriptures mention an option (about them)"—it has been stated, that a person who has attained Final Release does possess a body. So, it has to be seen here, whether, with respect to his becoming three-fold etc., when many different bodies are created, the bodies so created are as if they are mere wooden figures devoid of the Self, or whether they are created like our bodies along with the Jīva-Self, (and when the conclusion of the opponent of Vedānta is) that, inasmuch as any division of the Self and the mind is not reasonably sustainable, and as they have already a connection with one body, the other bodies are (necessarily) without



the Self, we reply—"The entering into (Āvesha), is like the lamp", just as a lamp, one as it is, becomes many (lamps) on account of its possessing the power to modify itself into an effect. In this way, a man that has attained knowledge, single as he is, having attained the condition of being many, by means of his lordly power, enters into all the bodies. Whence is it so ? Because the Shāstra indicates that one becomes many, by the Scriptural passage—"He becomes one-fold, three-fold, five-fold, seven-fold, and nine-fold etc." (Chhān. 7.26.2). This cannot be imagined to be so, if the simile of the wooden figures is accepted, or if this entering into all the bodies, is by some other Jiva-Selfs. Nor is any movement on the part of bodies devoid of Selfs, possible. With regard to the objection (of the opponent of Vedānta) that, inasmuch as any division of the Self or the mind is not reasonably sustainable, there is no possibility of the Jiva-Self having several separate bodies, (we reply)—This is no fault, inasmuch as the desires of a man who has attained knowledge are true, and he can very well create bodies equipped with minds which would follow the lead of one mind. And when they are so created, because of the differences in the limiting adjuncts (in the form of bodies), the Selfs also will be different (from each other), and would be able to preside over the different bodies. The Yoga-Shāstra also speaks of the use of the same technique with regard to the Yogins having simultaneous connection with several bodies.—15.

(The opponent of Vedānta says)—How again is it understood that a person that has attained Final Release, can have the lordly power of entering into several different bodies, when Scriptural passages, such as—"Whereby and whom would one see" (Brih. 4.5.15), "There is nothing, however, that is other than himself, so that he can know of something which is separate from him" (Brih. 4.3.30), "He then is (clear) like water, is the only one that is a seer and is without a second" (Brih. 4.3.32), deny any special knowledge ? Hence the reply is given, thus :

*(That the Jiva-Self that has attained Final Release has no special cognition, is spoken of by the Scriptures) with reference to*

*either complete merger or the attainment of unity, because it is so made clear.—16.*

By complete merger, deep sleep is meant, because the Scriptural passage says—"He becomes merged into himself, therefore, it is said that he sleeps" (Chhān. 6.8.1). Attainment (of unity) means a pure isolated condition (Kaivalya), because of the Scriptural passage—"Himself being Brahma in fact, he becomes merged in Brahma" (Brih. 4.4.6). It is with reference to one of these two conditions that the Scriptures speak of the condition of the absence of any special cognition. Sometimes it is spoken of with reference to the condition of deep sleep, and sometimes with reference to the pure isolated condition. Whence is it so understood? Because wherever this absence of special cognition is referred to, the chapter deals with either of these two conditions, as in the Scriptural passages—"Having emanated from the elements, it perishes after them, having departed (i.e. having died) there is no further cognition" (Brih. 2.4.14), "Where every thing has become but the Self only" (Brih. 2.4.14), "Where being in deep sleep he does not desire any thing and sees no dreams" (Brih. 4.3.19, Māṇḍūkya. 5). Where however this lordly power is spoken of, it is with reference to a different condition, similar to the condition of the heavenly world etc., where the Vidyā of the qualified Brahma ripens into fruition. Therefore, there is no fault.—16.

#### 7. JAGADVYĀPĀRĀDHIKARĀṆAM. Sū. 17-22.

*(Those who have attained Final Release possess all the lordly powers) barring the operation of running this world, (is understood) from the chapter (having the Lord as the relevant subject) and also because of the absence of proximity (of the person finally released).—17.*

Now, with regard to those, who, through meditation on qualified Brahma, attain unity with the Lord, along with the mind, the doubt arises, whether they have unlimited power or have only a limited power. What then is the con-

clusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) ? It is, that because of the Scriptural passages "He attains the Self's Lordship" (Tait. 1.6.2), "All deities carry offerings to him" (Tait. 1.5.3), "They move freely in all the worlds" (Chhān. 7.25.2, 8.1.6), they deserve to have unlimited powers. This being the conclusion, the reply is—They have all the powers, barring that of the operation of running the world. Barring the creation etc. of the world, they deserve to possess all other powers, such as Aṇimā (the power to reduce one's Self to the dimension of an atom) etc., the operation of running this world however being the exclusive power of the eternally perfect lord. Whence is it so ? Because of the Lord being the relevant subject there and the others not being anywhere in proximity. It is the Highest Lord who has jurisdiction over the operation of running this world. It is with reference to him that the Scriptures speak of the creation etc., and also because the word 'eternal' is confined to him only. The Scriptures speak of the lordly power of the other Jīva-Selfs such as assuming the dimensions of an atom etc. as a result of the antecedent search for Him (the Lord) and a desire to know him. They are not in proximity with the operation of running this world. Besides, each of them (i.e. the Jīva-Selfs) precisely because of having a separate mind of its own, when they are not all of one mind, one of them may wish that the world should subsist, while another may desire its destruction, and thus there may perhaps be a conflict (as between them). If, however, it is sought to uphold that there would be no such conflict, on the assumption that the intention of one may follow the intention of the other, then that would just establish straight off, that all the Jīva-Selfs depend upon the will of the Highest Lord.—17.

*If it be said (that the lordly power of the Jīva-Selfs that have attained Final Release is unlimited) because of direct Scriptural statement, (we say)—No, because the Scriptures declare (that the Jīva-Selfs attain Him who holds command over the Sun etc. and who resides in their spheres).—18.*

The argument (of the opponent of Vedānta) that be-

cause of the direct statement of the Scriptures, thus—"He attains unity with the Self" (Tait. 1.6.2), it is logical (to understand) that the lordly power of those who have attained Final Release is unlimited, has to be refuted. With regard to that, it is said—This is no fault. Because this attainment of unity with the Self depends upon the statement about him who holds command over the Sun etc. and who resides in those spheres. It is stated that the unity with the Self, attained (by the Jīva-Selfs), is dependent upon him who holds command over and resides in the particular abodes of the spheres of the Sun etc. (viz. the Highest Lord), because it is stated later on that "He attains the Lord of the mind" (Tait. 1.6.2). It means that the Jīva-Self attains the Lord of the mind i.e. the eternally existing Īshvara. And following the same lead, it is stated later on—"He becomes the Lord of the speech, the Lord of the eye, the Lord of the ear and the Lord of the knowledge" (Tait. 1.6.2). Thus in this context also, it should be construed as far as possible that the lordly power of the others is dependent upon the eternal perfect Lord.—18.

*There is another form of the Highest Lord which does not abide in the effect (Vikāra-vartī), for the Scriptures declare his existence in that manner.—19.*

There is also a form of the Highest Lord which is eternally free and which does not abide in the effect, and it is not that it has only that one form which is perceptible in the effect and which resides in the sphere of the Sun etc.. Thus is its existence in two forms spoken by the Scriptures in the passage—"Such is his greatness, and the Puruṣha is even greater than that. All beings collectively form but one foot (i.e. part) of Him, and the other three feet mean that which is immortal in the heaven" (Chhān. 3.12.6) etc.. It is not possible to say, that those who depend upon his other forms, attain that form of his which does not undergo any modification, because they have not entertained any desire about it. Hence it should be understood that even when there are these two forms of the Highest Lord, (the Jīva-Selfs) not having attained the unqualified form, they abide only in the qualified form and similarly not having

attained unlimited powers in the qualified form, they possess the limited powers only.—19.

*That this is so is also indicated by direct perception and inference.*—20.

The Scriptures and the Smṛiti also indicate, that the Highest Light (Jyoti) does not abide in its modification, thus—"The Sun is unable to shine there, nor the Moon, nor the Stars nor also the Lightning, whence then can this Agni (shine there) ?" (Kāṭha. 2.2.15, Shvet. 6.14, Muṇḍ. 2.2.10) and "The Sun does not illumine it, nor the Moon, nor the fire" (Bh. G. 15.6). In this way, the Sūtrakāra means, that it is well-known that the Highest Jyoti (Light, i.e. the Highest Lord, Brahma) does not abide in its modification.—20.

*Because of the indicatory mark (in the Scriptures) about equality only about experience (Bhoga) (between Jīva-Selfs that have attained Final Release, and the Highest Lord), and also because (it is understood that the former do not possess unlimited powers).*—21.

This is again why those who depend upon Brahma-the-effect (Kārya-Brahma) only, do not possess unlimited powers, inasmuch as it is stated in the Scriptures, that it is only this experience (Bhoga), that they have in common with the Eternal Lord, because of the indicatory marks thus—"(Hiranyagarbha said to the meditator), the (Primeval) Waters verily indeed are my worlds and yours also" (Kaush. 1.7), "All beings honour that deity. So do all beings honour him, who knows that. He obtains through it, equality in body (Sāyujya) and sameness of abode (Sālokya) with the deity" (Bṛih. 1.5.23).—21.

But (says the opponent of Vedānta) if it be so, then because of the lordly powers being either more or less, they are such, as are prone to come to an end and the Jīva-Selfs will be liable to revert (to the transmigratory existence). To this, Bhagavān Bādarāyaṇa replies :

*On the authority of the Scriptures, there is no more return, there is no more return (to transmigrational existence).—22.*

Those who go by the path of the Gods, which is connected with the Nāḍī and the ray (of the Sun) and have Archi etc. as its stages, towards the world of Brahma having special characteristics as stated by the Shāstra, thus—"That world of Brahma which is the third in the order of the heavens from here, and in which there are two seas (of nectar) by name Ara and Ṇya, a lake which consists of food which is intoxicating, an Ashvattha tree oozing Soma, a city of the Gods called Aparājitā in which there is a golden palace built by the Lord and which is often described at length in the Mantrās and Arthavādās etc., arrive there, but do not return from there, as some do from the world of the Moon after completing their experience (Bhuktabhogāh)". Whence is it so? Because of the Scriptural statements—"Proceeding upwards they attain immortality" (Chhān. 8.6.6, Kaṭha. 2.3.16), "In their case there is no return" (Brih. 6.2.15), "Those who arrive by the path do not again return to this transitory worldly whirlpool" (Chhān. 4.15), "He attains the world of Brahma, and does not return" (Chhān. 8.15.1) etc.. Even though their powers are liable to come to an end, as to how they never return has been indicated in Brahma-Sūtra IV. iii. 10. That, in the case of those whose darkness of ignorance has been dispelled by perfect knowledge, and who have resorted to the eternal Nirvāṇa, there is no return, has been established. Hence it goes without saying that those also who resort to qualified Brahma and have their resort in that Nirvāṇa, do not return. The repetition of the words 'do not return' indicates the end of the Shāstra.—22.

*Here ends Pāda IV of Adhyāya IV and Adhyāya IV also.*

## APPENDIX

### B R A H M A - S Ū T R Ā S

**समन्वयाध्यायः प्रथमः ।**

**प्रथमाध्याये प्रथमः पादः ।**

१ जिज्ञासाधिकरणम् । सू. १

अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ॥ १ ॥

२ जन्माद्यधिकरणम् । सू. २

जन्माद्यस्य यतः ॥ २ ॥

३ शास्त्रयोनित्वाधिकरणम् । सू. ३

शास्त्रयोनित्वात् ॥ ३ ॥

४ समन्वयाधिकरणम् । सू. ४

तत्तु समन्वयात् ॥ ४ ॥

५ ईक्षत्यधिकरणम् । सू. ५-११

ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम् ॥ ५ ॥

गौणश्चेन्नात्मशब्दात् ॥ ६ ॥

तन्निष्ठस्य मोक्षोपदेशात् ॥ ७ ॥

हेयत्वावचनाच्च ॥ ८ ॥

स्वाप्ययात् ॥ ९ ॥

गतिसामान्यात् ॥ १० ॥

श्रुतत्वाच्च ॥ ११ ॥

६ आनन्दमयाधिकरणम् । सू. १२-१९

आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात् ॥ १२ ॥

विकारशब्दान्नेति चेन्न प्राचुर्यात् ॥ १३ ॥

तद्धेतुव्यपदेशाच्च ॥ १४ ॥

मान्त्रवर्णिकमेव च गीयते ॥ १५ ॥

नेतरोऽनुपपत्तेः ॥ १६ ॥

भेदव्यपदेशाच्च ॥ १७ ॥

कामाच्च नानुमानापेक्षा ॥ १८ ॥

अस्मिन्नस्य च तद्योगो शास्ति ॥ १९ ॥

७ अन्तरधिकरणम् । सू. २०-२१

अन्तस्तद्धर्मोपदेशात् ॥ २० ॥

भेदव्यपदेशाच्चान्यः ॥ २१ ॥

८ आकाशाधिकरणम् । सू. २२

आकाशस्तल्लिङ्गात् ॥ २२ ॥

९ प्राणाधिकरणम् । सू. २३

अत एव प्राणः ॥ २३ ॥

१० ज्योतिश्चरणाधिकरणम् । सू. २४-२७

ज्योतिश्चरणाभिधानात् ॥ २४ ॥

छन्दोभिधानान्नेति चेन्न तथा चेतोर्पण-

निगदात्तथा हि दर्शनम् ॥ २५ ॥

भूतादिपादव्यपदेशोपपत्तेश्चैवम् ॥ २६ ॥

उपदेशभेदान्नेति चेन्नोभयस्मिन्नप्यविरोधात् ॥ २७ ॥

११ प्रतर्दनाधिकरणम् । सू. २८-३१

प्राणस्तथाऽनुगमात् ॥ २८ ॥

न वक्तुरात्मोपदेशादिति चेदध्यात्मसंबन्ध-

भूमा ह्यस्मिन् ॥ २९ ॥

शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तूपदेशो वामदेववत् ॥ ३० ॥

जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गान्नेति चेन्नोपासात्रैविध्या-  
दाश्रितत्वादिह तद्योगात् ॥ ३१ ॥

**प्रथमाध्याये द्वितीयः पादः ।**

१ सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धयधिकरणम् । सू. १-८

सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात् ॥ १ ॥

विवक्षितगुणोपपत्तेश्च ॥ २ ॥

अनुपपत्तेस्तु न शारीरः ॥ ३ ॥

कर्मकर्तृव्यपदेशाच्च ॥ ४ ॥

शब्दविशेषात् ॥ ५ ॥

स्मृतेश्च ॥ ६ ॥

अभिकौकस्तात्तद्व्यपदेशाच्च नेति चेन्न निचा-

य्यत्वादेवं व्योमवच्च ॥ ७ ॥

संभोगप्राप्तिरिति चेन्न वैशेष्यात् ॥ ८ ॥

२ अत्रधिकरणम् । सू. ९-१०

अत्ता चराचरग्रहणात् ॥ ९ ॥

प्रकरणाच्च ॥ १० ॥

३ गुहाप्रविष्टाधिकरणम् । सू. ११-१२

गुहां प्रविष्टावात्मानौ हि तद्दर्शनात् ॥ ११ ॥

विशेषणाच्च ॥ १२ ॥

४ अन्तराधिकरणम् । सू. १३-१७

अन्तर उपपत्तेः ॥ १३ ॥

स्थानादिव्यपदेशाच्च ॥ १४ ॥

मुखविशिष्टाभिधानादेव च ॥ १५ ॥

श्रुतोपनिषत्काम्यभिधानाच्च ॥ १६ ॥

अनवस्थितेरसंभवाच्च नेतरः ॥ १७ ॥

५ अन्तर्याम्यधिकरणम् । सू. १८-२०

अन्तर्याम्यधिदैवादिषु तद्धर्मव्यपदेशात्  
॥ १८ ॥

नच स्मार्तमतद्धर्माभिलापात् ॥ १९ ॥

शारीरश्चोभयेऽपि हि भेदेनैनमधीयते ॥ २० ॥

६ अदृश्यत्वाधिकरणम् । सू. २१-२३

अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको धर्मोक्तेः ॥ २१ ॥

विशेषणभेदव्यपदेशाभ्यां च नेतरौ ॥ २२ ॥

रूपोपन्यासाच्च ॥ २३ ॥

७ वैश्वानराधिकरणम् । सू. २४-३२

वैश्वानरः साधारणशब्दविशेषात् ॥ २४ ॥

स्मर्यमाणमनुमानं स्यादिति ॥ २५ ॥

शब्दादिभ्योऽन्तःप्रतिष्ठानाच्च नेति चेन्न  
तथाहृद्युपदेशादसंभवात्पुरुषमपि चैन-  
मधीयते ॥ २६ ॥

अत एव न देवता भूतं च ॥ २७ ॥

साक्षादप्यविरोधं जैमिनिः ॥ २८ ॥

अभिव्यक्तेरित्याश्रमरथ्यः ॥ २९ ॥

अनुस्मृतेर्बादरिः ॥ ३० ॥

संपत्तेरिति जैमिनिस्तथाहि दर्शयति ॥ ३१ ॥

आमनन्ति चैनमस्मिन् ॥ ३२ ॥

प्रथमाध्याये तृतीयः पादः ।

१ द्युभ्वाद्यधिकरणम् । सू. १-७

द्युभ्वाद्यायतनं स्वशब्दात् ॥ १ ॥

मुक्तोपसृप्यव्यपदेशात् ॥ २ ॥

नानुमानमतच्छब्दात् ॥ ३ ॥

प्राणभृच्च ॥ ४ ॥

भेदव्यपदेशात् ॥ ५ ॥

प्रकरणात् ॥ ६ ॥

स्थित्यदनाभ्यां च ॥ ७ ॥

२ भूमाधिकरणम् । सू. ८-९

भूमा संप्रसादादध्युपदेशात् ॥ ८ ॥

धर्मोपपत्तेश्च ॥ ९ ॥

३ अक्षराधिकरणम् । सू. १०-१२

अक्षरमम्बरान्तधृतेः ॥ १० ॥

सा च प्रशासनात् ॥ ११ ॥

अन्यभावव्यावृत्तेश्च ॥ १२ ॥

४ ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेशाधिकरणम् । सू. १३

ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेशात्तः ॥ १३ ॥

५ दहराधिकरणम् । सू. १४-२१

दहर उत्तरेभ्यः ॥ १४ ॥

गतिशब्दाभ्यां तथाहि दृष्टं लिङ्गं च ॥ १५ ॥

धृतेश्च महिम्नोऽस्यास्मिन्नुपलब्धेः ॥ १६ ॥

प्रसिद्धेश्च ॥ १७ ॥

इतरपरामर्शात्स इति चेन्नासंभवात् ॥ १८ ॥

उत्तराच्चेदाविर्भूतस्वरूपस्तु ॥ १९ ॥

अन्यार्थश्च परामर्शः ॥ २० ॥

अव्यश्रुतेरिति चेत्तदुक्तम् ॥ २१ ॥

६ अनुकृत्यधिकरणम् । सू. २२-२३

अनुकृतेस्तस्य च ॥ २२ ॥

अपि च स्मर्यते ॥ २३ ॥

७ प्रमिताधिकरणम् । सू. २४-२५

शब्दादेव प्रमितः ॥ २४ ॥

हृद्यपेक्षया तु मनुष्याधिकारत्वात् ॥ २५ ॥



८ देवताधिकरणम् । सू. २६-३३

तदुपर्यपि बादरायणः संभवात् ॥ २६ ॥

विरोधः कर्मणीति चेन्नानेकप्रतिपत्तेर्दर्शनात्  
॥ २७ ॥

शब्द इति चेन्नातः प्रभवात्प्रत्यक्षानुमाना-  
भ्याम् ॥ २८ ॥

अत एव च नित्यत्वम् ॥ २९ ॥

समाननामरूपत्वाच्चावृत्तावप्यविरोधो दर्शना-  
त्स्मृतेश्च ॥ ३० ॥

मध्वादिष्वसंभवादनुधिकारं जैमिनिः ॥ ३१ ॥

ज्योतिषि भावाच्च ॥ ३२ ॥

भावं तु बादरायणोऽस्ति हि ॥ ३३ ॥

९ अपशूद्राधिकरणम् । सू. ३४-३८

शुगस्य तदनादरश्रवणात्तदाद्रवणात्सूच्यते हि  
॥ ३४ ॥

क्षत्रियत्वगतेश्चोत्तरत्र चैत्ररथेन लिङ्गात्  
॥ ३५ ॥

संस्कारपरामर्शात्तदभावामिलापाच्च ॥ ३६ ॥

तदभावनिर्धारणे च प्रवृत्तेः ॥ ३७ ॥

श्रवणाध्ययनार्थप्रतिषेधात्स्मृतेश्च ॥ ३८ ॥

१० कम्पनाधिकरणम् । सू. ३९

कम्पनात् ॥ ३९ ॥

११ ज्योतिरधिकरणम् । सू. ४०

ज्योतिर्दर्शनात् ॥ ४० ॥

१२ अर्थान्तरत्वव्यपदेशाधिकरणम् । सू. ४१

आकाशोऽर्थान्तरत्वादव्यपदेशात् ॥ ४१ ॥

१३ सुषुप्त्युक्त्वादन्यधिकरणम् । सू. ४२-४३

सुषुप्त्युक्त्वादन्योर्भेदेन ॥ ४२ ॥

पत्यादिशब्देभ्यः ॥ ४३ ॥

प्रथमाध्याये चतुर्थः पादः ।

१ आनुमानिकाधिकरणम् । सू. १-७

आनुमानिकमप्येकेषामिति चेन्न शरीररूपक-  
विन्यस्तगृहीतेर्दर्शयति च ॥ १ ॥

सूक्ष्मं तु तदर्हत्वात् ॥ २ ॥

तदधीनत्वादर्थवत् ॥ ३ ॥

ज्ञेयत्वावचनाच्च ॥ ४ ॥

वदतीति चेन्न प्राज्ञो हि प्रकरणात् ॥ ५ ॥

त्रयाणामेव चैवमुपन्यासः प्रश्नश्च ॥ ६ ॥

महद्वच्च ॥ ७ ॥

२ चमत्ताधिकरणम् । सू. ८-१०

चमसवदविरोपात् ॥ ८ ॥

ज्योतिरुपक्रमेण तु तथा ह्यधीयत एके ॥ ९ ॥

कल्पनोपदेशाच्च मध्वादिवदविरोधः ॥ १० ॥

३ संख्योपसंग्रहाधिकरणम् । सू. ११-१३

न संख्योपसंग्रहादपि नानाभावादतिरेकाच्च  
॥ ११ ॥

प्राणादयो वाक्यशेषात् ॥ १२ ॥

ज्योतिषैकेषामसत्यत्वे ॥ १३ ॥

४ कारणत्वाधिकरणम् । सू. १४-१५

कारणत्वेन चाकाशादिषु यथाव्यपदिष्टोक्तेः  
॥ १४ ॥

समाकर्षात् ॥ १५ ॥

५ बालाक्यधिकरणम् । सू. १६-१८

जगद्राचित्वात् ॥ १६ ॥

जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गान्नेति चेत्तद्व्याख्यातम्  
॥ १७ ॥

अन्यार्थं तु जैमिनिः प्रश्नव्याख्यानाभ्यामपि  
चवमेक ॥ १८ ॥

६ वाक्यान्वयाधिकरणम् । सू. १९-२२

वाक्यान्वयात् ॥ १९ ॥

प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेल्लिङ्गमाश्मरथ्यः ॥ २० ॥

उत्क्रमिष्यत एवंभावादित्यौडुलोमिः ॥ २१ ॥

अवस्थितेरिति काशकृत्स्नः ॥ २२ ॥

७ प्रकृत्यधिकरणम् । सू. २३-२७

प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादष्टान्तानुपरोधात् ॥ २३ ॥

अभिष्योपदेशाच्च ॥ २४ ॥

साक्षाच्चोभयान्नात् ॥ २५ ॥

आत्मकृतेः परिणामात् ॥ २६ ॥

योनिश्च हि गीयते ॥ २७ ॥

८ सर्वव्याख्यानाधिकरणम् । सू. २८  
एतेन सर्वे व्याख्याता व्याख्याताः ॥ २८ ॥

**अविरोधाध्यायः द्वितीयः ।**

**द्वितीयाध्याये प्रथमः पादः ।**

१ स्मृत्यधिकरणम् । सू. १-२

स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्ग इति चेन्नान्यस्मृत्य-  
नवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गात् ॥ १ ॥  
इतरेषां चानुपलब्धेः ॥ २ ॥

२ योगप्रयुक्त्यधिकरणम् । सू. ३

एतेन योगः प्रत्युक्तः ॥ ३ ॥

३ विलक्षणत्वाधिकरणम् । सू. ४-११

न विलक्षणत्वादस्य तथात्वं च शब्दात् ॥ ४ ॥  
अभिमानिव्यपदेशस्तु विशेषानुगतिभ्याम्  
॥ ५ ॥

दृश्यते तु ॥ ६ ॥

असदिति चेन्न प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात् ॥ ७ ॥  
अपीतौ तद्वत्प्रसङ्गादसमञ्जसम् ॥ ८ ॥

न तु दृष्टान्तभावात् ॥ ९ ॥

स्वपक्षदोषाच्च ॥ १० ॥

तर्काप्रतिष्ठानादप्यन्यथानुमेयमिति चेदेवम-  
प्यविमोक्षप्रसङ्गः ॥ ११ ॥

४ शिष्टापरिग्रहाधिकरणम् । सू. १२

एतेन शिष्टापरिग्रहा अपि व्याख्याताः ॥ १२ ॥

५ भोक्त्रापत्त्यधिकरणम् । सू. १३

भोक्त्रापत्तेरविभागश्चेत्स्याल्लोकवत् ॥ १३ ॥

६ आरम्भणाधिकरणम् । सू. १४-२०

तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः ॥ १४ ॥

भावे चोपलब्धेः ॥ १५ ॥

सत्त्वाच्चावरस्य ॥ १६ ॥

असद्व्यपदेशान्नेति चेन्न धर्मान्तरेण वाक्य-  
शेषात् ॥ १७ ॥

युक्तेः शब्दान्तराच्च ॥ १८ ॥

पटवच्च ॥ १९ ॥

यथा च प्राणादि ॥ २० ॥

७ इतरव्यपदेशाधिकरणम् । सू. २१-२३

इतरव्यपदेशाद्विज्ञाताकरणादिदोषप्रसक्तिः

॥ २१ ॥

अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात् ॥ २२ ॥

अस्मादिवच्च तदनुपपत्तिः ॥ २३ ॥

८ उपसंहारदर्शनाधिकरणम् । सू. २४-२५

उपसंहारदर्शान्नेति चेन्न क्षीरवद्धि ॥ २४ ॥

देवादिवदपि लोके ॥ २५ ॥

९ कृत्स्नप्रसक्त्यधिकरणम् । सू. २६-२९

कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिर्निरवयवत्वशब्दकोपो वा ॥ २६ ॥

श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात् ॥ २७ ॥

आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि ॥ २८ ॥

स्वपक्षदोषाच्च ॥ २९ ॥

१० सर्वोपेताधिकरणम् । सू. ३०-३१

सर्वोपेता च तद्दर्शनात् ॥ ३० ॥

विकरणत्वान्नेति चेत्तदुक्तम् ॥ ३१ ॥

११ नप्रयोजनवत्त्वाधिकरणम् । सू. ३२-३५

न प्रयोजनवत्त्वात् ॥ ३२ ॥

लोकवतु लीलकैवल्यम् ॥ ३३ ॥

१२ वैषम्यनैर्घृण्याधिकरणम् । सू. ३४-३६

वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वात्तथा हि दर्शयति  
॥ ३४ ॥

न कर्माविभागादिति चेन्नानादित्वात् ॥ ३५ ॥

उपपद्यते चाप्युपलभ्यते च ॥ ३६ ॥

१३ सर्वधर्मोपपत्त्यधिकरणम् । सू. ३७

सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च ॥ ३७ ॥

**द्वितीयाध्याये द्वितीयः पादः ।**

१ रचनानुपपत्त्यधिकरणम् । सू. १-१०

रचनानुपपत्तेश्च नानुमानम् ॥ १ ॥

प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ २ ॥

पयोम्बुवच्चेत्तत्रापि ॥ ३ ॥

व्यतिरेकानवस्थितेश्चानपेक्षत्वात् ॥ ४ ॥  
 अन्यत्राभावाच्च न तृणादिवत् ॥ ५ ॥  
 अभ्युपगमेऽप्यर्थाभावात् ॥ ६ ॥  
 पुरुषाश्मवदिति चेत्तथापि ॥ ७ ॥  
 अङ्गित्वानुपपत्तेश्च ॥ ८ ॥  
 अन्यथानुमितौ च ज्ञातिवियोगात् ॥ ९ ॥  
 विप्रतिषेधाच्चसमञ्जसम् ॥ १० ॥

२ महद्दीर्घाधिकरणम् । सू. ११

महद्दीर्घवद्वा ह्रस्वपरिमण्डलाभ्याम् ॥ ११ ॥

३ परमाणुजगदकारणत्वाधिकरणम् । सू.

१२-१७

उभयथापि न कर्मातस्तदभावः ॥ १२ ॥  
 समवायाभ्युपगमाच्च साम्यादनवस्थितेः  
 ॥ १३ ॥

नित्यमेव च भावात् ॥ १४ ॥

रूपादिमत्वाच्च विपर्ययो दर्शनात् ॥ १५ ॥

उभयथा च दोषात् ॥ १६ ॥

अपरिग्रहाच्चात्यन्तमनपेक्षा ॥ १७ ॥

४ समुदायाधिकरणम् । सू. १८-२७

समुदाय उभयहेतुकेऽपि तदप्राप्तिः ॥ १८ ॥  
 इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वादिति चेन्नोत्पत्तिमात्र-  
 निमित्तत्वात् ॥ १९ ॥

उत्तरोत्पादे च पूर्वनिरोधात् ॥ २० ॥

असति प्रतिज्ञोपरोधो यौगपद्यमन्यथा ॥ २१ ॥

प्रतिसंख्याऽप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधाप्राप्तिर-

विच्छेदात् ॥ २२ ॥

उभयथा च दोषात् ॥ २३ ॥

आकाशे चाविशेषात् ॥ २४ ॥

अनुस्मृतेश्च ॥ २५ ॥

नासतोऽदृष्टत्वात् ॥ २६ ॥

उदासीनानामपि चैवं सिद्धिः ॥ २७ ॥

५ अभावाधिकरणम् । सू. २८-३२

नाभाव उपलब्धेः ॥ २८ ॥

वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत् ॥ २९ ॥

न भावोऽनुपलब्धेः ॥ ३० ॥

क्षणिकत्वाच्च ॥ ३१ ॥

सर्वथानुपपत्तेश्च ॥ ३२ ॥

६ एकस्मिन्नसंभवाधिकरणम् । सू. ३३-३६

नैकस्मिन्नसंभवात् ॥ ३३ ॥

एवं चात्माऽकात्स्न्यम् ॥ ३४ ॥

न च पर्यायादप्यविरोधो विकारादिभ्यः  
 ॥ ३५ ॥

अन्यावस्थितेश्चोभयनित्यत्वादविशेषः ॥ ३६ ॥

७ पत्यधिकरणम् । सू. ३७-४१

पत्युरसामञ्जस्यात् ॥ ३७ ॥

संवन्धानुपपत्तेश्च ॥ ३८ ॥

अधिष्ठानानुपपत्तेश्च ॥ ३९ ॥

करणवच्चेन्न भोगादिभ्यः ॥ ४० ॥

अन्तवत्त्वमसर्वज्ञता वा ॥ ४१ ॥

८ उत्पत्त्यसंभवाधिकरणम् । सू. ४२-४५

उत्पत्त्यसंभवात् ॥ ४२ ॥

न च कर्तुः करणम् ॥ ४३ ॥

विज्ञानादिभावे वा तदप्रतिषेधः ॥ ४४ ॥

विप्रतिषेधाच्च ॥ ४५ ॥

द्वितीयाध्याये तृतीयः पादः ।

१ वियदधिकरणम् । सू. १-७

न वियदश्रुतेः ॥ १ ॥

अस्ति तु ॥ २ ॥

गौण्यसंभवात् ॥ ३ ॥

शब्दाच्च ॥ ४ ॥

स्याच्चैकस्य ब्रह्मशब्दवत् ॥ ५ ॥

प्रतिज्ञाऽहानिरव्यतिरेकाच्छब्देभ्यः ॥ ६ ॥

यावद्विकारं तु विभागो लोकवत् ॥ ७ ॥

२ मातरिश्वाधिकरणम् । सू. ८

एतेन मातरिश्वा व्याख्यातः ॥ ८ ॥

३ असंभवाधिकरणम् । सू. ९

असंभवस्तु सतोऽनुपपत्तेः ॥ ९ ॥

४ तेजोऽधिकरणम् । सू. १०

तेजोऽतस्तथा ह्याह ॥ १० ॥

५ अवधिकरणम् । सू. ११

आपः ॥ ११ ॥

६ पृथिव्यधिकाराधिकरणम् । सू. १२

पृथिव्यधिकाररूपशब्दान्तरेभ्यः ॥ १२ ॥

७ तदभिध्यानाधिकरणम् । सू. १३

तदभिध्यानादेव तु तल्लिङ्गात्सः ॥ १३ ॥

८ विपर्ययाधिकरणम् । सू. १४

विपर्ययेण तु क्रमोऽत उपपद्यते च ॥ १४ ॥

९ अन्तराविज्ञानाधिकरणम् । सू. १५

अन्तरा विज्ञानमनसी क्रमेण तल्लिङ्गादिति  
चेन्नाविशेषात् ॥ १५ ॥

१० चराचरव्यपाश्रयाधिकरणम् । सू. १६

चराचरव्यपाश्रयस्तु स्यात्तद्व्यपदेशो भाक्तस्त-  
द्भावभावितात् ॥ १६ ॥

११ आत्माधिकरणम् । सू. १७

नात्माऽश्रुतेर्नित्यत्वाच्च ताभ्यः ॥ १७ ॥

१२ ज्ञाधिकरणम् । सू. १८

ज्ञोऽत एव ॥ १८ ॥

१३ उत्क्रान्तिगत्यधिकरणम् । सू. १९-३२

उत्क्रान्तिगत्यागतीनाम् ॥ १९ ॥

स्वात्मना चोत्तरयोः ॥ २० ॥

नाणुरतच्छ्रुतेरिति चेन्नेतराधिकारात् ॥ २१ ॥

स्वशब्दोन्मानाभ्यां च ॥ २२ ॥

अविरोधश्चन्दनवत् ॥ २३ ॥

अवस्थितिवैरोध्यादिति चेन्नाभ्युपगमाद्धृदि  
हि ॥ २४ ॥

गुणाद्वा लोकवत् ॥ २५ ॥

व्यतिरेको गन्धवत् ॥ २६ ॥

तथा च दर्शयति ॥ २७ ॥

पृथगुपदेशात् ॥ २८ ॥

तद्गुणसारत्वात् तु द्वयपदेशः प्राज्ञवत् ॥ २९ ॥

यावदात्मभावित्वाच्च न दोषस्तद्दर्शनात्  
॥ ३० ॥

पुंस्त्वादिवत्त्वस्य सतोऽभिव्यक्तियोगात्  
॥ ३१ ॥

नित्योपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गोऽन्यतरनियमो  
वाऽन्यथा ॥ ३२ ॥

१४ कर्त्रधिकरणम् । सू. ३३-३९

कर्ता शास्त्रार्थवत्त्वात् ॥ ३३ ॥

विहारोपदेशात् ॥ ३४ ॥

उपादानात् ॥ ३५ ॥

व्यपदेशाच्च क्रियायां न चेन्निर्देशविपर्ययः  
॥ ३६ ॥

उपलब्धिवदनियमः ॥ ३७ ॥

शक्तिविपर्ययात् ॥ ३८ ॥

समाध्यभावाच्च ॥ ३९ ॥

१५ तक्षाधिकरणम् । सू. ४०

यथा च तक्षोभयथा ॥ ४० ॥

१६ परायत्ताधिकरणम् । सू. ४१-४२

परात्तु तच्छ्रुतेः ॥ ४१ ॥

कृतप्रयत्नापेक्षस्तु विहितप्रतिषिद्धावैयर्थ्या-  
दिभ्यः ॥ ४२ ॥

१७ अंशाधिकरणम् । सू. ४३-५३

अंशो नानाव्यपदेशादन्यथा चापि  
दाशकितवादित्वमधीयत एके ॥ ४३ ॥

मन्त्रवर्णाच्च ॥ ४४ ॥

अपि च स्मर्यते ॥ ४५ ॥

प्रकाशादिवन्नैव परः ॥ ४६ ॥

स्मरन्ति च ॥ ४७ ॥

अनुज्ञापरिहारौ देहसंभ्रन्धाज्ज्योतिरादिवत्  
॥ ४८ ॥

असंततेश्चाव्यतिकरः ॥ ४९ ॥

आभास एव च ॥ ५० ॥

अदृष्टानियमात् ॥ ५१ ॥

अभिसंध्यादिष्वपि चैवम् ॥ ५२ ॥

प्रदेशादिति चेन्नान्तर्भावात् ॥ ५३ ॥

### द्वितीयाध्याये चतुर्थः पादः ।

१ प्राणोत्पत्त्यधिकरणम् । सू. १-४

तथा प्राणाः ॥ १ ॥

गौण्यसंभवात् ॥ २ ॥

तत्प्राक्श्रुतेश्च ॥ ३ ॥

तत्पूर्वकत्वाद्वाचः ॥ ४ ॥

२ सप्तगत्यधिकरणम् । सू. ५-६

सप्त गतेर्विशेषितत्वाच्च ॥ ५ ॥

हस्तादयस्तु स्थितेऽतो नैवम् ॥ ६ ॥

३ प्राणानुत्वाधिकरणम् । सू. ७

अणवश्च ॥ ७ ॥

४ प्राणश्रेष्ठ्याधिकरणम् । सू. ८

श्रेष्ठश्च ॥ ८ ॥

५ वायुक्रियाधिकरणम् । सू. ९-१२

न वायुक्रिये पृथगुपदेशात् ॥ ९ ॥

चक्षुरादिवत्तु तत्सहशिष्ट्यादिभ्यः ॥ १० ॥

अकरणत्वाच्च न दोषस्तथा हि दर्शयति

॥ ११ ॥

पञ्चवृत्तिर्मनोबध्यपदिश्यते ॥ १२ ॥

६ श्रेष्ठानुत्वाधिकरणम् । सू. १३

अणुश्च ॥ १३ ॥

७ ज्योतिराद्यधिकरणम् । सू. १४-१६

ज्योतिराद्यधिष्ठानं तु तदामननात् ॥ १४ ॥

प्राणवता शब्दात् ॥ १५ ॥

तस्य च नित्यत्वात् ॥ १६ ॥

८ इन्द्रियाधिकरणम् । सू. १७-१९

त इन्द्रियाणि तद्व्यपदेशादन्यत्र श्रेष्ठान्

॥ १७ ॥

भेदश्रुतेः ॥ १८ ॥

वैलक्षण्याच्च ॥ १९ ॥

९ संज्ञामूर्तिङ्कृत्यधिकरणम् । सू. २०-२२

संज्ञामूर्तिङ्कृतिस्तु त्रिवृत्कुर्वत उपदेशात्

॥ २० ॥

मांसादि भौमं यथाशब्दमितरयोश्च ॥ २१ ॥

वैशेष्यानु तद्वादस्तद्वादः ॥ २२ ॥

### साधनाध्यायस्तृतीयः ।

### तृतीयाध्याये प्रथमः पादः ।

१ तदन्तरप्रतिपत्त्यधिकरणम् । सू. १-७

तदन्तरप्रतिपत्तौ रंहति संपरिष्वक्तः प्रश्न-  
निरूपणाभ्याम् ॥ १ ॥

त्र्यात्मकत्वानु भूयस्त्वात् ॥ २ ॥

प्राणगतेश्च ॥ ३ ॥

अइयादिगतिश्रुतेरिति चेन्न भाक्तत्वात् ॥ ४ ॥

प्रथमेऽश्रवणादिति चेन्न ता एव ह्युपपत्तेः

॥ ५ ॥

अश्रुतत्वादिति चेन्नेष्टादिकारिणां प्रतीतेः

॥ ६ ॥

भाक्तं वानात्मवित्वात्तथा हि दर्शयति ॥ ७ ॥

२ कृतात्ययाधिकरणम् । सू. ८-११

कृतात्ययेऽनुशयवान्दृष्टस्मृतिभ्यां यथेतमनेवं

च ॥ ८ ॥

चरणादिति चेन्नोपलक्षणार्थेति कार्णाजिनिः

॥ ९ ॥

आनर्थक्यमिति चेन्न तदपेक्षत्वात् ॥ १० ॥

सुकृतदुष्कृते एवेति च बादरिः ॥ ११ ॥

३ अनिष्टादिकार्यधिकरणम् । सू. १२-२१

अनिष्टादिकारिणामपि च श्रुतम् ॥ १२ ॥

संयमने त्वनुभूयेतरेषामारोहावरोहौ तद्गति-

दर्शनात् ॥ १३ ॥

स्मरन्ति च ॥ १४ ॥

अपि च सप्त ॥ १५ ॥

तत्रापि च तद्व्यापारादविरोधः ॥ १६ ॥

विद्याकर्मणोरिति तु प्रकृतत्वात् ॥ १७ ॥

न तृतीये तथोपलब्धेः ॥ १८ ॥

स्मर्यतेऽपि च लोके ॥ १९ ॥

दर्शनाच्च ॥ २० ॥

तृतीयशब्दावरोधः संशोकजस्य ॥ २१ ॥

४ साभाव्यापत्त्यधिकरणम् । सू. २२

साभाव्यापत्तिरूपपत्तेः ॥ २२ ॥

५ नातिचिराधिकरणम् । सू. २३

नातिचिरेण विशेषात् ॥ २३ ॥

६ अन्याधिष्ठिताधिकरणम् । सू. २४-२७

अन्याधिष्ठितेषु पूर्ववदमिलापात् ॥ २४ ॥

अशुद्धमिति चेन्न शब्दात् ॥ २५ ॥

रेतःसिग्योगोऽथ ॥ २६ ॥

योनेः शरीरम् ॥ २७ ॥

तृतीयाध्याये द्वितीयः पादः ।

१ संध्याधिकरणम् । सू. १-६

संध्ये सृष्टिराह हि ॥ १ ॥

निर्मातारं चैके पुत्रादयश्च ॥ २ ॥

मायामात्रं तु कात्स्न्येनानभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वात्  
॥ ३ ॥

सूचकश्च हि श्रुतेराचक्षते च तद्विदः ॥ ४ ॥

पराभिध्यानात् तिरोहितं ततो ह्यस्य बन्ध-  
विपर्ययौ ॥ ५ ॥

देहयोगाद्वा सोऽपि ॥ ६ ॥

२ तदभावाधिकरणम् । सू. ७-८

तदभावो नाडीषु तच्छ्रुतेरात्मनि च ॥ ७ ॥

अतः प्रबोधोऽस्मात् ॥ ८ ॥

३ कर्मानुस्मृतिशब्दविध्यधिकरणम् ।

सू. ९

स एव तु कर्मानुस्मृतिशब्दविधिभ्यः ॥ ९ ॥

४ मुग्धेऽर्धसंपत्त्यधिकरणम् । सू. १०

मुग्धेऽर्धसंपत्तिः परिशेषात् ॥ १० ॥

५ उभयलिङ्गाधिकरणम् । सू. ११-२१

न स्थानतोऽपि परस्योभयलिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि  
॥ ११ ॥

न भेदादिति चेन्न प्रत्येकमतद्वचनात्  
॥ १२ ॥

अपि चैवमेके ॥ १३ ॥

अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात् ॥ १४ ॥

प्रकाशवच्चैवैयर्थ्यात् ॥ १५ ॥

आह च तन्मात्रम् ॥ १६ ॥

दर्शयति चाथो अपि स्मर्यते ॥ १७ ॥

अत एव चोपमा सूर्यकादिवत् ॥ १८ ॥

अम्बुवदग्रहान्तु न तथात्वम् ॥ १९ ॥

वृद्धिहासभाक्त्वमन्तर्भावादुभयामञ्जसस्या-  
देवम् ॥ २० ॥

दर्शनाच्च ॥ २१ ॥

६ प्रकृतैतावत्त्वाधिकरणम् । सू. २२-३०

प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च  
भूयः ॥ २२ ॥

तदव्यक्तमाह हि ॥ २३ ॥

अपि च संराधने प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम्  
॥ २४ ॥

प्रकाशादिवच्चैवैशेष्यं प्रकाशश्च कर्मण्य-  
भ्यासात् ॥ २५ ॥

अतोऽनन्तेन तथा हि लिङ्गम् ॥ २६ ॥

उभयव्यपदेशात्त्वहिङ्कुण्डलवत् ॥ २७ ॥

प्रकाशाश्रयवद्वा तेजस्त्वात् ॥ २८ ॥

पूर्ववद्वा ॥ २९ ॥

प्रतिषेधाच्च ॥ ३० ॥

७ पराधिकरणम् । सू. ३१-३७

परमतः सेतून्मानसं बन्धभेदव्यपदेशेभ्यः  
॥ ३१ ॥

सामान्यात्तु ॥ ३२ ॥

बुद्ध्यर्थः पादवत् ॥ ३३ ॥

स्थानविशेषात्प्रकाशादिवत् ॥ ३४ ॥

उपपत्तेश्च ॥ ३५ ॥

तथान्यप्रतिषेधात् ॥ ३६ ॥

अनेन सर्वगतत्वमायामशब्दादिभ्यः  
॥ ३७ ॥

८ फलाधिकरणम् । सू. ३८-४१

फलमत उपपत्तेः ॥ ३८ ॥

श्रुतत्वाच्च ॥ ३९ ॥

धर्मं जैमिनिरत एव ॥ ४० ॥

पूर्वं तु वादरायणो हेतुव्यपदेशात् ॥ ४१ ॥

**तृतीयाध्याये तृतीयः पादः ।**

१ सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययाधिकरणम् । सू. १-४

सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययं चोदनाद्यविशेषात् ॥ १ ॥

भेदान्नेति चेन्नैकस्यापि ॥ २ ॥

स्वाध्यायस्य तथात्वेन हि समाचारेऽधिकाराच्च

सववच्च तन्नियमः ॥ ३ ॥

दर्शयति च ॥ ४ ॥

२ उपसंहाराधिकरणम् । सू. ५

उपसंहारोऽर्थाभेदाद्विधिशेषवत्समाने च ॥ ५ ॥

३ अन्यथात्वाधिकरणम् । सू. ६-८

अन्यथात्वं शब्दादिति चेन्नाविशेषात् ॥ ६ ॥

न वा प्रकरणभेदात्परोरणीयत्वादिवत् ॥ ७ ॥

संज्ञातश्चेत्तदुक्तमस्ति तु तदपि ॥ ८ ॥

४ व्याप्त्यधिकरणम् । सू. ९

व्याप्तेश्च समञ्जसम् ॥ ९ ॥

५ सर्वाभेदाधिकरणम् । सू. १०

सर्वाभेदादन्यत्रेमे ॥ १० ॥

६ आनन्दाद्यधिकरणम् । सू. ११-१३

आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य ॥ ११ ॥

प्रियशिरस्त्वाद्यप्राप्तिरुपचयापचयौ हि भेदे  
॥ १२ ॥

इतरे त्वर्थसामान्यात् ॥ १३ ॥

७ आध्यानाधिकरणम् । सू. १४-१५

आध्यानाय प्रयोजनाभावात् ॥ १४ ॥

आत्मशब्दाच्च ॥ १५ ॥

८ आत्मगृहीत्यधिकरणम् । सू. १६-१७

आत्मगृहीतिरितरवदुत्तरात् ॥ १६ ॥

अन्वयादिति चेत्स्यादवधारणात् ॥ १७ ॥

९ कार्याख्यानाधिकरणम् । सू. १८

कार्याख्यानादपूर्वकम् ॥ १८ ॥

१० समानाधिकरणम् । सू. १९

समान एवं चाभेदात् ॥ १९ ॥

११ संबन्धाधिकरणम् । सू. २०-२२

संबन्धादेवमन्यत्रापि ॥ २० ॥

न वा विशेषात् ॥ २१ ॥

दर्शयति च ॥ २२ ॥

१२ संभृत्यधिकरणम् । सू. २३

संभृतिद्युव्याप्त्यपि चातः ॥ २३ ॥

१३ पुरुषाद्यधिकरणम् । सू. २४

पुरुषविद्यायामिव चेतरेषामनाम्नानात् ॥ २४ ॥

१४ वेधाद्यधिकरणम् । सू. २५

वेधाद्यर्थभेदात् ॥ २५ ॥

१५ हान्यधिकरणम् । सू. २६

हानौ तूपायनशब्दरोषत्वात्कुशाच्छन्दस्तु-

पगानवत्तदुक्तम् ॥ २६ ॥

१६ सांपरायाधिकरणम् । सू. २७-२८

सांपराये तर्तव्याभावात्तथा हान्ये ॥ २७ ॥

छन्दत उभयाविरोधात् ॥ २८ ॥

१७ गतेरर्थवत्त्वाधिकरणम् । सू. २९-३०

गतेरर्थवत्त्वमुभयथा हि विरोधः ॥ २९ ॥

उपपन्नस्तल्लक्षणार्थोपलब्धेर्लोकवत् ॥ ३० ॥

१८ अनियमाधिकरणम् । सू. ३१

अनियमः सर्वासामविरोधः शब्दानुमाना-

भ्याम् ॥ ३१ ॥

१९ यावदधिकाराधिकरणम् । सू. ३२

यावदधिकारमवस्थितिराधिकारिकाणाम्

॥ ३२ ॥

२० अक्षरध्यधिकरणम् । सू. ३३

अक्षरधियां त्वविरोधः सामान्यतद्भावाभ्या-

मौपसदवत्तदुक्तम् ॥ ३३ ॥

२१ इयदधिकरणम् । सू. ३४

इयदामननात् ॥ ३४ ॥

२२ अन्तराधिकरणम् । सू. ३५-३६  
 अन्तरा भूतग्रामवत्स्वात्मनः ॥ ३५ ॥  
 अन्यथा भेदानुपपत्तिरिति चेन्नोपदेशान्तरवत्  
 ॥ ३६ ॥  
 २३ व्यतिहाराधिकरणम् । सू. ३७  
 व्यतिहारो विशिंपन्ति हीतरवत् ॥ ३७ ॥  
 २४ सत्याद्यधिकरणम् । सू. ३८  
 सैव हि सत्यादयः ॥ ३८ ॥  
 २५ कामाद्यधिकाराधिकरणम् । सू. ३९  
 कामादीतरत्र तत्र चायतनादिभ्यः ॥ ३९ ॥  
 २६ आदराधिकरणम् । सू. ४०-४१  
 आदरादलोपः ॥ ४० ॥  
 उपस्थितेऽतस्तद्वचनात् ॥ ४१ ॥  
 २७ तन्निर्धारणाधिकरणम् । सू. ४२  
 तन्निर्धारणानियमस्तद्दृष्टेः पृथग्व्यप्रतिबन्धः  
 फलम् ॥ ४२ ॥  
 २८ प्रदानाधिकरणम् । सू. ४३  
 प्रदानवदेव तदुक्तम् ॥ ४३ ॥  
 २९ लिङ्गभूयस्त्वाधिकरणम् । सू. ४४-५२  
 लिङ्गभूयस्त्वात्तद्धि बलीयस्तदपि ॥ ४४ ॥  
 पूर्वविकल्पः प्रकरणात्स्यात्क्रिया मानसवत्  
 ॥ ४५ ॥  
 अतिदेशाच्च ॥ ४६ ॥  
 विद्यैव तु निर्धारणात् ॥ ४७ ॥  
 दर्शनाच्च ॥ ४८ ॥  
 श्रुत्यादिवलीयस्त्वाच्च न बाधः ॥ ४९ ॥  
 अनुबन्धादिभ्यः प्रशान्तरपृथक्त्वदृष्टश्च  
 तदुक्तम् ॥ ५० ॥  
 न सामान्यादप्युपलब्धेर्मृत्युवन्न हि लोकापत्तिः  
 ॥ ५१ ॥  
 परेण च शब्दस्य ताद्विध्ये भूयस्त्वात्त्वनुबन्धः  
 ॥ ५२ ॥  
 ३० ऐकात्म्याधिकरणम् । सू. ५३-५४  
 एक आत्मनः शरीरे भावात् ॥ ५३ ॥  
 व्यतिरेकस्तद्भावाभावित्वान्न तूपलब्धिवत्  
 ॥ ५४ ॥

३१ अङ्गावबद्धाधिकरणम् । सू. ५५-५६  
 अङ्गावबद्धास्तु न शाखास्तु हि प्रतिवेदम्  
 ॥ ५५ ॥  
 मन्त्रादिवद्वाऽविरोधः ॥ ५६ ॥  
 ३२ भूमज्यायस्त्वाधिकरणम् । सू. ५७  
 भूमजः क्रतुवज्ज्यायस्त्वं तथा हि दर्शयति  
 ॥ ५७ ॥  
 ३३ शब्दादिभेदाधिकरणम् । सू. ५८  
 नाना शब्दादिभेदात् ॥ ५८ ॥  
 ३४ विकल्पाधिकरणम् । सू. ५९  
 विकल्पोऽविशिष्टफलत्वात् ॥ ५९ ॥  
 ३५ काम्याधिकरणम् । सू. ६०  
 काम्यास्तु यथाकामं समुच्चीयेरन्न वा पूर्व-  
 हेत्वभावात् ॥ ६० ॥  
 ३६ यथाश्रयभावाधिकरणम् । सू. ६१-६६  
 अङ्गेषु यथाश्रयभावः ॥ ६१ ॥  
 शिष्टेश्च ॥ ६२ ॥  
 समाहारात् ॥ ६३ ॥  
 गुणसाधारण्यश्रुतेश्च ॥ ६४ ॥  
 न वा तत्सहभावाश्रुतेः ॥ ६५ ॥  
 दर्शनाच्च ॥ ६६ ॥  
 तृतीयाध्याये चतुर्थः पादः ।  
 १ पुरुषार्थाधिकरणम् । सू. १-१७  
 पुरुषार्थोऽतः शब्दादिति बादरायणः ॥ १ ॥  
 शेषत्वात्पुरुषार्थवादो यथाऽन्येष्विति जैमिनिः  
 ॥ २ ॥  
 आचारदर्शनात् ॥ ३ ॥  
 तच्छ्रुतेः ॥ ४ ॥  
 समन्वारम्भणात् ॥ ५ ॥  
 तद्वतो विधानात् ॥ ६ ॥  
 नियमाच्च ॥ ७ ॥  
 अधिकोपदेशात् बादरायणस्यैवं तद्दर्शनात्  
 ॥ ८ ॥



तुल्यं तु दर्शनम् ॥ ९ ॥  
 असार्वत्रिकी ॥ १० ॥  
 विभागः शतवत् ॥ ११ ॥  
 अध्ययनमात्रवतः ॥ १२ ॥  
 नाविशेषात् ॥ १३ ॥  
 स्तुतयेऽनुमतिर्वा ॥ १४ ॥  
 कामकारेण चैके ॥ १५ ॥  
 उपमर्दे च ॥ १६ ॥  
 ऊर्ध्वरेतःसु च शब्दे हि ॥ १७ ॥  
 २ परामर्शाधिकरणम् । सू. १८-२०  
 परामर्शं जैमिनिरुचोदना चापवदति हि  
 ॥ १८ ॥  
 अनुष्ठेयं ब्राह्मण्यः साम्यश्रुतेः ॥ १९ ॥  
 विधिर्वा धारणवत् ॥ २० ॥  
 ३ स्तुतिमात्राधिकरणम् । सू. २१-२२  
 स्तुतिमात्रमुपादानादिति चेन्नापूर्वत्वात्  
 ॥ २१ ॥  
 भावशब्दाच्च ॥ २२ ॥  
 ४ पारिप्लवाधिकरणम् । सू. २३-२४  
 पारिप्लवार्था इति चेन्न विशेषित्वात् ॥ २३ ॥  
 तथा चैकवाक्यतोपपन्नात् ॥ २४ ॥  
 ५ अग्नीन्धनाद्यधिकरणम् । सू. २५  
 अत एव चाग्नीन्धनाद्यनपेक्षा ॥ २५ ॥  
 ६ सर्वापेक्षाधिकरणम् । सू. २६-२७  
 सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्ववत् ॥ २६ ॥  
 शमदमाद्युपेतः स्यात्तथापि तु तद्विधेस्तदङ्ग-  
 तथा तेषामवश्यानुष्ठेयत्वात् ॥ २७ ॥  
 ७ सर्वाज्ञानुमत्यधिकरणम् । सू. २८-३१  
 सर्वाज्ञानुमतिश्च प्राणाल्यये तद्दर्शनात् ॥ २८ ॥  
 अवाधाच्च ॥ २९ ॥  
 अपि च स्मर्यते ॥ ३० ॥  
 शब्दश्चातोऽकामकारे ॥ ३१ ॥  
 ८ आश्रमकर्माधिकरणम् । सू. ३२-३५  
 विहितत्वाच्चाश्रमकर्मापि ॥ ३२ ॥

सहकारित्वेन च ॥ ३३ ॥  
 सर्वथापि त एवोभयलिङ्गात् ॥ ३४ ॥  
 अनभिभवं च दर्शयति ॥ ३५ ॥  
 ९ विधुराधिकरणम् । सू. ३६-३९  
 अन्तरा चापि तु तद्दृष्टेः ॥ ३६ ॥  
 अपि च स्मर्यते ॥ ३७ ॥  
 विशेषानुग्रहश्च ॥ ३८ ॥  
 अतस्त्वितरज्ज्यायो लिङ्गाच्च ॥ ३९ ॥  
 १० तद्भूताधिकरणम् । सू. ४०-४२  
 तद्भूतस्य तु नातद्भावो जैमिनेरपि नियमात्-  
 द्रूपाभावेभ्यः ॥ ४० ॥  
 ११ अधिकाराधिकरणम् । सू. ४१-४२  
 न चाधिकारिकमपि पतनानुमानात्तदयोगात्  
 ॥ ४१ ॥  
 उपपूर्वमपि त्वेके भावमशनवत्तदुक्तम्  
 ॥ ४२ ॥  
 १२ बहिरधिकरणम् । सू. ४३  
 बहिस्तूभयथापि स्मृतेराचाराच्च ॥ ४३ ॥  
 १३ स्वाम्यधिकरणम् । सू. ४४-४६  
 स्वामिनः फलश्रुतेरित्यात्रेयः ॥ ४४ ॥  
 आर्विज्यमित्यौडुलोमिस्तस्मै हि परिक्रीयते  
 ॥ ४५ ॥  
 श्रुतेश्च ॥ ४६ ॥  
 १४ सहकार्यन्तरविध्यधिकरणम् । सू.  
 ४७-४९  
 सहकार्यन्तरविधिः पक्षेण तृतीयं तद्वतो  
 विध्यादिवत् ॥ ४७ ॥  
 कृत्स्नभावात्तु ग्रहिणोपसंहारः ॥ ४८ ॥  
 मौनवदितरेषामप्युपदेशात् ॥ ४९ ॥  
 १५ अनाविष्काराधिकरणम् । सू. ५०  
 अनाविष्कुर्वन्नन्वयात् ॥ ५० ॥  
 १६ ऐहिकाधिकरणम् । सू. ५१  
 ऐहिकमप्यप्रस्तुतप्रतिबन्धे तद्दर्शनात् ॥ ५१ ॥

१७ मुक्तिफलाधिकरणम् । सू. ५२

एवं मुक्तिफलानियमस्तदवस्थावधृतेस्तदव-  
स्थावधृतेः ॥ ५२ ॥

### फलाध्यायश्चतुर्थः ।

#### चतुर्थोऽध्याये प्रथमः पादः ।

१ आवृत्त्यधिकरणम् । सू. १-२

आवृत्तिसकृदुपदेशात् ॥ १ ॥

लिङ्गाच्च ॥ २ ॥

२ आत्मत्वोपासनाधिकरणम् । सू. ३

आत्मेति तूपागच्छन्ति ग्राह्यन्ति च ॥ ३ ॥

३ प्रतीकाधिकरणम् । सू. ४

न प्रतीके नहि सः ॥ ४ ॥

४ ब्रह्मदृष्ट्याधिकरणम् । सू. ५

ब्रह्मदृष्टिरुत्कर्षात् ॥ ५ ॥

५ आदित्यादिमत्यधिकरणम् । सू. ६

आदित्यादिमतयश्चाङ्ग उपपत्तेः ॥ ६ ॥

६ आसीनाधिकरणम् । सू. ७-१०

आसीनः संभवात् ॥ ७ ॥

ध्यानाच्च ॥ ८ ॥

अचलत्वं चापेक्ष्य ॥ ९ ॥

स्मरन्ति च ॥ १० ॥

७ एकाग्रताधिकरणम् । सू. ११

यत्रैकाग्रता तत्राविशेषात् ॥ ११ ॥

८ आ प्रायणाधिकरणम् । सू. १२

आ प्रायणात्तत्रापि हि दृष्टम् ॥ १२ ॥

९ तदधिगमाधिकरणम् । सू. १३

तदधिगम उत्तरपूर्वाघयोरश्लेषविनाशौ  
तद्व्यपदेशात् ॥ १३ ॥

१० इतरासंश्लेषाधिकरणम् । सू. १४

इतरस्याप्येवमसंश्लेषः पाते तु ॥ १४ ॥

११ अनारब्धाधिकरणम् । सू. १५

अनारब्धकार्ये एव तु पूर्वे तदवधेः ॥ १५ ॥

१२ अग्निहोत्राद्यधिकरणम् । सू. १६-१७

अग्निहोत्रादि तु तत्कार्यायैव तद्दर्शनात्  
॥ १६ ॥

अतोऽन्यापि ह्येकेषामुभयोः ॥ १७ ॥

१३ विद्याज्ञानसाधनाधिकरणम् । सू. १८

यदेव विद्ययेति हि ॥ १८ ॥

१४ इतरक्षपणाधिकरणम् । सू. १९

भोगेन त्वितरे क्षपयित्वा संपद्यते ॥ १९ ॥

#### चतुर्थोऽध्याये द्वितीयः पादः ।

१ वागधिकरणम् । सू. १-२

वाङ्मनसि दर्शनाच्छब्दाच्च ॥ १ ॥

अत एव च सर्वाण्यनु ॥ २ ॥

२ मनोधिकरणम् । सू. ३

तन्मनः प्राण उत्तरात् ॥ ३ ॥

३ अध्यक्षाधिकरणम् । सू. ४-६

सोऽध्यक्षे तदुपगमादिभ्यः ॥ ४ ॥

भूतेषु तच्छ्रुतेः ॥ ५ ॥

नैकस्मिन्दर्शयतो हि ॥ ६ ॥

४ आसृत्युपक्रमाधिकरणम् । सू. ७

समाना चासृत्युपक्रमादमृतत्वं चानुपोष्य  
॥ ७ ॥

५ संसारव्यपदेशाधिकरणम् । सू. ८-११

तदाऽऽपीतेः संसारव्यपदेशात् ॥ ८ ॥

सूक्ष्मं प्रमाणतश्च तथोपलब्धेः ॥ ९ ॥

नोपमर्देनातः ॥ १० ॥

अस्यैव चोपपत्तेरेष ऊष्मा ॥ ११ ॥

६ प्रतिषेधाधिकरणम् । सू. १३-१४

प्रतिषेधादिति चेन्न शरीरात् ॥ १२ ॥

स्पष्टो ह्येकेषाम् ॥ १३ ॥

स्मर्यते च ॥ १४ ॥

७ वागादिलयाधिकरणम् । सू. १५

तानि परे तथा ह्याह ॥ १५ ॥

८ अविभागाधिकरणम् । सू. १६

अविभागो वचनात् ॥ १६ ॥

९ तदोक्तोऽधिकरणम् । सू. १७

तदोक्तोऽग्रज्वलनं तत्प्रकाशितद्वारो विद्या-  
सामर्थ्यात्तच्छेषगत्यनुस्मृतियोगाच्च  
हार्दानुगृहीताः शताधिकया ॥ १७ ॥

१० रश्म्यधिकरणम् । सू. १८-१९

रश्म्यनुसारी ॥ १८ ॥

निशि नेति चेन्न संबन्धस्य यावद्देहभावित्वा-  
दर्शयति च ॥ १९ ॥

११ दक्षिणायनाधिकरणम् । सू. २०-२१

अतश्चायनेऽपि दक्षिणे ॥ २० ॥

योगिनः प्रति च स्मर्यते स्मार्ते चैते ॥ २१ ॥

**चतुर्थाध्याये तृतीयः पादः ।**

१ अर्चिराद्यधिकरणम् । सू. १

अर्चिरादिना तत्प्रथितेः ॥ १ ॥

२ वाय्वधिकरणम् । सू. २

वायुमन्दादविशेषविशेषाभ्याम् ॥ २ ॥

३ तडिदधिकरणम् । सू. ३

तडितोऽधि वरुणः संबन्धात् ॥ ३ ॥

४ आतिवाहिकाधिकरणम् । सू. ४-६

आतिवाहिकास्तलिङ्गात् ॥ ४ ॥

उभयव्यामोहात्तत्सिद्धेः ॥ ५ ॥

वैद्युतेनैव ततस्तच्छ्रुतेः ॥ ६ ॥

५ कार्याधिकरणम् । सू. ७-१४

कार्ये बादरिरस्य गत्युपपत्तेः ॥ ७ ॥

विशेषितत्वाच्च ॥ ८ ॥

सामीप्यात्तु तद्व्यपदेशः ॥ ९ ॥

कार्यात्यये तदध्यक्षेण सहातः परमभिधानात्  
॥ १० ॥

स्मृतेश्च ॥ ११ ॥

परं जैमिनिर्मुख्यत्वात् ॥ १२ ॥

दर्शनाच्च ॥ १३ ॥

न च कार्ये प्रतिपत्त्यभिसंधिः ॥ १४ ॥

६ अप्रतीकालम्बनाधिकरणम् । सू.  
१५-१६

अप्रतीकालम्बनान्नयतीति बादरायण

उभयथाऽदोषात्तत्क्रतुश्च ॥ १५ ॥

विशेषं च दर्शयति ॥ १६ ॥

**चतुर्थाध्याये चतुर्थः पादः ।**

१ संपद्याविर्भावाधिकरणम् । सू. १-३

संपद्याविर्भावः स्वेनशब्दात् ॥ १ ॥

मुक्तः प्रतिज्ञानात् ॥ २ ॥

आत्मा प्रकरणात् ॥ ३ ॥

२ अविभागेन दृष्टत्वाधिकरणम् । सू. ४

अविभागेन दृष्टत्वात् ॥ ४ ॥

३ ब्राह्माधिकरणम् । सू. ५-७

ब्राह्मेण जैमिनिरुपन्यासादिभ्यः ॥ ५ ॥

चितितन्मात्रेण तदात्मकत्वादित्यौडुलोमिः  
॥ ६ ॥

एवमप्युपन्यासात्पूर्वभावादविरोधं  
बादरायणः ॥ ७ ॥

४ संकल्पाधिकरणम् । सू. ८-९

संकल्पादेव तु तच्छ्रुतेः ॥ ८ ॥

अत एव चानन्याधिपतिः ॥ ९ ॥

५ अभावाधिकरणम् । सू. १०-११

अभावं बादरिराह ह्येवम् ॥ १० ॥

भावं जैमिनिर्विकल्पात्मननात् ॥ ११ ॥

द्वादशाहवदुभयविधं ब्राह्मणोऽतः ॥ १२ ॥

तन्वभावे संध्यावदुपपत्तेः ॥ १३ ॥

भावे जाग्रद्वत् ॥ १४ ॥

६ प्रदीपाधिकरणम् । सू. १५-१६

प्रदीपवदवेशस्तथा हि दर्शयति ॥ १५ ॥

स्वाप्ययसंपत्त्योरन्यतरापेक्षमाविष्कृतं हि

॥ १६ ॥

७ जगद्धापाराधिकरणम् । सू. १७-२२

जगद्धापारवर्जं प्रकरणादसंनिहितत्वाच्च

॥ १७ ॥

प्रत्यक्षोपदेशादिति चेन्नाधिकारिकमण्डल-

स्थोक्तेः ॥ १८ ॥

विकारावर्ति च तथा हि स्थितिमाह ॥ १९ ॥

दर्शयतश्चैवं प्रत्यक्षानुमाने ॥ २० ॥

भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गाच्च ॥ २१ ॥

अनावृत्तिः शब्दादनावृत्तिः शब्दात् ॥ २२ ॥







*Continued from the back*

what argument, so as to prevent any such confusion arising. The several topics (Adhikaraṇās) are transliterated and given in their appropriate places in the Text. For easy reference the numbers of the Adhyāya, Pāda, and the Sūtra are given at the top of each page, and this would be found to be very convenient.

In his Preface the author has traced the development of Philosophic thought from the earliest Vedic times right up to the times of Shankarāchārya and his followers viz. the authors of the various glosses on his commentary, and has also noticed several interesting questions raised and comments made by later European and Indian scholars, and has offered his own brief comments on them. He has also taken a survey of the progress achieved by modern Science, which has now dis-established some of its own earlier theories, and has indicated how the latest researches in Scientific Knowledge tend to confirm the Advaita Vedānta tenets of 'Brahma' as the one and the only one Reality (Satya) and of the theory of Illusion and Unreality (Māyā or Vivarta) as being at once the cause and the explanation of the apparent phenomenal world (Jagat) as being Unreal (Mithyā).



**T**HIS volume gives English translation of Brahma-Sūtra-Shāṅkara-Bhāṣhya' (Bādarāyaṇās Brahma-Sutrās or Vedānta-Sutrās and Shankarāchāryā's famous commentary on them) by Shri V. M. Apte, an Advocate from Dhulia. Even in the midst of his professional career, he succumbed to the allure of Indian Philosophy particularly Shankarāchāryā's Philosophy of Monism (Advaita) and here is the result of his study and labour of several years.

The author has made available to the reader, an English translation of the original text in Sanskrit, as far as possible, word by word, in easy understandable English. While giving only a few important foot-notes and avoiding overburdening the book with many lengthy and abstruse notes, he has at the same time given short running notes in brackets, giving short explanations, clarifying or amplifying the meaning of the text, and whenever necessary indicating the manner in which he has translated a particular Sanskrit word in the text, by giving such Sanskrit word in brackets.

Shankarāchārya has in his commentary (Bhāṣhya) adopted the traditional Dialectic method of logical disputations in which an imaginary opponent of Vedānta raises objections by using the word 'But' (Nanu) in the beginning of his statement of objections (Purvapaksha) and the commentator (Bhāṣhyakāra) then refutes the arguments of the opponent and establishes his conclusion (Uttarapaksha or Siddhānta). Some times a third person intervenes in the discussion and is also similarly dealt with. This often causes confusion in the mind of the reader. The author has in such places clearly indicated as to who is advancing

*Continued on back flap*